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TORTS AND DAMAGES

G.R. No. L-20442 October 4, 1971

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representation dependents or nearest of kin against the

employer under the Civil Code or other laws, because of
said injury ..." .

CIRIACO ROBLES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. YAP

WING, defendant-appellee.

In the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler Corporation, et

al., 98 Phil. 856, in sustaining the order of the trial court
dismissing an employee's claim for damages against the
employer for injuries suffered in an accident which
happened in the course of his employment this Court said
that "the Legislature evidently deemed it best, in the
interest of expediency and uniformity, that all claims of
workmen against their employees for damages due to
accidents suffered in the course of employment shall be
investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission subject to the appeal in the
law provided." This was reiterated in at least two
subsequent cases, namely, Vda. de Mallari vs. National
Development Company, G.R. No. L-17914, October 31,
1962; and Hudencial vs. S. P. Marcelo & Co., Inc., G.R. No.
L-23969, February 27, 1971.

Appeal in forma pauperis taken by the plaintiff from the

order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
September 12, 1962, dismissing the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The allegations of the complaint, which for purposes of
the motion to dismiss were deemed admitted, are as
follows: that the plaintiff was employee by defendant in its
contracting business; that on July 6, 1961 at about 1:30
p.m. while plaintiff was dismantling lumber brace in the
construction of a bodega which defendant undertook to
construct, defendant negligently failed to provide safety
measures within the construction premises, as a result of
which a piece of lumber fell and hit plaintiff on the head,
causing him physical injuries; that immediately thereafter
plaintiff was taken to a medical clinic, where he remained
unconscious for several hours; that defendant defrayed
Plaintiff's medical expenses; that since then plaintiff was
unable to work, thereby losing his expected earning at an
average of P39.00 a week or a total of P2,340.00, more or
less, up to the filing of the complaint; that because of the
physical injuries sustained by plaintiff due to defendant's
negligence, he suffered mental anguish, anxiety, fright
and pain; and that because he was compelled to hire the
services of a lawyer he is entitled to recover attorney's
fees.

We are not unmindful of our rulings in the class of Pacaa

vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 32 SCRA 442, and Valencia vs.
Manila Yacht Club, Inc., G.R. No. L-27346, June 30, 1969. In
the Pacaa case the plaintiff had several other money
claims such as for separation pay, sick leave pay, vacation
leave pay, overtime pay, moral damages and attorney's
fees aside from permanent disability compensation
benefits. In reversing the trial court's order of dismissal,
we held that the plaintiff had the choice of instituting the
action in the regular courts under Article 1711 of the Civil
Code. We said:

In his answer defendant alleged by way of affirmative

defense that plaintiff's claim is one for disability resulting
from an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment and thus pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Upon
defendant's motion for a preliminary hearing on the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the lower court (which was
actually a motion to dismiss) and after plaintiff had filed
its opposition thereto, the lower court dismissed plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff moved to reconsider alleging that his
claim was for actual damages under Articles 1711 and
1712 of the New Civil Code and not a claim for
compensation under Act No. 3428, otherwise known as
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The motion to
reconsider was denied; hence, this appeal.

... Of course, the plaintiff thus foregoes the far more

expeditious procedures for recovery as provided in the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which practically foreclose
the employer from controverting the claim upon failure to
file a report of disability with notice of controversion
(section 45) and the liberal presumptions in favor of the
employees, inter alia, that the claim comes within the
provision of the Act (section 44). But there may be cases
where, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff is constrained to
invoke the provision of Article 1711 of the Civil Code and
files his suit in the regular courts due to his prosecution of
various other money claims, such as separation pay,
accrued sick and vacation leave pay, and overtime pay
during his employment, which do not fall under the
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The lone issue before us for resolution is whether or not

the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The validity of upholding the lower court's jurisdiction to

hear and decide the various claims of plaintiff in the single
case filed by him may readily be seen from the tenuous
jurisdictional arguments raised by defendant, where it
would have the plaintiff shuttle to four different courts and
agencies to prosecute his claims, namely, Workmen's
Compensation Commission and Social Security
Commission for disability compensation benefits and sick
leave pay, the Court of Industrial Relations for overtime
pay and the Municipal Court for separation pay. Courts do
not look with favor on split jurisdiction and piecemeal
litigation. ... (emphasis supplied) .

Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 772 (amending

Act No. 3428), which took effect on June 20, 1952, claims
for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
were cognizable by the regular courts but since then, as
provided in Section 46 therefore as amended, "the
Workmen's Compensation Commission shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation
under the Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the
Supreme court ..." In relation to this, Section 5 of the Act
provides that "the rights and remedies granted by this Act
to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and,
remedies accruing to an employee, his personal

It must be noted that in the above case we upheld the

jurisdiction of the trial court in view of the plaintiff's
various other claims which did not fall under the purview

TORTS AND DAMAGES

of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and also to avoid

multiplicity of suits. Obviously that case does not apply to
the one at bar.

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exclusive, as well as by virtue of Article 2196 of the Civil

Code itself, which provides: .
ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice
to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in
this Code. Compensation for workmen and other
employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated
by special laws ... (emphasis supplied) .

Similarly, the Valencia ruling is not applicable here. In that

case the only issue was "whether claimant's acceptance
from the Social Security System of sickness and disability
benefits, which are available to him as a member of the
System, precludes further collection from the employer of
compensation allowed under the law (Workmen's
Compensation Act) for the same sickness or injury." We
there said:

Our Workmen's Compensation Act is patterned after the

statutes of Hawaii, New York and Minnesota (Labor
Standards and Welfare Legislation by Fernandez and
Quiazon, Vol. 2, p. 401). American decisions and
authorities are therefore relevant in the interpretation of
our local law on the subject, thus:

... To deny payment of social security benefits because the

death or injury or confinement is compensable under the
Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive the
employees members of the System of the statutory
benefits bought and paid for by them, since they
contribute their money to the general common fund out of
which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits
provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues
to the employees concerned due to the hazards involved
in their employment and is made a burden on the
employment itself. However, social security benefits are
paid to the System's members, by reason of their
membership therein for which they contribute their money
to a general common fund.

The Compensation remedy is exclusive of all other

remedies for the same injury, if the injury falls within the
coverage formula of the act. If it does not, as in the case
where occupational diseases are deemed omitted because
not within the concept of accidental injury, the
compensation act does not disturb any existing remedy.
However, if the injury itself comes within the coverage
formula, common-law action is barred although the
particular element of damage is not compensated for, as
in the case of disfigurement in some states, impotency, or
pain and suffering. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law, Vol. 2, p. 135).

It may be added that whereas social security benefits are

intended to provide insurance or protection against the
hazards or risks for which they are established, e.g.,
disability sickness, old age or death, irrespective of
whether they arose from or in the course of the
employment or not, the compensation receivable under
the Workmen's Compensation law is in the nature of
indemnity for the injury or damage suffered by the
employee or his dependents on account of the
employment.

The Workmen's Compensation Act supersedes commonlaw redress in tort and substitutes a strictly statutory
formula for paying compensation without regard to the
fault of the employer or the contributory negligence or
assumption of risk of the employee. (Dudley vs. Victor
Lynn Lines, Inc. (N.J.)161 A. (2) 479 (1960) ).
The Workmen's Compensation Act are sui generis and
create rights, remedies and procedure which are
exclusive; (that) they are in derogation of the common law
and are not controlled or affected by our rules of
procedure in suits at law or actions in equity, except as
provided therein. (Hudson v. Herschback Drilling Co., 46
N.M. 330, 128 P. (2) 1044 (1942) ).

The Workmen's Compensation Act provides for two

exceptions. The first is in section 6, which gives the
injured employee the option to claim compensation
benefits against his employer under the Act or to sue the
third person who caused the injury for damages in the
regular courts. The other exception is in Section 42, which
refers to small private employers, in which case claims for
compensation by reason of accident or injury shall be
governed by the provisions of Act No. 1874 or by those of
the Civil Code. The instant case does not fall under any of
the exceptions.

The Workmen's Compensation statute regulates the

relation not between the workmen and the world at large,
but between the workman and employer. ... As between
them the remedies provided therein are exclusive.
(Caulfield vs. Elmhurst Contracting Co., A.D. 53 N.Y.S.
(2) 25 (1945) ).
The Workmen's Compensation Act which gives exclusive
rights and remedies, was enacted to exclude common law
actions for injury or death caused by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment. The legislature
intended to leave unimpaired common law right of action
for damages for injury or death not so arising; in other
words to the extent that the field is not touched by the
act, the employee's common law right of action is
preserved inviolate. (Griffith v. Raven Red, etc., Coal.,
Va. , 20 S.E. (2) 530, 1. c. 533 (1942) ).

Appellant contends that his claim is not for compensation

under the Workmen's Corporation Law but one for
damages under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. The
contention is without merit. Article 1711 provides for the
payment by employers of compensation for the death of
or injuries to their employees as well as for illness or
disease arising out of and in the course of the
employment, which provision is essentially the same as
that of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
fact that Article 1711 of the Civil Code appears to cover
appellant's claim is not decisive of the question: it should
still be prosecuted in accordance with the Workmen's
Compensation Act by virtue of Section 5 thereof which
makes the rights and remedies granted by said Act

To say that compensation as provided for in Article 1711

of the Civil Code is recoverable by action in the ordinary
courts, at the option of the claimant, just because the

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Workmen's Compensation Act is not expressly invoked is

to ignore the fact that the grounds upon which
compensation may be claimed are practically identical in
both statutes and to ignore likewise the exclusive
character of "the rights and remedies granted by this Act"
as stated in Section 6 thereof, as well as the provision of
Article 2196 of the Civil Code.

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appliances, or take other precautions for the prevention of

accident or occupational disease." Secondly, the alleged
negligence was not a quasi-delict inasmuch as there was a
pre-existing contractual relation of employer and
employee between the parties (Art. 2176, Civil Code); and
in breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered
only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged
in the complaint here. In any event, whether or not such
an allegation, in relation to the breach of a contract of
employment by the employer, resulting in injury to an
employee or laborer, would justify a claim for moral
damages and place it within the jurisdiction of ordinary
courts is a question which we do not decide in this case,
not being the issue involved.

The suggestion has been made that there is in this case a

claim for moral damages suffered by the plaintiff as a
result of the negligence of the defendant and that such
damages do not come within the purview of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. It should be pointed out
first, that the negligence alleged in the complaint consists
of the defendant's failure "to provide safety measures
within the construction premises," the nature of which
negligence is precisely covered by Section 4-A of the
same Act, which makes the employer liable to pay
additional compensation (of 50%) to the claimantemployee for failure "to install and maintain safety

In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is

affirmed, without costs. Dizon, Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.