KATZ v.

US
FACTS:

Katz: was convicted in the district court of Southern California under an eightcount indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone from LA to Boston, in violation of a federal statute (he was
transmitting gambling information)
The court allowed the government to submit evidence comprised of
petitioners telephone conversations overheard by the FBI (in transmitting the
wager information, Katz would use public telephones, so the FBI agents in
this case, placed a recording device on top of the telephone booth in which
Katz was in, doing his dirty work)
Contending that such evidence was inadmissible, petitioner went to the court
of appeals, such court however quashed his motion arguing that what the FBI
agents did was not a violation of the 4 th amendment as, "[t]here was no
physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]"

ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO

W/N A TELEPHONE BOOTH IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED

AREA? YES
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from
which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he
was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained
outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so
simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.
W/N THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENTS IN THIS CASE CANNOT BE
TESTED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE THEY EMPLOYED A
SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUE WHICH DID NOT CONSTITUTE ANY
PHYSICAL PENETRATION OF THE TELEPHONE BOOTH (ref: trespass
doctrine)? (THE RECORDING DEVICE WAS STRATEGICALLY PLACED ON
TOP OF THE BOOTH SO SA LABAS DAW KASI) NO
The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard
without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law." It then
becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. The
Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance
W/N THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONDUCTED IN THIS CASE COMPLIED
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS? NO

"Over and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. And that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.
Although the agents in this case acted with restraint. The fact remains that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.
Omission of such authorization bypasses the safeguards provided by an
objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far
less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search,
too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight
judgment
TERRY V. OHIO
The rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been
recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.
There is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails (FACTS
SHOULD BE MEASURED AGAINST OBJECTIVE STANDARDS-NEUTRAL SCRUTINY).

FACTS:

Petitioner was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon (2 REVOLVERS AND

A NUMBER OF BULLETS) and was sentenced to three years imprisonment
The police, Officer McFadden (39 years worth of experience as policeman; 35
years as detective) who accosted Terry and co. testified that while he was on
patrol, he saw the accused standing with another individual at the corner of
the street, behaving oddly:
He saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on Huron Road,
past some stores. The man paused for a moment and looked in a store window,
then walked on a short distance, turned around and walked back toward the
corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He rejoined his
companion at the corner, and the two conferred briefly. Then the second man went
through the same series of motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the
same window, walking on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store
window again, and returning to confer with the first man at the corner. The two
men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece -- in all,
roughly a dozen trips. At one point, while the two were standing together on the
corner, a third man approached them and engaged them briefly in conversation.
This man then left the two others and walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and
Terry resumed their measured pacing, peering, and conferring. After this had gone

on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men walked off together, heading west on Euclid
Avenue, following the path taken earlier by the third man.
By this time, Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. He testified
that, after observing their elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of
the store window on Huron Road, he suspected the two men of "casing a job, a
stick-up," and that he considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate
further. He added that he feared "they may have a gun."

This compelled the officer to act; he approached them, and subjected them to
what is commonly known as a stop and frisk through such process, the
officer recovered from the accused the aforementioned weapons
The court admitted the recovered items as evidence; the accused and co.
were subsequently convicted; CA affirmed trial courts jurisdiction
Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUES
MAIN ISSUE: W/N THE ADMISSION OF THE REVOLVERS IN EVIDENNCE
VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
SUB ISSUES: (a) W/N A STOP AND FRISK IS THE SAME AS A SEARCH AND
SEIZURE;
(b) W/N IT IS ALWAYS REASONABLE FOR A POLICEMAN TO SEIZE A
PERSON AND SUBJECT HIM TO A LIMITED SEARCH FOR WEAPONS UNLESS
THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST
HOLDING/RATIO
ANSWERS TO SUB ISSUES:
(a)

YES. The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between a
"stop" and an "arrest," or "seizure" of the person, and between a "frisk"
and a "search," is twofold. It seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny
the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and the citizen.
And, by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and
regulation under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of
constitutional regulation. In this case, there can be no question, then, that
Officer McFadden "seized" petitioner and subjected him to a "search"
when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his
clothing.

(b)

NOT ALWAYS. The nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights
which must be accepted if police officers are to be conceded the right to
search for weapons in situations where probable cause to arrest for crime
is lacking. Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal
security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps
humiliating experience. In the case at bar, the Court, after its evaluation,
concluded that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain
that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man, in the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given
not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his experience.

ANSWER TO THE MAIN ISSUE:

YES. The revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him.
At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden
had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it
was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The
policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery
of the particular items which he sought.
PINEDA-NG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation.
Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute
certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence which
would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction it is enough that there is a

reasonable belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.

FACTS

December 19, 2007: an Information for Qualified Theft was filed against: (1)
Richard Francisco), Branch Manager of private complainant Philippine
Business Bank located in Dolores, City of San Fernando, Pampanga; (2)
Mailada Marilag-Aquino; and (3) petitioner Ma. Imelda Pineda-Ng

Aquino was said to have drawn seven checks in favor of petitioner

Petitioner then submitted such checks to the bank by virtue of her Bill
Purchase Accommodation facility through Francisco

Francisco approved the payment of such checks (such act was not part of his
job description)

Petitioner filed a motion for recon with the City Prosecutor; it was denied
because the case was already filed with the RTC

RTC: case dismissed; no probable cause

The bank filed for a motion for recon; RTC reverses first ruling

Petitioner goes to the CA; CA affirms RTC decision

Hence, this petition

ISSUE
W/N THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT

Petitioners contentions: there was no evidence sufficient to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime was committed; he was a bank client, therefore
she could not be liable for qualified theft; there is no such thing as a
conspiracy to commit qualified theft; RTC judge merely relied in the City
Prosecutors findings and recommendation

HOLDING/RATIO

NO. The general rule is that the SC cannot review factual findings of the trial court
which include the determination of probable cause. Although there are exceptions,
the facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the exception.
Furthermore, the Court opined that it respects the CAs findings, as well as that of
the City Prosecutors.
NALA V. BARROSO
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures
is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative
or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing
and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the person and
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

FACTS:

June 25, 2001: PO3 Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search
Nala, who was referred to in the application as Romulo Nala alia Long

The application was filed in connection with petitioners alleged illegal

possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9mm pistol in violation of RA
8294

On the same day, respondent judge, after examining Alcoser and his witness
Nalagon, issues a search and seizure warrant

July 4, 2001; 6:30 AM: Alcoser + other policemen searched petitioners

house, and therein, they allegedly seized several firearms

July 5, 2001: criminal cases then were filed against petitioner before the
MCTC of Kitaotao, Bukidnon

August 8, 2001: petitioner filed an omnibus motion, seeking to quash the

issued warrant, and declare the seized items as inadmissible evidence; such
motion was denied (binalik though yung air rifle niya)
-

Respondent judge averred that the warrant was issued upon probable
cause and that he was sufficiently identified (Bernard kasi name niya, not
Romulo)

Nala filed a motion for recon; it was also denied

Hence, this petition (procedurally infirm, but the SC said, ok lang)

ISSUES
1. W/N petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
2. W/N there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant
against petitioner?
3. W/N the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioners residence are
admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms were not listed
in the search and seizure warrant?
HOLDING/RATIO

1. YES. The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first
name of petitioner, which is "Bernard" and not "Romulo" or "Rumolo", does
not invalidate the warrant because the additional description "alias Lolong
Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon"
sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner.
What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which,
as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the
officer to identify the accused without difficulty.
2. NO. In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in
connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the elements of

which are (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possess the same. Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms
would therefore be such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession
of a firearm and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the
same. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and testimony of witness
Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers application for the
issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no
license to possess a firearm. While Alcoser testified before the respondent
judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this
does not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief" because
neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification from the
appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a
firearm. This could have been the best evidence obtainable to prove that
petitioner had no license to possess firearms and ammunitions, but the police
officers failed to present the same. Regrettably, even the examination
conducted by the respondent judge on Nalagon and Alcoser fell short of the
required probing and exhaustive inquiry for the determination of the
existence of probable cause.

3. NO. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid.
In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2)
absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the
petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioners premises
had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol
and bullets." The plain view doctrine also finds no application in the instant
case because: 1.) the officers had no justification to search Nalas house; and
2.) the officers failed to discharge the burden of proving that subject articles
were inadvertently found in petitioners house.