01 - PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v.

ROMULO
Monique Lees digest)
May 27, 2004 Callejo Sr., J.

Digest by: Kathleen Villamin (sourced from

Topic: Overview, Local Governments as part of the Executive Branch

General Facts:
In 1998, then Pres. Estrada issued EO 48 entitled Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization in order to facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the
functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the
Local Government Code (LGC). Later, the program was renamed as the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF).
For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee
based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG. From 1999 onwards, the
corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA). The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the IRRs governing
equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to LGUs.
In the GAA 1999, of the P96 billion allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes, P5
billion shall be earmarked for the LGSEF for the funding requirements of the LGUs provided that these
funds will be released subject to the implementing rules and regulations that may be prescribed by the
Oversight Committee. The Oversight Committee also passed several resolutions which contained
guidelines that the LGUs must follow in order for them to be eligible for funding under the LGSEF (i.e. the
LGUs had to identify projects and submit project proposals that fell under the proposed criteria in the said
resolutions in order to get a share in the LGSEF). Similarly, in the GAA 2000 and GAA 2001, P5 billion was
earmarked for the LGSEF.
As petitioner, Batangas Governor Mandanas assailed the provisos in the 1999, 2000 and 2001 GAAs and
the corresponding resolutions, insofar as they each earmarked the amount of P5 billion of the IRA for the
LGSEF, as unconstitutional and void. It was also argued that imposed conditions for the release of such
funds were likewise unconstitutional and void.
Petitioners Arguments:
1. Violation of Automatic Release of Funds. The provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions
violate the Constitution and the LGC. Art. X Sec. 6 of the Constitution mandates that the just share of
the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Secs. 18 and 286 of the LGC of 1991 provides that
the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of
further action. The use of the word "shall" must be given compulsory meaning.
2. Anathema to Local Autonomy. To vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the
distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the
principle of local autonomy. (Example: In 1991, the release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the
Oversight Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines were issued therefor.)
Furthermore, the possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs
would result in the diminution of the latters share in the IRA.
3. Illegal Amendment to the LGC on Percentage Sharing among LGUs. The Oversight Committee
resolutions also made an improper amendment to Sec. 285 of the LGC on the percentage sharing of the
IRA among the LGUs. Said resolutions allocate the IRA as follows: Provinces - 40%, Cities - 20%,
Municipalities - 40%; whereas in Sec. 285 of the LGC, it provides that: Provinces - 23%, Cities - 23%,
Municipalities - 34%, and Barangays - 20%. Petitioner further point out that there was an instance when
Exec. Sec. Romulo endorsed to DBM Sec. Boncodin the release of funds from the LGSEF to certain LGUs
In accordance to with the handwritten instructions of President Arroyo. Thus, the LGUs are at a loss
as to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated.
Respondents Arguments:
1. LGU Shares Not Solely Determined by the LGC. The provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001
and the assailed resolutions by the Oversight Committee are not unconstitutional because Sec. 6 Art. X
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2.

3.
4.
5.

of the Constitution does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the
LGC. The Congress can also determine what should be the just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes.
LGC Percentage Sharing Not Intended to Be A Fixed Determination. Sec. 285 of the LGC, which
provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed
determination of the LGUs just share. LGUs have no vested rights in a permanent percentage as
Congress may adjust the just share of the LGUs. Sec. 285 was merely intended to be the default
share to do away with the need to determine annually by law the LGUs just share.
Petitioner has no legal standing because he has no suffered injury. In fact, the petitioners just share
has even increased.
Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact to the SC.
Petition is already moot since the IRAs for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001 have already been released
and the government is now operating under the 2003 budget

[Issue/ Held: WON the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions violate the Constitution and
the LGC / YES]
SC RULING
[Procedural Ruling: (1) Petitioner has locus standi to sue since its interest pertains to the LGUs share in the
national taxes; (2) Petition involves a significant legal issue and the nature of the present controversy
warrants the relaxation of procedural rules; (3) The SC will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.]
[Substantive Ruling: The SC cites the following as basis for its decision: Sec. 25, Article II, 1987
Constitution The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments; Sec. 2, Article X, 1987
Constitution The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

#1The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate
the constitutional precept on local autonomy:

Section 6, Article X, 1987 Constitution Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. [This provision mandates
that (1) the LGUs shall have a "just share" in the national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be
determined by law; and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the LGUs.]

The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution
and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee makes the release not automatic. The
LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy 'means a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.' Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are
subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels.
Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments 'more responsive and accountable' and 'ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision'
over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor
of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government
is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court
declared therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.

#2The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot
amend Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991

Section 284 of the LGC provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs' share in the
national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except
"in the event the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon
compliance with stringent requirements set forth. This also means that the only possible exception to
the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs' IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the
current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which
case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the
current fiscal year.

Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:
(a) Provinces Twenty-three (23%)
(b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and
(d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%).

However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion pesos LGSEF as the
assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
provided for a different sharing scheme.

The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may
amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any
amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should
be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums
of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Any provision therein which is
intended to amend another law is considered an "inappropriate provision." The category of
"inappropriate provisions" includes unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to
amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.

08 - Bara Lidasan v. Commission on Elections

Oct. 25, 1967; Sanchez
Prepared by Tobie Reynes
Facts
1. [June 18, 1966] The Chief Executive signed into law House Bill No. 1247, which became Republic Act
No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur.
a. The Act mentioned 21 barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of
Lanao del Sur that were to be separated from said municipalities and constituted into a
distinct and independent municipality to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province
of Lanao del Sur.
b. It also established Togaig (one of the 21 barrios) as the seat of the government of the
municipality.
2. However, it turned out that two of the barrios (i.e. Togaig and Madalum) are actually within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato; while ten were part of the municipality of
Parang, Province of Cotabato. These eleven provinces were not part of Lanao del Sur.
3. [Aug. 15, 1967] The COMELEC issued a resolution implementing the Act for purposes of
establishment of precincts, registration of voters, and other election purposes.
4. [Sept. 7, 1967] The Office of the President, recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the
statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.
5. [Sept. 20, 1967] COMELEC stood by its own interpretation and declared that the Act should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional.
6. Petitioner Lisadan filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition in his capacity as a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and as a qualified voter for the
1967 elections. He prays for the Act to be declared unconstitutional and for the COMELEC
resolutions to be nullified.
Petitioners arguments
1. The Constitution provides that [n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. [CONST. (1935) art. VI, 21 (1)]
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Respondents arguments
1. The change in boundaries of the two provinces (Cotabato and Lanao del Sur) is merely the
incidental legal result of the definition of the boundary of the municipality of Dianaton.
a. Thus, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away need not be expressed
in the title of the law.
2. The case of Felwa v. Salas is controlling. There, the title An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga, Apayao was assailed as the provisions thereof in reference
to the elective officials of the provinces created were not set forth in the title. The Court ruled that a
law creating provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run its affairs
something which is manifestly germane to the subject of legislation.
3. Assuming that the Act is unconstitutional for the arguments presented, it may still be salvaged with
reference to the nine barrios. The limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in Lanao
del Sur.
4. Petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the Act.
Issues/Held/Ratio
W/N the petitioner is the real party in interest YES, he is.
1. He is a qualified voter who expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio
before it was annexed to a new town is affected.
W/N Rep. Act No. 4790 is unconstitutional for having a defective title YES, it is.
1. Rationale behind the constitutional mandate relied on by petitioner:
a. The provision contains two limitations upon legislative power: (1) Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration of heterogeneous subjects under one statue; and (2) the title of the bill is to
be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
b. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment language
of such precision as to mirror all the contents and the minute details therein. It is simply to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
c. The test of sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading. Its substance rather than
its form should be considered.
2. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur creates
the impression that solely the province of Lanao de Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. However, it is a fact that the communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new town in Lanao del Sur.
a. In the Province of Lanao del Sur is thus misleading and deceptive.
3. COMELECs posture that the change in boundaries is merely an incidental legal result only
emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill.
a. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another necessarily involves
reduction of area, population, and income of the first and the corresponding increase of the
other; this is as important as the creation of a municipality.
4. Felwa v. Salas is inapplicable as the Act in question is totally different, as the statute involved here
contemplates the lumping together of barrios from two separate provinces under one statute
neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of a new municipality.
W/N Rep. Act No. 4790 is unconstitutional as a whole YES, it is.
1. The provisions of Rep. Act No. 4790 are inseparable. It is thus null and void in its entirety.
2. When the bill was presented in Congress, the totality of 21 barrios (not just 9) was in the mind of
the proponent.
a. The Explanatory Note to House Bill 1247 read: The territory is now a progressive
community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to
maintain an independent municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the
inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal
autonomy.
b. It can further be seen that Togaigone of the barrios located in Cotabatowas established
in the Act as the seat of the government of the municipality.
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c. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of
progressive community, large aggregate population, and sufficient income, the Court
cannot now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only 9 barrios with
a seat of government left to be conjectured.
Rep. Act No. 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. The COMELEC is PROHIBITED from implementing
the same for electoral purposes.
09 - Republic v City of Davao (2002) - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Doctrine: The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political
subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Therefore, LGUs are not excluded from
the coverage of PD 1586.
Facts:
The City of Davao filed an application with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), for a Certificate
of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome.
The EMB Region XI denied the application, finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally
critical area. The City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment process to secure
an Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement
System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the
construction of its project.
Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC, alleging that
1.
Its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an
environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.
2.
It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of
respondent upon submission of the required documents.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
1.
There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179
(prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with the
EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government
owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to
go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of
the environment. An LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is
deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
2.
The site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither
was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR,
through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the
requirements for its issuance.
Petitioner filed MR, which was denied. Petitioner then filed the petition for review.
Upon change of administration, respondent filed a manifestation expressing its agreement with petitioner
that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project.
While the petition has been rendered moot, the court decided to address the issue raised, for the
guidance of the implementors of the EIS law.
Petitioners arguments:
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of DENR, CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENRRegion XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENRENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Region XI
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC, which granted the writ of mandamus
and injunction in favor of the City of Davao
The proposed project was within an environmentally critical area. The City of Davao must undergo the
environmental impact assessment process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to

Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine
Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the construction of its project
Respondents arguments:
Respondent: THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City Mayor
Arguments in the RTC: Its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an
environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.
It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent
upon submission of the required documents.
(RTC in favor of Respondent) There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction
No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with
the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned
or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through
the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment.
An LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under
the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Issues:
WON LGUs are required to comply with the EIS law (YES)
WON the site was within an environmentally critical area (NO)

Ratio:
Nature of LGUs
Section 15 of the Local Government Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and
corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
It performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary.
Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of
the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.
Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.
When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an
agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the
community in the administration of local affairs.
Section 16 of the Local Government Code provides for the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right
to a balanced ecology. An LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption from the coverage of PD
1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of
the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Section 4 of PD 1586 states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political
subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local
government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
Environmentally Critical Area
The arguments, however, presuppose that a project is environmentally critical or within an
environmentally critical area. Respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have
a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is
not located in an environmentally critical area.
The trial court found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is
it an environmentally critical project.
The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates
certain government activities affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No. 1586.

Proclamation No. 2146 was later issued, proclaiming the areas and types of projects which are regarded
as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System
established under PD 1586.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub is not among the projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it
analogous to any of them. Therefore, the project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an
environmentally critical area. It is therefore the ministerial duty of the DENR to issue the Certificate of NonCoverage.

11 - Alecha v. Pasion
G.R. 164506

January 19, 2010

Corona, J.

Facts:
Petitioners Paulino M. Alecha and Precioso M. Tapitan filed before the Ombudsman
(Mindanao) a criminal complaint against respondent municipal officials of the Municipality of Midsalip,
Zamboanga del Sur for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, Section 81 of RA 7160, Section
10 of RA 6758 and RA 9137.
Petitioners averred that respondent municipal officials conspired in unlawfully adopting and actually
collecting the salaries, representation and travel allowances (RATA) and personnel economic relief
assistance (PERA) of public officials for special cities and/or first class provinces or cities, notwithstanding
the fact that the Municipality of Midsalip had no financial capacity to cover such expenditures, thus
seriously affecting the delivery of basic services within its jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against respondent municipal officials.
Petitioners Argument: Ombudsman was in grave abuse of discretion (GAD) amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed their letter-complaint against respondent municipal officials.
Petitioners cite the admission made by respondent municipal officials that they had been receiving salaries
for special cities even though the Municipality of Midsalip was a fifth-class municipality.
They also aver that the Municipality of Midsalip was financially incapable of implementing a higher
salary schedule.
Issue: WON there was GAD by the Ombudsman? NO.
SC Decision:
A fifth-class municipality like Midsalip is not absolutely prohibited from adopting a salary
schedule equivalent to that of a special city or a first- class province.
Local Budget Circular No. 64 dated January 1, 1997, in conjunction with paragraph 11 of Local
Budget No. 56, allows local government units (LGUs) lower than special cities and first-class provinces and
cities to adopt a salary scheme for special cities and first-class provinces. The adoption of a higher salary
schedule needs only to comply with the following requirements:
(1) the LGU is financially capable;
(2) the salary schedule to be adopted shall be uniformly applied to all positions in the in the LGU
concerned;
(3) the salary schedule for the special and highly urbanized cities and first class provinces and cities
shall not be higher than that being adopted by the national government;
(4) in implementing a new and higher salary schedule, the salary grade allocation of positions and
the salary steps of personnel shall be retained;
(5) the adoption of the higher salary schedule shall be subject to the budgetary and general
limitations on personal services expenditures mandated under Sections 324 and 325 of RA 7160;
(6) in the case of component cities and municipalities, the salary schedule to be adopted shall not
be higher than that of the province or city in the case of some municipalities, where they belong; and
(7) the adoption of a higher salary schedule shall not in any manner alter the existing classification
of the LGU concerned.
The Municipality of Midsalip has complied with above requirements.

Midsalip was financially capable of adopting the contested salary schedule as shown by the
following evidence:
5 years into the implementation of the higher salary schedule, the Municipality of Midsalip had
savings of P 14,913,554.68 in its bank account.
Certified statement of savings of unobligated balances for the years 2002 and 2003 issued by the
Midsalip municipal treasurer and accountant, revealed repeated surplus accounts in the amounts of
P7,709,311.64 and P 5,070,913.23 for the said years, respectively.
The certification of the Midsalip municipal accountant dated January 14, 2003 also stated that there
was no realignment or disbursement of the 20% municipal development project for personal
services expenditures from 1998 to 2002.
The Local Budget Ordinance of the Municipality of Midsalip was duly approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur and the Department of Budget and Management. The Commission on
Audit did not disallow or suspend the foregoing disbursement and/or expenditures.

12 - THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 182574; September 28, 2010; CARPIO, J.
Facts

21 December 1994 - the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No.
720-A4 allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province.
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care
Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000
23 January 1997 the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-001-1015
suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President
(OP) as provided under Administrative Order No. 1036 (AO 103), and that the premium payment
violated Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law).
President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of
P100,000.
The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued Notice of
Disallowance
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA.
COA affirmed the Provincial Auditors Notice of Disallowance
o COA: under AO 103, no government entity, including a local government unit, is exempt
from securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its
personnel.
o Further, Section 468(a)(1)(viii)11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local
Government Code of 1991 has to be harmonized with Section 1212 of RA 6758.
o The insurance benefits from Philam Care, a private insurance company, was a
duplication of the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare program which is
mandated by law.
Motion for Reconsideration: denied

Issues/Holding/Ratio
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium
paid by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees? YES. COA erred. Court
rules in favor of the Petitioners.
Petitioner:
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1. The payment of the insurance premium was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings
pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance.
2. Such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the principle of local fiscal
autonomy which includes the power of Local Government Units (LGUs) to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities.
3. While it is true that LGUs are only agents of the national government and local autonomy simply
means decentralization, it is equally true that an LGU has fiscal control over its own revenues
derived solely from its own tax base.
Respondents:
1. Although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA 6758 and their actions
are subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and applicable
auditing rules and regulations enforced by the COA
2. The grant of additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in
the present case, must have prior Presidential approval to conform with the state policy on salary
standardization for government workers.
3. (Implied) Based on Section 2 of AO 103,1 the President enjoined all heads of government offices and
agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances
and benefits without the Presidents prior approval.
Court:

1. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior
approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only
to "government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, as well as their respective governing boards." Nowhere is it indicated
in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior
approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices
and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch.
2. (SYLLABUS TOPIC) In other words, AO 103 must be observed by government offices
under the Presidents control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
which states:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
On the other hand, the President merely exercises general supervision over LGUs under Section
4, Article X of the Constitution:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
3. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay
down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the
grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the
present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.
4. Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA did not clearly establish that
the medical care benefits given by the government at the time under Presidential Decree No.
151917 were sufficient to cover the needs of government employees especially those employed
by LGUs.
5. Petitioner correctly relied on the Civil Service Commissions (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 33
(CSC MC No. 33), wherein all government offices including LGUs were directed to provide a

1 SECTION2.Allheadsofgovernmentoffices/agencies,includinggovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporations,aswell
astheirrespectivegoverningboardsareherebyenjoinedandprohibitedfromauthorizing/grantingProductivityIncentiveBenefits
oranyandallformsofallowances/benefitswithoutpriorapprovalandauthorizationviaAdministrativeOrderbytheOfficeofthe
President.
10

health program for government employees, which included hospitalization services and annual
mental, medical-physical examinations.
6. The CSC, through CSC MC No. 33, as well as the President, through AO 402 (which expanded
protection), recognized the deficiency of the state of health care and medical services
implemented at the time. Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II20 and Section 2, Article X,21
and the Local Government Code of 1991,22 we declare that the grant and release of the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioners officials and employees
were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioners Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

15 - PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 195770
17 July 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
petitioners
Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Sergio Tadeo, Nelson Alcantara
respondents
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, DSWD Secretary Corazon Soliman
summary
Petitioners assert that the budget allocation under the DSWD for its CCTP violates the
Constitution and LGC because it amounts to a recentralization of basic government
functions. SC ruled that unless an LGU is designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government even if it involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.

11

facts of the case

The DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy and issued AO 16 s. 2008 setting the IRR
for its Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. This Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP)
provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow them to meet certain human
development goals.
Under the AO, the DSWD, as lead implementing agency, institutionalized a coordinated interagency network among DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC (National Anti-Poverty Commission) and the
LGUs
Congress funded the program as follows: 2008: PHP298.5M, 2009: PHP5B, 2010: PHP10B,
2011, PHP21B.
Former Senator Pimentel, et al. challenged the disbursement of public funds and the
implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of
LGUs.
Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP is with the legislation, however, the
object to the fact that it is being implemented through a national agency like DSWD instead of the
LGUs to which the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health
care services have been devolved pursuant to Sec. 17, LGC in relation to Sec. 25, Art. II and Sec. 3,
Art. X, 1987 Const.
They assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the
manner by which services are to be delivered results in the recentralization of basic government
functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and decentralization.
issue
Whether the PHP21B budget allocation under the DSWD in the 2011 General Appropriations Act
(GAA) violates the Constitution and LGC. NEGATIVE.
ratio
In order to secure the autonomy of LGUs, Sec. 17, LGC vests in them the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities. Par. (c), however, provides an
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, programs and services. 2 Unless an LGU is
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the GAA even if it involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU
Ganzon v. CA: While it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a more
responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local autonomy does not
imply the conversion of local government units into mini-states.
Pimentel v. Aguirre: To enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners have failed to
prove the invalidity of the provisions under the 2011 GAA. The PHP21B budget allocation for an
intervention program formulated by the national government can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of LGs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. DISMISSED I tell you.

16 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU

G.R. 189041; July 31, 2012; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Digest by Reinerr Nuestro
Facts:

2 Sec. 17 par. (c), LGC. other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual GAA are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the LGU
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency

In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to RA 7160

(the Local Govt. Code of 1991) which affected the Dept. of Health along with other
government agencies.
Prior to the devolution, Dr. Castillo held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II)
of the DOH Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City and was the head of both the Basilan
Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services.
Respondent Dr. Agnes Yu, on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health
Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned at the Integrated Provincial Office in Isabela, Basilan.
Upon the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin refused to
accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to the LGU of
Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga where
she would serve the remaining four years of her public service.
In 1994, two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor
Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.
On Feb. 23, 1998, RA 8543 (An Act Converting the Basilan Provincial Hospital in the
Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital Under the Full Administrative
and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health, Increasing the Capacity to One Hundred
Beds and Appropriating Funds Therefor) was passed whereby the hospital positions previously
devolved to the LGU of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH.The Basilan
Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of
PHO II was then reclassified to Chief of Hospital II.
Dr. Yu was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified
position of Chief of Hospital II. One Dr. Domingo Remus Dayrit was appointed by DOH Secretary
Manuel Dayrit to the position of Chief of Hospital II.
Dr. Yu (Respondent in this Case) filed a letter of protest dated Sept. 30, 2003 before the Civil
Service Commission claiming that she has a vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II.
In her letter, she said that:
The Position of Chief of Hospital II to which Dr. Dayrit has been appointed is a mere
conversion from the item of Provincial Health Officer II she previously occupied.
When the former Basilan Provincial Hospital was renationalized, the position of PHO II which
she then occupied was refused renationalization by the DOH alleging that it was an LGU-created
position created by the LGU of Basilan. Hence, instead of being automatically reappointed PHO II
later to be renamed Chief of Hospital II pursuant to the Renationalization Law, she was instead
given an appointment still as a PHO II but under a coterminous status at the Center for Health and
Development, DOH which she refused to accept.
The Civil Service Commission (Petitioner in this Case) initially granted Dr. Yus protest and
revoked the appointment of Dr. Dayrit as Chief of Hospital II. It further directed DOH Secretary
Manuel Dayrit to appoint Dr. Yu to said position. But the CSC reversed itself upon MR declaring that
the position of PHO II was never devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan but was retained
by the DOH; that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position, therefore, she did
not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position created by RA 8543.
Dr. Yu moved to reconsider which was denied by the CSC. She then brought the case to the Court
of Appeals on petition for review raising the sole issue of whether the item of PHO II she
previously occupied was a devolved position or a locally created one.
The CA ruled in favor of Dr. Yu saying that she has a vested right in the Chief of Hospital II position
up to her retirement. It ratiocinated:
The CSCs ruling that there are two PHO II positions is not implausible but contrary to the
evidence at hand.
A perusal of the pleadings and attachments reveal that the PHO II position was devolved to
the Basilan Provincial Government.
A letter from one Ms. Vivian Young, OIC of the DOH, Local Government Assistance &
Monitoring Service, informed Governer Salapuddin that the POH II position was devolved to the
local government. The said letter provided that only the devolved health personnel who were not

accepted by their Local Chief Executive have been retained by DOH, the item positions per se
remained in the respective LGUs.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the PHO II position previously occupied by Dr. Yu is a
devolved position.
Held: NO
Ratio:
Pursuant to the declared policy under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)
to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization, national agencies or offices, including the DOH, were mandated to devolve to the
local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities.
Devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
Sec. 17 (i) of the same Code provides that devolution shall include the transfer to LGUs
of the records, equipment and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices
corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities. The personnel of said
national agencies shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they are
assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight
committee.
Hence, it was MANDATORY for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as
well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. The absence of discretion is highlighted by the use of the word
shall both is Sec. 17(i) of the Code and in Sec. 2(a)(2) of EO No. 503, which connotes a
mandatory order.
The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the national
government agency (NGA) personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable such that it
would lead to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the
national government.
In the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be
automatically reappointed [Sec. 2(a)(12)] by the local chief executive concerned immediately
upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.
Evidence shows that the item position of PHO II was in fact devolved to the Provincial
Government of Basilan. Governor Salapuddin himself certified that said position was included in
the 1992 Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (OSCAS) received from the DBM
with budget appropriation. He further declared during the formal turn over program in 1993 that
the item position of PHO II was among the positions turned over to the Provincial Government of
Basilan. It cannot be disputed that Dr. Castillos position was devolved.
But Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her devolved position in the
LGU for no other reason than that he wanted to accept only the item position of PHO II. It was not
shown that the absorption of Dr. Castillo was not administratively viable making Governor
Salapuddins refusal whimsical.
Nonetheless, the refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which took effect by
operation of law. To solve this dilemma, Governor Salapuddin requested that Dr. Castillo be
detailed instead at the DOH which was confirmed by Secretary Juan Flavier in an order which
provided that the Provincial Government of Basilan would continue to pay her salary and other
benefits.
Therefore, the drawing of Dr. Castillos salary from the LGU of Basilan was a necessary
consequence of her devolution and subsequent detail to the DOH.
A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance
of an appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees
occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If an employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission.
The law afforded Dr. Castillo the right to appeal her case to the CSC but she had not seen fit
to question the justification for her detail. The Court surmised that since Dr. Castillo was looking at
only 3 more years until retirement, she found it pointless to pursue the matter.
Neither did Dr. Castillo complain when she was categorized as a devolution non-viable
employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she was not accepted by the
LGU of Basilan and not because of actual non-viability.

Ms. Vivian Young, OIC of the DOH Local Government Assistance and Monitoring Service
assured Governor Salapuddin that while Dr. Castillo was retained by the DOH, her item position
remained with the LGU of Basilan. Moreover, Dr. Milagros Fernandez, Director IV of the DOH
Regional Field Office No. IX in Zamboanga City, clarified that Dr. Castillo never carried with her the
item position and the funds appropriated for salary and other benefits accruing to the position of
PHO II.
Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position of PHO II.
Issue#2: May Dr. Castillo be considered to have abandoned her position for consistently failing to
assert her rights thereto?
Held: NO
Ratio:
Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of
office, it must be total and under such circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute
relinquishment.
There are two essential elements of abandonment: (1) an intention to abandon, and (2) an
overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect.
Governor Salapuddins refusal to accept Dr. Castillo negates any and all voluntariness on
the part of the latter to let go of her position. The risk of incurring the ire of a powerful politician
effectively tied Dr. Castillos hands and it was quite understandable that she could not don her
gloves and fight even if she wanted to.
Under these circumstances with Dr. Castillos reabsorption by the DOH which appears to
bear the formers approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant.
Thus, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and consequently,
acquired a vested right to its reclassified designation chief of Hospital II. As such, Dr. Yu should
have been automatically reappointed by Secretary Dayrit in accordance with the Guidelines for the
Renationalization of Personnel, Assets and Appropirations of Basilan Provincial Hospital.
Considering that Dr. Yu had already retired, the SC upheld the ruling of the CA that since
reappointment was no longer feasible, she should at least recover her salaries for the services she
had rendered.
However, Dr. Yu admitted that she received her salary as PHO II converted to Chief of
Hospital II for the period August to November 2001. Therefore, she should receive her salary and
benefits as Chief of Hospital from December 2001 up to her retirement in aug. 2004.

21 - Batangas CATV v. CA, Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod

Sandoval- Gutierrez, J.
September 29, 2004 G.R. 138810
SUMMARY: Resolution No. 210 granted petitioner to operate a CATV system and charge its
subscribers with any increase in rates subject to the approval of the respondent. Petitioner
increased its subscriber rates without the approval of the respondent. The court held that said
Resolution is invalid and that an LGU cannot regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators due to NTCs exercise of regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other
bodies as provided for by the national legislature. A municipality cannot regulate the same
conduct that the state legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the subject
matter. Under the general welfare clause, an LGU may only prescribe regulations to the use of
public properties or the construction of a CATV system.
FACTS

The Sangguniang Panlungsod (respondent) enacted Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas
CATV (petitioner) a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City and
authorizing them to charge its subscribers the specified maximum rates with any increase subject
to their approval. When the petitioner increased its rates from Php 88 to Php 180 per month, the
mayor threatened to cancel their permit unless they secure the approval of the respondent.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for injunction alleging that the respondent had no
authority to regulate the subscriber rates because the National Telecommunication Commission
(NTC) has the sole authority to regulate CATV operators in the Philippines pursuant to E.O. 205.
The Trial Court enjoined the respondents from cancelling the petitioners permit to
operate and from interfering with their right to fix their service rates, which needs no prior
approval from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. It held that the enactment of Resolution 210 violates
the States deregulation policy as set forth by the NTC commissioner with the NTC as the sole
government agency that can regulated CATV operations and that the LGU cannot exercise
regulatory power without legislation.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court holding that although the NTC is the one
granting the certification, the respondent is not precluded from regulating the operation of the
CATV in the locality pursuant to the powers vested by the LGC of 1983. Under the General Welfare
Clause (Sec. 177 of the LGC of 1983), the LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit
their constituencies wherein the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided and
the fixing of service rates is lawful. Therefore, in violation of the requirements expressed in
Resolution No. 210, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise.
Petitioners MR was denied.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner: The LGC of 1991 does not authorize respondents to regulate the CATV operations. As
per E.O. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operations, including the fixing
of subscriber rates.
Respondent:
1. Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant of Section 177 (c ) and (d) of the LGS of 1983,
which authorizes the LGUs to regulate businesses.
2. Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract, being a grant of a franchise to operate a
CATV system. To hold that E.O. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts
MAIN ISSUE: W/N a LGU can regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operator
within the territorial jurisdiction
HELD: NO, the national government, through the NTC, has assumed regulatory power over the
CATV industry. Several presidential issuances3 reinforced the NTCs exercise of regulatory power
over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies, including fixing of subscriber rates. A

P.D. No. 1512 (President Marcos)Established a monopoly of the CATV industry by granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive franchise to operate CATV

system, prescribed their subscriber rates and terminated all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local
governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the national government.
LOI No. 894 (President Marcos)
Vested upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over the operations of Sining Makulay, Inc.
E.O. No. 546 (President Marcos)
Integrated the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau to form the National Telecommunications Commission.
E.O. No. 205 (President Aquino)
Opened the CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines
Mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
E.O. No. 436 (President Ramos)
Prescribed policy guidelines to govern CATV operation in the Philippines and restated the NTCs regulatory powers over CATV operations

municipality cannot regulate the same conduct that the state legislature has been regulating with
a statute that fully covers the subject matter. Under the general welfare clause, an LGU may only
prescribe regulations to the use of public properties or the construction of a CATV system.
RATIO:
The Sanguniang Panlungsod has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve
resolutions under the general welfare clause of the LGC of 1983, which is a delegation in statutory
form of the police power of the State to the LGUs to prescribe regulations for the protection of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their territorial jurisdictions.
The CATV operations may be regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause due to its
use of public properties to reach its subscribers but in this case, the respondents strayed from its
limits through its violation of the mandate of existing laws and the State deregulation policy over
the CATV industry.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as an agent of the national
legislature. However, Resolution No. 210 contravenes E.O. 205 and E.O. 436 in so far as it permits
the respondents to usurp the power exclusively vested in the NTC, particularly the fixing of
subscriber rates. In De la Cruz v. Paraz
Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare
clause [] must not be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the state.
Under its general powers, a municipality cannot regulate the same conduct that the state
legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the subject matter.
E.O. 205, as a general law, mandates the regulation of CATV operations by the NTC; an LGU
cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of said law. Municipal ordinances
are subordinate to the laws of the state; therefore, an ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and state-wide application is held to be invalid. In every power to pass
ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be
consistent with the general law. The basic relationship between the national legislature and the
LGUs has not been weakened by the new provision in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Congress still retains control of the LGUs, although in a reduced degree. The
national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs, which cannot defy or modify or violate it.
E.O. 436 provided for the deregulation of cable television industry and the LGUs are bound
to follow. LGUs cannot defeat national policy through enactments of contrary measures. Therefore,
petitioner may increase its subscriber rate without respondents approval, as per MC 06-2-81 and
the implementing guidelines of R.A. 7925. It bears stressing that municipal corporations are bodies
created as local units of self-government AND as government agencies of the states. The
legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its
sovereignty or absolve itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district.
Issue: W/N R.A. 7610 repealed E.O. 205 - NO
Argument of the Respondent: The regulatory power of the LGUs is granted by the LGC of 1991
(R.A. 7610), a handiwork of the national law making body. Thus, R.A. 7610 repealed E.O. 205.
COURT:
There is no basis to conclude that R.A. 7610 repealed E.O. 205. The repealing clause of R.A. 7610
contains specific laws and parts it has repealed but did not mention E.O. 205.
There is also no implied repeal by R.A. 7610, E.O. 436, MC 8-9-95, and the IRR of R.A. 7925 (Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines) shows that the NTCs regulatory power over the
CATV operations is continuously recognized.
On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. 205 and R.A. 7610, the proper action is to harmonize
them if possible. Thus, NTC has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operations,

including the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing precludes LGUs from exercising its general
power to prescribe regulations for the general welfare of their constituents.
Issue: W/N E.O. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts - NO
Respondents Argument: E.O. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts because Resolution No. 2010 was a grant of franchise to the petitioner.
COURT:
There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV systems. Assuming there was
one, it has been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. 1512, terminating all franchises for
the operation of CATV system previously grants be the local governments. Only the NTC may issue
Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority for the operation and maintenance of CATV system.

25 - Accord v. Executive Secretary Zamora

J. Carpio Morales
FACTS: President Estrada submitted the National Expenditures Program for fiscal year 2000 to
Congress. In the said program, the President proposed an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the
amount of P121,778,000,000, following the formula provided for in Section 284 of the Local
Government Code of 1992:
SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. Local government units shall have a share in
the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
The General Appropriations Act (GAA) SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) passed by Congress and
subsequently approved by President Estrada, however provides that:
1. IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000 only.
2. An UNPROGRAMMED FUND in the amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10B) shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount which amount shall be released only when the original
revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on
a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies,
namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of
the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates
a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the
latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
NGOs filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With
Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno,
then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the
constitutionality of above-quoted provision. Governors of the provinces of Batangas and Nueva
Ecija intervened.
ISSUES: Whether or not the GAA provisions on Unprogrammed Fund is unconstitutional as they
violate the autonomy of local governments by reducing by P10B the IRA due to the local

governments and withholding the release of such amount; Whether or not said GAA provision
violates ART. X, SEC. 6 of the Constitution (and SECS. 284, 286. 4)
Petitioners Arguments:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether
revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather
than making the release automatic.
Respondents Arguments:
The above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive,
hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the
IRA.
Basis: During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioners Davide and
Nolledo shared a common assumption that the entity which would execute the automatic release
of internal revenue was the executive department.
The subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from
unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to
withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially means that the President or any
member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute,
withhold the release of the IRA
HELD: The GAA provision on the P10B Unprogrammed Fund is void and unconstitutional.
RATIO: A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback
that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. As a rule, the term shall is
a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative.
Under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified
by the words as determined by law, and not the release thereof. The plain implication is that
Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the
IRA.

4 Section 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of
any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within
five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose.(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local
government units under existing laws.

Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution binds the legislative just as much as the executive branch
was presumed in the ruling of this Court in the case of The Province of Batangas v. Romulo which
is analogous in many respects to the one at bar.
This provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just
share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
NOTE: There is an exception to the automatic release of IRA rule. SECTION 284: . . .Provided, That
in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of
Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management,
and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the "liga", to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of
local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year:

28 - Navarro v. Ermita (2011)

Nachura
FACTS:
On Oct. 2, 2006, the President approved into law RA 9355, creating the province of Dinagat
Islands.
On Dec. 3, 2006 the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of
the creation of the province under the LGC.
o 69, 943 affirmed while 63,502 voted in the negative.
The President appointed the interim set of provincial officials, and they took their oaths on
January 26, 2007.
Rodolfo Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
in the SC, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9335.
o But the petition was dismissed on technical grounds.
Again, they filed a petition for the same reason, on the grounds that:
o The creation of Dinagat as a new province would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would deprive the people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of
territory, natural and financial resources.
o That when the law was passed, Dinagat only had a land area of 802.12 square
kilometers and a population of 106, 951
Violating Sec. 461 of the LGC which mandates that at least 2,000 sq.km. of
land and a population of 250,000 are needed to create a province.
And in thus violating the criteria set by the LGC, it also violated Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution.
The SC granted this petition and declared RA 9335 unconstitutional.
o Also declared null and void the provision on Art. 9(2) of the LGC IRR which said that
the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed o 1 or more islands inasmuch as the same exemption is not provided for
in the law.
o The law only states an exception to the contiguity requirement for pronvinces
composed of islands.
The Republic, the Sol Gen and Dinagat filed their MRs but were all denied.
o They filed a second one which was noted without action.
Movants-Intervenors filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
o They are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte, whose positions will be
affected if the SC Resolution is not reversed.

 Their election to their offices would be annulled.

As per COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, which says that:
If the decision of the SC is reversed, then status quo will remain since the
system in place is that Dinagat and Surigao del Norte are two separate
provinces.
If the decision of the SC is not reversed and becomes final and executory
before the elections, the province of Dinagat will revert to its previous status
as part of Surigao del Norte.
Voters of Dinagat will not be able to vote for candidates of Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Reps, and
candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte,
since they are not in the respective ballots.
Thus, the COMELEC will postpone the elections.
If the decision of the SC is not reversed and becomes final and executory
after the elections, the province of Dinagat will revert to its previous status
as part of Surigao del Norte.
The result of the elections would have to be nullified, and a special
election would be conducted.
The SC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene.
o The movants intervenors filed an MR. Denied.
The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that this decision had become final
and executory already.
The Movant-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion for Recall Entry of Judgment which is
resolved in this Resolution.
o

ISSUES + RULING:
On the propriety of the Urgent Motion for Recall Entry of Judgment
There appears nothing in the case which would support the contention that this motion was
a ploy by the respondents lawyers to reopen the case despite the entry of judgment.
It was COMELEC resolution 8790 which gave the movant intervenors interest in reopening
the case.
If the motion was not entertained, the movant-intervenors would be left with no other
remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their elections.
It cannot be denied that movant-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the even that their
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied.
They should not be left without any remedy simply because their interest in the case
became manifest only after the case had already been decided.
Anyway, in this case, the compelling concern is not only the movant-intervenors right to be
heard, but also the arrival at the correct interpretation of the LGC and the manner of
creation of LGUs.
On the creation of the LGUs
The criteria prescribed by the LGC (income, population, land area) are designed with
central policy considerations on creating an LGU in mind:
o Economic viability
o Efficient administration
o Capability to deliver basic services to constitutions
Economic viability being the primordial criterion, as given evidence by congressional
debates.
o Hon. Laguda: The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than
the House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a
minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability of the area,
because you have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic
development, population will naturally increase because there will be an

immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being converted into
a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be able
to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never
have the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.
Case also cited the provisions and IRR on the creation of the LGUs.
The LGC says that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442
and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively.
o This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears no reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municiaplities, but
not to provinces.
o In fact there is greater likelihood that island or ground of islands would form part of
the land area of a newly created province.
Thus, it seems that the exception given to cities and municipalities was inadvertently
omitted in Sec. 461, or for provinces.
o The inclusion of such exemption in the IRR was to correct such oversight.
Thus, the Court upholds the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
o Finds merit when considering the underpinning principle of local autonomy.
In Sec. 2 of the LGC (Declaration of Policy)
It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the national government to the local government units.
o Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve
the desired results.
Strict interpretation of the previous SC decision would be counterproductive.
Anyway, if the provision is applied, This would mean that Congress has opted
to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land
area over one composed of islands -- and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of
basic services to the constituency
This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if
the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to
one with a contiguous land mass.
o Court also quotes portions of the a Bicameral Conference Committee meeting which
clearly show the manifest intention of the Congress to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them a direct
share in the national budget.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction,
such as the legislative history of the law,[31] or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives,
particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it
cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from
the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or
more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section
461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
o The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations
with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of
local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated.
o This amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court,[ but to legislative construction as well, especially with the
inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as
members of the Oversight Committee.
Despite lack of exemption in the LGCt Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption
from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only
be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
o The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in
both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively
show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the
land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of
one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR.
o Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A.
No. 9355.

DISPOSITION: The Court granted the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment. The first SC
Resolution is set aside, and provision in Art. 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC of 1991 is declared VALID. RA 9335 is also declared VALID. Original petition is dismissed.
CARPIO, J., DISSENTING:
The ruling is a blatant violation of the Constitution and the Local Government Code, and
opens the floodgates to the proliferation of pygmy provinces and legislative districts.
1. The Dinagat Islands province simply does not meet the criteria for the creation of a
province.
Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum income requirement and either the
minimum land area or minimum population requirement. In short, two of the three
minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the minimum income requirement one of
the two.
The Dinagat Islands province does not meet either the minimum land area requirement or
the minimum population requirement. Its population was only at 120,813 in 2006 and the
land area of the island comprised only 802.12 sq.km.
The Local Government Code contains no exception to the income and population or land
area requirements in creating provinces.
What the Code relaxed was the contiguity rule for provinces consisting of "two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province.
No exception was ever created by law. Hence, the exception created in the implementing
rule of the Local Government Code, exempting provinces "composed of one (1) or more
islands" from the minimum land area requirement, is void for being ultra vires.
The majority argues that since the exception of island provinces from the minimum land
area requirement was inserted in the implementing rules by the congressional Oversight
Committee, the Court should extend great weight to this "legislative construction" of the
Code. BUT:

i. A congressional oversight committee has no power to approve or disapprove the

implementing rules of laws because the implementation of laws is purely an
executive function (Macalintal v Comelec)
ii. Congress has no power to construe the law. Only the courts are vested with the
power to construe the law. Congress may provide in the law itself a definition of
terms but it cannot define or construe the law through its Oversight Committee
after it has enacted the law because such power belongs to the courts.
Ratio behind the withholding of exemption for minimum land area requirement for
provinces composed of islands:
o The province, as the largest political and corporate subdivision of local governance
in this country, serves as the geographic base from which municipalities, cities and
even another province will be carved, fostering local development.
o The ruling wipes away the territorial and population tiering among provinces, cities
and municipalities the Local Government Code has carefully structured, reducing
provinces to the level of a rich municipality,unable to host otherwise qualified new
smaller local government units for sheer lack of space.
Even assuming that the minimum land area requirement does not apply to island
provinces, an assumption that is devoid of any legal basis, Dinagat Islands still fail to meet
the minimum population requirement.
The majority's ruling clearly violates Section 461 of the Code, no question about it.

2. When Congress creates a province it necessarily creates at the same time a

legislative district. The province must comply with the minimum population of
250,000 because the Constitution mandates that 250,000 shall be the minimum
population for the creation of legislative districts. The 1987 Constitution mandates
that "each province[,] shall have at least one representative
To treat land area as an alternative to the minimum population requirement (based on the
conjunctive "either" in Section 461) destroys the supremacy of the Constitution, making the
statutory text prevail over the clear constitutional language mandating a minimum
population through the requirement of proportional representation in the apportionment of
all legislative districts.
In creation of a province neither Congress nor the Executive can replace the minimum
population requirement with a land area requirement because the creation of a province
necessarily creates at the same time a legislative district, which under the Constitution
must have a minimum population of 250,000.
As an effect of the ruling, The House of Representatives will now count among its members
a representative of a district consisting, as of the 2007 census, of only 120,813
constituents, well below the minimum population of 250,000 his peers from the other
regular districts represent.
This malapportionment tolerates, on the one hand, vote undervaluation in overpopulated
districts, and, on the other hand, vote overvaluation in underpopulated ones, in clear
breach of the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, one vote in Dinagat Islands has the weight of more than two votes in Metro Manila for
the purpose of representation in the House of Representatives.
This is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
3. Fosters entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by
assuring political dynasties easy access to public funds.
For each new province created - entailing at the same time the creation of a legislative
district - a pipeline to a huge pool of resources is opened, with the Congressman enjoying
wide discretion on how and where he will dispense such legislative largesse.
Under the majority's ruling, not only land area but also population is immaterial in creating
island provinces. This is an open invitation to ruling political clans strategically situated in
this country's thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of more underpopulated
provinces within their political bailiwicks.

4. Far from being dispensable components in the creation of local government units,
population and land area - not income - are the pivotal factors in funding local
government units.
Under the Local Government Code, these components determine 75% of the share from the
national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) each local government unit receives, the
lifeblood of their operations, based on the following formula:
o Population - Fifty percent (50%)
o Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%)
o Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
Thus, population, with a weight of 50% ranks first in determining the financial entitlement
of local government units, followed by land area (25%)
5. By treating Dinagat Islands' land area of 802.12 square kilometers as compliant with
the 2,000 square kilometers minimum under Section 461, the majority effectively
included in their land area computation the enclosed marine area or waters of
Dinagat Islands.
In short, other island provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan,
can now claim their enclosed marine areas as part of their "land area" in computing their
share of the IRA.
On the part of landlocked provinces hosting large bodies of water, like Rizal, Laguna,
Batangas, Cavite and Lanao del Sur, the situation is reversed. Finding themselves holding,
but not surrounded by, water, the submerged territory, no matter how large, is excluded
from the computation of their land area, thus proportionately lowering their share in the
revenue allotment compared to their island counterparts.
6. The Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for courts to
reasonably interpret and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as
encoded in their provisions.
Members of this Court go beyond the bounds of their sworn duties when they second guess
the intent of the Constitution's framers and the people's elected representatives,
pretending to act as if they themselves have been accorded electoral mandate to amend
statutes as they see fit.

33 - League of Cities v. COMELEC

April 12, 2011; Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
1. At the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was enacted which amended Sec 450 of the LGC by
increasing the annual income requirement for the conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20M to P100M. The law did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement.
2. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives (HOR) adopted a joint
resolution exempting 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending when RA 9009
was enacted (These cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress). The joint
resolution, however, was not approved by the Senate.
3. At the 13th Congress, HOR re-adopted the said joint resolution but the Senate again failed
to approve it.
4. Upon the advice of Sen. Pimentel, 16 municipalities instead filed individual cityhood bills
which had a provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the new P100M income
requirement under RA 9009.
5. All the cityhood bills were enacted and later lapsed into law without the Presidents
signature.
6. These Cityhood Laws also directed COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
affected constituents approved of the conversion.

7. League of Cities, et al filed petitions with the SC for prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and TRO assailing the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscites. The petitioners main contention is
that the 16 municipalities should not be exempt from the new income requirement under
RA 9009.
8. On February 15, 2011, the SC issued a resolution declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws
constitutional.
9. Petitioners filed this Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration challenging the February 15,
2011 Resolution.
Petitioners arguments:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 65 and 106 of Art. X of the 1987 Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.
2. The new income P100 million requirement from locally generated sources is not arbitrary
because it is not difficult to comply with since there are several municipalities that have
already complied (i.e. Sta. Rosa, Navotas, San Juan, Dasmaris, and Bian, etc.).
3. There exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of petitioners member cities, considering
that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of
their creation.
Respondents arguments: (not explicitly stated in the case; probably the same as the SCs
decision)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: (SC basically reiterated its ratio in its Feb. 2011 resolution)
1. W/N the 16 cityhood laws are constitutionalYES.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood
Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
SC cited the manifestation of Senator Pimentel showing the legislative intent to exempt the
LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws from the P100 million requirement.
The acts of both Chambers of Congress (of unanimously approving the conversion bills
together with the deliberations on the scope of RA 9009) show that the exemption clauses
in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. As such,
R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the 100M requirement is arbitrary and
difficult to be complied with.
When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or
empirical data supported the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into
account the after-effects that were likely to arise.
With the imposition of the 100M requirement, even the danger the passage of R.A. No.
9009 sought to prevent might soon become a realitythat metropolis-located local
governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more
qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the
Cordilleras, or whatever. (Senator Pimentel)

5 Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
6 Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.

By increasing the income requirement abruptly, cities outside of Metro Manila would be less
likely to become cities. This is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly
envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth.

Petitioners 3rd argument is too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the P20
million requirement was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government
facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a city.
The increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for
any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. This is evidenced by the
fact that even the 59 members of the League of Cities have failed to be compliant with the
new P100 million income requirement five years after R.A. 9009 became law but still
remained viable.
The LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces.
They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and
flourishing tourism spots.
While the Constitution mandates that the creation of LGUs must comply with the criteria
laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield
to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects
contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization,
countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.
Cityhood Laws did not violate the League members right to a just share in the national
taxes.
The share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the
LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the
basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also
dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases,
then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. With every newly converted city
becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received
may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of
Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

DISSENTING OPINION (CARPIO)

This Court has made history with its repeated flip-flopping in this case.
1. Majority opinion erred in declaring that the Cityhood Laws amended the LGC.
a. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this be inferred. The laws
contains a uniformly worded Separability Clause:
i. That if any of its provisions is inconsistent with the LGC, the other consistent
provisions shall continue to be in full force and effect. Hence, any provision in
each Cityhood Law inconsistent with the LGC is void and ineffective.
b. Since the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the LGC, said laws cannot
stipulate an exception from the requirements of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution:
i. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
c. The constitution is clear that the creation of LGUs must follow the criteria established by
the LGC itself and not in any other law.
2. The increased income requirement of P100 million is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.
a. The legislature is not required by the Constitution to show the courts evidence to
support the increased income requirement such as data like inflation rates. This court
should not venture into areas of analyses beyond its competence. The increase is a

policy determination involving the wisdom of the law which exclusively lies within the
province of the Legislature.
b. Cities of San Juan and Navotas. Sta. Rosa, Dasmarias and Bian were created in full
compliance with the P100 million income requirement. 21 other municipalities have also
satisfied the requirement.
3. The reduction in the Internal Revenue Allotment will adversely affect the cities economic
situation.
4. The P20 million criterion is not substantial compliance, but outright violation of the
constitution.

36 - [G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.

Facts:

Dante O. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his drivers license was confiscated
for illegal parking along Binondo.

Respondents arguments:

In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled
discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause
of the Constitution.

The provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited
- fines and other penalties.

MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 (authorizing confiscation of licenses upon issuance
of a TVR) was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.

MMDAs arguments:

The powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and
imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and
executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the
penalty imposed.

The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of
government
in
administrative
agencies.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/apr2005/130230.htm - _ftn4

Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 has an existing IRR: MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001.
Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for
the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such
power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or
circular.

A license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and
welfare.

The revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process
as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

RTC:

MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 void. It was passed without a quorum.

The summary confiscation violates due process.

MMDA is ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the
opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

Supervening Event:

MMDA implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04 S. 2004. Under the circular, traffic
enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of
traffic violations.

Issue:

WON Section 5(f) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA, which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend
or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, is valid.

Ruling:

Case is moot. The petitioner, however, is not precluded from implementing any scheme
that would entail confiscating drivers licenses.

Ratio:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of
its police power.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A
local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Local government units are the

provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies.

There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of
the inhabitants of Metro Manila.

The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature.7

MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to
the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis.

3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact,
ordinances.

37 - MMDA v VIRON TRANSPORTATION

G.R. No. 170657; 15 Aug 2007; CARPIO MORALES, J.
Digest by Miguel
I.

FACTS:

1. Recognizing the worsening traffic situation in Metro Manila and nearby provinces, on
February 10, 2003, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the questioned EO
179, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System." Among the
salient points of the EO are the following:
a. In one of the Whereas clauses: The MMDA recommended a plan to decongest
traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system by
providing common mass transport terminal facilities, integrating buses and railway
systems.

7 Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- MMDA shall perform planning,

monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters.

b. Secs. 2 and 3: The project was for four interim common terminals, focusing initially
on North and South Metro Manila. The MMDA would be designated as the
Implementing Agency for the project.
c. For this project, the MMDA would have several functions and responsibilities:
1. preparation of the project Master Plan
2. coordinating with agencies and landowners for the use of land/properties for the
project
3. supervising and managing construction of structures and facilities.
4. executing necessary contracts for the implementation of the project in
accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations
5. managing funds as may be necessary for the projects in accordance with
prevailing accounting and audit practice in government
6. enlisting the assistance of any national govenrment agency, office, or
department, including LGUs and GOCCs, as may be necessary
7. assigning and hiring personnel for the above purposes
8. performing such other related functions as necessary to accomplish the
objectives and purposes of EO 179.
2. The MMDA's governing board and policymaking body, the Metro Manila Council (MMC), issued
Resolution No. 03-07 s.2003 expressing full support of the Project. In particular, the MMC stressed
the need to remove the bus terminals along major Metro Manila thoroughfares.
3. The MMDA then began implementing the EO. Around February 24 of the same year, two
bus companies filed petitions before the RTC of Manila:
a. Viron Transport filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the MMDA was
poised to issue a Memo Circular or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial
bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of Metro Manila. Its terminals in Sampaloc,
Manila and in Quezon City would be among them. They allege that such is outside the
authority of the MMDA to regulate traffic under its charter, RA 7924. In addition, they seek
a ruling on the legality of the said acts alongside the Public Service Act and related laws
which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as requisite for
operating as common carriers.
b. Mencorp Transport filed a similar petition, making similar allegations as Viron.
They also seek that the EO be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the
possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals.
4. The TC in its original decision ruled in favor of MMDA, holding that the EO was a valid
exercise of police power as it satisfied the subject matter and means tests. However, they
reversed on MR, holding that the EO was an unreasonable exercise of police power, that MMDA's
authority under Sec. 5e of its charter does not include the power to close the terminals, and that
the EO is inconsistent with the Public Service Act. MMDA's MR being denied, they file the present
petition with the Supreme Court.
II.

ISSUES and ARGUMENTS PER ISSUE:

1. W/N the case presents a justiciable controversy, allowing for a petition for declaratory
relief.
A. PETITIONER MMDA's ARGUMENTS
a. There is no justiciable controversy as nothing in the body of the EO mentions
or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals. No evidence was cited
apprising the transport groups of an immediate plan to close down their terminals.
b. Even then, the EO is only an administrative directive to government agencies
to coordinate with the MMDA, and to make available for use government property
along EDSA and SLEX. As such, the EO only created a relationship between the Chief
Executive and the implementing officials, and not third persons.

B. RESPONDENTS' COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
a. There is a justiciable controversy. They resorted to the Court because the EO,
in one of its whereas clauses (see Facts), set out the MMDA's plan to eliminate the
bus terminals. Viron even alleged that there is already a diagram laying down the
design of one the terminals, and that such is already being constructed. (the MMDA
even affirmed that they have begun implementing the EO)
2. W/N the MMDA has the authority to order the elimination of the bus terminals given the
law and the Constitution.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS
a. The MMDA has no authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals
under the EO. Such violates the Constitution and the Public Service Act; they do not
even have the necessary authority in their charter.
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
a. The real issue is the President's authority to undertake/cause the implementation
of the project. EO 125 (Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications), her residual power, and the Revised Administrative
Code constitute sufficient authority.
b. Moreover, the EO is a valid exercise of police power.
3. Assuming arguendo that police power was validly delegated to the MMDA, W/N the EO was
a valid police power measure.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS:
a. No issue as to public purpose. Traffic congestion is a public concern that
needs to be addressed immediately.
b. The exercise of the power was oppressive and transgressed their rights
over their respective terminals (of a confiscatory character).
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS:
a. There was a valid exercise of police power.
4. Regardless of the implementing agency, W/N the EO is in line with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT:
a. The closure of the terminals is not in line with the PSA, which mandates
public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as requisite for
the privilege of operating as common carriers.
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT:
a. The closure is in line with the PSA. The issue is more on the Presidents authority.
III.

COURTS DISCUSSION:

1. YES, as the EO is already being implemented, and there is already the possibility of closure of
terminals (an event that would make the EO applicable to the transportation companies)-- such
would be ripe for declaratory relief.
- General: The requirements of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court are: (1) There must be a justiciable controversy, (2) Such controversy must be between
persons with adverse interests, (3) The party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy, and (4) The issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.
As to the argument that closure was not contemplated:
- A justiciable controversy is present when an actual legal controversy exists between
the parties, and is before the Court, and the declaration sought would help in ending
the controversy: in other words, where there is a claim of a right which is actually
contested. Moreover, in a petition for declaratory relief, the action must be brought before
the breach or violation as per Rule 63, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court.

- The resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the EO. Several provisions
under the EO show an intent to immediately execute the plans laid therein:
- The EO was made effective immediately.
- Sec. 2 laid down the immediate establishment of common terminals for north- and
south-bound commuters.
- Sec. 8 directed the DBM to allocate funds for the terminals.
- Such resolve is bolstered by the MMC's Resolution 03-07, where it also stressed the
intent to remove bus terminals, and to establish common terminals. The MMDA even affirmed
that they have begun implementing the project.
- This is no longer conjectural or anticipatoryit is an actual, justiciable controversy. For
them to wait for actual issuance of an order of closure would be to bring the case outside the
ambit of declaratory relief.
As to the argument that the EO is unrelated to third persons:
- The provisions of the EO are clear that the MMDA seeks to eliminate the existing
bus terminals, including those owned by the respondents. Said respondents would have to
operate from the common terminals.
- Surely, there would be an adverse effect on them for they stand to be deprived of
their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
2. NO, as (1) the agency with the power to establish and administer integrated programs for
transportation is the DOTC, and (2) even if the MMDA could be delegated the power, the MMDA's
Charter is limited merely to administer and apply the law.
I. On the part of the President
- Secs. 4, 5, 6, and 22 of EO 125 gave the DOTC the power to establish and
administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications, with the DOTC as the primary entity for the promotion, development, and
regulation of transportation and communications.
- Such power extends to the President through her control of the executive
department, bureaus and offices under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, and Sec. 1, Bk III
and Sec. 38, Chapter 37, Bk IV of the Revised Administrative Code. The latter even defines
supervision and control to include authority to act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate.
[Note that such a delegation is a delegation of police power. This is a matter of importance in
related issues.]
II. On the part of the MMDA
- However, EO 125 states that the DOTC is the primary implementing and
administrative entity for transportation. With this alone, EO 125 is ultra vires by making
the MMDA the implementing agency.
- Moreover, RA 7924 does not give authority to the MMDA to eliminate bus terminals.
- The scope of the MMDA's functions was already settled in MMDA v Bel-Air, where
the Court stressed that they are limited to the delivery of seven basic services-- one of which is
transport and traffic management, including the mass transport system, and that only certain acts
were allowed under their charter: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of systems and
administration.
- That scope did not give them anything resembling police or legislative power,
unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs. They cannot order the elimination of terminals, the act
being one of police power.
3. NO, as the means used in lessening traffic congestion were unduly oppressive.
- There are two tests for a valid police power measure.

(1) Public purpose test - the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
that of a particular class, requires its exercise
(2) Means test - the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
- There was no issue as to public purpose, only as to the means employed. The
effect of the EO would necessarily be the closure of the existing bus terminalsis this
oppressive?.
- This is similar to Lucena Grand Central Terminal v JAC Liner, where a city
ordinance requiring all PUVs in Lucena to unload and load at a single common terminal
was struck down due to overbreadth, the Court then finding that it was beyond what was
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. Worse, the compulsory use of the
central terminal was held oppressive as it subjected its users to additional fees and charges.
Surely there could have been alternatives-- if terminals lack adequate space that drivers have to
load and unload on the streets, then they could impose regulations for terminal specifications.
Worse, the scope is so broad that even entities that may be able to provide better facilities are
barred.
- The same is the case here. There are so many less intrusive measures that could have
been availed of, such as banning colorum vehicles or strictly enforcing traffic rules. Here, there is
certainly an invalid exercise of police power.
- A caveat: the EO cannot said to be confiscatory of properties as their certificates of public
convenience confer no property rights-- they are mere licenses or privileges that must yield to
legislation.
4. NO, as the law recognizes the terminal facilities as a necessary service, with the elimination of
such running contrary to it.
- Paragraph (a), Sec. 13, Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now part of the LTFRB charter)
vested the PSC (now LTFRB) with jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services (at least
for land transport), as well as their franchises, equipment, and other properties. It may also
impose conditions as to construction and service as the public interest and convenience may
require.
- Among these is the power to compel public utilities to furnish safe, adequate and proper
service, including facilities (Sec. 16 of the Public Service Act). This recognizes the terminals as a
necessary service where elimination would run counter to the law.
PETITION DENIED. EO 179 DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ULTRA VIRES.

38 - DISOMANGCOP vs. DATUMANONG

G.R. No. 149848; November 25, 2004; Tinga.
Digest by Ian
Facts: This case involves the constitutionality and validity of RA 8999 8 signed by Pres. Estrada
and DPWHs D.O. 1199 issued by then Sec. Gregorio R. Vigilar.

8 An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur
and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
9 Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office

Petitioners in this case are Arsadi M. Disomangcop and Ramir M. Dimalotang, in their
capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First
Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur.
The 1987 Constitution10 mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 673411 was signed into
law on Aug. 1, 1989 by Pres. Aquino eventually creating the ARMM. This was followed by E0 426
(Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and
Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional
Government).
After 9 years, on May 20, 1999, Sec. Vigilar issued DO 119 creating DPWH Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and
facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur . This was followed
by RA 899912 on January 17, 2001 which provided that the sum necessary for the maintenance
and operation of the district office shall be included in the annual GAA. Then Congress passed
R.A. 905413 which lapsed into law ]on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on
14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the
same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic
Acts.
On July 23, 2001, petitioners wrote DPWH Sec. Simeon Datumanong seeking the revocation
of the DO and the non-implementation of the RA. No action was taken on the petition so they filed
this petition before the SC.
Petitioners
Reliefs sought:
1. to annul and set aside D.O. 119;
2. to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing the DO and RA and
releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City
to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of
DPWH;
3. to compel the DBM Sec. to release all funds for public works projects intended for
Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and
4. to compel respondent DPWH Sec. to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area.
Arguments:
1. DO was issued with grave abuse of discretion and it violates the constitutional
autonomy of the ARMM because it has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH- ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
2. On RA 8999
a. A piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly studied, and
that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law
originated is questionable. [SC will mention at the later part of the case that
the HB was passed in record time on 2nd reading (not more than 10 mins.),
without the usual sponsorship speech and debates].
b. Prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor consultation with
the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee on Public Works and
Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected
agency.

10 Art. X, Secs. 1 and 15.

11 An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
12 An Act Establishing An Engineering District In The First District Of The Province Of Lanao Del Sur
And Appropriating Funds Therefor
13 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose RA 6734.

c. The law was skillfully timed for signature by former Pres. Estrada during the
pendency of the impeachment proceedings.
Respondents (through the OSG) Arguments :
1. Maintain the validity of the DO because it was issued in accordance with EO 124
(Reorganizing The Ministry Of Public Works and Highways, Redefining Its Powers And
Functions, And For Other Purposes).
2. In defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the
autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress.
3. Petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law
and the department order. They note that petitioners have no personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.
Petitioners: They have standing, as they will suffer actual injury as a result of the
enactments complained of.
Issues: WON (I) R.A. 8999 and (II) D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
Held: The Court agrees in part with the petitioners. It held the RA and DO unconstitutional.
It does not agree, however, that there is grave abuse of discretion based on the allegation
that the RA was allegedly signed into law under suspicious circumstances because according to
the SC, it cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of legislative
branch. It further disagrees as regards the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing because
absence of consultation does not render a law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not
transgress the Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite a resource person
from the DPWH-ARMM during the Committee meeting.
Discussion:
I.
On RA 8999 and the Autonomy Organic Acts- RA 8999 violates regional autonomy
It never became operative because it was superseded by RA 9054.
It is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for the adjudication
of this case. The challenged law never became operative and was superseded or
repealed by a subsequent enactment., RA 9054.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than
ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in
this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. This was
explicitly mentioned in the excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission quoted by the SC.

Regional Autonomy under RA 6734 and RA 9054

Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised
by the local government unit vis--vis the central government.
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal
government powers to the people of a particular area or region
with least control and supervision from the central government.

However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the

establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic,
as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined
groups, with a common tradition and shared social-cultural
characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage,
exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is

RA 8999 violates regional autonomy

E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM
to the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG).
Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public
works to the ARG.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the
offices of the DPWH within the ARMM, including their functions, powers and
responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG.
According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables it to
appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the
region by the central government.
The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and
transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and
funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered.
Christians in this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National
Government takes control again.

II.

achieved through the establishment of a special governance regime for

certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within
the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to
them to decide internal community affairs.
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation
of more positive means for national integration. It would remove
the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the
government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation
of the development programs in the region.
And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean meaningful
and authentic regional autonomy.
Substantial and meaningful autonomy is the kind of local
self-government which allows the people of the region or area the
power to determine what is best for their growth and development
without undue interference or dictation from the central
government.
To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over
autonomous region. In essence, the provision also curtails the power of
Congress over autonomous regions.

The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by
virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the
national government to the autonomous government in order to effectuate
a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore,
runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers
which have previously been handed over.

On DO 119:
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a
duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed
under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers
which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs
counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWHs order, like spring water, cannot
rise higher than its source of power the Executive.

The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and
approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no moment. It is
a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law
prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant generali.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect
superseded E.O. 124.
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with
this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With the repeal of E.O.
124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also
rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

39 - Bai Sandra S. A. Sema v. Commission on Elections and Didagen P. Dilangalen

G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
Carpio, J.
Summary:
Upon the creation by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan via
local law (Act 201), Cotabato City, as one of the local units transferred to the new province from its
former province of Maguindanao, asked COMELEC to clarify its legislative district status in light of
the upcoming May 2007 elections. COMELEC issued Resolution 7902, which stated that Cotabato
City, while belonging to the new province of SK, would retain its status as part of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao, absent any national law proclaiming otherwise.
Petitioner Sema, a candidate for representative of SK, assailed this Resolution arguing that the
Province of SK should have its own legislative district, and that the votes cast in Cotabato City, as
belonging to the first legislative district of Maguindanao, should be excluded from elections for an
SK representative to Congress.
The Court ruled that Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Act 201 creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan is void. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is valid.
Facts:
In the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, 2 legislative districts were apportioned for
the Province of Maguindanao. Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities formed the first legislative
district of Maguindanao which, in turn, formed part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) as created by Organic Act RA 6734, amended by RA 9054. Cotabato City, however, is part
of Region XII and not ARMM because constituents voted against its inclusion in ARMM in the Nov
1989 plebiscite.
Aug 28, 2006, ARMMs Legislature (ARMM Regional Assembly/ARMM Assembly) exercised its power
to create provinces (granted by Sec 19, Art. VI of RA 9054) by enacting the Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201 (Act 201)14 which created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan (SK); 8

14 Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are
hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority
of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

municipalities from the first district of Maguindanao were separated from the latter to make up the
province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
As a result of SKs creation, all that was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting
its second legislative district. Cotabato City, while part of Maguindanaos first legislative district,
now belonged to SK.
In anticipation of the May 2007 elections, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City requested
COMELEC via resolution to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the enactment of Act 201.
COMELEC issued several resolutions in response:
1. Resolution 07-407: maintained status quo with Cotabato City as part of SK in the first
legislative district of Maguindanao, pursuant to the COMELECs Law Departments memo
recommending that Cotabato Citys status quo be maintained pending enactment by
appropriate law by Congress. (in other words without law by Congress, Cotabato City was to
remain part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, despite belonging to the province of SK).
2. Resolution 7845 (subsequently issued): Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City, because of the enactment of Act 201.
3. [Contested] Resolution 7902, amending 07-0407: renaming the legislative district as
SK Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City)
Arguments of the Parties:
a. On the reapportionment of Maguindanao
Petitioner SEMA (a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan w/
Cotabato City) prayed for the nullification of COMELECs Resolution 7902 and the exclusion of the
votes cast in Cotabato City as far as the province of SK is concerned, arguing that:
1. SK, as a province, is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec 5(3) Art. VI of the
Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2. [ main ] COMELEC acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing said Resolution maintaining the
status quo of Maguindanaos first legislative district when its earlier resolution had already
designated Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first
legislative district
3. COMELEC had usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts
Respondent COMELEC:
1. SEMA wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify the COMELEC resolution because
COMELEC issued such resolution pursuant to the exercise of its administrative, and not-quasijudicial, power
2. SEMAs prayer became moot when Respondent Didagen Dilangalen was proclaimed
representative of the legislative district of SK Province with Cotabato City.
Respondent DILANGALEN:

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will
choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for
the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local
elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new
readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.

1. SEMA is estopped from questioning COMELECs resolution because the certificate of candidacy
indicated she was seeking election as a representative of the Province of SK including Cotabato
City.
2. COMELEC Resolution is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for SK
nor reapportion legislative districts in Maguindanao, but merely renamed Maguindanaos first
legislative district.
3. COMELEC did not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its
lone component because the power to reapportion lies exclusively with Congress and Cotabato
City does not meet minimum population requirements under the Constitution for the creation
of a legislative district within the city.
b. on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Assembly is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives (HoR) without need of national law
creating a legislative district.
Petitioner SEMA (w/ concurrence by COMELEC, abandoning its earlier stance): YES
1. Citing Felwa v. Salas, SEMA argues that when a province is created by statute (Act 201 by the
ARMM Assembly in this case), a corresponding representative district comes into existence by
operation of the Constitution, without reapportionment.
2. RA 7160 on the creation of provinces affirms the apportionment of legislative districts incident
to such creation.
3. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
mandate apportionment of a legislative district.
Respondent DILANGALEN: NO
1. Sec. 3, Art. IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Assembly the power to enact measures
relation to national elections, including the apportionment of legislative districts for members
of the HoR
2. Recognizing a legislative district for every province created by the ARMM Assembly would lead
to disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the HoR
3. Cotabato Citys population of less than 250k does not entitle it to a representative in the HoR
c. on WON Sec. 19, Art. VI, RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces is constitutional, and if so, whether a province so created is
entitled to one representative in the HoR without need of a national law.
Petitioner SEMA: YES
1. RA 9054 is a constitutional delegation by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the
formers power to create provinces.
2. Art. X of the Constitution grants to autonomous regions through the organic acts legislative
powers over other matters authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in that region
Respondent DILANGALEN (w/ concurrence by COMELEC): UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1. the power to create provinces is not granted to autonomous regions
2. to grant ARMM the power the prescribe lower standards in the creation of provinces than those
provided by RA 7610 contravenes Art. X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause
Courts Ruling:
Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities. Act 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void.
COMELEC Resolution 7902 is valid.

Ratio:
ISSUE [main] : WON Sec. 19 Art VI of RA 9054 delegating to ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional. Unconstitutional, wrt
the creation of provinces and cities.

While Congress, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, has delegated to provincial boards
and municipal councils the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, the Local
Government Code states that only an Act of Congress can create provinces cities or
municipalities.
o Under Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, three conditions must be complied with for the
creation of any of the four local government units: a) criteria in the local government code
must be followed, creation of said unit must not be in conflict with Constitutional
provisions, and c) a plebiscite must be held in the political units affected

While there is no conflict with the Constitution wrt to the delegation of power to create
municipalities and barangays, the creation of provinces and cities is a different matter
because under the Constitution, pending certain requirements, the creation of the
latter two units may result in additional representatives to the House of
Representatives.
o Cities with a population of at least 250k or more shall have at least 1 HoR
o Any province subsequently created, or city with a population of 250k or more, shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one member in the HoR
o Thus, a province, or a city with a population of 250k or more, cannot be created
without a legislative district, or else the Constitution will be violated. Even the
creations of provinces, or cities with less than 250k, also requires the power to create
legislative districts because a citys population may increase in the future.

Legislative districts are created or reapportioned only by an Act of Congress.

o The power to increase allowable membership in the HoR and reapportion legislative
districts is vested exclusively in Congress. (Art. VI, Sec. 5, Constitution):
Sec 5(1), Art VI: Congress may increase through law allowable membership in the HoR;
Sec 5(4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts, which necessarily
includes the power to create such districts.
o These powers are exercised exclusively through Congress because the latter is a national
legislature, thus any change in its allowable membership or incumbent membership must
be embodied in national law; an inferior legislative body (i.e. a regional body) may not
change the membership of the superior legislative body (i.e. national body)

ARMMs Regional Assembly cannot create legislative districts whose representatives are
elected through national elections, because such would extend ARMMs legislative powers
beyond its territorial jurisdiction, in violation of the Constitution.
o Nothing in Sec. 20, Art. X of the Constitution (which enumerates the powers of
autonomous regions) authorizes autonomous regions expressly or impliedly to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
o Sec. 3, Art. IV of RA 9054 provides that the ARMM Assembly may exercise legislative
powers except on certain matters, including national elections, thus it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
o The office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office,
maintained by national funds.
o ARMMs Regional Assembly cannot create a national office because such would allow the
formers legislative powers to operate outside of ARMMs territorial jurisdiction, in violation
of Art. X of the Constitution which expressly limits coverage of regional assemblys to within
its territorial juridiction.

ISSUE [main] : WON a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly via Act 201 is entitled
to one representative in the HoR without a need of national law creating a legislative district for

such province. NO. A province cannot legally be created without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that each province have at least one
representative. The creation of the SK Province without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.

Petitioner SEMAs use of the Felwa ruling (the creation of legislative districts by operation of
the Constitution upon the creation of a province) does not apply in this case. In Felwa, the
creation of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao occurred
via RA 4595 which was a national law. The new province of SK was enacted by a regional
law. While the Felwa doctrine holds true insofar as the creation of a legislative
district occurs by operation of the Constitution when a province is created, the
power to create such legislative districts nevertheless remains exclusively with
Congress because the power to create provinces belongs exclusively to Congress.

If the creation of the SK Province included an apportioned legislative district, Cotabato City
would be left as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao, in violation
of the Constitution, because pursuant to the 2000 census, Cotabato Citys population stands at
163, 849.

The grant by Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create
provinces and cities without regard to the criteria provided by RA 7160 (minimum annual
income of P20M and minimum contiguous territory of 2k sq. km., or minimum population of
250k) would give rise to the ff. absurd possibilities:
o An inferior legislative body like ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces
and increase its membership in a superior legislative body like the HoR beyond the
maximum limit provided by the Constitution (250)
o Proportional representation in the HoR of one representative per 250k residents will be
negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement that
every province created must have at least 250k population
o Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the HoR thru the
ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within ARMM

Organic Acts of Autonomous Regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Sec. 20, Art. X of the
Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited,
within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws.

ISSUE: [minor] WON the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution 7902, and whether the proclamation of Dilangalen as
representative of the SK Province with Cotabato City mooted Semas petition. Yes, the writs are
proper. The petition is not moot.

The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the constitutionality of election laws, rules and
regulations.
Dilangalens proclamation as representative to the province of SK does not moot the petition
because this case does not involve Dilangalens election, but inquires into the validity of the
COMELEC Resolution and the constitutionality of Act 201 and Sec. 19, Art VI of RA 9054. The
issue is whether votes cast in Cotabato City for the representative of SK Province will be
included in canvassing of ballots, and ruling on these petitions will affect all other succeeding
elections, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create future additional
provinces.

43 - CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COA

29 January 1990

Digest by Kathleen Villamin

Cortes, J.:

Topic: Part III Creation of autonomous regional bodies

GENERAL FACTS
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued EO 220, which created the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR), covering Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City
of Baguio. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a
Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR, Assembly and Executive Board shall
exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized.

In this case, the constitutionality of EO 220 is now being assailed on the primary ground that it
pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
1. By issuing EO 220, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.
2. EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
3. The creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio
City) which compose the CAR.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS (Implied)

1. By issuing EO 220, the President did not preempt Congress.
2. EO 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision.
3. The creation of CAR did not contravene local autonomy for the provinces involved.

SC RULING
1. E.O. No. 220 actually envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of
line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does
not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then
appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law.
Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18].
Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to
address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet
been passed and the autonomous region created.

Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is the interim
autonomous region in the Cordilleras." E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional
government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the
main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. The
bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor
are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

2. E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones
into a larger subdivision.
-

Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does
not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither
is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power
to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and
the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable
participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National

Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create
under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14].

3. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government
authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision
in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of
an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family
and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political
autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group
of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. Petitioner failed to show
how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered
provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to
probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.