D.M. Consuji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Maria J.

Juego
G.R. No. 137837 April 20, 2001 (357 SCRA 249)
FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. PO3 Rogelio
Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that victim was rushed to the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro
Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de
Yzo, at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date. Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date
and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were]
performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building on board a platform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8
meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the platform, got loose xxx causing the whole platform
assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the
building under construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companions
who luckily jumped out for safety. It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death
when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the
platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991,
Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among
other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, which is also affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. D.M. Consuji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE(S): (1)Whether or not the petitioner is negligent based on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur
(2) Whether or not the private respondent can still claim for damages against the petitioner after
recovering under the Workmens Compensation Act.
HELD: (1)Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to hold the petitioner negligent. As
a rule of evidence, the doctrine is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is
absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Applying in the case at bar, all the
requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present. First, no worker is going
to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction
site unless someone is negligent. Second, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and
human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
petitioner. Third, no contributory negligence was attributed to the private respondents deceased
husband. Thus a reasonable presumption or inference of petitioners negligence arises.
Further, petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine for though the
petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur,

the petitioner argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it
proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband. As
stated earlier, the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes
the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh
the inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the
presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into
play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.
(2) Yes. Though the Court ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously, the Court recognized that a
claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code if it falls
under the exception. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under
the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the
basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
The Court ruled that private respondents case came under the exception because
private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint
for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners
personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in
the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, if at all, the
case is civil in nature.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. However, the case is REMANDED to the
RTC to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC.
Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments
already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom to
prevent double compensation.
HEIRS OF THE LATE DELFIN DELA CRUZ v. PHIL TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC
GR 196357, April 20, 2015
Facts:
Delfin Dela Cruz (DDC) was contracted as an oiler by Philippine Transmarine (Phil Trans), a
local manning agent for and in behalf of the latter's principal, Tecto Belgium for a duration of 9
months, working 44 hours a week with a salary of $535/mo and overtime pay for $298/mo.
After undergoing a Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared fit for sea service,
DDC embarked the vessel Lady Hilde on August 17, 2000. While on board, he felt gradual chest
pains and pain in his upper abdominal region. On 26 June 2001, while performing his regular
duties, he was hit by a metal board on his back. He, thereafter, requested medical attention and
was given medications and advised to be given light duties for the rest of the week. Upon the
vessels arrival at a convenient port on 16 August 2001, his contract expired and was signed off

from the vessel. He reported to respondents as required. He also sought medical assistance but
was not extended such.
DDC was diagnosed to be suffering from malignant peripheral nerve sheath tumor. He was not
employed by respondent's thereafter because he was already incapacitated to engage in his
customary work. He filed for his claim for sickness allowance from the same manning agency
but the same was not granted which led to a complaint before the NLRC.
Respondents denied the petition arguing that the claim has been filed beyond the one year
period from the date of the termination of the contract. DDC countered that the applicable
prescription is 3 years pursuant to the POEA Standard Employment Contract.
DDC asseverated that he is entitled to sickness allowance because of the incident when he was
hit by a metal board on his back, which required medical attention. Furthermore, he asserted
that he is entitled to said allowance because his inability to work and perform his usual
occupation lasted for more than 120 days. To which the respondents averred that the medical
condition is not work-related and therefore not compensable. And that the company-designated
physician neither issue any certification as regards the medical condition of DDC nor conducted
any post-employment medical examination.
The LA ruled in favor of DDC;opined that Delfin contracted his illness during the period of his
employment with respondents and that such illness is a compensable occupational disease.
On appeal, the NLRC, found Delfins claims to be barred by prescription for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period of one year from the termination of the employment contract.
The NLRC also found no evidence that would establish a causal connection between Delfins
ailment and his working conditions.
However, the CA ruled that Delfins Complaint was filed well within the reglementary period of
three years from the date the cause of action arose, as provided for in Section 30 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA SEC). Nonetheless,
the CA sustained the NLRCs pronouncement that petitioners are not entitled to disability
compensation as they failed to establish that Delfins illness was work-related.
Issue: Whether Delfin is entitled to permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance?
Held: The petition lacks merit. Petitioners are not entitled to permanent disability benefits and
sickness allowance.
Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA SEC reads as follows:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
x x x x B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSFOR INJURY OR ILLNESS:
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his
contract are as follows:

1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the
vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer
shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as
well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury
or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the
degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company designated physician, but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination
by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he
is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the
same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory
reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear
the full cost of repatriation in the event that the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2)
fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former
vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment
caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits
arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. (Emphasis supplied)

The 1996 POEA SEC clearly provides that a seafarer must submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines (mandatory reporting
requirement) so that his claim for disability and sickness allowance can prosper.29 The only
exception to this rule is when the seafarer is physically in capacitated to do so, but there must
be a written notice to the agency within the same period of three days for the seaman to be
considered to have complied with the requirement.
Unfortunately in this case, petitioners failed to show the steps supposedly undertaken by Delfin
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement. To the Courts mind, this lapse on
petitioners part only demonstrates that Delfin did not comply with what was incumbent upon
him. The reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that at the time of his repatriation, Delfin was not
suffering from any physical disability requiring immediate medical attendance. Otherwise, and
even if his request for medical assistance went unheeded, he would have submitted himself for
check-up with his personal physician. After all, the injury complained of by Delfin was a serious
one and it would seem illogical for him to just suffer in silence and bear the pain for a

considerable length of time. Moreover, while the rule on mandatory reporting requirement is not
absolute as a seafarer may show that he was physically incapable to comply with the same by
submitting a written notice to the agency within the same three-day period, nowhere in the
records does it show that Delfin submitted any such notice. Clearly, petitioners failed to show
that Delfin complied with the mandatory reporting requirement. Thus, he is deemed to have
forfeited his right to claim disability benefits and sickness allowance.
Even assuming that there was compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement, other
factors that strongly militate against the granting of petitioners claims exist in this case.
The medical certificate pertains to a blow on Delfins back caused by a metal board and for
which he complained of persistent pain in the chest and upper abdominal region. However, the
injury that showed up in his chest x-ray and MRI for which he claimed compensation pertains to
a different portion of his body, i.e., a fracture in one of his ribs. Besides, if indeed there is truth to
petitioners assertion that Delfin continued to experience pain after he was hit by a metal board
on his back, then why did he not request for reassessment as advised or submit himself to the
mandatory reporting requirement after he was repatriated? What is glaring instead is that
against all these, petitioners only offered their bare allegation that Delfins medical condition did
not improve thereafter. Second, while Delfin averred that he experienced on-and-off pain even
prior to the June 26, 2001 incident, there exists no record thereof. On the contrary, Delfin
himself claimed that despite the pain, he "remained calm and unbothered by the same."
As a final note, it must be mentioned that the Court respects and upholds the principle of
liberality in construing the POEA-SEC in favor of the seafarer. Nonetheless, it cannot grant
claims for compensation based on mere conjectures.

BEL CHEM v. ZAFRA

GR 204845, June 15, 2015
Facts:
Zafra was hired as a wiper by Belchem, through its local manning agent UPL, for a period of
four (4) months under a duly approved contract of employment.
Records reveal that on July 17, 2009, Zafra boarded MT Chemtrans Havel and while onboard,
he sustained injuries on his left knee after hitting the floor on his way to the ship's engine room
to check for leaks; he was advised to undergo x-ray examination and was repattriated for further
medical treatment in the Philippiines. Upon his arrival, he immediately reported to the UPL office
and was sent to the petitioners designated physician, Dr. Lim at the Metropolitan Medical
Center, Marine Medical Services; the attending physician found him to have probable Medial
Meniscal Tear, Left knee and Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) Tear, Left Knee which required
surgery;6 that on January 5, 2010, he underwent a procedure known as Arthroscopic ACL
Reconstruction costing him more than one (1) week of confinement and subsequent
rehabilitation measures for him to walk again.
On April 19, 2010, or within the 240-day treatment period, the attending doctor, William
Chuasuan, Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan, Jr.), wrote a letter to Dr. Lim stating that the suggested disability
grading of Zafras injuries was 20% of Grade 10, which under the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), was equivalent to

US$3,590.73.
Thereafter, Zafra filed a complaint for payment of permanent total disability benefits. He also
demanded a copy of his medical records from petitioners but he was not given one.
The LA declared Zafra entiled to disability benefits in the amount of $3,590.73. The LA reasoned
out, among others, that Zafras claim for the maximum benefit of US$60,000.00 was
unsubstantiated considering that (1) the assessment of the company- designated physician of
his injury as Grade 10 should be respected; and (2) he failed to present the medical findings
showing total and permanent disability.
On appeal, the NLRC, reversed and set aside the findings of the LA awarded US$60,000.00.
Pointing out that, in disability compensation, what was being compensated was not the injury
per se but the incapacity to work. Considering that more than 240 days from date of repatriation
had lapsed without any declaration of fitness to work from the company-designated physician,
the NLRC found him entitled to receive permanent total disability benefit.
The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Zafra should have been declared as partially disabled with a Grade 10
disability and entitled to $3,590.73 only?
Held: No. The rulings of the NLRC and CA is hereby adopted.
Zafra contended that his entitlement to full
disability benefits was in accord with the following facts:
1. The petitioners did not declare his fitness to work or the existence of his permanent disability
within the 240-day period.
2. The petitioners medical records of his condition have shown to have remained the same from
the time he sustained his injury until August 20, 2010.
3. He remains unemployed from the time of his repatriation and is unable to perform the same
physical activities he was able to do prior to his injury.

There is no dispute that Zafra has been suffering permanent disability because he has remained
unable to resume sea duties after the lapse of the 240-day period. The dispute is simply
whether such permanent disability is partial or total in character. If the permanent disability is
partial, then Zafra shall be entitled to US$3,590.73 only, the amount corresponding to the
assessed Grade 10 disability pursuant to the schedule provided in the POEA- SEC. If it is total,
Zafra shall receive the maximum US$60,000.00 as compensation.
The Court has reiterated in many cases that total permanent disability means the disablement of
an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does
not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is

compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning
capacity.
Partial disability, on the one hand, is when the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the
use of any part of his body as a result of the injury or sickness.
In Vicente v. Employees Compensation Commission, the Court laid down the litmus test
and distinction between Permanent Total Disability and Permanent Partial Disability, to
wit:
While permanent total disability invariably results in an employees loss of work or
inability to perform his usual work, permanent partial disability, on the other hand,
occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body
which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of
whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the
capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability
he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is
unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 or [240] days and he does not
come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability
(which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability),
then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from permanent total disability regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
To the petitioners, this assessment forecloses any claim that Zafras injury is total or one that
incapacitates the employee to continue performing his work. They treat it as the certification
required under Section 20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC30 as it contained his degree of disability and
fitness to resume sea duties.
The statement, however, is clearly devoid of any definitive declaration as to the capacity of Zafra
to return to work or at least a categorical and final degree of disability. As pointed out by the CA,
all the medical certificates found in the record merely recited his medical history and, worse, it
made no mention as to whether the seafarer was even capable of resuming work. In fact, it was
merely a suggestion coming from the attending doctor and not from the company-designated
physician, as if the letter was written while the process of evaluation was still being completed.
To stress, Section 20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC requires the declaration of fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability by the company-designated physician and not by anyone else.31
Here, it was only Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. who signed the suggested assessment, addressing the letter
solely to Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician. Taken in this context, no assessment,
definitive in character, from the company-designated physicians end was issued to reflect
whether Zafra was fit or unfit to resume duties within the 120/240 day period, as the case may
be. Thus, the Court deems him unfit to resume work on board a sea vessel.
It makes sense then to conclude that because Zafra has been deemed unfit to work after the
expiration of the 240-day period, it would be illogical to declare him as merely permanently,
partially disabled. To reiterate, partial disability exists only if a seafarer is found capable of
resuming sea duties within the 120/240 period. Here, there was no such finding. Thus, the
petitioners claim that Zafra only suffered a partial disability has undoubtedly no basis on record.
If at all, the basis was not strong enough to merit its affirmation by the NLRC and the CA.

Verily, there is no question that Zafra has remained in a state of disability that has become
permanent and total considering that no certification, compliant with the POEA-SEC and the
Labor Code, was issued within the 120/240-day period.