Statesmanship and the Limits of Morality

Trustees of Princeton University
Statesmanship and Moral Choice

Author(s): Arnold Wolfers
Source: World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jan., 1949), pp. 175-195
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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STATESMANSHIP
AND MORAL CHOICE
By ARNOLD WOLFERS
mHROUGHOUT the ages moralistshave expressedhor-
1 ror at the way princes and sovereign states behave

toward each other.Behavior whichwould be consideredimmoral by any standardcan obviouslybe detectedin all realms
of life; but nowheredoes the contradictionbetweenprofessed
ethical principlesand actual behavior appear so patent and
universalas in the conductof foreignrelations.Governments
spy on each otherand lie to each other; theyviolate pledges
and conductwars,oftenat the cost of millionsof lives and untold misery.No wonder,then,that in westerndemocraciesif
not elsewhereindignationover such practicesshouldbe voiced
with vehemence.In our day it frequentlyexpressesitselfin
systemon theground
wholesaledenunciationsofthemulti-state
that sovereignstatescannotdeal witheach otherexceptby the
called powerpolitics.Some
use of immoralmeans,derogatorily
that
moralityhas no place in
draw the cynical conclusion
internationalpolitics,whileotherswould have men fulfilltheir
forthe present
world government
moral duty by substituting
immoralpoliticalsystem.
This sweepingmoral condemnationof foreignpolicyas pursued by all nations points to a strikingand disturbingcontradictionin our public life.Most of our statesmenclaim to
be pursuingpolicies of peace and enunciatehighmoral principles upon whichtheirpolicy is supposed to be based; they
and many publicistspraise the democraciesfor the moral
superiorityof their conduct of foreignaffairsover that of
aggressiveand ruthlessdictators.Yet at the same time many
respectedstudentsin the fieldof internationalrelationsinsist
that all sovereignstates alike are compelledby the "system"
to play theevilgameofpowerpolitics.The twopositionswould
seem to be incompatible.Eitherour statesmenand theirsupporters are deceiving themselvesand others or those who
176
WORLD POLITICS
withoutdiscrimination
condemnall powerpoliticsas immoral
are overstatingthe case. In a countrylike the United States
wheremoralpassion tendsto run highand wherethe question
of moralityin politicsis a matterof genuineand wide concern,
to tryto resolvethiscontradiction.
it is important
The idea thatpowerpoliticsarebeyondthepale ofmoralityis
not new.Down throughthe centuriesMachiavelli and Machiavellianismhave stood fora doctrinewhichplaces princesand
sovereignstates under the rule not of ordinarymoralitybut
of the "reason of state,"consideredan amoral principlepeculiar to the realm of politics.1German writershave been particularlyinsistentthatethicalstandardswhichapplyto private
individualscannotmeasurethebehaviorofstateswhichare said
to be guidedby necessityif notby a hohereSittlichkeit.2
The English-speakingworld, not seldom accused of comdenyingthe contradictions
fortablyignoringor hypocritically
betweenethics and internationalpolitics,has been unwilling
on the whole to admit of any peculiar ethics of state behavior. Because states are abstractions,or at best fictitiouspersonalities,it is not the state that decides and acts but always
individuals,thoughtheybe statesmen.Should theirbehavior
fromthat of other individualsmerely
be judged differently
because they act for the state? To answerin the affirmative
would mean acceptingthe hardly more palatable idea of a
double standard of morality,accordingto which individuals
when actingforthemselvesshall followone set of moral principleswhilethesame individualswhenconductingtheirnation's
1One might question whetherMachiavelli meant to draw a sharp distinctionbetween
the ethics of state behavior,the behaviorof "princes,"which was his main concern,and
the ethics of individualbehavior. In the same Chapter XV of The Prince, in which he
advises the sovereignto learn "how not to be good," he also speaks generallyof the
conditionof man, saying that "whoever abandons what is done for what ought to be
done will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation."He goes on
to say that such a man "must necessarilycome to griefamong so many who are not
good."
2FriedrichMeinecke's Die Idee der Staatsrdson,Munich and Berlin, 1925, is a classic
study of the relationsbetween ethics and power politics as seen by Machiavelli and his
continentaldisciplesdown to Treitschke.No similarstudy has been writtenon the views
of their Anglo-Saxoncontemporaries,
though Gerhard Ritter, in Machtstaat und Utopie,
Munich and Berlin, 1914, makes a suggestivebeginningto such a study. He contrasts
Machiavelli, "pioneer of the continentalpower state," with Thomas More, "ideological
father of the English insular welfare state"-the formersetting power above morality
der Macht" (p. 89).
(p. 31), the latter seekingthe "Ethisierungund Entdamonisierung
STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE
177
foreignpolicyshall be bound by anotherand presumablyless

stringentcode of behavior.3
At firstsight the facts seem to bear this out. Do we not
condemnand punish citizensforcommitting
the veryacts of
violence,treatyviolationor untruthfulness
whichwe condone
in internationalpolitics?Are we not constantlystruckby the
gulf that separates the relativelypeaceful and humane life
withinthe national bordersof states fromthe events occurring on the internationalscene? It is this contrast-more
apparentthan true,as we shall see-that has led some to demand that statesmenbe made to giveup theirsinfulways and
to conformto the rules of behaviorexpectedfromindividuals
in an orderlycommunity.Unfortunately,
advice of this kind
oftenproves so patentlyimpracticalthat instead of inducing
statesmento mend theirways it provokesin thema sense of
moral cynicism.What is the use of listeningto moral advice,
theyask, if statesmanship,
capable of masteringthe problems
which presentthemselvesin practice,is apparentlyincompatiblewithmorality?
The fundamentaldiscrepancywhichseems to existbetween
the moralityof "state" and privatebehaviorwould disappear
only if it could be shownthat politicsconductedin a multistate systemis not necessarilyany moreimmoralthan average
privatebehavior,or that the chiefdifference
pertainsnot to
the degree of immoralityprevailingin the two spheres of
human action but to the circumstancesunderwhichmen are
requiredto act. Much of what strikespeople as immoralpractices of governments
may proveto be morallyjustifiedby the
peculiar and unhappycircumstanceswhichthe statesmanhas
to face and which,moreover,he may oftenbe unableto change.
Anyethicalperfectionist
willbe shockedat sucha suggestion.
He will deny that any action that would be evil under one
8 While Hans J. Morgenthauin ScientificMan vs. Power Politics, Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1946, declares that "No civilizationcan be satisfiedwith . . . a dual
morality" (p. 179), William Ernest Hocking, The Spirit of World Politics, New York,
Macmillan, 1932, writes that statesmen distrust public opinion in internationalaffairs
because the public "takes for grantedthat the codes (for individualsand for states) are
the same." E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis,London, Macmillan, 1940, in contrast
to these authorsasserts that most people, while believingthat states ought to act morally,
do not expectof themthe same kindof moralbehaviorwhichtheyexpectof themselvesand
of one another (p. 199).
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WORLD POLITICS
set of conditionscould be morally justifiedunder another.

If men are held to be morallybound to act in accordancewith
an absolute ethic of love such as the Sermonon the Mount,
obviouslyno set of circumstances,
in which
evencircumstances
the survivalof a nationwere at stake,could justifyacts such
as a resortto violence, untruthfulness,
or treatyviolation.
The concernfor self-preservation
and power in itselfwould
have to be condemnedas evil. This beingthe case, the ethical
can offerno advice to statesmenotherthan that
perfectionist
theygiveup publicofficeand turntheirbacks on politics.As a
matterof fact,in orderto be consistent,the perfectionist,
as
some have pointedout, must give the same advice to private
citizens,requiringof themthattheyabandon theirconcernfor
theirown welfare,forfamilyor business.If, as Hans Morgenthau holds,"theveryact ofactingdestroysourmoralintegrity,"
only a life of saintlinesscould come close to satisfyingperfectionistmoral commands.4
We must address ourselves exclusivelythen to the nonwho demandsof man,not thathe followan absoperfectionist
lute code of ethicalrules-what Max Webercalls the "natural
law of absoluteimperatives"-butthathe make thebestmoral
choice whichthe circumstancespermit.'
But surely,it will be objected,no moralist,at least in our
culture,could deviate so far fromperfectionist
standardsas
condone
even
in
to
wartimesuch inhuman practicesas the
tortureof enemy soldiers or the shootingof hostages. One
would wish that this objectionwould always be valid, but the
factis that the non-perfectionist
cannotescape the conclusion
that circumstancesmay justifywhat superficiallyappear to
be the most despicablekinds of human conduct.Or would he
condemnwithoutcarefulpriorinvestigationall the members
of the FrenchResistancemovementwho,in the face of brutal
Nazi tactics,are said to have answeredtheirenemyin kind?
What if theywere unable to discoverany other alternatives
but eitherto stop in this repulsivefashionthe horrorscom4Hans J. Morgenthau,op. cit., p. 189.
5 See Max Weber's "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
New York, OxfordUniversityPress, 1946, pp. 120 ff.
STATE.SMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE
179
mittedby theNazis or else to leave theirfriendsand theircause

unprotected?This does not implythat circumstancesmorally
justifyeveryact of power politics fromthe violation of the
pledged word to aggressionand concentrationcamps; the
chances are that in most instancestheywill not, whetherbecause the cause is unworthyof such extremesacrificesor
because othermeans are available whichwill assure morally
preferableover-all results.Nor does it mean that wherecircumstancesdo justifysuch acts men may not be guiltyof
havingbroughtabout these circumstancesor of havingfailed
to removethem.
There is nothingpeculiar to internationalpolitics in this
impact of circumstance.Our consciencerevolts at the idea
of men puttingother men to death. Yet non-perfectionist
moraliststhroughoutthe westernworld agree in condoning
in obedienceto an
the acts of those who kill in self-defense,
order to execute a criminal,in war, or possiblyin the case
In otherculturesit has been consideredmorally
oftyrannicide.
proper,if not a moralduty,to put thefirstborn,agingparents,
or widowsto death.One and thesame act,then,will be judged
differently
dependingon the contextwithinwhich it is performedand dependingalso, of course,on the ethicalstandards
by whichbehaviorin generalis judged.
This is not the place to enterupon the age-olddiscussionof
ethicshouldbe, nor
what the standardsof a non-perfectionist
is such a discussionnecessaryforour purpose.Howevermuch
non-perfectionists
may disagreeon ethicalstandardsand thus
on the nature and hierarchyof values, theyhold in common
the processby whichtheyreach theirmoral judgments.They
start with the convictionthat there can be no escape from
sacrificesof value whether,as theologiansmaintain,because
of man's originalsin and essential corruption,or because of
the dilemmasof a world in whichman is faced with incompatiblemoral claims.With this as a basis theyhold thatmen,
statesmenand privateindividualsalike, are morallyrequired
to choose amongthe roads open to themthe one whichunder
the circumstancespromisesto produce the least over-alldeThis content downloaded from 200.17.203.24 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 22:52:48 UTC
180
WORLD POLITICS
structionof value or, positivelyspeaking,points toward the

maximizationof value.'
Moral condemnation,accordingto non-perfectionist
ethics,
restsnot on the factthatvalues have been destroyed,however
deplorableor downrightevil such destructionmay be judged.
Instead it is based on the convictioneitherthat the action in
questionrestedon false ethical standardsor that in termsof
agreed ethical standards a less destructivechoice could and
shouldhave been made.7
Thus a privatecitizen who breaks familyties in order to
servewhat he considersa highercause may findhimselfcondemnedbecause his cause is not consideredworththe sacrificeor because therewere otherless costlyways of attaining
his end. Similarlya statesmanwho decidesto break offdiplomaticnegotiationsratherthanto acceptthetermsoftheopposing side may be judged wrongbecause he placed undue value
on an incrementof nationalprestigewhichwas at stakeor because he failed to appreciateproperlythe dangersinvolvedin
eitherin themethod
his choiceof action.There is no difference
of evaluationor in the ethical standards,whetherthe case be
one of politicalor privatebehavior.In that sense the ethicof
politics is but a part of general ethics.The question which
remainsto be answered,however,is whythe sacrificesofvalue
in internationalpoliticsshould be as widespread,continuous,
and shockingin extentas theyso obviouslyare. Is it becausethe
circumstancesunder whichforeignpolicyis conductedare so
6Max Weber's "ethic of responsibility,"(op. cit., pp. 118 ff.) comes closer to what is
here describedas a non-perfectionist
ethic of maximizationof value than it mightappear
fromsome of his statements.Weber, it is true,declaresthat "fromno ethics in the world
can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose 'justifies'the
ethicallydangerousmeans and ramification"(p. 121). He is here taking issue with the
revolutionary
fanaticwho fromthe point of view of an "ethic of ultimateends" considers
every act of violencejustifiedso long as it serves his ultimateend. But when Weber goes
on to demand of men that they hold themselvesresponsiblefor the consequencesof their
acts, especiallytheiracts of violence,he does not refutetheirmoral rightto "contractwith
the diabolic powersof violence" which as political men they must do, but implicitlycalls
on themto choose the road whichwill minimizethe evil consequencesforwhichthey bear
responsibility.
7
Hans J. Morgenthau,op. cit., followingin the footstepsof Max Weber, also emphasizes the "ethical paradoxes" of politics. "Political ethics," he says, "is indeed the ethics
of doing evil" (p. 202). Yet he too concludes that "it is moral judgment," meaning
presumablythe best a man can morallydo "to choose among several expedientactions
the least evil one" (p. 203).
181
and so unalterablydifferent
fromthose underwhich
different
privatecitizensmake theirchoices?
German writerson internationalpolitics have emphasized
what they considera unique and all-pervasivecircumstance
characteristicof inter-staterelations.Writingin the heyday
of GermanRealpolitikRatzenhoferdeclaredcategoricallythat
the relationsbetween sovereignstates are unalterablyrelations of enmity.8
His assertionremindsone of the no less dogmatic Marxist propositionaccordingto which the relations
betweencapital and labor in a capitalisteconomyare relations
of enemiesengagedin a class war.9
If one looks at the factsof historyand of the contemporary
world,one cannot subscribeto this Germanview. Instead it
seems as if the relationsbetweensovereignstates no less than
the relationsbetweenothergroupsor individualsrunthewhole
gamutfromalmostcompleteamity-take Canadian-American
or Anglo-Canadianrelations-to almost unmitigatedenmity,
as in the days of war. Amityand enmityappear as the two
extremepoles of a wide scale of human relationships.It remains true,however,and a matterof greatpoliticaland moral
consequence,that the multi-statesystem,for reasons which
cannotbe analyzed here,has a tendencyto push relationsbetweenat least some statesin the directionof enmity-and, for
thatmatter,moreso in our centurythanin thelast. The Nazis
certainlysaw to it that this would be so. As faithfuldisciples
Carl Schmittand others,theynot only
of Gustav Ratzenhofer,
believed in the inevitabilityof internationalenmitybut true
to their theoreticalassumptionconductedGerman policy in
such a way as to arouse the fiercestkind of enmityin most
partsof theworld.
The conceptsof amityand enmitycan be usefullyemployed
to shed lighton the contextwithinwhichstatesmenare forced
to make theirchoices. They stand for the two opposite and
8See Gustav Ratzenhofer,Wesen und Zweck der Politik, Leipzig, 1893.
9 Carl Schmitt,in Der Begriffdes Politischen,Munich, 1932, modifiesRatzenhofer's
thesis by declaringthat inter-stateand, in fact, all truly political relationsare in the
nature of "friend-foe"relations.While he does not claim that relationsbetweenall states
at all times are inevitablyhostile, he maintains that nations always group themselves
as friendsand foes and that, there could be no such thing as statehood or politics if it
were not forthe existenceof potentialenmity,by whichhe means the possibilityof deadly
physical combat.
182
WORLD POLITICS
marginalextremesof human relationships.Behavior changes

as therelationshipapproximatesone or theotherofthesepoles.
The causes of enmityin inter-staterelationsare significant
to the moral problemonly to the extentto which statesmen
may be responsibleforbringingabout or for not eliminating
enmity,and thus become responsibleforthe consequencesof
such enmity.
One can imagine a conditionof completeenmitybetween
states.There would be no trace of communitybetweenthem,
no senseof commonlyheld values or of commoninterest.Each
individualstate would have to be looked upon as an entirely
separate entityoperatingin the social vacuum of absolute
anarchy.There would exist a state of latent if not actual
war all the time, turningdiplomacyinto warfarewith other
means. With good reason nations could considerthemselves
in a constantstate of emergencywith all the thingsgravely
endangeredto whichtheyattachedvalue. It would be a situation,as we knowit fromthe experienceof total war, in which
the sheerquest forsurvivalwould justifyalmostany courseof
action. "Out-groupmorality"of the most extremetypewould
prevail.
Take the other extreme,that of amity or the "friend-tofriend" relationship.While there would be no complete
to
a sense of communitywould exist sufficient
identification,
eliminatemutualfearand suspicion.There would be no expecno need forpreparationswith
tationof violenceand therefore
whichto meetthedangersof conflict.Despite thefactthateach
state would be sovereign,or ratherbecause each state would
be freeto handle its own affairs,such friendlynations could
behave towardeach otheraccordingto the codes of "in-group
morality"and live in peace witheach other.
The morerelationsbetweenstatesdegeneratetowardenmity
the more nations are justifiedin fearingfor the thingsthey
cherishand the more reason they have to make and require
sacrificesby which inimical claims can be defeated.Greater
enmitythereforeincreases the likelihoodthat Machiavellian
practices will become necessary and morally justified.The
degreeof amityor enmitythusappearsas a morallyportentous
circumstance.While in a state of amitystatemenare likelyto
183
avenues toward cooperabe able to choose betweendifferent

tion,compromiseand conciliation.Enmity,however,may preclude such choices and place beforethe statesmana different
set of alternatives.He may be able to take steps whichwill
promiseto mitigateif not to eliminateexistingenmity.Often,
however,he will have to choose betweeneffortsto deter his
ofenmity,and efforts
opponent,therebyneutralizingtheeffects
to defeathim.
This cannotbe said to be a peculiarityof internationalpolitics or of the multi-statesystem.The same phenomenoncan
be foundin the relationshipbetweenfatherand son, employer
and employee,white and colored man. There may be completeamitybetweenthemwithno traceof distrust,no shadow
no awarenessof conof fear,no concernfor self-protection,
flictingdemandsor expectations.But here,too, relationsmay
degenerateinto fiercehostilityfor reasons too numerousto
detail. Behaviorthen may changebeyondrecognition.
Two friendsmay live in almost perfectharmony.But let
suspicion arise that one is seeking to exploit their hitherto
in sometreacherousfashion.The other
harmoniousrelationship
will feeljustifiedin spyingon his onetimefriend.He may start
layingtraps.The case may end withone man killingtheother.
What is importantto rememberin this connectionis that the
killermay be judged to have been neitherlegallynor morally
guilty,providedthe treacherywas flagrantenough.Not only
our courts but public opinion in our countryrecognizethe
and unbearableprovocation.
excusesofself-defense
Similarly,strifebetweensuch groups as industrialistsand
workersmay lead to propertydamage, kidnapping,or even
open violence.Here, again, moral judgmentwill take the circumstancesinto account. Public opinionhas been aroused at
of industrialpolice in labor disputes
timesby the employment
and by acts of violenceon thepartof strikingworkers.In each
judges
case, however,condemnationon thepartof fair-minded
of human behaviorhas been based not so much on the fact
that the groupin questionused tacticsof powerpoliticsas on
the convictionthat the provocationor grievancesin a given
to justify acts of coercion and
instance were not sufficient
violence.
184
WORLD POLITICS
It will be objected,and rightlyso, that intra-staterelations

are less likelythan inter-staterelationsto reach a degreeof
hostilitythat would call for the use of violence and other
Machiavelliandevices.10
The state protectsmany of the values
to whichpeople are attached.The state can also prohibitthe
use of means to whichsocietyis opposed and can enforceits
prohibition-thoughonly by the verymeans which the componentsof that societyhave renouncedfor themselves.This
holds true,however,only forwell organizedstates wherethe
can marshalsufficient
authorityand police power
government
to preventfamilyfeuds and social or racial conflictsfrom
breaking into the open and degeneratinginto violence and
the use of otherMachiavellian means. But while the pacifying influenceof such a state and its influenceon human behavior should not be minimized,exponentsof world statehood tend to exaggeratethe case for government.1"
The kind
the kind of internalpeace which
of governmentand therefore
the exceptionrather
thiscountryenjoys at thistimerepresents
than the rule. Our government
operatesunderconditions,not
whollystate-made,of widespreadamitybetweenmost of the
groups that are powerfulenough to influencethe course of
domesticevents. It is recognizedas legitimateby practically
everyoneand is ordinarilyobeyednot because it has the force
of coercion but because its authorityis freelyaccepted. If
eitherin
one looks at the performanceof othergovernments
worldor in past periodsof history,one finds
the contemporary
no lack of examplesof governments
operatingunderquite difresults.
ferentconditionsand withquite different
10 Some writerswhile agreeing that the ethical problemsof political and private life
if only quantitative,which makes
are basically the same neverthelessstressthe difference,
internationalpower politicsthe domain of evil par excellence.In his earlierworksReinhold
Niebuhr stressesthe peculiar selfishnessand immoralityof human communitiesincluding
the state, as indicated by the title of his book, Moral Man and Immoral Society, New
York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Later, however,he places more emphasis on the
fact that all life is a "contest of power" and that internationalwar and conflictare
but a revelationof the generalcharacterof human existenceand human sinfulness.(See
his Christianityand Power Politics, New York, Charles Scribner'sSons, 1940, especially
pages 11, 12, and 103.)
11MortimerAdler,How To ThinkAbout War And Peace, New York, Simon and Shuster,
1944, declares anarchyto be the only cause of war and definesanarchyas "the condition
of those who tryto live withoutgovernment."(p. 69)
185
Some governmentsare strongand ruthlessenoughto suppress the hostilitiesthat would otherwisebreak out between
warringfactions,ethnic,social, or religious,but they do so
Rather
by means of suppression,oftentyrannicalor terroristic.
such
governments
than eliminate Machiavellian practices,
merelymonopolizethem.To what extremesof behaviorthis
may lead has been drasticallydemonstratedby the way modern totalitarianregimeshave persecutedthe "enemies of the
are too weak to controlthe forces
people.".Othergovernments
of internalenmity;thenthereare bloodyrevoltsor civilwars.
When that happens enmityoftenreaches a degreeof fierceness which relations between states rarely approximate.
Machiavellian practices of the most extremekind become
the orderof the day.
Governmentor statehood,whethernational or world-wide,
no panacea againstthose aspectsof powerpolitics
is therefore
are
which
morallydeplorable.The real evil is enmityand its
threatto values to which people are devoted.
However,the moralistneeds to be remindedof the factthat
thereis not only no sure way to eliminatethe fatefulcircumstance of enmitybut that at a given time theremay be no
way at all. Certainlythe eliminationof the multi-statesystem
itself,whetherwithina regionsuch as Europe or on a worldwide scale is not one of the objectivesstatesmenare freeto
morallyobligedto choose under all circhoose and therefore
cumstances.Even if a radical change in the existingorder
were morally desirablebecause therewas reason to suppose
would create
that a regionalfederationor a worldgovernment
circumstancesof greateramitythan exist today,the psychological prerequisitesfor a concertedmove of major nations
towardsuch a goal are beyondthe controlof governments.
If it be true that statesmencannot at all times choose to
workforconditionsof world-wideamityunderworldgovernment,is it not theirmoraldutyat least to promoteamityat all
timesand at all costs?Once it is concededthatenmityrequires
and justifiessacrificesofvalue oftenofthemostshockingkind,
it would seem as if no pricepaid foramitycould be considered
too high.Yet statesmenwould be renderedincapableof maxiThis content downloaded from 200.17.203.24 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 22:52:48 UTC
186
WORLD POLITICS
mizingvalue if,withoutrespectforthe contextin whichthey

wereforcedto operatein a giveninstance,the quest foramity
were taken as the sole measure of theiractions. Amityis a
conditionpassionatelyto be desired; but thereare timeswhen
efforts
to bringit about will lead to disaster.It takes two to
may
make friends.An attemptto establishbonds of friendship
as a signof weakness; the resultmay be aggresbe interpreted
sion. Again the demands of the opponentmay call for sacrifices of value greaterthan those connectedwith continued
enmity.Firmnessand even resortto forcemay under certain
circumstancesrequire less loss of life, less human suffering,
less destructionof faithand principlethan the most sincere
attemptto eliminatethe causes of hostilityby concessions.
This is not the same as sayingthat powerpoliticsgenerally
precludethe opportunityfor persistentand active pursuitof
amity-or of justice for that matter.There are many occasions whendisputescan be settledpeacefullyand whenenmity
can be eliminatedor avoided,providedone side at least has
enoughcourage,imaginationand initiative.Sometimesa spirit
can do wondersin evoking
of conciliationor evenof generosity
a ready and sincere response.Wheneverthe lines of enmity
are not irreparably
drawn,theremay remainroomformoderaforbetterunderstanding
of each other's
tion and self-restraint,
true designsand forfaircompromise.While it is truethat in
the end it needstwo to make friends,it is not alwaysthe other
side whichmusttake thefirststep.'2
Only those who extol the value of national "virility"which
is supposed to expressitselfin obstinateresistanceto compromise,or thosewho are afraidofbeingthe suckerswill insist
thatthe "necessityof state" is always on the side of toughness
and unrelenting
assertionof national claims. Harold Nicolson
castigates Napoleon for being able to ascribe Castlereagh's
12Winston Churchill,The GatheringStorm,Boston, HoughtonMifflin,
1948, p. 320, testifies admirablyto these opportunitiesfor statesmanship.He says "those who are prone by
temperamentand characterto seek sharp and clear-cutsolutionsof difficult
and obscure
problems,who are ready to fightwheneversome challengecomes froma foreignPower,
have not always been right.On the other hand, those whose inclinationis to bow their
for peacefulcompromise,are not always wrong.On
heads, to seek patientlyand faithfully
the contrary,in the majorityof instancesthey may be right,not only morallybut froma
practical standpoint.How many wars have been averted by patience and persistinggood
will!"
187
"splendid moderation"only to treacheryor corruption,to

ignoranceor folly.'"Whethermoderationis politicallypractical
or suicidal depends on the circumstances.Those who feel
called upon to give moral advice to statesmenmust be ready,
ethics,
if theyare to be trueto the tenetsof non-perfectionist
in one
to demand restraintof power,charityand forgiveness
situation,as when feelingsof revengeand war passions run
high,but to insiston a break with an opponent,if not on the
threatento
use of violence,when weaknessor procrastination
If
world governmentwere not only
bring on greaterevils.
practicalbut would, if established,temperenmitiesand help
value mosthighly,it
nationsprotector attainwhattheyrightly
wouldbe themoraldutyof statesmento seek to bringit about.
As thingsstand today,however,lack of consensusamong the
major nations about the desirabilityof world governmentas
well as about the kind of worldgovernment
theywould accept
a government
any
attempt
to
establish
such
is so obviousthat
todaywouldbe morelikelyto lead to warthanto reduceenmity.
To the extentthat enmityexists and cannot be eliminated
at a givenmomentit would appear to dictateto the statesman
a course of action that will oftenrun counterto his moral
Does this not mean that thoseexponentsof Realpreferences.
politikare rightwho claim thatthe statesman,insteadof being
able to make moral choices,is leftwith virtuallyno leeway,
havingto bow to the dictatesof the "necessityof state?"
It confusesthe moral issue to state the case in this way.
The "necessities"in internationalpoliticsand forthat matter
in all spheresof life do not push decisionand action beyond
the realmof moraljudgment;theyreston moralchoicethemselves. If a statesmandecidesthat the dangersto the security
of his countryare so greatthat a courseof actionwhichmay
lead to war is necessary,he has placed an exceedinglyhigh
value on an incrementof nationalsecurity.
Necessitiesof a similarkind are knownto privatecitizens.
Parents may decide that in orderto save the familybusiness
theymusttryto gettheirson to enterthefamilyfirm.Although
they know that they are asking him to choose a career he
abhors,theyare readyto sacrificehis happinessto the "neces18
of Yienna,London, Constable,1946, p. 236.

Harold Nicolson,The Congress
188
WORLD POLITICS
sityof family."A trade union leader who calls a strikewhich

he knowsto be ruinousto patronsto whomhe is devotedmakes
and requires a painful sacrificefor the "necessities"of the
values,interests
labor movement.In everysuch case conflicting
and loyaltiescall for choices in whichwhat is deemed to be
the highercause or value calls forsubmissionto its necessities.
It is no play on wordsto say thatthe necessityor reasonof
state is but anotherof these necessitiesof life whichbecome
compellingonly as a particularpatternof values is accepted.
If the positionof the statesmandiffersfromthat of private
citizensit is because he must take upon himselfthe responsibilityforsacrificesof value in orderthat others,as a nation,
may protector attain the thingswhichtheytreasure.He may
feelin dutybound to do so eventhoughin a giveninstancehe
may disagreewith the moral judgmentof those to whom he
is responsible.In that sense if in no otherit may be justifiable
to speak of the peculiar "demonic" quality of politics and
public office,as Max Weber and otherwritersfrequentlydo.
There is good reasonwhythe controversy
about the relationof
and
ethical
standardsshould
state
ship betweennecessity
be rifein our culture.It points to a clash betweentwo sets
of ethical standards,one Christianor humanistic,the other
nationalistic.Nationalisticethics place what are called vital
nationalinterests-and not nationalsurvivalonly-at thevery
or attainpinnacleof the hierarchyof values. The preservation
colonialpossessions,
mentof thesevalues-territorialintegrity,
Lebensraum,treatyrightsor economicinterests are therefore
assumed to justifythe sacrificeof almost everyothervalue
whetherit be life, generosity,humane treatmentof others,
or obedienceto the law. Especially,the interests
truthfulness
on a nationalistic
of othernationscountforlittle,if anything,
scale of values.
Christianor
While those who adhere to non-perfectionist
humanisticethicalviews acceptthe factthatsacrificesof value
in
are inescapable,as non-nationalists
theymay nevertheless,
the case of any policy decision,questionwhethera particular
national interestis worththe sacrificesrequiredor could not
be protectedby a less costlymethod.This may not seem to
hold true when national survival itselfis unquestionablyat
STATESMANSHIPAND MORALCHOICE
189
stake. It could properlybe said that the multi-statesystem,

since it restson the co-existenceof a multitudeof independent
states,is incompatiblewithany ethicwhichwould forbidsacrificesnecessaryfornational survival.Moral advice not to submit to the necessitiesof survivalwould not only be advice to
commitnational suicide but would tend to wreckthe multistatesystemitself.14
As a matterof fact,the controversy
betweenexponentsof
nationalisticand non-nationalisticethical standards in our
cultureis not overthe moral rightto pay the priceof survival.
or absolutepacifistsdeny a nation
None but the perfectionists
is
in
a
life
and
deathstrugglethe rightto make
which engaged
and demand everysacrificenecessaryforvictory.
But thisis not the same as sayingthatthe non-perfectionist
must capitulatebeforeeveryalleged "necessityof state." Nationsengagedin internationalpoliticsare facedwiththe problem of survivalonly on rare occasions. How otherwisecould
it be explainedthat most of the nationswhichhave attained
independencein recentcenturieshave survivedwhen surely
mostof themmost of the time have been devotedto anything
but an unrestrainedquest for power? If ever any country
did employMachiavellian principlesconsciouslyand methodicallyit was Hitler'sGermany,but withthe resultthatshe lost
her independenceas conclusivelyas few great nations have
done.
As a rule,not survivalbut other"national interests"are at
stake, such as the preservationof outlyingbases and possesof national
sions,theprotectionoftreatyrights,the restoration
14 It is not surprisingthat authors who believe that international
politics is essentially
a strugglefor national survival should reach very pessimisticethical conclusions.Thus,
Nicholas J. Spykman,America's Strategyin World Politics, New York, Harcourt Brace,
1942, bases his case on the propositionthat "the strugglefor power is identicalwith the
strugglefor survival" and that states can survive only by constant devotion to power
politics. Althoughthe use of power "should be constantlysubjected to moral judgments"
(p. 12), Spykman concludes that the "statesman can concern himselfwith values of
justice, fairnessand toleranceonly to the extentthat they contributeto or do not interfere with the power objective," meaningthe quest for survival. In his furtherstatement
that the quest for power is not made for "the achievementof moral values" he is taking
issue with those exponents of nationalisticethics who place supreme moral value on
national survival. See also in this connectionMortimerAdler's statementthat "so long
remains the dominantend for which prudence must choose
as national self-preservation
means, the principlesof moralitycannot be reconciledwith the counsels of prudence."
(op. cit., p. 78)
190
WORLD POLITICS
honor, or the maintenanceof economic advantages. While

it is a prerequisiteof the systemthat nations attach a high
if not the highest value to their survival, the same cannot be said of these othernational interests.As a matterof
fact,themoraldilemmaswithwhichstatesmenand theircritics
are constantlyfaced revolvearound the question of whether
in a giveninstancethe defenseor satisfactionof interestsother
than survivaljustifythe costs in othervalues. Does the expropriationof Americaninvestmentsabroad,forinstance,justify
ratherthan of unpromising
the choiceof militaryintervention
negotiation?Is it morallypreferableto riska loss of prestige
withits possibledangerousconsequencesforthe safetyof the
countryratherthan to insiston maintaininga positionwhich
threatensto provokehostilities?In everycase the interpretationof what constitutesa vital nationalinterestand howmuch
value should be attachedto it is a moral question.It cannot
be answeredby reference
to allegedamoralnecessitiesinherent
in internationalpolitics; it restson value judgments.
Even nationalsurvivalitself,it shouldbe added,is a morally
compellingnecessityonly as long as people attach supreme
value to it. In that sense the multi-statesystemitselfdepends
on a value patternin whichthereis an elementof nationalism.
If at any time those who have the power to decide over the
foreignpolicies of the major countriesshould come to attach
highervalue to the attainmentof world governmentthan to
the preservationof independence,the psychological,though
not necessarilyall otherpractical,obstaclesto world governUntil thathappensnationsare likely
mentwould be removed.'5
to consentto all kinds of Machiavellian practices,however
muchtheymay abhorthem,whenevertheyare convincedthat
theirindependencecan be saved in no otherway.
15
R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government,New York, Macmillan, 1947, suggests
that these basic value judgments may change as the old mythsof national sovereignty
and national interestslose their grip on people, while Arnold Toynbee, A Study of
History,New York and London, OxfordUniversityPress, 1947 (p. 299), passing moral
judgment, denounces the "pagan worship of sovereignnation-states"calling it a monstrous product of the impact of parochialismon the WesternChristianChurch." See, in
this connection,also Harold Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity,New York
and London, McGraw-Hill, 1935, who devotes Chapter XI, "In Quest of a Myth: The
Problem of World Unity," to the problemof how, by the use of symbols,myths,and
other practices,human value judgments might be changed in favor of world unity.
191
Internationalpolitics offersome opportunitiesand temptations for immoral action on a vast and destructivescale;
theytend to presentthemselvesin the guise of "necessityof
state." Statesmen in command of the machineryby which
public opinion can be manipulatedmay make it appear as if
theywere actingforthe sake of objectivesto whichthe people
attach highvalue when in fact theyare out to servematerial
personal interestsor to satisfypersonal ambitionsfor power.
Where men wield as much power as theydo in international
politicsthereis roomforan infinite
varietyof abuses forwhich
the "necessityof state" can serveas a convenientcloak. Then
again, statesmenmay sincerelybelievethata particularcourse
of actionis dictatedby vital nationalinterests;but judged by
non-nationalistic
standardsofethicstheymaybe placingundue
value on certaininterestsof theirpeople or underestimating
the value of thingsnot pertainingto theirnation whichtheir
policywould sacrifice.
While this makes moral criticismand self-criticism
imperawhichstand in the way of theirproperuse
tive,the difficulties
in internationalpoliticsneed to be emphasized.If it is hard
forstatesmento make propermoralchoices,it is not any easier
forothersto do justice to theirconductof foreignpolicy.
It is a bafflingtask, almost exceedinghuman capacity,to
comparethe value of an incrementof national securitywith
thevalue of humanlives,or the value of a continuedperiodof
peace with the risksof a more destructivewar in the future.
Yet the statesmanis facedwitheven moreexactingand truly
terrifying
problems.Forced to make his choices whenevera
decisionis called for,he may have to comparethe value of an
uncertainchance of greatersecuritywithonly roughlypredictable risksof conflictand destruction.It maybe easy withhindsight,and years afterthe event,to condemna statesmanfor
havingfailedto maximizevalue; but it also becomesincreasas time goes on to do justice to the inevitable
inglydifficult
lack of knowledgeand foresightunder which the decisionmakerlaboredat thetime.Yalta is a good exampleto illustrate
this moral problem."6
16
See RudolphA. Winnacker,
"Yalta-AnotherMunich?"in The FirginiaQuarterly
Review,Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn,1948), pp. 521-37.
192
WORLD POLITICS
The trouble about much of the moral condemnationof

foreignpolicies and with much of the moral advice tendered
to statesmengoes back to a lack of appreciationof the kind
of knowledgerequiredfor properand useful moral criticism
in internationalaffairs.From a non-perfectionist
pointof view
the circumstances,howevertechnical,have to be taken into
consideration;moral convictionand highideals, much as they
are needed to guide moral judgment,cannot by themselves
offeran answer.Nor is thistruein internationalpoliticsonly.
It need some knowledgeof economicsto judge whetheran
industrialistis exploitinghis workers; he may be paying
the highestwages the traffic
will bear. It needs psychological
understandingto decide whetherin a particular situation
divorcerepresentsmorallythe least evil choice.
Similarly,in internationalpoliticswherethe circumstances
are no less involvedand technical,moralconvictionscannottell
whatroads are opento a statesmanunderthespecificconditions
underwhichhe is forcedto act, nor can theyrevealwhat the
politicalconsequencesand therefore
the relativecostsin terms
of value of any one of several courses of action are likelyto
be. Will an alliance provokewar or will the failureto make a
commitment
temptan aggressor?Will an appeal to theUnited
Nations in a givencase help bringabout a peacefulsettlement
or instead create graver tension,perhaps even going so far
as to destroythe organization?Disarmamentmay be morally
thebestchoiceunderone set ofcircumstances;it maybe downrightevil in anotherin which it would place a nation-and
small nations dependentupon it for their security-at the
mercyof an ambitiousconqueror.The same holds trueforall
the otherpanaceas or devicesso dear to the heartof thosewho
are most quicklyreadyto give moral advice to policy-makers
or to condemnthemfortheiractions.In one contextit may be
rightto offerconcessionswhereasin anotherit may constitute
"appeasement"withall ofits evil consequences.
There mightseem to be one exceptionto the rule that no
moral judgment
generalprinciplecan guide non-perfectionist
on all occasions.It mightseem properto assume thatthe "defensive"sideis alwaysrightand thateveryactionis justifiedand
of
justifiedonlyifnecessaryfortheprotectionand preservation
193
values alreadypossessed.Unfortunately,
whileindividualscan
disprovetheirguiltif theycan rightlyclaim to have acted in
self-defense,
the case of nationsis far more complex.Neither
the nation's self nor its possessionsare clearlycircumscribed.
May a nation defendas its self and its possessionsonly its
territorial
integrity
and independence,
or does the rightof selfdefensecovera way of life,national honor,livingspace, prestige,colonial possessionsand economicrightsabroad? Status
quo powers whose main concern is the preservationof the
values they possess and thereforethe defenseof the establishedorderare proneto blame all Machiavellianismon those
nationsthatseek to bringabout change,whetherit be revision
of treaties,revolutionof the social order or liberationfrom
foreigndomination.Yet, the "offensive"
side may have a valid
case for insistingthat it has a vital need forthingswithheld
fromit and may rightly
value themto a pointwhereany means
ofattainingthembecomemorallyjustified.Those whorefuseto
make the sacrificesof change or who, having broughtabout
an unjust distributionof possessionsand powerare unwilling
to correctit, may be guiltyof provokingenmityand aggression. If the Moslems in India or the Zionistsin Palestine resortedto violence,theywere not defendingan existingorder
but were seekingto establishnew and independentnational
homes throughchanges in the existingorder.They were not
necessarilyat faultmerelybecause theywantedthesechanges
so urgentlyor because theydespairedof any means shortof
violence. The beati possidentesmay be more peaceful and
less inclinedto initiateopen hostility,but theirguilt may lie
and blind devotionto the status quo
in their self-righteous
whichtheyevokein others.
or in the resentment
of doing justice to the statesman
Despite the difficulties
and of avoidingthe pitfallsof politicallydangerousas well as
morally untenable condemnations,men who have non-perfectionistand non-nationalisticmoral convictionsdare not
evade thetask ofmoraljudgmentwhetheroftheirown political
acts or of the acts of others.Wherethereis so much roomfor
moral choices as thereis in internationalpolitics and where
the destinyof entirenationsdependson thesechoices,attempts
to evade, silence or ignoremoral judgmentmerelyplay into
194
WORLD POLITICS
the hands of those who relishthe uncriticizeduse or abuse of

theirpower.The Nazi leaders were helped by the climateof
moral cynicismwhichprevailedin Germany.It made it easy
forthemto justifyeven the most brutal acts on the grounds
of necessityof state or to glorifytheir freedomfrom any
"decadent"moralinhibitions.
The world will not fail to sufferfromthe immoralacts of
statesmenas ofothermenin thefutureas it has in thepast,nor
does it look as thoughnationswould soon be freedfromthe
bitterconsequencesofinternational
enmity,or fromthe appalling sacrificesinflictedand justifiedin the name of national
engaged
interestand survival.A singlepowerfulgovernment,
forwhateverreasons,in a policyof aggressionand aggrandizement may force all others into line with its Machiavellian
practices,providedtheseothershave thewillto survive.In such
cases moral exhortationsand intentionswill servelittleunless
the causes of such aggressionand the dangersinherentin it
are removed.
Yet internationalpoliticsare not beyond the pale of nonmorality.Statesmenneed not
nationalistic,non-perfectionist
be foolingeitherthemselvesor othersif theycontend,as they
frequentlydo, that in specificinstancesthey have restrained
theirnation's quest forpower; nor need they apologizeif,on
occasion theychoose a conciliatoryor even a generouscourse
of action,thougha moreegotisticalpolicywould promisemore
tangiblenational benefits.Despite the continuedstrengthof
nationalistsentimentin all partsoftheworld,thereis no reason
to assume that people value national benefitsonly. They
oftenattach a great deal of value to a good recordof internationalcollaborationand at timesapplaud a leaderwho takes
risks for the good will, the amity or the interestsof other
nations-or seeks to keep his own conscienceand that of his
people clear.
This explains why under certaincircumstancesa national
governmentmightreceivethe backing of its people even in
sacrificingnational independenceitself,particularlyif it were
done forthepurposeofestablishinga betterinternational
order,
Fromthepointofviewofnonfederation.
perhapsa world-wide
forworldgovernnationalisticethicssuchnationalself-sacrifice
195
mentmightappear morallyjustifiedif therewas assuranceof

enough amity and all-roundconsentto permitthe establishmentand functioning
of an orderlyand humanegovernment
of
the world; it mightbe condemnedif it led to worldtyrannyor
worldanarchy.There are historicalinstanceswhensuch sacrifice of independencehas justifieditselfin the eyes of almost
everybody,as when the thirteenAmerican states federated
successfully.
Under the circumstancesusually prevailingin a multi-state
systempainfullimitationsare set on policiesof self-negation,
generosity
or restraintof power.It would be utopianto expect
drasticchangesin thisrespect.But to say thatthefieldofinternational politics is reservedfor selfishness,brutality,selfrighteousnessor unrestrainedambitionforpoweris not only
cynicalbut manifestlyunrealistic.

Statesmanship and the Limits of Morality

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Trustees of Princeton University

Statesmanship and Moral Choice

AND MORAL CHOICE

mHROUGHOUT the ages moralistshave expressedhor-

1 ror at the way princes and sovereign states behave

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

foreignpolicyshall be bound by anotherand presumablyless

set of conditionscould be morally justifiedunder another.

New York, OxfordUniversityPress, 1946, pp. 120 ff.

STATE.SMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

mittedby theNazis or else to leave theirfriendsand theircause

structionof value or, positivelyspeaking,points toward the

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

marginalextremesof human relationships.Behavior changes

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

avenues toward cooperabe able to choose betweendifferent

It will be objected,and rightlyso, that intra-staterelations

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

mizingvalue if,withoutrespectforthe contextin whichthey

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

"splendid moderation"only to treacheryor corruption,to

of Yienna,London, Constable,1946, p. 236.

sityof family."A trade union leader who calls a strikewhich

stake. It could properlybe said that the multi-statesystem,

honor, or the maintenanceof economic advantages. While

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

The trouble about much of the moral condemnationof

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

the hands of those who relishthe uncriticizeduse or abuse of

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

mentmightappear morallyjustifiedif therewas assuranceof

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