G.R. No.

L-22533

February 9, 1967

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L.

RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and
ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
Placido B. Ramos and Renato L. Ramos for
petitioners.
Trinidad & Borromeo for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. 1 and Andres
Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as
a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958,
involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractortruck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at
the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos,
son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's
tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and codefendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio
negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily,
were ordered to pay the plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual
damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees,
with costs.
Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants
appellee to the Court of Appeals.
Said Court, on January 15, 1964, affirmed the trial
court's judgment insofar as it found defendant
Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving
defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that,
contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA
sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of
its driver Bonifacio.
Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this
petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision.
And appellants would argue before this Court that
defendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to show

that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of

its driver in question.
Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of
Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's favor, thus:
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco,
personnel manager of defendant company, was to
the effect that defendant driver was first hired as
a member of the bottle crop in the production
department; that when he was hired as a driver,
'we had size [sic] him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and
later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the
usual driver's examination, consisting of: First,
theoretical examination and second, the practical
driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was
a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof,
we are of the sense that defendant company had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the choice or selection of defendant
driver'. In the case of Campo vs. CamaroteNo.
L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's
brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it
down as a rule that "In order that the defendant
may be considered as having exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family, he should
not have been satisfied with the mere possession
of a professional driver's license; he should have
carefully examined the applicant for employment
as to his qualifications, his experiences and
record of service." Defendant Company has
taken all these steps.2
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion
of the decision under review by taking issue with the
testimony of Anasco upon which the findings of due
diligence aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now
contended that Aasco being PEPSI-COLA's
employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that
his testimony is not believable.
It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise
herein an issue of fact and credibility, something as to
which this Court has consistently respected the
findings of the Court of Appeals, with some few
exceptions, which do not obtain herein.3
Stated differently, Aascos credibility is not for this
Court now to re-examine. And said witness having

been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his

testimony, as accepted by said Court, cannot at this
stage be assailed. As We said in Co Tao vs. Court of
Appeals, L-9194, April 25, 1957, assignments of
error involving the credibility of witnesses and which
in effect dispute the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these proceedings.
For a question to be one of law it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. 4 And the
distinction is well-known: There is a question of law
in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.5
From all this it follows that for the purposes of this
appeal, it must be taken as established that, as
testified to by Aasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact
carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to
his qualifications, experiences and record of service,
taking all steps mentioned by the Court of Appeals in
its decision already quoted.1wph1.t
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that
PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence in
the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in
Campo vs. Camarote53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order
that the defendant may be considered as having
exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no
question is raised as to due diligence in the
supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article
2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:
... The owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall

cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.

And construing a similar provision of the old

Civil Code, this Court said in Bahia vs. Litonjua,
30 Phil. 624, 627:
From this article two things are apparent: (1)
That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that the presumption is juris tantumand
not juris et de jure, and consequently may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not
duly proved by PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in
the selection of its driver. And, parenthetically, it is
not surprising that appellants thus confine their
arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the
record as even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17) reflects
in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's
witness would show sufficient evidence to
establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSICOLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.
Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise
outside the purview of this Court's reviewing power.
Thus, the question of whether PEPSI- COLA violated
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and rules and
regulations related thereto, not having been raised
and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot be
ventilated herein for the first time. 6 And the matter
of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the
negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper
herein.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

May 16, 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners seek a reconsideration1 of Our decision2 in
the instant case affirming in totothe challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals absolving
respondent PEPSI-COLA from liability. In Our
decision, We refrained from passing on the merits of
the question whether PEPSI-COLA, in operating the
tractor-truck and trailer, violated the Rev. Motor
Vehicle Law3 and the rules and regulations related
thereto, for the procedural reason that it did not
appear to have been raised before the Court of
Appeals.
It now appears, however, that said question was
raised in a motion to reconsider filed with the Court
of Appeals which resolved the same against
petitioners. Due consideration of the matter on its
merits, convinces Us that the decision of the Court of
Appeals should still be affirmed in toto.
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of
subpars. 1 and 4(d), par. (a), Sec. 27 of M.V.O.
Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951, in
that at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck,
which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a)
being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond
the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a
rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the
driver.
The cited provisions read:
SECTION 27. Registration, operation, and
inspection of truck-trailer combinations, semitrailers, and tractors.
(a) No trailer or semi-trailer having a gross
weight of more than 2,000 kilograms and is not
equipped with effective brakes on at least two
opposite wheels of the rear axle and are so
controlled that the brakes will act in unison with
or preceding the effective action of the brakes of
the tractor-truck shall be registered for operation
on public highways of the Philippines; provided,
that the trialers without brakes may be registered
from year to year for operation under the
following conditions:

1. No such trailer shall be operated at any time at

a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in
conjunction with a tractor-truck, the actual gross
weight of which is less than twice the weight of
the trailer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

4(d) Tractor-trucks shall be either equipped with

rear-vision mirror to enable the driver to see
vehicles approaching mirror the rear or shall
carry a helper who shall be so stationed on the
truck or trailer that he will constantly have a
view of the rear. He shall be provided with
means of effectively signalling to the driver to
give way to overtaking vehicles.
4(e) No truck and trailer combination shall be
operated at a speed greater than 30 kilometers
per hour.
It will be noted that the 15 k.p.h. limit in subpar.
1, supra, refers only to trailers or semi-trailers
having a gross weight of more than 2,000 kgms.,
AND which are "not equipped with effective
brakes on at least two opposite wheels, of the
rear axle and are so controlled that the brakes
will act in unison with or preceding the effective
action of the brakes of the tractor-truck..." This is
the condition set in the provisoin par. (a), supra,
wherein "trailers without [such] brakes may be
registered from year to year for operation ..." i.e.,
they should not "be operated at any time at a
speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in
conjunction with a tractor-truck ...". But there
was no finding by the Court of Appeals that the
truck-trailer here did not have such brakes. In the
absence of such fact, it is subpar. 4(e), supra, that
will apply. And petitioners admit that the trucktrailer was being driven at about 30 k.p.h.
It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied
by a helper on the night of the collision since he was
found to be driving alone. However, there is no
finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rearvision mirror. To be sure, the records disclose that
Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman who went
to the collision scene, testified that he saw the tractortruck there but he does not rememberif it had any rear
vision mirror.4 This cannot prove lack of rear-vision
mirror. And the cited provision subpar. 4(d) is
complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having

a rear-vision mirror or a helper, is present. Stated

otherwise, said provision is violated only where there
is a positive finding that the tractor-truck did not have
both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the driver.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having
violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor
Vehicle Law, providing that:
No motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall
exceed the following dimensions:

any finding to that effect. And it was incumbent

upon petitioners-appellants to have proved lack
of such permit since the tractor-truck and the
trailer were registered.5 Compliance with law and
regularity in the performance of official duty
in this case, the issuance of proper registration
papers are presumed6 and prevail over mere
surmises. Having charged a violation of law, the
onus of substantiating the same fell upon
petitioners-appellants. Hence, the conclusion that
there was a violation of the law lacks factual
basis.

Overall width ................ 2.5 meters.

xxx

xxx

xxx

since there was an express finding that the trucktrailer was 3 meters wide. However, Sec. 9 (d) of
the same law, as amended, providing that
SEC. 9. Special permits, fees for.-The chief of the
Motor Vehicles Officewith the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
shall establish regulations and a tariff of
additional fees under which special permits may
be issued in the discretion of the Chief of the
Motor Vehicles Office or his deputies, for each
of the following special cases, and without such
special permit, no such motor vehicles shall be
operated on the public highways.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) For registration or use of a motor vehicle

exceeding the limit of permissible dimensions
specified in subsections (b) and (c) of section
eight-A hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

expressly allows the registration, or use of motor

vehicles exceeding the limits of permissible
dimensions specified in subsec. (b) of Sec. 8-A.
So, to conclude that there was a violation of law
which undisputably constitutes negligence, at
the very least it is not enough that the width of
the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in
addition, it must also appear that there was no
special permit granted under Sec. 9.
Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual
link is missing. There was no proof much less

Petitioners would also have Us abandonthe

Bahiaruling.7 In its stead, We are urged to apply the
Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We
cannot however, abandon the Bahia ruling without
going against the explicit mandate of the law. A
motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against
all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our
Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's
responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. The Bahiacase merely clarified what
that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the
selection and supervision of the driver-employee.
Neither could We apply the respondent
superiorprinciple. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own
negligence, not that of his employees. The former is
made responsible for failing to properly and
diligently select and supervise his erring employees.
We do not and have never followed the
respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings
cited by petitioners, based as they are on said
doctrine, are not authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing,
reconsideration is hereby denied.

the

motion

for

the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts,

however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.

G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor
represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA,
ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT,defendant-appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendantappellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict,
decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by
the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort,
13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962
their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a
plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly
worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently
to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At
that precise moment the latter turned around to face
her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting
from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated
it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related
the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to
a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August
4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of
twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents

in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso
Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the
defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual
damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of
a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another under the specific facts related
above and the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof,
which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasidelictand is governed by provisions of this
Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article
shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by
Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying
the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or
intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or
omission is that of one person for whom another is

responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable

under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated
therein, such as that of the father or the mother under
the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this
vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from
that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and
may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter
of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on
the defendant. But what is the exact degree of
diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove
it in connection with a particular act or omission of a
minor child, especially when it takes place in his
absence or outside his immediate company?
Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated
measure applicable; and when the law simply refers
to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the
attendant circumstances in every individual case, to
determine whether or not by the exercise of such
diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may
be inferred that the defendant could have prevented
the damage by the observance of due care, or that he
was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where
she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have
any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity,
or indeed any trait in the child's character which
would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little
commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that
befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to

compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal

sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral
compulsion of good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the
complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS
OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA
DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR.,respondents.
RE S O LUTI ON

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare

null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis
Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al.,
CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October
1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the
petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However,
even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a

burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed

and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the
family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal,
a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch
XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of
which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the
fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30,
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was
denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment
and
denied
their
motion
for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R.
No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion
for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this
Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,

August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule

and went further to restate and clarify the modes and
periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the
operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace
period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June
30, 1986, within which the rule barring
extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion
for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on
June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for
extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace
period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period
to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published

in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions

(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument
that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been
applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.

G.R. No. L-54357 April 25, 1988

REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father
PEDRO PASCO,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN,
BRANCH V, STA. MARIA and ARANETA
UNIVERSITY,respondents.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for petitioner.

states:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
is equally applicable to academic institutions.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions,
while walking inside the campus of the private
respondent Araneta University, after attending classes
in said university, was accosted and mauled by a
group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim
Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also
students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was
subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence
he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University
(MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save
his life.
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father
Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against
Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent
Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as
Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded
as a party defendant based on the aforementioned
provision of the Civil Code.
On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180
of the New Civil Code under which it was
sued applies only to vocational schools and
not to academic institutions;

Marcelo C. Aniana for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this

case is whether the provision of the penultimate
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which

b. That every person criminally liable for a

felony is also civilly liable under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil
liability in this case arises from a criminal
action which the defendant university has
not committed;
c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should
have been made by the plaintiff, hence, it
would be premature to bring an action for

damages against
(Rollo, p. 96)

defendant

University.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.,dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.

On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order *

granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the Order of Dismissal but the motion was
likewise denied on the ground that there is no
sufficient justification to disturb its ruling. Hence,
this instant Petition for certiorari under Republic Act
No. 5440, praying that judgment be rendered setting
aside the questioned order of May 12, 1980
dismissing the complaint as against respondent
school and the order of July 17, 1980 denying the
reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal,
with costs against respondent school.
We find no necessity of discussing the applicability
of the Article to educational institutions (which are
not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this
petition is actually whether or not, under the article,
the school or the university itself (as distinguished
from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the
answer in the negative, for surely the provision
concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J. and Padilla, JJ., concur.

As stated by him, my view is that while the

educational institution is not directly liable, yet the
school, as the employer, may be held liable for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article
2180, Civil Code). The school, however, may
exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J.,dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed
as the basis for the liability of the school as the
employer for the failure of its teachers or school
heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47745,
citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages,
1978 ed., p. 201).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.,dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J.,dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed
as the basis for the liability of the school as the
employer for the failure of its teachers or school
heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47745,
citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages,
1978 ed., p. 201).

As stated by him, my view is that while the

educational institution is not directly liable, yet the
school, as the employer, may be held liable for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article
2180, Civil Code). The school, however, may
exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.