1

The Proverbs and Its Definition 3: A Ka:rmik Linguistic Analysis of

the Characteristics of the Definition of the Proverb
Chilukuri Bhuvaneswar, Department of Linguistics, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India

Abstract
In the first two articles (Bhuvaneswar 2015 a, b) on the The Proverb and Its Definition 1, and
2, fifty definitions by important proverbiologists have been taken into consideration and their
defects have been pointed out by an analysis of the 15 important characteristics observed in
these 50 definitions. In the analysis, it has been observed that these definitions are not anchored
on solid logical and linguistic principles. In addition, there is a lack of clear-cut, linguistic
understanding of what proverbs are, how they are used, and why they are used in the context of
their creation and application. What is more, there is no scientific rigour in the derivation of the
definition of the proverb as can be seen from the list of these 50 definitions given in
Bhuvaneswar (2015a) and the 15 characteristics of proverbs reviewed in Bhuvaneswar (2015b).
Therefore, there is a need for establishing the defining procedures and characteristics of the
proverb. In this connection, in this article, three important secondary, essential, and
uncommon characteristics for defining the proverb are proposed in the ka:rmik linguistic
paradigm to fill the gap in defining it. Finally, in the last and fourth paper, the definition of the
proverb is further supported by a ka:rmik linguistic analysis of some more examples from real
life.
Key Words: 50 definitions of the proverb, 15 characteristics of proverbs, ka:rmik
linguistic analysis, definition of the proverb, secondary, essential, and uncommon
characteristics of the proverb

I.
INTRODUCTION
Proverbs are language and as such they inherit the properties of language. As
language, they are created through the medium of sound in patterned structures at the
level of phonology, morphology, and syntax to semiotically represent meaning, also, in
definite patterns to perform certain functions. These patterned structures representing
meaning and performing functions are products of cognitions of individuals (Vyashti)
generalized at the collective (Samashti) level of the society or culture. Furthermore,
these cognitions themselves are patterned and are derived a:nushangikally from the
svabhavam (disposition) of the individuals as the society a:nushangikally means that
in a set, each following member inherits the properties of the former member in addition
to its own property; it can also be a cause-effect constituting set in which A is the cause of B
and so on). What is more, the svabhavam which is the cause (ka:raNam) for the
impressionality or internalized habituation (va:sana) in cognitions is the result of the karma
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the individuals as constituting the society performed. Hence, the properties of
proverbs as language span across the formal (structural), functional, cognitive, sva:bha:vik,
and ka:rmik levels of action.
Proverbs are also a genre of language and as such they will have their own generic
properties. These properties can be secondary, essential, uncommon, and impossible. The
secondary properties are differentially distributed among the same genre and can
equally be found in other genres also in the same way; the essential properties are
universally found within the same genre but can equally be found in other genres also
either as secondary or essential properties; the uncommon properties are the essential
characteristics which are genre specific and absent in other genres; and the impossible
properties are the negative properties which cannot be obtained within a genre.
Hence, the properties of proverbs as a genre can be secondary, essential, uncommon
and impossible under the properties of proverbs as language which are, as already
pointed out, formal, functional, cognitive, sva:bha:vik and ka:rmik.
For the definition of proverbs as a genre to be made correctly, its linguistic and generic
properties have to be not only understood intuitively but must also be identified and
classified empirically. Only then can we incorporate the most essential ingredient,
which is the uncommon characteristic, into the definition. Inability to do so will result
in mere descriptions in the garb of definitions, as it happened in the history of
paremiology [see Bhuvaneswar (2015 a, b) for such 50 references].
Right from the time of Aristotle, many critics have made attempts to describe the
properties of proverbs and define them in terms of these properties. Some described
the secondary properties and some described one or two essential properties but none
the uncommon characteristic. Hence they could not hit the nail of the proverb on the
top of its uncommon characteristic and fix it solidly on the definition plane.
Such a failure can be attributed to a number of factors. First, research on proverbs is
lopsided. Proverbs have been subjected to extensive analysis in the field of meaning
and aetiology on the one hand and collection and compilation of individual proverbs
on the other hand. Very little research has been done in the most important and vital
area of discourse analysis of proverbs, be it their collection or interpretation. Second,
mainstream linguists have not focused their attention on proverbs to a considerable
extent. None of the pioneers of linguistic theories have written substantive research
articles on proverbs, be it Bloomfield, Chomsky, or Halliday, as far as I know. Third,
pragmatics and discourse analysis are relatively recent phenomena in the long history
of paremiology. As such, the earlier paremiologists have been deprived of the
necessary tools to handle proverbs. It is true that a bad workman quarrels with his
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tools but it is equally true that a good workman cannot succeed without good tools. Adding
fuel to fire, most of the paremiologists are not thoroughbred linguists. In spite of their
outstanding dedication and immense erudition, they have been turned into great
archers without the powerful linguistic arrows to hit the bulls eye. Such is the case
with giants like Archer Taylor and even Wolfgang Mieder who is virtually an
encyclopedia of proverbiological bibliography! Fourth, proverbs belong to a complex
genre whose properties cut across formal, functional, and cognitive linguistics and
beyond into social psychology and ka:rmatics (experiential pragmatics). As a result, an
inter-disciplinary approach is needed to grasp the overall nature of proverbs. Very
surprisingly, no such overall attempts have been made and all research is piecemeal,
scattered and tattered; until today, no such attempts have been made to
comprehensively record the overall formal, functional, cognitive, and cultural
anthropological linguistic properties at one place. So the interpretation of proverbs for
a definition has become a wild goose chase without a centrally coordinated
orientation.
What is more, the mainstream linguists are all partially blind. Formal linguists are
functionally myopic; functional linguists are formally hypermetropic; cognitive
linguists are formally and functionally astigmatic; and anthropological linguists are
culturally jaundiced. Finally, all the linguists are ka:rmikally blind, thus turning the
whole dialectics of linguistics into a tangled choreography of fission, diffusion, fusion
and confusion, making confusion worse confounded! In such a scenario, the
proverbiologist has impaired his sense of vision, and in turn his description of the
elephant proverb has become a:nushangikally and proverbially blind fitting the
properties of the cause into the properties of the effect as in jaundiced vision. Finally,
he is not in a position to comprehensively pinpoint the characteristics of proverbs at all
the levels under an overall framework as this and that to be so and so in such and such
manner.
In the late 1990s, Bhuvaneswar attempted to study proverbs from such an overall
perspective under a unified theory called the ka:rmik linguistic theory and identify
their characteristics as secondary, essential and uncommon. From that perspective it is
possible to look afresh at the definitions in this paper. But before that, let us make a
comprehensive review of the definitions of proverbs made so far by the learned critics.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Among the major proverbiologists who examined and defined the proverb, Richard
Chenevix Trench (1853 as 1905 as 2003: 1-25), Edward Hulme (1856 as 2007: 1-25),
Archer Taylor (1931), Bartlett Jere Whiting (1932: 273-307), Wolfgang Mieder (1993: 317; 18-40; 2004: 1-16), and Bhuvaneswar (2015) are important. These critics (excluding
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Bhuvaneswar) have reviewed a number of definitions given by their predecessors and
then offered their own definition in their articles on the definition of the proverb
Mieder (2001: 395-6) lists 206 entries under definition in the Subject Index!
Nonetheless, their definitions have still remained descriptions only! The reason is that
there is a research gap in proverbiology which is lack of research in conversational
discourse analysis of proverbs, especially, proverbial conversational exchanges (as
Bhuvaneswar (2012 a, b) calls them), and also in the methodology of not identifying
the uncommon characteristic of the proverb which identifies the proverbness proper of
the proverb a parallel term proverbiality is broad and it may cover any of the properties of
proverbs and so it is not used here since it does not precisely reflect the concept of the
uncommon characteristic that marks off a proverb from other genres. In Bhuvaneswar
(2013 a, b, 15), the uncommon characteristic is identified as a mixed characteristic of the
three essential characteristics which are: frozen textuality; cultural confirmation; and procat instantiation without taking into consideration the illocutionary force of the proverb
in its use or as a text in citation where the text projects its own illocutionary force. In
addition, he has written two articles (2015 a, b) in which he reviewed 50 definitions by
various proverbiologists and defined the proverb in a rigorously scientific method of
taking defects as well as the characteristics of definitions into account (in 2015 c, d). In
the first article, he has mentioned a list of 50 definitions by various proverbiologists
and identified 15 important characteristics mentioned in these 50 definitions. They are:
i. popularity including tradition, currency, and cultural acceptance (30); ii. brevity (19); iii.
Wisdom (13); iv. truth (13); v. experience (8); vi.a. figurative language and imagery (7), b.
metaphorical (5); vii. anonymity (7); viii. social advice (5); ix. strategies (3); x.
generalizations (3); xi. fixed form (2); xii. memorable (2); xiii. syntactic formulas (4); xiv.
formulaic (1); and xv. authority (1). In the second article, he showed WHY they cannot by
themselves be used to define the proverb. In the third article (2015c) which is the present
article he establishes the secondary, essential, and uncommon characteristics of the
proverb. In the last article (2015 d), he re-examines the observations made by Mieder
(2007) in his Review of Bhuvaneswar (2007 as 2014) that he (Mieder) has no objection
for Bhuvaneswars new definition but it is also one among the hundreds of definitions:
I have no problem with Chilukuri Bhuvaneswar's own and informed proverb definition: "A
proverb is a culturally confirmed frozen text of a prototypical practice used as an illocution over a
categorial action in a setting for a projected view of life", or in short, "A proverb is a culturally
frozen prototypical text (or illocution)". Of course, as has been the case with hundreds of earlier
definitions, even this complex statement is but an approximation of what proverbs really are and
what they can achieve due to their polyfunctionality, polysituativity, and polysemanticity.
[Mieder 2007]
In this last paper, he takes not only polysemanticity, polyfunctionality, and polycontextuality
(polysituativity as called by Mieder) but also polytextuality (a word coined by
Bhuvaneswar to indicate dialectal and stylistic variations of the same proverb) of
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proverbs into consideration and shows that his definition is NOT affected by these
characteristics of proverbs. Hence, he claims that his definition stands out from the other
50 definitions reviewed by him and perhaps hundreds of definitions that Mieder is
aware of that do not contain the uncommon characteristic mentioned by him
(Bhuvaneswar). Furthermore, Bhuvaneswar claims that any and every proverb should
possess these three characteristics as a whole to be a proverb, be it a proverbial
sentence or a proverbial phrase. Idioms can be marked off from proverbial phrases as
lexical items by the Pro-Cat (Instantiation) Test. So too quotations! What is more, a
definition of the proverb is not a comprehensive list of its properties but a
distinguishing characterization of its properties from other genres in a systematic way.
As such, the inclusion or exclusion of polysemanticity, polyfunctionality, and
polycontextuality (polysituativity as called by Mieder) but also polytextuality (a word coined
by Bhuvaneswar to indicate dialectal and stylistic variations of the same proverb) in the
definition need not affect the definition since they are not the UNCOMMON
characteristics of the proverb these are found among other genres of language, eg.,
words and speech acts, as well.
As mentioned above, proverbiologists reviewed many definitions of proverbs. I
collected 50 such definitions from their works. They are not given here for want of
space [see Bhuvaneswar (2015a) in this book for these 50 definitions and their
references and Bhuvaneswar (2015b) for their critical review]. The 50 critics are:
[1. Aristotle (4c. B.C.), 2. Goethe,
3.
Mathien De Vendome (12 C),
4.
Lord John Russell (1792-1878), 5.Richard Chenevix Trench (1953), 6.Archer Taylor
(1931), 7. Bartlett Jere Whiting (1932), 8. G. L. Apperson (1935), 9. Kenneth Burke
(1941), 10. Marjorie Kimmerle (1947), 11. Anonymous (1961), 12. Matti Kuusi (1957), 13.
Horace Reynolds (1959), 14.
Stuart A. Gallacher (1906-1977), 15.
Mario Pei
(1964), 16. F.L. Lucas (1965), 17. Peter Seitel (1969 and 1976), 18. George B. Milner
(1969), 19.
Gyuala Paczolay (1970), 20.Roger D. Abrahams (1972), 21. Barbara
Kirshenblatt Gimblett (1973), 22.Alan Dundes (1975), 23. Nigel Barley (1972), 24.
Harald Burger (1977), 25.O. Nagy (1979), 26. Galit Hasan-Rokem (1982), 27. Oxford
Dictionary, 28.Wolfgand Mieder (1993), 29.
Hugh Kenner (1983), 30.
Stephan
Kanfer (1983), 31. Peter Grzybek (1994), 32.Jan Harold Brunvand (1986), 33.Paul
Hernadi and Francis Steen (1999), 34.Voo (1989), 35. English Proverbs about Proverbs,
36. Stevenson (1969), 37. Champion (1928), 38. Erasmus, 39. Better Eifelein, 40.
James Howell (17c), 41.
Lord Bacon, 42. Cervantes, 43. Samuel Palmer, 44. John
Ray]
as cited in Mieder (1993 a, b, 2004; Hulme (1905); and Trench (1903),
45. Chiluku:ri Nara:yana Rao (1965 as 1974 as in Diva:karla Venkata:vadha:ni), 46.
Sampath Raghava:cha:ri (1959 as 1974 as in ibid.), 47. Visvanatha Satyanarayana

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(ibid.), 48. Nedunuri Gangadharam (1964 as 1983 as in Narasimha:reddy 1983), 49.
Papireddy Narasimha:reddy (1983), and 50. Jayade:va (as in BVS Murthy 2000)
All these definitions can be divided into two types: Those who believe that the proverb
can be defined (Pro-definition); and those who do not (Anti-definition). Except Charles
Taylor and a few others, the majority of these proverbiologists believe that the proverb
can be defined. However, they could only describe it in their attempts!
These definitions can be analyzed under a systematic classification of definitions
according to: 1. Lingual Action: i. Form-oriented; ii. Function-oriented; iii. Meaningoriented; 2. Dispositional Action; and 3. Ka:rmik (Cause-Effect Experiential) Action.
Let us briefly discuss these definitions under these headings.
2. 1. Lingual Action: When the proverb is defined in terms of its formal properties
such as its phonological, lexical, and syntactic properties, such a definition is a formal
definition; if it is defined in terms of its functions, it is a functional definition; and if it is
defined in terms of its meaning or content, it is a semantic definition. If these properties
are mixed, it becomes a mixed definition with these properties. Such definitions give
rise to formal or functional or semantic or mixed linguistic definitions. From the
perspective of lingual action, language itself becomes the ultimate cause, which is
empirically found to be wrong, since the ultimate goal of language is not the construction of
lingual reality but its use for the (dispositional) coordination of action as well as the
coordination of coordination of action and the experience of the results of action from such
coordination it is axiomatic that we do not use language for the sake of using it; if it
were so, people should simply talk and talk and talk without any goals to be reached.
On the other hand, we talk using speech acts to do things with language and act-react
in the coordination of action by experiencing the results of our action mediated
through language.
If we consider the proverb as a resource for the construction of social reality as in
functional linguistics, we get a sociolinguistic or functional linguistic definition. Again,
this view is also defective even though it is one step better than lingual reality view
since it includes the social function via the formal function since language ultimately
aims to construct the individuals experience of the results of action and not merely
the social construction of action:
i. In a bottom-up view, individuals join together to make up the society as its members. In
other words, a society is a group of individuals who form the group by joining
together. On the other hand, by a top-down view, individuals are born by union of two
individuals, not by fission like amoeba. They join together to fulfil their desires (sexual,
etc.) which Nature constituted by mutual conjunction: a males sexual desire for the
female is the females sexual desire for the male. Ipso facto, they are born as group
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animals by biological relations. However, when it comes to existence, they first, exist
as biological animals, second, as social animals, third, as contextual actional animals (as
contextual lingual actional animals), and finally, live as ka:rmik animals, (i.e., as
autonomous, biological, socioculturalspiritual, contextual actional, experiential
individuals (ji:va:s or beings) in a society experiencing pain or pleasure or delusion
from the results of their actions in fulfilling their desires through the medium of the
society with or without their being affected by it; in other words, an individual
ultimately lives for oneself by oneself in a society; in the process, a member may or
may not live in terms of others or for others; even if a member does so, he does so for
himself: Individuals only exist together but ultimately live alone.
ii. The society functions as an organism exhibiting ka:rmikopoeisis. Social
construction of action is only a means for the ultimate goal of construction of ones
ka:rmik via dispositional reality; individuals function in a society and through the
society primarily for the sake of themselves and not for the sake of the society; and
when they do so, they do so for their (individuals) sake at large since a society that
does not function for the welfare of the individuals harms the individuals at large;
hence it is a case of individuals ultimately working for themselves by themselves
according to their dispositional knowledge (made up of their inclinations-informationhabits) in terms of the society according to its world view (made up of its sociocultural-spirituality) and in the society at large in a spatiotemporal-material
environment.
It is in this context, language is born to coordinate the coordination of action for the
fulfillment of an individuals desires constituted in terms of himself alone or in terms
of others; it is born out of ones as well as others dispositional functional pressure by
mutual conjunction to fulfill complex desires that demand a semiotic system: to eat a
fruit on the ground fallen from a tree, an individual does not need speech to
coordinate his action but a child needs speech to ask his mother for food or a modern
man needs speech to coordinate the coordination of his action to go to the moon. As
desires become complex, the dispositional functional pressure builds up to meet the
complexity and in that struggle, the innate disposition for semiosis bursts forth
leading to sounds as tools, tools as symbols, symbols as systems, systems as resources
as speech to coordinate the coordination of action for the fulfillment of desires by the
experience of the results of action as pleasure or pain.
So also is the case with the view that the proverb is a product of the cognitive reality as
in cognitive linguistics. Even though cognition is critical in the creation or use of a
proverb in a context, it is only a means like the social reality but not the goal in itself.
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2. 2. Dispositional Action: When the proverb is considered a resource for the
construction of dispositional reality (i.e., the view that language is not only used
dispositionally for living in a context (by living in it) but it is also created
dispositionally by living in it (for living in it), it is generated-specified-directedmaterialized by disposition via its socioculturalspiritual, contextual cognition. Hence, when
the proverb is defined as dispositional action, we get a dispositional actional
definition. From the perspective of dispositional (lingual) action, disposition itself
becomes the ultimate cause which is also empirically found to be wrong, since the
ultimate goal of language is not the construction of dispositional reality per se but its
construction as a means for the ultimate experience of the results of action (for the fulfillment of
ones dispositionally impelled desires) disposition is a complex of traits, knowledge, and
vasana:s, and is produced by the experiential influence of previous activity which is
ka:rmik; it is a means for the experience of the results of action by the human being
(ji:va) and hence the ultimate goal is the construction of ka:rmik reality for the ji:va as a
ka:rmik actor who apparently transforms (vivartam) into a dispositional,
socioculturalspiritual, cognitive, contextual actional, lingual actional, proverbial
ka:rmik actor in a top down a:nushangik process. After the use of the proverb in a
context, he experiences the results of proverbial action by spontaneous superimposition of
ka:rmik action on to lingual proverbial action via his disposition and springs back into a
ka:rmik actor. A similar process takes place in the case of the hearer also.
In this connection, it should be noted that in the set of ka:rmik (K), dispositional (D),
socioculturalspiritual (SCS), cognitive (C), contextual actional (CA), and lingual
actional (LA) realities (Rs), the following level(s) of reality become(s) means for the
previous level: dispositional reality is the means for ka:rmik reality;
socioculturalspiritual (SCS) reality becomes the means for dispositional (D) reality and
SCS, D reality the means for ka:rmik reality and so on; and cognitive (C) reality is the
medium through which all realities are construed.

(1) {Experience

[(((LA R ((CA R (SCS R

Cognitive Reality

(D R))))]

KR}

2. 3. Ka:rmik (Cause-Effect Experiential) Action: When the proverb is considered a

resource for the construction of ka:rmik reality (i.e., the view that language is not only
used but also created to coordinate the coordination of action for the fulfillment of
desires and the experience of the results of contextual action according to ones
disposition), dispositional action becomes the means and the experience of proverbial
action becomes the effect for the ka:rmik proverbial action which is the cause. From the
perspective of ka:rmik action, ka:rmik reality itself becomes the ultimate cause for the
use and creation of language which is empirically observable: if the ultimate goal of the
creation and use of language is language per se (formalism), then its main function should be
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the use of language for the sake of language only, but we find it to be not so only mad men
talk for the sake of talking; in a similar way, construction of social reality per se
(functionalism) cannot be the main function because we construct social reality as a means to
fulfill a higher function of individual experience of living; so also, use of cognitive structures
(cognitivism) is a means for the creation of language but not the end in itself; on the other
hand, we use and create language for the coordination of coordination of action for the
fulfillment of desires and the experience of the results of action, which is ka:rmik.
By looking at proverbs as a resource for the construction of proverbial ka:rmik reality,
our understanding of what proverbs are changes from the formal or functional or
cognitive perspectives into the ka:rmik perspective and so too its definition. And such
a definition becomes the most comprehensive of all as will be seen in the next section.
III. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF THE PROVERB: A KA:RMIK LINGUISTIC
APPROACH
In this section, we will first know what a definition should be in terms of its
characteristics and what characteristics of the defined term (definiendum) should be
taken into consideration in formulating the definition; second, we will analyze the
secondary, and essential (primary) characteristics of the proverb and resolve the
uncommon characteristic of the proverb from among them by problem solving
strategies; and finally formulate the definition of the proverb and establish it by
troubleshooting.
[The following letters are used to indicate the typical Samskrit pronunciation:
Capital letters T, D, N are used to indicate the retroflex voiceless, voiced, and nasal
phonemes;
Ordinary English letters t and d are used to indicate the voiceless, and voiced dental
plosives;
The letter s with an apostrophe *s or S+ is used to indicate the alveopalatal fricative.+
3. 1. Definition and Its Characteristics
3. 1. 1. Ways of Understanding Things
Three important ways for understanding a thing are popular in the Indian
philosophical tradition. They are: i. Udde:sam: mere naming of a thing (pointing out the
properties); ii. LakshaNam: the grasping of the form or nature of a thing (understanding
the properties); iii. Pariksha: thinking again and again over the form and nature of a
thing.
In the case of proverbs, even the udde:sam has not been comprehensively described. All
the properties of proverbs have not been identified, for example, the prototype
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categorial instantiation. In the case of lakshaNa, some of the properties of proverbs have
been identified and described but again the properties for a definition of the proverb
have NOT been identified and incorporated without the three following defects:
1. Ativya:pti is under extension of a defining characteristic. For example, if a cow is
defined as a black animal, such a definition is defective, since the property of
black animalness is not universally present among all cows it excludes a
white or brown cow from the species.
2. Ativya:pti is over extension of a defining characteristic. For example, if a cow is
defined as a four legged animal, such a definition is defective, since the property
of four-legged-animalness is not only shared by all the cows but also equally
shared by other animals such as a dog, a cat, and a horse which belong to
different specie.
3. Asambhava is the impossible presence of a defining characteristic. For example, if a
cow is defined as a one hoofed animal, such a definition is defective, since the
property of one-hoofedness is not present in any cow.
In addition, there should be the uncommon characteristic (asa:dharana ka:raNa) of the
proverb, which distinguishes the proverb from the other non-proverbial expressions,
and it should be incorporated into the definition to make it error proof.
4. Asa:dha:raNa Ka:raNa, the uncommon characteristic is a characteristic which is
universally present among all the members of the concerned species (genre)
and absent in other specie (genres).
So far all the definitions that have been attempted as far as I know suffer from one
or more of these defects, especially those of Avya:pti or Ativya:pti. Furthermore, all
these 50 definitions could not identify, describe, and incorporate the asa:dha:raNa
ka:raNa into the definition systemically.
In the case of pari:ksha, a number of scholars tried their best to examine the properties
of proverbs and define the proverb. However, their attempts were not based on
rigorous scientific principles.
3. 1. 2. Classification of Proverb Characteristics
Based on an understanding of the properties of proverbs, we can divide them into
essential, secondary, and uncommon characteristics as follows:
1. essential (or primary) characteristics are those that are universally present among
all the members of the species and which can equally be present either as
secondary or essential characteristics among the members of a different species.
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Frozen textuality, cultural confirmation, and pro-cat (prototype-categorial) instantiation
are the three important essential characteristics of a proverb in addition to the
illocutionary function in its usage as the fourth property. For example, idioms are
culturally frozen texts but they are not pro-cat instantiating and so not proverbs.
2. secondary characteristics are those that are present in some but not all the
members of the species, and which can equally be present in members of other
species. Most of the formal, functional, and semantic characteristics are secondary
in their nature. For example, rhyme, alliteration, affixation, balance, parallelism,
formulaic patterns, affirmation, denegation, compounding, etc. can be present in
proverbs as secondary characteristics. In fact, all the phonological, lexical,
syntactic, and semantic properties of proverbs except frozen textuality are
secondary; in a similar way all the speech act functions except prototype-categorial
instantiation as a common speech act are secondary; and so are the semantic
properties except referential, prototypical, and contextual meanings of proverbs
which cut across all the proverbs, and
3. the uncommon characteristic as explained above.
In addition, the asa:dha:raNa ka:raNa can be arrived at in three different ways as
follows.
3. 2. Types of Lakshana
1. The asa:dha:raNa ka:raNa can be arrived at as: 1. the vyavrutti LakshaNa by ne:ti ne:ti
not this, not this process of elimination; 2. the tatastha LakshaNa by realizing it as the
unchanging basis of the changing objects; and 3. the svaru:pa lakshaNa by realizing the
direct feature or the inherent features.
[In the traditional Advaita philosophy, a thing is defined in three ways: 1. by
distinguishing it from others (Vya:vrutti Lakshana), e.g., a particular house may be
defined as to the north of another house when the distinction is by negation, it is
called the ne:ti<ne:ti logic as by saying that a proverb does not have fixed syntactic
patterns; fixed figures of speech; etc.); 2. by pointing out its apparent attributes
(Tatastha Lakshana), eg., as the house wherein the crow is just perching on an
utterance wherein there is a figure of speech, say, alliteration; and 3. by describing its
essential nature (Svaru:pa Lakshana), eg., as the house which has four storeys an
utterance which has cultural confirmation.]
In the case of proverbs, such type of an analysis has to be conducted to arrive at a
comprehensive understanding of the uncommon characteristic of proverbs. It
demands a much more rigorous enquiry into the nature of formation of objects and
actions as discussed in the next sub-section.
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3. 3. Types of Asa:dha:rana Ka:raNa

From an observation of the nature of objects and actions, we find that the uncommon
characteristic of objects and actions can be structural (formal), functional, cognitive,
and ka:rmik.
i. Structural Uncommon Characteristics
A structural uncommon characteristic is a structural property. For example, a powder
is a substance (object) whose uncommon characteristic is its unique powderiness this
is a structural property. It is not necessary that the same structure should perform the
same function. Structures are generally qualified: gun-powder, face-powder, etc.
ii. Functional Uncommon Characteristic
A functional uncommon characteristic is a functional property. For example, a bed is
an object whose uncommon characteristic is its unique function of providing the
facility for lying down for taking rest. It is also not necessary that the same function
should be performed by the same structure but the structure should facilitate the
performance of the concerned function. Here, the structure (the shape) and even the
form (matter) can be variable round, rectangular, high, low, etc. and cotton, sponge,
etc. but the function is constant. Here, the structure varies according to aesthetic
appeal (round or heart-shaped beds) or other sub-functions such as the number of
people who sleep (double bed for couples), etc., and the form according to further
requirements: coco-nut fibre bed to avoid heat; sponge bed to make it softer, cheaper,
etc. Function decides the form if the cognition is function-oriented and proceeds from
function to the choice of form, especially, in the case of inventions such as television,
radio, computer, etc.; alternatively, if it is a case of forms already existing, then, it boils
down to a matter of choosing this or that. For example, if one wants to cut body as in
surgery, he needs a strong, sharp, anti-rust substance and therefore he chooses a metal
alloy such as steel to cut which is its property. Here, function decides form. On the other
hand, iron ore is discovered and its property of hardness is also discovered. If this
property is made use of in performing the function of hammering by creating a
hammer, form decides the function since it is from the property, the function is created
and moreover, a hammer cannot be made with cotton. Here, form decides function. In
practice, it is a matter of the direction of cognition and processing: processing from function-toform or vice versa that decides functional-formal or formal-functional structuration.
iii. Co-Functional and Structural Uncommon characteristic
A co-functional and structural uncommon characteristic is one in which both
functional and structural properties co-occur together to constitute the uncommon
characteristic. For example, a television is an object in which the structure of a screen
and the electronic equipment are the structural properties and relaying audiovisual
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signals from a relay station is the functional property. Both these properties have to be
combined together to form the uncommon characteristic.
iv. Cognitive Uncommon Characteristic
Impressional (internalized habitual) cognition of an action or an object alters the
perception of that phenomenon. Here, the structure by itself and the normal function
associated with it by virtue of its structure have no meaning by themselves. For
example, a deity in Hinduism is so because of the impressional cognition of the
members in a culture. Without that cultural cognition, the uncommon characteristic
cannot be found. The Goddess Sarasvathi is the Goddess Sarasvathi by virtue of
cognizing the vi:Na (stringed instrument) in two of her four hands, a rosary and
Ve:das in the other two hands and the padmasana on a white lotus as the structural
uncommon characteristics of Goddess Sarasvathi Ma:ta. If it were not for that, the
deity would be a sculpture or photograph of a woman. Dispositional cognition plays
the crucial role in the creation-modification-transformation of language. Language is
as it is not because of what it does but because of what it is dispositionally cognized and
intended to do what it does.
From a purely cognitive perspective, cognitive characteristics such as attention,
perception, creativity, and memory play an important role in the cognition of a
proverb not only in its use but also in its formation. For example, lack of focused
awareness (attention) of a set of similar social practices may hinder the choice of an
appropriate social practice or image for a proverb; lack of linguistic creativity may
form an unappealing proverb; lack of memory leads to wrong applications or
improper wording of the proverbs.
v. Pragmatic Uncommon Characteristic
A pragmatic uncommon characteristic is one in which the members of a society confer
a particular function to an object, by a process of selection (and election). For example,
a husband is one who is selected to perform the function of being a husband to a
women and conferred husbandship through an act, a ritual etc. An M.P. (Member of
Parliament) / P.M (Prime Minister) is another example. Unless they are selected and
elected (re selected) and further have taken the oath, they will not become so. Again,
they have to function in that capacity to be so. One more example is that of a father-in
law. Here, a person (male) must have produced a female and performed another
action of marrying her to a male. All these functions can range from one to many, as in
the case of a grandfather, etc.
A pragmatic uncommon characteristic becomes a ka:rmatic (experientally pragmatic)
chraracteristic at an individual level, if pragmatic meaning is reinterpreted and
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transformed into a different personal experiential meaning. Consequently, a husband
may mean a support or burden to a woman as she experiences the husbandship of her
husband.
vi. A Ka:rmik Uncommon Characteristic
A ka:rmik uncommon characteristic is one in which an object or an action exists or
performs a function for the experience of pain and pleasure within time, space and
matter. All material action performed by humans or any other sentient creature is
ka:rmik, for example, the making of a powder, a bed, and a television (material
phenomena); an administrative post, a law, and a social norm (sociocultural
phenomena); an ideology, a theory, a technological process (intellectual phenomena);
and a religious experience, belief, deity (spiritual phenomena). In a ka:rmik
perspective, in a bottom-up process, first, every action will have a form (matter) which
embodies a pattern (as a structure) which embodies a process/a concept and the
structure, pattern, and process/concept are all dispositionally generated-chosenspecified-directed-materialized along with the material content which is of course not
created (but may be modified); second, it embodies a function which embodies a
dispositional cognition of meaning of the action as this and that to be so and so in such
and such manner in its variety-range-depth; third, it embodies a desire which is a
product of svabha:vam; and finally this svabha:vam is obtained as a product of
previous karma (action) for the experience of pain or pleasure or delusion by humans, in
fact, any sentient creature in Ka:rmik Linguistic Theory, what is obtained at the time
of birth is the given svabha:vam and what it becomes later is the maintained
svabha:vam which remains constant for long periods. Rebirth is not within the scope
of KLT and hence the given svabha:vam is not motivated from action in previous
births. KLT neither accepts nor rejects rebirth since the theory is non-religious.
(2) Structure Pattern Process Function Cognition Desire Svabha:vam
Karma
The uncommon characteristic of language is a ka:rmik characteristic. It is a
dispositional cognitional representational action of action in time, space and matter
established
by
ICCCSA
[Individual-Collective-Contextual-Conjunction-andStandardization of (lingual) Action]. Its highest phenomenal function its highest
noumenal function is to index the Principle of Creation is to function as a resource for
the construction of ka:rmik reality which is realized as

(3) [Ka:rmik
Cognitive

Dispositional
Socioculturalspiritual
Contextual Actional
Lingual Actional] Reality
in that order. [
leads to]

The uncommon characteristic of a proverb as language in a generic mode is a

dispositional cognitional prototypical representational action of categorial action in a
culturally frozen text. To put it in other words, a patterned structure (ie, a frozen text)
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as a dispositionally cognized meaning (i.e., the prototypical meaning via the
referential meaning as the contextual meaning) is used as a prototypical illocution to
instantiate a categorial action over a setting for projected view of life (to experience
pain and pleasure as the karmaphalam).
As can be seen from the above explanation, proverbs have a structure (a frozen text)
performing a function (pro-cat instantiation) through a pragmatic, and dispositionally
experiential (ka:rmatic) cognitional action of action. As such, they can be defined as
follows in a unified theory where form, function and meaning are interrelated, interconnected, and interdependent (I-I-I) in a huge mind boggling network of ka:rmik
options of action and reaction:
A proverb is a culturally confirmed frozen text of a prototypical practice used as an
illocution over a categorial action in a setting for a projected view of life or a
culturally confirmed frozen prototypical illocution (as a text).
Let us establish this uncommon characteristic of the proverb in a detailed manner
using the above concepts.
3. 4. The Ka:rmik Uncommon Characteristic of the Proverb: Its Derivation
The uncommon characteristic of the proverb is derived by isolating its primary, and
secondary properties as vyavrutta lakshaNa, and also its unchanging property as
taTastha lakshaNa and finally identify its svaru:pa lakshaNa empirically. The
discovery of the asa:dha:raNa ka:raNa can be made in two ways: 1. Apava:dam
(Sublation); and 2. Adhya:ro:pam (Superimposition). In the former, the secondary and
essential characteristics are isolated and negated to arrive at the asa:dha:raNa ka:raNa;
in the latter, the essential characteristics are asserted and superimposed to arrive at it.
3. 4. 1. Apava:dam (Sublation) of the Characteristics of the Proverb
When we observe proverbs, we can identify their primary (essential) and secondary
characteristics by an empirical examination of their linguistic properties and their
classification. Let us conduct such an examination and find out their properties.
3. 4. 1. 1. Apava:dam of Secondary Properties
According to Ka:rmik Linguistic Theory, secondary characteristics are those that are present
in some but not all the members of the species, and which can equally be present in
members of another species.
The secondary characteristics in proverbs cut across all the formal, functional, and
semantic levels of language in proverbs. Since a particular property is observed at the
individual level of the proverbs but not obtained universally across all the proverbs, it
cannot be used as a defining characteristic. Therefore, all the definitions that make use
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of these secondary characteristics turn out to be mere descriptions and not definitions. A
brief outline of these properties is made below with examples to provide an empirical
proof.
3. 4. 1. 1. 1. Apava:dam of Formal-Functional-Semantic Secondary Properties
The formal properties of proverbs can be described at the five levels of phonology
(phonotactic changes), lexis (word-formation processes such as affixation, conversion,
compounding, blending, reduplication, etc.) (see Bhuvaneswar (No Date)), syntax,
(simple, compound, and complex sentences), (ibid. 2009), semantics (denotation,
semantic changes, semantic relations) (ibid. 2013a, 2010b, 2012b), and discourse
structure (P1, P2, and P3 forms) (ibid. 2012a), figures of speech (ibid. 2010a) and even
functions (eg., polyfunctionality, performing different functions in different contexts),
contexts (eg., polycontextuality or polysituativity, the same proverb being used in
different contexts), and meanings (eg., polysemanticity, the same proverb giving
different meanings in different contexts as well as the same proverb interpreted with
different meanings at the sociocultural level of the existence of the proverb eg., a
rolling stone gathers no moss is understood differently in England (as a stone in a brook
not getting beautiful moss) and Scotland (as a stone-roller getting rusted with moss)
that cut across all the five levels. At these five formal linguistic levels of proverbs, ALL
these major properties are found to be secondary characteristics only as they are
present in their variety-range-depth in some proverbs and absent in others while the
majority of them are collectively present in the whole corpus of proverbs. The
property of frozen textuality which was also identified earlier by proverbiologists
such as Norrick (1985) as fixed form but not interpreted as in KLT takes care of the
formal secondary characteristics mentioned above and distinguishes a proverb from
other non-frozen genres of language, whatever they be, be it free speech or otherwise.
However, it cannot distinguish a proverb from other frozen textual genres such as
idioms, aphorisms, maxims, adages, and quotations because it has ativya:pti (overextension) in them. Therefore, a proverb needs another distinguishing characteristic to
exclude proverbs from other genres which property will be shown to be its
prototypical illocutionary force.
In a similar way, their functional properties (the five speech acts: representatives or
assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations) are also found to be
secondary characteristics only. They are also over-extensive in that they can be found
in free speech as well as in proverbs themselves. However, the property of prototypical
illocutionary force restricts its over-extension by limiting it only to prototypicalcategorial instantiating expressions which can be either textually frozen proverbs or
other utterances performing the same function. Notwithstanding, other utterances
performing the same function may or may not be culturally frozen. When someone uses
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an utterance as a pro-cat instantiating expression in a fixed form, that expression may
or may not have been popular and thus culturally accepted. Some quotations of
writers have gained currency and are thus culturally frozen and some others are not.
Therefore, cultural confirmation overcomes this defect of over-extension of
prototypical illocutionary force and excludes those utterances which are
idiosyncratically created and collectively not established. All the same, it permits
under-extension of illocutionary functions among proverbs: some can be
representatives without being directives and some can be directives without being
representatives according to the context.
In function, there is also an implication of context in the sense no function can be
performed without a context. You represent, direct, promise, be expressive, or declare
something to become something by speech acts in a context. When context is
dispositionalized, it becomes variable: the same event can be interpreted in different
ways by looking at it in different ways according to ones dispositional choice of
looking at it. This dispositional cognition of the context which leads to
polycontextuality is also a secondary characteristic and hence polycontextuality cannot
be a defining characteristic. From another angle, lexical items such as idioms have a
fixed meaning and do not lend themselves to polycontextual meanings whereas
proverbs have contextual and discourse functional meanings.
At the semantic level, proverbs embody socioculturalspiritual practices whose
propositions convey meanings that cut across the variety-range-depth of semantics.
There is connotation, denotation, synonymy, antonymy, and polysemy in proverbs.
Such semantic properties are dependent on the socioculturalspiritual practices and
their dispositional cognition which are varied and not fixed in proverbs; so also is the
case of wisdom (e.g., Hit first and talk next contains no wisdom but only expediency
cf. the tale of the Brahman and the Mongoose in Panchatantra for a classic instantiation of
the folly of the proverb) and polysemanticity (e.g., A rolling stone gathers no moss has two
meanings in social practice cognition). Therefore, they also become the secondary
characteristics of the proverbs with under-extension or over-extension. Nonetheless,
social praxis as such at the generic level is universal among proverbs and it is
prototypical. Hence, the property of prototype, as an essential characteristic, accounts
for the variable content and semantic properties of proverbs. The prototype can be an
action (practice) or an object (animate or inanimate) as it occurs in natural and social
action. As already mentioned, essential characteristics can also suffer from overextension in other genres. For example, a bird, as an object, is a prototype but it is not a
proverb. Again, this kind of over-extension has to be eliminated. Such a problem can
be overcome by combining the characteristic of the prototype with the property of
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illocutionary force. In other words, prototypes as lexical items are excluded from
becoming proverbs.
These formal-functional-semantic properties are discussed with numerous examples
in various articles on lexis, syntax, semantics and discourse analysis in Bhuvaneswar
(No Date; 1999, 2010 a, b, 2012 a, b, 2013a, b; and also 2015a, b, d). Owing to constraints
of space, they are not exemplified here.
3. 4. 1. 1. 2. Apava:dam of Textual Characteristics
Length of the text of the proverb is a secondary characteristic since some proverbs are
very short (e.g., Time flies 2 words) and some very long (e.g., It is easier for a camel to
go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God- 25 words.).
Hence, it cannot be a defining characteristic. The textual characteristic also includes
style. The text may contain intra-dialectal and inter-dialectal variations as well as
cultural variations in language and figures of speech. Again, these characteristics are
also secondary. It thus contributes to the inclusion of style as a secondary
characteristic into the definition when we incorporate frozen textuality as an essential
characteristic.
3. 4. 1. 2. Apava:dam of Essential Properties
When we look at the essential properties of proverbs, we can immediately identify the
following four properties: 1. frozen textuality; 2. cultural confirmation; 3. illocutionary
(canonical and discoursal speech act) function and 4. prototypical-categorial
instantiation.
Any and every proverb in its canonical form is frozen in its standard form and again
further frozen in its variation. This freezing is culturally done and confirmed and
adhered to in usage. If a proverb is used in a modified form which varies from the
standard and variant forms, it does not affect this condition of frozen textuality since
the modified forms can be dismissed as idiosyncratic variations of the individuals. If
they were not ideosyncretic, they too must have been included in the Collections of
Proverbs. Since they are not included, it means that they are not collectively accepted.
Therefore, we can safely conclude that all proverbs share the characteristic of frozen
textuality. This is a formal textual characteristic that is built out of various secondary
formal characteristics which are outlined earlier. This property makes it literally
impossible to define a proverb by functional-semantic-discourse properties or other
formal properties alone.
Any and every proverb in its canonical form is culturally confirmed not only in its
standard but also in its variant form. If a frozen text is not culturally confirmed as a
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proverb, it cannot be a proverb; otherwise any frozen text (e.g., Dishonesty is the
best/worst policy) can become a proverb which is not the case in reality. It does not
mean that frozen texts cannot become proverbs in fact, they have become when they
are culturally confirmed: famous texts from authors such as Alexander Pope [e.g.,
Fools rush in where angels fear to tread -"An Essay on Criticism"]. This is a sociolinguistic or
cultural anthropological characteristic which is outside language but ipso facto it implies all
the essential and uncommon characteristics since cultural confirmation takes place
only if these properties are present. This property makes it literally impossible to
define a proverb by formal-functional-semantic-discourse properties alone.
Any and every proverb in its canonical form is a speech act not only in its standard but
also in its variant form in its variety-range-depth. In its canonical form, it is a speech
act as a formal text and in its application in a context, it is an appropriate speech act in
its pragmatic and ka:rmatic context. This is a pragmatic or ka:rmatic (experiential
pragmatic) characteristic. This property takes care of all the speech act functions which
are secondary characteristics at their individual level but an essential characteristic at
the their general (prototype) level.
Any and every proverb in its canonical form is a culturally confirmed prototype that
can be used to instantiate a categorial social practice not only in its standard but also in
its variant form. In view of its prototypical-categorial instantiation and its illocutionary
function, a proverb in its citation form has not only a referential meaning which can be
explicitly recoverable but also a prototypical meaning which can be implicitly
recoverable by its abstraction and a contextual meaning which can be derived when it is
applied in a culturally qualified context. These meanings are interconnectedinterrelated- interdependent on the very intrinsic generic structure of the proverb as a
pro-cat instantiating utterance and as such are inherent properties of the proverb. This
prototypical-categorial instantiation (pro-cat instantiation) is a discourse function that has
not been discovered and identified as such until Bhuvaneswar (1999, 2003, 2013b) did
it with a number of examples (see below for an example of a P1 proverb). This is also a
discourse pragmatic (or ka:rmatic) characteristic. This property also makes it literally
impossible to define a proverb by formal-semantic properties alone.
All these four characteristics are essential characteristics since they are universally
present in each and every proverb be it a sentence or a phrase. Nonetheless, they
cannot be taken alone to define a proverb. For example, all idioms and famous
quotations are frozen texts and culturally confirmed but they are not proverbs they
may become proverbs if they satisfy the other two characteristics of pro-cat
instantiation and illocution. In a similar way, pro-cat instantiating paraphrases or
idiolectal literary creations cannot be proverbs because they are not culturally
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confirmed and frozen. Therefore, the uncommon characteristic of a proverb should be
a mixed characteristic that incorporates all these four properties and excludes nonproverb texts that contain only any one or more but not all these four characteristics.
What is more, such a mixed characteristic should be amenable to be described in a
solid linguistic model of language and proverbs. Such an uncommon characteristic is
possible only in the ka:rmik linguistic framework, and it is a culturally confirmed frozen
prototypical illocution (as a text). This is its svaru:pa lakshaNam. Its quality thus becomes
communicable as a mixed characteristic and not otherwise.
3. 4. 1. 2. Discovery of the Asa:dha:raNa Ka:raNam by Adhya:ro:pam
Before writing was developed, proverbs were stored in cultural memory and recalled
by individuals for their use in a context. After writing was developed, they are stored
by recording them in books, etc. for reference and used. Whatever be the case, the test
for their veracity is in their use since books reflect what was in use at the time of
writing the books. Therefore, real life discourse should be the basis for all
proverbiology and it should be complemented by recorded proverbs and their usage.
Consequently, real life conversations should be taken into consideration and the
collectively evolved essential properties have to be negatively discovered and identified
by apava:dam in a scientific method; in addition, they have to be positively recognized by
statistical methods and superimposed on the concerned text in use to discover the
uncommon characteristic. This is the reverse process of apava:dam: in apava:dam, the
secondary and essential properties are identified and negated to find out the
uncommon characteristic; in adhya:ro:pam, the essential properties are positively
discovered and identified by rigorous comparative statistical analysis. Then they are
superimposed to find out the uncommon characteristic by integration; finally, it is also
confirmed by apava:dam.
By an examination of all the proverbs in use, we find that there is: 1. a common frozen
content of the proverb in use as recorded in books as its citation form. This form
excludes the proverb initiators and linkers as well as idiosyncratic
modifications/memory errors of the citation form in use. Hence, proverbs are frozen
texts. In a similar way, all these frozen texts are: 2. culturally confirmed to be so by the
speech community that uses these proverbs, be it the standard ones or their regional or
dialectal or taboo variations this is done by oral interviews and written evidence.
Unfortunately, even though some work has been done on speech functions
(illocutionary function) of proverbs from the speech act theory, both the 3. illocutionary
function and 4. the pro-cat instantiation function have escaped the attention of
proverbiologists, until Bhuvaneswar (1999, 2003) discovered them as essential
characteristics. This discovery has paved the way for a foolproof definition of the
proverb. These characteristics are not the sole prerogative of proverbs alone. Hence,
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each property by itself cannot define the proverb. As a result, a mixed characteristic has
to be worked out that excludes all other genres and distinguishes the proverb from
others. This is obtained by combining all these properties into a single characteristic
that gives us its uncommon characteristic which is used to define the proverb as a
culturally confirmed frozen prototypical illocution.
3. 5. Evidence for the Ka:rmik Linguistic Definition of the Proverb
The ka:rmik linguistic definition of the proverb is one among the numerous definitions
proposed by proverbiologists right from the time of Aristotle to the present day. As
there are already hundreds of definitions given by proverbiologists (see Mieder 2004),
the addition of one more definition will certainly become irritatingly redundant, if it is
not properly justified. It is claimed here that it is indeed necessary to propose this new
definition for the following reasons:
1. All the definitions proposed so far are atomic in their nature, i.e., either
formal, functional and/or semantic properties are taken into consideration
as reviewed in Bhuvaneswar (2015 a, b) but not all the formal-functionalsemantic-discourse properties are integrated as a unified uncommon
characteristic of the definition;
2. No definition of the proverb is rigorously motivated within a scientific
framework of the definition so far, i.e., the uncommon characteristic is
neither properly taken into consideration nor discovered;
3. Discourse analysis based characteristics are not included in the uncommon
characteristic of the definitions; proverbs are fundamentally illocutions
preserved as texts in cultural memory: illocutions as texts but used or
transmitted in the form of texts as illocutions. They are used to talk about
something that happened or not; something that has to happen or not.
4. The existing popular formal, functional, and cognitive linguistic models of
Chomsky, Halliday, and Langacker are not explored adequately for a
definition in their frameworks;
5. Ka:rmik Linguistic Theory is new and claims to be (w)holistic, rigorously
scientific, and comprehensive to identify the uncommon characteristic of
the proverb and hence more suitable than others in its approach.
3. 5. 1. A KLT Definition of the Proverb Test (DPT)
Any definition of the proverb can be tested by the four criteria already mentioned:
avya:pti (underextension), ativya:pti (over-extension), asambhava (impossibility), and
asa:dha:raNa ka:raNa (uncommon characteristic). If it satisfies these criteria, that definition
holds good; if not, it fails.
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In addition, the definition proposed should cut across the variety-range-depth of the
proverb corpus and should defend the uncommon characteristic in the creationmodification-transformation of the proverb from its application-transmission-retention in a
context. In the process, it distinguishes between proverbs and [sayings, adages,
aphorisms, maxims, and idioms]. In addition, it should adequately explain the
violations of the uncommon characteristic in usage, e.g., incorrect form of the proverb
owing to lack of knowledge, memory, recall and inappropriate use of the proverb
owing to lack of knowledge of the proverb and its use.
All proverbs are either sentential or phrasal or wellerisms; either P1 or P2 or P3 in the
spoken exchange structure; either literal (e.g., better late than never) or figurative (e.g., a
stitch in time saves nine). These three are the most important secondary characteristics
that permeate the corpus of proverbs.
In the following sections, an attempt has been made to support the KLT definition in a
dispositional, socio-cognitive, experiential linguistic model with graphs and networks.
To elaborate further, it will be shown how a proverb is created-modified-transformed
as a culturally confirmed, frozen, prototypical illocution (as a text) and how a
proverb is further applied-transmitted-retained as such.
The procedure followed here consists of the following perspectives for proving the
KLT definition of the proverb:
1. Creation
(e.g., Hear no evil, speak no evil, and do no evil; A picture is worth a thousand words);
2. Application (e.g., Every cloud has a silver lining);
3. Transmission and Retention;
4. Modification
(e.g., Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and happy; variants,
and anti-proverbs: Absence makes the heart wander);
5. Transformation
(e.g., Dialectal Variation; Synonymy: Distant hills are green Faraway birds have fine
feathers, Farway cows have long horns; etc.)
3. 5. 1. 1. KLT Definition of the Proverb: Proof from the Creation of the Proverb Perspective
In this section, the formation of the proverb is described from its dispositional
cognition by the creators of the proverb. First, a network for the disposition of the

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proverb-maker is taken into consideration and then his desire for creating a proverb is
motivated from his dispositional functional pressure (D. F. P.) to do so. At this level,
i. the nature of the individual (Avidya) consisting of the guNa:s [sattva-rajas-tamas] in a
particular composition decides
ii. his disposition (svabha:vam) consisting of [Traits-Knowledge-Va:sana:as] that forms
iii. his personality or character (vyaktitvam) consisting of specified likes and dislikes
(preferences) as this and that which manifests in terms of his phenomenal knowledge to
be so and so and is realized by his internalized habits (va:sana:s) in such and such
manner. The network 5 in Bhuvaneswar (2013: 282) has been adapted to include the
distinction between Avidya (individual nature) and Svabha:vam (disposition) and
Vyaktitvam (personality) and given as Network 1 here.
Sattva (Luminosity)
(Karma)

Avidya

Rajas

(Activity)

Tamas (Inertia)

Vocal Organs
Physical

Traits

Knowledge

Va:sana:s
(Internalized Habits)

Mental

Sattva
Rajas
Tamas
Sattva
Rajas
Tamas
Sattva
Rajas
Tamas

Svabha:vam
(Abstract or General)

Loudness
Pitch
Length

Emotional
Cognitive
Intellectual

Cultural

Social
Cultural
Spiritual

Linguistic

Formal
Functional
Semantic

Vyaktitvam
(Concretized or
Realized Svabha:vam)
(Ka:rmik Pragmatic
Constraints)

So and So [Traits - Knowledge - Va:sana:s] in Such and Such Manner

as

(SCS) Dispositional Cognition

Network 1. Network of Avidya - Svabha:vam - Vyaktitvam

The guNa:s are the root constituents that spread into all other levels. As such, the
guNa:s appear in svabha:vam which is an apparent transformation of avidya and
again they manifest themselves in vyaktitvam also. To elaborate more, an individuals
nature decides his likes and dislikes or preferences that become his traits (his traits
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are further qualified by the three guNa:s to bring about variation in the likes and
dislikes); the knowledge that he gains; and the va:sana:s (internalized habits) he gets in
their variety-range-depth because of repeatedly performing action by its knowledge
consciously or unconsciously - in certain ways. Both knowledge and va:sana:s are also
equally qualified by the traits according to their guNa:s. These three factors of traitsknowledge-va:sana:s constitute his svabhavam (disposition). Put differently, nature in an
individual, by its specification, apparently transforms (vivartayati) into svabha:vam.
This svabha:vam of a human being operates when he lives in a context and gets into
contact with the spatiotemporal-material environment on which the socio-culturalspiritual environment of the language community is superimposed. His own
svabha:vam then impacts on this socioculturalspiritual, spatiotemporalmaterial
environment and forms his personality as a bundle of his likes and dislikes based on
his phenomenal knowledge leading him to act in particular ways (which are called his
va:sana:s or internalized habits). It is in this vyaktitvam (personality) which is a
vivartam of his svabha:vam, D.F.P. builds up impelling a desire to create a proverb.
In KLT, these three divisions of Avidya (nature of the individual), Svabha:vam
(disposition), and Vyaktitvam (personality) are posited for more descriptive and
explanatory adequacy in the causal motivation of the theory of language. This division
is necessitated because of the typological variation found in and across language
communities. Let us illustrate the apparent distinction between these three concepts by
taking a general metal gold in Nature: 0. Gold exists with its inherent qualities in
Nature. 1. Gold is obtained as an ore; 2. This ore is further treated and refined as
ornament-metal to make ornaments; 3. This so called ornament-metal is turned into
ornaments such as a necklace, a ring, a bangle, etc. Here, we find two distinct stages in
the transformation of gold: 1. Ore into Metal Gold; 2. Metal Gold into Ornaments of
Gold. In the first transformation, gold is refined and its impurities are eliminated; in
the second transformation, the refined gold is given a form with a function as a
meaningful object according to the dispositional creativity of the goldsmith in its
variety-range-depth.
Now, let us extend a similar argument to explain avidya-svabha:vam-vyaktitvam.
0. Root Nature (Mu:la Prakriti) exists in Creation just as Gold (like Mu:la Prakriti)
exists in Nature (like Nature in Creation) as ore. This is axiomatic. This Mu:la Prakriti
consists of Sattva-Rajas-Tamas as its inherent constituents.
1. This Root Nature (Mu:la Prakriti) apparently transforms itself into Limited Nature
(Avidya) in the living systems just as gold transforms itself into a lump of gold (i.e.,
limited gold). In the case of limited gold, the nimitta ka:raNa (efficient cause) is the
goldsmith who makes the lump and in the case of the living systems, it is the
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Immanent Intelligence in Nature that transforms Nature (Mu:la Prakriti) into Limited
Nature (Avidya) in the living systems such as human beings. The upa:da:na ka:raNa
(material cause) is still (Unlimited) Nature itself because it is only that Nature that is
(apparently) limited, like space in a pot that is limited from space outside, or
ornamental gold that is limited from the metal gold. The only difference is in the
qualification of Avidya (Limited Nature) in the human being in terms of the
constitution of the [Sattva-Rajas-Tamas] guNa samuda:yam (SRT guNa complex) in its
variety-range-depth just like the space is qualified in a pot in terms of its shape, size,
air, etc.
2. This Avidya (Limited Nature) with its inherent constitution gives rise to the
Svabha:vam of the individual human being (called ji:va in Samskrit) who resides in a
particular body. To explain more, avidya is the material cause of the traits-knowledgeva:sana:s of the individual human being as it apparently transforms into svabha:vam.
It is like gold that becomes the lump of gold by its apparent division along with its
particular qualities. To elaborate further, the type and class of traits, knowledge, and
va:sana:s that an individual possesses are decided here by avidya. This is done in two
ways by: 1. Nature (what is given at the time of birth); 2. Nurture (what is obtained
later by experience).
3. This svabha:vam is the further basis of vyaktitvam (personality). That means
Avidya transforms into Svabha:vam and Svabha:vam transforms further into
Vyaktitvam. It is just like gold transforming into ornamental gold and ornamental
gold transforming into the ornament necklace or bangle, etc.
4. Vyaktitvam is individual but when the same qualities are shared by many, it can be
looked at from a collective perspective also: Individual Personality; Collective or
Group Personality. However, the Group personality cannot be purely homogeneous
since variations can exist within a generally (fuzzy) homogeneous group.

For example, the svabha:vam of the individuals in a language community, say,

Telugu, is to choose SOV order in the simple sentence. The same svabha:vam is
present in Hindi speakers also. However, their personalities act-react in the context of
Telugu and Hindi and project it in their respective languages in particular
phonological combinations and permutations . In the case of proverbs also such a
distinction holds good. For example, the svabha:vam of both the English and Telugu
speakers is the same in the choice of a proverb that has the same prototypical meaning:
that P which is distant phenomena look better than phenomena close by. However,
its contextualization is affected by their personalities: the American English people
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have created Faraway hills are green while the Telugu created Distant hills (are)
smooth. Again, the English people have so many synonymous proverbs for this same
idea: 1. Faraway birds have fine feathers; 2. Faraway hills are green; 3. Faraway pastures look
green; 4. The other side of the fence is always green; 5. Far fowls have fair feathers; 6. Far folk
fare best; 7. The other track on the road is always smooth; 8. The grass is always greener on the
other side of the fence / 9. the Grass always seems greener in foreign fields; 10. Things always
look greener on the other side of the street while the Telugu have only more: poruginTi
pulla ku:ra ruche Neighbours (house) sour curry (is) tasty.
Here, there is a superimpositional relationship in which avidya apparently transforms
(
) into svabha:vam and further transforms into vyaktitvam by remaining itself as
it is like gold remaining as it is and apparently transforming itself into an (golden)
ornament which further apparently transforms into a (golden) ring, necklace, etc. To
explain more, the material cause is the same but its name and form change by
apparent transformation (vivartam) by superimposition (adhya:ro:pam) of name and
form on nature/gold according to the individuals dispositional choice.
(4a) Avidya

Svabha:vam

Vyaktitvam

From another angle, we can also observe an a:nushangik relationship between avidya
and svabha:vam and vyaktitvam. Root Nature (Mu:la Prakriti) consists of Sattva
(Luminosity) Rajas (Activity) Tamas (Inertia) as its inherent constituents; it is
universal in creation permeating through and through in it. An individual living
system inherits this Mu:la Prakriti (Nature) at its own individual level with its
limitations of space-time-matter as well as quality-quantity-size. This limited Nature is
called Avidya (individualized Nature, literally, ignorance). In other words, Avidya is
qualified [Individuation of Nature (Avidya) + Nature]. This Avidya with
individualized rajas-sattva-tamas in an individual living system becomes specified by
transforming into specific [Traits-Knowledge-Va:sana:s]. This specified Avidya is
called Svabha:vam in KLT. In other words, Svabha:vam is [Specification of Avidya +
Avidya]. Finally, Svabha:vam becomes (individualized, specified, and) contextualized
as this and that trait to be so and so trait as knowledge in such and such manner of
trait as knowledge as habit. This specified svabha:vam is called vyaktitvam in KLT. In
other words, vyaktitvam (personality) is [Contextualization of Svabha:vam (+
Svabha:vam)].
(4b) Avidya
[(4c) Gold

Svabha:vam (+ Avidya)
Ornament (+ Gold)

Vyaktitvam [+ Svabha:vam (+ Avidya)

Necklace (+Ornament (+ Gold)]

The nature of the individual is what the individual is in terms of his body-mind-action
- experience + (consciousness). All human beings share this body-mind-action26 | P a g e

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experience-(consciousness) complex and hence it is universal. In KLT, it is biologically
considered as the given in the human being as he is born and what he gets by birth is
considered to be inherited biologically; this is how he inherited his karma which is
uncontroversial from a HOW perspective in Hinduism, from a WHY and HOW
perspective, it is the result of past actions in a previous birth; since KLT is a-theological
(not religious), the issue of rebirth is beyond its scope and so we are not concerned
with it since the existence of rebirth or no rebirth does not affect our theory. However,
this nature is individualized in its variety-range-depth in human beings. This is
empirically valid. However, the question Why this svabha:vam should vary from
individual to individual cannot be answered with the present state of research in
psychology and Consciousness Science, even though some researchers have found
evidence for rebirth. We still have to wait for unanimity among scientists.
Nonetheless, the development of svabha:vam as a complex of traits-knowledgeva:sana:s can be motivated from karma (action); as actions are performed, their results
are experienced leaving behind their impressions; when these impressions get
strengthened, they become traits; traits further lead to the acquisition of certain types
of knowledge more and others less or nil; again from the union of traits and
knowledge, behavior, and repeated patterns of the same behavior develop; in the
performance of behavior, again, the guNa:s enter and bring in efficiency, inefficiency,
mastery, addiction, etc. These finally become va:sana:s (internalized habits). Efficiency
in car driving and addiction to alcohol are simple examples to prove this point. It is
from this individualized nature, via karma, a human being develops his svabha:vam.
This svabha:vam can be viewed from different angles: from a physical plane, it gives
physical svabha:vam that accounts for the specified nature of the body, e.g., for
example, cold-liking; sweet-liking; sun-allergic; milk-allergic; etc.; from a mental plane,
it gives mental svabha:vam: sharp logical thinking; weak memory; clear-cut
perception; etc.; from an action plane: different types of action and their choice;
experiential plane, it gives experiential svabha:vam: cheerful, gloomy, etc. From each
perspective, a science emerges: anatomy and physiology from the physical plane;
psychology from the mental plane; action theory (which is yet to be developed into a
full-fledged science); living science (developed as religion but which has to be
developed with scientific rigour).
In KLT, svabha:vam is considered from a theory of action (Karma Sangraham) with
reference to lingual action as one of the triple actions, the other two being physical and
mental. From that perspective, it is considered to be a complex of traits-knowledgeva:sana:s which forms the source for all activity. This svabha:vam gives us the type of
an individual, the general character of the individual, that decides his traits27 | P a g e

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knowledge-habits in general. It varies from individual to individual in its varietyrange-depth. When it operates in a context, it begets his personality: his traitsknowledge-habits get chosen as this and that to be so and so and specified in such and
such manner as well as substantiated to be this and that trait or knowledge or habit; in
short, personality is particularized and realized disposition; and svabha:vam is
particularized and realized avidya. Personality also varies from individual to
individual in its variety-range-depth. For example, the nature of the individual
stipulates that he should have a body; the manner of the composition of nature in the
individual which becomes (the physical aspect of) his svabha:vam stipulates that he
should have a strong body; and his (physical) personality is particularized and
realized as a body which is strong which consists of strong bones, muscles and limbs.
In principle, svabha:vam is the cause for what a man will be; personality is the product
of svabha:vam as what the man becomes out of svabha:vam. The relationship is that of
cause and effect where the cause apparently transforms (vivartayati) into the effect. It
is this svabha:vam as personality that generates-chooses-specifies-directs-materializes
(GCSDMs) lingual action as a means for constructing actional reality at the lower level
which becomes a means for constructing dispositional reality at the middle level
which further becomes a means for constructing ka:rmik reality at the higher level.
When dispositional functional pressure builds up in the individual to fulfill a desire
such as expressing the abstract/unknown/unfamiliar, the inclination for categorizing
that by a known prototype is impelled by svabha:vam (disposition) in its Traits
component by virtue of the individuals dispositional creativity and realized as the
inclination for proverb making by vyaktitvam (personality) in the same component.
That desire to express the abstract/unknown/unfamiliar in terms of another sub-desire
of expressing that by prototype-categorial instantiation (through dispositional
creativity) leads to making a PCIing utterance by choosing content from the
knowledge component (at this stage as a category of another category, which becomes
a prototype). The way you make the PCI utterance is further facilitated by the va:sana
component. Since va:sana component deals with habits, if you have skilful habits, you
create the PCI utterances skillfully, aesthetically appealing; if not, not. As you are, so
you think; as you think, so you speak. By extension, as you are proverbial, so you
think proverbially; as you think proverbially, so you speak proverbs.

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R(ajas)
(Activity)

Traits (Guna:s)
Avidya

S(attva)
(Conceptuality)

(Karma)

Choice of
Proverbial Activity

T(amas)
(Inactivity)

Svabha:vam

Knowledge/Analyticity (Jna:nam)

D.F.P.

Desire for PCI as

a Proverb

Knowledge of Proverbs
Vyaktitvam
Habits

(Va:sana:s)

Internalized habits for dispositional creativity

for prototype-categorial instantiation (PCI)

Creation of PCI Utterance that

becomes a proverb by ICCCSA

[D.F.P. Dispositional
Functional Pressure]

Causal Network 1: Dispositional Cognition of a Proverb as a PCI

In the above given network, this process is shown in a causal manner. In the graphs
and other networks that follow in Stages 1 and 2, this process is shown in its Pattern &
Structure (subtle or cognitive) and Realization (gross or sociolinguistic) modes.
Stage 1: Formation of the Proverb
The following KLT Graph 1 can be used to motivate not only the formation of the
proverb Every cloud has a silver lining (and in fact any other proverb) but also its
application in a ka:rmik (dispositional, sociocognitive, experiential) linguistic
framework to support the KLT definition of the proverb.
In the formative stages of the proverb, first, dispositional functional pressure (D.F.P.)
builds up in one speakers Consciousness-qualified-Disposition (C-q-D) to express an
unknown/unfamiliar/abstract social contextual practice in terms of a known / familiar /
concrete salient practice it is the desire. This desire is born from the union of his
guna:s (traits) with his va:sana:s (internalized habits). It becomes a part of his
dispositional knowledge. Second, his will stirs his guNa:s (traits) in his C-q-D in the
Disposition Quadrant 1 to impact (shown by an arrow) on his phenomenal knowledge
impinging on the C-q-D from the World View Quadrant II (shown by an arrow).

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Graph 1: Combined Triaxial Graphs of Cognitive Actionality Quadrants (KLT)

Spirituality

Ideology

Cogneme

Concept

Participants Society
World View Quadrant II

Concept Quadrant III

Culture

Relation

Guna:s

C-q-D

Context

Disposition Quadrant I

(Dispositional)
Knowledge

Outer
Circle
(Vaikahari)

Vasanas
(Phenomenal)
Knowledge

KLT Graph1

Context Quadrant IV

Activity
Contextual
Actionality

Actionality
(lingual)

Medial
Circle
(Madhyama)

Inner Circle
(Pasyanthi)

KLT Network 1

Legend
The Individual Consciousness (the Being in the Human Being or the ji:va)
The Triad (sattva giving knowledge of activity; rajas giving choice of activity by traits;
and tamas giving inertia or materiality of activity by va:sana:s) of Disposition
Horizontal Line; Vertical Line; Diagonal Line: Horizontal, Vertical, and Diagonal
Axes; I, II, III, and IV: the quadrants 1, 2, 3, and 4;
gives rise to
s 1.inner (pasyanthi cognitive); 2. medial ( madhyama pattern); 3. outer (vaikhari
form or phonic) levels of realization of language

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KLT Graph 1: Combined Triaxial Quadrants of Cognitive Actionality;

KLT Network 1. Tricircled D-Q-C Creating Proverbial Action
Action
Type
Reaction

Cooperation
Class

Neutrality
Non-Cooperation
Challenge
Polite

Manner
Impolite
Standard
Colloquial

Register

Taboo
The Trait Maxim

Style

Poetic
Prosaic
Figurative

Genre

Literary
Impact on knowledge
Quantity

Content

More
Required
Less
True

Quality

Action

False
Form
Relevance

Network 3: Trait Maxim

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This cogneme cognition is captured in the following KLT Chakram 2.
KLT Chakram 2: Cogneme Cognition

KLT Chakram 2: Cogneme Cognition

The Whole Chakram represents the cognition of the concerned cogneme in terms of
its cognition and its meaning. It consists of three chakrams (circles): inner, medial,
and outer. The inner chakram, in this network, represents the ka:rmatic meaning of
the cogneme, the middle chakram its pragmatic meaning, and the outer chakram its
semantic meaning. Each chakram encloses a triangle which stands for svabha:vam
(disposition) that is a complex of Traits-Knowledge-Va:sana:s and each evolves from
svabha:vam. All the three circles are concentric and they have the star as their centre.
This star envelopes a triangle which is the svabha:vam of the speaker. This star is
further enclosed by two rectangles cutting each other at right angles. The four short
sides of the two rectangles contain eight intersecting arcs emanating from the both
the ends of the four long sides of the two rectangles. The four long sides of the
rectangles are D1---D2 representing disposition; and S1<S2 representing sense on
the horizontal rectangle; and R1<R2 representing the referent; and Sy 1a/1b<Sy
2a/2b representing the symbol in its original (Sy 1a/1b) and modified / transformed
(Sy 2a/2b) states. Disposition inter-relates with the Referent and the Symbol from its
two ends (as shown in the Titled Inner Chakram) and inter-connects them by the
two arcs intersecting each other at S to produce Sense of the relation between the
referent and the symbol. By so doing, it makes them further interdependent to
produce sense since no sense can be produced without one depending on the other.
Thus, an I-I-I relation is constituted between disposition-referent-symbol-sense. In a
similar way, Sense inter-relates with the referent and the symbol from its two ends
(as shown in the Titled Inner Chakram) and inter-connects them by the two arcs
intersecting each other at D to represent the choice and interdependence of the
relation between the referent and the symbol through disposition. So also the two
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ends of the Referent interrelates-interconnects-interdepends (I-I-Is) Sense and
Disposition as do the two ends of the Symbol. On the whole, Disposition generateschooses-specifies-directs-materializes the symbol, sense, and their relationship to
cognize the cogneme.
In successful cogneme cognition, Disposition (D1<D2) is charged by
Consciousness to become C-q-D as shown at the centre by a star-enclosed-triangle.
It thus gains the property of awareness. This Disposition at the point D1 cuts and
spreads across Sy1 to produce Dispositional Symbolic Awareness (DSA) it
spreads like the redness in a lotus. This DSA touches the Referent at R1 and
superimposes itself on R1 to produce DSA of the Referent by willful knowledge of it
it superimposes itself on the referent like a snake on a rope where both the snake
and the rope can be seen by tilting the focus from the foreground to the
background as in psychology experiments. In the absence of tilting the focus,
only one is seen. Since dispositional cognition is multifaceted, this is what
happens in automated name-oriented speech production or form-oriented
cognition we mean either the referent or the name and recognize only one of
them but not recall both of them. In a similar way, Disposition at the point D2
cuts and spreads across R1 to gain Dispositional Referential Awareness (DRA).
This DRA touches the Symbol at S1a and superimposes itself on S1 to produce
DRA of the Symbol by willful knowledge. This is a new type of superimposition:
superimposition through knowledge (sa:gja:na:dhya:sam) as Bhuvaneswar discovers it
but not superimposition through ignorance of the adhishTa:nam (substratum) as in the
case of a snake appearing on a rope.
Finally, the cogneme gradually evolves from pasyanti (the un-manifest state of
cognition as a concept) - to - madhyama (semi-manifest cognition of its pattern and
structure of an utterance) - to - vaikhari (its material form of sound) as shown in KLT
Network 1 as he materializes the cogneme as an utterance in the context as
contextual lingual action in the Context Quadrant IV to fulfill his desire and
experiences the results of his action.
The same Titled Inner Chakram as given in KLT Chakram 3 can be made use of to
describe the dispositional cognition process of ka:rmik reality construction via
dispositional reality via lingual (proverbial) actional reality as follows. The spaces
enclosed between the two sides below the intersecting arcs can be represented as the
four realities: dispositional reality (D. R.); socioculturalspiritual reality (SCS. R.);
contextual actional reality (CA. R.); lingual (proverbial) actional reality ((L)A. R.).
Again, the spaces between the intersecting horizontal and vertical lines can be
represented as the a:nushangik realities by the realities-in-contact: 1. [D. SCS] R; 2.
[SCS. CA] R; 3. [CA. A] R; 4. [D. A] R. As a whole, the entire action can be construed
as [D. SCS. CA. (L)A] reality which is cognized to give rise to [D. SCS. CA. (L)A.
Cog.] reality. This is so cognized in C-q-D.
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KLT Chakram 3: Ka:rmik Reality Construction by Dispositional Cogneme Cognition

[In the Hindu philosophic tradition, the ji:va (the Being or the soul in the Human) is
defined as a (sa:bha:sa (reflected)) antakaraNa (mind) visishta (qualified) chaitanyam
(Consciousness) (Consciousness-Reflected)-Mind-qualified-Consciousness meaning
mind (like blueness) qualifying Consciousness (like the lotus). Here, it is Mind (or
Disposition) that qualifies the Consciousness. In KLT, the other perspective is taken
into consideration: when lingual action is performed it is the svabha:vam through
the mind by the influence or superimposition of Consciousness that performs
activity and does the job and not the Consciousness; Consciousness is neutral like
electric current in a machine; it only runs the machine whereas the nature of the
machine chooses and processes the action through the machine. Hence, in KLT, we
look at the other side of the coin, from the perspective of svabha:vam of the human
being and hence we look at D-q-C (in its potential state) as C-q-D (in its dynamic
state). It is only a matter of looking at the same thing but from different angles: the
man (-with-the-proverbial disposition) as the same as the proverbial disposition of the man
creating or using the proverb. We opt for the C-q-D perspective to easily account for
the variation in action. For example, tamas, rajas, sattva which are the guna:s in the
nature of a human being cause the formation of (traits-knowledge-va:sana:s)
complex as svabha:vam and so it is easy to account for their influence in the GCSDM
of lingual action than referring to the tamas-dominant, rajas-dominant, or sattvadominat human being as creating or using the proverb.]
Finally, as the PCI is made, it is polished by ICCCSA (shown in Stage 2) and then
from there a Popular Proverb will be developed consisting of the uncommon
characteristic which is a mixture of i. frozen textuality that takes care of all the formal
phonological, lexical, and syntactic characteristics including figures of speech; ii.
prototypical-categorial instantiating socioculturalspiritual practice that takes care of
meaning as the content of the phenomenal activity, including polysemanticity which
is derived by dispositional cognition of a socioculturalspiritual practice to mean this
or that by such and such manner; iii. Illocutionary force that takes care of the
functional characteristic as the pro-cat instantiating function in its variety-rangedepth of the other five speech act functions of Searle, including polyfunctionality
that is injected into it from its polycontextuality; and finally, iv. cultural confirmation
that takes care of the dispositional choice of the form-function-meaning-style-context
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of the proverb as well as its polytextuality in its variant intra-dialectal or interdialectal forms. It seems that the so called incommunicable quality (see Taylors
definition given in Bhuvaneswar 2015 a: No. 6) mentioned by Taylor lies hidden in
this mixed characteristic nature of the proverbs, which has not been discovered till
now.
Dispositional Creativity and Exploration of Contextual Variables play the most
critical role in the linguitecture of the proverb as well as its languageering. At each
and every stage of form-function-meaning-style-context development of the proverb,
each individual contributes his quota in the ICCCSA of the proverb as will be shown
below and illustration of the examples.
Stage 2: Individual-Collective-Contextual Conjunction and Standardization (ICCCS)
Material Layer

Context

Contextual - Lingual Action

Temporal Layer
Spatial Layer
I/I IPC
2

C
C /I IPT

a. CTP Network

I/I IPC

I-to-C IPC

C/I IPT

b. I-I-I Network of ICCCS

Legend:
transmission from .. to .. ; I Individual; C Collective; I / I
Individual-to-Individual; C/I Collective-to-Individual; IPC Interpersonal Communication;
IPT Interpersonal Transmission; I-to-C Individual-to-Collective; 1 Dispositional;
2 Socioculturalspiritual; 3 Contextual Actional; 4 Lingual Actional Realities
KLT Network 2: a. Creation and Transmission of Proverbs by ICCCS
b. I-I-I (Interconnected-Interrelated-Interdependent) Network of ICCCS
In the Network 2, how this utterance becomes a proverb is shown. The individual (I)
uses this utterance to categorize the social contextual practice with another individual
through individual interpersonal communication (I IPC) in the first instance. If the
second individual accepts it in toto (cultural confirmation by a single individual) and
likes it, he further uses it as a prototype with another individual to categorize the
same or a similar practice. Here, the utterance becomes a proverb in principle but not
popular. Thus, a proverb-in-principle is created at this particular instance, but it is not
created as a popular-proverb-in-practice. If he does not accept it in toto, he modifies
it and standardizes it and uses it with another individual in a similar way. As the
usage gains currency by its cyclic use, it is finally polished and standardized at the
collective (C) level by collective cultural confirmation (by many individuals many
is fuzzy and cannot be a mathematically fixed number; it means generally known)
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in a frozen form. Thus, it becomes an accepted prototype to instantiate different
categorial social practices. At this instance, a proverb in principle becomes a popular
proverb, which is generally understood and known as a proverb. To clarify further,
the proverb as commonly understood by people refers to the popular-proverb-inpractice but not the proverb-in-principle. This exact instance of the gradual evolution
of a proverb-in-principle to a popular-proverb-in-practice is unnoticed like water
under a mat but becomes felt as its cultural confirmation is progressively established
by popular usage through time.
At this stage, a proverb is applied as a popular proverb per se. To prove the KLT
definition of the proverb, only one example is taken from real life conversations
owing to constraints of space and the use of the proverb is analyzed to illustrate the
definition [see Bhuvaneswar (2015d) for more examples]. Here, the proverb occurs in
P1 (proverb alone) form it can also occur in P2 (proverb embedded in an
utterance), and P3 (proverb preceding or following an utterance in a turn) forms in
its basic varieties of discourse structure and functions as an illocution performing
pro-cat instantiation. In addition, we discover it as a culturally confirmed (and) frozen
text from folk wisdom and printed books. Therefore, these four properties are
superimposed on a text in question and the uncommon characteristic is discovered
by Proverb Identification Test (PIT).
3. 4. 1. 2. 1. Illustration of the KLT Definition by the Use of a P1 Proverb:
[A (Me) and B (Robin Fawcett) were going on a sightseeing trip in Hyderabad in
1999. B, a famous linguist, knows that I am doing research on proverbs. We hired an
auto to the famous Golconda Fort but missed the way and passed through Kutub
Shahi Tombs, another historical sight. When we reached the Tombs, the following
conversation occurred.]
(1)

A (Me):
B (Robin Fawcett):
A:
B:

It is good that we have come this way.

Every cloud has a silver lining.
Oh, you used a proverb!
Because of you< I have used it for you.

In the above real life conversation, the text in question occurs in the second turn of
the exchange: it is the sentence Every cloud has a silver lining. A culturally informed
speaker immediately recollects and recognizes the proverb in its fixed form, and in
his doing so, we find that it is a frozen text since it is fixed and recalled in the cultural
memory as such. That it is a culturally confirmed frozen text is also confirmed by the
empirical evidence of the folk knowledge of its usage in the daily life of the English
speaking people and its occurrence as a recorded proverb (text) in books of proverbs.
In this real exchange, it is further proved to be so. In languages such as Telugu, the
proverb initiators or linkers such ani that; e:do: sa:myam cheppinaTTu like some
proverb said, anna:TTu said like that or anna:TTa said that also indirectly indicate
this property of cultural confirmation by authorizing what someone said.
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Again, when we observe its usage, we find that it is an assertive speech act (illocution)
used as a follow up move to support the assertion made by A. The statement made by
A expresses a natural event cognized as an unhappy social practice which turns out
to have an advantage: going to Kutub Shahi Tombs is not in the plan which is a
waste of time and money and so an embarrassing mistake. Therefore, it is one
categorial instance of such a mistake. However, since B is on a sightseeing trip and
Kutub Shahi Tombs are an important tourist attraction, going that way brought an
advantage. By the use of the proverb, it is confirmed that there is an advantage in
such mistakes by virtue of its cultural authorization. In other words, the proverb
serves as a prototype to instantiate a category of such practice: pro-cat instantiation.
Furthermore, as A makes an attempt to save his face, B indirectly saves Bs face by
supporting his view. On the same text, all these four characteristics are
superimposed as a mixed characteristic. In other words, that text on which this
mixed characteristic is superimposed becomes a proverb; alternatively, any and
every proverb must have these characteristics as a whole.
Hypothetically, the same proverb can be used either mono-functionally as it
occurred in the above context or poly-functionally also. When it is used monofunctionally, it can be used to perform different functions in the same or different
situations. For example, if the proverb is used with the rising intonation of a
question to question A sarcastically it is used to perform a different function in
the same situation. Here, disposition ultimately decides the choice. This is one kind
of poly-functionality dispositionally variable proverb-functionality. Suppose, B uses a
rising intonation on the last word lining to convey both an assertion and an
exclamation, then the proverb becomes poly-functional at the same time. This is
another kind of poly-functionality dispositional simultaneous multiple proverbfunctionality. Sometimes, because of the ambiguity in the structure of language, the
listener may be confused or mislead to comprehend an unintended function.
Whatever be the case, poly-functionality does not affect the uncommon characteristic
of the proverb because it is subsumed as a secondary characteristic in the essential
pro-cat instantiation characteristic poly-functionality can neither decide nor affect
the proverbness of a proverb (I prefer proverbness over the commonly used term
proverbiality since proverbiality may refer to any property of a proverb such as
alliteration, metaphor, etc. whereas proverbness refers to the intrinsic quality of the
proverb that differentiates it from other genres). Whatever be the function, meaning,
text, and context, for an expression to be a proverb, it has to be textually frozen,
culturally confirmed, and illocutionarily prototypical-categorial. To put in other words,
poly-functionality, poly-semanticity, and poly-situativity cannot be a part of the
uncommon characteristic to define the proverb, nor can they affect the uncommon
characteristic. A similar argument can be extended to all the other characteristics
such as poly-semanticity, and poly-situativity mentioned by Mieder that are
supposed to militate against this definition (see Bhuvaneswar 2015d for a detailed
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discussion on this topic). The uncommon characteristic of culturally frozen
illocutionary prototypicality cannot be a mere approximation but a definitive
characterization since it accounts for any and every proverb in its canonical form
pending the status of weather and medical sayings which are also considered
proverbs. Even idioms (including proverbial phrases that may become idioms)
which are culturally frozen can be distinguished by the pro-cat instantiation test
(PIT) as lexical units and not as proverbs. Hence, from a functional linguistic
perspective, it is difficult to sustain Mieders vast scholarship-informed observation on
this definition [i.e., a culturally frozen prototypical illocution (as a text)+ that
Of course, as has been the case with hundreds of earlier definitions, even this complex
statement is but an approximation of what proverbs really are and what they can achieve due to
their polyfunctionality, polysituativity, and polysemanticity.
I think Prof. Mieder made this observation from a different perspective based on the
properties of proverbs he seems to be unduly influenced by the ployfunctionality,
polysemanticity, and polysituativity aspects of proverbs without taking into
consideration the role of the uncommon characteristic that must and should exclude
the redundant secondary properties such as the ones mentioned by him and include
only the needed essential characteristics for effectively defining the proverb. After
all, a definition cannot be a list of all the properties since it is not a description! From
that perspective, out of the fifty selected definitions in this paper, it may turn out to
be the only one that is more comprehensive (see Bhuvaneswar 2015 a, b) and may
probably turn out to be the only one among the hundreds of definitions (which Mieder
knows from his vast scholarship of definitions he has 206 entries on the definition of the
proverb in one of his bibliographies!) that can systematically provide a valid, fool-proof,
concise definition of the proverb! It is most likely to be so because PIT has not been
discovered until Bhuvaneswar (1999) and because the uncommon characteristic has
not been methodically formulated. Of course, this claim is only a humble claim made
to provoke further research and has to be tested extensively and ratified by
analyzing those hundreds of definitions as well as sayings, saws, adages, maxims,
aphorisms, and idioms!
The entire process of the formation, application and transmission can be captured by
graphic networks to empirically support the ka:rmik linguistic definition of the
proverb as a culturally confirmed frozen prototypical illocution (as a text). This is
process is explained below in the KLT Star Network 1.
When a proverb is popularized, it gets entrenched in the I/C memory of the C-q-D of
the speech community in the society. In other words, its frozen form as it is culturally
established gets fixed in the memory of the individuals.

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Stage 3. Transmission, Retention and Perpetuation of Proverbs
Traits

Satellite
Planet
Star

Knowledge
Disposition

Va:sana:s
D

Directive
Commissive

E
R

Dec

C-q-D

Move
Transaction

Speech Act

Exchange

a. Star Network Model

Function
Form
Context

Meaning

Style

b. Star (PK) Network

Legend: D Disposition; C Context; L Lingual Action; R Representative; E Expressive;

Dec Declaration;
apparently transforms into; Consciousness / Knowledge/Awareness
KLT Star Network 1. Retention of Proverbial Knowledge (PK) as DK

At this stage, the knowledge of the language and its proverbs along with their formfunction-meaning-style (L) and the rules of making moves, speech acts
(representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations as
illocutions), exchanges, and transactions in contextual discourse (C) for pro-cat
instantiation are also unconsciously stored in the knowledge component of disposition
(D) as Dispositional Knowledge (DK) in the mind as shown in the Star Network Ib
given below.
That it is so can be inferred when it is used in a context by recall: when an individual
gets a dispositional impulsion from his D.F.P. to use a proverb to construct pro-cat
actional reality according to his dispositional reality, he conceptualizes a proverbial
utterance as a cogneme by recall in a similar way as shown in KLT Graph 1 and
Network 1 and uses it in a context in C/I IPT. As it is used, it is heard, learnt and
retained and perpetuated by its further use in a cyclic, I-I-I network of IPC and IPT
as shown in Network 2b: individuals communicating with individuals InterconnectInterrelate-Interdepend together to form the collective by IPC; the collective
communicating with the individual is also I-I-Ied; In addition, it is also taught by its
recollection. Hence, it is proved that it is confirmed and retained in the cultural
memory in a frozen form as an illocution.
As it is continuously used or recalled, it is propagated and its life is perpetuated. The
deviations in its use are caused by lack of alertness, focus, attention, and loss of
memory. If the proverb is modified in any way be it dialectal or simply formal, a
bifurcation point starts (as in autopoeisis) and as it spreads, one to more than one
variant is produced. Finally, the entire process becomes ka:rmikopoeitic wherein
dispositional experience of the process decides its changes or the status quo. They
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may or may not co-exist with the original standard depending on their popularity. A
rupture in the cycle brings the death of the proverb.
From the ka:rmik linguistic analysis (KLA) conducted above, we conclude that
formal, functional, semantic, cognitive and mixed definitions cannot provide a
conclusive definition of the proverb. They cannot withstand scientific analysis. Only
KLA can withstand such scrutiny. Hence, it is humbly submitted to the learned
reader to test this definition of the proverb as a culturally confirmed frozen text of a
prototypical practice used as an illocution over a categorial action in a setting for a
projected view of life or a culturally confirmed frozen prototypical illocution (as
a text) and censure it if it is faulty or else ratify it.
References
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www.Scribd.com/bhuvanesvar
-----1999. The Structure of the English Proverb in I/E Exchange: A Multilayered
Systemic Analysis. First ICEG Conference. Hyderabad: CIEFL
____
2003. The Proverb and Its Definition: A Karmik Linguistic Approach. 30th
International Systemic Functional Linguistics Congress. Lucknow: CIEFL
------2009. The Syntax of Proverbs I: The Sentence In American English Proverbs:A
Case Study in Quirks Model. Al Mergib Journal of English Studies, Vol.1. Ghasar Khiar, Al
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-----2010a. Figures of Speech in Proverbs I (Phonology): Evidence for Ka:rmik
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