RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF KALAW, 20 SCRA 987

(1967)
FACTS: The National Coconut Corp (NACOCO) was chartered as a
non-profit governmental organization. In 1946, NACOCOs charter
was amended to grant the corporation the express power to trade
coconut products in order to stabilize copra prices
1. At the time, the GM and BOD chair was Maximo Kalaw,
Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the
board
2. After the charter of NACOCO was amended, Kalaw,
as GM, brokered several contracts for the delivery of
copra. However because of typhoons, NACOCO was
unable to make good on its obligation to deliver the
copra products, thus causing NACOCO to sustain
heavy losses
3. NACOCO, in turn, sought to recover the losses it
sustained from Kalaw and the
members of the
board. NACOCO charged Kalaw with negligence
under Art 1902 Old Civil Code (now Art 2176 NCC)
for bad faith and/or breach of trust for having
approved the contracts
4. The Heirs of Kalaw argued that NACOCOs action is
personal to the deceased Maximo Kalaw and may
not be deemed to have survived after his death
under Sec 5, Rule 87 1940 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON action is unenforceable against the Heirs of Kalaw
HELD: No, the action may be enforced against the heirs of Kalaw.
The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw
for having entered into the questioned contracts without prior
approval of the board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff; and is against Kalaw and the other directors for having
subsequently approved the said contracts in bad faith and/or
breach of trust." Clearly then, the present case is not a mere action
for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising from
contract. The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the action is
embraced in suits filed "to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal", which survive.
Rule 88, section 1 (now Rule 87), enumerates actions that
survive against a decedent's executors or administrators,
and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal

property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien

thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property. The present suit is one for damages
under the last class, it having been held that "injury to
property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but
extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is
injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur
unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly
injury to that party's property.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

BELAMALA V. POLINAR, 21 SCRA 970 (1967)

FACTS: Claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the offended party in
a criminal case filed before CFI Bohol against Mauricio Polinar, for
frustrated murder
1. The administrator (herein respondent) Marcelino
Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the
deceased Mauricio Polinar
2. In 1966, CFI Bohol convicted Mauricio Polinar of the
crime serious physical injuries and sentenced him to
pay Belamala the amount of P2,025.80
3. While Mauricio Polinars appeal was pending before
CA, he died. However, there was no notice or
notification of his death filed with CA
4. The administrator-appellant argued that the death
of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished
all criminal and civil liabilities arising from the
offense in view of Art 89, par 1 RPC

VILLEGAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 271 SCRA 148 (1997)

FACTS: On July 25, 1969, an information for libel was filed by
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court of
First Instance of Manila against Villegas who denied the
charge.
1. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for
the United States where he stayed until his death on
November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded
in absentia; by the time of his death in 1984, the
prosecution had already rested its case.
2. Two months after notice of his death, the court
issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of
the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil
aspect. No memorandum was ever filed in his behalf.

ISSUE: WON Belamalas claim may be enforced against the

administrator of Mauricio Polinars estate

ISSUE: WON Raquiza can claim damages against the executor or

administrator of Villegas

HELD: Yes. The claim should have been prosecuted by

separate action against the administrator, as permitted by
sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87, since the claim is
patently one "to recover damages for an injury to person or
property" (Rule 87, sec. 1). Belamala's action cannot be
enforced by filing a claim against the estate under Rule 86,
because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to
those for funeral expenses, expenses for last sickness,
judgments for money and "claims against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied;" and this last
category (the other three being inapposite) includes only
"all purely personal obligations other than those which
have their source in delict or tort, and Belamala's
damages manifestly have a tortious origin.

HELD: Yes. Sec 1, Rule 87 ROC provides: No action upon a claim

for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him.
In this case, the court a quo should have dismissed both
actions against Villegas which dismissal will not, however,
bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his
claim for damages against the executor or administrator of
the former's estate, notwithstanding the fact that he did
not reserve the right to institute a civil separate civil action
based on Art 33 NCC.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

GASKELL & CO V. TAN SITT, 43 PHIL 810 (1922)

FACTS: Gaskell and Dy Poco, deceased husband of Tan Sit,
were solidarily liable to a certain bonding company.
1. The bonding company demanded payment from
Gaskell while a bankruptcy proceedings was filed by
such creditor against Dy Poco
2. During the proceedings, Gaskell did not prove the
solidary liability of Dy Poco.
3. Before
the
termination
of
the
bankruptcy
proceedings, Dy Poco died, but said proceedings
continued.
4. It appears that there was a life insurance policy
executed in favor of Dy Poco. Tan Sit, widow of Dy
Poco, was appointed administratrix of the proceeds
of the life insurance.
5. While the intestate proceedings was pending, the
bankruptcy proceedings was decided releasing Dy Poco
from any liability
6. Subsequently, Gaskell presented the claim as a
contingency claim against the estate of Dy Poco in
the intestate proceedings.
ISSUE: WON Gaskell has the right to claim against the property of
Dy Poco in administration
HELD: No. There can be no question that the claim of
Gaskell & Co against Dy Poco is properly designated as a
contingent claim, which may be defined as a claim in which
liability depends on some future event that may or may not
happen, and which makes it uncertain whether there will
ever be any liability. The expression is used in contradistinction
to the absolute claim, which is subject to no contingency and may
be proved an allowed as a debt by the committee or claims. The
absolute claim is such a claim as, if contested between living
persons, would be proper subject of immediate legal action and
would supply a basis of a judgment for a sum certain. It will be
noted that the term "contingent" has reference to the uncertainty
of the liability and not to the uncertainty in which the realization or

collection of the claim may be involved. The word "contingent," as

used in the original English, in the Code of Civil Procedure, conveys
the idea of ultimate uncertainty as to the happening of the event
upon which liability will arise; and it is not the prices equivalent of
the Spanish word "eventual" by which it is commonly translated.
The idea involved in the word "eventual" may be satisfied with the
idea of that which is uncertain only in respect to the element of
time. A thing that is certain to happen at some time or other will
eventually come to pass although the exact time may be
uncertain; to be contingent its happening must be wholly uncertain
until the event which fixes liability occurs.
The claim in question having been discharged in
bankruptcy, it cannot serve as the basis of recovery against
the estate of Dy Poco in administration. When it happens,
as
here,
that
both
bankruptcy
proceedings
and
administration proceedings are simultaneously conducted
over the estate of a deceased bankrupt, no claim can be
proved against the administrator which is provable in
bankruptcy; and it was partly with a view for making this
point clear that we were at pains to say at the conclusion of
our
opinion
in
Sun
Life
Assurance
Co.
of
Canada vs. Ingersoll and Tan Sit, supra, that the proceeds
of the policy of insurance there awarded to the
administratrix were not liable for any of the debts provable
against Dy Poco in the bankruptcy proceedings then
pending.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

BUAN V. LAYA, 102 PHIL 682 (1957)

FACTS: Sylvana Laya filed a contingent claim for more than
P500,000 against the intestate estate of deceased spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan. The contingent
claim was based on the fact that in August 1952, a
Philippine Rabbit bus, owned
and operated by Buan,
collided with a car in which Juan Laya, Rodolfo Escosa, Jose
Palma, and Juan De Leon were riding. Said collusion was
caused by the negligence of the bus driver
1. The heirs of Juan Laya reserved the civil action for
damages, and in 1953, they filed a civil action
before CFI Manila against the administrator of the
deceased spouses Buan.
2. When the administrators learned of the contingent
claim, they filed an opposition on the ground that
the same was not filed before the death of the
spouses Buan, and that it was also not filed within
the period prescribed by Rule 89, Sec 4 ROC. CFI
Tarlac admitted the claim but denied that prayer that a
portion of the estate be set aside to respond for the
amount of the contingent claim
ISSUE: WON the contingent claim against the estate of the
spouses Buan will prosper
HELD: Yes. A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which
liability depends on some future event which may or may not
occur, so that duty to pay may never become absolute.
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya,
would succeed in the action brought in Manila against the
administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event
or contingency upon which the validity of the claim

presented in the administration proceedings depends.

While the said action has not yet been finally decided or
determined to the effect that the petitioners herein, heirs
of the deceased Juan C. Laya, have no right of action
against the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P.
Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, the contingent claim that
petitioners have filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
in the proceedings for the administration of the deceased
spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, may not be
dismissed. The order of the court dismissing the claim and
declaring that the same may again be entertained if another valid
complaint by the petitioners herein is filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, is inconsistent with the nature and character of
a contingent claim. A contingent claim does not follow the
temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon which it is
based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only said
final result can cause its termination. The rules provide
that a contingent claim is to be presented in the
administration proceedings in the same manner as any
ordinary claim, and that when the contingency arises which
converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court
should then be informed that the claim had already
matured. (Secs. 5. 9, Rule 87.) The order of the court subject of
the appeal should, therefore, be set aside.
The validity of the contingent claim is apparent. A portion of the
estate should therefore, be set aside to respond for such damages
as petitioners herein may subsequently recover in the action they
have brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK V. CHENG TAN, 4

SCRA 501 (1962)
FACTS: In an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, CFI
Manila held Silvio Cheng Tan solidarily liable to pay the
First National City Bank of New York the sum of
P142,000.56
1. During the pendency of the case, Cheng Tan died
and was substituted by his legal representative,
Serafin Cheng.
2. Cheng filed a motion to dismiss the action on the
ground that under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 5,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff should file its
claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of said deceased pending in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal since February
27, 1958, an administrator having been appointed
by said court on April 7, 1958.
3. Opposing the motion to dismiss, the bank contended that
the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 59502 having
ceased to be executory, demandable and operative, the
same had been reduced to a mere right of action; that the
present action to revive said judgment is not one for the
recovery of money; that it was for this reason that a
contingent claim had been filed by it against defendant's
estate.
ISSUE: WON the contingent claim against defendant estate is valid

HELD: Yes. As held in BPI vs. Concepcion e Hijos (53 PHIL

806), deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must
be filed with the probate court where the settlement of the
estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the
period of time fixed for the filing of claims. On the other
hand, Sec, 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that,
among others, judgments for money against the decedent
whose estate is in the process of judicial settlement must
be filed with the private court within the time limited in the
notice given for that purpose, otherwise they will be
deemed barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaim in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the judgment creditor.

It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil action remaining

unsatisfied after 5 years from its date of entry, is reduced to the
condition of a mere right of action but this does not argue against
the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for
corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to
the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a
promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted
as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate
of the deceased debtor is pending.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

5. Private respondent opposed the motion, disputing
the personality of the petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of her husband
ISSUE: WON the petitioners has the right to intervene in the
interstate proceedings of the deceased

HILADO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 587 SCRA 464 (2009)

FACTS: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S.
Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by
his
wife,
private
respondent
Julita
Campos
Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.
1. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases
against Benedicto involving the petitioners.
2. On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court
3. In January 2001, the administratrix submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the decedent. In the list
of liabilities, Campos Benedicto included two
pending claims which were being litigated in
Bacolod city courts.
4. Subsequently, petitioners filed with RTC
Manila a
motion praying that they be furnished with copies of
all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings.

HELD: No. The Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested

persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in
varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1,
Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to
oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition
for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the
giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule
76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for
the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to
the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or
interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of
the time and place of the examination and allowance of the
Administrators account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of
Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7)
Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of
the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied
or provided for.

However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were

based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection
with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil
actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are
civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section
1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate
estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator,
was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178,
whereas the other civil case was already pending review
before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against
Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they
were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings.

estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel

of land, which Allan did for P450,000.00 with interest.
3. For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage
4. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder.
However, the loan having a payable balance, to
claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with
the RTC, Balayan, Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua
and Allan.

ISSUE: WON the special administrator and the heirs are liable for
the debts of the estate

PNB V. COURT OF APPEALS, 360 SCRA 370 (2001)

FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of
land covered by a TCT and registered in their names.
1. Upon the husbands death, the probate court
appointed his son, private respondent Allan as
special administrator of the deceaseds intestate
estate.
2.

The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan

accommodation from PNB to be secured by a real

HELD: No. Sec 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage
creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the
mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time
before it is barred by prescription, without right to file a
claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno vs.
Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes
out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the
mortgage creditor, and which would precisely include
extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second
alternative.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.
Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial
foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the
creditor waives any further deficiency claim.
CAB: Petitioner as chosen the mortgage-creditors option of
extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the
Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency
claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua.
Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said
estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing
the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no
further liability remains on the part of respondents and the
late Antonio M. Chuas estate.

HELD: File a claim against the estate in the testate or

intestate proceedings of the deceased person. As correctly
pointed by petitioner, the CPG terminates upon the death
of either spouse. After the death of one of the spouses, in
case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal
property to pay any outstanding obligations of the
partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and
with the formalities established by the ROC for the sale of
the property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is
brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action
should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the intestate
or testate proceedings of the deceased person.
Under Rule 78 Sec 6 ROC, Uy may apply in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor or the
deceased Carlos Ngo if after 30 days from his death, Ventura failed
to apply for administration or request that administration be
granted to some other person.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition for certiorari granted. Complaint filed by Uy
is dismissed.

VENTURA V. MILTANTE, 316 SCRA 226 (1999)

ISSUE: What remedy should be availed of by Uy?

SALIGUMBA V. PALANOG, 573 SCRA 8 (2008)

FACTS: Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino
Palanog, filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

damages against spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo
Saligumba before RTC Aklan.
1. In the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that
they have been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession as owners for more than 50
years of a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan.
2. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from
entering and residing on the subject premises and had
destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land
3. During the pendency of the case, Eliseo Saligumba
died. The trial court held that the Palanogs were the
lawful owners of the land and ordered spouses
Saligumbas to vacate the premises and restore
possession to spouses Palanogs
4. The heirs of Saligumba contended that the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the
spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment
was not binding on them.
ISSUE: WON the cause of action is extinguished with the death of
a party defendant
HELD: No. The instant case is an action for quieting of title
with damages which is an action involving real property. It
is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule as the
claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when
a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the procedure.
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party,
and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal
representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased.
In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving
an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes,
failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of
the deceased. There was no court order for deceaseds legal
representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal
representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the
deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the
appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever
ask to be substituted.

PENEYRA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 181 SCRA

244 (1990)
FACTS: On May 7, 1976, the Board of Trustees of the Corregidor
College Inc. awarded the management and operation of its canteen
at a monthly rental of P80.00 to petitioners herein who are
stockholders of the said College.
1. Subsequently, upon instructions of Eulogio Dizon,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Corregidor
College, Inc., the rental payments of petitioners
were refused, and on August 6, 1980, partial
demolition
of
the
canteen
was
effected.
Consequently, on September 9, 1980, petitioners
filed in the then Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija an action against Eulogio R. Dizon for damages
with preliminary mandatory injunction.
2. After Dizon filed his answer and counterclaim, pretrial took place. On February 20, 1981, petitioners
presented their evidence and rested their case.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages against Euologio Dizon

survived his death
HELD: Yes. An action for the recovery of damages for injury to
personal property is not extinguished by the death of the
defendant. This is because such action may still be brought against
the executor or administrator of the estate of the defendant. Since
the demolition of petitioners' canteen is a ground for the recovery
of damages arising from injury to personal property, then, as
provided in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, the deceased
defendant should now be substituted by the executor,
administrator or legal representative of his estate as partydefendant.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

RIOFERIO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 419 SCRA 54 (2004)

FACTS: Alfonso Orfinada Jr. died without a will leaving
several personal and real properties. He also left a widow,
respondent Esperanza Orfinada, with whom he had 7
children
1. The decedent also left his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner Teodora Rioferio and
children Veronica, Alberto and Rowena
2. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate
children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner
Teodora and her children executed an extrajudicial
settlement of estate of a deceased person with
quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of
the decedent in Dagupan city
3. Respondent Alfonso, then, filed a petition for letters
of administration. Respondents filed a complaint for
the annulment/rescission of extrajudicial settlement
of estate.
4. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents
are not real-parties-in-interest but rather the estate of
Alfonso Orfinada Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings
ISSUE: WON the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights
belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of
the administration proceedings
HELD: Yes. Even if administration proceedings have already been
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator
has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite
the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 ] and Section 2, Rule 87
ROC. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court recognized
the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and
properties of the decedent under administration pending the
appointment of an administrator

Rule 87, while permitting an executor or administrator to

represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do
not
prohibit
the
heirs
from
representing
the
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in
which an administrator has already been appointed. But no
rule categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already
been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence
recognizes two exceptions: (1) if the executor or
administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2)
when the administrator is alleged to have participated in
the act complained of[31] and he is made a party
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek
judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as
compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not
more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he
is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty
parties himself.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

MARINI-GONZALES V. LOOD, 148 SCRA 452 (1987)

ISSUE: WON respondent judge Lood abused his discretion in
ordering the respondent Eliseo Zari to represent the deceased as
party defendant
HELD: Yes. Under Rule 87 Sec 2 ROC, it is the executor or
administrator of the estate of the decedent who may bring
or defend actions in the name of the deceased, and the SC
has ruled that the choice of an executor is the sole
prerogative of the testator and is not addressed to the
discretion of the court.
In Ozaeta v. Pecson, the SC held: It is natural that the testator
should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be
trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The
curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the
rights to dispose.
The joinder of the deceased Rafael as a party defendant is no
longer necessary and may be dispensed with, since no cross-claim
has been filed against him by his co-defendants; and petitioners
right under Art 173 NCC may be enforced against third persons
even without joining her husband as party defendant.

VELASQUEZ V. GEORGE, 125 SCRA 456 (1983)

FACTS: Plaintiffs-appellants are the widow and legitimate children
of the late Benjamin B. George.
1.

Plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint against the five

defendants-mortgagors alleging that the latter are officers
of Island Associates Inc. Andres Muoz, aside from being
the treasurer-director of said corporation, was also
appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of
Benjamin George.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants claim that without the proper
approval from the probate court and without notice
to the heirs and their counsel, the defendantsmortgagors executed a Deed of First Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the defendant-mortgagee
Erlinda Villanueva, covering three parcels of land
owned by Island Associates. In said Deed, the
defendants-mortgagors also expressly waived their
right to redeem the said parcels.
3. A motion to dismiss was filed by William George,
Robert George, and administrator Andres Muoz on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case. The trial court dismissed the
complaint stating that the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission
4. Villanueva contends that the plaintiffs-appellants
have no capacity to file the complaint because the
general rule laid down in Rule 87, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court states that only the administrator or
executor of the estate may bring actions of such
nature as the one in the case at bar. The only

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

exception is when the executor or administrator is unwilling
or fails or refuses to act, which exception according to the
mortgagee-appellee does not apply in the present case.
ISSUE: WON plaintiffs-appellants have capacity to file the case at
bar?
HELD: Yes. The administrator, Andres Muoz, is the same
person charged by the plaintiffs-appellants to have voted in
the board of directors without securing the proper
authority from the probate court to which he is accountable
as administrator. In Ramirez v. Baltazar (24 SCRA 918), the
SC ruled that "since the ground for the present action to
annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud
resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in
which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would
be far-fetched to expect the said administrator himself to
file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the
heirs, who have an interest to assert and to protect, would
bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the
exception, rather than the general rule that pending
proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs
have no right to commence an action arising out of the
rights belonging to the deceased." The case at bar falls
under such an exception.

OBANDO V. FIGUERAS, 322 SCRA 148 (2000)

FACTS: Alegria Strebel Figueras, together with her
stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a Petition for
settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband
Jose Figueras. While settlement of the estate was pending,
she died and Eduardo assumed administration of the joint
estates of Don Jose and Doa Alegria.
1.

Later, Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what

purported to be Doa Alegria's Last Will and Testament,
filed by Felizardo S. Obando (herein petitioner), a nephew
of Doa Alegria. The alleged Will bequeathed to Petitioner
Obando and several other members of the Obando clan
properties left by the Figueras couple.
2. The NBI found that the questioned and the standard
signatures were not made by the same person. This led to
the indictment and the conviction of Petitioner Obando in a
Criminal Case for estafa through falsification of a public
document.
3. Eduardo's then filed a Motion for authority to sell
the two parcels of land in New Manila but the RTC
denied the same. Despite such denial, Eduardo sold
the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

4. Petitioner
Obando,
in
his
capacity
as
coadministrator and universal heir of Doa Alegria,
filed a Complaint (Civil Case) against Eduardo and
Amigo Realty (collectively referred to as the
respondents) for the nullification of the sale.
5. However, in Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and
123948, the probate court, in its Order dated
December 17, 1997, removed Petitioner Obando
from his office as co-administrator of the joint estate
of the Figueras spouses. Consequently, in the civil
case, respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents built their evidence around the loss
of his legal standing to pursue the case. RTC granted
the Motion and dismissed the civil case without prejudice.
ISSUE: WON the conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through
falsification and the revocation of his appointment as
administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient
grounds to dismiss the civil case
HELD: Yes. Petitioner Obando derived his power to
represent the estate of the deceased couple from his
appointment as co-administrator. When the probate court
removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he
lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras
estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case.
Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss
on this ground.
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal
from administration are on appeal only means that his legal
standing could be restored; thus, the civil case was
correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his conviction is
reversed and his appointment restored by the probate
court, the case may continue without being barred by res
judicata. The lower court's Decision showed that it was
careful in its action. On the other hand, Obando has yet to
show that he has regained administration of the Figueras
estates. Noteworthy also is the fact that his removal from
office was predicated not only on his conviction for a crime,
but also on his failure to render an accounting of the rental
of a property leased to the Community of Learners.

LOPEZ V. OLBES, 15 PHIL 540 (1910)

FACTS: Plaintiffs brought suit against Adolfo Olbes alleging in their
complaint that:
a.

the latter executed a public instrument before the

notary Felix Samson whereby she donated to the
plaintiffs a parcel of hemp land containing an area of
162 hectares, 2 areas, and 50 centares;

b.

said Martina Lopez was the legitimate mother and

grandmother of the plaintiffs;

c.

Adolfo Olbes was the testamentary executor duly

appointed by order issued by the CFI

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

d.

1.

2.

said Olbes, as executor, claimed to have rights of

ownership and possession to the aforementioned land
adverse to those then held by the plaintiffs

The defendant filed a demurrer in writing alleging that the

facts set forth in the complaint did not constitute a right of
action, inasmuch as the plaintiffs, as the heirs or donees,
could not maintain any suit against the testamentary
executor to recover the title or possession of the land so long
as the court had not adjudicated the estate to them or until
the time allowed for paying the debts should have expired,
unless they be given possession of the said land by the
executor.
The RTC granted the demurrer.

ISSUE: WON plaintiffs, as the heirs or donees, could maintain any

suit against the testamentary executor to recover the title or
possession of the land

HELD: Yes. Property of the testate estate of the deceased Martina

Lopez is not here concerned. During her lifetime she gave away the
land mentioned, in the exercise of a right that pertained to her as
owner thereof. By virtue of the said donation the sole and true
owners of the land donated are the plaintiffs, so long as the said
donation is not proven to be null, inefficacious, or irregular. All the
questions which by reason of the same are raised by the interested
parties must be heard in a regular trial and decided by a final
judgmet absolutely independent of the probate proceedings
concerning the estate of the deceased, who was the previous
owner of the land concerned; and therefore the complaint of the
donees should not have been dismissed, but the trial should have
been proceeded with to final judgment.

CHUA V. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP, 413 SCRA 547

(2003)
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for letters of administration. RTC
appointed Betty T. Chua as administratrix of the intestate estate of
her deceased husband Jose L. Chua.
1.

2.

3.

One of the creditors of the deceased, [herein respondent]

Absolute Management Corporation, filed a claim on the
estate in the amount of P63,699,437.74. As administratrix,
Betty T. Chua tentatively accepted said amount as correct,
with a statement that it shall be reduced or adjusted as
additional evidences may warrant.
In the interim, respondent noticed that the deceaseds
shares of stocks with Ayala Sales Corporation and Ayala
Construction Supply, Inc. were not included in the
inventory of assets. Chua alleged that these shares had
already been assigned and transferred to other parties
prior to the death of her husband.
Respondent, suspecting that the proof of transfer of the
aforementioned shares were spurious and simulated, filed
a motion for the examination of the supposed transferees.
xxx It premised its motion on Section 6, Rule 87, Revised
Rules of Court, infra, which states that when a person is
suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed
away any of the properties of the deceased, a creditor may
file a complaint with the trial court and the trial court may
cite the suspected person to appear before it and be
examined under oath on the matter of such
complaint. RTC denied the motion. CA reversed RTC.

ISSUE: WON Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, mandatory or

merely directory on the trial court
HELD: MANDATORY
RATIO: Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from
persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of
the properties left by a deceased person, or of having
concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the properties of
the deceased.

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of
a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings has supervision and control over these
properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to
it that the inventory of the administrator lists all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance
with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to
determine what properties, rights and credits of the
deceased the administrator should include or exclude in
the inventory. An heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased may call the courts attention that
certain properties, rights or credits are left out from the
inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the courts duty to
hear the observations of such party. The court has the
power to determine if such observations deserve attention
and if such properties belong prima facie to the estate.
There is no reason why the trial court should disallow the
examination of the alleged transferees of the shares of
stocks. This is only for purposes of eliciting information or securing
evidence from persons suspected of concealing or conveying some
of
the
decedents
properties
to
the
prejudice
of
creditors. Petitioners admission that these persons are the
decedents assignees does not automatically negate concealment
of the decedents assets on their part. The assignment might be
simulated so as to place the shares beyond the reach of
creditors. In case the shares are eventually included in the estate,
this inventory is merely provisional and is not determinative of the
issue of ownership. A separate action is necessary for
determination of ownership and recovery of possession.

SOTERO PUNONGBAYAN V. DANILO PUNONGBAYAN, 446

SCRA 100 (2004)
FACTS: scolastica Punongbayan-Paguio died intestate leaving
behind considerable properties. The petitioner is her brother while
the respondent is her nephew.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Proceedings for the settlement of her estate were initiated

and Miguel Paguio (deceaseds husband) was appointed
administrator and later, DANILO, as co-administrator to
represent the interests of the Punongbayan family.
The heirs of Escolastica executed a compromise agreement
distributing among themselves the estate of the decedent.
They likewise authorized the administrator to sell 5 parcels
of land to pay the liabilities of the estate.
DANILO was ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court the
proceeds of the sale of whatever properties were already
sold and to render an accounting of his administration of
the estate.
SOTERO moved for his appointment as co-administrator of
the estate on the grounds that DANILO failed to discharge
his duties as administrator, to render an accounting of his
administration, and to turn in the proceeds from the sales
of a substantial portion of the estate. The motion was
granted.
DANILO filed a Motion to Order Sotero Punongbayan to
Render an Accounting alleging that SOTERO appropriated
certain properties of the estate. DANILO prayed that
SOTERO should be made to account first for the income
derived from such illegal transfers and lease before he
(DANILO) could render the full accounting required by the
intestate court. RTC denied the motion but CA revered this.

ISSUE: WON Sotero should be render accounting first before

Danilo

RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

HELD: No. The intestate court correctly denied respondents
motion for accounting. It is obvious that the motion was just
another ploy of the respondent to delay his compliance with the
courts Order directing him (Danilo) to render an accounting of his
administration of the estate.
Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides:
Every executor or administrator shall render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters
testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise
directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against,
or paying the debts of, the estate, or of disposing of the estate;
and he shall render such further accounts as the court may require
until the estate is wholly settled.
And Sec. 7, Rule 87, of the same Rules, which provides
The court, on complaint of an executor or administrator, may cite a
person entrusted by an executor or administrator with any part of
the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require
such person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods,
chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate
as came to his possession in trust for such executor or
administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; and if a person so
cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may
punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the
court.
Applying Sec. 8, Rule 85, the intestate court denied the
motion on the ground that it was premature considering
that petitioner has been co-administrator for only one (1)
day at the time it was filed. With the denial, petitioners
accountability as co-administrator was in no way settled as
it did not preclude or forestall future accountings by him
which, under said Sec. 8, he is obliged to render within one
(1) year from receiving letters of administration, or as
required by the court until the estate is settled. Neither an
accounting or an examination of petitioner under Section 7,
Rule 87, definitely settle the issue of his alleged illegal
transfers and lease since a proceeding under this section,

like that under Sec. 6 of the same Rule, is merely in the

nature of fact-finding inquiries. It is intended to elicit
information or evidence relative to estate properties.