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The Historical Performance of the Federal Reserve: The Importance of Rules
The Historical Performance of the Federal Reserve: The Importance of Rules
The Historical Performance of the Federal Reserve: The Importance of Rules
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The Historical Performance of the Federal Reserve: The Importance of Rules

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Distinguished economist Michael D. Bordo argues for the importance of monetary stability and monetary rules, offering theoretical, empirical, and historical perspectives to support his case. He shows how the pursuit of stable monetary policy guided by central banks following rule-like behavior produces low and stable inflation, stable real performance, and encourages financial stability. In contrast, he explains how the failure to adhere to rules that produce monetary stability will inevitably produce the dire consequences of real, nominal, and financial instability. Bordo also examines the performance of the Federal Reserve and he reviews the history of monetary policy during the Great Depression.
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Release dateJun 1, 2019
ISBN9780817922160
The Historical Performance of the Federal Reserve: The Importance of Rules

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    The Historical Performance of the Federal Reserve - Michael D. Bordo

    2019

    INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW

    THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007–2008 and the Great Recession—which officially ended in June 2009, although the subsequent recovery was sluggish—led to massive intervention by the Federal Reserve and other central banks. The crisis was triggered in 2006 by the bursting of a massive housing boom that had been facilitated by permissive government housing policy, financial innovation (subprime mortgages, shadow banking, and securitization), and lax regulatory oversight by the Fed and other agencies. The boom was fueled by the Fed to keep its federal funds rate well below the Taylor rule rate from 2002 to 2005 (Taylor 2009). In the face of financial stress in the fall of 2007, the Fed cut its policy rate by 300 basis points. It also introduced radical extensions to its discount window-lending arsenal, which included, inter alia, the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF), and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to unclog the arteries of the financial system. This shift to credit policy (Goodfriend 2012) involved the provision of credit directly to financial firms that the Fed deemed most in need of liquidity—in contrast to delivering liquidity directly to the market by open-market purchases of Treasury securities and leaving the distribution of liquidity to individual firms to the market. Such targeted lending represented fiscal, not monetary, policy. Credit policy was also a threat to the Fed’s independence.

    In early 2008 the Fed suspended its funds rate-cutting policy out of concern over a run-up of global commodity prices threatening future inflation. The consequent rise in real interest rates may have generated a steep recession (Hetzel 2012). In March 2008 the Fed arranged a rescue of the insolvent investment bank Bear Stearns on the grounds that it was too interconnected to fail. This led to concern by many over moral hazard. Then, in a dramatic policy reversal in September 2008, the investment bank Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail on the grounds that it did not have sufficient sound collateral to justify a Fed rescue. The resulting global financial panic then led the Fed to quickly cut the funds rate to close to zero and resuscitate the Bretton Woods–era swap network with many central banks. By year’s end, faced with the zero lower bound on short-term interest rates, the Fed introduced the unorthodox policy of quantitative easing (QE1) by purchasing both long-term Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities. This policy succeeded in modestly reducing long-term interest rates and may have aided in arresting the downturn. QE1 was followed by two successive QE strategies whose impact has been less potent. Despite these actions, the recovery remained sluggish at least until 2017; indeed, the current recovery is unique among financial recession recoveries, which are generally more rapid than those of ordinary recessions (Bordo and Haubrich 2017).

    Many have argued this record of hyperactive Federal Reserve discretionary monetary policy has prevented the US economy from having a repeat of the 1929–1933 Great Contraction. An alternative view is that had the Fed followed more rule-like policies, including sticking to the Taylor rule, it would have avoided the housing bubble (Taylor 2009). Moreover, even if the housing bubble had continued to inflate and then burst, as it did, more consistent rule-like policies in 2007–2008 could have mitigated the recession and prevented the Lehman Brothers panic in September 2008 (Ball 2018). Finally, providing lender of last resort liquidity to the financial markets in general and not following discretionary credit policy would have preserved Fed credibility and independence and lessoned the policy uncertainty that was an important ingredient in the crisis. An important lesson from the monetary history of the United States and other advanced countries is that the pursuit of stable monetary policy guided by central banks following rule-like behavior produces low and stable inflation, stable real performance, and encourages financial stability.

    The modern approach to rules focused on the role of time inconsistency. According to this approach, a rule is a credible commitment mechanism that ties the hands of policy makers and prevents them from following time-inconsistent discretionary policies—policies that take past policy commitments as given and react to the present circumstances by changing policy as given and react to the present circumstances by changing policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983).

    The classical gold standard from 1880 to 1914 was based on such a credible monetary rule by defining the dollar as a fixed weight of gold (fixing the price of gold in terms of the dollar) and requiring the monetary authorities to maintain the peg above all else. This rule both precluded discretionary monetary policy and the running of fiscal deficits. It was a contingent rule in the sense that gold convertibility could be temporarily suspended in the event of an emergency, such as a war or a financial crisis not of the monetary authorities’ own making (Bordo and Kydland 1995). The gold standard era was associated with long-run price stability and good, real economic performance. The Great Moderation period from 1985 to 2005, based on a fiat-based credibility for low inflation rule, also exhibited exemplary price stability and real economic performance and had some of the features of the gold standard without the resource and other costs of having a commodity-based currency.

    History teaches us that episodes of sustained expansionary monetary policy in excess of the potential growth of the real economy—not policy based on adherence to a credible monetary rule—can create inflation. Sustained slow monetary growth relative to potential growth will lead to deflation and in the face of nominal rigidities will lead to recession.

    Expansionary/contractionary discretionary monetary policy based on fine-tuning can exacerbate the business cycle. The record of the Federal Reserve shows that it has often been too late in exiting from expansionary policy as the economy recovers and too slow in recognizing recessions (Bordo and Landon-Lane 2012).

    The recent US experience, as well as the historical record for many countries, shows that expansionary discretionary monetary policy can produce asset price booms (in equities, real estate, and commodities) as part of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This can lead to future inflation, as was the case in the 1970s. Asset price booms can also end in busts that can lead to financial (banking) crises, as occurred in 2008 and in many other episodes.

    Financial crises, as evident in the very recent past, can severely impact the real economy. Banking crises since the 1970s have led to fiscal bailouts, which in turn increased fiscal deficits and national debt. As recently witnessed in Greece, Ireland, Spain, and other countries, debt crises ensue that inevitably result in default (Bordo and Meissner 2016).

    Fiscal bailouts can lead to monetization by the monetary authorities and inflation. This can happen via unpleasant monetarist arithmetic (Sargent and Wallace 1981) or via the fiscal theory of the price level (Leeper 2011).

    Finally, price level and inflation variability can lead to and exacerbate financial instability. Unexpected inflation or deflation can damage the balance sheets of firms and financial institutions, leading to restricted lending and insolvency (Schwartz 1995).

    In sum, the failure to adhere to rules that produce monetary stability will inevitably produce the dire consequences of real, nominal, and financial instability.

    1. The Case for Monetary Rules

    There is a long tradition in monetary economics making the case for monetary rules instead of central bank discretion. The classic statement of the case for rules goes back to the Currency Banking School debate of the 1820s and 1830s in England (Viner 1937). The Currency School advocates (McCulloch, Overstone, Longfield, Norman, and Torrens) emphasized the importance for the Bank of England to change its monetary liabilities in accordance with changes in its gold reserves—that is, according to the Currency principle, which advocated a rule tying money supply to the balance of payments. The opposing Banking School (Tooke, Fullarton, and Mill) emphasized the importance of disturbances in the domestic economy and the domestic financial system as the key variables the Bank of England should react to. They advocated that the Bank directors should use their discretion rather than be constrained by a rigid rule (Schwartz 2008). The Currency School argued that following rules was deemed superior to allowing policy to be based on the discretion of even well-meaning and intelligent officials in the face of limited information. The Currency principle was enshrined in the operations of the Issue Department in the 1844 Bank Charter Act, which governed the Bank of England for a century. The Banking principle was embodied in the Banking Department of the Bank of England.

    The Federal Reserve, founded in 1913, was based on both the gold standard and the real bills doctrine, which derived from Banking School theory. The basic premise of real bills was that as long as central banks discounted only self-liquidating short-term real bills, then the economy will always have the correct amount of money and credit. Adherence to the real bills doctrine has been viewed as being responsible for monetary and financial stability in the interwar period and even into the late 1970s (Meltzer 2003, 2009).

    In the twentieth century the question that followed the Currency Banking School debate was whether monetary policy should be entrusted to well-meaning authorities with limited knowledge or to a rule that could not be designed to deal with unknown shocks. Henry Simons (1936) made the case for rules. Milton Friedman, Simon’s student, posited the case in 1960 for his famous k% rule under which the central bank would set the rate of monetary growth equal to the long-run growth rate of real income adjusted for the trend growth rate of velocity. Adhering to Friedman’s rule would maintain stable prices.

    Friedman argued, based on voluminous empirical and historical evidence documenting how discretionary Fed policies exacerbated US business cycles, that pursuit of his rule would have delivered economic performance superior to that generated by the policies followed by the Fed.

    Friedman’s (1960) rule, which was based on steady growth of broad money, was improved upon by Bennett McCallum’s (1987) base-growth rule with feedback from the real economy and by John Taylor (1993), who developed an interest rate rule based on the policy instruments that central banks were actually using. In his rule, the Fed would set its rate depending on the natural rate of interest and a weighted average of the deviations of inflation from its target and real output from potential output. Taylor (1999) showed how his rule could be converted into a money growth rule that could be used in environments where central banks target monetary aggregates. In the past two decades the Taylor rule has been widely accepted as the best-practice monetary rule.

    Pursuit of rules like the Taylor rule or the McCallum rule by maintaining price stability would mitigate real economic instability, avoid asset price booms and financial crises, and prevent financial instability.

    2. The Book

    This book is a collection of my articles (some written with others) on the importance of monetary stability and the case for monetary rules. The chapters present theoretical, empirical, and historical perspectives to support the case.

    2.1. Theoretical Perspectives

    The chapters in this section survey the history of the case for monetary rules.

    Chapter 1, Rules versus Discretion: A Perennial Theme in Monetary Economics, examines the classical early nineteenth-century debate in England between the Bullionists and the anti-Bullionists and the Currency Banking School debate that led to the first formulation of the case for monetary rules. I then analyze the case for a monetary rule by the Chicago School (Henry Simons and Milton Friedman). Friedman posited the case for his constant money growth rate rule in 1960. I conclude by revisiting the modern case for instrument rules and the Taylor rule. This approach is based on the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott on time inconsistency.

    Chapter 2, The Importance of Stable Money: Theory and Evidence, was written with the late Anna J. Schwartz. In it we survey postwar developments in monetary theory on the case for stable money and the importance of monetary rules. Our survey begins with Milton Friedman’s case for stable money (rules-based monetary policy) and against the pursuit of discretionary countercyclical stabilization policy fine-tuning. We then examine an opposing theory of monetary policy associated with the work of Theil (1967) and Tinbergen (1978), which made the case for discretionary stabilization policy. We then make the case for Friedman’s (1968) natural rate hypothesis and the rational expectations hypothesis. We conclude with the case for a legislated monetary rule and provide empirical evidence in favor of Milton Friedman’s constant money growth rate rule.

    2.2. Empirical Evidence

    Part Two examines the historical and empirical record of economic performance (both inflation and real output) across policy regimes.

    Chapter 3, Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic Performance: The Historical Record (with Anna J. Schwartz) surveys the historical performance of monetary regimes: the classical gold standard period (1880–1914), the interwar period (1919–1939), the postwar Bretton Woods international monetary system period (1946–1971), and the managed float period (1971–1959). A salient theme in our survey is that the convertibility (into gold) rule that dominated both domestic and international aspects of the monetary regime before World War I has since declined in its relevance. Policy techniques and doctrine developed before World War I proved to be inadequate to deal with the domestic stabilization goals in the interwar period, setting the stage for the Great Depression. In the post–World War II era, the complete abandonment of the convertibility principle and its replacement by the goal of full employment, combined with the legacy of inadequate policy tools and theory from the interwar period, set the stage for the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The lessons from that experience have convinced monetary authorities to reemphasize the goal of low inflation, as it were, thus committing themselves to rule-like behavior.

    Chapter 4, Introduction to ‘The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking’ (written with Athanasios Orphanides), describes the salient features of the Great Inflation of 1965–1983. It describes how inflation ratcheted up, as loose monetary policy was followed by contraction, but not sufficient to break the back of rising inflationary expectations. Fear of rising unemployment tempered the Federal Reserve’s willingness to tighten policy, leading to the phenomenon of stagflation. We also survey the debate over the causes of the Great Inflation. The contending explanations included: expansionary monetary policy (the monetarist explanation); oil price and other commodity price shocks; time inconsistency; political pressure on the Fed; the Phillips curve trade-off; fear of repeating the Great Depression; data mismeasurement; and an expectations trap. Many of the alternative explanations are explained in detail in Bordo and Orphanides (2013).

    2.3. Monetary Policy Performance

    This section contains six chapters on the performance of the Federal Reserve in its pursuit of discretionary monetary policy.

    Chapter 5, Exits from Recessions: The US Experience, 1920–2007 (with John S. Landon-Lane), examines the record of the Fed’s discretionary monetary policy. Specifically, we provide evidence on how the Fed shifted from expansionary to contractionary monetary policy after a recession has ended—the exit strategy. We examine the relationship between the timing of changes in several instruments of monetary policy and the timing of changes in real output and inflation across US business cycles from 1920 to 2007. Based on historical narratives, descriptive evidence, and econometric analysis, we find that in the 1920s and 1950s the Fed would generally tighten when the price level turned up. By contrast, since 1960 the Fed has generally tightened when unemployment peaked, and this tightening often occurred after inflation began to rise. The Fed is often too late to prevent inflation.

    Chapter 6, Deep Recessions, Fast Recoveries, and Financial Crises: Evidence from the American Record (with Joseph G. Haubrich), focuses on the coincidence of financial crises and economic recoveries. Specifically, we ask whether recessions associated with financial crises have slow or steep recoveries. Our analysis based on all US business cycles since the establishment of the Fed is that recessions associated with financial crises are generally followed by fast recoveries. We find three exceptions to this pattern: the recovery from the Great Contraction in the 1930s; the recovery after the recession in the 1990s; and the recovery since the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. The recent recovery has been strikingly more tepid than the recovery of the 1990s. Factors that can explain the recent experience include policy uncertainty and the moribund nature of residential investment.

    Chapter 7, Credit Crises, Money and Contractions: An Historical View (with Joseph G. Haubrich), analyzes the relationship between policy-induced monetary changes and credit crises. Using a combination of historical narrative and econometric techniques, we identify major periods of credit distress from 1875 to 2007, examine the extent to which credit distress arises as part of the transmission of monetary policies, and document the subsequent effect on output. Using business cycles defined by the Harding-Pagan algorithm, we identify and compare the timing, duration, amplitude and co-movement of cycles in money, credit, and output. Our regressions show that financial-distress events exacerbate business cycle downturns both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and that a confluence of such events makes recessions even worse.

    Chapter 8, Three Great American Disinflations (with Christopher Erceg, Andrew Levin, and Ryan Michaels), analyzes the role of transparency and credibility in accounting for the widely divergent macroeconomic effects of three episodes of deliberate monetary contraction from high inflation: the post–Civil War greenback deflation; the post–World War I deflation; and the Volcker disinflation of 1979–1982. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we show that the salient features of these three historical episodes can be explained by differences in the design and transparency of monetary policy. For a policy regime with relatively high credibility (as in the 1870s), our analysis highlights the benefit of a gradualist approach rather than a sudden change in policy (as in 1920–1921). By contrast, for a central bank with relatively low credibility (such as the Federal Reserve in late 1980s), an aggressive policy stance can play an important signaling role by making the monetary shift more evident to private agents.

    Chapter 9, Aggregate Price Shocks and Financial Instability: A Historical Analysis (with Michael Dueker and David Wheelock), presents evidence for the hypothesis that aggregate price shocks (often induced by monetary policy) cause or worsen financial instability. Based on two annual indexes of financial conditions for the United States covering 1790–1997, we estimate the effect of aggregate price shocks on each index using a dynamic ordered probit model. We find that price-level shocks contributed to financial instability during 1790–1932, and that inflation shocks contributed to financial instability during 1980–1997. Our research indicates that the size of the aggregate price shocks needed to substantially alter financial conditions depends on the institutional environment, but that a monetary policy focused on price stability would be conducive to financial stability.

    Chapter 10, Does Expansionary Monetary Policy Cause Asset Price Booms? Some Historical and Empirical Evidence (with John Landon-Lane), uses a panel of eighteen OECD countries from 1920 to 2011 to estimate the impact that loose monetary policy, low inflation, and high levels of bank credit has on housing, stock, and commodity prices. We review historical narratives on asset price booms and use a deterministic procedure to identify asset price booms. We show that loose monetary policy—having an interest rate below the target (Taylor rule) rate or having a growth rate of money above the (Friedman rule) target rate—does positively impact asset prices, and this correspondence is heightened during periods when asset prices grew quickly and then subsequently suffered a significant contraction.

    2.4. Monetary History

    This section contains several chapters on the history of monetary policy and especially of the actions by the Federal Reserve during the Great Depression. A leading theme is how the record could have been better had monetary rules or rule-like behavior been followed. It concludes with a reflective essay on how the US economy would have fared if it had a central bank in the eighty years before the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913.

    Chapter 11, The History of Monetary Policy, surveys the history of central banks since the establishment of the Swedish Riksbank in 1664 and the evolution of monetary policy and its instruments from the gold standard to the present. A key theme that runs through this historical overview is the importance of following a regime dedicated to maintaining price stability.

    Chapter 12, The Banking Panics in the United States in the 1930s: Some Lessons for Today (with John Landon-Lane), discusses the lessons learned from the US banking panics in the early 1930s for the response by the Federal Reserve to the crisis of 2008. We revisit the debate on illiquidity versus insolvency in the banking crises of the 1930s, providing evidence that the banking crisis largely reflected illiquidity shocks. In the 2007–2008 crisis, the Federal Reserve, under its chair, Ben Bernanke, had learned the lesson well from the banking panics of the 1930s of conducting expansionary monetary policy to meet demands for liquidity. However, unlike in the 1930s, the deeper problem of the recent crisis was not illiquidity but insolvency and especially the fear of insolvencies of counterparties. A number of virtually insolvent US banks deemed to be too big or too interconnected to fail were rescued by fiscal bailouts.

    Chapter 13, Could Stable Money Have Averted the Great Contraction? (with Ehsan U. Choudhri and Anna J. Schwartz), directly tests whether the implementation of Milton Friedman’s constant money growth rate rule during the Great Contraction of 1929–1933 would have largely prevented the disastrous collapse of output that occurred. We simulate a model that estimates separate relations for output and the price level and assumes that output and price dynamics are not especially sensitive to policy changes. The simulations include a strong and weak form of Friedman’s constant money growth rule. The results support the hypothesis that the Great Contraction would have been mitigated and shortened had the Federal Reserve followed a constant money growth rule.

    Chapter 14, Was Expansionary Monetary Policy Feasible during the Great Contraction? An Examination of the Gold Standard Constraint (with Ehsan U. Choudhri and Anna J. Schwartz), reconsiders a well-known view that the gold standard was the leading cause of the worldwide Great Depression of 1929–1933. According to this view, for most countries continued adherence to gold prevented monetary authorities from offsetting banking panics with expansionary monetary policies, thereby blocking their recoveries. We contend that although this may have been the case for small open economies with limited gold reserves, it is not the case for the United States, the largest economy in the world, holding massive gold reserves. The United States was not constrained from using expansionary policy to offset banking panics, deflation, and declining activity. Simulations based on a model of a large open economy indicate that expansionary open-market operations by the Federal Reserve at two critical junctures (October 1930–February 1931, September 1931–January 1932) would have been successful in averting the banking panics that occurred—without endangering gold convertibility. Indeed, had expansionary open-market purchases been conducted in 1930, the contraction would not have led to the international crisis that followed. As I argue in chapter 15, the pursuit of rule-like policy could have maintained macroeconomic stability.

    Chapter 15, Could the United States Have Had a Better Central Bank? An Historical Counterfactual Speculation, argues that two alternative hypothetical central bank scenarios could have improved the Federal Reserve’s track record with respect to financial stability and overall macroeconomic performance in its first century. The first scenario assumes that the charter of the Second Bank of the United States had not been revoked by President Andrew Jackson, and the Second Bank would have survived. Had this scenario been followed, the US central bank would have learned to prevent the banking panics that characterized much of the nineteenth century, and possibly it would have learned, as the Bank of England did, to follow more stable monetary policies.

    The second scenario takes as given that the Second Bank did not survive and history evolved as it did, but considers the situation in which the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was closer to the original plan for a central bank proposed by Paul Warburg in 1910. Had the Warburg Plan been closely followed, the Federal Reserve might have followed more rule-like lender of last resort policies and mitigated the banking panics of the 1930s.

    We thank the various presses for permission to reprint the articles in the chapters in this volume.

    References

    Ball, Laurence M. 2018. The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Setting the Record Straight on a Financial Disaster. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Barro, Robert, and David Gordon. 1983. Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12:101–21.

    Bordo, Michael, and Joseph Haubrich. 2017. Deep Recessions, Fast Recoveries, and Financial Crises: Evidence from the American Record. Economic Inquiry 55, no. 1 (January): 527–41.

    Bordo, Michael, and Finn Kydland. 1995. The Gold Standard as a Rule: An Essay in Exploration. Explorations in Economic History 32 (4): 423–64.

    Bordo, Michael, and John Landon-Lane. 2012. Does Expansionary Monetary Policy Cause Asset Price Booms; Some Historical and Empirical Evidence. Journal Economia Chilena, Central Bank of Chile, 16, no. 2 (August): 4–52.

    Bordo, Michael, and Christopher Meissner. 2016. Fiscal and Financial Crises. In Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 2A, edited by John B. Taylor and Harald Uhlig, 355–412. Amsterdam: North Holland.

    Bordo, Michael, and Athanasios Orphanides. 2013. The Great Inflation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Friedman, Milton. 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University Press.

    ________. 1968. The Role of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review 58, no. 1 (March): 1–17.

    Goodfriend, Marvin. 2012. The Elusive Promise of Independent Central Banking. Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

    Hetzel, Robert. 2012. The Great Recession: Market Failure or Policy Failure? New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott. 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85 (3): 473–92.

    Leeper, Eric. 2011. Perceptions and Misperceptions of Fiscal Inflation. Paper presented at the 10th Annual BIS Conference: Fiscal Policy and Its Implications for Monetary and Financial Stability.

    McCallum, Bennett. 1987. The Case for Rules in the Conduct of Monetary Policy: A Concrete Example. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 73 (September/October): 10–18.

    Meltzer, Allan H. 2003. A History of the Federal Reserve. Vol. 1, 1913–1951. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    ________. 2009. A History of the Federal Reserve. Vol. 2, Book 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Sargent, Thomas, and Neil Wallace. 1981. Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5 (Fall): 1–11.

    Schwartz, Anna J. 1995. Why Financial Stability Depends on Price Stability. Economic Affairs 15 (Autumn): 21–25.

    ________. 2008. Banking School, Currency School, Free Banking School. New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Simons, Henry. 1936. Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 44 (1): 1–30.

    Taylor, John B. 1993. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39 (1): 195–214.

    ________. 1999. A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules. In Monetary Policy Rules, edited by John B. Taylor, 319–48. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the NBER.

    ________. 2009. Getting Off Track. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

    Theil, Henri. 1967. Economics and Information Theory. Vol 7. Amsterdam: North Holland.

    Tinbergen, Jan. 1978. Economic Policy: Principles and Design. Amsterdam: North Holland.

    Viner, Jacob. 1937. Studies in the Theory of International Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Warburg, Peter. 1910. The United Reserve Bank Plan. In The Federal Reserve, Vol. 1, edited by Paul Warburg. New York: Macmillan.

    PART ONE

    THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

    CHAPTER 1

    Rules versus Discretion

    A Perennial Theme in Monetary Economics

    MICHAEL D. BORDO

    Introduction

    THE D EBATE OVER RULES versus discretion has been ongoing in monetary economics for over two centuries. The question is, Should a free society allow well-intentioned, even wise, individuals to run monetary policy, or should it be guided by simple and well-understood (automatic) rules? The debate has evolved in its context and theoretical framework over the years, but the main theme is the same.

    We survey the issues from the classical debate between the Bullionists and the anti-Bullionists and then the Currency School versus the Banking School in early nineteenth-century England; to the operation of the gold standard convertibility rule in its various manifestations from the mid-nineteenth century until 1971; to the mid-twentieth-century perspective of the Chicago School: Henry Simons and Milton Friedman; to the late twentieth-century perspective that came from the literature on rational expectations and time inconsistency; and to the current discussion on interest rate instrument rules and the Taylor rule.

    The Classical Debate; the Bullionists and anti-Bullionists; the Currency School versus the Banking School

    During the Napoleonic Wars from 1793 to 1815 there was a significant run-up in inflation and depreciation of the pound on the foreign exchanges following the suspension of specie convertibility in 1797. The Bank of England requested the suspension because it was unable to maintain convertibility according to its charter and also finance government expenditures by the purchase of Exchequer (Treasury) bills at a low interest rate (Bordo and White 1990). The Bank of England’s note issue expanded as the intensity of the conflict reached its climax, so that by 1810 prices were rising close to 10 percent per year. During this period there was a debate between some of the leading economic thinkers of the time over the causes of the inflation (Viner 1937). The Bullionists, led by David Ricardo and Henry Thornton, attributed the rise in prices and the decline in sterling to excessive note issue by the Bank of England.¹ The anti-Bullionists, Thomas Tooke and James Fullarton, attributed the inflation to nonmonetary causes, including harvest failures and the ongoing remittances to British allies on the Continent (Bordo and Schwartz 1980). The Bullion Report of 1810, largely drafted by David Ricardo, blamed the Bank for overissuing its notes. As a solution, Ricardo proposed that the Bank follow a simple rule: the Bank should always maintain specie convertibility, that is, it should peg the price of sterling in terms of specie at the official rate of 3 pounds, 17 shillings, and 10½ pence per ounce of gold and allow its note issue to fluctuate automatically with the Bank’s gold reserves. In the case of a balance of payments (trade) deficit, the Bank’s gold reserves would decline, and the Bank would reduce its note issue. The opposite would occur with a balance of payments (trade) surplus. The rule, in a sense, would stabilize the purchasing power of gold in terms of other goods and services (Laidler 2002).

    Specie convertibility at the original parity was restored in 1821, and the Bank returned to its peacetime role. A second debate began in the 1820s between the successors of the Bullionists, the Currency School (McClelland, Lord Overstone, Longfield, Norman, and Torrens), and the successors to the anti-Bullionists, the Banking School (Tooke, Fullarton, J. S. Mill). The Currency School writers focused on the issue of how the Bank could maintain price stability with a mixed currency system (specie and bank notes). They argued that the Bank should follow the Currency principle, that is, the money supply should behave exactly as it would under a pure specie standard. Thus a gold inflow should lead to a one-to-one increase in the total currency and the opposite for a gold outflow. This principle led to the adoption of Palmer’s rule (1827), named after Horsely Palmer, a governor of the Bank of England. Palmer posited that the Bank should keep its security portfolio constant and keep its gold reserves at one-third of its total liabilities. This would allow the Bank’s note issue to vary directly with gold flows into and out of the Bank.

    The Banking School criticized Palmer’s rule and the Currency principle for omitting deposits at the Bank of England and the country banks for not accounting for movements in the velocity of circulation. They also defined money as currency plus deposits, whereas the Currency School defined it as simply currency (coins plus bank notes).

    The Banking School argued that the money supply was endogenous and was determined according to the real bills doctrine by the needs of trade. If the Bank discounted only real commercial bills, reflecting the state of the economy, there never would be too much or too little money in circulation. An increase in the note issue by the Bank would always return via the operation of the price-specie flow mechanism and by the Law of Reflux (Schwartz 2008a).

    Another critique of the Bank’s sole pursuit of the Currency principle was the problem of internal drains, or commercial bank runs in the face of financial distress. The demands for liquidity would reduce the Bank’s gold reserves, and via the Currency principle would lead the Bank to tighten monetary policy, thus aggravating the financial crisis. The Banking School believed that discretionary policy was needed to deal with liquidity drains. Serious banking panics in 1825, 1836, and 1839 led to the call for major reform of the Bank of England.

    Reform came in the Bank Charter Act of 1844, which divided the Bank into the Issue Department and the Banking Department. The Issue Department would follow the Currency principle. Its balance sheet consisted of a fixed fiduciary note issue of 14 million pounds, and then every additional pound would vary with gold flows into and out of the Bank’s reserves. The Banking Department was set up on commercial banking lines. The Bank would accept deposits from commercial banks and other financial intermediaries, and private individuals and would make loans at the discount rate (Bank rate) at rates slightly above the market rate. The Banking Department had reserves of the Fiduciary note issue and some gold.

    Although the Bank was following rules-based policy, it was unable to deal with several very serious banking panics in 1847, 1857, and 1866. The problem was that the Banking Department did not have adequate reserves to freely provide liquidity to the financial system in the face of a panic. On several occasions the Bank avoided suspending convertibility by requesting a Treasury letter (a temporary suspension of the Bank’s charter), which allowed it to expand the fiduciary note issue as needed. As it turned out, just the news of the issue of the Treasury letter was sufficient to allay the panic in 1847 (Dornbusch and Frenkel 1984) and later in 1866. Another problem with the Bank of England’s handling of financial crises was that it attached greater importance to the well-being of its shareholders than to the public in general. In several banking panics (1825, 1847, and 1866), the Bank, concerned over its profitability, acted too late to provide liquidity to the general money market (Schwartz 1986). This led Walter Bagehot, editor of the Economist, to state his Responsibility Doctrine urging the Bank, which was privately owned but had a public charter, to put the public’s interest first. In his classic book Lombard Street (1873), Bagehot also formulated rules for a lender of last resort: in the face of an internal drain (banking panic), lend freely; in the face of an external drain (a currency crisis), lend at a high rate; and in the face of both, lend freely at a high rate.

    In the years after 1844 the Bank developed a set of rules of thumb to operate as a central bank under the classical gold standard in a world of free capital mobility (Bordo and Schenk 2017). The rules of the game required the Bank to use its discount rate to accommodate gold flows. Thus in the face of a balance of payments deficit and a gold outflow, the Bank was supposed to raise the Bank rate both to encourage a capital inflow and to depress aggregate demand to reduce the demand for imports (raise the balance of trade). In the face of a balance of payment surplus, the Bank was supposed to lower the Bank rate and encourage capital to leave and stimulate the economy to increase the demand for imports (reduce the balance of trade) (Bordo 1984).²

    The gold standard convertibility rule prevailed until the collapse of the classical gold standard at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Following the rule meant that countries would subsume domestic stability concerns to maintaining the fixed gold parity. The rule followed was a contingency rule under which the monetary authority would maintain the fixed gold price except in the event of a major emergency, such as a war when convertibility could be suspended and the central bank could expand its note issue to raise seigniorage, and the fiscal authorities could run large deficits to smooth taxes (Bordo and Kydland 1995).³

    The gold standard rule was successful in the sense that it was associated with stable exchange rates and long-run price stability, and its macro performance was better than it had been in the interwar period (Bordo 1981). However, many contemporary economists were critical of the gold standard because it was associated with short-run price level instability and frequent recessions.

    The price level exhibited long swings of low deflation (twenty years) followed by long swings of low inflation (twenty years). These swings in the price level reflected the operation of the commodity theory of money (Barro 1979), whereby long-run price stability (also known as mean reversion) in the price level was brought about by changes in gold production and shifts between monetary and nonmonetary uses of gold in response to changes in the price level affecting the real price of gold. Thus in periods of deflation, falling prices raised the real price of gold (assuming that monetary authorities fixed the nominal price). This led to increased gold production and occasional gold discoveries, in addition to a shift from nonmonetary to monetary uses of gold, which led to an increase in the world monetary gold stock and then rising prices. The opposite occurred in periods of inflation.

    Contemporary economists posited that alternative variations of the gold standard rule could produce price stability (Bordo 1984). W. S. Jevons (1884) discussed stabilizing a price index. Alfred Marshall (1926) preferred symmetalism—basing the monetary standard on a mixture of gold and silver whose value would remain constant with changes in the relative supplies of the two metals. Irving Fisher (1920) developed the compensated dollar, whereby the monetary authorities would change the official price of gold to offset movements in a price index. His proposal was, in essence, a price-level rule. Indeed, in the 1920s his scheme was incorporated in two acts of Congress, which were never passed but which would have required the Federal Reserve to follow a price-level rule (Bordo, Ditmar, and Gavin 2008).

    The classical gold standard broke down at the start of World War I. Only the United States maintained the gold dollar peg (although the United States imposed a gold embargo from April 1917 to April 1919). After the war many major belligerents wanted to return to the prewar gold standard at the original parities according to the gold standard contingent rule. Most of these countries came out of World War I with very high rates of inflation and unprecedented levels of outstanding national debt, making resumption a daunting task. The United Kingdom returned to gold at the original parity in 1925, but it did so at the expense of high unemployment (Keynes 1925). France was unable to resume at the original parity because of its high debt and unstable polity (Bordo and Hautcoeur 2007). Germany and other former Central Powers ran hyperinflations. They all restored gold at greatly devalued parities.

    The interwar gold standard created at the Genoa Conference in 1922 was a gold exchange standard in which members held both gold and foreign exchange as reserves. The United Kingdom and the United States as center countries backed their currencies with gold. The interwar gold exchange standard lasted only six years. It lacked the credibility of the prewar standard, as most countries were unwilling to let the gold convertibility rule dominate their needs for domestic stability. It also was plagued by maladjustment in the face of disequilibrium parities and nominal rigidities (Meltzer 2003). It collapsed in 1931.

    The last vestige of the gold standard rule was the Bretton Woods system established at the international monetary conference in New Hampshire in 1944. Under Bretton Woods, the United States as center country would peg its dollar to gold at $35 per ounce while other countries would peg their currencies in terms of dollars. Unlike the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system was an adjustable peg system whereby members could change their parities in the face of a fundamental disequilibrium brought about, for example, by a supply shock that changed the real exchange rate. Bretton Woods also had capital controls. Like the interwar gold exchange standard, the Bretton Woods system, which had some of the flaws of the Gold Exchange Standard, broke down between 1968 and 1971. A key problem was that the basic rules of the system were not followed. The United States as center country inflated its currency after 1965. Other countries also broke the rules by not allowing the adjustment mechanism to work in the sense that surplus countries like Germany did not allow their money supplies to expand, and deficit countries like the United Kingdom did not allow adjustment through deflation (Bordo 1993).

    Rules versus Authorities in the Twentieth Century

    The Federal Reserve was founded in 1913 to be the central bank for the United States. The Federal Reserve Act was in part based on concepts from the Currency School versus Banking School debate and the history of the Bank of England (Meltzer 2003, chap. 2). From the Currency School the Fed inherited the convertibility rule of the gold standard. From the Banking School the Fed inherited both the real bills doctrine and the institution of a lender of last resort to allay banking panics.

    By the time the Federal Reserve opened its doors for business in November 1914, most of the belligerents in World War I had left the gold standard, and when the United States entered the war in April 1917, an embargo on gold exports was imposed for two years. The Federal Reserve became an engine of inflation financing the government’s fiscal deficits. The gold standard became operational after the war, but in the 1920s the Fed prevented the adjustment mechanism from working by sterilizing gold inflows and preventing the money supply from rising. This policy contributed to the global imbalances that eventually led to the breakdown of the interwar gold exchange standard (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Irwin 2010).

    The real bills doctrine guided the Fed’s action in the first two decades of its operation, and according to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2003), contributed to some serious policy errors, including the recession of 1920–1921, the Wall Street stock market boom and crash in the 1920s, and the banking panics of the Great Contraction. Indeed, Milton Friedman (1960), following Henry Simons (1936), was highly critical of the independent Federal Reserve for following flawed discretionary policies.

    In a seminal article Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy, Henry Simons (1936) made the case for the Federal Reserve to follow rules rather than discretion. Simons posited that in a liberal order (a free society and free market economy), central bank discretion would lead to uncertainty, which would prevent relative prices and markets from operating efficiently, thus contributing to economic instability. He believed that a simple legislated monetary rule would remove the uncertainty of leaving policy decisions to central bank officials. Simons considered a number of possible rules. His first choice was to have a fixed money supply. If prices were flexible, it would lead to deflation as productivity advance would lead to real economic growth. He had reservations with this rule because of measurement issues in determining which monetary aggregate to use; these include: the presence of price rigidities and financial innovation and the development of money substitutes, which would shift velocity. However, he argued that 100 percent Reserve banking could solve the problem of money substitutes (shadow banking). In his scheme commercial banks would become public utilities that just managed the payments system (Friedman 1967; Rockoff 2015). The financial intermediation function of banks would be done by investment banks. Simons also considered tying the money supply to the fiscal deficit and having monetary policy run by the Treasury.⁶ Maintaining a balanced budget would also keep the money supply stable.

    In the end, he came out preferring a price-level rule, which he argued would avoid the problems associated with a monetary aggregate rule. Prices would be kept stable by the Treasury following a balanced budget and by keeping the money supply constant.

    Milton Friedman, in chapter 4 of A Program for Monetary Stability (1960), built upon Henry Simons’s case for a monetary rule (Friedman 1967). Friedman, who was a student of Simons at the University of Chicago, further developed Simons’s case against discretion. Discretion would lead to uncertainty, which impedes the private sector’s decision-making process. He focused his criticism on the Fed’s policy of fine-tuning, which was developed in the post–World War II era to offset business fluctuations. Friedman (1953) demonstrated that when the Fed used its policy tools to offset exogenous shocks, it would in most cases aggravate the business cycle. It does this by mistiming its policies because of the long and variable lags between changes in monetary policy and its effects on prices and output. Friedman also argued that the correlation between the policy action and the shocks needed to be greater than 0.5 to be stabilizing. Other arguments against discretion included that discretion involves both changes in the guides for monetary policy and changes in its conduct. The guide to monetary policy changed from real bills in the interwar period, to influencing the money market after the Federal Reserve Treasury Accord, to fine-tuning and leaning against the wind in the postwar period. Friedman also argued that discretion did not allow an objective method to judge monetary policy. Finally, he argued that discretion exposes the conduct of monetary policy to political influences.

    In a series of articles Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz documented the long and variable lags of monetary policy and how discretionary Fed policy led to instability in prices and output throughout the Fed’s history.⁷ The Fed’s worst mistake was its key role in precipitating the Great Contraction of 1929 to 1933.

    The rule that Friedman favored (and is always associated with) was his constant growth rate of the money supply rule (CGMR), which he first exposited in 1960. However, Friedman had an earlier rule in 1948 that was related to one of Henry Simons’s rules. The rule was designed to stabilize the business cycle over time. In Friedman’s 1948 rule the Fed would use its open market operations to finance the fiscal deficit over time to ensure a long-run balanced budget and to stabilize the economy. When the level of output fell below the full employment level, automatic stabilizers, such as a decline in tax revenues via the progressive income tax, would lead to a budget deficit that would be financed by an increase in the money supply. The opposite would happen when the economy faced inflationary pressure. The resultant equilibrating change in income would restore both full employment and budget balance. Nelson (2019) argues that Friedman later changed his mind about this rule as he became more critical of the Keynesian thinking that underlay it.

    In chapter 4 of A Program for Monetary Stability (1960) Friedman proposed his famous CGMR. He argued that the Fed should set the growth rate of the stock of money equal to the long-run growth rate of real GDP adjusted for the trend change in velocity. The trend growth of real GDP in the century before 1960 was about 3 percent whereas the trend growth in velocity was −1 percent. To achieve price stability (inflation equals zero), money growth would need to be at 4 percent per year. Friedman argued that the Fed should increase money growth at 4 percent, year in and year out. He argued that the rule was simple enough that people would understand it and that adhering to it would eliminate the uncertainty that accompanied discretion.

    Friedman was in favor of using M2 as his definition of money (currency plus demand deposits plus time deposits minus large certificates of deposits) on the grounds that it was both a temporary abode of purchasing power (his favored explanation for the use of money as both a medium of exchange and an asset) and that it was the only monetary aggregate where the data existed back to the nineteenth century (Friedman and Schwartz 1970). But he believed that an alternative definition like M1 (currency plus demand deposits) could also work as long as the Fed stuck to the rule indefinitely.

    Friedman’s CGMR rule, or k% rule, was very controversial. It was criticized for its definition of money, and for its simplicity. Some argued that M2 was inappropriate because the money multiplier was largely determined by the real economy and that a monetary base rule would more appropriately reflect a variable that the Fed actually controlled. Many argued that it did not account for the endogeneity of the money supply (Tobin 1970). Alternative variants of his rule were developed that accounted for feedback from the real economy and short-run changes in velocity (e.g., McCallum 1987). Modigliani (1964) showed that a simulation of the rule over the postwar period did not stabilize the economy. In contrast, historical studies by Warburton (1966) and Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (1995) showed that had the Fed followed the CGMR, then the Great Depression would have been avoided.

    Friedman was highly critical of the Fed in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s for not paying adequate attention to monetary aggregates in their policy setting. In a number of papers he criticized the Fed for not tightening monetary policy enough to prevent run-ups in inflation and during recessions for waiting too long to follow expansionary policy (Bordo and Landon-Lane 2013). In addition to criticizing the Fed for its destabilizing fine-tuning policy, he also criticized it for using interest rates as both its policy instrument and its target, arguing that had it used the money stock, it could have done better. After Friedman predicted in the 1960s and 1970s that there would be a large inflation, the economics profession and the Fed began to listen to him (Nelson 2019), and the Fed began to pay attention to monetary aggregates in its policy setting. The height of Friedman’s influence was reached in 1975, when Congress passed a bill requiring the Federal Reserve to announce its monetary aggregate targets for the future and to report to the Congress every year on how well it performed in hitting its targets. Most of the time, the Fed missed its targets.

    The Fed’s experience with monetary targeting, which was the closest thing that it came to following Friedman’s CGMR, was quite dismal. The Fed’s monetary policy strategy was to use a short-run money demand function with lagged adjustment (the Goldfeld [1973] model), and then based on the coefficients of the model and forecasts of real output and inflation, it would set the short-run interest rate in order to hit its money growth target. This strategy, which was used in the 1970s and 1980s by the Fed, the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of England, was abandoned because of the missing money problem—that is, velocity kept shifting up in an unpredictable manner, reflecting both financial innovation and changes in financial regulation (Laidler 1985; Anderson, Bordo, and Duca 2017). By the early 1980s the Fed and other central banks abandoned monetary aggregate targeting and shifted to using short-term interest rates as its method to operate monetary policy.

    The Modern View of Rules versus Discretion

    The rules versus discretion debate has been reinterpreted following the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970s. Seminal work by Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975) posited that in the face of rational expectations under which market agents understood the models that central banks used in their policy making, the central banks as a consequence no longer had an information advantage to conduct discretionary monetary policy. Lucas (1976) demonstrated that with rational expectations large-scale models could not be used to simulate alternative counterfactual discretionary policies without accounting for the rational expectations of the public. Sargent and Wallace (1975) showed that optimal control techniques used in the 1960s and 1970s to design countercyclical monetary policies to offset shocks and smooth the business cycle (Brainard 1967) and to confront Friedman’s (1953) critique would be ineffective in a world of rational expectations. In this new macro theoretical context, Kydland and Prescott (1977) argued that discretion, defined as changes in monetary policy based on current information taking the past as given, would not be successful in the pursuit of stabilization policy. This is because market agents with rational expectations would adjust their behavior accordingly. According to them, discretionary policy would be time inconsistent in the sense that if the Fed had announced a policy strategy at time zero, which was supposed to continue indefinitely into the future, and then in the next period, when faced with new information—on the assumption that the public would not change its actions—the Fed changed its policy. When the public caught on and adjusted its behavior, the Fed’s policy actions would be stymied. Kydland and Prescott gave the example of the Phillips curve trade-off, arguing that if agents had adaptive expectations (the assumption made by Friedman in his seminal 1968 AEA presidential address in which he argued that in the long run the Phillips curve was vertical), then the Fed could reduce unemployment by following expansionary policy and hence return the economy to the natural rate of unemployment before the public could adjust its expectations of inflation. They argued that with rational expectations, when the Fed followed its discretionary policy, market agents would immediately adjust their expectations so that there would be no effect on unemployment, and the price level would end up at a higher equilibrium level.

    Kydland and Prescott argued that the only way the Fed could follow a time-consistent policy would be by committing itself to a rule that would constrain it from changing previously announced policies when circumstances change.

    According to Barro and Gordon (1983), even if the Fed did announce that it was following a rule, there would always be a temptation to cheat once circumstances changed, and the advantages of cheating would outweigh the cost. But in that case, the public with rational expectations would catch on, and the policy would be ineffective. They argue that what is required is a binding commitment mechanism where the costs of cheating would be less than the costs of following the rule. In other words, the Fed would need a mechanism that effectively tied its hands (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). A historical example of such a commitment mechanism was the gold standard rule (Bordo and Kydland 1995).

    Modern Instrument Rules: The Taylor Rule

    The new approach to rules versus discretion led to important empirical and theoretical work on finding rules that could be the best guides for policy makers. Empirical work by Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), based on a number of large multicountry econometric models incorporating rational expectations, found that instrument rules based on policy interest rates would give the best performance. According to the Taylor rule, the policy interest rate would react to the central banks’ two principle policy goals (which in the United States were based on the dual mandate of low inflation and low unemployment¹⁰)—of deviations of inflation from expected inflation and the output gap—performed best in terms of producing the lowest variations. These rules performed better than target rules like Friedman’s CGMR. In addition, instrument rules using the policy rate as an instrument outperformed rules using monetary aggregates. Along these lines, Taylor (1993) devised a simple version of an interest rate rule for the United States, as shown in equation (1):

    where it is the target level of the short-term nominal interest rate (the federal funds rate), Πt is the target level of inflation, yt is the output gap (the per cent deviation of real GDP from its potential level), and R is the equilibrium level of the real interest rate (the natural rate of interest).

    Taylor (1993) postulated that the output gap and inflation gaps entered the central bank’s reaction function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the inflation target were each equal to 2 percent. This led to equation (2), which is commonly known as the Taylor rule.

    A number of other interest rate instrument rules have been used in the past two decades. Some rules (interest rate smoothing rules) have the interest rate reacting to the lagged interest rate (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000). Other rules put a higher weight on real output than did Taylor, while some rules focused on changes rather than levels of the interest rate and the policy

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