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The Bakara market arms

clearance operation of 1993:
The Zimbabwe national army
in Somalia
Martin R. Rupiya

Lecturer in War and Strategic Studies,

Department of History , University of
Zimbabwe ,
Published online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Martin R. Rupiya (1997) The Bakara market arms clearance
operation of 1993: The Zimbabwe national army in Somalia, International
Peacekeeping, 4:1, 115-121, DOI: 10.1080/13533319708413654
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319708413654

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The Bakara Market

Arms Clearance Operation of 1993:
The Zimbabwe National Army in Somalia
MARTIN R. RUPIYA

Peacekeeping doctrine is still in a state of flux as it continually responds to

concepts and practices emerging from the field. Several small operations,
conducted within the broader framework of peacekeeping mandates, have
received little attention. This is despite the fact that at times, these
'sideshows' have been critical turning-points in the evolution of the conduct
of the wider operation. Consequently, a review of some of the recent
operations, considered to be unique, becomes all the more relevant.
In retrospect, one such operation which merits re-visiting is the
clearance of weapons in the Bakara Market in central Mogadishu in early
1993, by elements of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The operation
was carried out as part of the United Nations International Task Force
(UNITAF), being a coalition of some 27 nationalities, commanded by the
United States. Its primary aim was to restore law and order among the
fractious political factions and their affiliated marauding gangs preying on
international food hand-outs. Once this was achieved, UNITAF was
scheduled to hand over responsibility for monitoring the peace to the United
Nations Operation In Somalia (UNOSOM II) by the beginning of May
1993.
Against the background of this broader objective by the international
force, the ZNA contingent was expected to execute a surgical operation to
stamp out arms sales in the Bakara Market. The selling of war material coexisted with other normal entrepreneurial activities supplying goods and
services, as well as providing much-needed employment to stall-holders. A
major limitation of the envisaged operation was, therefore, not to disrupt
these other aspects of normal trading.
Amidst the fratricidal war and chaos in the whole country, and especially
around Mogadishu, Bakara Market seemed to radiate a different order and
inertia of its own. Here, seemingly-normal trade continued. The market
represented the convergence of modern and traditional trade routes by sea,
Martin Rupiya (Lt-Col, ret.) is a lecturer in War and Strategic Studies, Department of History,
University of Zimbabwe.
International Peacekeeping, Vol.4, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 115-121
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

road and camel desert trails which linked Somalia to merchants in North
Africa, the Middle East and the world beyond. Tentacles of local and
external trade supplied arms of war which could easily be secured for cash,
including: machine guns of various types; 14.5mm anti-air guns with dual
ammunition to operate in an anti-tank or anti-air role; MILAN anti-tank
missile systems; shoulder-borne rocket projectile gun types (RPG2 and
RPG7) and vehicle-mounted 75mm recoilless rocket launchers (RCS);
Strella shoulder-borne anti-air missiles of the SAM series; anti-personnel
and anti-tank mines, complemented by a variety of grenades. Much more
important, however, was the complementary availability of ammunition, to
liberally replenish all the above weapon categories. These weapons and
ammunition were openly tested and on sale in the various stalls in Bakara
Market. Consequently, the availability of weapons and the inexhaustible
supply of ammunition in the centre of the capital had been taken advantage
of by the factions vying for the control of Somalia.
In seeking to re-impose law and order, UNITAF planned to seize the
strategic harbours, airports and major cities such as Mogadishu, Kismayo,
Baidoa, Mecca and Belet Huen, around which the political factions
exercised competing control. The next step envisaged opening the closed
lines of communications from the sea and airports to the inland towns for
the resumption of the delivery of relief aid to ordinary starving Somalis.
The international task force proceeded to implement a double-pronged
strategy. First, a political initiative involving all existing Somali political
factions was launched in early February, with the support of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its headquarters in Addis Ababa.
This forum was soon moved to recognize the authority of UNITAF's
international authority and mandate on 15 February. The Somali conference
participants were also prevailed upon to agree to a ceasefire which would
come into immediate effect, culminating in their subsequent endorsement of
the decision to surrender arms to UNITAF forces. It was also pointed out at
this time that factions violating the above agreements would be declared
bandits, and UNITAF would have the authority to descend upon the
recalcitrant parties and hunt them down.
The second route which sought to complement the political process was
to be made up of military efforts by UNITAF contingent forces in Somalia
itself. The military option focused on the rump of instability - the Bakara
(arms) Market in Mogadishu.
The above framework formed the basis of deployment of the ZNA
contingent in Somalia in the Bakara Market, for 16 weeks, from 12
February until 3 June 1993.

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Deployment of the ZNA contingent to Somalia and in Bakara,

12 February-3 June 1993
On 15 January 1993, a Zimbabwe National Army contingent of 162 men
under Maj. Vitalis Chigume was seconded to participate in the United
Nations peace enforcement operation conducted under US Command in
Somalia. The force was expected to prepare the way for a peacekeeping
force under the world body, scheduled to be in place by the beginning of
May 1993. UNITAF's primary aim was to stem the repeated lootings,
killings and food convoy hijackings by politically-backed, armed gangs in
Somalia. These gangs owed allegiance to various competing warlords. In
carrying out this task, however, the ZNA contingent found itself in Bakara,
well beyond the hand-over period as, 'during the first few weeks of the
succession, operations remained essentially unchanged'.1
On deployment, the Zimbabweans were allocated a 2-300 metre sector
alongside the perimeter of Mogadishu airport as well as responsibility for
keeping the peace over two adjacent suburbs. In this period, the men served
in such normal tasks as re-opening roads for both civilian and military
traffic, re-establishing schools and hospitals and assisting the setting up of
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) community kitchens in
six different sites, to serve mostly children and those on the point of
starvation.2
Given the military option to be followed by UNITAF to complement the
political agreements secured in Addis Ababa at this time, the operational
concept was to impose a security blanket over the capital Mogadishu. The
ZNA contingent in this operation was tasked on 5 February to prepare to
move from their current Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) to the
Bakara Market. Their current task, involving security of the airport and its
environs, was to be handed over to a Nigerian contingent.
Before deploying into Bakara, it was announced and stressed to the
Somalis that the purpose of the exercise was to confiscate weapons and
munitions of war, leaving normal trade to flourish. Law-abiding citizens and
combatants, from whatever side, who were prepared to voluntarily
surrender arms, were assured that they would be protected by the
international forces.
Execution of the Search of Bakara Market
Maj. Chigume's plan for the operation was to seek to dominate the market
activity from the centre with an operational force of 90 men. Subsequently,
a variety of tactics would be employed, to include cordon and search,
patrolling, conducting sweeps and establishing short- and long-term road

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blocks as well as searches of specified sectors, suspicious individuals/

groups and houses. In deploying his forces, two-thirds were to be housed in
the East Africa Hotel, a run-down establishment located in the centre of the
market, while the rest took up position as a Reserve a little distance away.
The initial tasks and deployment envisaged the following:

to establish an Inner and Outer Cordon around the market, and where
necessary, call in assistance of other international forces;

to deploy two platoons (60 men) in the centre of the market;

to have a Reserve of one platoon (30 men), including radio

communications, medical personnel, logisticians and spare drivers,
located some distance away and not directly involved with the force in
the centre but readily available to react as reinforcements if required
(this was to be located a kilometre away in an abandoned milk factory);

to augment the operation with road-blocks, including the short- and

long-term shifting of emplacements, to control the movement of goods
and people;

to carry out high-profile vehicle and foot patrols in the cordoned zone.

Firm, but not overly-aggressive, patrolling commenced, combined with

the road-blocks and searches. The ZNA contingent's tactical operations in
tackling the Bakara sector, which were concentrated on arms purveyors and
their private security protectors, called for reinforcements from other
contingents. 'A' Company from Pakistan, another from Botswana and two
platoons from the US Marines were received and placed under the
command of the ZNA contingent commander. Further, the United States
also provided air cover for a sweep of the arms market which was to be
rapidly carried out in three and half hours. Despite the operation taking
place in the most dangerous area of Bakara, there were no shooting
incidents. This, it was concluded, was as a result of the preponderance of
force exhibited by the international task force patrols.
Three more days into the operation, it received the necessary political
fillip when the factions which were gathered in Addis Ababa signed the
agreement acknowledging UNITAF's authority. It is important that we
acknowledge the importance of this complementary action to the
subsequent success achieved; peacekeeping is evolving in rather specific
circumstances, and when these occur they must be recognized.
Following closely on this development was the agreement on a
ceasefire. Disarmament and military representatives of the different factions
met to work out the modalities of ordering their troops to report to
designated assembly points. The overall effect of these developments soon

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119

registered itself on the ground. Ordinary Somali civilians began coming

forward and confiding in the ZNA forces, information on arms cache sites
and houses normally used by the armed men. Weapons and other ordinances
of war were also simply abandoned in the streets, to be picked up by the
roving patrols. These were back-loaded to UNOSOMII Headquarters with
no questions asked.
The patrols also came close to the horrors of conflict in Somalia as, on
average, every morning, they recovered no fewer than 15 bodies (others
were known to have died but were quickly buried, either by their murderers
or by friends).3 In executing this task, Maj. Chigume admits that his medical
back-up troops, as well as the available transport which also ferried injured
civilians, were soon exhausted and he had to quickly call in extra assistance
to be able to cope.4
The combination of the effectiveness of the military operation in Bakara
and the conducive political environment soon showed that the UNITAF
estimates of arms holdings in Bakara had been on the low side. Available
statistics indicate that from 12 February to 30 March, the ZNA confiscated
over 1,000 assorted weapons - enough to equip an infantry heavy battalion
- apart from the many tons of ammunition and explosives found. Towards
the end of April, peace was gradually returning to Bakara with only
intermittent gun battles taking place for very short periods (for fear of
detection). The arms clearance operation, although not completely
eliminating the arms flow, had certainly drastically affected the easy
availability. The price of an AK47 assault rifle rocketed to US$75,
significantly more than double the going price at the beginning of February.
However, it was at this time that local arms merchants who were being put
out of business began to fight back.
On 5 May, a ZNA patrol came under fire at close range, seriously
wounding one soldier in the chest. Fortunately, the Officer Commanding
was in the vicinity with his land-rover and within 15 minutes the wounded
man was receiving medical attention at a nearby Swedish Field Hospital.
However, on return Chigume regrouped the patrol and relieved them of their
duties. The men were only re-tasked after another four days of rest. Their
continuing task was immediately re-allocated to another standby patrol.
This decision, in retrospect, was vindicated when, a year later, Chigume met
the patrol commander and asked him what he would have done if allowed
to continue with the patrol? The simple and honest reply was that they
would have 'wiped out the whole clan' on the slightest provocation. And as
if to prove them right, at the time in Somalia: 'all the locals following the
shooting immediately went into hiding - fearing the worst in retribution.
Fortunately, this development further enhanced security in that area from
then on.'5

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Later, on 17 May, a lone gunman was reported to be lurking in the arms

market. A patrol was quickly dispatched to the scene where they soon
located him. Upon challenging the armed man, he immediately attempted to
run away and was shot dead. He was subsequently identified as Nii AH - a
well-known notorious bandit who had killed many people in Bakara market
during his reign of terror.
By the end of the operation, during the first week of June, enough
weapons and ammunition had been accounted for to equip a Brigade,
demonstrating the correctness of the strategy and tactics being used by the
ZNA contingent.
Conclusion
The Bakara arms clearance operation, although aimed at eliminating arms
supplies to the fighting Somali factions, was not exclusively offensive. It
was also carried out in conjunction with other humanitarian activities such
as food distribution, re-opening barricaded and mined streets, offering
medical treatment to the local people, re-establishing legal and policing
mechanisms and systems, assisting in resolving clan disputes and
establishing and reviving the school system. But its relevance lies in the
elimination of easy and readily available arms and related equipment and its
impact on the wider aims of UNITAF. Because of the rapid decline in the
intensity of the conflict and the severely limited ability of armed gangs to
loot and disrupt all trade in arms, sales of ammunition appeared to
comfortably meet the insatiable demand emanating from the factions in
Somalia through Bakara. For example, on 25 February 1993, a major arms
cache was discovered by a Zimbabwean patrol led by Lt Benjamin Chipfiko
on a property owned by a Somali businessman, Abdullah Abdi, who was
living in exile in Germany. After the arms were found, his house caretaker,
Mohammed Guledi, revealed to the patrol that the abode was being used as
a strategic port by supporters of the faction led by Farah Aideed.
At this time, in February 1993, the much sought-after, maintenance-free
Russian AK47 assault rifle could be bought in Bakara for as little as US$35.
Somalia's biggest arsenal boasted the availability of any type of weaponry
required - from a wide range of pistols to US service rifle type Ml6,
Portuguese G3s and standard NATO FN rifles. Bigger calibre support
weapons were also on sale.
International food distribution and the scheduled introduction of
UNOSOM II was effected, and pacification continued for a few more
weeks. Gradually, as peace returned, troops deployed in Bakara started to
engage the local people in sport and other social activities during weekends,
designed to occupy the young and keep them away from involvement with

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121

the gangs. Finally, on 3 June 1993, well after UNOSOM II had taken over
command of the Somali operation from UNITAF, the ZNA contingent was
re-deployed to Bakul to serve in a French area of responsibility, but its most
critical contribution had already been made.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Parts of this article were published in Martin Rupiya, 'Peace-keeping Operations: The
Zimbabwean Experience', in Mark Shaw and Jakkie Cilliers (eds), South Africa and
Peacekeeping In Africa, Vol.1, Institute for Defence Policy, IDP, South Africa, 1995, pp.111-25.

NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Presentation by Maj. Vitalis Chigume to the Zimbabwe Staff College, Harare, Sept. 1995.
Ibid.
Interviews with Maj. Vitalis Chigume, Harare, Nov. 1995 and June 1996.
Ibid.
Ibid.