70.

DELA PENA VS CA
FACTS: respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc. (respondent) extended a loan of to
petitioners. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note.
Petitioners failed to pay their obligation in full when it became due. Demands for
payment were made by respondent, but these were not heeded. Consequently,
respondent filed a collection case against the petitioners with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
At the pre-trial conference set on October 17, 1995, petitioners did not appear.
Consequently, upon motion by respondent, petitioners were declared as in default,
and respondent was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
the MTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. After the case was
remanded, The case was then set for hearing but petitioners failed to appear, thus,
respondent introduced and offered the pieces of evidence which it had earlier
presented ex parte. MTC promulgated a Decision] reiteraing its previous decision.
Petitioners again elevated this adverse decision to the RTC. On June 14, 2001, the
RTC set aside the MTC decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Again, petitioners failed to appear in the pre-trial. MTC ruled in favor of the
respondents, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. they
later on appealed to RTC, but the petitioners were not satisfied, respondent appealed
to the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners are correct on their contention that the CA faulted for
reversing the RTC, and for reinstating and upholding the MTC decision because it
does not conform to the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and
of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is
likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply
say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that
without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe
that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to
how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than
that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against
the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed
neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained
public confidence in the justness of his decision.
Thus, the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the
Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their
sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise
to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions;
contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties; convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or
principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous; consisted
merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to

support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of
which were quotations from the labor arbiters decision including the dispositive
portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its
own discussion or reasonings; was merely based on the findings of another court
sans transcript of stenographic notes; or failed to explain the factual and legal bases
for the award of moral damages.
71. MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC,
FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
FACTS: Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate
of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on
April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held.
72. AMPONG VS CSC
FACTS: During the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) a certain
Evelyn Junio-Decir applied for and took the examination. She passed with a rating of
74.27%.
At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were
public school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS). Later, Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. On July
5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service
Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of
Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the
woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP).
Upon further probing, it was confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility was
different from the one who took the examination. It was petitioner Ampong who took
and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. The CSRO conducted a
preliminary investigation and determined the existence of a prima facie case against
Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner
Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty and ordered their dismissal from the service.
Ampong moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction.

CSC denied the motion. Petitioner Ampong appealed to the Court of Appeals which
also denied the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of
the Judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still with the Executive or
Education Department
HELD: Petition DENIED. The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative
but the Court rules against the petition on the ground of estoppel. It is true that the
CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned
or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is
granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service
examinations. This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any
irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates
the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory
powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the
judiciary. Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a similar
violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly
different in that Ampong committed the offense beforeher appointment to the judicial
branch. At the time of commission, Ampong was a public school teacher under the
administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations,
under the CSC. Ampong surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place
of another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty
in a civil service- supervised examination. That she committed the dishonest act
before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative reach of
the Supreme Court. The bottom line is adm inistrative jurisdiction over a court em
ployee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the judiciary. Indeed, the standard
procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the present case.
However, the Court is constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel. The previous actions of Ampong have estopped her from
attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising quasi- judicial functions to secure an
affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Ampongs dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee.
Indeed, the Court takes note that petitioner should not have been appointed as a
judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she
committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, Ampongs present
status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged
with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility.
The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and
lowest of its personnel. The Court will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary
expects the best from all its employees.

73. INONOG VS JUDGE IBAY

FACTS: The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Venancio
P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge
Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross
abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall
basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of
court because complainant parked his superiors vehicle at the parking space
reserved for respondent judge.
Respondent judge initiated the proceeding for indirect contempt. respondent judge
issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt.
Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint.
In his Comment dated June 10, 2005, respondent judge explained that on March 18,
2005, he proceeded to the court at around 7:00 a.m. to finalize the decision in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69 and 03-392-393, all entitled People
v. Glenn Fernandez, et al., which were to be promulgated on the first hour of the
same day. Upon reaching his parking slot, he found complainants vehicle parked
there. As a result, he had a hard time looking for his own parking space. Hence, the
promulgation of the decision was delayed.
According to respondent judge, complainant knew that the parking slot was reserved
for him because it bore his name. He emphasized that prior to the incident, he
already had his name indicated at the said slot precisely because there had been
previous occasions when other vehicles would occupy his parking space and he had
been forced to park at the public parking area.
Respondent judge added that he ordered the complainant to appear before him for
the hearing at 10:30 a.m. of March 18, 2005, but, complainant refused, thus, he
declared him in contempt of court.
ISSUE: w/n respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
HELD: Yes. Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice
or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in
judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts
must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they
exercise.
74. ZARATE VS BALDERIAN
FACTS: Atty. Noe Cangco Zarate charged respondent Judge Isauro M. Balderian
(formerly acting presiding Judge of MCTC, Carmona, Gen. Mariano Alvarez, now
presiding Judge of MTC, Bacoor, Cavite) with gross Ignorance of the law,
incompetence or serious misconduct for ordering complainant's arrest and
incarceration in view of the latter's failure to appear in court despite proper notice
and for fallure to make good his promise that he will facilitate the repair of the
vehicle, subject matter of Crim. Case No. CC-95-118, entitled 'People of the
Philippines vs. Luis Hemopia y Donado', for [d]amage to [p]roperty [t]hrough
[r]eckless [i]mprudence.
Complainant, who is the counsel for the accused in the aforecited criminal case,
alleges that the criminal action arose from a vehicular accident involving a damage
claim of P30,000.00 with the accused.
During the pre-trial conference, the offended party refused the option to have the
vehicle repaired by a repair shop of his choice, hence the trial was set on December

1, 1995 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. While the accused appeared, his counsel,
complainant herein, failed to appear on time. For such non-appearance, the
respondent Judge immediately issued an ORDER arresting the defense counsel for
failure to inform the court of his absence.
ISSUE: Whether or not on the basis of facts herein attributed against the herein
respondent judicial officer, he has committed gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence or serious misconduct in the performance of his judicial duties.
HELD: Respondents assailed Order, is manifestly erroneous. In Silva v. Lee Jr.,[6] this
Court has clearly ruled that failure to attend a hearing does not constitute direct
contempt. We quote below the pertinent portion of that ruling:
"At the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 13, 1984, Atty. Silva did
not appear. This prompted Judge Lee to dictate in open court an order citing Atty.
Silva for direct contempt of court, ordering his arrest and sentencing him to five (5)
days imprisonment. Atty. Silva was arrested and jailed that same afternoon. He was
in jail for five (5) days.
xxxxxxxxx
"But can such behavior be considered a direct contempt which would warrant an
outright order to immediately arrest and jail complainant?
"Direct contempt is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of
the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act, while indirect contempt is the
failure to do something ordered done by the court or judge, such as failure to appear
at a hearing or in the use of disrespectful language in a pleading. A direct contempt
may be punished summarily while an indirect contempt can be punished only after
charge and hearing.
"Clearly, the acts of complainant do not constitute direct contempt."
75. UY VS DEPASUCAT
FACTS: Complainant Uy together with UBS Marketing Corporation (UBS) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 43) an action for reconveyance of real
property, cancellation of titles and recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages against SK Realty. the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum
shopping. Defendants moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens which
the trial court granted. Complainants Uy and UBS filed their appeal before the Court
of Appeals. After the parties had filed their respective briefs with the Court of Appeals
and before the latters resolution submitting the case for decision , respondents filed a
pleading entitled, Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of the Hon. Court of
Appeals from a Self-Confessed Briber of Judges which contains the following
statement:
" That, Plaintiff-Appellant Johnny KH Uy had, in fact, confessed to Bribery and
Telling On of judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by
using illegally taped conversations both actual and by telephone, copies of the
decision of the court "
In the instant administrative complaint, Uy alleges: Respondents, as members of the
Bar are sworn not to do falsehood or consent to the doing of any in court, nor should
they mislead the appellate court by their false, malicious and libelous imputations
against him. Respondents filing of the subject Manifestation was for the purpose of
putting him in a bad light so as to obtain a favorable judgment for their clients.
Accordingly, the undersigned IBPcommissioner fully agrees with the respondents that
the allegations in their manifestation with respect to the fact that the complainant is
a briber of judges are true and correct. In fact, records show that complainants
former counsel has been disbarred by the Supreme Court because of the bribing
incident referred to in the said manifestation. It cannot therefore be said that the
respondents did falsehood or misled the Court of Appeals when they filed their
manifestation.

ISSUE: Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations
carries with it the license to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper
language?
HELD: In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or
oral made in the course of judicial proceeding are classified as absolutely privilege
communications. However, this doctrine applies only in such cases where the
statement is relevant or pertinent or material to the case. In this respect,
respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or relevance of such
statement like Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of our judicial
system had, in fact confessed to Bribery and Telling On of judges, after the judges
allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by using illegally taped conversation
both actual and/or by telephone in the appealed case involving recovery of property
and cancellation of title. Furthermore, if such fact is relevant, why did the
respondents make such fact known to the Court of Appeals only when the appealed
case has already been submitted for decision. Respondents timing makes their claim
of good intention a doubtful claim. It seems that the real intention is to influence the
Court of Appeals in an improper way.