Corporate Governance & HR - Back Up

REFERENCES
1. Governing the Modern Corporation by Roy C. Smith, Ingo Walter

2. Corporate Governance by Bob Tricker
3. Investopedia
4. Wikipedia
5. Management Study Guide.com
6. The Journal of Finances
7. ITCportal.com
8. Applied-corporate-governance.com
9. IR Magazine Investor Perception Study Europe 2015
10. CONTENT referred in the websites through the following journals in the field of management by
various authors (Daily et 2003, Durisin and Puzone, 2009) i.e. Academy of Management Review,
Academy of Management Journal, Accounting Review, Administrative Science Quarterly,
International Journal of Accounting , Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting
Research , Journal of Business, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Management
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11. http://www.sciencedirect.com/
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