Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Peru
Policies
to StopHyperinflation
andInitiateEconomicRecovery
(InTwoVolumes) VolumeIl:AnnexesandStatisticalAppendix
December
15,1988
CountryDepartmentIV
LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
Regional
Office
U.,~~~~~~~~~
Report
No.7460-PE
DocumentoftheWorldBank
Thisreporthasa restricted
distributionandmaybeusedbyrecipients
onlyin theperformance
of theirofficialduties.Itscontentsmaynototherwise
bedisclosed
withoutWorldBankauthorization.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit =
Inti (I/.)
I/. 1.00
US$ 1.00
=
=
US$0.002
I/. 500
FISCAL YEAR
January
1 to December 31
PREFACE
This report was prepared and drafted prior to the announcementof
two packages of economic measures by the Peruvian Government, first in
September 1988 and then in November 1988. A description of these measures
as well as an update on the current state of the economy is contained in
the Addendum provided in the last section of Volume I.
This report is based on findings and analysis of Bank economic
missions which visited Lima in October 1987, November/December1987, and
March/April 1988. Support for the Bank work with the Government was
provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Participation
in the missions, which varied in size and composition,was as follows:
William Tyler (MissionChief); Ricardo Lago (Deputy h.tCsionChief ani
principal author); Ulrich Lachler (trade and exchange rate policies);
Daniel Oks (consultant,macroeconomics);Jeno Malatinszky (public
enterprises);Ricardo Martin (projections);Fernando Rezende (consultant,
taxation); Javier Escobal (consultant,agriculture);Bruce Herrick
(consultant,labor markets); Cesar Burga (projections,statistical annex,
and research assistance). Pedro Mercader (UNDP Lima Representative)
accompanied the work of the missions in Lima and provided valuable guidance
and overall support. Valuable comments on an earlier draft were provided
by Rudiger Dornbusch. Michel del Buono provided a short note on the state
of the energy sector. Brian Wesol provided research assistance in one of
the missions. Dorothy Jenkins provided secretarialwork throughout the
cycle of the report. Milagros Aquino-Divinoprovided secretarial
assistance in the final stage of the report.
This report was discussed in great detail with the Government's
economic team in Lima during October/November1988 by Messrs. Tyler and
Lago. While there was general agreement between the Bank and the
Government's economic team as to the diagnosis and analysis of the
situation, the Government'seconomic team stressed political and social
constraints to taking strong policy action to forestallhyperinflationand
indicated the need for a more gradual policy approach.
VOLUME
I:
THEMAIN REPORT
Page No.
COUNTRY
DATA
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
RESUMEN
EJECUTIVO
CHAPTER I.
i
xvi
A. Background.............,
B. Recent History.................................
C. The Diagnosis of the Economy in 1985 and
Strategy of the IncomingAPRA Government......
D. The Implementationof the Policies,
July 1985 to December 1986...................
E. The Results in 1986: Reactivationand
Disinflation
.................................
F. Economic Policy in 1987........................
G. Economic Perfor.mancein 1987: Stagnatio
4 i of
Production and Intensificationof
InflationaryPressures.......................
H. Economic Policy during January-August1988.....
1
1
3
4
9
12
19
21
23
28
38
A.
23
..............
39
41
47
54
56
60
60
68
76
ii
..
..
99
99
100
103
112
120
A;NNEXES* ....
Annex 1.
Annex 2.
Annex 3.
Annex 4.
17
28
38
41
42
47
58
79
92
93
I.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
II.
iii
...............................
.......
95
......
...................... ,95
Total PopulationDistribution
.
.
Demographic Indicators
.
.
Enployment and Labor Productivity............
Un- and Under-Employment
....................
2.1
GDP by Sectoral Origin (Constant Intis)......
2.1(A) Real GDP Average Growth Rates (Percentages)..
2.2
Nominal GDP by Sectoral Origin
(CurrentIntis)............................
2.2(A) GDP: Percentage Distribution
.................
2.2(B) GDP Deflators
.................
2.2(C) GDP Deflators: Yearly Percentage Changes.....
2.3
GDP by Expenditures(Constant Intis).........
2.4
GDP by Expenditures (CurrentIntis)..........
2.5
Domestic Irncome
..............................
2.5(A) (PerceLatage
Distribution)
..............
2.6
Gross Capital Formation by Goods and Origin-..
2.7
Real GDP Per Capita .........................
.
2.8
Per Capita GDP by Departments .
.11.......
III. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ............................. ....
3.1
Summary Balance of Payments
.
.........
3.1(A) (As a Percent of GDP)
.............
3.2
Merchandise Exports by Commodities (Current
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
95
96
97
98
99
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
i
112
112
113
Dollars) ..................................
114
116
117
118
PUBLIC FINANCE
5.1
5.1(A)
5.2
5.2(Al
5.3
5.3(A)
5.3(B)
.........................
Non-FinancialPublic Sector Operations.......
(As a Percent of GDP)........................
Central Government Operations
................
(As a percent of GDP)........................
Non-FinancialPublic Enterprise Operations...
Non-FinancialPublic EnterpriseOperations...
Non-FinancialPublic EnterpriseOperations
by Company.................................
121
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
iv
5.4
128
129
.......
130
MONETARY STATISTICS.................................
6.1
6.2
6.3
VII.
132
.....
........
..........
.
Agricultural Production
.......................
Volume Index of ManufacturingProduction......
133
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
7.1
7.2
131
136
136
137
138
138
139
140
GLOSSARYOF ACRONYMS
Spanish
APRA
BAP
BC.R
BOP
CD
CRB
CENTROMIN
CERTEX
COFIDE
CONADE
CPI
ECASA
ELECTROPERU
ENCI
FENT
FRASA
GDP
GNP
HIERROPERU
ICE
IDB
INE
English
American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance
Agricultural Bank of Peru
Central Reserve Bank of Peru
Balance of Payments
Certicatesof Deposit
Central Reserve Bank of Peru
Central Peruvian Mining Enterprise
Export Tax Reimbursement
Certificate
Development Finance Corporation
National DevelopmentCorporation
Consumer Price Index
Rice Marketing Enterprise
Peruvian ElectricityEnterprise
Inputs Marketing Enterprise
Fund for Non-TraditionalExports
National Fund for Agrarian
Reactivationand Nutritional
Security
Gross Domestic Product
Gross National Product
Peruvian Iron Mining Enterprise
Institute of Foreign Trade
Inter-Ameri-anDevelopment Bank
Peruvian Statistical Institute
Estadistica
IGV
IMF
LIBOR
MEF
MINEROPERU
MN
MUC
OCN
PAIT
PETROPERU
PROEM
PSBR
QFD
QRs
TINTAYA
WPI
Sales Tax
InternationalMonetary Fund
London Inter-BankOffer Rate
Ministry of Economy and Finance
PeruvianMining Enterprise
Negotiation Table
Official Exchange Market
Net UnclassifiedAssets
Temporary Income Support Program
Peruvian Petroleum Company
Temporary Employment Program
Public Sector Borrowing Rights
Quasi-FiscalDeficit
QuantitativeRestrictions
ANNEX 1
INFLATION ANDINFLATIONARYFINANCE
1.
The purpose of this annex is to study the relationshipbetween the
inflation rate and the real resources from inflationaryfinance
(seigniorage). In particular,the focus is placed on identifying the shape
of the trade-off between the inflation rate (as a tax rate) and the amount
of real resources that can be transferred to the government from a given
demand for money (as a tax base). This trade-off can be termed as a Laffer
curve, in analogy with the theory of taxation. From analyzing this tradeoff it can be calculatedthe inflation rate that maximizes revenues from
inflationaryfinance. It is found that in the case of Peruvian economy,
that inflation rate is between 500 percent and 600 percent per annum, and
the maximum revenue from inflation is just over 10 percent of GDP.
2.
The demand for money utilized here is the simple Cagan
formulation:
(1)
y = real GDP
Since in Peru interest rates on Bank deposits are very low compared to
inflation and the share of deposits in broad money is declining rapidly, it
is assumed for simplicitythat the nominal return of all broad money is
zero.
3.
R = (M/kp) n1
[A exp (-%l)Y 1
]/k (2)
= o or f
(max) = I/a
(3)
= w ==) R (Min) = 0
4.
To infer the value of the parameter "a'. the following convenient
expression of (1) can be used:
(M/p)/y = A exp (-acl) or
(4)
ldH
or
(dV/V)/dll
= a
(5)
5.
The variables of expression (5) can be proxied by the growth rate
of velocity and the increase in inflation trom the second semester of 1987
to the first semester of 1988. Thus:
d V/V t
Since: M/P (at Dec. 1987) = 1163; Real GDP (averageJuly-Dec. 1987) = 121;
and M/p (at June 1988) = 809; Real GDP (average Jan.-May 1988) = 121
In addition: AH = 3.62 - 1.38= 2.24
Since: n (July to Dec. 1987) = 138
I (Jan. to June 1988) = 362
(annual rate)
(annual rate)
Chart 1-1
I !'
hS.d. Pr.j
-1
iI l,,_
fl
Lil~
t..:1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~y
*1~~~~~~~inlt3
rI; l; I'
.0
.i
V-,
'ij} rr.l
gill
n-1LItltl
[Fl9i
[f { kv [ 0 (' t f l t t 2
l
,r IT."
13
X
i- LI.
1 1.
1j i-1, ,>,'I I X. ,- X
jr
at
'
I tX 11;
' f -!
V-
'.27
O -),
^
i
'
eDi)
coPI
1:
IO
~Iii1ol
.3nrrsfi1!
6.
To find out the numerical expression of equation (2), it is also
necessary to calculateA. This can be done using expression (4) and
-3-
A = 0.11
Therefore, the expression for revenue from inflation (equation (2)) is:21
R/y = 0.065 x exp (-0.19611) x II (6)
This equation calculates the government's revenue from inflation as a
percentage of GDP. The Laffer curve implied by equation (6) is plotted in
Chart 1-1.
7.
It can be seen in the figure that the maximum revenue from
inflation is about 12 percent of GDP and that this is reached at a steady
state inflation of between 5002 and 6002. For inflation rates beyond 600Y
percent the model becomes unstable and the revenue from inflation drops
exponentiallytowards zero. (Note that for each (revenue/GDP)point in the
vertical axis there are two solutions (two inflation rates) in the
horizontal axis; one solution is at low inflation--alongthe efficient and
stable portion of the Laffer curve, and the other solution is at high
inflation--thatis in the inefficient or unstable portion of the curve.
The second solution is, therefore, in the hyperinflationarypath).
1/ The value used for V, 10.9, is equal to nominal GDP (1987) divided broad
money supply (as of end of 1986); that is GDP/M_
Because this measure
1.
of velocity is more suitable for inflationaryrevenue calculations than
the alternativeGDP/M. The inflation rate in 1987 was 115 percent.
2/ The money supply multiplier in 1987/88 was k = 1.7.
-4ANNEX2
THE INFLATION TAXs THEORETICALDERIVATIONAND CALCULATION
FOR 1980-87
A.
Introduction
1.
The purpose of this annex is to propose a broad measure of the
inflation tax and a method to estimate it for Peru in the 3980-87 period.
2.
The textbook conventionalmeasurement of the inflation tax is
restricted to the inflation-erosionof non-interestbearing public debt
(e.g.,currency). However, currency is not the only public liability which
can be amortized through inflation. The real value of other forms of
public debt, such as bonds, fixed int0rest loans, or interest bearing
reserve requirementof the commercialbanks in the Central Bank, is also
eroded by increases in the price level. Thus, a broader measure of the
inflation tax ought to focus on the inflation-amortization
of the principal
of all public debt instruments (monetaryand financial)not compensatedby
interest payments. The difference between monetary and financial debt
instruments,though, is that the latter bear an interestwhich tends to
compensate (partiallyor totally) the debt-holder for the amortizationof
debt in real terms induced by inflation. Accordingly, the inflation tax
proposed here refers only to that portion of the inflation-amortization
of
debt which is not compensated by interest payments. To illustrate this,
consider the case of currency. Since currency is a zero-interest
liability, there is no interest compensationfor the inflation-inducedreal
amortizationof it and, hence, all that real amortizationis inflation tax.
In the case of financial debt, since it bears a nominal interest rate which
compensates (partiallyat least) debt-holdersfor inflation-inducedcapital
losses, the inflation tax will be smaller than the total inflationamortizationof debt.
3.
Estimating the inflation tax according to this definition requires
knowledge of the component of nominal interest rates which is a
compensation (to debt-holders)for inflation-inducedcapital losses. That
component is, of course, equal to the nominal interest rate minus the
"benchmark"real interest rate.l/ To simplify the calculation process, it
is first assumed that the full amount of nominal interest rates is
compensation for the inflation-erosionof debt. This obviously implies
that the benchmark real interest rate is zero. In a second calculation,
though, it is assumed that the benchmark real interest rate is 5 percent.
This, in turn, implies that the compensationfor inflation-amortization
of
debt is approximatelyequal to the percentagenominal interest rate minus 5
percent (see Footnote 1).
4.
In principle, in order to estimate accurately the inflation tax,
all assets and liabilitiesof the consolidatedpublic sector, and their
correspondinginterests and returns,would be required. However, in Cae
1/ More rigorously, ((l + i)/(l + R)] - 1, where 'i" is the nominal rate of
interest and "R" is the real rate of interest.
- 5 -
- 6 -
Deposits (D)
Foreign Currency Deposits (FCD)
Loans (L)
Net Loans (NL)
Real Capital (K)
Bonds (B)
Reserves (R)
Currency in Circulation (C)
9.
An asset, (e.g., D) held by sector i (e.g., BC) and originating in
a transactionwith sector j (e.g., CRB) is written as D[i,j]. In our
example this would be D[BC,CRB] which refers to deposits of BC on the CRB
(these are principally legal and excess reserves of BC held in CRB). Note
that in this case D[BC,CRB] appears as a liability in the balance sheet of
the CRB and as an asset of BC. When an asset is held by more than one
sector (or when it is originated in transactionswith more than one sector)
this is indicated by a dash; e.g., DrSPR-BC,BN]refers to deposits of SPR
and BC at BN.
10.
K[NFPS,SPR-F]
D[NFPS,CRB]
NW[BF]
/a
/b
/c
/d
With CRB
Includes
Includes
Excludes
resources.
"Bono Tipo C" issued by COFIDE.
legal reserves on FCD.
legal reserves on FCD of BF and BN.
/e
-8 -
ConsolidatedPublic Sector
K[NFPS,SPR]
OCN[CRB-BF-BN]
R[CRB-BN-BF,F]
L[PB,BC-SPR]= L[BF,BC] +
+ L[BN,BC] +
+ L[CRB,BC] +
+ L(BF,SPR] +
+ L[BN,SPR] +
+ L[CRB,NB]
D[NFPS,BCJ
LF = NL[F,NFPS] + NL[F,CRB] +
+ NL[F,BN] + NL[F,BF]
| NW
|C
B[SPR-BC,NFPS]
| L[NPB,NFPS] = L[BC,NFPS] +
i
+ L[NB,NFPS]
| EME = FCD[FS,CRB]
i EMN = D[BC,CRB] + D[SPR,CRB]+
j
+ D(O.CRB]
FCD[SPP.,BN-BF]
D(SPR-BC,BN-BF]
Asset Group
institutionallyfixed at zero
B[SPR,NFPS]
L[NPB,NFPS]
Source
NS
SGSM
EMN
EME
D[SPR,BC-BF]
IMF-FS
and NS
SGMS
FCD[SPR,BN-BF]
L(PB,BC-SPR]
SGSM
SGSM
D[NFPS,BC]
10
IS = (l/l+inf)*{L[PB,BC-SPR]*(inf
- i(red)) +
+ D[NFPS,BC)*(inf- i(dep))}
11
18.
The net inflation-inducedfinancialwealth transfer from the
private and the public sector is termed net inflation tax (MIT), and can be
expressed as the difference between the IT and the I:
(3) NIT = IT - IS.
19.
From the conceptual point of view inflationarytaxation can arise
both from: (a) inflationarymisperceptions,which make inflation higher
than originally anticipated,thereby rendering ex-post real interest rates
lower than ex-ante interest rates; or (b) institutionalrigidities in the
determinationof interest rates, which impede agents from adjusting nominal
rates to anticipated inflation. In general, assessing the relative significance of both sources of inflationarytaxation (inflationmisperceptions
and institutionalrigidities) involves considerabledifficulty. The main
difficulty stems from the fact that inflation expectationsare nonobservable. However, the system of fixed and artificiallylow interest
rates, which have been prevailing in Peru since 1976 (and in particular
since 1985), suggests that institutionalrigiditieshave been the principal
explanatory factor of the IT on financial assets/liabilities.
20.
From equation (1) it is clear that only public financial and
monetary liabilitiesheld by the domestic private sector are considered a
source of IT. Real assets (such as K[NFPS,SPR])are excluued because,
unless their relative price changes, their nominal value moves along with
inflation. Foreign liabilities (such as LF) or assets (such as R(CRB-BNBF,F]) are neglected since their rate of return in domestic currency is
equal to the external real interest rate plus domestic inflation under
purchasing power parity and, therefore,they are perfectly indexed assets.3/
21.
The account OCN[CRB-BN-BF],which approximatescumulative
operational losses of public banks (mainly the CRB, see ANNEX III), can be
viewed as a non-performingasset (that is an asset with zero nominal
return). Or else, the CPS balance sheet could have been presented
substractingthis item from the right-hand side of the balance sheet in
which case the CPS net worth would have been smaller by a similar amount.
inf*
is the rate of devaluation
is the domestic rate of inflation
is the foreign rate of inflation.
i*
r*
is
is
- inf* + inf=
+ inf
the foreign nominal interest rate and
the foreign real interest rate.
Assuming that the external real interest rate is zero, the nominal
return on the foreign asset is equal to inflation under purchasing
parity, i.e. the inflation-erosionof the foreign asset (prior to
devaluation).
- 12 -
22.
The data employed(stocksof assets ard liabilitiesand interest
rates) are reportedin Table 2-4. and the estimatesof the IT, IS and NIT
ItO
l130c IOF AU
lost
i#
ALIAIRZ3 MD DIwa
168
95155
1is4
19W
1956
19t?
:,6f
418
m
725
1,817
1,030
7"
1,018
12,1W
2,02
1,804
14,52t
23,1W
8,218
2,68
20,58
6,444
11,124
4,274
47,797
2,042
(average,*1.tl8)
will.
Stt!ke
C
st(W,Sp1 !1
LO4P ,PJ
*/
E1
eM el
o(IPl,-6P
FGC6P3,I-IW
LLft,K-5P11j
D(WPNS,K
219
21
148
as
213
238
25
6a
180
141
41
me
S
6t#
14
i(np)
68.0
l(_,)
I()
I(ci)
i(fcd)
I(red)
I (dep)
l,,letlfi
6.8
71.4
56.
t2.6
72.6
62.2
72.6
87.5
023.
72.7
58.1
*87.
55.1
25.3
54.
!/60.6
1906-IV
Stock. (averarm.
C
(plR,WISl @/
LD6,WFPS) k/
EO
EI IE
OESPRIM6-17]
PCOISPOIN48p
L(' ,C-1,J
DWPMS,K]
Interest
ate
I(b)
I(npb)
I(el)
71
61
247
68
421
112
1.21t
21
1"
404
1 06
I4
2n
2,608
a8
57. a
6*.6
67.4
116.0
61.6
116.0
870.
70.6
72.0
63.6
7.4
66.6
114
66.0
156.4
47.6
74.0
121.1
4.o13 6,"6
1,244
ON
6,064
110
62.0
*7.8
60.0
1U8.3
78.5
116.2
71.2
60.2
I.
1997-1
1927-11
1917-411
16,216
1,62
1,5U
20,60
8,670
*,172
2,604
88,061
2,206
16,216
1,714
1,988
24,062
8,581
9,l11
2.751
$8,155
2,264
24,637
1,680
2,?72
26,246
8,27
11,250
2,747
45*,68
2,064
5.04
2,6*0
2,512
120,9
*U
6.0
119.6
76,4
160.6
72.1
160.6
50.7
1.5
118.$
5,828
1,171
24,85S
1.
48.2
40.0
38.8
6.6
21.7
6.6
25.1
28.6
61.0
d/
6.5
U8.
158.6
14.8
158.6
24.4
21.0
114.5
167.11
14,100
1,714
1,56
10,764
8,7 24
6,920
2,748
28,064
1,721
6.0
6.8
1.5
6.0
1.S
5.6
6.7
12.7
81,616
2,245
8,672
51,76
5,"7
13,482
4,275
156.87
1,9S4
9/
10.7
U.S
6.8
7.4
5.0
7.4
5.6
6.7
1U.5
10.6
6.6
O.&
9.0
5.4
*.0
5.6
6.7
16.2
10.7
6.0
7.7
2.2
5.6
2.2
5.6
6.1
22.7
10.9
7.2
7.0
114.9
5.3
114.9
6.6
6.0
24.0
I1 Fr
e/
10.4
KatIe)
S.t
i(aea)
l(fed)
I(red)
I (dep)
inflation
gill.
and Jntlet_et
I(am)
582
1064 elY 'ksa. Tilpe C of COPIOII for 106-Ge alee Central GOver,mt banda In
found for 1960.-U
Apprite.td
by L[C , IIF).
EMEOVre ti.atet net lgal rearvae on FC of SRI and tC bacause It slte co eritae
ndilrect *atletes
of the letter (aNlch are net
legal rautrvte on fCD of ON and IF.
reported In Nate S_rnal) suggest that EMSmy _av bea overettilted
1S percent In
196, 26 perent Ia 1966 and 1i percent In 1ii7.
Anual Interet
rates .ape
In efectIve prcentao
tare.
the Ieant ontU of the year end the leet month of
The annual rate of Inflation (bta
the Previoet year) according to te coneumr Price Index of Lie.
Qu"terIy
Interea raOte 1 quarterly eff* ctiV Percentage.
The quarterly rte of infltiotn
(betae the leat
eatt
of tib quarter a"d the eat
otentbof the previous quarter) accordin, to the ceatamr pIet Index of Liet.
Sourctt
- 13 -
Annual
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Inflation
Tax (IT)
(Intis) (Z GDP)
Inflation
Subsidy (IS)
(Intis) (Z GDP)
135
185
74
536
23r
5,037
11,783
30,843
2.3
1.7
0.4
1.6
0.3
2.5
3.2
4.2
69
122
250
893
1,162
5,532
5,868
20,622
1.2
1.1
1.4
2.7
1.6
2.8
1.6
2.8
66
63
-175
-357
-923
-495
5,914
10,221
1.1
0.6
-1.0
-1.1
-1.3
-0.3
1.6
1.4
0.8
1.2
1.0
1.4
0.8
1,867
3,849
4,415
4,974
9,001
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.6
1.0
1,720
2,292
2,198
5,951
-1,837
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.7
-0.2
Quarterly
b/
1986-IV
3,587
1987-I
6,141
1987-II
6,613
1987-III
10,925
1987-IV
7,164
Net Inflation
Tax (NIT - IT-IS)
(Intis) (Z GDP)
a/
The above calculationsare based on equations: (1) for the IT, (2) for
the IS and (3) for the NIT. These assume that the benchimarkreal
interest rate is zero (See Footnote 1).
b/
Since INE does not provide quarterly figures of GDP, the annualized
quarterly figures of GDP employed were obtained by multiplying the
annualized quarterly level of GDP reported by the CRB (base 1970) by
the ratio between the annual GDP figures of CRB and INE.
- 14
'rable
2-6: INFLATION TAX ESTIMATES a/
Period
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Inflation
Tax (IT)
(intis) (%GDP)
160.0
222.3
155.5
679.9
652.2
6,395.6
13,139.0
31,564.0
2.6
2.1
0.9
2.1
0.9
3.2
3.6
4.3
Inflation
Subsidy (IS)
(intis) (ZGDP)
80.6
145.5
298.4
983.0
1,401.0
5,781.9
6,827.0
22,095.0
1.4
1.4
1.7
3.0
1.9
2.9
1.8
3.0
Net Inflation
Tax (NIT)
(intis) (ZGDP)
79.4
76.8
-142.9
-303.1
-748.8
613.7
6,312.0
9,469.0
1.2
0.7
-0.8
-0.9
-1.0
0.3
1.8
1.3
a/ The above estimates are based on equations (1) for the IT, (2) for the
IS and (3) for the NIT, assuming that the benchmark, real interest rate
is 5 percent; i.e. in equations (1) and (2) i () should be replaced by
(1 + i ())/1.05-1 (see Footnote 4.)
- 15 -
26.
The dollarizationof the economy in 1983-85 was the result of the
attempt by private agents to escape the inflation tax as well as the
liberal measures which allowed foreign currency deposits in the financial
system. On the other hand, although since 1985 dedollarizationfollowed
mainly from the suspensionof convertibilityof foreign currency deposits
into foreign currency, the policy of fixing the exchange rate (and the
subsequent real appreciation)also played a role. This became particularly
obvious after the official exchange rate devaluationsof the last quarter
of 1987 have raised significantlythe return on foreign currency deposits.
However, by then, the low share of foreign currency deposits in total
financial liabilitieshad left depositorsweakly hedged against
inflationarytaxation.
27.
Inflation has also induced financial wealth transfers (implicit
subsidies) from the public to the private sector. A measure of these is
given by the inflation subsidy estimated in Section C. The inflation
subsidy rose from 1.2/1.4 percent of GDP in 1980 to 2.7/3 percent in 1983
(accordingto whether the benchmark real interest rate is zero or 5
percent). Thereafter, it exhibited an oscillatory behavior reaching a
level equivalent to 2.8/2.9 percent of GDP in 1985 and 2.8/3 percent in
1987.
28.
However, the on average higher level of the inflation subsidy did
not suffice to neutralize the upward trend in the inflation tax. As a
consequence, the average net inflation tax (the differencebetween the
inflation tax and subsidy) has risen from -0.41-0.8 percent of GDP in
1984-85 to 1.5/1.6 percent in 1986-87. Between the same periods the
central government tax revenue dropped from 11.8 percent of GDP to 8.8
percent. This suggests that there has been strong substitutionbetween
conventional and inflationarysources of taxation. Since the inflation tax
is a more regressivekind of tax (from the income distributionpoint of
view), this substitutionis bound to have had adverse social effects.
29.
Moreover, to the extent that the beneficiariesof the inflation
subsidy tend to differ from those who bear the inflation tax burden,
inflation may have distributionaleffects even if the net inflation tax was
zero. Since the recipients of subsidizedcredit are producers (the most
important being agriculturalproducers), inflation is bound to induce
transfers of financialwealth from cash holders and bank depositors to poor
"campesinos"and other beneficiariesof subsidizedCRB credit. Although
this could be justified on income distributiongrounds if the holders of
liquid assets were sufficientlyricher than the beneficiariesof subsidized
credit, it could not be justified on efficiency grounds since it implies
taxing savings and the use of money (a commodity with high productivity
that society can produce at negligible cost). Since, in addition, there is
evidence that poorer consumers are the main holders of cash, it is not
warranted to tax them in order to finance the poor, but perhaps not
necessarily poorer "campesinos". Taxing the rich through direct
conventional taxes is a more desirable avenue. A similar reasoning could
be applied for wealth transfers between private agents through the banking
system: low and middle income bank depositors subsidize firms who are large
enough to be able to borrow from banks.
- 16 -
30.
Under the present circumstances,as further relative price
realignmentsseem inevitableand, given that the nearly depleted level of
foreign exchange reserves cannot cushion further demand pressures, the
policy of maintaining low nominal interest rates can only enhance the risk
of inflationarytaxation. Moreover, since the process of financial
disintermediationis quite advanced and accelerating,i.e., the inflation
tax base is shrinking fast, collecting a similar level of inflation revenue
would require ever increasing inflation rates.
31.
Unless serious fiscal measures are undertaken the monetary effects
of the fiscal and financial imbalancewill fuel the inflationaryprocess to
even more worrying levels. The socially regressiveeffects of inflationary
taxation are bound to show quickly into a further deteriorationof the
government'spolitical strength and into greater social disintegration.
This, though, may be the cost that society and the governmentas part of it
has to bear in order to be ready to accept the fiscal and financial remedy.
-17-
ANNEX3
THE CENTRAL BANK'S QUASI-FISCALDEFICIT
A.
Introduction
1.
The Central Reserve Bank's (CRB) interventionin Peru's financial
and foreign exchange markets has created subsidies to the private sector
with budgetary implications. Those subsidies,conventionallyreferred to
as the quasi-fiscaldeficit of the CRB, have recently become an important
source of primary money creation. The sources of the quasi-fiscal deficit
(QFD) examined here are interest rate and foreign exchange losses.
Interest rate losses occur when the interest the CRB pays on its
liabilities (mainly reserves of the financial system, since currency in
hands of the public pays zero interest) is higher than the interest it
receives on its assets (mainly credit to the government, credit to the
Banca de Fomento, rediscount facilities and internationalreserves).
Foreign exchange losses arise when the average buying price of foreign
exchange by the CRB exceeds the average selling price. During the 1985-87
period foreign exchange losses were due to the fact that the average
exchange rate paid to exporters and other sellers of foreign exchange
(includingthose offering foreign exchange to the government in the open
market) exceeded, on average, the exchange rate charged to importers and
financial debtors.
2.
Interest rate losses were estimated by two methods: i) directly,
from analyzing the movements in the sub-accounttermed "Costo por
Regulacion de Exceso de Liquidez" of the CRB account "Otras Cuentas Netas"
(which, reportedly,measures precisely interest rate losses); and ii)
indirectly, through measurement of the average return on CRB assets and
liabilities.Likewise, foreign exchange losses were also estimated: i)
directly, through inspectionof the movements in the sub-account termed
"DiferencialCambiario" of the CRB account "Otras Cuentas Netas"; and ii)
indirectly,comparing average buying and selling exchange rates. For
reasons given below (paragraph18) the direct measurement of QFD is deemed
more reliable that'the indirect one. The adequacy of the direct measurement
of the QFD hinges on the specific accountingmethodology employed by the
CRB of Peru. Thus, it cannot be assured that the same approach will be
valid for similar studies of other countries. The indirectmeasurement of
QFD, apart from serving as a check for the direct measurement,permits
assessing the composition of foreign exchange and interest rate losses
(which the direct measurement does not convey). The direct estimate of QFD
is performed in Section B and the indirect estimate in Section C. The
evolution of QFD is analyzed in Section D.
B. Direct Estimate to The Quasi-Fiscal Deficit (QFD)
Foreign Exchange Subsidies
3.
The sub-account "DiferencialCambiario" of the CRB account "Otras
Cuentas Netas" measures: i) foreign exchange losses due to the difference
between buying and selling exchange rates; and ii) accounti-g capital
losses/profitsarising from changes in the Inti valuation of the CRB's
assets (includinggold) and liabilitiesdenominated in foreign currencies
due to either changes in the inti/US$ exchange rate or to changes in the
4.
More precisely,changesin the sub-account
"Diferencial
Cambiario"
(CDC)measure,apart from FES, the changein valueof the net foreign
exchangeposition(FEP)of the CRB (termed"Posicionde Cambio III" in CRB
publications)
at the beginningof the period.Thus, if FEP,(t-l,t)is the
FEP of time (t-l)valuedat exchangeratesof time t:
(1) CDC = FES - [FEP(t-l,t)- FEP(t-1,t-l)]
The FEP measuresgross foreignexchangereserves(including
gold)minus
shortand long run foreignliabilities
of the CRB (principally
with the
IMF, i.e. SDR's)and minus foreigncurrencyobligations
with domestic
residents.
The main componentsof FEP which are not denominated
in US$ are
gold reservesand SDR's liabilities
to the IMF. It is assumedfor
simplicityand in the absenceof properinformation
that the rest of the
assets/liabilities
are stipulatedin US$. Thus FEP can be written:l/
(2)
where:
"
'
-19-
It thus follows that the change in value between time (t-l) and time (t) of
the FEP existing at the beginning of period (t) is:
(3) FEP'(t-l,t)-FEP'(t-l,t-l)
- G*(t-l) x [g(t) x e(t)
-g(t-1) x e(t-1)] - S(t-1)
x [o(t) x e(t) - s(t-l) x e(t-l)]
+ R*(t-l) x [e(t) - ^(t-l']
e(t) x G*(t-l) x lg(t) - g(t-l)]
e(t) x S*(t-l)x[s(t) - s(t-l)]
+ [e(t) - e(t-l)] x [G*(t-l)
x g(t-l) - S*(t-l) x s(t-l)
+ R*(t-l)]
=
-
The first term measures the revaluationof gold due to the appreciationof
gold with respect to the US dollar; the second term measures the
revaluation of SDR's due to the appreciationof SDR's with respect to the
US dollar; and the third term captures the revaluation of the FEP of (t-l)
due to the inti devaluationwith respect to the US dollar. Substituting
"changes in the FEP" of equation (3) in equation (1) we arrive at the
expression for FES employed for its direct estimate:
(4) FES' = CDC + e(t) x G*(t-l) x [g(t) - g(t-l)] - e(t) x
S*(t-1) x [s(t) - s(t-1)] + [e(t) - e(t-1)] x
FEP'(t-l,t-l)
5.
The official benchmark exchange rate (MUC) is the accounting rate
used by the CRB for the inti valuation of foreign exchange
assets/liabilities. However, actual transactionstake place at a set of
premia and discounts on it. Other transactionstake place at the rate of
the Mesa de Negociacion (MN). These rates constitutethe basic system of
multiple exchange ra'.esat which trade and capital transactionstake place.
In order to estimate directly FES arising from multiple exchange rates the
other items of equation (4), that is, changes in the dollar valuation of
gold and SDR's, and the revaluationof the net foreign exchange position
due to domestic devaluations,must be estimated. Annex Table 3.1 reports
estimates for each of these items and the resulting direct estimate of FES
based on equation (4):
-20-
Tabl- $-Is
DIRECTESTIMATE
OF FOREIGN
EXCHANGE
SUBSIDIES
(inmillon lntl.)
6,012
C. Revaluation
of SDR's
liabilities
vie a via
tha USs
c/
tE(t)x S*(t-1)x (s(t)
4,878 2,870
-618
g(t-1))J
185
-366
-2,045
23,011
3806
1040
88a
687
180
722
2,498
211
-7,528
749
14,626
-(t-l))]
D. Revaluation
of foreign
exchangeposition(FEP)
due to devaluations
of
the officialexchange
rated/
-8,a89 -1,479
[(e(t)- *(t-1))x FEP'(t-1,t-I)]
E. ForeignExchange
Subsidy(FES)
W88
2,611 2,183
-646
[E = A + 8 - C e D] from equation
(4)
a/
Source: NoteSomenal(various
numbers)and *Subgerencia
del
SectorMoneterlo'
of Cha.
Financial
Losses
6.
The QFD is also composed of financial,or interest rate, losses.
As it was mentioned before these losses derive from the fact that the CRB
has an average return on its assets smaller than the average cost of its
funds. Financial losses are measured with precision by the sub-account
"Costo por Regulacion de Exceso de Liquidez" of the CRB account "Otras
Cuentas Netas". Table 3.2 reports both estimates of financial losses (the
change in value of the sub-account "Costo por Regulacion de Exceso de
Liquidez") and foreign exchange subsidies (derived in Table 3.1). Their
sum, QFD, is also reported in Annex Table 3.2 (in nominal terms, in real
-21-
86-II
1986
86-I
86-II
1988
87-I
87-II
1,7683
4,337
6,100
749
14,626
16,874
1987
A. Financial
Losses l/
-mlt. I7.
899
899
1,641
8,783
5,874
B. Foreign
Exchange
Subsidyb/
-mil.I/.
869
2,611
2,879
2,188
-646
1,688
C.QuaiFiscal
D etict
A+B
-mil. I/.
868
3,410
8,778
3,824
8,188
7,012
2,612
18,962
21,474
-U ODP
0.2
1.7
1.8
0.3
2.6
2.8
Memorandum
Item:
Nominal CDP
-nil. 1/.
1.9
199,846
1.0
0.8
881,022
Notes. a/
Si
Source:
C.
760,168
7.
In order to provide a double check of the previous estimates, an
additional exercise was carried out. In this exercise: a) foreign exchange
subsidies were calculated through comparing buying and selling exchange
rates of the foreign exchange transactions of the CRB; and b) financial
losses, through comparison of interest rates applicable to CRB's financial
assets and liabilities.
Foreign Exchange Subsidies (FES)
8.
Ideally, if the volume of purchases of foreign exchange by the CRB
equalled the volume of sales, FES could be calculated by subtracting the
weighted average exchange rate of all purchases from the weighted average
exchange rate of all sales, and multiplying that difference by the volume
of purchases (or sales). In general, though, the volume of purchases
differs from the volume of sales, i.e. the CRB either accumulates or draws
down foreign exchange reserves. In this case, a convenient procedure to
calculate FES is to select a :^eferenceor accounting exchange rate. The
measurement of FES will of course vary with the choice made of the
reference exchange rate. The reference rate may be, for example, the
average historic cost of foreign reserves, some sort of market average
exchange rate or, as in the case of the CRB, the official MUC exchange
rate.
-22-
9.
where: P
S
e
ep
es
is
is
is
is
is
the
the
the
the
the
x S
volume of purchases
volume of sales
reference exchange rate
purchase price of foreign exchange
selling price of foreign exchange
i.e. FES arise whenever the CRB buys foreign exchange at a price above the
reference exchange rate, or sells foreign exchange at a price belnw the
reference exchange rate. If the first term is positive (the second term is
negative) the CRB is purchasing (selling) foreign exchange above the
reference price, and is therefore making a loss (gain). Thus, if both the
purchase and selling price are above the reference exchange rate there will
be FES if the first term is larger than the second one. Note that if the
volume of sales equals the volume of purchases, the previous formula
becomes the product of the volume of transactions and the difference
between the purchase and sale exchange rates.
10.
The indirect estimate of FES performed here is based on equation
(5). To facilitate comparisons with the direct estimate of FES obtained in
the previous section, the accounting exchange rate used by the CRB (that
is, the KUC rate) was chosen as the reference exchange rate.
11.
The indirect estimate of FES provided here measures only FES
originated: in import and export transactions and in CRB direct purchases
of foreign exchange from residents in the open market. Due to the lack of
data any other balance of payment transaction are excluded. Hence, the
calculation here is only partial and it is conducted to identify the main
items that explain FES, but in no way are meant to challenge the direct
estimates of the previous section. Based on equation 5, total FES were
calculated as the difference between the sum of items a) to c) below:
a)
b)
C)
-23-
12.
The indirect estimate of FES, and the correspondingdata employed,
are reported in Annex Table 3-3. It can be seen that FES in this
calculation differ considerablyfrom the direct estimates of FES performed
in the previous section. This may be due, apart from the omissions
mentioned above, to the lack of proper weighted average exchange rates for
items a) to c) as well as to the lack of a reliable figure of CRB purchases
of foreign exchange to residents.
Table 8.8: INDIRECTECTIMATE
OF FOREIGNEXCHANGESUBSIDIES
86-II 1986
87-I
87-II
1987
788
3. Purchaseo
to
Residentsa/
861
361
395
82
477
88
202
238
0.96
0.64
2.77
6.73
4.76
4.28
3.39
-0.03 0.13
0.06
0.32
5. Imports
0.00
0.04
0.02 0.17
1.08 0.62
2.60
8. Purchases
Residents
0.00
8.46
1.72
.46
5
3.8
6.40
398
86.8
22.80 13.80
C. ForeignExchangeSubsidies(FES)b/
7. Exports (1x4)
-46
198
163
8. Imports (2x6)
-33
-33
-46
186
120
9. ForeignTrade (7 + 8)
10.Purchases
to
Residents(3 x 6)
11.TotalFES
(9 + 10)
-as X GDP
Memorandum
Item:
NominalGDP
(millionof Intis)
199,845
-808
-96
173
2,011 2,184
300 1,863
194
4,601 4,696
381,022
a' Corresponds
to the CR8 accounts:Captacion
de Excedentes
de la BancaountilJuly
1987;and *Comprasa Residentes'
thereafter.
b/ FES originated
exclusively
in tradetransactions,
purchases
to residents
and
redemption
of reserverequirements
on foreigncurrencydeposits.
760,166
Source:Note Semanal(various
numbers)and "Subgerencia
del SectorExterno'(CRB).
-24-
Financial
Losses
13.
The indirect estimate of financial losses of the CRB was obtained
subtracting total interest paynmentsreceived on its assets from total
interests paid on its liabilities:
(6) FIL = i(l) x L - i(a) x A
wheres FIL
14.
The CRB receives interest on its credit to the financial and
public sectors and on its net internationalreserves, and it pays interest
on deposits of the financial institutionsin the CRB (primarilyreserve
requirementsof commercialbanks). To measure interests received and paid
by the CRB the following interest rates were imputed.
Returns
on CRB's Assets
a)
b)
-25-
c)
On currency in circulation:zero.
b)
c)
15.
The data employed and the indirect estimate of CRB financial
losses (FIL) are reported in Annex Table 3.4. The indirect estimate of FIL,
based on equation (6), is equal to the sum of the product of average stocks
of liabilitiesand their correspondinginterest rates (accordingto para.
14) minus the sum of the product of average stocks of assets and their
correspondinginterest rates.
-26-
Table8:
INDIRECTESTIMATEOF FINANCIALLOSSES
Stocks of:
1986-I
1985-I
1966-I
1986-II
1987-I
1967-11
-862 -1,231
6,803 7,608
16,844 19,318
978
6,007
10,723 16,376
16,686 12,962
18,148
28,109
6,987
1,426
7,898 17,811
21,366 24,363
a3,374
8,463
8,926
b) Liabilities
4. LegalReservesof Fin.
Systemin Domestic
Currency
S. LegalReservesof Fin.
SystemIn Foreign
Currency
5,998
4,192
3,842
4,998
21.4%
95.6%
22.6%
32.3%
13.3%
18.2%
9.2%
14.9%
13.3%
14.9%
10.4%
19.3%
9.3%
7.6%
f.2%
8.4%
16.0%
101.2%
8.3%
37.8%
37.8%
37.8%
31.2%
19.3%
9.3%
6.2%
4.1%
8.1%
6.3%
b) Liabilities
9. LegalReservesin
Dom. Currency
10.LegalReservesin
ForeignCurrency
.65%
C. Financial
Losse measuredas:
(1/2)x[(4)x(9)+(6)x(10)-(1)x(6)-(2)x(7)-(3)x(8)]
a/
1985-I 1986-II 1986 1986-I1986-II 1986
11. Financial
Losses
-mill. I/.
-as % GDP
Note:NominalGDP
-mil.I/.
451
0.4
1987-I1987-II 1987
1.6
1.9
199,845
1.2
0.9
2.1
0.6
0.5
381,022
Sources:NoteSemanal(various
numbers)for sectionA; and "SubgerencIa
del
SectorMonstarlol
and *Superintendencia
de Bancoy Seguros"(CRB)
for sectionB.
1.0
760,168
-27-
- 28 -
ANNEX4
1.
The modificationsintroduced in the past three years reduced the
number of taxes that composes the Central Government revenues. Minor taxes
were either derogated or transferred to the responsibilityof the local
governments. A major reform was introduced in income tax following
recommendationsto broaden its base and reduce exemptions. In addition,
special taxes on assets revaluationand the capitalizationof profits were
derogated. In turn, taxes on the holding or transfer of property
(includingvehicles and on gambling)were transferred to the municipal
sphere). A description of the main components of the present system
follows.
A.
Income Taxes
- 29 -
Under the personal income tax, all incomes derived frcm activities
7.
not covered by the corporate income tax are taxed. Taxpayers (except in
the case of Category 5 incomes)may choose among two alternativesfor
estimating the advanced payments (pagos a cuenta):
(a) duodecimos (one-twelfth)of the tax due in the
previous year; and
- 30 -
Rates (Percent)
15
20
25
33
41
50
60
72
72
8
10
12
16
20
25
31
38
45
9.
Deductions from gross income are made in the form of credits
against the tax. The most important deductions--thelimits are shown in
parenthesis--are: basic exemption (4 UIT); special deduction for labor
income of Categories 4 and 5 (3 UIT); family allowances (2 UIT per capita);
donations (10 percent of net income); insurance premiums (50 percent of one
UIT); and health expenses (3 UIT). These rules imply that the head of a
household composed of four people (wife and two children) who gets only
salaried income (Category5) were exempted from the income tax in 1987 if
his annual income were below the level 5.7 minimum wages.
10.
15.4
45.0
45.0
- 31 -
B. PropertyTaxes
CorporateNet-WorthTax
11.
The base of this tax is the net worth of privateand public
enterprises,
definedas the differencebetweenassetsand liabilities.The
coverageof this tax is similarto the profittax,but the numberof
exemptionsis broader(seebelow). The proportionof each company'sasset
that representsparticipation
in the capitalof other corporations
are not
includedin the tax base. The tax is paid in four quotas--the
firstthree
along the fiscalyear, and the last in March of the followingyear-togetherwith the presentation
of the legalstatements.Prepayments
are
based on past year'sliabilities
accordingto the followingscale:
- first quota
- second quota
- third quota
40 percent
50 percent
60 percent
Percent
1.0
2.5
13.
Exemptions.Agriculture
and agroindustry,
silviculture
and other
activitiesrelatedproductionof animalfishingand vegetalgoods for human
consumption
are exempt. Also exemptedare: manufacturing
industries
locatedin the Selvaand Frontera;educational
and culturalcenters;small
mining (under5,000metric tons of annualproduction);
tourism(for
enterprises
locatedout of Lima and Callao);publicutilities(waterand
sewage,electricity,
telecommunications,
etc.). Partialexemptionsare
grantedto manufacturing
firmslocatedout of Lima (50 percent)and Callao
(37.5percent). Large-and medium-sized
mining companiesalso get a 30
percentreductionon this tax. The municipalreal state tax and the
vehicletax generatescreditagainstthe net-worthtax.
PersonalPropertyTax
14.
This tax was introducedin 1988 as part of the 'ProgramaTrienal"
fiscalmeasures. The tax base includesrealestate,motor vehicles,
financialassets,bank deposits,piecesof art and race horses. Market
values,whereverpossible,shouldbe consideredfor assessingtotaltaxable
property. Debts incurredin the purcheseof any item can be deductedin
the processof establishing
the base of the tax. The detailedrulesand
regulations
for collectingthis tax were stillunder preparation
as of
April 1988.
15.
32
Percent
Up to 200 UIT
1
2
3
Over 3,500UIT
16.
Deductions. The shareof the corporation
net-worthtax
represented
by titlesin possessionof individuals
may be deductedin the
processof computingthe individualpropertytax liabilities.Taxes paid
on real estateand motor vehiclesmay also be consideredas anticipated
payments(Ipagoca cuental)againstthe tax. The tax shallbe paid in four
quotasaccordingto the rulesappliedto the corporation
propertytax.
C. DomesticTaxeson Productionand Consumption
GeneralSales Tax (IGV)
17.
This tax is leviedon salesof domesticproducedand imported
goodsand serviceson a value-added
basis. The generalrulesestablisha
standardprocedurefor appraisingliabilities
throughthe balancingof
debts (on sales)and credit (on purchases).In the case of imports,debts
are based on the CIF value plus
- 33
21.
Rates. The rates vary according to the nature of the product, the
highest one being applied to cigarettes. Table 4.1 provides a detailed
breakdown of the rate structure of this tax (general gcods) and Table 4.2
rates fsi-fuels.
22.
Exemptions. The sale of fuels to ENATRU, EPSEP, Instituto del
Mar, cement producers in the Department of Puno and the Armed Forces are
exempted from the ISC. Also exempted are the sale of taxed products when
made by firms located in the regions of Selva and Frontera (except for
cigarettes and combustibles). Imports for communicationactivities (radio
and television) are also exempted.
Other Taxes on Services
23.
There exists a handful of minor taxes on services that are not
significant from the revenue viewpoint. These are:
(a) Tax on foreign trips - Peruvian residents
travelling abroad are required to pay a US$100 tax
per trip (employeesof internationaltransportation
companies, as well as those crossing borders and
those living in frontier zones are exempted).
(b) Tax on the purchase of internationalair tickets Peruvian residentswho travel with tickets bought
out of the Country are subjected to a tax of 14
percent double the basic rate applied to sales of
air tickets within the Country. (The basic tax is
part of the ISC.)
(c) Tax on the expedition of passports - Peruvians are
required to pay a tax equivalent to US$55 each time
they ask for a passport (diplomatsare exempt and
students have lower rates).
(d) Special tax on consumption of electricity - The
rates applied to the value of the monthly bills are
10 percent for consumptionsbelow 150 kwh, and 25
percent for higher levels of consumption.
Exemptions are granted for Governmentalagencies
(of all levels), universitiesand other educational
activities, and foreign legations. Only 20 percent
of the proceeds from this tax is included in the
general budget, the other 80 percent is earmarked
to Electroperu.
(e) Tax on the buying and sale of foreign currency Applied on foreign currency transactionswhen
related to expozts or imports, except those of the
Central Bank. The rate is 1 percent.
34 -
Import Taxes
24.
Custom Duties. Applied on an "ad-valorem"basis to the CIF value
of the imports of goods in general. A detailed descriptton of these is
provided in Chapter III, Section B. There are a countless number of
exemptions and special provisions, the most important granted to the
Government, diplomatics,primary production, and some branches of the
manufacturingand service industries (cement,radio and telecommunications,
etc.). A list of the main beneficiariesof these exemptionswith the
estimated values for 1986 presented in StatisticalAnnex Table 5.6.
25.
Surcharges. A rate of 17 percent on the CIF value of imports is
applied as a surcharge. Goods exempt from the basic duties are also
exempted from the surcharge. Another surcharge earmarked to the ICE (7
percent)was institutedas of December 1987.
26.
Minimum Duty ("ArancelMinimo"). Applied to the import of goods
for which the basic duty is zero. The rate of 1 percent was raised to 5
percent in December 1987. The only exemptions are books, magazines and
other goods imported for universities.
27.
Consular Fees. Imposed on documents or certificates issued by
Peruvian diplomaticmissions. The rates are fixed values and vary
according to the subject of the document.
28.
Peru-ColombiaSpecial Agreement. The special agreement allows for
a preferential treatment of goods to be used along the3common border.
E. Export Taxes
29.
Taxes on Traditional Exports are apnlied to the FOB value of these
exports. The most important goods subjected to these taxes are minerals,
oil, coffee, sugar, fish and cotton-derivedproducts. There is a basic tax
plus surchargesbased on the same rules. The rates vary according to the
nature of the good and the fluctuationof internationalprices. Annex
Table 4.3 provides the rate structure for 1987.
- 35 -
Cigarettes
Cheaper Cigarettes
Beer
Wine
Whisky
Rum
Brandy, Vermouth
Cider
Soft Drinks
1986
1987
March 1988
-____-------Percent--------------
145
75
56
18
40
24
18
32
24
205
75
100
18
120
77
98
78
70
300
150
200
35
250
120
250
120
150
Mineral Waters
Fruit Juices
--
46
34
50
--
Cosmetics
Vehicles
- Categories Al, A2, A3 and C
32
34
80
50
18
48
120
50
107
300
Yacht
Leather Goods
Tapestry
Caviar
Crystal Luminaries
Crystal Decorative Goods
Air Conditioner
Dishwashers
Color TV
Sound and Video Apparatus
Pearls, Diamonds and Jewels
Precious Metal-CoveredPens
50
32
40
40
102
53
55
55
300
100
200
200
--
30
100
18
18
24
10
18
40
40
34
34
36
10
34
55
70
100
100
150
25
150
200
200
10
14
--
15
22
--
Insurance
International Air Tickets
Rental Movies
House Rentals
10
14
10
10
14
10
5
--
- Categories A4
----
- 36 -
Products
1987
January
February
April
DS.025-87-EF DS.070-87-EF
1988
July
January
March
DS.149-87-EF DS.01S-88-EF DS.082-88-EF
Govoline96
Costa-Sierra
211.90
208.40
206.60
208.80
198.60
876.88
Gasoline84
Costa-Sierra
Slva
211.20
184.80
200.90
127.80
202.80
129.20
208.10
129.40
190.70
120.10
286.68
286.66
DomesticKerosone
Costa-Siorra
Solve
48.90
68.60
Industrial
Kerosene
Costa-Sierra
148.10
Selva
182.70
Oran Ulner;a
1e6.00
DieselI
Costa-Sierra
Oran Mineria
DieselII
Costa-Sierra
Se l v
Oran Mlneria
Residual5
Costo-Sierra
Oran Mineria
Residual6
Costa-Sierra
87.60
46.80
187.80
127.60
37.90
46.50
128.40
114.80
186.60
180.00
129.00
118.60
104.50
'29.00
127.00
200.60
209.62
99.18
121.40
109.00
186.00
90.60
80.10
217.78
227.78
48.84
48.84
81.48
144.00
Solva
100.00
99.18
Oran Mineria
141.00
106.86
LiquidGas
100.60
Source: INP-DOPE-DSP.
68.10
69.00
- 37 -
Products
Traditional
Exports Tax
Additional
Ad-Valorem
Ad-Valorem
FOB
Surcharge
Special Tax
Fish Meal
5.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
3.0
Cotton
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Sugar
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
3.0
Coffee
0.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
3.0
Oil
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
Mining
2.6
0.0
00
0.0
3.0
Source: INP-DGPE-DSP.
- 38 -
ANNEX5
MISALIGNMENTOF PRICES AND TARIFFS OF STATE ENTERPRISESs
A PRELIMINARYCALCULATION
1.
In this annex, an attempt is made to estimate the revenue losses
of state enterprises as a result of lagging output prices controlled and
kept unrealisticallylow by the Government. An accurate calculation would
require detailed knowledge of the General Equilibrium level of prices and
tariffs, i.e. prices that reflect the opportunitycost (border price for
tradeable goods or the long run marginal cost for services not traded
internationally). However, this clearly falls beyond the scope of the
current study, therefore here a tentative and preliminary approach is
followed based on the follcwing methodology:
(i) the five most important public enterprises in terms of
forgone revenues due to price controls were selected:
Petroperu,Electroperu,ENCI (marketingof agricultural
products and inputs), ECASA (rice marketing) and ENATRU.
Although ENTEL (telecommunications)
also suffered significant
revenue losses, it had to be excludeu because of the
complexity of its tariff structure;
(ii) for all these companies, a calculationwas made on the
difference between the actual 1987 revenue and the revenue
that companies would have achieved, had their output prices
and tariffs been increased according to the rate of
inflation,i.e. parallel with the increase of the consumer
price index. Table 5.1 shows the lag of the price and tariff
increases of the relevant goods and services compared to the
CPI. As we can see from Table 5.1 this lag reached in many
cases up to 60-65 percent of the real July 1985 price by the
end of 1987 and the situation has, in some cases, worsened
further by early 1988. Table 5.2 shows the gap between the
real revenues and the revenues that the companies would have
rece.lvedif their 1985 prices would have been increased
according to CPI.
- 39 -
July
1986
Dec.
1985
hO.OO
100.00
100.00
107.11
107.24
67.75
100.00
100.86
100.72
Dec.
1986
Average
Price1967
Jan.
198
Maoch
1966
August
1988
65.84
59.09
29.57
41.16
43.11
19.78
45.82
52.00
30.92
32.28
87.04
22.08
28.37
36.88
11.47
23.06
8.87
23.81
3.77
16.60
16.48
16.70
15.56
24.86
Petrolgum
Products
Gasoline84
Gasoline96
Kerosenedomestic
KerooeneIndustrial
DleselOil 1
DieselOil 2
Residual6
Residual8
Liquifled
gas
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.42
100.82
100.83
93.13
66.76
86.83
41.69
56.72
56.72
56.41
66.66
86.S6 22.91
22.98
23.14
22.04
23.11
21.88
55.89
86.74
86.97
33.60
22.31
19.84
66.91
Electricity
Public
Residenbial
Industriol
Commercial
Generaluse
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
78.33
86.45
88.03
81.69
62.20
59.28
64.68
60.80
64.16
47.70
83.s8
82.40
78.16
62.92
82.23
76.97
87.43
69.54
70.42
68.79
64.99
86.44
38.61
63.80
46.49
TotalGeneral
100.00
87.40
63.89
68.0!
66.08
41.17
66.32
79.23
63.86
36.71
84.61
54.67
26.78
90.18
72.38
57.88
90.03
49.20
n.a.
86.26
49.22
47.23
93.86
90.60
42.07
41.16
31.23
78.33
74.29
33.62
31.26
19.62
82.46
80.73
32.32
23.46
18.99
103.6S
99.70
27.28
10.67
14.26
46.68
44.94
12.46
RIce
Standard
Integral
Superior
100.00
100.00
100.00
82.53
81.99
37.76
68.79
Productsmarketed
throughENCI
Wheat
Fertilizers
Corn
Sorghum
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
Soya Oil
100.00
80.18
78.93
80.18
80.18
80.18
Bus fares
100.00
103.74
68.01
85.89
67.08
63.03
66.28
98.22
83.86
81.6s
77.42
64.95
47.74
- 40 -
(1)
(2)
Sales
Average
Price In
In
1967
Phjrysica
395.1
Oseoline85
70.9
Kerosensdomestic
Korceena international
Inti/g%l
gel.
Ousoline 84
Revenue In
()
l(X 4)
15,903
6,864
48.23
3,419
1.398
1,212
13.29
4,097
2,885
308.3
8.93
15.7
9.12
Oil 2
510.6
13.36
Residual5
23.3
11.40
Residual 6
458.0
11.20
69.4
7.17
Totel
143
32.14
506
44
37.17
118
74
36.45
18,612
11,791
68n21
266
5,130
498
31.02
724
30.29
13,874
21.34
1,482
25,174
Unit-
899
636
458
8,744
984
33,561
4.4
11.433
4,129
0.5
2,070
(Ints/MWH)
(Inti/MlH)
OWH
8,125
7,304
1,407
Unit: tons
(Inti/tons)
Standard
571,149
6,823
3,896
10,445
5,966
Superior
144,297
9,979
1,439
12,595
1,817
(Inti/ton)
378
2,448
RCI
(Inti/tone)
1,156
3,885
8,166
9,440
5,555
547
2.650
1,449
8,486
4,461
3,012
676
5,042
3,408
6,605
465
1,057
Sorghbm
23
4,588
105
6,176
142
Soyt Oil
85
9,864
838
29,427
Corn
Total
Ll
(Inti/ton)
3,361
Fertilizers
47.498
0.3
Unit:
(000 tons)
Wheat
Revenue
(DP percentage)
Inti/gel
40.25
Disel
(Rice)
(7)
Las
(5 - 8)
2,021
13.71
ECA
Revenue
9,039
3.2
Total
lntl-
28.50
Oil 1
ELECTRQPERU
Price In
1/.
(6)
Lost
22.88
Oisel
gsa
(t)
Potential
Unit:
million
Liquified
(4)
1967
mIllion
(1X2)
Units
PETROPE_
(a)
if
2,501
98,960
37
1,663
11,324
1.5
51,462
6.7
the nominal price of each product had been increasedat the rate of consumer
- 41 -
ANNEX6
THE WORKINGOF THE "MESADE NEGOCIACION'
OF FOREIGNEXCHANGrCERTIFICATES
1.
Mesa de Negociacion.
The so-calledMesa de Negociacion
de
Certificados
Bancariosen McnedaExtranjera(MA)was introducedin August
1987 in the hope of attractingdot.estically
held foreignexchange
(including
the considerable
revenuesfrom illegalexports)to the formal
bankingsector,afterthe legalfreemarketwas abolished. This has not
been very successful,
however,becauseof the access restrictions
imposed
and the manner in which the MN is operated. All except incorporated
businesses
have accessto the MN on the supplyside,and may supplythe
foreignexchangethat does not have to be burrendered
to the CentralBank.
The incomingforeignexchangeis depositedin a foreignexchangeaccountat
a participating
domesticbank and a Certificado
Bancarioen Moneda
Extranjerais issued,which earnsan interestrate of LIBOR - 1 percent.
This is the actualinstrumenttradedon the MN. The initialsupplyof CD
was the outsta.nding
stockof foreigncurrencydeposits,which, as it was
mentionedbeforewere declaredinconvertible
to foreignexchangein August
1985. On the demandside,accessto participatein the MN is also limited.
In practice,the participants
allowedto bid on the marketare travelers
goingabroad,domesticimportersthat have receivedan importlicensebut
eitherexceededtheir foreignexchangebudgetallocationor were
automatically
referredto the MN, and firmsor individuals
wishingto hold
the CDs as a savinginstrument.Touristsare chargeda 25 percenttax over
the MN rateon their foreignexchangepurchases. Other serviceimporters
may receiveforeignexchangefrom the CentralBank, quotedat the rate
determinedon the MN, but thoseimportersdo not submitbids that could
influencethe market rate. Moreover,the CDs are not automatically
redeemablein foreignexchange. Rather,to obtainforeignexchangethe
holderof the CD must presentan importlicenseor a foreignexchange
license(in the case of services)togetherwith the corresponding
invoices.
2.
As for the auctionmechanismitself,the MN is operatedin the
followingmanner:potentialbuyersand sellersof foreignexchangesubmit
sealedbids and offers. The marketsoperatesfivedays a week. The
managingofficialsat the CentralBank subsequently
eliminateall offers
above the highestbid and all bids below the lowestoffer. Then the
highestpricedbids are pairedoff with the highestoffers,and so on down
the line untileitherdemandor supplyis exhausted. This means that the
sellersof foreignexchangecapturethe consumersurplusfrom the buyers,
similarto a Dutch auction,only that the totalvolumeof transactions
is
not known beforehand.The ratequotedon the MN representsthe average
weightedprice of all transactions
made and is publishedthe next day. The
dailyvolumeof transactions
on the MN representsthe averageweighted
price of all transactions
made and is publishedthe next day. The daily
volumeof transactions
on the MN has been on the orderof US$1.0- 1.2
million. The CentralBank could,but reportedly
has not intervenedin the
MN so far as a buyer or seller. It does,however,controlthe exchange
rate determinedin t.hismarketby limitedaccessand not acceptingbids and
offersabovea pre-specified
rate so thac the closingMN exchangerate
attainsthe leveltargetedby the authorities.The rate,however,has been
allowedto move to higher levelssinceDecember1987,and the ratehas
moved from about 40 Intis/US$then to above 70 by March 1988.
- 42 -
ANNEX7
1.
The organized Peruvian financial system comprises the banking subsystem, the non-banking sub-systemand capital markets.
2.
The Banking Sub-System. The banking sub-system,which in 1987
accounted for 84 percent of the stock of credit provided by the financial
system and 90 percent of the stock financial liquidity, is composed of:
(i)
(ii)
- 43
3.
The Non-Banking Sub-System.The non-banking sub-system,whose
share in total financial savings has been growing in the last three years,
accounted in 1987 for 16 percent of the total stock of credit and captured
one-fifth of the total stock of financial deposits. It is composed of:
(i)
- 44 -
- 45
Table 7.1
1. Commercial Banks
I. Banking SubSystem
- Banco Agrario
2. Development Banks - Banco Industrial
(Banca de Fomento) - Banco Minero
- Banco Hipotecario
- Banco de la Vivienda
3. National Bank
(Banco Nacion)
4. Central Reserve Bank
1. Financial DevelopmentCorporation
(COFIDE)
2. Financial Firms
(Financieras)
II. Non-Banking
Sub-System
III.CapitalMarkets
1. Stock Exchange
5.
Unorganized Financial Markets. This encompasses all financial
transactionsthat take place outside the organized or formal financial
system described above. Preliminary and rough estimates suggest that
unorganized markets might have been in recent years as important as the
organized financial system in terms of the volume of financial
transactions. There are three types of markets in the unorganized
financial system: (i) equity raised outside the stock exchange; (ii)
suppliers'credit; and (iii) lending by irformals (informal intermediaries
pe9rse'. Although the available data is conjectural and not truly
- 46 -
47
ANNEX8
POPULATION,INCOME DISTRIBUTIONAND LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION
A. DemographicTrends
1.
Populationand Age Structure. Peru'spopulation,now (1987)
numberingmore than 20 millionpeople,will grow to more than 22 millionin
1990. The averageannual rate of growth of populationis estimatedat 2.5
percentfor the five-yearperiod between1985 and 1990 (Table8.1). The
populationis distributedamong the country'sthreemajor regionsas
follows:
Coast
Sierra
Selva
52.1 percent
36.9 percent
11.0 percent
2.
Forty percentof the populationare less than 15 years old and
four percentare 65 or more, leaving56 percent in the 'workingages' of
15-64. The dependencyrate,now 77 dependents(youngand old) per 100
persons in the workingages, will fall to 66 at the end of the century,as
the age structureundergochangesassociatedwith projecteddeclinesin
both the birth and death rates (Table8.2). Changes in the dependency
rate, at leastwithin Peru's prospectiveranges,will have a wholly
positiveeffect on potentialdevelopment,sincc they imply that a higher
proportionof the populationwill be in the working ages and a
correspondinglower proportionwill be childrenand old people, for whom
economicdependencyis customaryand sociallydesirable.
Table 8.1: POPULATION
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
Population a/
7,633
8,671
9,931
11,467
13,193
15,161
17,295
19,697
22,332
25,123
27,952
30,746
22,479
36,125
38,647
41,007
Rate of Growth b/
2.59 percent
2.75 percent
2.92 percent
2.84 percent
2.82 percent
2.67 percent
2.64 percent
2.54 percent
2.38 percent
2.16 percent
1.92 percent
1.72 percent
1.53 percent
1.36 percent
1.19 p'ercent
Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Population
19,697
20,207
20,727
21,256
21,791
22,332
a/ In thousands
b/ Averageannual rates during five-yearperiodsending that year.
Source: InstitutoNacionalde Estadistica(INE). "Proyecciones
de
poblacion". BoletinEspecialNo, 10, pp. 65-66
- 48 -
3.
Vital Rates. Birth rates have fallen from the mid-40's per 1,000
in the 1970's to about 35 at present (Table 8.2). A further decline to 26
is officially projected for the year 2000 although these estimates are
sensitive to changes in economic conditions and in the effectivenessof
family planning campaigns. The total fertility rate (number of children
per mother) now averages 4.5, having fallen from 5.6 in 1975. Consistent
with the decline in the birth rate, decreases in the total fertility rate
to 3.3 have been projected for the year 2000.
Year
Dependency
Rate a/
1975
1980
1985
1987
1990
1995
2000
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
77
75
71
66
Fertility
CBR b/ TFR c/
39.4
37.9
37.9
n.a.
32.8
29.5
26.4
Infant
Mortality Mortality
Life
CDR d/
Rate e/ Expectancy f/
5.6
5.2
4.7
4.5
4.2
3.7
3.3
12.2
11.3
10.1
9.4
8.3
7.1
6.3
107
101
93
88
81
70
62
56.5
57.8
60.2
61.4
63.4
66.1
68.1
b/
c/
d/
e/
f/
4.
If the decline actually occur--and it is too early to assess its
plausibility--thepressures on social spending, especially in formal
education,would be lessened. Current standards could be achievedwith
lower expenditures relative to GDP. More desirable,broader coverage and
higher quality of state-supportededucation could be achieved with current
real expendituresas a proportionof GDP, given the expected decline in the
proportion of the popunlation
in the cehool ages.
49 -
5.
Mortality rates have also fallen. At present, the crude death
rate is 9.4 per 1,000, having declined from 12.2 in 1975. It is expected
to reach 6.3 at the turn of the century. Declines in the crude death rate
reflect improvementsin overall health conditionsas well as changes in the
age distribution of the population. Rapid population growth leads to a
younger population. More formally, the rapid rate of population growth has
been accompanied by a set of birth and death rates that concentrate the age
distributionof the population in age groups where the probabilityof
mortality is lowest--thatis, among the young.
6.
More significant than the crude death rate in interpreting
improvements in social welfare are the infant mortality rate and life
expectancy at b4.rth. Infant mortality now shows an overall average of 88.2
infant deaths per 1,000 live births, having fallen from 107 in 1975 (Table
8.2).
7.
These figures motivate three comments. First, the decline in
infant mortality has occurred during a period in which the most optimistic
hopes for Peruvian developmenthave been largely frustrated. Improvements
'n infant mortality appear therefore to relate more directly to the size
and effectivenessof expendituresdevoted to public health and to
inexpensive imported techniquesof death control among infants rather than
to robust economic development. Second, the rates are still excruciatingly
high by internationalstandards. Many Latin American countries with
similar per capita incomes have mobilized health services that effectively
generate rates oe-half or even on.e-third
the size of Peru's infant
mortality. And third, the nationwide average in infant mortality obscures
a distressing variation in the indicator among different regions. Some
Andean provinces suffered infant mortality rates in excess of 180 per 1,000
in 1981, a year in which the average rate was 87 and in which some
provinces in coastal Peru had rates of 50 or less.
8.
Life expectancy at birth has risen from 56.5 years in 1975 to 61.4
years at present. Further increases to 68.1 by the year 2000 are expected
(Table 8.2).
9.
Labor Force ParticipationRates. During the period since 1970,
labor force participationrates of men have declined while those of women
have increased. Year-to-yearchanges have not been monotonic (Table 8.3).
Nevertheless,the overall decline in male participationrates is consistent
with increases in school attendance ratios, while higher female
participationin metropolitanLima reflects (i) worldwide changes in
attitudes about the role of women in the labor force; and (ii) the lower
labor costs associatedwith women's lower wages.
- 50 -
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Men
80
73
76
74
69
72
72
n.a.
74
Women
38
35
40
36
37
37
40
n.a.
50
Note: Labor force participationrates are shown for persons aged 15 and
over
Source: Ministry of Labor, Boletin Mensual de Empleo, No.16, April 1987.
10.
Changes since the early 1980s deserve further comment. Focussing
on the Lima metropolitanarea, the labor force participationof men over 15
years of age reversed its longer term decline and actually rose from 69
percent in 1982 to 74 percent ir.1986. For women, the increasewhich
occurred after 1981 was faster than the earlier increases. While in 1981,
36 percent of womernin Lima were members of the labor force, the proportion
had risen to 50 percent by 1986.
11.
Higher participationrates mean that the labor force is growing at
a rate faster than the population. The labor force grew at an average
annual rate of 2.7 percent between 1981 and 1987, a period during which the
populationwas growing at a rate of 2.6 percent. Needless to say, in a
poor labor-surpluseconomy fast growth in the labor force may do more harm
than good. The maintenance of capital labor ratios would necessitate
greater savings and investment. Higher government outlays for social
services might also be required. In the absence of these conditions a fall
in real wages intensifiespoverty, unemployment rises, and per capita
social services deteriorate.
B.
- 51 -
13.
Engel's Law suggests that as income increases,the absolute
expenditures for food rise at the same time that their proportion in total
expenditures falls. Peravian data are consistentwith both halves of the
law. Thus inequalityin food consumption is less marked than in
expendituresoverall. Peruvians in the top expendituredecile, for
example, spend "only" 11 times as much food per capita as those in the
bottom decile (9 times, adjusted for adult equivalents).2/
14.
Comparing the expenditures,adjusted for adult equivalents,of two
groups of the poorest citizenswith the rest of the population allows a
bird's eye view of these importantmeasures of welfare.
Total Exp.
Poorest 10 percent
Poorest 30 percent
Remaining 70 percent
2.0 percent
9.9 percent
90.1
Food Exp.
2.7 percent
12.9 percent
87.1 percent
15.
Rural Poverty. Geographicaldisaggregationis necessary to
comprehend fully the nature of Peruvian poverty and under development.
While macroeconomicmodels provide useful insights, they also divert
attention from important regional and sectoral patterns.
16.
The Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study provides useful data
on the regional distributionof poverty. In 1985-86, 31 percent of the
population lived in rural districts of the Sierra. Among the poorest ten
percent of Peruvians nearly double that proportion (60 percent) were found
there.3/ Table 8.4 contains additional details that make clear the
concentrationof poverty in the Andes.
17.
These findings are further supported by research performed by the
Instituto Nacional de Planificacionon social and economic indicatorsof
poverty at the level of 153 Peruvian provinces. Of 42 provinces in the
impacted Trapecio Andino, 33 fall into the strata showing the worst
indicatorsof poverty.4/ These provinces are overwhelminglyrural. They
depend on subsistenceagriculture practiced on tiny plots. These minifarms
lack physical and financial inputs in the form of mechanical power,
fertilizers,purchased seeds, and credit.
Table 8.4:
Lima
Urban Coast
Sierra
Selva
Rural Coast
Sierra
Selva
Total
52 -
Poorest
10 percent
Poorest
30 percent
Remaining
70 percent
All
3.4
6.0
8.1
2.3
9.2
59.8
10.6
8.4
11.7
9.4
2.2
9.6
48.7
10.0
34.6
16.7
11.4
3.3
6.2
22.8
4.8
26.8
15.2
11.0
3.0
7.2
30.6
6.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Raising
agricultural
incomesis the key to significantly
reducingpovertyin Peru."5/
5/ Glewe, "TheDistribution
of Welfarein Peru,'p. 40.
- 53 -
Table 8.5s
Poorest
10 percent
Poorest
30 percent
Remaining
30 percent
All
Employer
None
Private firm
Government
State Corporation
Private Household
Self-employed
5.5
12.2
1.3
0.0
3.0
78.0
4.8
16.9
3.2
0.4
3.2
71.5
6.5
22.2
11.5
3.6
1.5
54.7
6.0
20.6
9.0
2.6
2.0
59.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
None
5.5
Professional
White Collar
0.5
Sales and Service
7.4
Agriculture
70.8
Manufacturing
and Construction 15.8
4.8
6.5
6.0
2.2
13.6
61.2
15.8
26.0
30.9
10.9
22.3
40.0
18.2
20.8
20.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
Occupation
Total
100.0
- 54 -
22.
The following expositiondistinguishesbetween a modern or formal
sector and an informal sector. The theoretical literaturehas engaged in
considerable controversy over the definition of formality and informality.
The characterizationsnoted below, while potentially controversialin
themselves, allow clear distinctionsto be drawn between the two.
23.
The most outstanding difference lies in capital intensity,with
the formal sector more capital intensive than the informal. Note that this
and other differences apply equally to urban and rural sectors. That is,
production in the rural formal sector is more capital intensive than in the
rural informal sector, analogous to differences between the two in their
urban settings. Technologicaldualism is manifested by high elasticity of
factor substitutionbetween labor and capital under informal circumstances
and by the more rigid factor proportion (that is, lower elasticity) in the
formal sector. Not only does the formal sector use more physical and
financial capital per worker than the informal sector, owing simply to the
greater creditworthinessof the former, but also a higher concentrationof
human capital is present in the formal sector as well. Workers that are
better educated and bring to the job greater skills than do workers in the
informal sector.
24.
Accordingly, productivityis higher in formal activities than in
informal ones, with estimates of the differentialranging between a
multiple of seven (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la
Participacion,CEDEP) and three (InstitutoLibertad y Democracia, ILD).
Table 8.6 provides additionalmeasurementsof the contrasts between modern
and informal sectors in the Lima metropolitanarea. By contrast,
specialized studies of small business in the industrializedcountries
frequentlyconclude that their productivityequals or exceeds that of
larger enterprises.
Table 8.6: LIMA - MEASURES OF LABOR MARKET SEGhENTATION,1983
Modern Sector
Informal as
Informal Sector Percent of Modern
21,000
12,000
469
1,697
2 percent
14 percent
222
116
52 percent
- 55 -
56 -
29.
At the most fundamentallevel, the biggest gaps appear to lie in
labor skills, formal managerialknow-how, and financial credit. Programs
to fill these gaps should have first priority. In this connection, the
establishmentof decentralizedinstitutes (IDESIS)to supervise loans to
small enterprises along with short after-hours courses for their workers
and managers have identifiedthe critical problems, are working outside the
capital to resolve them, and have achieved an admirable record in a short
period.
30.
Andean agriculturalpoverty is likely to continue to be a serious
problem. It is important to devote extra resources to improving the low
health standards and educationalattainment that accompany the region's low
incomes. In particular, attempts to decrease the nation's current fiscal
deficit should not be made at the expense of cutting attention and
expenditures in this seriously deprived region.
31.
Rural poverty and its economic roots in low agricultural
productivity should continue to receive the most energetic efforts at
resolution. The problems are subject to alleviation both by macroeconomic
and microeconomicpolicies. At the macroeconomiclevel, the most important
remaining area is the reestablishmentof a set of trade policies and
exchange rate policies that make agriculturalexports and efficiently
produced import substitutioncrops profitable once again. The increase in
agriculturaloutput so stimulatedwill have beneficial effects both on the
balance of payments and on the nutritional status of farm workers.
32.
The widespread employmentof tramitadores (professionalred tape
cutters) provides ample evidence of the bureaucratic complexitiesand
delays that face every firm in the formal sector. Since it is agreed that
employment and incomes in the economy as a whole are strongly influencedby
the productivityof modern firms, every effort to reduce the numbers of
signatures, seals, approvals, forms, and other red tape should be made.
33.
In much the same vein, current efforts to decentralize
governmentalproductive activity and decision-makingdeserve reinforcement,
both to decrease the geographic income differentialsthat spur migration
and to express tangibly the Govermnent'sdeterminationto permit regional
authorities to make decisions now excessively centralized in the capital.
34.
Official statistics show that public sector and unionized workers
enjoyed the fastest rates of increase of real wages after 1985. Most lowincome countries seek to focus their wage policies on the poorest workers.
To avoid the elements of transfer payments that could result from such a
policy emphasis, continued attention to improving the productivityof lowskilled workers should be an integralpart of any overall policy measures.
57 -
- 58 -
ANNEX 9
A.
1.
Background. State-owned enterprisesplay an important role in the
economy of Peru. There are 135 non-financialstate-ownedenterprises,that
employ 130,000 people (about 2 percent of the economicallyactive
population), their contributionto GDP fluctuatesaround 10 percent, the
book value of their capital is equal to about US$5.5 billion, 60 percent
of which is concentratedin three enterprises and their subsidiaries (which
operate in the sectors of electricity,petroleum, telecommunications).In
addition, state enterprises provide about 30 percent of the total exports
of the country and are a major source of tax revenues. Thus, in 1986
taxes paid by the sector (mainly by the petroleum industry) constituted 29
percent of the revenues of the central governmentand the sector's net
contribution to the budget (taxes minus transfers)was equal to 2.5 percent
of the GDP.
2.
The state enterprise sector has evolved In various phases,
reflectingchanging policies of successive governments. A large part of
the sector (53 percent in terms of current total value of assets) emerged
through establishmentof new firms by the state (mostly before 1968), firms
totalling 42 percent of total assets became public, mostly under the
military regime of Gral. Velasco Alvarado between 1968 and 1975, through
nationalizationof foreign firms or expropriationof private firms
operating in sectors consideredby the government as strategic areas
(electricity,railways, fishing, cement, chemicals, etc.) and 5 percent
were established through takeovers of bankrupt private firms. A sideeffect of the nationalizationsand takeovers was that the state became
owner of a number of subsidiariesof intervened firms too.
3.
With these developments,by the end of the 1970s the sector had
grown into a very diverse conglomerateof enterprises. They operated, on
the one hand, in the traditional areas of infrastructureand exploitation
of key natural resolurces(providing100 percent of the electricity,
drinking water and telecommunicationservices; controllingthe total oil
and gas production, representingabout 35 percent of mining and 33 percent
of transportation);and, on the other hand, in a wide variety of other
areas like manufacturing,fishing, agriculture,marketing, news,
entertainment,etc. In other words, state enterprises participatedin
virtually all sectors of the economy. Nevertheless,about half of their
total output and capital and two-fifths of their employees are concentrated
in three areas: petroleum, power and mining. Firms in these industries
are large-scale: up to 17,000 employees. The petroleum company,
PETROPERU, is the largest, representingone-third of total revenues of the
state enterprise sector.
In turn, the
nower
companies,
mainly
ELCRTROPFRU
- 59 -
1980
1981
1982
1985
1986
1987
Real revenues
115.6
(at 1979 prices)
84.8
73.4
Nominal revenues
(as GDP share)
25.3
21.3
14.1
Employment
(in 1000 workers)
--
Number of Firms
--
100.0
--
1983
1984
22.6
29.0
23.1
26.1
17.5
--
--
97.0
--
--
115
--
--
--
--
135
--
Source: CONADE.
6.
Administrationof the Sector and Decision-MakingProcess. The
administrativeand legal structure of the sector is in a process of change.
In the past the shares of the public enterpriseswere held either by stateownted bL-s or by the relevant sectoral miinistries. The administrationof
these enterpriseswas entrusted to the sectoralministries, which appointed
the boards of directors and made the major business decisions. Very often
this meant direct interventionin the operations of the companies
concerning issues that could have been better dealt with by their
60 -
decisions
management.Often sectoralministriesimposedon the enterprises
on
political
but
strategy
business
on
purely
that were basednot
considerations.
- 61 -
(ii)
(v)
11.
Financial Performance. As a result of these conditions, financial
performance has been poor for a long time and has dramaticallydeteriorated
in 1985-87. Thus, the combined current account savings after being negative
in the early 1980s, improved somewhat in 1983-85, but deterioratedmarkedly
since 1985. This deteriorationwas a result of policy changes introduced
since mid 1985: (i) prices and tariffs of state enterpriseswere used as an
instrument to control cost pressures and inflation. Although price
controls affect most economic sectors, they are especially strong for state
enterprises ; (ii) The growing overvaluationof the Inti in 1985-87
resulted in reduction of the revenues of exporting companies as GDP
percentage (minerals,petroleum products, fishmeal, etc.); (iii) Public
enterprisewages and salarieswere increased faster than inflation,and as
a result, the share of wages in current expendituresgrew from 12 percent
in 1984 to 15 percent in 1987.
- 62 -
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986 1987*
Current Revenues
25.3
21.3
22.6
29.0
23.1
26.1
17.5 14.1
Current
Expenditures
25.5
21.4
22.9
27.1
21.5
23.9
17.4
13.8
Current Account
Balance
-0.2
-0.1
-0.3
1.9
1.6
2.2
0.1
0.2
1.3
0.8
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.3
3.0
3.4
4.8
5.1
4.3
3.1
2.2
1.7
2.6
3.3
4.7
5.0
4.1
3.0
2.0
1.7
-2.7
-4.0
-2.2
-1.9
-0.5
-1.7
-1.1
Capital Revenues
Capital
Expenditures
Gross Capital
Formation
*Preliminarydata
Source: Banco Central de Reserva and CONADE.
12.
Due to these factors, combined revenues of state enterprises fell
from 26.1 percent of GDP in 1985 to 14.1 percent in 1987 and likewise
current account savings dropped from 2.2 percent to 0.2 percent between
both years (Table 9.2). The latter despite the fact that state enterprises
suspended most interest payments on their external debt. As it is shown in
Annex Table 5.3(B), the situation is very critical in a series of firms
which in 1987 experiencednegat e current savings. In effect, of the 27
largest state enterprises,9 registerednegative current savings, other 10
experienced current savings superior to 5 percent of their sal.es,and the
remaining 8 were close to breaking-evenin the current account. The big
loss-makerswere ECASA (rice marketing), SIDERPERU (steel) and
C.P.V.(shipbuilding). Savings-makerswere CENTROMIN (minerals),
ELECTROPERU (electricity),SEDAPAL (water and sewerage), PARAMONGA (paper
and chemicals), and ENCI (agriculturalmarketing). Although the latter
received substantialhidden subsidies through favorable exchange rates for
its imports of agriculturalproducts. Other major firms like PETROPERU and
MINPECO (mineralmarketing) displayed a current saving position close to
zero. It must be noted that, in general, even firms with positive savings
had problems to cover with them their depreciationallowances. The drop in
internal revenues, togetherwith the non-availabilityof foreign financing,
have seriously hampered needed routine expenditureson maintenance and
conservation of existing capital stock, let alone new investments. Thus,
- 63 -
gross capital formation in the sector has dropped from 4-5 percent of GDP
in 1982-84 to around 2 percent in 1986-87, the lowest level of the decade.
Total
1980 1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
-5.0
29.4
15.0
36.1
24.5
-7.2
3.3
19.8
72.2
11.9
36.6
5.2
14.7
29.6
13.9
37.4
70.3
7.0
2.7
11.3
10.2
28.2
41.7
16.1 -24.9
1.1
12.1
6.6
50.3
29.9
17.7
43.8
0.0
13.3
25.2
-3.3
5.8
16.4
13.1
68.0
13.
Between 1982 and 1985 there was a strong improvement in the
current account savings: they grew from -0.3 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent
(Table 9.2) and their share in investmentfinancing increased from
-7.2 percent to 70.3 percent (Table 9.3). These savings were, however,
completelywiped out in 1986 by the effects of the policy of depressed
public sector prices, lagging exchange rates and substantialwage
increases. In 1985 the companieswere called upon by the Central Bank to
deposit the Inti counterpart of their accrued-unpaidexternal debt service
in Central Bank's blocked accounts. Although this regulationwas only
partially fulfillsd, the companies'net position with the domestic banking
system improved. Therefore in that year the financing of investmentscame
from own savings and to a lesser extent from external financing. In
1986-87 the evaporated current savings of the enterpriseswas replacedby
growing borrowing from domestic sources, and also from capital transfers.
Thus, while in 1985 the net amortizationof the sector's domestic debt was
0.8 percent of GDP, net borrowing in 1986 and 1987 was about 0.6 percent of
GDP.
B.
14.
Now the Government is working on a reform package of the state
enterprise sector. The package consists of two major parts: (i)
improvement of the performance of the state enterprises; (ii) redefinition
of the role, scope and size of the sector with a view to liquidationof
inefficient companies; sale of non-strategicenterprises;transfer of firms
of local interest to regionai governments;invitationof private capital
through sales of shares in some enterprises.
15.
The Enterprise Reform Program. The main elements and objectives
of the program are as follows:
- 64 -
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
16.
The program is coherent, logical and comprehensive. If fully
implemented,it will dramaticallychange the performance and financial
shape of the state enterprises. The most salient element of the program is
its striving to separate and isolate the entrepreneurialactivity of the
state from the political processes. However, the implementationof the
program is expected to be a difficult task. The rehabilitationof the
sector requires strong commitment, radical policy changes, management
reform, huge investmentsand significant price increases. One of the
crucial issues is going to be the adjustment of output prices and tariffs.
The slow and indecisivestart suggests that the commitment is not strong
enough.
C.
17.
Presently the program does not comprise an action plan and
timetable that would specify the implementationmeasures. Elaboration and
announcement of such an action plan would help to start the implementation
65 -
- 66 -
- 67
- 68 -
Title
Acronym
State
Ownership
Profile
Sales I/
Employees 2/
Equity 1/
tNptProfit/
Loss
1/
(%)
1. Water and Seweraqe
Serviclo de Agua Potable y
Alcantarillado de Lima
SEDAPAL
100
681
3364
Serviclo Naclonal de
Abastecimiento de Agua
Potable y Alcantarillado
SENAPA
100
127
1756
583
SECACUZCO
100
212
SEOALAMBAYEQUE
100
34
838
113
SEDALORETO
100
16
185
49
SEDAPAR
100
513
58
SEDAPAT
100
408
45
SEDAPIURA
too
100
SEOAPUNO
100
SEOATACNA
100
115
27
SEDATUMBES
100
69
-I
6991
.i
-3
I/
2/
-78
Acronym
Title
State
Ownership
Profile
Sales I/
Employees 2/
EquIty 1/
Net Profit/
Loss
(5)
2. Agricultural Marketing
Emprosa Maclonal do
Comercializacion de Insumos
ENCI
100
5855
1368
1143
890
Emprosa Comerclalizadora
de Arroz, S.A.
ECASA
100
Rice marketing
2730
1861
42
-1013
100
Wholesale marketing
16
272
16
Emprosas de Comerclallzaclon
ae Productos Pecuarlos
EMCOPESA
100
Agricultural marketing
70
GRUPO TAS
100
Retail marketing
Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaclones de Peru
ENTEL
100
Telecommunlcatlons
2466
4889
C.P.T.
45
Telephone
1099
1924
-138
5. TelecommunicatIons
4.
8886
-
Electricity
Empresa de Electricidad
de Llma, S.A.
ELECTROLIMA
100
3B99
4062
5322
-164
ELECTROPERU
100
162
2230
20725
26
Ildroolectrica
S.A.
HIDRANDINA
100
635
ELECTRO CENTRO
100
108
Energla
Andina,
995
2044
400
-55
-32
__
State
Title
Acronym
Ownership
Net Profit/
Profile
Sales I/
Employees 2/
Equity 1/
Loss
419
-165
ELECTRO NORTE
100
148
ELECTRO ORIENTE
100
292
443
861
68
ELECTRO SUR
100
105
431
466
ELECTRO SURESTE
100
135
855
425
-42
Socledad Electrica de
Arequlpa, S A.
SEAL
95
249
710
921
-21
75
PETROPERU
SOLGAS
100
85
Petroleum 'productlon,
transportation, refinery
and marketIng
24498
10137
8460
Gas distribution
374
390
100
11
51.5
302
347
22
405
-82
Petrolera Transoceanica
100
Oil transportatlon
Petromar
100
Off-shore
SERPETEO
100
production
-(3023)
6. Agrolndustry
Empresa para el Desarrollo
y Explotaclon de La Palma
Aceltera, S.A.
EMOEPALMA
100
Palm oll
B88
1236
1l
Acronym
Tltle
State
Ownership
Profile
Net Profit/
1/
Loss
Employees 2/
Equity 1/
221
447
127
62
59
190
35
54
-17
Sales I/
M5)
Coca
ENAOD
ENATA
Forestales Amazonas
FASA
15
Wood
IMOSA
17
Wood
IPSA
72
Wood
Industria Maderera
Oriente, S.A.
100
Tobacco
*
do
IquitosPlywood, S.A.
7. Cement
Cementos Sur
100
103
Cementos Yura
100
214
264
464
27
Cemento Andino
49
388
562
18
49
474
569
29
Cementos Lima
49
895
1037
89
Lab Carbon
14
Nuevas Inversiones,
S.A.
SIA
NISA
5
14
Acronym
State
Ownership
1)
Profile
Sales I/
Employees2/
Not Protit/
Loss
LX
Equity 1/
100
FERTISA
QUIMPAC
EMCCHOL
EMSAL
IndustrlasCachimayo
2250
3367
1759
36
Fertilizers
135
404
118
100
Salt,caustic soda
193
269
169
to
100
50
146
Denatured alcohol
11
45
207
565
126
48
85
249
102
-23
145
229
25
15
Acrylic f'ber
918
402
37
2491
4321
2800
-383
100
100
100
Salt
too
La PapeleraPeruana
Sayer Industrial,S.A.
100
BAYINSA
RetractorlosPeruanos
30
10
Refractorymaterlals
9. Steel
EmpresaStderurgicadel Peru
Siderselva
SIDERPERU
100
100
57
Acronym
Profile
Ownership
SaIos 1/
EquIty 1/
Employees 2/
Not Profit/
Loss
10. Textile
MANYLSA
91
Nylon
MCDASA
52
Diesel engines
Compresores Andinos
COMPASA
92
Compressors
89
Refrigerators
FETSA
40
ALAMERESA
20
FUNAPER
HELITUBCA
22
steel tebes
Maquinas y Herramlentas
Andinas, S.A.
MHASA
53
Machinery
too
Shipyard
51
Tractors
Moraveco,S.A.
93
19
Telephones
WIre
Fabrica de Equipos de
Tolefonla
Plsca Astilleros
Tractores Andinos, S.A.
TASA
263
_
-
12. MIning
Empresa Mlnera de Centro
del Peru
I/
2!
CENTROMIN
100
4664
16981
103?
-1235
if
Title
Acronym
State
Ownership
Profile
Sales
1/
Employees 2/
IS)
Emprosa Minera
del Peru
del
100
Iron.
MINEROPERU
100
MIWPECO
Empresa Estatal
Mlnera
Asoclada Ttntaya,
S.A.
Consultora
del
Peru
Empresa de ComercialIzaclon
de Productos Mineros
Minero Metaturgica
Agentes Navleros
3324
776
-183
1964
3487
739
-131
100
Mineral
1677
548
-634
153
TINTAYA
100
Copper
775
1132
-17
COMMSA
99
16
89
101
19
11
San Nicolas
100
marke-.Ing
Consulting
Mineral
shipping
67
100
Mlneros
100
Condestable
USA, Inc.
Silver
537
62
245
100
21
Bayovar
PROBAYOVAR
tOO
Phosphates
It
III
Empresa Promotora
del
PROCAR13ON
100
Coal
10
100
Real estate
30
Reactivos
I/
-268
Empresa Promotora
Pr3pledad
I/
2/
980
Mlnpeco,
HNt Profit/
Loss
Hlerro
HIERROPERU
Emapresa Mlnera
E ulty 1/
Carbon
Minas Justaa
Nacionales.
Million
Intis
In 1986
Number In 1986
S.A.
RErJASA
93
ianthate
81
102
Tltle
Acronym
State
OwnershIp
IS)
Profile
94
19
18
Mlnerales
20
Copper
18
20
40
Copper
Sales 1/
Employees2/
Equity 1/
Net Profit/
Il
Loss
13. Transportation
Empresade Transporte
Aereo del Peru
AEROPERU
100
AIrline
1273
1653
350
40
CompanlaPeruana de Vapores
CPV
100
ShIpping
817
158B
-749
-267
CORPAC
1O0
AIrportoperatlon
559
3272
1276
25
Empresa NcI.inaIde
Ferrocarrlles
ENAFER
100
Railroad
606
5414
1559
-259
EmpresaNaclonalde Puertos
ENAPU
100
Ports
1203
4632
1721
-41
EmpresaNaclonalde
TransporteUrbano
ENATRU
too
Urban transport
249
3"93
78
-144
Title
Acronym
State
Ownership
Profile
Sales 1/
Employees V
EquItyy/
Not Profit/
Loss
1,
Ms)
PESCAPERU
100
Fish processing
1530
1792
635
-82
100
Qualitycontrol
35
277
15
Fish processing
614
251
616
92
41
32
COPES
51
EmpresaPeruanade
Serviclo2Pesqueros
EPSEP
100
Fishing
Flopesca
100
Fishing
Llily
100
Fish processing
MaritimosBalboa
90
Fish processing
Nuelle Centenarlo
75
Fish processing
100
Fish processing
PosqueraSan Jose
58
Flsh processing
SindlcatoNacionalde
Produccionde Harina y
Acelte de Pescado
89
PEPESCA
I5. Pharmaceutical
Indugtry
AmpollasFarmaccuticas
Laboratorlos Unidos, S.A-
86
LUSA
100
_'
State
Tlt'%
Acronym
Ownership
Not Profit/
Profile
Sales 1/
Employees 2/
Equity 1/
Loss
1/
SIMA
100
Empresas Publlcas de la
Industrla Aeronautica
INDAER PERU
100
INDUtMIL
100
Ammunit'in, clothing
ANDINA
100
News agency
25
EDITORAPERU
100
Publishing
162
548
Shipbuilding, metalworks
428
5157
477
14
48
84
-2
339
2534
446
14
21
26
-4
18. Others
Artesanias del Peru
100
Handicrafts
100
Construction
100
Tourism
Clne Porvenir
100
Movle theater
Cine Pericholl
100
Movie thenter
Empresa Naclonal de
Edlitlcaclones
EmnpresaNaclonal de Turismo
del Peru
ENACE
ENTURPERU
52
779
126
-
40
-13
328
JMalatinszkl/trc
March 15, 1988
79 -
ANNEX 10
THE INTERACTION
OF FISCALA.D MONETARYPOLICIES
policy
1.
The Switchof FinancialStrategy. Liberal-oriented
measuresimplemented
in the financialsystemduringthe 1980-85period
included: upwardnominalinterestrate adjustments;
reductionsin legal
reserverequirements
on domesticcurrencydepositsuntil late 1984 (from76
percentin January1981 to 15 percentin October1984, laterlegal reserve
requirements
were raised);l/deregulation
by allowingthe entranceof new
firmsto the industryand wideningthe spectrumof activitiesallowed
within it (in particularthe operationof foreigncurrencydepositsand
loans);and greaterlatitudeto financialinstitutions
for determining
effectiveinterestrateson loansand depositsthroughchangesin the
of interestrates,commissions
and advanced
periodof capitalization
interestpayments.
2.
The liberalizing
trendwas reversedin August1985. The new
Governmentestablished
measures,aimedat enhancingthe controlof
financialinstitutions
and of monetaryand creditpolicyin general. On
of foreigncurrencydepositswas suspended
the one hand, the convertibility
initiallyfor 90 days but laterextendedindefinitely.In addition,
depositand loan interestrateswere scaleddown (in severalstepsto
approximately
one-thirdof the.rFebruary1985 level,Table 10.1).
However,sinceinflationstartedto deceleratefaster,by February1986
interestrates,althoughstillnegativein real terms,becameless negative
than before. This trend,though,was reversedstartingin late 1986when
inflationpeakedup again. On the otherhand,marginallegalreserve
on domesticcurrencydepositswere raisedfrom 50 percentin
requirements
October1984 to 75 percentin August1985 (Table10.2). In turn,a series
to promotelendingto specificregionsand
of portfoliorestrictions
sectorsof the economywere established.Othermeasures,gearedat
of the excisetax
loweringthe cost of credit,were: the exoneration
the prohibition
of commissions
and
appliedon interestsand commissions;
and the
fees chargedby financialfirmson directcredittransactions;
settingof maximuminterestratesexpressedin effectiveterms.
80
Table10.1: SW
INTERESTRATES
(Maximumannualeffective)
.1
LendingRates
Come rcial
Co_ rcial Agricultural
(low then a year) Rediscountb/ Promotion
February 1, 1986
101.2
101.2
August5, 1986
August26, 1986
October1, 1985
February16, 1988
July17, 1987
March11, 1988
110.0
76.0
46.0
40.0
82.0
56.0
106.1
71.2
41.9
86.5
80.8
41.6
Sayings
February1, 1985
August6, 1985
August26, 1966
October1, 1985
February16, 1986
May1, 1986
April16, 1987
July 17, 1987
March11, 1988
Notes:
96.5
68.0
35.0
21.0
20.7
20.7
24.7
24.7
86.5
Export
(FENT)
28.1
20.7
13.8
7.8
4.0
5.9
108.0
66.3
28.1
20.0
20.0
-
SavingsRates
Xnflation
c
FixedTorm
Bonds'C'
(OneYesr) of COFIDE
107.4
76.4
61.6
82.8
88.2
87.8
43.3
32.8
44.0
136.4
1386.4
47.4
44.3
39.6
48.4
60.8
64.0
267.0
260.0
260.0
156.7
61.9
69.9
97.0
95.0
270.0
I/nterestrates reportedarg)ly
fromthe day Indicated.
b/ Interestrateon promotional
creditlineof BancoAgrarlo:
FomentoAgropecuario.
S/ Consumerpriceinflation
of the previousquarterIn annual
terms.
3.
Financial Restraint,Disinflationand Dedollarization: July
1985-July 1986. Impulsed by the balance of payments surplus the stock of
base money as a percentage of GDP jumped from 10 to 12 percent the first
and second semesters of 1985 (Table 10.4). The balance of payments surplus
- 81 -
was a result of the limitation of public foreign debt service payments and
the favorable external situation (1985 registered a record trade surplus
for the decade). By contrast, fiscal policy did not put pressure on
Central Bank financing, for the public sector deficit for 1985 (including
CRB foreign exchange and financial losses)was reasonablymoderate, around
4.3 percent of GDP, and most of it was financed through foreign sources
either fresh disbursementsor else accumulationof arrears on interest
payments. To this outcome of relative fiscal austerity contributed the
disciplinedictated by the existence of "escrow"accounts in the Central
Bank where the central government and state enterpriseshad to deposit
accrued unpaid service on external debt.
Notes:
a/
50.0
75.0
_
64.0
64.0/50.0 b/
72.0
87.5
70.0
54.0
36.0
32.5
_
27.5
_
31.0
l/ For
Source:
82 -
4.
Compensating for the increase of base money, the money supply
multiplier dropped from 1.86 in June 1985 to 1.44 in December.21 This was
mainly the consequ.ence
of the raising of marginal legal reserve
requirementswhich led to an increase in the effective reserve-deposit
ratio from 0.48 to 0.62 (Table 10.4). Tighter legal reserve requirements
were established so as to neutralize the switch from, high reserve ratio,
foreign currency deposits into, lower reserve ratio, domestic currency
deposits, and also in an attempt to sterilize monetary expansion resulting
from balance of payments surpluses. As a result of this policy of monetary
restraint the broad money supply contracted during the second half of 1985
(from 19 percent of GDP in June to 18 percent in December) in spite of the
expansion of the monetary base (from 10 percent of GDP to 12 percent) in
the same period.
5.
The drop in the quantity of broad money as a proportion of GDP
also meant that the remonetizationof the economy (i.e., the increase in
liquidity in domestic currency)was the counterpart to the dedollarization
process. Dedollarizationbegun during the second quarter of 1985 as
uncertaintywith regards to the treatment of foreign currency deposits by
the new governmentbuilt up. Later, it was fostered by the suspensionor
convertibilityof foreign currency deposits into US dollars. Dollar
denominated deposits and certificatesdropped by US$556 million in the
second half of 1985 (to US$918 million in December).
6.
The policy of budgetary and monetary moderation continued during
the first half of 1986. Thus, during the first year of government, July
1985 to July 1986, the stock of credit to the public sector (excluding
CRB's net unclassified assets and CRB financing of development banks) by
the financial system did t.nfact decrease in nominal terms (Table 10.5).
The main sources of CRB's primary liquidity creationwere: (i) the balance
of payments surplus; 'ii) the CRB's own quasi-fiscaldeficit (which reached
1.7 percent of GDP in the second half of 1985 and 0.9 percent in the first
half of 1986); and (iii) CRB credit expansion to development banks (for a
total of 0.4 percent and 0.5 percent in the same periods) and in particular
to the Banco Agrario. Furthermore,as noted before, the tighter legal
reserve requirementsreduced the potential for secondary expansion of
credit. Consequently,the overall domestic credit expansion (includingnet
unclassifiedassets) of the financial system during June 1985-June 1986, as
a proportion of the stock of broad money of June 1985, was only about 58
percent (Table 10.5). All this indicates that the mix of budgetary and
monetary policies followed during the first year of the new governmentwas
roughly consistentwith the disinflationpursued by the price-cost
"freeze". As a result, inflation declined from 88 percent in the first
half cf 1985 to 38 percent in the second half and to 28 percent in the
first semester of 1986. In addition, the moderate domestic credit
expansion renderedviable the maintenance of the relatively strong
internationalreserves position achieved through the limitation of debt
service payments. Thus, by March 1986 CRB's gross reserves peaked at
US$2.5 billion, or about one year of imports, and net reserves at US$1.4
billion.
- 83 -
Table 10.8:
1986-I1 1985-Il
1.
Central Government
Deficit
1986
1986-
196-II
1996
1987-1
1987-II
1961
0.9
1.2
2.1
0.2
3.2
3.6
1.2
4.3
656
2. PublicEnterprise
Deficit
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.8
0.6
1.4
0.3
0.7
1.0
3. EconomicDeficit(1+2)
1.0
1.4
2.4
1.0
3.8
4.9
1.6
6.0
6.5
4. CentralBankLosses
- ForeignExchangeLosses
- FinancialLosses
0.2
0.2
0.0
1.7
1.2
0.6
1.9
1.4
0.6
0.9
0.
0.4
0.9
-0.1
1.0
1.8
0.4
1.4
0.3
0.1
0.2
2.5
1.9
0.6
2.8
2.0
0.8
1.2
3.1
4.3
1.9
4.7
6.7
1.8
7.5
9.8
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.9
1.4
1.0
0.9
1.9
7. TotalPublicSector
BorrowingRequirements
1.6
3.5
5.1
2.5
5.6
8.1
2.8
8.4
11.2
8. Financing
of the Deficit
1.6
8.5
5.1
2.5
6.6
8.1
2.8
8.4
11.2
1.4
0.2
2.6
1.0
3.9
1.2
1.1
1.4
1.8
4.2
2.4
5.7
0.7
2.1
0.7
7.7
1.4
9.8
Deficit
8.
(8.4)
Foreign
Domestic
MemoItem:
NominalGDP
(million
of Intla)
199,845
881,022
760,166
7.
The Upsurge of ExpansionaryFinancial Policies. Financial
policies turned into expansionaryduring the second half of 1986. In
parallel, the exchange rate freeze, price controls and the scaled down
structure of nominal interest rates continued,while the forced
dedollarizationof the economy went ahead, though at a slower pace since
April 1986. Domestic credit of the financial system to the public sector
started to increase for the first time in three years as a result of a
84 -
- 85 -
- 86 -
Table 10.4:
SOURCES
OF THE MONETARY
BASEAND COMPOSITION
OF THEMONEYSUPPLY
(percentages of CDP)
1986-I
19861II
10.0
12.3
11.4
5.7
.6
0.4
7.8
2.0
-0.6
1.8
0.7
A) MONETARYBASE
a) Net ForeignAssets
b) DomesticCredit
- Non-financial
PublicSector
- Financial(ofwhich:)
Development
Banks
c)NetUnclessifled
Assets
(ofwhich:)CRB'SQuasi-Fiscal
Deficit
B) BROADMONEYSUPPLY !/
a) In DomesticCurrencyb/
b) In ForeignCurrency
196-I
196-iI
1967-I
1987-II
9.8
8.9
10.2
6.1
2.4
-0.3
2.9
83.
0.7
2.0
4.8
1.3
0.0
;0
3.1
1.6
2.6
1.7
3.9
2.0
8.2
2.6
2.1
2.6
3.2
0.2
1.7
1.0
0.9
0.3
2.7
18.6
17.7
16.3
16.6
16.9
17.0
8.0
10.8
12.3
5.4
13.3
3.0
14.7
1.9
14.6
1.4
16.3
1.7
C) FINANCIALINDICATORS
Multiplier
c/
Reserve-Deposit
Ratiod/
Currency-Deposit
Ratio
IncomeVelocityof BroadMoney
Memo Item:
NominalGODP: /
-mill.I/.
1.86
0.48
0.26
6.40
1.44
0.82
0.23
65.0
154,662
240,714
1.43
0.e6
0.24
6.10
1.70
0.46
0.30
6.00
1.80
0.43
0.27
6.30
1.68
0.48
0.40
6.90
900,114
- 87 -
12.
In this respect, the overall public sector deficit (iacluding
foreign exchange and financial losses) reached 9.3 percent of GDP in 1987,
up from 6.7 percent in 1986, and the total public sector borrowing
requirements(which result from adding to the former the flow of subsidized
credit from the Central Bank to development banks) reacned 11.2 percent of
GDP in 1987 (up from 8.1 percent in 1986). Of this total only a small
share, about 1.4 percent of GDP in 1987, was financed by external
resources,mostly through capitalizationof interest on arrears, and the
remainderwas financed through recourse to CRB primary credit. Given the
current money supply multiplier of around 1.7, an expansion of Central
Bank's primary credit of 9.8 percent of GDP, such as the one experienced in
1987, implies a potential overall expansion of the broad money supply of
16.7 percent of GDP. In a country like Peru wl;erethe stock of total
financial savings to GDP (the ratio of broad money to GDP) is around 14
percent 3/ such an expansion of the broad money supply implies more than
doubling the stock of broad money. Hence, the doubling of inflation in
1987, as well as the growing balance of payments deficit.
13.
Furthermore,inflationarypressures were compounded by the
shrinkage of the financial system relative to GDP, or its reverse, the
increase in the income velocity of money, in the wake of growing inflation
and increasinglynegative real interest rates. In this sense, although the
jump of velocity between the first half of 1985 and the second half of
1987, from 5.4 to 5.9, might not appear spectacular (Table 10.4),
indications are that the trend in the more recent months has substantially
worsened. Thus, in the first quarter of 1987 alone the broad money supply
dropped by 22 percent in real terms. If this trend is continued in future
months the accelerationof inflation during 1988 might be far beyond what a
simple financial programmingexercise might indicate based on the size of
the domestic financing of the deficit. Indeed, the 52 percent inflation
rate registeredin the first quarter of 1988 is already signalling that the
process of financial disintermediationis compounding the already high
monetary imbalance propelled by the public sector budget. Moreover,
experience in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America shows that acceleration
of inflation tends to be perpetuated by widespread wage indexation,
exchange rate adjustments and eventuallyby public prices and tariffs
corrections and interest rate adjustmentsto inflation. The motion of
these variables, in turn, confers the system pervasive inflationary
inerti.a.
14.
The CRB's quasi-fiscaldeficit reached unprecedentedlevels in the
second half of 1987, registeringa level of 2.5 percent of GDP, up from 0.9
percent in the second half of 1986 and 0.3 percent in the first half of
1987 (Table 10.3). This jump in the quasi-fiscaldeficit was mainly the
result of the widening up in the multiple exchange rate structure brought
about by the exchange rate adjustments introduced in October and in
- 88 -
Table10.6: FINANCIAL
SURVEY: USESAND SOURCESOF BROADMiONEY
!/
(percentgrowth)b/
198S-II1987-1
i986-I
1986-II
1988-I
A) BROADMONEYSUPPLY(USES)
(a) Money
(b) Near Money
- Domestic
Currency
- Foreign
Currency
S0.7
44.8
7.1
87.2
47.6
81.8
16.8
28.2
-12.4
21.4
12.6
8.8
18.7
-8.0
36.4
20.6
14.9
17.9
-3.0
84.3
12.6
21.7
21.8
0.0
57.0
36.8
20.1
12.6
7.7
B) BROADMONEYSUPPLY(SOURCES)
60.7
47.6
21.4
86.4
84.3
57.0
(a)Net International
Reserves 10.1
(b)DomesticCreditto Public
Sector
-188a
(c)DomesticCrecalt
to
PrivateSector
48.4
(d)Not Unclassified
Assets
5.6
27.4
-6.0
-7.1
-2.0
-1658
-12.3
-4.1
20.7
11.7
33.2
27.2
5.2
22.3
8.2
29.2
-7.4
32.0
-7.3
39.8
64.8
90.4
37.6
23.0
28.5
13.8
26.8
27.1
40.1
67.7
87.7
6.4
1987-Ii
-0.7
Memo Itms:
Base Moneyc/
Inflation
Rated/
63.1
s/ Includesall financialoperations
of formalsectorfinancialinstitutions
(banksand other
non-banks)
with economicagents
b/ Percentchangesare calculated
with respectto the stockof broadmoneyoutstanding
at the
end of the previousperiod.
c/ Growthof the basemoney Is calculated
as percentpreviousyearbasemoney.
Inflation
for the semester.
c/
- 89 -
15.
The widening of the fiscal gap implied, in addition to monetary
expansion, that by the end of 1987 the non-financialpublic sector received
34 percent of total stock of credit issued by the financial system
(comparedwith 21 percent one year earlier and zero two years earlier).
This, combined with the foreign credit constraint and the process of
financial disintermediation,suggests that financial crowding out pressures
have become important. Likely, crowding out of private economic activity
through credit rationing in the organized financial system has put pressure
on the unorganized financial system. Since public sector demand for credit
is satisfied in the organized market a higher public sector deficit will
shift private credit demand to the unorganizedmarket. This, in turn,
tends to raise interest rates charged in the latter, thereby shifting
savings away from the formal market and towards the unorganized one, and
thus deepening financial disintermediation. Evidence supportingthis view
is that interest rates in the secondarymarket registered increases in 1987
and 1988. The situation of smaller and medium sized firms wzLich,in view
of their higher risk and lack of collateral requirements,had poor access
to bank lending is that they faced much higher financial costs in the
unorganized market. Reduced availabilityof credit for the private sector
in the organized market, coupled with the higher cost of informal credit,
limit production of firms by making scarce and expensive the financing of
working capital.
16.
The expansionarydomestic credit policy followed since mid-1986
had a large cost in terms of internationalreserve losses. Thus, CRB's net
reserves declined pzogressivelysince the second quarter of 1986, from US$
1.4 billion in March 1986 to zero in December 1987. In gross terms,
internationalreserves fell from US$ 2.5 billion to US$ 1.1 billion during
the same period.4/ Reserve losses were particularlyacute during the
of the acceleration of domestic credit
second half of 1987 as a result
growth. Indeed domestic credit grew 73 percent (of the broad money dupply
outstandingas of end June of the same year). up from 43 percent in the
first semester, and the loss on net internationalreserveswas at the rate
of 15 percent of broad money, up from 2 percent in the first semester
(Table 10.5).
A noticeable feature of monetary developmentsduring the second
17.
half of 1987 is the increasingpreference for cash by the private sector.
The demand for cash rose from 27 percent of deposits in June to 40 percent
in December. This sudden preference for cash can be explained in light of
the alleged increased transaction activity in the parallel market for
dollars. Low nominal interest rates in the presence of soaring inflation
have prompted economic agents to seek in foreign exchange a safer shelter
for their savings. This shift of the liquid portfolio towards dollars
explains the overshootingof the parallel market exchange rate in recent
months. The latter, in turn, has rendered the profitabilityof investing
in dollars a self-fulfillingprophecy. The relative returns of domestic
term deposits and parallel market dollars are compared (Table 10.6). It
can be seen there that, since the second quarter of 1987, the nominal
return on hoarding dollars has not only been far higher than the deposit
90
Tablo 10.6:
quarter
RATES
OF RETtRNOFDOMESTIC
SWK DEPOSITS
AD BLACK
MARKET
DOLLARS
(Quarterly
percentage
Rates)
BlockMarketExchangeRate
(Intl.per 8)
NominalReturn(Quarterly
Rte*)_
Quarterly
Infltblon
BlackMarketDollar Dox tic TimeDeposits
Rate
1986I
II
III
IV
17.4
17.4
17.6
19.9
0.0
0.0
1.1
13.1
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.9
16.4
11.4
12.6
12.6
1987r
:I
III
IV
20.8
29.6
41.4
90.4
2.0
46.8
39.9
118.4
4.9
5.5
6.7
6.7
18.5
18.2
22.7
24.8
1988 I
II
III
110.0
180.0
426.8
21.7
63.6
136.6
6.2
9.8
22.1
64.6
39.2
241.1
Source: Instituto
Nacionalde Planificacion
and CentralReserveBank.
18.
Nationalizationof Banks. The most salient institutionalchange in
financial policy occurred during 1987 was the government'sinitiative to
nationalize private banks, finance companies and insurance institutions
issued in July 1987. Prior to that date, the state already controlled
directly around 50 percent of all deposits and 70 percent of overall credit
allocation. Of the 24 commercialbanks operating in Peru, eight were
already government owned, seven were of foreign ownership and nine were
privately owned. In addition, the allocationof credit by private banks was
91
- 92 ANNX 11
iSV
voto
Coe_srcial
Bankt and FinancialFirm
Basic /
abrinal b/
12/10/84
FC
15
75
OfficialInmtitutlons
60
90
6-16 c/
76
6-16 c/
6-15 c/
08/02/86
DC
06/01/66
DC
b/
70
10/16/66
DC
FC
b/
60 d/
64
100
6-16 c/
60d/
08/01/87
DC
d/
60-64*/
6-15 .1
Date
02/01/66
07/10/865
08/06/86
08/26/85
10/15/65
02/16/86
08/11/68
Notation:
Rmuneration
72.0
87.6
70.0
54.5
86.0
82.6
81.0
FixedTerm Deposits
Superintendencia
do Bence y Socuroo(CRB).
91
ANNEX12
BRIEF BACKGROUND
ON THEAGRICULTURAL
SECTOR
1.
Peru is a country that encompasses such a variety of geographic
and climatic characteristicsthat 84 of the 103 possible ecological zones
can be found in its territory. This diversity allows the cultivation of a
large variety of crops. The agricultural sector represents12 percent of
GDP and is the most important sector in terms of employment,absorbing over
35 percent of the country's labor force. There are three distinct
agricultural regions: the Coast (Costa),a desert strip located between
the Pacific Ocean and the Andean highlands,which accounts for 11 percent
of the territory and 26 percent of cultivated land; the Highlands (Sierra),
made up of valleys and western plateaus cf the Andean mouiitains,
which
accounts for 26 percent of the area of the cour,tryand 47 percent of
cultivated land; and the Jungle (Selva),composed of valleys and eastern
plateaus of the Andes and the Amazon Basin, which is the largest region
comprising 63 percent of the territory and 27 percent of cultivated land.
Most agriculture in the coast is irrigated, and the ma; crops are cctton,
sugarcane, yellow maize, potatoes and rice. By contrast only a small
proportion of sierra farms (27 percent) are under irrigationwhile the main
products are potatoes,white maize, wheat, beans and barley as well as
several Andean crops such as quinua, olluco, oca and kiwicha. In the selva
year-round rainfall promotes the cultivation of coffee, rice and yellow
maize. Despite the vast heterogeneityof ecological zones and variety of
crops, Peruvian agriculture confronts a severe limitationin its endowment:
less than 2.5 percent of its territory can be counted as arable land, and
almost 20 percent of it is fallow. Thus, Peru's 0.14 cultivable hectares
per capita is well below the Latin American average of 0.5 hectares per
capita and also below European and Asian averages of 0.3 and 2.2 hectares
per capita, respectively.
Table 12.1:
MAINAGRIWLURAL
PRODUCTS
(1997)
(percertages)
Share in
Demand
Rice
Wheat
Potatoes
YellowMaize
Sugar
Cotton
Coffee
White Maize
Beans
Other
14.7
11.8
9.6
8.9
6.8
5.4
2.8
2.2
1.0
88.8
Share In
Production
14.0
1.6
10.7
6.9
4.6
6.a
10.9
2.6
1.2
42.4
I.port-Coneump.Export-Output
Ratio
Ratio
16.8
98.1
-
8.8
3.8
8.0
7.2
4.8
71.2
0.7
4.9
40.4
83.2
-
Share in
Cultivated
Area
9.3
1.8
4.0
6.2
7.7
8.0
47.9
Region of
Cultivation
Coast andJungle
Sierr
Coast andSierra
Coastand Jungle
Coast
Coast
Jungle
Sierra
Sierra
-
- 94 -
2.
Between 1969 and 1976, the military regime of Velasco Alvarado
carried out an agrarian reform with the objective of redistributingthe
highly concentratedland tenure prevailing since colonial times, and
accentuated during the 19th century. Thi agrarian reform, however, failed
to meet expectationsbecause the newly-createdcooperativesdid not operate
efficiently. In addition, at that time, a new administrativestructurewas
established,strengtheningthe role of the public sector in agricultural
activity. The Rice Trading Enterprise (ECASA) and the National InputTrading Enterprise (ENCI) were created to play key roles in policy making
and implementation. These institutionscame to gradually hold monopoly
power in the commercializationof a variety of agriculturalproducts and
inputs. In general, agrarian policy during the 70s was marked by a
strategy of controlled food prices which kept prices for the rural
producers low, thus favoring urban consumers. Furthermore, imports of
agriculturalproducts for industrywere subsidized,reinforcing the
deteriorationof agriculturalterms of trade. In response, the balance of
trade for agriculturalproducts switched from a US$118 million surplus in
1970 to a US$135 million deficit in 1980 and agriculturaloutput grew at an
average annual rate of 0.1 percent in that period, while global GDP grew at
2.8 percent. In parallel to stagnationof agriculturalproduction,
important changes in the crop pattern took place. In particular, changes
in consumptionpatterns as well as the incentive system favored coastal
products such as rice, cotton and sugarcane, in detriment of Andean crops
like potatoes and white corn.
3.
In 1980, the new civilian administrationof President Belaunde
laid out a new strategy; free market prices and free trade. However, in
view of political p-essures to curb inflation, it was only possible to
release partially existing controls and regulations. ECASA's monopoly over
rice commercializationcontinued as did controlledprices for some
agriculturalproducts, and subsidies to agriculturalinputs and credit. In
general, existing incentives to producers benefitted relativelymore
coastal and Amazonian producers than Andean farmers. Moreover, the
protection granted to the industrialsector and to urban consumers
continued to deteriorate the terms of trade of basic agriculturalcrops.
4.
The 1980-85 period can be characterizedas one of economic and
organizationalcrisis in the agricultural sector. The former, because of
the stagnationof physical productivityand the worsening of the
relationshipbetween product and input prices; the latter, because of the
chaotic restructuringand parcelling out of the cooperatives,as the
agrarian reform collapsed. These troubleswere compoundedby exogenous
factors such as a drought in the southernhighlands and floods in the
northern coast, which occurred simultaneouslyduring 1983 leading to a 9.6
percent drop in agriculturalGDP in that year. For the 1980-85 period as a
whole, per capita agriculturalproduction dropped by a cumulative 5
percent, and the agriculturaltrade account maintained an average deficit
close to US$100 million.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
95 -
table1.1 :PERU
- TOTAL
POFULATION
DISTRIBUTION
(Thousandil
PROJECTED
, _ o__~~~--
1960
1970
1980
--
1987
--
- -
1990
--
1995
--
2000
TOTAL
POPULATION
9,931.0 13,192.9 17,295.3 20,727.1 22,332.1 25,122.8 27,952.1
Male 5,003.8
Feeale4,927.2
GRONTH
RATES
Totalpopulation
Nale
Fenale
2.80
2.89
2.88
2.74
2.74
2.75
2.62
2.62
2.62
2.52
2.52
2.52
2.39
2.39
2.38
2.16
2.16
2.16
50.4
49.6
50.4
49.6
50.4
49.6
50.4
49.6
50.4
49.6
50.4
49.6
PERCENTAGE
DISTRIBUTION
_
---_
_-----.
SNale 50.4
Female 49,6
Source NationalStatiscalInstitute.
Table1.2 : PERU
- DEN06RAFIC
INDICATORS
FERTILITY
1950-1955
1955-1960
1960-1965
1965-1970
1970-1975
1975-192.
1980-1985
1985-1990
1990-1995
1995-2000
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.6
6.0
5.4
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
iaurce
: hationai itatistical Institute
GROSS
IORTALITY
RATE
(per 10001
21.6
19.7
17.6
15.6
12.8
11.7
10.7
9.2
7.7
6.7
LIFE
EtIECTANCY
lin yeaFr)
43.9
46.3
49.1
51.5
55.5
56.9
58.6
61.4
64.6
67.0
- 97 -
TABLE
1.3: PERU
- EMPLOYMENT
ANDLaBOR
PRODUCTIVITY,
1970- 1986.
Employeent
aj
-------------------------------
-----
Non
TotalAgricultureAgriculture
Adequate
Employment
a/ b I
Labor
Productivity
ci
1970
3,971.4
1,873.6 2,097.8
2,059.0
613.4
1975
4,581.3
1,950.0 2,631.3
2,538.7
676.2
1:90
5,210.7
2,046.0
3,164.7
2,341.4
690.3
1991
5,377.5
2,272.2
3,105.3
2,613.7
694.2
1982
5,540.0
2,329.1
3,211.9
2,567.5
666.7
1993
5,585.7
2,355.1
3,230.6
2,306.9
585.5
1994
5,684.4
2,374.v
3,309.5
2,242.0
603.2
1985
5,7BI.9
2,392.7
3,389.2
21235.4
609.0
1986
6,212.9
2,416.1
3,796.8
2,734.3
619.3
a-J - Thouands
of persons.
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1995
198b
1987
4.7
4.9
7.0
6.8
7.0
9.2
10.5
11.8
8.2
n.a
Agriculture
labor
fwrce
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
n.a
Non-agricultural
labor force
9.3
8.1
10.9
10.4
10.6
13.9
1b.6
18.4
12.6
n.j
Undereaployaent
a_/
45.9
42.8
51.2
47.9
49.9
57.1
54.2
54.1
51.4
n.o
Agriculture
laboforce
64.3
68.2
68.2
61.5
60.9
67.5
61.4
60.4
58.7
n.a
Non-agricultural
labor force
30.9
24.8
41.4
40.3
43.9
51.6
49.9
50.5
47.4
n.a
6,555.5
Umeaploymeat
Laborforce
itbousanl)
4167.3
Agriculture
labwu
forceItbousand)
1,979.5 1,955.9 2,052.2 2,072.2 2,330.5 2,405.3 2,381.7 2,399.3 2,422.9 2,460.3
b,7b7.9 b,909.5
1975
1980
1981
1992
1983
1984
358.1
371.0
362.6
395.4
404.2
365.2
402.6
414.3
430.1
456.3
47.2
15.6
18.9
2).6
24.2
17.0
24.9
29.1
37.4
31.8
422.6
1970
Agriculture
Fishing
1985
19"
a-I
1997
a-I
lining
229.8
231.8
468.7
454.3
459.9
414.7
434.5
453.2
432.5
Nanufacturing
626.7
905.2
966.7
972.6
863.9
718.0
757.4
794.6
921.2
1,029.4
23.9
39.0
41.9
45.3
38.0
38.2
40.5
45.4
49.3
133.0
216.4
202.3
225.0
229.5
181.7
193.2
164.0
203.5
64.9
79.5
88.6
90.6
92.2
93.2
94.5
95.3
97.9
191.1
233.5
239.8
241.7
257.9
277.6
279.0
295.4
29.7
Electricity,later
Construction
Housing
15.1
235.6
100.5
Government
Services
144.4
Financial Institutions
60.8
83.1
297.5
320.4
319.3
299.1
297.0
329.1
347.7
377.3
Transport
130.2
199.1
235.9
251.5
247.7
230.2
231.4
237.8
259.2
277.3
Comerce
357.9
531.9
528.6
562.0
558.9
458.1
467.7
471.5
539.5
577.B
Others
267.2
350.9
202.6
205.1
207.6
198.5
219.9
212.5
240.2
260.0
83.3
113.5
101.7
128U.
123.9
75.7
77.1
67.6
91.3
84.4
2,519.6
3,213.0
3,646.6
3,807.7
3,817.3
3,346.3
3,505.9
3,599.6
3,929.2
4,200.9
Import Duties
BDPlearket prices)
a-1 Preliminaryfigures.
Source: National Statistical
Institute.
'
100
Table
2.11A)
: PERU- REAL6DPAVERAGE
GRORtH
RATES
.. _
_ .__
(percentages)
1970-19751975-19890
1970-1980
19B0-1987
1970-1987
kgriculture
10.5)
0.1
3.3
1.4
(19.9)
3.9
(8.7)
7.7
(2.3)
mining
0.2
15.1
7.4
(1.5)
3.6
HMnufacturing
5.1
1.5
3.3
2.5
3.0
Electricity,mater
9.6
10.3
10.0
3.4
7.2
Lz:'trU:t:cn
10.2
(1.3)
4.3
2.2
3.4
Housing
4.1
2.2
3.2
1.8
2.6
6overnment
Services
5.8
4.1
4.9
3.6
4.4
Financial
Institutions
6.4
29.1
17.2
3.5
11.3
Transport
8.9
3.4
6.1
2.3
4.5
Couerce
9.2
(0.1)
4.0
1.3
2.9
Others
5.6
(10.4)
(2.7)
3.6
(0.2)
Import
Duties
6.4
12.2)
2.0
12.b)
0.1
GDP(earketprices)
5.0
2.6
3.8
2.0
3.1
Fishing
0.7
Source:
Derived
froaStatistical
Appendix
lable
2.1
fable
2.2: PERU- NOMINAL
SDPBY SECTORAL
8RIGIN,1970,1975,1980-1987
(Nillion
Current
Intis)
1970
1975
1980
Agriculture
46.7
103.7
580.9
Fishing
5.6
5.3
29.4
Ninieg
13.7
22.3
904.4
55.4
133.3
Electricity,water
2.0
4.9
51.5
110.7
Construction
17.4
50.8
342.3
736.7
Housing
23.7
41.0
121.0
IB3.0
6overAaent
Services
24.4
57.1
461.0
916.7
5.5
16.0
469.8
Transport
15.2
44.7
396.2
Coerce
29.9
94.3
819.1
Others
31.5
71.7
426.6
857.6
9.0
20.3
159.8
312.5
280.0
665.4
anufacturing
Fimascial
Institutions
laport Duties
64Piearket
prices)
Source:
National
Statistical
Institute.
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
87.5
149.9
399.0
2b9.6
824.2
477.2
788.4
705.1
1975
1980
1981
192
1983
1984
19BS
1986
1987
Agriculture
16.7
15.6
9.7
9.8
9.0
10.1
10.4
8.7
11.2
MO.0
Fishing
2.0
0.8
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.9
0.6
fininq
4.9
3.4
15.2
11.8
10.4
11.0
10.6
9.8
3.0
2.7
19.8
20.0
20.2
18.3
18.5
18.6
20.4
25.0
24.7
22.5
Electricitylvater
0.7
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.1
0.8
1.1
1.2
1.0
1.0
Construction
6.2
7.6
5.7
6.9
9.9
6.7
6.5
7.0
7.4
7.2
Housing
8.5
6.2
2.0
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.1
0.7
0.6
0.5
Government
Services
8.7
8.6
7.7
8.6
9.7
9.3
9.8
9.1
8.7
8.5
Financial 1nstitutions
2.0
2.4
7.9
9.9
10.9
10.3
10.1
9.0
9.7
10.9
TranspDrt
5.4
6.7
6.6
6.7
6.1
5.6
5.9
6.1
6.1
5.3
Coaserce
10.7
14.2
13.7
13.7
12.4
13.3
12.9
12.9
12.8
12.8
Others
11.2
10.9
7.1
8.0
9.6
10.2
9.7
8.8
12.2
16.7
3.2
3.1
2.7
2.9
2.3
2.2
1.9
2.0
1.9
1.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Nanufacturing
lmportDuties
6DP(marketprices)
Source:
t-- --------------le-su-Source:National Statistical Institute.
- --------
-GDPt?EFLATORS
Table2.2(9): PERiJ
- 100)
11979
1984
1995
1986
1987
1970
1975
1990
1981
1982
1983
Agriculture
13.0
28.0
160.2
263.4
401.3
997.2
Fishing
11.9
34.0
155.6
276.7
361.6
881.8
fining
6.0
9.6
193.0
276.7
407.2
865.5
Manufacturing
B.B
16.6
139.2
224.1
383.9
844.8
Electricity,water
13.2
20.5
132.1
264.2
421.0
709.5
Construction
13.1
23.5
169.2
327.4
692.5
Housing
36.5
51.6
136.6
202.0
320.9
Services
6overnemnt
16.9
29.9
197.4
382.3
648.2
Institutions
Financial
9.0
19.3
157.9
329.2
613.6
Transport
11.7
22.4
168.0
283.3
439.9
799.7
CoW.rce
8.4
17.7
154.9
260.3
398.2
945.6
Others
11.9
20.4
210.6
418.1
821.7
Duties
lapcrt
10.8
17.9
157.1
243.4
339.1
931.4
GDP(marketprices)
11.1
20.7
163.7
279.9
470.2
973.2
2.1and2.2.
frowTables
Derivated
Source:
834.3
1970-1975 1975-1980
1991
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Agriculture
16.5
41.8
64.4
52.3
123.o
109.9
123.4
135.6
67.6
Fishing
23.4
35.6
77.9
30.7
143.9
81.7
157.2
108.0
67.1
Rising
10.0
82.2
43.4
47.2
112.5
104.8
142.9
(38.7)
84.2
11aufactturing
13.4
53.1
61.0
71.3
120.0
132.2
220.8
62.3
62.9
ElEctriCity,vater
9.1
45.1
100.1
59.3
68.5
204.1
168.3
41.0
84.9
Construction
12.4
49.4
93.5
111.5
72.6
116.6
231.9
62.1
65.9
Huuing
7.1
21.5w
47.9
59.9
59.6
62.9
85.3
47.8
54.1
Govurnuuat
Services,
12.1
45.9
93.6
69.6
80.6
98.1
148.9
94.3
91.2
Financial
Institutions
16.3
52.3
108.5
86.4
83.6
119.1
121.4
94.3
106.6
Transport
14.0
49.6
68.7
55.2
79.6
133.5
177.9
75.4
62.2
Cmrce
16.2
54.3
68.0
53.0
137.5
113.1
172.1
64.9
85.9
Others
11.6
59.5
98.5
98.5
102.3
92.0
157.1
132.6
Import
Duties
10.6
54.4
54.9
39.9
175.5
94.9
229.7
47.9
52.3
60P(larket
prices)
13.3
51.2
71.0
48.0
106.9
113.5
168.0
74.1
86.6
Source:
Derivated
fromTable2.2(8).
153.1
, 1V79-1987
Table2.3: PERU- GOPBYEXPENDITURES
INillion
1979intisl
1979
CONSINPTION
Private
Public
1981
1992
19B3
1984
1985
1986
1997
BROSSINVESTMENT
GrossFixedInvest
Construct
Equipsent
Change
inStocks
756.9
723.6
412.6
311.0
33.2
RESOURCE
BALANCE
Exports
Imports
302.0
969.2
666.2
6DPlearket
prices)
1990
152.3) 1122.3)
953.5
905.7
1,005.9 1,028.0
716.3
712.1
423.4
288.7
4.2
645.4
668.1
424.5
243.6
(22.7)
579.7
597.6
377.9
219.7
(19.9)
955.9
742.0
469.8
272.2
113.9
962.6
861.5
544.1
317.4
101.1
88.7
812.1
723.4
294.3
886.1
591.9
384.5
925.1
540.6
130.6
810.9
680.3
125.8
932.0
706.2
Source:
National
Statistical
Institute.
Table
2.4 : PERU
- NOMINAL
6DPBYEIPENDITURES
, 1979-1987
(Nillion
Current
Intiti
1979
CONSIISPTI1N
Private
Public
2,431.4
2,130.7
300.7
1980
1991
1982
1983
4,325.2
3,658.5
666.7
7,953.6
6,738.4
1,215.2
13,329.1 25,175.6
11,069.5 21,098.7
2,259.6
4,076.9
1994
16,517.4 44,6b8.0
16,138.0
44,254.0
10,692.1 29,598.0
6,045.9
15,656.0
(220.6)
414.0
756.8
723.6
412.6
311.0
33.2
1,640.4
1,401.7
752.8
648.9
238.7
3,347.1
2,771.6
1,543.8
1,227.8
575.5
5,644.6
4,980.7
3,010.9
1,969.9
663.9
7,733.3
7,561.4
4,773.2
2,788.2
171.9
RESUURCE
ALANICE
Exports
Imports
302.0
968.2
666.2
2.7
1,331.7
1,329.0
1642.2)
1,735.3
2,377.5
(1,023.3)
2,805.5
3,828.8
(344.3) 2,691.2
5,879.6
13,485.6
6,223.9
10,794.4
5,968.3
10,658.5 17,950.4
3,490.2
Source:
National
Statistical
Institute.
32,564.6
1986
1987
GOSS INVESTHENT
SrossFixedInvest
Construct
Equipment
Change
inStocks
60Plarketprices)
1985
9,307.0
39,611.2
30,304.2
92,125.1
B2,645.3
55,203.2
27,442.1
9,479.0
186,824.1
154,673.3
105,990.2
49,683.1
32,150.8
18,033.6' 112,911.6)
43,708.0
71,895.6
51,741.6
84,697.1
, 1979-1981.
INCOME
Table 2.55 PERU- WMESTIC
Intisb
(Nillion
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1995
1986
1987
a-/
& SALARIES
VASES
Salaries
Wages
928.0
511.5
416.5
1,609.3
897.9
721.4
2,796.1
1,504.1
1,292.0
4,569.5
2,417.0
2,152.5
8,458.2
4,415.9
4,042.3
16,233.5
9,165.0
8,068.5
39,678.6 '84,697.8
19,556.4 42,610.4
41,887.4
20,122.2
174,952.6
IORKERS
INDEPENDE.NT
607.0
1,017.4
1,827.3
2,943.7
5,363.5
11,912.2
30,137.9
67,991.2
133,206.2
67.0
97.0
154.1
248.2
545.9
1,169.5
3,552.3
5,105.4
7,232.2
947.0
1,370.1
2,092.4
3,469.4
6,414.0
17,036.2
48,347.9
85,441.4
189,393.2
39.1
70.4
176.1
343.4
672.1
1,491.3
3,037.9
3,301.5
6,817.5
2,599.1
4,164.2
7,044.0
11,574.3
21,453.7
47,842.8
RENT
PROFITS
NETINTEREST
TOTAL
a-1Prelieinary figwres.
Source: Central Bank.
89,515.7
85,436.8
Table2.5(A) : PERU
- DOIESTIC
INCINOE,
1979-1987.
(percentagedistributGon)
1979
1980
1991
1982
1983
1914
1985
1986
1997
WASES& SALARIES
Salaries
Wages
35.9
19.9
16.1
39.6
21.3
17.3
39.7
21.3
10.3
39.5
20.9
18.6
39.4
20.6
18.9
33.9
17.1
16.9
31.9
15.7
16.1
34.4
17.4
17.0
34.2
17.5
16.7
INDEPENDENT
WORKERS
23.5
24.4
25.9
25.4
25.0
24.9
24.2
27.6
26.0
2.6
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.5
2.4
2.8
2.1
1.4
36.6
32.9
29.7
30.0
29.9
35.6
38.8
34.7
37.0
1.7
2.5
3.0
3.1
3.1
2.4
1.3
1.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
RENT
PRWOITS
NETINTEREST
TOTAL
1.5
100.0
Institute.
00
1979-1997.
ORIGIN,
AND
08 6CODS
FORATI1ON
CAPITAL
- MROSS
2.6 s PERU
Table
(Million 1979Intis)
1979
TOTAL
723.6
412.6
CMNSTRUCTION
246.8
hildins
Construction 143.1
0thwr
22.7
Land Improvements
198
981.8
1901
1024.1
1982
1983
1994
1995
1996
1997
1003.3
712.1
669.1
597.6
742.0
861.5
463.0
272.1
162.7
29.2
524.6
299.7
192.6
32.3
533.6
311.3
194.9
27.4
423.4
251.8
142.9
29.7
424.b
249.5
148.6
26.5
377.9
225.3
132.0
20.6
469.9
263.0
176.4
30.5
544.1
307.3
201.2
35.6
EOUIPIEIT
Transport
Agriculture
Industrial
Other
311.0
62.9
10.3
135.5
102.4
418.9
110.1
17.3
150.6
140.9
499.5
162.3
14.b
176.7
145.9
469.7
143.9
12.6
171.2
142.0
298.7
90.9
4.5
114.0
79.4
243.5
74,8
5.9
91.7
66.2
219.7
73.9
6.1
81.2
59.5
272.2
91.8
11.3
103.9
65.3
317.4
110.5
15.6
i8.1
73.2
DOMESTIC
504.9
607.7
674.4
684.5
525.1
533.9
493.4
629.B
730.5
412.6
CONSTRUCTION
246.8
Buildings
Construction 143.1
Other
Landlaprovuemnts 22.7
463.0
272.1
162.7
28.2
524.6
299.7
192.6
32.3
533.7
311.3
195.0
27.4
423.4
251.9
142.9
28.7
424.6
249.5
149.6
26.5
377.9
225.3
132.0
70.6
469.9
263.0
176.4
30.5
544.1
307.3
201.2
35.6
92.3
49.9
3.3
15.1
24.0
144.7
79.0
4.6
18.2
42.9
149.9
83.5
5.1
19.3
41.9
150.8
87.7
4.1
19.2
39.9
101.7
53.7
2.0
17.1
28.9
109.3
52.9
1.7
23.4
31.3
115.5
54.1
2.6
26.5
32.3
159.0
72.7
3.8
44.9
37.6
166.4
84.9
4.7
55.1
41.9
EQUIPIIENT
Transport
Agriculture
Industrial
Other
INPRTED
219.7
274.3
349.6
319.0
187.0
134.3
104.2
113.2
131.0
EWUIPhIIENT
Transport
Agriculture
Industrial
Other
218.7
12.9
7.0
170.4
79.4
274.3
31.1
12.7
132.5
99.0
349.6
78.8
9.4
157.4
104.0
319.0
56.2
8.5
152.0
102.3
187.0
37.1
2.5
96.9
5O.5
134.3
27.0
4.1
68.3
35.0
104.2
19.7
3.5
54.7
26.2
113.2
19.1
7.5
58.9
27.6
131.0
25.6
10.9
63.0
31.4
110
Table
2.7: PERU
- REAL
SOPPER
CAPITA,
1970-1987
------
---
-------
lotal Population
(llillion)
--- -
------
SOP
Mlillion 1979intis)
---------------
BDP
(Iillion USA
Dollars)
RealGDPper Capita
(1979intis)
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
13,192.8
13,568.3
13,954.7
14,350.3
14,753.1
15,161.2
2.518.6
2,623.9
2,6"9.2
2,B44.3
3,107.4
3,213.0
11,207.7
11,676.2
12,011.5
12,657.3
13,827.8
14,29B.0
190.9
193.4
193.4
198.2
210.6
211.9
849.5
860.5
860.7
982.0
937.3
943.1
1976
1977
1979
1979
?21.1
15,573.2
15,990.1
16,414.4
16,894.7
:7,295.3
3,276.1
3,299.3
3,298.6
3,490.1
3,646.7
14,578.5
14,637.5
14,678.7
15,531.0
16,227.5
210.4
205.7
201.0
207.1
210.8
936.1
915.4
994.3
921.6
938.3
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
17,754.8
19,225.7
18,707.0
19,197.9
19,697.5
3,807.7
3,817.3
3,346.3
3,505.9
3,589.6
16,944.3
16,996.8
14,891.1
15,601.1
15,969.2
214.5
209.4
178.9
192.6
182.2
954.3
932.0
796.0
812.6
910.7
1986
1997
20,207.1
20,727.1
3,929.2
4,200.9
17,495.0
19,694.1
194.4
202.7
865.3
901.9
Sources
Source:
National
Statistical
Institute.
----------..
a~-
-- ------
--
111
Table
2.9:PERU- PERCAPITA
6DPBYDEPARTHENTS
(1979intis)
PERU
1979
1980
1981
1982
1993
1994
1995
207.1
210.9
214.5
209.4
179.9
182.6
182.2
101.9
121.9
51.4
234.0
49.9
68.6
99.1
90.2
139.6
200.1
184.2
150.9
173.8
317.1
562.2
297.0
934.0
218.6
195.7
70.1
138.4
436.7
140.8
232.5
100.9
122.2
50.6
236.2
53.3
70.2
100.3
103.3
137.8
213.2
178.9
181.4
195.7
321.9
538.9
295.0
870.7
207.4
179.9
72.7
134.8
396.4
141.6
227.9
96.8
125.2
53.5
233.0
55.0
61.2
98.3
92.7
147.4
20B.4
184.0
164.0
197.7
307.5
530.3
265.5
874.2
200.9
185.6
73.4
129.4
393.1
149.3
223.4
90.4
89.4
45.6
203.1
49.9
72.1
92.7
93.2
137.2
164.8
170.9
144.0
157.1
257.1
447.6
259.1
779.3
197.3
132.9
67.7
117.8
364.0
116.7
195.2
102.6
112.8
51.7
199.1
45.6
50.9
99.4
93.4
128.2
182.3
161.1
135.9
174.2
253.3
452.0
260.1
903.7
189.1
176.4
55.7
107.4
359.3
226.7
177.0
95.3
112.4
50.4
199.9
44.8
66.1
94.7
89.9
132.5
194.3
165.3
137.9
170.6
249.0
432.4
254.4
907.1
198.1
155.2
60.4
103.6
370.2
132.2
174.0
Amauonas
97.5
125.8
ApUrieac
51.9
Arequipa
229.0
Ayacucho
54.2
Cajamarca
66.9
Cuzco
99.4
Huancavelica 92.6
Huanuco
145.6
lea
198.2
Junin
192.9
LaLibertad
158.3
Lambayeque
185.6
Lima& Callao
304.2
Loreto
571.2
Nadre
deDios
308.8
Hoquegua
1,061.9
Pasco
215.0
Piura
193.1
Puno
70.4
Sannartin
122.1
Tacna
347.5
Tusbes
142.2
Ucayali
222.8
Ancash
aj Preliminary
figures.
Source: Nationalstatistical Institute.
112 -
table
3.13 PERU- SUNIARY
BALANCE
OF PAYHENTS,
1970,1975,1900-1987
--------(million
USAO)
1975
1.BALANCE
ONCURRENT
ACCOUNT
1900
1981
1982
1984
1985
-871
-221
125
1986
1987
-1535
-102
-1097
826
-553
-429
293
1007
1172
-65
-463
1. Exports FOB
2. ImportsFOB
1330
-2427
3916
-3090
3249
-3802
3293
-3722
3015
-2722
3147
-2140
2978
-1806
2531
-2596
2605
-3068
B. Financial
Services
-284
-909
-1019
-1033
-1130
-1165
-1011
-821
-769
-177
-107
-437
-472
-456
-563
-548
-495
-636
-494
-806
-359
-707
-304
-605
-216
-541
-228
-231
-166
-318
-314
-253
-221
-170
-343
-395
77
147
161
167
219
158
134
150
132
1135
463
565
1194
1394
1189
691
630
793
793
371
305
989
1431
1392
814
606
664
A. TradeBulance
3. Public
Sector
4. Private Sector
C. NonFinancial Services
D. Transfers
11.LONBTERNCAPITALS
E. Public
Sector
Disburuseents
6.Refinancing
7. Amortization
(1)
B.OtherCapitals
2.
F. Private Sector
(1+11)
111.BASICNETBALANCE
6. Short TereCapital and
Errors andOmissions
IV. CHAN6E
IN RESERVES
(111+6)
1-indicates
increase)
(1) Arrears
Source
: Central
lank
-1729 -1609
1983
-1079 -1495
92
260
205
-47
-203
-123
24
129
-400
361
-1164
-415
513
968
916
-449
-702
-177
361
660
539
-553
-721
-536
-6B
-104
577
-722
504
-124
40
-247
-280
517
906
- 113 -
Table
3.1MA): PERU- BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS
AS A PERCENT
OFGDP,1970,1975,1980-1987
I.BALMNCE
ONCURRENT
ACCOUNI
A. TradeBalance
1975
1990
1981
1982
1983
1994
1985
1996
1987
-9.3
-0.5
-6.9
-6.3
-4.4
-1.1
0.7
-4.3
-4.3
-6.7
4.0
-2.2
-1.7
4.9
6.4
-0.3
-1.3
1.5
1.Exports
FOB
2. Ieports FOB
8.1
-14.7
S. Financial Services
-1.7
-4.4
-4.0
-4.0
-5.7
3. PublicSector
4. Private Sector
-1.1
-0.6
-2.1
-2.3
-1.8
-2.2
-2.1
-1.5
C. NonFinancialServices
-1.4
-0.8
-1.3
D. transfers
0.5
0.7
6.9
11.LON6
TERN
CAPITALS
E. Puulit Sector
5. Disbursements
6.Refinancing
7.Amortization
8.Other
Capitals
(1)
F.Private
Sector
Ill.
BASIC
NETBALANCE
(1+11)
6.Short
TermCapital
and
Errors andOmissions
IV. CHANGE
INRESERVES
(111+6)
mr:B
1:a:=cz~---
:-:
stvLUag
16.4 10.1
-9.9 -10.3
7.5
-B.
-5.5
-5.6
-3.3
-2.2
-3.2
-2.5
-3.8
-1.7
-3.9
-1.7
-2.4
-0.9
-1.6
-0.7
-1.2
-1.3
-1.1
-0.9
-1.4
-1.1
0.6
0.b
1.1
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
2.2
2.2
4.6
6.9
5.7
3.6
2.5
2.3
4.8
1.8
1.2
7.2
6.6
4.5
2.4
1.9
6.5
0.0
-1.7
0.0
5.8
1.8
-5.8
-0.0
6.4
0.3
-5.5
-0.0
4.9
2.4
-6.9
6.2
3.6
1.1
-7.3
6.9
2.0
0.0
-5.9
6.2
1.6
0.0
-4.6
4.9
2.1
0.4
1.0
-0.2
-1.0
-0.7
0.1
0.4
2.6
4.6
4.5
-2.8
-3.4
-2.9
-2.4
1.7
-1.1
1,7
3.5
=2229
-3.5
:gUZ-
-4.6
7.5
7.7
0.4
5.1
-4.1. -5.7
0.0
0.1
0.9
-1.6
2.6
2.1
2.0
-0.5
a::r:=
0.2
ggunt
-1.2
Mass:
-1.5
gg=g
-1.8
-2.0
-0.3
-0.3
2.1
maS:
2.3
ZsMAZ
- 114 Table
3.2i PERO- HERCHANDISE
EXPORTS
BYCOINODITIES
,1975,1980-1987
1975
FISHMEAL
Value
(Smillion)
Volume
Ithonus.
tons)
Price
(Sperton)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
19bi
1986
1997
168
195
141
202
90
137
119
206
229
791
417
315
616
205
401
508
716
742
215.9 469.4 440.0 329.5 306.7 342.4 232.6 287.7 309.4
COTTONYalue
(Smillion)
53
72
63
Volume
(thou..
quintals) 737
702
695
Price
(Sperquintal)
71.9 101.9 92.0
95
1287
66.1
44
670
66.4
23
246
92.5
51
624
92.6
39
19
474
190
91.6 103.2
SUGAR Value
(Imillion)
Volume
(thou&.
tons)
Price($perquintal)
269
422
29.3
20
59
15.2
35
99
17.9
49
116
19.4
23
64
16.6
22
55
18.5
COFFEEValue(Smillion)
Voluse
Ithous.
tons)
Price(Sperquintal)
49
140
107
114
116
126
151
27c
143
42
44
46
43
55
52
60
74
71
53.8 146.9 107.4 119.4 96.9 112.7 115.9 169.1 94.2
COPPERValue
(Smillion)
(a)
Volume
(thous.
tons)
Price
(UScents
perlb.)
183
156
53.2
750
350
97.4
529
324
74.1
460
335
62.3
442
292
69.9
442
337
59.5
476
363
59.3
449
347
58.7
516
351
66.5
IRON
Value
O million)
Volume
(thous.
tons)
Price
(Sperton)
52
5
10.4
95
5.8
16.5
93
5.3
17.7
109
5.7
19.1
75
4.3
17.5
5
4.2
13.9
76
5.2
14.6
60
4.2
14.4
59
4.3
13.7
SOLD
Value
($million)
(b)
Voluse
Ithous.
troyounces)
Price
(Spertroyounce)
0
0
0
SILVERValue
(Ssillion)
92
Voluse
(thous.
troyounces) 20.7
Price (S per troy ounce)
4.5
13
53
11.4
0
0
0.0
15
33
20.5
40
74
56
69
67
43
7
1
65
157
149
164
193
135
20
2
616.5 472.7 375.6 420.9 366.7 320.6 353.1 363.6
315
16
19.7
312
28
11.1
205
26
7.9
391
32.7
11.9
227
26.8
0.5
140
22.3
6.3
107
19.1
5.6
93
13.9
6.7
99
142
31.6
384
152
114.4
219
146
68.0
215
177
55.2
294
191
69.6
234
191
58.7
202
174
52.7
172
136
57.4
251
146
7B.3
ZINC
Value(S million)
Volume
(thouw.tons)
Price (UScentsper lb.)
163
359
20.6
211
468
20.4
267
477
25.4
268
491
24.9
307
522
26.7
340
511
30.2
268
459
76.4
246
477
23.4
234
427
24.9
PETROLEUN
Value(Imillion)
Volume
Ithous.barrels)
Price ($ per barrel)
41
4
10.1
792
22.4
35.2
690
19.9
34.6
719
22.9
31.6
544
20.5
26.6
61B
23.5
26.3
645
27.1
2i.9
232
21.6
10.9
274
17.9
15.4
OTHER
TRADITIONAL
PRODUCTS
(c)
65
64
54
79
63
100
71
71
56
NON
TRADITIONAL
PRODUCTS
96
845
701
762
555
726
714
645
716
TOTAL
NERCHANDISE
EXPORTS,
F.O.B.($ million)
1330
3916
3249
3293
3015
3147
2979
2531
2605
115
Table
3.3: PERU- HERCHANDISE
EXPORTS
BYCONNODITIES
,1975,1980-1987
(Million
1978USADollars)
1975
___-- -
FISHHEAL
--
--
- .
...
1900
.
1991
.
. .
1982
.
--
1983
-
1984
- -
- --
1995
- -
1986
-
-_-
1987
-
COTTON
69.6
59.0
49.1
65.8
33.3
17.3
39.1
25.4
11.1
SUGAR
353.0
10.5
0.0
15.5
26.5
36.6
17.6
14.3
8.8
cOrFEE
64.3 112.7
83.3
89.3
97.9
COPPER
IRON
69.2
76.5
72.4
93.7
56.8
43.5
58.2
39.0
33.9
SOLD
0.0
32.2
57.6
43.4
52.3
50.3
33.0
4.6
0.6
SILVER
69.6
54.4
LEAD
ZINC
PETROLEUn
OTHERTRADITIONAL
PRODUCTS
95.3
NONTRADITIONAL
PRODUCTS
TOTAL
HERCHANDISE
EXPORTS,
F.O.B.
4 millionl
Source:
Derivedfrom Table3.2
51.5
42.!
61.2
47.7
75.0
54.4
46.2
32.9
1,745.4
3,153.0
2,530.4
2,550.7
2,284.1
2,360.e
2,292.01,646.7
1,524.3
- 116 -
Table
3.4:
PERU
- hERCHANDISE
IHPORTS,1975,
1980-1997
(Nillion
USADollarsi
1.CONSUNER
60ODS
. _.
216
372
335
240
112
378
405
28
417
82
253
23
211
11
101
142
236
153
252
949
041
596
571
---
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
42
174
II.INPUTS
Public
Settor
Private
Sector
III.
CAPITAL
60ODS
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
IV.OTHER
ANDADJUSTMENTS
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
V.TOTAL
559
445
........
-----
108
264
420
752
169
389
448
953
_---_
1242 1450
395
926
441
584
325
624
296
545
346
896
497
953
796
900
771
558
761
923
425
371
426
661
511
943
518
893
457
443
400
371
169
399
15B
603
143
780
242
459
399
545
462
190
295
215
2V0
208
34
398
61
324
65
480
65
362
100
110
70
227
68
159
56
234
56
~~~~atSD
anst5
__________
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
RENO
D Principal
food
product.
Uheat
Corn
Rice
Sugar
Milk
products
Soya
oil
Heat
---Source:
Central
Dank
5:
5c-5:
::=:
' 5-
5::
=::_
==:==
423
503
371
431
295
204
386
414
137
57
33
0
39
40
7
141
65
93
32
44
35
13
167
50
60
99
55
44
29
156
55
17
0
60
39
44
151
61
40
63
3?
53
22
143
18
11
34
29
39
21
104
32
0
0
22
33
13
114
33
31
46
50
40
72
92
36
36
57
60
50
el
---------
-----
- 117
Table
3.5:PERU- MERCHANDISE
IMPURTS,1975,
1980-1987
(Million
1979USADollars)
1975
1.CONSUMER
GOODS
_
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
1980
1981
1902
1983
1984
11.INPUTS
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
711.9
1985
1996
1987
111.CAPITAL
GOODS
1,044.6 975.21,132.4
1,093.0 681.9 579.4 427.6 495.1 540.1
Public Sector
Private
Sector
IV.OTHER
ANDADJUSTMENTS
Public Sector
Private
Sector
V.TOTAL
3,185.0
2,487.9
2,961.12,993.0
2,062.11,605.41,383.9
1,689.0
1,795.2
Public Sector
Private
Sector
1,668.0
1,088.6
1,130.8
1,100.7
1,016.7 643.7 538.7 523.7 600.9
1,517.1
1,399.4
1,830.2
1,782.3
1,045.5 961.7 945.21,165.3
1,194.3
MEMO: Principal
foodproducts
-____-__
_
__
-___
Wheat
Corn
Rice
Sugar
Milk
products
Soyaoil
Meat
Source
u
Derived
froe Table3.4
179.9
74.9
43.3
0.0
51.2
52.5
9.2
_
---
__
-----
113.5
52.3
74.9
25.8
35.4
28.2
10.5
_-
130.1
38.9
46.7
77.1
42.8
34.3
21.9
_--
120.8
42.6
13.2
0.0
46.5
30.2
34.1
114.4
46.2
30.3
47.7
29.5
41.7
16.7
107.3
13.5
9.3
25.5
21.9
29.3
15.8
79.7
24.5
0.0
0.0
16.9
25.3
10.0
74.2
21.5
20.2
29.9
32.5
26.0
46.8
53.8
21.1
21.1
34.5
35.1
29.3
47.4
11R -
Table3.6s PERU
- EXPORT,IIPORT
ANDTERNS
OFTRADEINDEXES
,1975,1980-1987
(1979
- 100)
1975
1900
1981
1982
1993
1984
1995
1996
1997
ExportPrice Index
91.4 189.5
IbO.4
133.0
146.0
134.6
118.2
101.4
109.2
76.2
124.1
129.4
129.1
132.0
133.3
130.5
153.7
170.9
119.9
152.7
124.9
103.0
110.6
101.0
90.6
66.0
63.9
27.3
-19.2
-17.5
7.4
-8.7
-10.3
-27.2
-3.1
Torosof TradeIndex
Percentage
Chan;e
Source:CentralBank
Notei termsof trade differ fromthosepresentedin Table111-16of report,dueto methodological
differences.
119
Tables
4.1:
PERU- TOTAL
EXTERNAL
DEBT
OUTSTANDING
ANDDISDURSED,1975,
1980-1987
(Hillion
USADollars)
1975
MEDIUM
ANDLON6IERN
DEBT
19B0
1981
1902
1983
1984
1995
1986
1987
Nonfinancial
Public
Sector3,066 6,043 6,127 6,025 9,256 9,64B 10,46211,068 11,732
Central
bank
0
710
455
707 1,009 862 925
758
870
Private Sector
1,286 1,373 1,508 1,665 1,580 1,466 1,342 1,344 1,448
SHORT
TER ,PUBLIL
ANDPRIVATE
1,905 1,469
- _- _ -- . - -_- - -- - Comsercial& Financial Cred 1,553 902
BankingSfstem
352
567
IKPUTED
INIERESI
ON
ARRcni;WL.Lnuliteda
77
;19
494
249
TOTALEXTERNAL
DEBT
s=.==z=2=
:::
vzzz
=:
t:
--
--
==_
MEMO:
ACCUMULATED
ARREARS
- PRINCIPAL
- INTEREST
Source: Central Bankand Bankestimates
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
0
22
120
PIJBL
- SERVICE
PAYMENTS,DISOURSEMENTP
aNDDINJTANDINB
ANDUNTS
OFEXTERNAL
Table4.2 : PERU
(Ihillion USAWilars)
1980
1991
1982
1993
1984
1985
19E
1997
t94
475
480
Disbursements
(1)
Service Payments
- Principal
(1)
- Interest
Other
Capitals
(2)
Adjustaents
Outstandinq
External
Public
Debt (3)
22
NA
n.f
1,932
n.a
(1)Includes refinancings
(2)Arrears
; it doesnotinclude
interest
on arrears
13)Excludes
Central
Bankandexcludes
isputed
interest
on arrears.
Source
: Central
BankandDankestimates
- 121 -
Table
5.1: PERU- NONFINANCIAL
PUBLIC
SECTOR
OPERATIONS,
1975,1980-1987
(Nillion
Intis)
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1997
CURRENT
REVENUES
201
1.Taxes
2.Social
Security
Contrib.
3.Other
Revenues
4.Transfers
83
17
101
0
CURRENI
EXPENDITURES
201
1.Remunerations
2.Purchases
ofgoodandservices
3.Interests
4.Transfers
60
103
16
22
487
922 1,655
1,321 2,002 3,531
284
504
780
457
631 1,065
LURRENT
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
151
49
CAPITAL
REVENUES
1.Repayments
ofloans
2.Other
0
0
0
32
4
28
72
1
71
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES
54
418
938
1,508 2,744
I.Capital
Formation
2.Financial
Investment
3.Other
49
1
4
361
14
43
771
12
55
OVERALL
DEFICIT
FINANCING
(NET)
54
1.External
1.1LongTere
Utililation
Amortization
1.2ShortTerm
2.Internal
Source
a CentralBank
(9)
202
1
201
(716) 642
273
2
271
436
5
433
6,206
153 (16,575)
235
717
28
28
39
10
n.a
102
103
329
226
(1)
26
133
537
292
- 122 -
Table5.l(A) : PERU
- NONFINANCIAL
PUBLIC
SECTOR
OPERATIONS,
1975,1980-1987
(Asa percentof 8DP)
1975
1980
1991 1992
1983
1984
1985
1986
1997
CURRENT
REVENUES
1. Taxes
2. Social SecurityContrib.
3. OtherRevenues
4. Transfers
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
1.Remunerations
2. Purchases
of goodandservices
3. Interests
4. Transfers
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
0.00
2.53
0.98 3.11
0.04
-2.44
CAPITAL
REVENUES
1. Repayments
ot loans
2. Other
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.54
0.07
0.47
0.69 1.13
0.01 0.01
0.67 1.12
0.94
0.01
0.93
0.60
0.01
0.59
0.50
0.01
0.49
0.30
0.01
0.29
0.30
0.01
0.30
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES
8.12
7.00
7.86
9.40
8.43
7.63
5.98 5.24
4.35
I.CapitalFormation
2. FinancialInvesttent
3. Other
7.36
0.15
0.60
6.05
0.23
0.72
7.23
0.11
0.52
5.82
0.10
0.06
3.89
0.00
0.46
4.89
0.08
0.29
OVERALL
DEFICIT
-9.12
FINANCING
(KET)
8.12
3.94
1. External
1.1 LongTerm
Utilization
Amortization
1.2 ShortTerm
4.21
4.21
5.71
1.50
0.00
1.71 1.69
1.73 2.20
5.51 5.47
3.79 3.27
-0.02 -0.52
2.43 1.38
1.98 1.49
7.07 4.91
5.09 3.31
0.45 -0.12
2. Internal
3.91
2.23
1.57
2.47
Source
s CentralBankandNationalStatistical Institute
6.73
5.04
7.33
9.79
4.23
1.61 -1.55
4.90
6.50
5.12
- 123 -
Table
5.2: PERU
- CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS
,1975,1980-1987
(million
Intis)
--
- --
- --
- --
- _.
--
- -
- --
--
_ _--
_-
__
- ---
CURRENT
REVENUES
88
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
91
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
(3)
121
19
CAPITAL
REVENUES
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES
28
263
439
OVERALL
DEFICIT
FINANCING
(NET)
31
142
420
17
17
23
6
n.a
35
42
224
192
(7)
124
114
389
274
10
409
400
925
525
9
14
15
-I
107
90
17
296
312
-16
1.External
1.1Long
Tere
Utilization
Amortization
1.2Short
Ter
2.Internal
2.1Banking
Systes
2.2Others
Source
: CentralBank
92
272
140
- 124 -
,1975,1980-1987.
OPERATIONS
60VERNNENT
- CENTRAL
: PERU
Table
5.2(A)
ofrOP)
(Asa percent
------------------- -
--------------
-- -
----
--
--------
--
-----
--
_.-----------------
_---_----_----_--
____
_-_
____-_
_-_-_
__
-_-----
REVENUES
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
CURRENT
BALANCE
ACCOUNT
CURRENT
CAPI'tLRE'VENUES
EXPENDITURES
CAPITAL
DEFICIT
OVERALL
(NET)
FINANCING
1.E^tErnal
Tern
1.1 Long
Utilization
Asortization
Term
1.2Short
2.55
2.55
3.46
0.90
n.j
2.Internal
Systes
2.1 Banking
2.2Others
0.59
0.70
3.75
3.05
-0.12
1.16
1.07
3.64
2.57
0.09
2.28
2.23
5.15
2.92
0.05
3.86
3.72
8.22
4.49
0.14
3.17
2.88
9.49
5.61
0.29
2.50
2.44
7.92
5.38
0.06
1.30
1.18
5.15
3.97
0.13
0.77
0.72
3.40
2.68
0.05
Institute.
Statistical
DankandNational
Source
: Central
125 -
Table
5.3 s PERU
- NDNFINANCIAL
PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE
OPERATIONS,
1975,1980-1987
(Nillion
Intis)
1975 1990
CURRENT
REVENUES
95
1.Salesof goods
andUrvices
2.Current
Transfers
3.Other
Revenues
96
5
4
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
99
1.Resunerations
2. Purchases
ofgood
andservices
3. Interests,Coumission6
4. Taxes
5. Others
13
77
6
1
2
BALANCE
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
(4)
(9)
CAPITAL
REVENUES
1.Capital
Transfers
2.Other
9
7
1
80
53
27
BO
21
59
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES
33
190
359
I.Capital
Formation
2.Financial
Investment
3. CapitalTransfers
andothers
32
1
0
153
6
21
352
5
2
199
29
170
331
86
245
587
225
362
143 1,849
OVERALL
DEFICIT
(29)
FINANCING
INET)
29
109
11
11
n.a
65
61
4
47
621
492
900 2,615 4,077 4,403
115
261 1,041 1,511 3,151 2,870 5,600
(60) 360 1549) (611) (536) 1,207 (1,197)
18
44
244
1.External
1.1 LongTero
1.2ShortTero
2. Internal
Source
s Centrallank
723
102
232
- 126 -
Table
5.3A) : PERU
- NONFINANCIAL
PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE
OPERATIONS,
1975,1980-1997
(As
a percent
ofGOP)
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1997
22.55 28.95
23.13
26.11
17.45
14.07
22.03
0.00
1.10
CURRENT
REVENUES
14.29 25.30
1.Sales
ofgoods
andservices
2.Current
Transfers
3.Other
Revenues
21.31
0.01
1.24
27.52
0.00
1.43
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
14.99 25.45
21.42
22.90
27.08 21.49
23.91
17.41
13.82
1.Remunerations
2.Purchases
ofgoDd
andservices
3. Interests,Commissions
4.Taxes
5.Others
1.95
11.57
0.90
0.15
0.30
1.96
1.95
16.49 13.56
1.11
1.04
4.57
3.22
1.32
1.65
2.56
13.35
1.10
3.72
2.16
2.54
2.54
17.50 12.25
1.26
1.26
4.05 4.32
1.74
1.12
2.34
13.55
1.22
5.99
0.81
2.32
9.79
0.61
4.37
1.12
2.08
7.36
0.79
2.48
1.11
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
-0.35
0.04
0.24
21.31
1.87
1.64 2.21
CAPITAL
REVENUES
-. CapitalTransfers
2.Other
1.20 1.34
0.75 1.11
1.05 0.89
0.20
0.16
0.15 0.45 0.55 0.95
0.32
0.03
0.29
CAFITAL
EXPENDITURES
4.96
3.37
4.79
5.11
4.39
3.14
2.15
1.70
I.Capital Foreation
2. Financial
Investment
3. Capital
Transfers
andothers
4.91 2.56
3.30
0.15 0.10 0.05
0.00 0.35
0.02
4.71
0.07
0.02
5.03
0.04
0.04
4.13
0.17
0.09
3.01
0.09
0.03
2.01
1.70
0.09 0.00
0.05
0.00
-4.03
-2.22
-1.94
-0.52
4.03
2.22
1.94
0.52
OVERALL
DEFICIT
3.02
FINANCING
(NET)
4.36 1.83
1. External
1.1Longterm
1.2 Short
Term
1.65
1.09
0.44 3.46
1.65
1.02
1.08 1.45
0.00 0.07 -0.64
2.01
2.Internal
2.71
0.74
Source
: Central
DankandNational
Statistical Institute.
2.73
2.29
0.57
-1.74
1.66 1.14
1.51 1.24
1.31
1.07
3.20
2.07
1.59 0.75
-1.b9 -0.94 -0.27
0.32
0.71
0.71
-0.79
-1.14
0.59
0.59
0.74
-0.16
0.56
- 127
1987.
OPERATIONS
DYCONPANY,
PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE
- NONFINANCIAL
Table
5.3(B): PERU
(Nillion
IntisI
---
SIDER PESCARESTOTOTAL
WINERD
CENTRONIN
PETROENCI/ELECTRO
PERU ECASA PERU PERU ECASA PERU PERU
--
,-_-
-.-
REVENUES
CURRENT
andservices
1.Sales
ofgoods
2. Current
Transfers
Revenues
3. Other
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
913 (3,750)
REVENUES
CAPITAL
Transfers
1.Capital
2. Other
529
255
274
0
0
0
770
859
0
959
0
0
0
419
0
419
0
0
0
600 2,406
255
0
600 2,151
4,694 12,900
EXPENDITURES
CAPITAL
1,914
113 5,431
200
478
67
13
I.CapitalFormation
Investeent
2.Financial
andothers
3. CapitalTransfers
1,914
0
0
113 5,431
0
0
0
0
200
0
0
478
0
0
67
0
0
13 4,684 12,900
0
0
0
0
0
0
DEFICIT
OVERALL
13,803) 152
(572) (3,963)
709
INET)
FINANCING
(709)
681
59
64
(5)
(510)
280
(798)
(9)
(46)
5
(11)
135) (14)
__
__
488
100 9,646
_.
1.External
1.1Long
term
Term
1.2 Short
2. Internal
al ank
: Cmnif
Source
576
949
(273)
511 2,9S9
512 2,938
20
(1)
14) 3,352
845
(211) (199)
727
497
4,403
955 5,600
(911 (1,197)
964
(764) 4,243
- 128 -
TLable
5.4: PERU- CURRENT
REVENUE
OFTHECENTRAL
6OVERNMENT
8YSOURCE,1975,19B0-1987
(Million
Intis)
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
TAXREVENUES
82
1.Income
Taxes
Taxes
on
Persons
Corporations
Wages
&Salary
Taxes
Other
24
16
5
11
3
5
298
263
16
247
34
1
4
2
I
1
3.lportTaxes
4.Export
Taxes
303
237
41
196
65
1
480
369
34
335
109
2
33
61
96
135
281
23
B
2
46
14
1
71
23
2
101
32
2
226
37
18
636
0
3u
18
158
321
475
714
123
116
119
98
andConsumption
32
379
629
bood
andServices
22
250
409
674
15
159
223
327
External
Fuel
and6asoline
Other
7
3
7
91
91
38
186
156
64
347
305
190
6.Other
TaxRevenues
Amnesties
Revaluation
ofassets
2
1
0
1
31
2
25
50
16
27
E3
9
53
118
39
53
21
26
145
NONTAXREVENUES
78
141
236
377
FISCAL
CREDIT
DOCUMENTS
(2)
TOTAL
CURRENT
REVENUES
98
2.Wealth
Taxes
Business
Assets
Stamps,Registration
Otbcr
2,057 2,759
0
n.a
7
0
91
576
653
239
5.Taxes
onProduction
Internal
Other
Source
a Central
Bank
415
847
1,823
- 129 -
Table
5.41A)
: PERU
- CURRENT
REVENUE
OFTHECENTRAL
GOvERNrENT
BYSOURCE,1975,1980-1987
(A;apercent
of iDP)
--
--
--
--_
_-- --
---
--
--
--
---.---
--
--
--
--
_ _ --
--
--
--
_-- ----
-- _----
--
-_---
--
TAXREVENUES
1.Incose
Taxeb
Taxes
on
Persons
Coroorations
gaqes
&Salary
Taxes
Other
3.61
2.40
0.75
1.65
0.45
0.75
4.99
4.41
0.27
4.14
0.57
0.02
2.94
2.22
0.38
1.84
0.61
0.01
2.67
2.06
0.19
1.87
0.61
0.01
1.99
1.34
n.a
n.a
0.65
0.01
1.95
1.28
n.a
n.a
0.67
0.01
1.73
1.30
n.a
n.A
0.42
0.01
2.59
2.55
n.a
n.a
0.03
0.00
1.73
1.71
n.a
n.a
0.01
0.00
2.Nealth
Taxes
Business
Assets
Stamps,Registration
Dther
0.60
0.30
0.15
0.15
0.55
0.39
0.13
0.03
0.57
0.43
0.13
0.01
0.53
0.40
0.13
0.01
0.41
0.31
0.10
0.01
0.39
0.31
0.05
0.02
0.33
0.32
0.00
0.07
0.54
0.54
0.00
0.00
0.36
0.36
0.00
0.00
3.Iaporttaxes
4.Export
Taxes
5.Taxes
onProduction
AndConsueption
Good
andServices
Internal
External
Fuel
andGasoline
Other
4.81
3.31
2.25
1.05
0.45
1.05
6.35
4.19
2.66
1.52
1.52
0.64
5.90
3.84
2.09
1.75
1.46
0.60
6.52
3.75
1.82
1.93
1.70
1.06
5.94
2.81
1.44
1.37
2.08
1.05
6.20
2.47
1.27
1.20
2.44
1.29
7.75
2.39
1.25
1.15
4.05
1.30
5.57
1.37
0.81
0.56
2.84
1.36
4.56
1.05
0.69
0.37
1.71
1.80
6.Other
TaxRevenues
Ahnesties
Revaluation
ofassets
Other
0.30
0.15
0.00
0.15
0.52
0.03
0.42
0.07
0.47
0.15
0.25
0.07
0.46
0.05
0.30
0.12
0.36
0.12
0.16
0.08
0.74
0.37
0.16
0.20
0.55
0.27
0.08
0.21
0.31
0.06
0.03
0.22
0.25
0.01
0.00
0.24
NONTAXREVENUES
1.20
1.31
1.32
1.31
1.16
2.19
1.60
1.15
0.59
REVALUED
TAXES
ToTaL
CURRENT
REVENUES
Source
: CentralBank
- 130
Table
5.5i PERU- CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
OFTHECENTRAL
BOVERNNENT
,1975,1900-1997
(Niilion
Intis)
CURRENT
EXPENDITURES
91
1.#ages
andSalaries
2.Goods
andServices
3.Transfers
a)NonFinancial
Public
Enterprises
b!Public
Institutions
& Local
Governments
c)Pensions
andother
4.Interest
Payments
a)Internal
Debt
b)External
Debt
5.Defense
32
6
19
239
36
165
449
65
237
n.a
n.a
n.a
9
4
5
26
55
105
214
92
122
244
90
144
382
204
178
372
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES
28
263
439
1.Capital
Formation
2.Transfers
a)Nonfinancial
Public
Enterprises
biFinancial
Public
Enterprises
c)Public
Institutions,
Local6overnments
and
others
3.Other
16
12
178
85
351
86
541
43
53
21
29
86
225
172
508
255
22
52
57
335
978
I
0
10
0
13
2
14
11
20
12
54
6
11D
TOTAL
ANORTIZATION
1. InternalDebt
2. ExternalDebt
TOTAL
EXPENDITURES
Source
: CentralBank
2,062 991
211
29
182
335
61
274
131 -
,1975,1980-1987
BOVERNNENT
OFTHECENTRAL
EXPENDITURES
Table5.5(A,i PERU- CURRENT
ofGDP)
I Asa percent
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1995
1986
1997
EXPENDITURES
CURRENT
andSalaries
1.Naqes
andServices
2.Goods
3.Transfers
a) NonFinancial
Enterprises
Public
Institutions
b) Public
6overnments
& Local
andother
c)Pensions
Payeents
4. Interest
Debt
a) Internal
Debt
bIExternal
5. Defense
4.91
0.90
2.71
4.00
0.60
2.76
4.20
0.61
2.22
4.08
0.53
1.59
4.20
0.72
2.17
4.02
0.79
2.31
3.71
0.87
1.73
3.97
0.88
2.68
3.94
0.66
2.82
n.a
0.08
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.54
0.13
n.a
n.a
1.35
0.60
0.75
3.91
0.92
1.76
3.59
1.54
2.04
4.09
0.84
1.35
3.58
1.91
1.67
3.49
0.71
0.97
3.10
1.44
1.66
4.38
0.B2
1.36
4.33
1.51
2.82
4.13
0.75
1.56
4.20
0.99
3.21
2.92
0.52
1.21
4.07
1.13
2.94
3.25
0.70
1.44
2.29
0.53
1.76
2.91
0.87
1.92
1.73
EXPENDITURES
CAPITAL
4.21
4.41
4.12
3.31
3.13
3.24
2.53
2.88
2.24
Foreation
1.Capital
2.Trapsfers
financial
a)Nor,
Enterprises
Public
Public
b)Finan.cial
Enterprises
Institutions,
c)Fublic
and
LocalGovernments
others
3.Other
2.40
1.90
2.98
1.42
3.29
0.81
3.01
0.24
2.77
0.33
2.95
0.38
2.29
0.22
2.19
0.67
1.45
0.56
1.05
0.89
0.20
0.16
0.26
0.31
0.09
0.13
0.03
0.60
0.37
0.49
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.09
0.13
0.15
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.12
0.02
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.11
0.02
0.45
0.02
0.40
0.23
SUBTOTAL
3.14
0.57
2.57
3.24
0.32
2.92
4.85
0.35
4.49
5.90
0.29
5.61
6.01
0.63
5.38
4.71
0.74
3.97
o.85
0.88
2.85
2.90
0.30
2.68
onORTI1ATION
Debt
1.Internal
Debt
2.External
1.95
1.05
0.90
EIPENDITURES
TOTAL
: Central Bank
Source
132 -
Table
5.6: PERU- FISCAL
COST
OFEIEMPTIONS
ONINPORT
TARIFFS,BY
SECTORS,1996-1967.
(Hillion
Intis)
SECTOR
/ ITEM
AGRICULTURE
Capital
goods
Soya
andyellow
corn
Inputs
andfertilizers
Others
1996
1987
IJan.-June)
464.5
242.0
150.1
46.9
25.5
321.3
182.6
90.5
36.7
11.5
FISHING
Capital goods
Others
44.9
37.9
7.0
36.6
36.6
0.0
NININ6
Capital
goods
71.7
71.7
26.8
26.8
PETROlEUN
Capital
goods
0.5
0.5
8.4
8.4
547.9
276.7
137.9
108.6
4.6
19.9
331.4
176.4
43.1
101.6
2.9
7.4
4.9
0.0
14.b
1.4
149.9
25.1
70.9
2.1
70.4
53.3
25.9
43.0
1,491.6
1,181.1
DIPLONATICS
444.6
405.8
GRANTS
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
273.2
185.9
136.9
107.0
OTHERS
532.9
369.1
3,756.9
2,752.B
MANUFACTURING
Ioports
for Editorsandlewspapers
Machinary
for Cement
Industry
Imports
forPaper
Factories
Automobile
parts
Others
ELECTRICITY
NATER
TRANSPORTATION
Equipment
forPorts
andStorages
Imports
forTelevision
andBroadcasting
Corporations
Others
TRAL,LOCAL
CEN
ANDRE61GNAL
GOVERNhENTS
TOTAL
Source
: Ministry
ofFinances
iMEF).
,1975,1990-19B7
SYSTEN
FINANCIAL
IFTHECONSOLIDATED
ACCOUNTS
- SUlMMARY
Table6.1 : PERU
Intis)
(Million
1975
1980
1981
1982
5.2
21.0
15.8
436.1
072.3
436.2
391.1
923.8
532.7
896.9
2,008.4
1,121.5
OPERATIONS 120.0)
NETINTERNAT.
11. OTHER
(119.3)
(308.3)
RESERVES
1.NETINTERNATIONAL
a.Assets
b.Liabilities
CREDIT
111. INTERNAL
Sector
a.Private
Sector
b.Public
Assets
c. NetUnclassified
251.8
138.6
63.0
50.2
2,304.3
1,035.9
1,937.0
939.3
974.4
474.4
(376.9) (601.1)
SECTOR
TOPRIVATE
IV.LIABILITIES
a. Currency
Deposits
b. Demand
c. TiseDeposits
Deposits
d. Savings
Deposits
Currenty
e. Foreign
Bonds
f.Iortgage
9.Others
153.2
42.4
36.3
15.7
20.5
0.5
17.6
20.2
1,353.7
272.7
251.4
111.1
176.9
380.1
106.3
55.2
Dank
: Central
Source
2,387.1
432.6
331.2
211.2
434.2
653.8
241.5
82.6
(786.7)
1993
1,943.9
4,715.4
2,771.5
1994
6,281.9
13,033.3
6,751.4
1985
19,278.0
34,491.5
15,213.5
1986
1907
1,977.7
12,074.1
29,401.6 46,856.5
17,327.5 44,978.8
111,209.3)
12,103.3) (3,763.0) (6,910.0) (5,443.0)
4,226.5
624.7
424.0
426.3
922.9
1,480.8
321.5
126.3
9,087.7
1,104.3
897.7
846.6
1,396.0
3,264.9
421.2
167.1
19,160.7
2,487.8
2,049.1
1,756.8
2,676.6
9,392.4
540.0
258.0
,1975,1980-1987
SYSTEN
BANKING
OFTHECONSOLIDATED
MARYACCOUNTS
- SU
Table6.2 : PERU
Intis)
(Million
1982
1983
1989
1995
1996
1987
1975
1980
1981
RESERVES
1 NETINTERNATIONAL
a. Assets
b.Liabilities
5.2
21.0
15.9
436.1
872.3
436.2
391.1
923.8
532.7
OPERATIONS
It.OTHERNETINTERNAT.
114.7)
CREDIT
111.INTERNAL
a. Private Sector
SKctor
b. Public
Assets
c.NotUnclassified
139.3
108.6
52.2
(21.5)'
SECTOR
TOPRIVATE
IV.LIABILITIES
a. Currency
Deposits
b. Demand
c. TimeDeposits
Deposits
d.Savings
Deposits
Currency
e.Foreign
Bonds
f. Mortgage
g. 0t0ers
129.8
42.6
37.2
9.7
15.0
0.7
18.2
6.4
7,532.7
1,114.4
969.9
526.6
1,154.9
3,314.7
422.6
29.6
Table6.3 : PERU
- SUI"ARM
AOUWTS
OFTIE CENTRAL
RESERVE
8AK ,1975,1980-1987
lnillion Intis)
1975
1980
1981
1992
1983
1994
1995
1996
1997
1. NETINTERNATIONAL
RESERVES
a. bsets
b. Liabilities
19.3
19.2
0.9
505.9
756.9
251.0
402.2
644.8
242.7
904.7
1,642.9
738.2
2,019.6
3,966.1
1,946.5
6,408.2
11,317.2
4,939.0
20,913.8
31,931.5
11,017.7
13,351.9
25,942.b
12,590.7
1,422.5
37,290.5
35,968.0
11. OTHER
NETINTERWT.
OPERATIONS
(1.03
(7.4)
113.8)
(639.7)
(2,093.7)
(1,269.0) (1,684.9)
Ill.
36.1
9.3
0.0
30.3
5.9
(0.0
14.4
1.7
(1.9
249.3
200.9
0.0
152.6
35.3
9.8
107.5
5.7
(99.5)
759.4
365.1
0.7
367.9
139.6
39.6
18B.7
3.5
21.2
53.4
48.4
4.7
0.3
0.0
746.8
319.3
217.8
200.1
10.6
1,147.7
526.2
262.8
352.0
6.7
INTERNAL
CREDIT
a. Public Sector
b. Private Sector
c. Daikiog Sector
Baco de la macian
Comercial Banks
Development
Banks
d. Capital andReserv
c. Not UnclassifiedAssets
IV. LIABILTIES7OPRIVATE
SECTOR
a. Currnqcy
b. Ba Deposits
e. ForeignCurrencyDeits
e. ForeignCurrencyCertificates
169.7) 1576.5)
1,002.1
539.0
3.0
387.0
125.0)
60.6
351.4
4.6
77.7
2,473.0
1,403.3
11.0
1,164.5
24.0
259.1
881.4
54.6
151.2)
4,262.0
988.0
31.1
3,099.5
226.8
972.0
1,900.7
233.4
376.8
10,844.4
(2,2.3)
136.4
6,999.1
846.8
2,660.2
3,492.1
42.3
6,028.5
29,093.5
1,319.0
166.7
14,220.1
1,667.1
4,000.4
8t552.6
70.1
13,457.8
89,034.2
22,378.1
243.4
37,346.9
4,132.4
10,553.7
22,660.9
216.7
29,282.5
1,939.1
734.0
189.9
995.2
19.0
3,916.1
1,333.1
495.3
2,056.7
41.0
10,030.5
2,938.3
665.3
6,396.6
140.3
29,56!.5
9,304.3
12,789.6
7,274.8
195.8
i;,176.4
111,415.0
19,898.7
3,682.3
18D.4
87,771.8
46,724.B
32,020.9
7,968.e
1,157.t
Table7.1: PERU
- A6RICULTURAL
PRODUCTION
,1975,1980-1987
(Thousand
Toas.)
COTTON
RICE
CO!VEF
SUSARCAME
EANS
HAtIE
POTATOES
SORtiHUH
SOYA
WHEAT
POULTRY
SHEEP
PORK
BEEF
E68S
FRESH
MILK
Source:Central Rank
1975
1980
1981
1992
1983
1984
1985
1996
1987
226
537
65
8,959
49
634
1,640
29
2
126
256
420
95
5,598
39
453
1,380
35
11
77
296
712
95
5,129
44
597
1,705
44
14
119
256
776
90
6,509
43
631
1,900
39
8
101
105
798
91
6,381
35
585
1,200
12
2
76
203
1,156
11
6,998
45
776
1,43
44
2
84
291
878
91
7,329
46
703
1,557
23
2
92
304
726
96
6,273
54
876
1,658
39
4
121
202
1,169
98
6,099
59
914
1,709
24
6
133
183
19
59
90
64
795
205
20
59
91
65
805
206
21
55
111
68
752
182
19
55
103
65
790
201
17
54
101
78
809
230
17
59
90
95
281
19
65
107
97
819
830
130
21
55
86
50
813
144
21
55
84
60
780
- 137 -
Table7.2 : PERU
- VOLIME
INDEI
OFNMAFACTURING
PRODUCTION
1S75,1980-1987
(1979* 100)
1975
180
1981
I92
I193
1994
1995
2986
1987
lOTAL
NIIAHFACTURIN
99.2
105.1
109.7
103.4
84.0
90.4
96.0
113.1
127.5
FoodandOthes
103.3
105.6
106.3
105.1
94.2
98.7
100.7
124.1
140.2
106.9
148.3
101.7
100.3
80.7
110.7
102.8
72.0
114.1
1A1.4
87.0
110.8
86.3
63.3
110.7
96.5
96.1
102.8
95.8
102.4
I1I.5
106.5
n.n
171.2
117.1
na
207.2
108.6
98.0
102.6
106.8
90.5
96.1
105.9
114.6
123.2
92.5
126.2
139.4
133.6
95.4
105.9
120.2
111.4
100.8
102.7
125.3
103.7
108.1
115.1
102.2
81.9
91.2
103.0
90.0
60.4
97.9
112.2
92.8
56.3
112.4
102.6
77.0
59.7
120.9
112.0
96.2
65.0
132.2
n.a
105.3
36.5
143.2
120.8
120.3
102.9
93.5
90.3
87.6
96.8
120.7
100.6
168.7
121.9
119.8
107.4
133.6
78.1
128.3
70.6
96.9
71.2
110.1
65.6
110.4
80.1
114.0
99.1
M
97.0
110.8
114.6
108.5
89.9
95.4
98.4
120.9
140.1
74.5
107.3
112.7
86.6
105.5
125.2
118.1
103.0
112.9
132.3
114.0
111.4
107.3
132.4
103.3
U2.5
81.2
100.7
89.0
104.9
102.4
72.1
76.3
1I1.
102.5
97.5
95.1
116.3
123.2
n.a
15.5
119.8
135.6
n.a
150.5
130.8
MonMetal
lineral Products
108.2
109.4
115.6
109.0
90.1
70.7
7J.9
106.7
136.0
Bsit Metals
47.8
97.8
91.9
99.0
79.5
07.6
93.6
99.2
91.9
99.8
40.9
112.2
94.5
81.2
94.5
67.6
94.6
55.3
94.6
66.3
93.1
74.0
98.7
91.6
98.6
110.9
96.9
127.8
124.1
146.7
115.2
67.7
69.8
92.6
119.6
153.4
113.9
111.4
122.8
9
149.9
120.6
121.2
27.5
154.7
121.7
138.5
139.0
206.8
9S.4
105.9
116.5
143.9
66.0
60.6
79.7
53.5
70.3
49.0
95.7
57.0
73.9
57.6
104.9
74.2
105.5
101.3
138.4
114.9
155.1
119.2
169.8
146.6
PrKcesed
Products
SugarIndustry
Beveagns
textile,Clothing
Textiles
Clothing
Leathergoods
Footwear
PaperPrinting
Paper,Paper
Products
Printing
ChnicalProducts
Basic
Chnicals
Medicines
andothes
Otherchniecals
Petroleusrefinig
Ferrousmtals
Nknferrous etals
MetalProducts
Metal
Products
MonElectrical Machinery
ElectricalMachinery
Transport
Equipsent
Source Nhational
StatisticalInstitute.
- 138 -
Table9.1 s PERU
- CONSUIER
PRICE
INDEXES
FORETROPOLITAN
LINA,1970-1987
(1979* 100)
Endof period
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1994
1985
1986
1987
Rate I change
11.7
12.6
13.1
14.9
17.9
22.0
31.9
42.2
73.2
122.1
196.3
339.0
586.3
1,319.6
2,790.4
7,206.4
11,739.1
25,191.9
Source:NationalStatistical Institute.
5.6
7.6
4.3
13.8
19.2
24.0
44.7
32.4
73.7
66.7
60.8
72.7
72.9
125.1
111.5
159.3
62.9
114.5
Periodaverage
Rate
12.0
12.9
13.9
15.1
17.6
21.9
29.1
40.2
63.4
100.0
159.2
279.2
459.2
969.5
2,039.0
5,368.2
9,551.1
17,750.4
change
5.0
6.9
7.2
9.5
16.9
23.6
33.5
38.0
57.9
67.7
59.2
75.4
64.5
111.1
110.2
163.4
77.9
95.8
- 139 -
Table
8.2s PERU
- EICHANSE
RATES,1970-1987
Intit/ USS
$
FinancialMarket
Official
Market
Endofperiod
Year
Rate
197)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Iiib
1977
1978
1979
1990
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1996
1987
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.045
0.069
0.130
0.196
0.250
0.342
0.507
0.990
2.271
5.696
13.950
13.950
33.000
Source
s Central
Bank
change
Period
average
Rate
X change
0.039
0.0
0.039
0.0
0.039
0.0
0.039
0.0
0.039
16.3
0.040
54.2
0.056
87.9
0.084
50.5
0.156
27.5
0.225
36.6
0.289
48.4
0.422
95.2
0.698
129.5 1.629
150.8 3.467
144.9 10.980
0.0
13.950
136.6 16.707
0.0
0.0
0d
0.0
4.4
38.1
50.9
95.7
43.7
28.6
46.2
65.2
133.5
112.9
216.7
27.0
19.8
Endofperiod
Rate I change
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.209
0.253
0.344
0.510
0.996
2.307
5.820
17.380
19.530
63.000
Period
average
Rate I change
0.000
0.0
0.000
0.0
0.000
0.0
0.000
0.0
0.000
0.0
0.000
o.0
0.000
0.0
0.000
0.0
0.172
21.3
0.228
36.0
0.295
49.4
0.426
95.4
0.707
131.6 1.659
152.3 3.652
198.7 12.620
12.4 17.760
222.6 31.349
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
o,o
0.0
0.0
32.6
29.6
44.4
65.8
134.9
120.1
245.6
40.1
76.5
140
Table
8.3s REALEXCHAN6E
RATEINDEX
(Base
Dec.1978
= 1001
MONTH
Trade
weighted
12-78
12-79
12-80
12-81
12-82
12-83
12-84
7-85
B-85
9-85
10-85
11-B5
12-85
1-86
2-86
3-86
4-86
5-86
6-86
7-86
8-96
9-86
10-86
11-96
12-86
1-87
2-87
3-87
4-87
5-87
6-87
7-87
8-87
9-87
10-87
11-87
12-87
1-98
2-88
3-89
4-88
5-88
6-98
7-88
B-89
100.00
121.73
127.78
145.88
133.08
126.35
115.80
97.84
91.29
93.61
94.97
96.61
98.34
102.28
103.51
106.79
113.04
115.92
119.59
121.49
123.88
114.47
119.33
123.91
123.43
125.69
128.60
131.66
135.24
139.09
139.07
142.51
153.00
160.80
131.56
136.01
97.84
106.45
112.78
119.70
123.42
121.35
110.50
123.52
94.44
Imports
weighted
Exports
ueighted
100.00
121.73
127.82
145.95
133.13
126.61
115.08
97.92
91.73
74.04
95.91
97.56
99.31
103.29
104.95
108.27
114.62
117.44
i21.27
124.01
126.69
107.98
112.46
116.78
121.14
123.35
126.21
129.21
132.72
136.50
133.10
144.19
154.81
162.91
141.27
146.05
102.74
115.98
131.01
136.32
159.61
172.14
153.34
144.65
86.77
100.00
121.73
127.73
145.93
133.04
126.12
115.74
97.77
90.93
93.24
94.16
95.78
97.50
101.41
102.27
105.51
111.69
114.43
118.16
119.33
121.85
122.92
128.14
133.06
127.48
129.81
132.92
135.98
139.67
143.66
136.79
136.37
146.42
153.99
122.97
127.13
93.72
99.06
100.17
108.18
102.73
96.14
80.62
109.34
102.40
Note: A dropintheindexes
seans
realdepreciation.
Theindexes
refer
tothe
weighted
averages
ofallexchanges
rates
applicable
tothedifferent
exports
andisports
cattegories,adequately
adjusted
bytherelation
between
PeruConsumer
Price
Index
andthatofPeru's
seven
maintrading
partners.The
baseisDecember
1979: 100.
-
------
Source
: horld
Bank
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