3 Wheeler C.C.

100
Circuit Court, D. New York.
UNITED STATES
v.
SMITH and OGDEN
July 15, 1806.
Indictment for misdemeanor under Act June 5, 1794, 5. Motion to bring on the trial, and for an attachment
against absent witnesses.
[Francisco de Miranda was an adventurer who played a leading role in the early stages of the French Revolution.
When the Revolution turned into a Napoleonic regime, Miranda looked for new worlds to liberate. In 1805, he
came to the United States with the goal of launching an expedition to free Venezuela from Spanish rule. His
principal American supporters were Col. William Smith, who was John Adams son-in-law and an aide to
Washington in the Revolutionary War, and Samuel Ogden, a banker. Operating out of New York, Miranda and
Smith openly built a warship and recruited a small army to invade Venezuela. The project was bankrolled by
Ogden. The ship sailed unmolested out of New York harbor. The expedition was a fiasco, with the Spanish
intercepting the ship and killing or capturing Miranda and his followers.
[While preparing for the expedition in New York, Miranda met with President Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of
State James Madison. Miranda reported that they supported and authorized the expedition and the liberation of
Venezuela.
[The Spanish government blamed the US government for Mirandas expedition and said that it was an American
act of war against Spain. Jefferson and Madison admitted meeting with Miranda but denied authorizing or
supporting his venture. They ordered Smith and Ogden prosecuted for violating the Neutrality Act, which
prohibited (and still does) Americans from taking hostile military action against any country with which the
United States is at peace. The presiding judges in the trial were Supreme Court Justice William Paterson and a
District Court judge Tallmadge. Paterson had been a member of the Constitutional Convention and was one of
Washingtons original appointees to the Supreme Court.
[The defendants counsel issued a subpoena for Madison and other State Department officials to testify at the trial.
Jefferson invoked executive privilege and ordered them not to testify. The defendants then moved for an order of
attachement to have them arrested and forced to testify and/or held in contempt.
[The court summarily held that Madison and the other officials could be required to testify, thus rejecting the
claim of executive privilege. As for the attachment, the judges required the defendants to show why Madisons
and the other officials testimony would be material. The defendants asserted that they would testify that the
expedition was authorized by the President of the United States and this justified their actions].

PATTERSON, Circuit justice:

The first question is, whether the facts stated in the defendants affidavit be material, or ought to be given in
evidence, if the witnesses were now in court, and ready to testify to their truth? Does the affidavit disclose
sufficient matter to induce the court to put off the trial? As judges, it is our duty to administer justice according to

law. We ought to have no will, no mind, but a legal will and mind. The law, like the beneficent author of our
existence, is no respecter of persons; it is inflexible and even-handed, and should not be subservient to any
improper consideration or views. This ought to be the case particularly in the United States, which we have been
always led to consider as a government not of men, but of laws, of which the constitution is the basis.
The facts, however, which are disclosed in the defendants affidavit, we must, in the discussion of the present
question, take to be true in the manner therein set forth; and the objection goes to the invalidity, the inoperative
virtue, and the unavailing nature of the facts themselves. Are the contents of the affidavit pertinentare they
materialare they relevant? The fifth section of the statute, on which the indictment is founded, is expressed in
general, unqualified terms; it contains no condition, no exception; it invests no dispensing power in any officer or
person whatever. Thus it reads: And be it further enacted and declared, that if any person shall, within the
territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begin or set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for, any military
expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or
state with whom the United States are at peace, every such person so offending shall, upon conviction, be
adjudged guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall suffer fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court, in
which the conviction shall be had, so as that such fine shall not exceed three thousand dollars, nor the term of
imprisonment be more than three years. The section which I have real is declaratory of the law of nations; and,
besides, every species of private and unauthorized hostilities is inconsistent with the principles of the social
compact, and the very nature, scope, and end of civil government. The statute, which is the basis of the present
indictment, was passed the 5th of June, 1794, and was temporary; but congress found it expedient, and, perhaps,
necessary, to continue it in force, without limitation of time, which was done on the 24th of April, 1800 [2 Stat.
54]. This fifth section, which prohibits military enterprises against nations with which the United States are at
peace, imparts no dispensing power to the president. Does the constitution give it? Far from it, for it explicitly
directs that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This instrument, which measures out the
powers and defines the duties of the president, does not vest in him any authority to set on foot a military
expedition against a nation with which the United States are at peace. And if a private individual, even with the
knowledge and approbation of this high and preeminent officer of our government, should set on foot such a
military expedition, how can he expect to be exonerated from the obligation of the law? Who holds the power of
dispensation? True, a nolle prosequi may be entered, a pardon may be granted; but these presume criminality,
presume guilt, presume amenability to judicial investigation and punishment, which are very different from a
power to dispense with the law.
Supposing then that every syllable of the affidavit is true, of what avail can it be on the present occasion? Of what
use or benefit can it be to the defendant in a court of law? Does it speak by way of justification? The president of
the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a
person to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would render the execution of the laws dependent on his will and
pleasure; which is a doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any supporters in our government.
In this particular, the law is paramount. Who has dominion over it? None but the legislature; and even they are
not without their limitation in our republic. Will it be pretended that the president could rightfully grant a
dispensation and license to any of our citizens to carry on a war against a nation with whom the United States are
at peace? If we were at war with Spain, there is an end to the indictment; but, if at peace, what individual could
lawfully make war or carry on a military expedition against the dominions of his Catholic majesty? The indictment
is founded on a state of peace, and such state is presumed to continue until the contrary appears. A state of war is
not set up in the affidavit. If, then, president knew and approved of the military expedition set forth in the
indictment against a prince with whom we are at peace, it would not justify the defendant in a court of law, nor
discharge him from the binding force of the act of congress; because the president does not possess a dispensing
power.
Does he possess the power of making war? That power is exclusively vested in congress; for, by the eighth section
of the 1st article of the constitution, it is ordained, that congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. And we accordingly find, that
congress have been so circumspect and provident in regard to the last three particulars, that they have from time
to time vested the president of the United States with ample powers.
Thus, by the act of the 28th of February, 1795 (3 Swifts Laws, 188 [1 Stat. 424]), it is made lawful for the president
to call forth the militia to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and execute the laws of the Union. Abstractedly
from this constitutional and legal provision, the right to repel invasions arises from self-preservation and defence,
which is a primary law of nature, and constitutes part of the law of nations. It therefore becomes the duty of a

people, and particularly of the executive magistrate, who is at their head, and commander-in-chief of the forces by
sea and land, to repel an invading foe. But to repel aggressions and invasions is one thing, and to commit them
against a friendly power is another. It is obvious, that if the United States were at war with Spain at the time that
the defendant is charged with the offence in the indictment, then he does not come within the purview of the
statute, which makes the basis of the offence to consist in beginning or preparing the means to carry on a military
expedition or enterprise against a nation with which the United States are at peace. If, indeed, a foreign nation
should invade the territories of the United States, it would I apprehend, be not only lawful for the president to
resist such invasion, but also to carry hostilities into the enemys own country; and for this plain reason, that a
state of complete and absolute war actually exists between the two nations. In the case of invasive hostilities, there
cannot be war on the one side and peace on the other. What! in the storm of battle, and, perhaps, in the full tide of
victory, must we stop short at the boundary between the two nations, and give over the conflict and pursuit? Will
it be an offence to pass the line of partition, and smite the invading foe on his own ground? No; surely no. To do so
would be a duty, and cannot be perverted into a crime.
There is a manifest distinction between our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being made against us
by an actual invasion, or a formal declaration. In the former case, it is the exclusive province of congress to change
a state of peace into a state of war. A nation, however, may be in such a situation as to render it more prudent to
submit to certain acts of a hostile nature, and to trust to negotiations for redress, than to make an immediate
appeal to arms. Various considerations may induce to a measure of this kind; such as motives of policy,
calculations of interest, the nature of the injury and provocation, the relative resources, means and strength of the
two nations, &c. and, therefore, the organ intrusted with the power to declare war, should first decide whether it is
expedient to go to war, or to continue in peace; and until such a decision be made, no individual ought to assume
an hostile attitude; and to pronounce, contrary to the constitutional will, that the nation is at war, and that he will
shape his conduct and act according to such a state of things. This conduct is clearly indefensible, and may involve
the nation, of which he is a member, in all the calamities of a long and expensive war. It is a matter worthy of
notice on the present occasion, that when the offence laid in the indictment is stated to have been committed,
congress were in session; and if, in their estimation, war measures were prudent or necessary to be adopted, they
would, no doubt, have expressed their sentiments on the subject, either by a public declaration of their will, or by
authorizing the executive authority to proceed hostilely against the king of Spain. But nothing of this kind has
been done, or at least appears to have been done. Congress does not choose to go to war; and where is the
individual among us who could legally do so without their permission? War is not pretended; and the law under
consideration is absolute, requires universal obedience, and does not vest any officer with a dispensing power, or
the extraordinary privilege of authorizing a person to do what it expressly prohibits. It appears, then, that the
testimony of Mr. Madison [and the other officials] as stated in the defendants affidavit, is not pertinent to the
issue, nor material by way of justification or defence against the facts charged in the indictment.

End of Document

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