Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION

WHY DID THE COMMUNISTS TAKE POWER IN CHINA IN 1949?

MAY 2009 WORD COUNT: 1,966

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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

WHY DID THE COMMUNISTS TAKE POWER IN CHINA IN 1949?

Section A: Plan of investigation

The aim of this investigation is to find and assess the reasons why the Communists took
power in China in 1949. Military, social, political, international, economic and personal
factors present prior to the Communist victory will be defined and evaluated according to
their significance in relation to the topic. Though it may be necessary to mention earlier
periods at times, the essay will concentrate on the period 1945-1949 (the years of the civil
war) as decisive for the Communist victory. For reasons connected to the events, the
assessment will also present GMD incapability as a factor contributing to Communist victory.
The assessment will be based on accounts by different Western historians writing in different
time periods and with perspectives, such as Michael Lynch, Odd Arne Westad, Lionel Max
Chassin and Jack Grey. Subsequently two secondary sources, L.M. Chassin’s “The
Communist Conquest of China” and Odd Arne Westad’s “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese
Civil War 1946-1950” will be evaluated with respect to their origin, purpose, values and
limitations.

Section B: Summary of evidence

In 1945 Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist party, the GMD ruled China. However, his
opposition to the Communists never died out despite the establishment of Second United
Front in 1937 following the Japanese invasion. Though the GMD’s power in China was
always more apparent than real1 with individuals holding power in each province, Chiang Kai-
shek didn’t seek a long-term agreement with Communists and used the best of Nationalist
forces not against the Japanese but to contain the forces of Communist party during World
War 22. Despite achieving his aim of victory over Japan without fighting3, Chiang and GMD

1 Lynch, Michael. “China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949”, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1996, page 51
2 Gray, Jack. “Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s”, Oxford
University Press, 1994, page 277
3 Taylor, A. J. P. “The Second World War”, Berkeley Windhover Book, 1975, page 229
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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

were left with hyperinflation4, corruption5 and the Communist area unconquered6.

Meanwhile Communists were saved from oblivion by the war and Mao’s United Front
policies7. The time between 1945 and early 1946 consisted of consolidations of recent gains
on both sides, local skirmishes between Nationalist army and Chinese Red Army (later
renamed People’s Liberation Army and it’s the latter name that I will use in the rest of the
essay) and American mediations between the two sides.8 General Marshall, sent by President
Truman for mediations, failed to conclude any lasting cease-fire between GMD and CCP.
These were the conditions under which the Civil war between the Communists and
Nationalists restarted.

In July 1946 war broke out in Manchuria. Initially, things went well for the GMD – during the
last months of 1946 the CCP lost 174,000 square kilometers of territory and 165 towns. It was
troubled by defecations of local cadres9 and military losses. The GMD continued to push
northwards. Despite constant mediations (lasting till 28th of January 1947 when US
withdrew), Chiang was assured of his imminent victory, especially once GMD forces
occupied Yen’an in March 19th 1947. In reality it was only another false victory and their
strategic situation worsened as the progressed10.

4 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 89
5 Ibid., page 11
6 Lynch, Michael. “China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949”, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1996, page 110
7 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 30
8 Lynch, Michael. “China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949”, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1996, page 55
9 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 61
10 Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966, page 130
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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

1947 was a year of slow changes. Despite the loss of its capital, CCP’s position was
improving and PLA’s offensives in Shandong11 and Manchuria12 in May 1947 prove that.
A serious hindrance for Nationalists began revealing itself as Communists began cutting
through their supply lines and encircling Nationalist armies. A radical land reform in
Communist-controlled areas pushed throughout 1946 and 1947 was revised in favour of more
pragmatic one, helping CCP to avoid conflicts in the area where it had already established its
power13. Also, unofficial Soviet support also proved useful to the Communists meager
resources14. On the other side, GMD regime sunk further into hyperinflation15 and corruption,
seriously undermining its legitimacy, while the party itself began fragmenting. GMD still
needed more revenue for the military purposes and imposed further taxes to the public
discontent. Chiang, though his forces were flanked by Communists, still pressed for conquest
of Manchuria. Meanwhile GMD preoccupation with cities left villages and small towns
vulnerable to Communists16. Nationalist superiority in numbers and armament forced CCP to
continue guerrilla warfare, with the aim of inflicting more casualties than they themselves
would suffer and of capturing modern weapons.17 The Communists were slowly making up for
their initial losses. But the outcome of this struggle was not given until the tide turned at the
battlefields in 1948.18

1948 marked effectively beginning of the end of Nationalist government in China. Not only

11 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 158
12 Ibid., page 175
13 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 118
14 Ibid., page 175
15 Vide: Appendix A – inflation under GMD rule
16 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 126
17 Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966, page 122
18 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003, page 107
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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

that on battlefield the numbers began to match but PLA was also far superior in morale and
organization and tactics, while corruption ruined the GMD and diverted remaining popular
support to the communists19. The almost complete militarization of controlled areas and unity
of Communists20 showed CCP’s capacity to lead a total war. The Communist-controlled
Northeast became the “anvil of victory”21. Lin Biao’s successful Winter Offensive in Central
China22, and then decisive campaigns of Liao Shen and Huai Hai sealed Nationalist fate.
Defections reached extremes as shown by the examples of Ceng Zesheng23 or 7th Army
Group24.

1949 was a year of Chiang’s resignation and loss of major cities which effectively amounts to
the Nationalist coup de grace. Communist could continue their offensive because of constant
influx of turncoats and peasant support. Through the strict and centralized control Mao aimed
at avoiding of the corruption of communist cadres.25 In spite of slow PLA progress in
Northwest, by summer 1949 main military operations of the civil war were over26, and
following the conquest of Beijing, Mao declared People’s Republic of China on October the
1st 194927. Though the civil war was not yet over, the Communists had already won.

Section C: Evaluation of sources

“The Communist Conquest of China” was first published in France in 1952 and was written
by Lionel Max Chassin. It aims at explaining why and how the Communists won in China in

19 Ibid., page 182

20 Ibid., page 109
21 Ibid., page 128
22 Ibid., page 176
23 Ibid., page 197
24 Ibid., page 202
25 Ibid., page 229
26 Ibid., page 255
27 Gray, Jack. “Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s”, Oxford
University Press, 1994, page 287
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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

1940s. Its value lies mostly in the fact that Chassin was “a retired General of the French Air
Force” who “did most of the research for this book while he was serving, from 1946 to 1949,
as Vice Chief of Staff for National Defense”28, a position that gave him access to multiple
French reports. Thus, unlike many other Western historians of that time, Chassin had access to
intelligence sources (albeit only French) as well as to the already published literature on the
topic. Also, being a military man, his knowledge and evaluation of Nationalist and
Communist tactics might be of some interest to the readers. Nevertheless, the lack of access
to Chinese or Soviet sources as well as the Cold War period during which the author was
writing the book might had a serious influence upon his overview and evaluation of the
situation.

“Decisive Encounters” The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950” by Norwegian US-educated

scholar Odd Arne Westad who now works in England was written in 2003, well after the fall
of Soviet Union. The purpose of the source was to describe the development of the Chinese
Civil war and its immediate aftermath. Proceeding chronologically while cautiously
employing sources as diverse as the Soviet, US and Chinese intelligence reports, different
primary accounts, interviews and secondary studies, statistics and maps, placing them in
social, economic and international context, Westad presents us with a comprehensive
overview of Civil war period. The only limitations could be personal approach of Westad
himself towards GMD and Communists which in his conclusion seems to differ from the one
presented throughout the rest of the book, implying a slight lack of impartiality.

Section D: Analysis

Communist victory of 1949 was neither immediate nor predicted; it seemed that in 1949
GMD possessed all advantages – aided by the Americans, with Chiang Kai-shek recognized
worldwide, leading over 350 million people29 and 5 million troops30 , controlling rich cities

28 Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966, page ix
29 Ibid., page 248
30 Lynch, Michael. “China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949”, Hodder &
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such as Nanjing, Shanghai, Beijing and Canton and majority of Chinese resources, equipped
with American weapons, and even having a serious military presence in Manchuria thanks to
the American airlift. What however GMD lacked and CCP had, was popular support and
skilled leaders31. Communists officially might have controlled only Northern provinces and
parts of Manchuria, but in reality they had their guerrillas as far as Hainan islands or Central
plains. Also, their regular forces, though on paper appeared inferior to Nationalists both in
men and in weapons, had in fact a far better morale, discipline and leadership.32

Victory was achieved directly through the civil war of 1946-1950 yet its roots can be traced
into the preceding events and causes such as GMD’s war exhaustion and continuous economic
mismanagement, Mao’s successful policies of United Front and land reform as well as his
pragmatic approach in certain cases, unity of CCP as in opposition to the fragmented nature of
GMD. Sources also point out to the very nature of the Chinese politics which consisted of
traditional cycle of revolutions which would clean the system from oppression and corruption
and which GMD didn’t follow as the Manchu corrupt officials remained in their places.33

But both Chassin and Westad agree that ultimate Communist victory came primarily through
the military operations, especially Manchurian front and Central China’s campaigns of Liao-
Shen and Huai-Hai. Without these PLA triumphs CCP would not have been able to capitalize
its popular or Soviet support, nor would Mao be able to oust Chiang Kai-shek and Li
Zongren. To survive the initial GMD onslaught CCP had to rely on the accumulated peasant
support and guerrilla warfare tactics it developed during Sino-Japanese war. To move to
offensive however, CCP needed to expand its power base and lessen its extremism to appeal

Stoughton, 1996, page 55

31 Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966, pages 254-257
32 Ibid., page 49, or the quote about Nationalists from General David Barr in Westad, Odd
Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford University Press,
2003, page 186
33 Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966, page 252
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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

to the people, a point rightly noticed by Ren Bishi34. Paradoxically the oppressive nature of
GMD regime more aided than hindered communists. Economic blight caused by the war,
omnipresent corruption and printing of money alienated GMD’s main supporters - middle
class and businessmen – who, as shown on example of Shanghai, would welcome
Communism as a lesser evil. Also US aid to Chiang’s government proved a mixed blessing as,
though it allowed GMD to sustain its war effort, the influx of easy money crippled the
collapsing economy even further35 and allowed Communist propaganda to portray GMD as
imperialist puppet36. Yet the immediate post-World War Two international situation didn’t
favour large military interventions, so the Chinese conflict was to be internally resolved and
the party with greater support and might was to win. With its superior morale, democratic
façade, apt military and political leadership, as well as massive defections on GMD side and
Chiang’s inability to exploit his initial successes, the Communists were such as a side.

Section E: Conclusion
Was there then, after all, a major aspect that weighted the scales in favour of Communists? In
my opinion yes and that ultimately it was the popular support what made China Communist.
Communist wouldn’t be able to win the war without the people but also they would never be
able to survive had not GMD consequently and stubbornly buried all its triumphs – first the
peasant support, then US aid, then its military superiority and finally its city power bases.
Chiang’s elopement to Taiwan, a province he had not so long ago obtained and where he
recently quashed a rebellion, was more than a suitable epitaph to GMD rule. It also shows a
basic difference in leadership of CCP and GMD – while GMD was a fragmented and only
slightly more predisposed to master China than any random warlord, CCP was in fact a
formidable, united political power of incredible zeal. Unlike its Soviet counterpart at that
time, Chinese Communists were fighting for freedom of their country and presented an
incorruptible stance. Numerous defections to the Communist cause which were marked by
sudden fervor of the previously apathetic troops show that CCP had a power about which
GMD might have only dreamed about. Many people though supported communists because

34 Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford University Press,
2003, page 118
35 Ibid., page 188
36 Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, page 251
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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

they saw them as the only alternative. Hence as such, a Communist takeover in 1949 and
proclamation of People’s Republic of China wasn’t a coup-d’état but a real reflection of the
general will of people.
Word Count: 1,966

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Chassin, Lionel Max. “The Communist Conquest of China”, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.
Gray, Jack. “Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s”, Oxford
University Press, 1994
Lynch, Michael. “China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949”, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1996
Taylor, A. J. P. “The Second World War”, Berkeley Windhover Book, 1975
Westad, Odd Arne. “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946-1950”, Stanford
University Press, 2003

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Candidate number: 000821-022 Aleksander Jasiński

APENDIX A – INFLATION UNDER GMD RULE37

THE
INFLATIONARY
SPIRAL, 1937 –
1948
Notes issued (in millions of Chinese $) Price Index
1937 2,060 100
1938 2,740 176
1939 4,770 323
1940 8,440 724
1941 15,810 1,980
1942 35,100 6,620
1943 75,400 22,800
1944 189,500 75,500
1945 1,031,900 249,100
1946 3,726,100 627,210
1947 33,188,500 10,340,000
1948 374,762,200 287,700,000

37 Lynch, Michael. “China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949”, Hodder & Stoughton, 1996, page
59
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