North American Philosophical Publications

The Idea of Religious Tolerance

Author(s): Jay Newman
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), pp. 187-195
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 15, Number 3, July 1978

III.THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

JAY NEWMAN
reacting strongly. It is not to like or respect the thing.

THERE
are many obstacles
to religious
tolerance?superstition,
misunderstanding,
in? My mother does not like any of my father's eccentri?
dolence, ethnocentrism, genuine differences in re?

cities or respect him for them. I do not like bad

ligious creeds. But we often overlook the most basic

manners or respect people for them. But often we do

not react strongly to things which we do not like or

obstacle to religious tolerance, which is that few

people have a clear idea of what religious tolerance respect people for.
To say that tolerance is a kind of acceptance or
is. Good will is not enough to insure peace among
endurance is to reveal little, for in this context at
men of different creeds; reason must be called upon,
too. And so let us take a hard look at this idea of least, "acceptance" and "endurance" are them?

selves nebulous terms. One does not accept

religious tolerance and see whether we can make it a

little less nebulous.

someone's eccentricities in exactly the same way as

he accepts a gift, an invitation, a challenge, or a
belief. The kind of acceptance that is involved here
must be understood in terms of the criterion of

We have to begin by considering what men mean reaction. Sometimes we speak of people as tolerant
or intolerant on the basis of whether their likes and

when they talk about "religious tolerance."

Eventually we are going to find that men are not very

clear about the nature of religious tolerance, and

dislikes are reasonable or unreasonable. But for

practical purposes, the test and determinant of

that their conceptual confusions are reflected in their

everyday discourse. So we are going to have to arrive

tolerance and intolerance is in action, specifically, in

internally-consistent than that of the ordinary man.

ations of behavior rather than opinion; opinions

are only relevant to morality when they influence

the way a person reacts to whatever he is or is not

at an idea of religious tolerance which is more tolerating. Moral evaluations are essentially evalu?
Tolerance is not necessarily related to religious

belief The word "tolerance" is a noun which conduct. Few of us believe that a nasty thought is as
corresponds to the verb "tolerate"; and men can

bad as a nasty deed; and in any case, we do not

tolerate all sorts of things. My teachers often com?

possess the power to delve into the recesses of other

plained about the widespread willingness to tolerate minds. So when my mother says she cannot tolerate
stupidity and bad manners. They could not tolerate my father's snoring, she is not saying that she has an
such things. My mother claims that she cannot
irrational dislike for it; rather, she is saying that she
tolerate all of my father's eccentricities. My physi?

cian told me many years ago that I did not have a

has come to the point where she must take action to

prevent her being disturbed by it. By not having

reacted to it up to this point, she has accepted or
endured it.
Another condition of tolerance is that it is half?
immigrants. So there are many kinds of tolerance
and intolerance which have nothing to do with hearted ; it is the acceptance in one sense of some?
religion or religious belief. When people talk about thing which one does not accept in another sense. We
tolerance in these difficult senses, they are always do not merely tolerate those things which we like,
speaking about a kind of acceptance or endurance. love, or approve of; tolerance involves acceptance or
My mother cannot accept or endure some of my
endurance of something which one has a negative
father's eccentricities, and she invariably reacts to attitude towards. Every act of tolerating involves an
tolerance for penicillin. I often hear it said that my
aunt is intolerant with regards to blacks and certain

them. People who cannot tolerate bad manners underlying wish that things were different. There are

cannot accept or endure them, and they show us that

they cannot by reacting strongly to them. I cannot

different degrees of disapproval. A child who tol?

erates sherbet when he really wants ice cream does

variety of unpleasant "side-effects." So to tolerate

he would simply prefer ice cream to sherbet, and so

accept or endure penicillin; I react to it with a not necessarily dislike sherbet in any absolute terms ;

something is to accept or endure that thing without

he is merely tolerating the sherbet because he

i87

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l88 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

disapproves of it relatively to what he might have religious beliefs and engage in religious actions).
been given for dessert. We often tolerate things This tolerance may take several forms. A non
which we do dislike in absolute terms; but often we religious person may tolerate some, most, or all
tolerate things which we just do not like as much as
things that they might have been.

When we consider ordinary discourse, we are

reminded that there are two nouns which cor?
respond to the verb "tolerate"?"tolerance" and
"toleration." The latter seems to have a broader

religious beliefs, actions, or people. A religious

person may tolerate some, most, or all non-religious

beliefs, actions, or people. Or?and here is the case

we usually think of?a religious person may tolerate
some, most, or all religious people who do not share
his particular religious beliefs, or he may tolerate
application; it refers to any instance of tolerating. some, most, or all of their beliefs and actions.

But "tolerance" is more closely related to the

Most of the confusion about the nature of religious

and intolerant on another. But most of us believe that

more complex than racial tolerance or tolerance of

adjective "tolerant." Tolerance is manifested when tolerance has stemmed from a misunderstanding of
one is tolerant; toleration is manifested when one what is involved in tolerating a religious belief. It is
tolerates. Now one can be tolerant on one occasion the element of belief which makes religious tolerance
some men are generally tolerant while others are not.

bad manners. For it is widely and mistakenly

"Tolerance," then, unlike "toleration," is often seen believed that tolerating a belief is primarily a matter
as a character-trait, a disposition, and usually as that
of making a judgment about the content of that
kind of disposition which we call a "virtue." In this belief. Some people seem to think of tolerating as a
sense, tolerance is like courage or temperance, and kind of propositional attitude. But tolerating a belief
we praise a man for being tolerant in the same spirit
is primarily a matter of making a judgment about

as we praise him for being courageous or temperate.

specific cases of believing. Let me explain this
Of course, if we think of tolerance as a virtue, then obscure thesis by means of an illustration. Roman

the concept of tolerance has a normative aspect as Catholics believe that there is one God who exists in
well as a descriptive one. The concept of tolerance three eternal persons (the Father, the Son, the Holy
does not necessarily have a normative aspect. A person Spirit). This proposition,/?, is unquestionably one of
may criticize someone, even himself, for merely
the central propositions of the Catholic's creed. But/?
tolerating what he should strongly approve of or is rejected not only by atheists but by Jews and
respect. And a person may also criticize himself or certain Christians (mainly Unitarians). Now what is
involved when an atheist, Jew, or Unitarian tol?
someone else for tolerating something which should

not be tolerated (e.g., as when injustice or bad erates the Catholic's belief in p, or when the
manners or stupidity is tolerated). But when we Catholic tolerates someone's belief in ~p? Clearly it

think of tolerance as a virtue, as we often do, we are is not proposition p which is being tolerated by the
thinking of it strictly as tolerance of what ought to be Unitarian or the Jew. For the Unitarian or the Jew,/?
tolerated.
is false, as false as the proposition that God has a body

or the proposition that the moon is made of green

II

cheese. From an ethical and an epistemological

point of view, the Unitarian's "attitude" towards/? is

Having considered the concept of tolerance, we wholly negative; he doubts/?, and he believes that
are in a better position to understand the idea of those who believe/? are seriously mistaken. And the
religious tolerance and the fundamental confusions falsehood of/? is something which the Unitarian or
that have arisen with regard to it. We want to the Jew takes very, very seriously; he may well be
consider now how religious tolerance differs from prepared to burn at the stake or suffer other
other kinds of tolerance and what it has in common hardships rather than publicly affirm belief in/?. So

with them in virtue of which it is a kind of tolerance.

I will resist the temptation to offer a formal

definition of "religion" so as not to alienate or offend
students of religion. But obviously religion involves

in tolerating the Catholic's belief in/?, the Unitarian

or the Jew is not in any way mitigating his judgment
about the content of/?, his judgment that/? is false. Nor
is he implying that he considers /? more reasonable

beliefs about the "spiritual"?whatever that may than alternative propositions accepted by atheists,
be?and actions which are rooted in such beliefs.
pantheists, or witch doctors. He is not adopting a
Religious tolerance, then, must be tolerance of one special attitude towards/?; rather, he is adopting a
or more of the following?religious beliefs, religious certain attitude towards the Catholic's believing of/?.
There is no way that a Unitarian or Jew or atheist
actions, or religious people (i.e., people who hold

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THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 189

can "accept" or "endure" p; he rejects p, and he towards the Jew's believing ~p, while the Jew has a

believes that the Catholic ought to reject it, too.

Tolerating a religious belief, then, does not involve a

half-hearted acceptance or endurance of the beliefs

itself, but rather, it involves acceptance or endurance

of someone's holding that belief. Now let me explain

why I think this is so important. In recent years,

philosophy and the social sciences have been in?
fected by the pernicious doctrine of relativism, a
doctrine which I shall discuss later at greater length.
One of the results of the rise of relativism has been the

negative attitude towards the Catholic's believing/?.

Now, we have just seen that it is one thing to accept
someone's holding a certain belief and quite another
thing to accept the belief per se; and to regard a belief
as false is certainly to reject it in a fundamental sense
of the word. But here is a second point?if the Jew or
Unitarian believes that /? is no less (or more) true than
~p, and if he regards belief in /? as neither signifi?
cantly better nor significantly worse than belief in
~p, is he capable of merely tolerating someone's belief
in /?? Is he capable of being only half-hearted in his
acceptance of the Catholic's believing/?? Can the Jew

increasing popularity of the view that tolerating

someone's religious beliefs involves respecting his
religious beliefs. In effect, to hold such a view of or Unitarian even remain a zealous, devout Jew or

tolerance is to see tolerating as a kind of pro Unitarian if he believes that his most basic religious
beliefs are no better, by any standard, than anyone
positional attitude. But how can the Unitarian or the
Jew or the atheist respect a proposition like p when else's? The fact is that most religious believers regard
he considers p to be false and is even prepared to their basic religious beliefs as true; moreover, for a
suffer great hardships rather than publicly affirm variety of reasons they believe that it is moral and
belief inp? Manyjews and other "disbelievers" have prudent to hold the religious beliefs that they hold.

been prepared to accept and endure torture and And it is hard to disapprove of a belief, or of
someone's holding a belief, when one feels that the
extreme privation rather than accept or endure

belief in or public commitment top. The plurality of

religions is itself a testament to the seriousness with

belief is in no way inferior to one's own.

So it would seem that tolerating a religious belief is

which Jews, Unitarians, and others look upon the not primarily a matter of making a judgment about
the content ofthat belief. It is not acceptance of a
difference between the content ofp and the content
of ~p. Nor is the "disbeliever" likely to see p as a belief per se; rather, it is acceptance of someone's
doctrine "almost, but not quite as good" as ~p, in holding a belief which one considers to be signi?
the way that the young child tolerates sherbet ficantly inferior to one's own alternative belief, if not
because it is almost, but not quite as good as ice
by the standard of truth or falsity, then by some other
cream. Proposition/? does not represent some middle standard. However, tolerating a religious belief is
ground between ~p and some other proposition. For secondarily a matter of making a judgment about that
the Jew, Unitarian, and atheist, p is false, and its beliefs content. For one may be able to endure the
falsity is not something to be taken lightly.
company of a Jew or Catholic or Unitarian and yet
Consider this matter from another perspective. be unable to endure the company of one who
For those who have been bitten by the bug of publicly affirms his belief in the main doctrines of
relativism, the Catholic, Jew, and atheist can only be Satanism or atheistic communism. And the fact is
regarded as tolerant if they regard belief in p as not that many people are not even capable of enduring
significantly better or significantly worse than belief the company of those who believe in Judaism or

in ~p. Such a view indirectly impugns all religious Catholicism or some non-materialistic form of
teachings and suggests that they are not nearly as atheism. Indeed, the question arises as to how one can
important as has traditionally been thought. But the tolerate someone's believing a proposition which he
view not only conflicts with the actual nature of himself regards as both false and important. For even
religious commitment but also conflicts with the true if tolerating someone's religious beliefs does not
nature of tolerance. For think back to a point we require our looking favorably upon the content of his
considered earlier. Tolerance, by its very nature, is beliefs, our accepting his right to believe whatever he

half-hearted, and it involves acceptance or en? wants to believe is not in itself an easy thing to do.
durance of something which one has a negative

attitude towards. Catholics believe that Jews ought

Ill
to believe/?; and Jews believe that Catholics should
not believe p. The Catholic has a negative attitude
This new question can only be answered when we
towards ~p, while the Jew has a negative attitude understand why men have so much trouble tolerating
towards/?. The Catholic also has a negative attitude the religious "believings" of other men. C. E. M.

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i go

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

patient and rational and demand that they be

Joad has suggested that all persecution and pro?
patient and rational, too. If we can show a self
paganda arise from the "curious inability of the
human mind to think anything by itself; for no professed "defender" of Truth-for-its-own-sake that
lover of wisdom "is really content with the con? what he regards is true is not obviously true, he will not
viction that he has found truth. He is lonely with react so strongly to the "believings" of other men.
truth and is not content until others share it."1 But That is, he will become more tolerant.
Then there are the altruists who want to save us.
we have to delve more deeply than Joad does. There
are all sorts of irrational sources of intolerance, and I They cannot tolerate our doing ourselves harm.
mentioned some of them at the outset of our inquiry :

superstition, ethnocentrism, etc. The only way to

deal with irrationality is to discourage it by promot?

ing rationality. But there are also rational sources of

They are not necessarily worried about Truth for its

own sake. They are worried about us, our souls, our
lives. Sometimes they will go to great extremes to
save us; they will burn us at the stake and torture us

religious intolerance, and they are of three kinds? and deny us freedom of choice. How can we get such
men to tolerate our "doing ourselves harm" ? We can
philosophical, altruistic, and prudential. That is,
men seek to change the religious beliefs of other men begin by suggesting to them that in harming our
because they are concerned with either Truth or bodies or preventing us from accepting the dictates
their fellow man's welfare or their own welfare.

of our reason, they are harming us more than we can

Consider the first kind. Many of us are willing to

allow people to live by their illusions as long as these

and example of great religious leaders like Moses and

believe in elves and fairies to be rather charming. But

oppression lightly. One is not "witnessing" very well

illusions are innocuous. These are the people who

suppression of rational thought. The greatest re?

ligious leaders are primarily teachers, not bullies.

ever harm ourselves. We can point to the teaching

people do no harm. We may even find people who Buddha and Jesus who do not take violence and

there are also some people who believe that no

believe that one ought to believe only what is true, no

if he has to resort to murder and torture and the

matter what the consequences. Those among them Besides, in preventing a man from choosing the right
who also believe that their personal religious beliefs course, on the basis of insight and understanding,
are true are inevitably motivated to react strongly to one is preventing him from making full use of his
human powers, and is doing him spiritual as well as
what they consider to be religious illusions. They are
relatively unimpressed by the fact that such "il? physical damage. The persecuting altruist must be
lusions" may have pragmatic or psychotherapeutic taught that what he regards as true is not as
value. For them, value is of secondary importance obviously true as he has suspected. He must be made
to see that there are methods of witnessing which do
not
require the use of force (e.g., appealing to reason
people to be tolerant, especially if they believe that
and setting a good example). He must be en?
religious beliefs are more important than most other

here where Truth is at stake. Now, it is hard for such

beliefs. How should we deal with them? How can we couraged to pay more attention to those religious
make them act in the spirit of what we call "toler? teachings which relate to the immorality of force,
ance"? For one thing, we might attack their basic violence, and oppression. That is, he must be made
principle that Truth, in the last analysis, is all that to see that according to most great religious teachers,
matters. We might argue that love and good will are being tolerant is an important part of being religious.
as important as true belief. But one invariably runs For tolerating "believings" is itself an important
into trouble when he begins to take Truth lightly. It part of tolerating people. And no major religion
is safer and wiser to challenge the self-professed sanctions our treating human beings as anything less
than human beings.
"defender" of Truth than to challenge Truth itself.
We can trust Aristotle when he tells us that he loves
And so we come to the intolerance of the prudent
Truth and Wisdom and is prepared to devote his life
to them. But what about those young Mormons and
Jehovah's Witnesses who come to show us the way?
How much have they studied? How many hours a
day do they devote to contemplation? How is it that
they know so much more than doctors and pro?
fessors, philosophers and theologians? We must be

man. Many regard the religious "outsider" as a

threat to the unity of their religious community.
They do not so much object to the outsider's beliefs
as to his actions. When children see how the outsider

behaves, their respect for the religion of their parents

often wanes. They begin to grasp the concept of

alternatives, to ask questions, to challenge authority.

1 CE.M. Joad, "Thought and Temperament," in Essays in Common-Sense Philosophy (Port Washington, N.Y., 1969 [1920]), pp.

251-252.

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THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IO,I

If the outsider quietly held his personal beliefs but

acted as everyone else does, he would not be a threat
to the unity of the community. But religious belief
usually leads to a special pattern of living; a major
part of religious doctrine prescribes how we ought to

Consider another but related kind of intolerance

stemming from prudence. Even in this liberal society
of ours, there are important limits to our tolerance,

limits which are determined largely by prudence.

Look at the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses. They

behave. Now, the attitude of such prudent men have made many demands, and often they have been

conflicts with the spirit of tolerance. We can mitigate

the conflict somewhat by pointing out to those who
have this attitude that force should be a last resort,
that there are civilized ways to witness, that the truth

vindicated by the highest courts in the land. But our

leaders will only acquiesce to their requests up to a

point. If, on the other hand, there were fifty times as

many Jehovah's Witnesses as there are now, our

of their beliefs is not all that obvious, etc. But leaders would have to lend them a more sympathetic
ultimately we must come face to face with the ear. Or look at the case of observant Jews. In our

attitude itself. For to those who fear the spread of liberal society, the Jews can worship in their syna?
apostasy, secularism, and materialism, force may gogues, celebrate their own holidays, send their
children to special schools, etc. But often they find
well appear to be the only efficient resort left open.
that social institutions will not accommodate their
What one man sees as freedom, another may well see
as license, and if a member of the majority believes
that the members of a small cult are, by their actions,

setting a bad example for the young, disrupting

special needs. For example, in small communities,

they often have to work on their Sabbath ; there is no

attractive alternative. In any case, Jews and

established institutions, and destroying the unity of Jehovah's Witnesses, because of their numbers and
the community, it is hard for him to accept or endure influence, are a good deal better off than members of
their religious actions without reacting strongly. The more exotic cults. Now, the kind of prudence that I
fact is that any ideological pluralism?and es? have just been talking about may seem very different
from the first kind, the one related to fear. But in both
pecially a religious one?does take its toll on the laws
of a society, which come to reflect that "lowest cases, members of religious minorities are being told,

common denominator" of ethical principles accep? "We will tolerate your religious actions and beliefs
ted by members of all the major groups making up only as long as they do not come into conflict with
the society. Most of us find the idea of a theocracy

any of our major institutions ; when they do, it is you

children. But consider the other side of the ledger.

minority must "know his place" in order to survive,

unattractive, and we know that theocracies are not people who will have to do the accommodating."
governed by God but by second-rate dictators. We The more liberal a society is, the fewer will be the
institutions it regards as "major" in this sense. But
also know that living in a pluralistic society does not
necessarily destroy one's religious faith or that of his even in a liberal society, the member of a religious
There can be no question that religious institutions and he must be constantly mindful of the fact that his
are taken more seriously in a theocracy (or even in liberal neighbours will only tolerate so much. The
most societies where there is an established State liberal may reply, "But how much can be expected
Church) than they are in a society which is highly of us? We already allow members of minorities to do

pluralistic and made up of several competing

x, y, and z." It is not easy to answer such a question.

the State Church should be. And when the Church is

later they came to take their right to do x for granted,

Churches. There can be no State Church in a society At one time, members of religious minorities would
where there is significant disagreement about what have been happy if they were allowed to do just x;

separated from the State, people develop an al? and petitioned for the right to do y; and so on. By
legiance to secular political symbols and institutions

some medieval standards, a society is tolerant if it

which to some extent supplants their prior al? does not burn outsiders at the stake.
legiance to purely religious symbols and institutions.
This kind of secularism does not necessarily give rise
to materialism, but it allows materialism to flourish
in a way that more repressive social systems do not.

Intolerance which stems from prudential con?

siderations is probably the most difficult kind with

which to cope. The liberal's question is a powerful

one: "How much can be expected of us?" How

So we can see how we and our children and our much can we expect a reasonable man to tolerate?

grandchildren do pay a price for today's tolerance; How much should he tolerate? Should he alter his
and we can see why people like the Amish are so entire life-style simply to accommodate the needs of
concerned about keeping their children away from Zoroastrians or moon-worshippers or even Jews or
the corrupting influences of our "liberal" society. Mormons or Presbyterians? Serious questions are

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I92 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

also raised by the conservative who fears that "strong" enough to qualify as a manifestation of
religious pluralism will eventually lead to social intolerance?

disunity and the breakdown of traditional ethical

One way we can answer this question is by

values. Now, the conservative will only become applying a utilitarian standard. According to utilita?

tolerant when he has been convinced that he should rianism, the reaction is too strong (and wrong) when
it leads to unhappiness. The right action or reaction

not perceive the existence of religious minorities as a

serious threat to the fundamental policies and

is the one which is conducive to the greatest

happiness for the greatest number of people. But

that the main threats to a religious way of life are utilitarianism has its weakhess. Say, for example,
internal weakness and the incompetence of its that in having prevented a Roman Catholic from
defenders. We also have to remind the conservative getting a job with their firm, fifty Protestant business
institutions of his society. So we have to get him to see

that it is dangerous to try to repress freedom of executives have made themselves so happy that their
thought and choice, and that the price religious
total happiness outweighs the happiness of the
leaders pay for doing so is often a high one, that of
Catholic, who can get a fairly good job with another
alienating the more enlightened members of the firm. Even if the Catholic is not very unhappy, and

flock. In other words, we must show the conservative

that prudence itself dictates that we be patient with
outsiders and worry more about our own beliefs and

even if the Protestant executives knew that he could

get a good job with another firm, the executives

reacted strongly enough to the Catholic's religion to

actions than theirs. We have no right to expect the qualify as intolerant men. So consider a second
conservative to regard the beliefs and actions of criterion : the reaction is too strong when it is based
outsiders as healthy or positive; but we can expect on seeing a man's religion as relevant to something to
him to react to their differences in a civilized, which it is not really relevant. Being a Catholic does

rational way. The liberal's problem is harder to not prevent a man from being a good business

solve. He is pointing out to us that it is not clear

where we should draw the line between what ought
to be tolerated and what need not be tolerated. Can
we make it clearer for him?

executive. Still, "relevance" is a vague term, too. A

truly religious person sees his religious beliefs as

relevant to all aspects of his life. The only people who

talk about religion as being relevant in only certain

contexts are people who do not take religion all that
seriously. So while it is obvious that a Catholic can be

IV

a good executive, we should not draw the empty

inference that being tolerant is a matter of recogniz?

We have seen that for practical purposes, the test ing when religion is "relevant." We need a more
and determinant of tolerance is in action. When we specific criterion,
say that a man is "intolerant," we mean that he
We tend to associate "strong reaction" with the

refuses to accept something which he can and use of force. To force someone to do something is to
should. His refusal to accept that thing is manifested'in make him do that thing against his will. There are

his reaction to it. So we say that he is "intolerant" degrees of force: one can physically control a man's
when we see that he has "reacted strongly" to it. arms, or he can give the man a queer sort of
"Reacted strongly" is a nebulous phrase; what one "choice"?"Do such-and-such or we will torture
man regards as a strong reaction another may regard
your children (or take away your job, exclude you

as a weak one. Most of us consider murder and from the club, etc.)." To force someone to do

torture strong reactions. But in the last few centuries, something is to deprive him of a certain degree of
religious intolerance has rarely manifested itself in freedom, which, understood in a broad sense, is the
acts of murder and torture. Instead, members of ability to do what one wants. Freedom is a universal,
religious minorities now find themselves excluded trans-cultural ideal. Now, in a society which is
from executive positions, country clubs, and pro? advanced on the scale of civilization, people are not
fessional schools. They find their children being allowed to do whatever they want. They cannot kill,
ridiculed by playmates, their churches and syna? steal, or rape without incurring the wrath of their
gogues defaced, their local governments refusing to fellow citizens. Freedoms conflict; if a man were free
give their religious schools financial aid comparable to kill anyone that he wanted to, he would be, in

to that received by the religious majority's schools.

effect, free to rob other human beings of their basic

in certain social circles. How much of this reaction is

society is brought about only when certain freedoms

And they find themselves being ignored or avoided freedoms. The maximum amount of freedom in a

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THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE I93

are curtailed. So while force as a general rule opinions and yet refuse to use force. So not tolerating

deprives men of a certain degree of freedom, some something involves only some reactions, "strong"
force is warranted and actually promotes freedom.2
Consider the differences between two members of

ones. In the case of religious tolerance, reactions are

considered strong enough to be wrong when they

a religious group who have very different methods of involve unwarranted use of force. When we think of
getting someone to adopt their religious way of life;
force, we think of violence, threats, and deception.
the first uses force, while the second believes only in But essentially, force is the restriction or denial of
rational persuasion. The second man is not nec? freedom, or of specific freedoms or rights. When we

essarily intolerant. He does not approve of the force someone to do something, we are making him
potential proselyte's present way of life; but he is do that thing against his will, and we are indicating
prepared to accept it until he can rationally per? that we cannot tolerate, accept, or endure his doing
it. But we say that a man is "tolerant" when he
suade the potential proselyte to convert by an act of
free will. He is reacting to something he dislikes and
tolerates those things which ought to be tolerated.
disapproves of; he is attempting to change the We do not regard a man as virtuous if he tolerates
potential proselyte's way of life. But he is patient anything and everything. Some things should be
enought to accept the man's present way of life until

that man chooses another of his own free will. The

first man, on the other hand, does not take freedom
as seriously. He reacts with force : violence, threats,
deception. That he has turned to force is evidence
enough that he is not patient enough to accept the
potential proselyte's present way of life. His in?

tolerated, and others should not; sometimes the use

of force is not only acceptable but is advisable.

Freedoms often conflict, and one freedom must be

weighed against others. Also, freedom is just one of

several universal ethical ideals; others are love,

justice, wisdom, self-realization, peace, prosperity,

etc. Force is often warranted because freedom itself

tolerance is manifested in his use of force. Notice that must be weighed against other ideals. Now, there is
the difference between the two men has nothing to
no simple formula which enables us to do all this

do with happiness or "relevance." It has to do with weighing of freedoms against freedoms and ideals
the nature of the reaction rather than the circum?
against ideals. The liberal's problem still stands. But
stances of the reaction.
it is still helpful to understand the essence of religious
tolerance.
I admit that it is not easy to determine when the
use of force is warranted and when it is not. If the
only way we can prevent ritual human sacrifice is by
using force, then we must use force. Still, those who

would be tolerant should above all be concerned

V
We also think of tolerance as a virtue. When I say,

with freedoms or rights. When we exclude a man "X is tolerant" or "X is a tolerant man," I am
from a job or school, we are interfering with his praising him in roughly the same spirit as I praise
freedom or right to work or learn. We are not him when I say, "X is temperate," or "X is a
interfering with his more basic right to live, and so
courageous man." People have had all sorts of ideas
we are not being as intolerant as a Torquemada. But about the nature of virtue, but none are more
we are being more intolerant than those who profound than those of the ancient Greek philo?
interfere only with his freedom to enjoy their
sophers, who argued that a virtue is a disposition
company. His freedom to enjoy their company has to

which helps or enables a man to achieve self

be weighed against their freedom to associate only realization or self-fulfillment. Against hedonists and
with those with whom they wish to associate. But relativists, the major philosophers of ancient Greece
what freedom is the bigoted employer invoking? Or
maintained that a human being has a function and a
a Torquemada? Is it comparable?
destiny, and that a virtue helps him to realize them
Let us look again at this new piece of the while a vice hinders him in his attempts to realize

explanatory model we have been building. To

them. Aristotle also argues in his Nicomachean Ethics

tolerate something is to accept or endure it, and the
that a virtue is a mean between two vices, the
test or determinant of whether we accept it is in our extreme of excess and the extreme of deficiency. And
reaction to it. A man can react to something that he we can analyze the virtue of tolerance along these

does not like or approve of and yet be prepared to

accept it. He can try to change other men's religious

lines. For when we say that a man is "tolerant," we

are implying that we believe that he has found the

2 Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan (Oxford, 1942).

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194 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

mean between too much tolerating and not enough.

Remember that the word "tolerance" is closely

which is generally regarded as absolute or objective

(e.g., an ethical value or a religious belief) is

related to the word "tolerant"; tolerance involves dependent on the background, character, or atti?
being tolerant. And while a man may be tolerant on tudes of particular individuals or societies. For the
this or that particular occasion, some men seem to be ethical relativist, for example, actions are not good
disposed to be tolerant on all occasions. But we do or right in themselves but are good-for-so-and-so or
not call a man "tolerant" if he accepts or endures right-as-perceived-by-so-and-so. There are even

everything. As Aristotle observes at the beginning of some thinkers who believe that there is no such thing
the third book of the Ethics, "To endure the greatest as absolute or objective truth, and that a proposition
indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the is never true in itself but is always true-for-so-and-so.
mark of an inferior person."3 So being tolerant does One of the most important facts of recent intellectual

not involve tolerating everything; it is a matter of history is that relativism has been becoming an
tolerating that which ought to be tolerated, and by increasingly popular outlook. Relativists often claim
implication, using force whenever it is warranted. to be concerned with tolerance, and many of them
support relativism by arguing that it provides a
On the other hand, there are some people who do not
theoretical foundation for tolerance.4
even tolerate those things which should be tolerated.

When they talk about religion, most relativists

If the man who tolerates too much represents the
extreme of excess, the man who does not tolerate argue along the following lines : religious beliefs are
enough represents the extreme of deficiency. Both not really true or false in any objective sense; they

men are vicious rather than virtuous. When we think

are either speculations, hypotheses, presuppositions,

of the "intolerant" man, however, we only think of the or perspectives; and while some are incentives to
man who represents the extreme of deficiency. Here, morality and peace of mind in a way that others are
not, all of the major beliefs of the major religions of
then, is a problem in our ordinary language which is
the source of much of our confusion about the nature the world have roughly the same moral, spiritual,

of tolerance. We think and speak of tolerance as a and psychotherapeutic value ; therefore, for the most
virtue, a mean between two extremes; but we think part it is foolish to be intolerant or to use force in
trying to prevent people from holding on to the
and speak of intolerance only as a vice of deficiency.
What about the man who tolerates too much? If religious beliefs they now hold. If we read between
tolerance is a virtue, this man cannot be considered the lines, we see that the relativist is actually a critic of
tolerant; on the other hand, we do not say that he is

the spirit of tolerance, not a defender. For if we take

intolerant, either. And it even seems unfair to call his epistemological outlook seriously, we have no
such a man "non-tolerant" when he tolerates even reason to be half-hearted in our acceptance of the
more than the tolerant man does. So let us call this beliefs of other men. We should not merely tolerate

man "morally weak." We can then say that the

virtue of tolerance is a mean between the vice of

"moral weakness" (the extreme of excess in tolerat?
ing) and the vice of intolerance (the extreme of
deficiency in tolerating). Here we understand, of

their beliefs but should respect them, for they are no

worse, by any significant standard, than our own.

The true relativist must view toleration as a vestige of

an absolutistic conception of religion. He usually

considers mere toleration unreliable and feels that

there will only be peace among men of different

faiths when these men come to respect each other's
beliefs. And why shouldn't they respect each other's
moderate number of things.
religious beliefs when no major religious belief is
VI
substantially truer or better than any other?
Now, the pure relativist is simply masquerading
In everything that I have said so far, I have
course, that the tolerant man tolerates those specific

things which ought to be tolerated, not just a

implied that I consider religious tolerance both as the apostle of religous tolerance. He is not a

healthy and possible. There are, of course, many

who consider it pernicious or impossible, and we

have already considered the views of some of them.

Consider now the views of the relativists. A relativist

tolerant man at all ; he is morally weak. He is willing

to tolerate any kind of religious outlook or opinion;
for him, the metaphysics of the tribal barbarians who
practice voodooism is not substantially inferior to the

is a person who believes that something important metaphysics that underlies the religion of a civilized
3 Nicomachean Ethics, III, i, iuoa22-4; Oxford University Press, Vol. IX, 1925.
4 Cf. Jay Newman, "Metaphysical Relativism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 12 (1974), pp. 435-448; also, "Ethical
Relativism," Laval Th?ologique et Philosophique, Vol. 28 (1972), pp. 63-74.

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THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 195

people. But pure relativism is not as popular as not significant distinctions between the ethical codes

structuralism, a modified relativism. The structu? of the Lutherans, Catholics, Anglicans, and Jews?
ralist is prepared to admit that some religions are And is it not dangerous and inaccurate to suggest
superior to others. For him, there are "great" that ethics is the core?and only important element?
religions and not-so-great religions; the latter are of religion ?
If what I have said about tolerance in this essay is
significantly inferior to the former, but all of the
former are equally acceptable. Structuralism is an reasonably accurate, then we may infer that being
attractive doctrine; the structuralist is not nearly as
tolerant does not require being a structuralist. The
morally weak as the pure relativist. But there is
advent of relativism and structuralism is, along with
something disturbing about structuralism. At what

point does a religion suddenly become "great" and

as acceptable as other "great" religions? And is it
not possible that, say, Lutheranism is just slightly
superior to or inferior to Roman Catholicism or
Anglicanism or Judaism? The structuralist usually
responds by pointing to a "common ethical code"
which underlies the "great" religions. But are there

centuries of intolerance and persecution, part of the

price that religious leaders have had to pay for their

refusal to think clearly about the idea of religious

tolerance. But such reflection would not even have
been necessary if religious men had learned long ago

to spend more time worrying about their own

hypocrisy than about the religious commitment of

their neighbor.

University of Guelph Received April 21, igyy

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