EN BANC

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180146

Present:

- versus -

POLICE
DIRECTOR
REYNALDO
P.
VARILLA,
REGIONAL
DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
POLICE OFFICE and ATTY.
RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE,
REGIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS
SERVICE,
Respondents.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

December 18, 2008

x---------------------------- -----------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision [1] dated 9 August 2007
and Resolution[2] dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500 dated 24
August 2005 and 23 August 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), dismissing petitioner Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the
police service.
The following are the factual antecedents:

Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned

to the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon City, when the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044[3] on 9 September
1998 dropping him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend
the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC) at the Special Training
Unit, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig City. Montoya had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period
of 67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31 March 1998.
On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from the rolls,
Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP
Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22
January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick
Leave Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his
name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave
Form was not approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was
beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms
of severe body pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a certification simply dated
1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and authenticated by Police
Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD.
Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the
NCR Regional Director issued on 11 June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling
Special Order No. 1044. Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days,
from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his administrative
liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL)
were immediately deducted from his leave credits.
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by
Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of
the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR
Regional Director rendered a Decision[4] on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya
from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective
immediately. Montoya received a copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000.
Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the
CPD office a Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration [5] of the 23 June
2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP
Chief. In a Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate for Personnel
and Records Management of the PNP Headquarters, Montoyas Petition/Motion
was denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion

or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director may only be

appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).
Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal of the 23 June 2000
Decision of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB of the National Capital
Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack of due process considering that he was not even
notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of
the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer
in the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal
from police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC, without even
looking into his side of the controversy.
On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision [6] granting
Montoyas appeal and ordering his reinstatement. Pertinent provisions of the said
Decision read:
The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO), P/Supt. Francisco Don
Montenegro, conducted the hearing ex-parte on the basis only of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the [herein petitioner Montoya] in which he categorically
stated that on January 22, 1998, when he went to Police Station 2 to have his sick
leave form approved, he was informed that his name was already forwarded to
NCRPO to undergo LEEC schooling. With that information, the SHO concluded
that appellant, PO2 Montoya, should have proceeded to STU, NCRPO to inform
his superior about his physical predicament. However, [Montoya] did nothing to
have the officers of STU, NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that
appropriate actions can be instituted. Sixty-seven days is too long for a period for
[Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to present his
Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment. Thus, [Montoya] was
ordered dismissed from the Police Service.
xxxx
This Board, after careful review and evaluation of the records and
arguments/evidence presented by herein [Montoya] finds this appeal meritorious
and tenable. Nothing on the records would show that [Montoya] was notified of
the summary hearing conducted by the Summary Hearing Officer nor was he
given a chance to explain his side and submit controverting evidence on his
behalf. On the other hand, what appeared on the record is the fact that the
Summary Hearing Officer, who was tasked to resolve this case, conducted the
hearing ex-parte. Thereafter, he recommended for the [Montoyas] dismissal from
the police service on the ground that the latter failed to inform his superiors about
his physical predicament since [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of STU,
NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that appropriate actions can be instituted.
Summary Hearing Officer further concluded that sixty-seven days is too long for
a period (sic) for [Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO
to present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment.

The RAB-NCR decreed in the end:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from

is hereby reversed and movant-appellant PO2 Ruel Catud Montoya is hereby
ordered to be reinstated in the police service without loss of seniority rights and
with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective
from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement.[7]

Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director authorized Police Senior

Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere (Manere) to appeal several
RAB-NCR decisions involving different police officers,[8] including the Decision
dated 11 December 2002 on Montoyas case, before the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG). The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR
decision reinstating Montoya in the police service on the following grounds:
a.

Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his appeal to the
Appellate Board, as provided by Sec. 2, Rule III, MC # 91-007;

b. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the fact that the
decision of the NCRPO dated 23 June 2000 had already become final and
executory.
c.

The Board erred in giving backwages despite the no work, no pay policy.

On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police

personnel[9] reinstated in the service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively
referred to as Montoya,et al.), filed before the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director.
On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an Order
denying the appeal of the NCR Regional Director.[10] DILG Secretary Lina noted
that the NCR Regional Director received a copy of the RAB-NCR decision on
Montoyas case on 10 February 2003, but it only appealed the same to the DILG
on 30 April 2003, beyond the 15-day reglementary period for appeals. DILG
Secretary Lina also declared that neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director
has personality to appeal the RAB-NCR decision to the DILG. The right to appeal
from the decision of the RAB to the DILG is available only to the active
complainant or the respondent who was imposed a penalty of demotion in rank,
forced resignation, or dismissal from the service. Manere, representing the NCR
Regional Director, is not a party complainant or a respondent aggrieved by the
adverse decision, hence, he cannot appeal the said decision. Similarly, there is no
specific provision allowing the NCR Regional Director, in his capacity as the judge
and/or arbiter of PNP disciplinary cases, to file an appeal to the DILG from the
decision of the RAB. Finally, DILG Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an
appeal by either party under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 [11] covers only
demotion and dismissal from the service and never exoneration and
suspension. Thus, the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision exonerating Montoya

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for the reason that the said decision
had already become final and executory. The dispositive portion of DILG
Secretary Linas decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeals are hereby denied for lack of merit.
The assailed decisions of the Regional Appellate Board National Capital
Region, 4th Division, are hereby affirmed in toto.[12]

The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed the Order

dated 10 November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). The NCR Regional Director asserted its right to appeal citing Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy.[13]
On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No.
611 reinstating Montoya, et al., without prejudice to the pending appeal of the
NCR Regional Director before the CSC.
Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution No. 05-1200
which recognized the right of the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the
decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG. The CSC set aside the 10 November
2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR
Regional Director dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service. According to
the CSC, Montoya, in particular, was guilty of laches and abandonment of his
position. It also held that the 11 December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on
Montoyas case, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, was based on mere affidavits
which were not substantiated.
The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et al., in
Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23 August 2006 for lack of new evidence or any
valid reason that warrants the setting aside or modification of its Resolution No.
05-1200.
Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96022.
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, since there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CSC in issuing Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500. The
dispositive portion of said Decision states:
Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS
Resolution No. 05-1200 dated August 24, 2005 and Resolution No. 06-1500
dated August 23, 2006 of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the Order

dated November 10, 2003 of the DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. affirming the
nine (9) decisions of the Regional Appellate Board reinstating [Montoya, et al.] to
the police service is SET ASIDE. The decisions of the NCRPO Regional Director
dismissing petitioners-police officers Enrique C. Paulino, Rebecca P. Fernandez,
Donato L. Geda, Marlo S. Quiambao, Danilo De Leon Nuqui, Ruel C. Montoya,
Cecilia Z. de Leon, Alberto S. Mendoza and Rodolfo C. de Leon are hereby
AFFIRMED.[14]

Aggrieved, Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.

SP No. 96022, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 18
October 2007.
Hence, the present Petition[15] in which Montoya raises the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MANERE FAILED TO

EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT MANERE HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY

TO APPEAL THE DECISION EXONERATING THE PETITIONER.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF

PETITIONER WAS VIOLATED.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DELAYED IN APPEALING THE

DECISION SUMMARILY DISMISSING HIM.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DESERVED TO BE DISMISSED

FROM SERVICE.

The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.

Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent
and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from
basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is
applicable to administrative proceedings.[16]
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[17] Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down
administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies
freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In
particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present

witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4)
a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.[18]
Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are
not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and
equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to enable
the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. [19] In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[20]
In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya
were flawed from the very beginning when these were conducted without due
notice to him. The NCR Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the
fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice
to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings, present
written or oral arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely
deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him
and was irrefragably denied due process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to
due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.[21] The rule must be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative
bodies, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by what type of proceedings
(whether judicial or administrative) he stands to lose the same. Consequently, the
Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya
from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the latters due
process.
The foregoing finding of this Court precludes a ruling that Montoya delayed
appealing the NCR Regional Directors Decision of 23 June 2000, and the said
decision has already become final and executory.
The Court reviews the vital dates. Montoya was able to receive a copy of
the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from

service on 20 July 2000. He erroneously filed his Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. The PNP denied
Montoyas Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002, two years after the filing thereof, citing
lack of jurisdiction, considering that the proper appellate body is the RABNCR. Thus, Montoya was only able to file his appeal of the decision of the NCR
Regional Director before the RAB-NCR on 2 September 2002.
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of
1990, provides:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action
imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a
disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director or by the
PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the
Regional Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the
notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the
Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the
National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided,
furthermore, That, the Regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be,
shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate Board to act on
the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without
prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Obviously, Montoyas appeal on 2 September 2002 with the RAB-NCR, the

appellate body with jurisdiction, was filed way beyond 10 days from his receipt of
a copy of the NCR Regional Directors decision on 20 July 2000.
As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the
failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory.
[22]
The Court, however, reiterates its previous pronouncements herein that the
Summary Dismissal Proceedings were conducted without notice to Montoya and in
violation of his right to due process. The violation of Montoyas fundamental
constitutional right deprived the NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over
Montoyas administrative case; and the decision rendered by the NCR Regional
Director therein was void. A void judgment does not become final and executory
and may be challenged at any time.
A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial administrative body)
without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it can never logically become final and
executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.[23] Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of due process may be
regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head."[24]

The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny Montoyas
Petition/Motion before it, even though the PNP Chief manifestly did not have
jurisdiction over the same. While Montoya did err in first filing his appeal with the
PNP Chief, the prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to re-file his
appeal sooner before the appropriate forum, the RAB-NCR.
As to the issue of whether the NCR Regional Director may appeal the
Decisions dated 11 December 2002 and 10 November 2003 of the RAB-NCR and
DILG Secretary Lina, respectively, the Court answers in the negative.
Prior to Dacoycoy, case law held that dismissal of the charges against or
exoneration of respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and
not subject to appeal even by the government. On 29 April 1999, the Court
promulgated its Decision in Dacoycoy, in which it made the following
pronouncements:
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party
adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the
appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no
question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent
official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, herein respondent
Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the
government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the civil service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil
Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not
the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant
George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently,
the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by
such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to
the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion
in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office and not included are
cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days
or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary or when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal. In other words, we
overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative
charges enunciated
in Paredes
v.
Civil
Service
Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone
Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.
[25]
(Emphasis ours.)

Subsequently, the Court qualified its declarations in Dacoycoy. In National

Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,[26] citingMathay,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court elucidated that:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a
decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize
either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One
party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other
party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty
of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the services is
the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party
appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the
respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining
authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached,
becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil
Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a
quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened
to a judge who should detach himself from cases where his
decision is appealed to a higher court for review.
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service
Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and
became an advocate. Its mandated function is to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions
and actions of its offices and agencies, not to litigate.

While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal the decision
exonerating respondent public officer or employee from administrative charges, it
wasMamauag which specifically required that the government party appealing
must be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal
which heard the administrative case.
In the present case, Montoya appealed to the RAB-NCR the 23 June
2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from service. The
RAB-NCR, in its 11 December 2002 Decision, reversed the appealed decision of
the NCR Regional Director and ordered Montoyas reinstatement. The NCR
Regional Director then appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR to the Office of the
DILG Secretary. DILG Secretary Lina, in his Decision dated 10 November 2003,

affirmed the decision of the RAB-NCR. Once more, the NCR Regional Director
filed an appeal with the CSC, where he was able to secure a favorable ruling.
It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the
investigating and disciplining authority when he rendered his Decision dated 23
June 2000dismissing Montoya from the service. The pronouncement
in Mamauag, that the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the one appealing the
subsequent exoneration of the public officer or employee, squarely applies to the
NCR Regional Director.
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group,[28] the Court explained:
It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases
where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for
such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding
and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the
appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. When a judge
actively participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be
judicial and has become adversarial instead.
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not
only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is
brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a
quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle
the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and the
applicable laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already
clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more
need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate
courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in
the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his
interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to
settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the
appellants assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being
overturned on appeal.

The NCR Regional Director, in actively appealing the reversal of his

Decision, had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and had become adversarial. His
interest was only in seeing to it that his decision would be reinstated.
The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the decisions of the
RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from the administrative
charges against him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a bureau. It
was the PNP, in the exercise of its authority to implement internal discipline among
its members, which instigated the administrative investigation of Montoya, so it
may be deemed the prosecuting government party. And it is the PNP which stands

to suffer as a result of the purportedly wrongful exoneration of Montoya, since it

would be compelled to take back to its fold a delinquent member.
Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the RAB-NCR,
affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, reinstating Montoya to the service. It was only
the RAB-NCR which properly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it
and was able to render a decision after a consideration of both sides to the
controversy. In Go v. National Police Commission,[29] the Court already issued a
caveat, worth reiterating herein:
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not
even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is
in the opinion of his superiors strong can compensate for the procedural
shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases such as this that
the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police
those who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are
guilty are allowed to escape punishment.

Before finally writing finis to this case, the Court still finds it necessary to
address the remaining issue on the supposed failure of the NCR Regional Director
to exhaust administrative remedies. Montoya argues that the NCR Regional
Director failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed the 10
November 2003Decision of DILG Secretary Lina directly to the CSC, without first
filing an appeal with the Office of the President.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted
to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before courts judicial power can be sought. [30] The administrative agency
concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its
forum.[31]
Montoyas reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is misplaced, for said doctrine does not find application in the instant case. The
doctrine intends to preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial administrative
body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case. Montoya is questioning
the supposed premature resort of the NCR Regional Director from the decision of
the DILG Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office of the President;
obviously, he is challenging the resort from one administrative body to another.

Furthermore, Montoyas assertion that DILG Secretary Linas decision

should have first been appealed to the Office of the President before the CSC is
baseless.
PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and supervision of the
DILG,[32] which, in turn, is under the administrative control and supervision of the
CSC.
In Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,[33] the Court settled that the one and only
Philippine police force, the PNP, shall be civilian in character [34] and, consequently,
falls under the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.

It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that

the decision of the Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the
administrative penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service is appealable to
the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the
DILG Secretary.
Now the question is, from the DILG Secretary, where can the aggrieved
party appeal?
In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, his
decision may be appealed to the CSC.[35]
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and
its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department [DILG].

Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the

Civil Service Law also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against
PNP members. The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act
of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the
decision rendered by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of the PNP) is appealable to

the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department (i.e.,
DILG) and finally to the Commission (i.e., CSC).[36]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution
dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The
Philippine
National
Police
is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C. Montoya to the police service
without loss of seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages
covering the period effective from the time of his dismissal from the service up to
his reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]

[9]
[10]

[11]

[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]

[16]
[17]

[18]
[19]

[20]
[21]

[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]

[33]
[34]

[35]
[36]

Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 90-106.
Rollo, pp. 108-109.
Id. at 40.
Annex D.
Rollo, pp. 45-51.
RAB Case No. 2002-0088 SD; rollo, pp. 60-65.
Id. at 65.
SPO2 Enrique C. Paulino, SPO1 Rebecca P. Fernandez, SPO1 Donato L. Geda, PO2 Marlo S. Quiambao,
PO3 Danilo de Leon Nuqui, SPO1 Cecilia Z. de Leon, SPO1 Alberto S. Mendoza and SPO1 Rodolfo C. de
Leon.
Id.
The Order addressed all the appealed RAB-NCR decisions, but the Court shall only present herein the
rulings particular to Montoyas case.
An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and
Local Government, and for Other Purposes; RA 6975 was later on amended by RA 8551, approved on 25
February 1998 and published in newspapers on 5 March 1998.
CA rollo, p. 316.
366 Phil. 86 (1999).
Rollo, p. 105.
Montoyas co-petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022 have a separate pending petition with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 180063.
Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486, 491 (1999).
Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Samaniego, G.R. Nos. 146653-54, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 611,
619.
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940, 952-953 (1997).
National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 89, 107 (1997);
citing Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. L-80485, 11 November
1988, 167 SCRA 294, 301.
Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 184 Phil. 419, 424 (1980).
State Prosecutors v. Muro, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-876, 19 September 1994, 236 SCRA 505, 522-523;
see also Paulin v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386, 392.
Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 820, 828 (1996).
Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 169.
People v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-27935, 16 August 1985, 138 SCRA 166, 171.
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, supra note 13 at 104-105.
G.R. No. 149999, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 624, 641-642.
378 Phil. 466, 483-484 (1999).
G.R. No. 169982, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 534, 549.
338 Phil. 162, 171 (1997).
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 152-153 (1997).
Id.
The PNP, as a bureau, is now a part of the reorganized DILG. (Cabada v. Alunan III, 329 Phil. 669
[1996].)
G.R. No. 139658, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 399.
Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution provides:
Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM, supra note 33.
Cabada v. Alunan, III, supra note 32.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
President and General Manager of GSIS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157383

- versus MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M.

VELASCO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
President and General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 174137

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus -

MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M.

VELASCO,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
August 10, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by Winston F. Garcia
(petitioner) in his capacity as President and General Manager of the Government

Service Insurance System, or GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina (Molina)

and Albert M. Velasco (Velasco). In G.R. No. 157383, petitioner assails the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated January 2, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated March 5,
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No. 174137, petitioner assails the CA
Decision[3] dated December 7, 2005 and Resolution[4] dated August 10, 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75973.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two
separate Memoranda[5] dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner charging them with
grave misconduct. Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the
following acts: 1) directly and continuously helping some alleged disgruntled
employees to conduct concerted protest actions and/or illegal assemblies against
the management and the GSIS President and General Manager; 2) leading the
concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002 during office
hours within the GSIS compound; and 3) continuously performing said activities
despite warning from his immediate superiors. [6] In addition to the charge for grave
misconduct for performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco was accused of
performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his office
without informing his supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for
persistently disregarding petitioners instructions that Velasco should report to the
petitioners office.[7] These acts, according to petitioner, were committed in open
betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance of the
Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In the same Memoranda,
petitioner required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy two
(72) hours. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered
the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay,
effective immediately.[8] The following day, a committee was constituted to
investigate the charges against respondents.
In their Answer[9] dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the charges
against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness
and bad faith in charging them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive
suspension for lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their
opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension Order.[10] They contended
that the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave
misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act as the
complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed with the
CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This Commission.[11]
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the
jurisdiction of the investigating committee and required them to appear at the
scheduled hearing.[12]

Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve respondents motions
to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the case from the GSIS to the
CSC.
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a special civil action
for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
[13]
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. Respondents sought the
annulment and setting aside of petitioners order directing the former to submit to
the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and investigate the administrative
case filed against them. They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee)
be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and from taking any action
on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents.
On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a decision [14] in favor of respondents,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents
are hereby PERPETUALLY RESTRAINED from hearing and investigating the
administrative case against petitioners, without prejudice to pursuing the same
with the Civil Service Commission or any other agency of government as may be
allowed for (sic) by law.
SO ORDERED.[15]

The CA treated the petition as one raising an issue of gnawing fear, and thus
agreed with respondents that the investigation be made not by the GSIS but by the
CSC to ensure that the hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal.
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court in this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR
AUTHORITY AND HAVE BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS; AND IN
PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND
INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY
UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE RULE ON
NON FORUM SHOPPING IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE
PETITIONERS
FROM
HEARING
AND
INVESTIGATING
THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AND
COMPLETELY DISREGARDS APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND
WHICH, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT, DOES NOT CLEARLY
STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED.[16]

In the meantime, on February 27, 2003, the CSC resolved respondents

Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension and Petition to Transfer
Investigation to the Commission through Resolution No. 03-0278, [17] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that:
1.

2.

The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive Suspension

is hereby DENIED for having become moot and academic.
The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is
likewise DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, GSIS
President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia is directed to
continue the conduct of the formal investigation of the charges
against respondents-petitioners Albert Velasco and Mario I.
Molina.[18]

As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, the CSC considered

the issue moot and academic considering that the period had lapsed and
respondents had been allowed to resume their specific functions. This
notwithstanding, the CSC opted to discuss the matter by way of obiter dictum.
Without making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the case against
respondents, the CSC declared that a preliminary investigation is a pre-requisite
condition to the issuance of a formal charge.[19]
On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to the CSC, the
latter denied the same for lack of merit. The Commission concluded that the fact
that the GSIS acted as the complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge
does not mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no longer be
served.[20]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[21] The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO.
75973.
On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[22] in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
formal charges filed by the President and General Manager of the GSIS against
petitioners, and necessarily, the order of preventive suspension emanating
therefrom, are declared NULL AND VOID. The GSIS is hereby directed to pay
petitioners back salaries pertaining to the period during which they were
unlawfully suspended. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The CA declared null and void respondents formal charges for lack of the
requisite preliminary investigation. In view thereof, the CA disagreed with the CSC
that the question on the propriety of the preventive suspension order had become
moot and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise void having
emanated from the void formal charges. Consequently, the CA found that
respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive
suspension.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED THE
REQUISITE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, WERE IN FACT HEARD AND
BEING HEARD, AND WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS AN
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF ADJUDICATION.

II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

THEIR

III.
WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI, AS HERE.

IS

RIGHT

TO

REQUIRED

IN

IV.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED
JURISDICTION, AS THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMNARY
INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE GSIS AND,
THEREAFTER, BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; THE
GSIS HAVING ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS.
V.
WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
A NON-ISSUE.
VI.
WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS ISSUED AGAINST
RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND VELASCO ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED
AND DULY RECOGNIZED BY LAW.
VII.
WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY AND, THUS, MAY
NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
VIII.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF BACK

SALARIES PERTAINING TO THE PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION.
IX.
WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS PETITION
BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS ENTIRELY
PREMATURE.
X.
WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS AS
REGARDS THE PARTIALITY OF THE GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL
BASIS.
XI.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM SHOPPING
SHOULD BE COUNTENANCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.[24]

The petitions are without merit.

The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original
charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the employees are
part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules
and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and general terms and
conditions of employment.[25] The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees. In addition, Section 37 (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines also
gives the heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities the authority to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. As for
the GSIS, Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known as the GSIS Act
of 1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:
SECTION 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General Manager. The
President and General Manager of the GSIS shall among others, execute and
administer the policies and resolutions approved by the Board and direct and
supervise the administration and operations of the GSIS. The President and
General Manager, subject to the approval of the Board, shall appoint the
personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause,
in accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations, and prescribe
their duties and qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be
employed.

By this legal provision, petitioner, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is

vested the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline
GSIS personnel for cause.[26]
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such power is not
without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules.

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the
procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge against an erring employee, to
wit:
First, the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or
employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and
sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper
disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath. [27] Except when
otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be filed at
anytime with the Commission, proper heads of departments, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities.[28]
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complaint
which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require
the person complained of to submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath
within three days from receipt.[29]
Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the
ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and
the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other
government offices. During said investigation, the parties are given the
opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure of the person
complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall be considered as a waiver
thereof.[30]
Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of
the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall submit the
investigation report and the complete records of the case to the disciplining
authority.[31]
Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the
investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining authority. A
formal investigation shall follow. In the absence of a prima facie case, the
complaint shall be dismissed.[32]

It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents were

the formal charges against them. These formal charges contained brief statements
of material or relevant facts, a directive to answer the charges within seventy two
(72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice that they had the right to a formal
investigation and a notice that they are entitled to be assisted by a counsel of their
choice.[33]
It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were issued without
preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Petitioner explained that no such
investigation was conducted because the CSC rules did not specifically provide
that it is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a formal charge. He likewise claimed that
preliminary investigation was not required in indictments in flagranti as in this
case.
We disagree.

Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge
without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. However, as
clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.
The use of the word shall quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent
should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be
gleaned from the procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the
formal charge and the comment required therein is different from the answer that
may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioners claim, no exception is
provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by
petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as
in the present case. To comply with such requirement, he could have issued a
memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With
respondents comments, petitioner would have properly evaluated both sides of the
controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against
respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is
noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an
event that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears,
therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the
petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against
respondents.
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power
to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the
charges. We, therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process of law.
Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their
guilt is in the opinion of their superior strong can compensate for the
procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this
case.[34]The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without
complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process.
Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or
indirectly at anytime.[35]
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to
due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings
(whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.[36]

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied
more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings.[37] In particular, due process in administrative
proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to
defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[38]
Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to preliminary
investigation as they failed to raise it before the GSIS.
Again, we do not agree.
It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it
is invoked.[39] Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack
of preliminary investigation, records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve
(their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents
questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges
against them for lack of preliminary investigation.[40] There is, thus, no waiver to
speak of.
In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were preventively
suspended in the same formal charges issued by the former without the latter
knowing that there were pending administrative cases against them. It is true
that prior notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive
suspension order.[41]However, considering that respondents were preventively
suspended in the same formal charges that we now declare null and void, then their
preventive suspension is likewise null and void.
Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the payment of
back salaries during the period of respondents preventive suspension. As the
administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or
misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension meted
them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be awarded their salaries
during the period of their unjustified suspension.[42] In granting their back salaries,
we are simply repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents, and
unless we can turn back the hands of time, we can do so only by restoring to them
that which is physically feasible to do under the circumstances. [43] The principle of
no work, no pay does not apply where the employee himself was unlawfully
forced out of job.[44]

In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the

other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 157383
is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 174137 is DISMISSED, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

On Official Leave
Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Amelita
G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 157383), pp. 37-40.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Amelita G.
Tolentino, concurring; id. at 41.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Vicente S.E.
Veloso, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 174137), pp. 69-78.
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Vicente
S.E. Veloso, concurring; id. at 80-83.
[5]
Id. at 85-89.
[6]
Id. at 85-86.
[7]
Id. at 87-88.
[8]
Id. at 86 and 89.
[9]
Id. at 90-101.
[10]
Id. at 102-114.
[11]
Id. at 119-122.
[12]
Embodied in two Orders dated July 30, 2002 and September 24, 2002; id. at 145 and 161.
[13]
Id. at 127-144.
[14]
Supra note 1.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 157383), p. 40.
[16]
Id. at 127-128.
[17]
Id. at 42-51.
[18]
Id. at 51.
[19]
Id. at 48-50.
[20]
Id. at 50.
[21]
Rollo (G.R. No. 174137) pp. 232-248.
[22]
Supra Note 3.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 174137) pp. 77-78.
[24]
Id. at 509-512.
[25]
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R. No.
170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622, 629-630.
[26]
Id. at 637.
[27]
Section 8, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[28]
Section 9, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[29]
Section 11, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[30]
Section 12, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[31]
Section 14, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[32]
Section 15, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[1]

[33]

Section 16, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

[34]

Pat. Go v. NPC, 338 Phil 162, 171 (1997).

Engr. Rubio, Jr. v. Hon. Paras, 495 Phil 629, 643 (2005).

[35]

[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]

Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 831, 843.
Id. at 841; Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil 486, 491 (1999).
Montoya v. Varilla, supra ar 841-842; Fabella v. CA, 346 Phil 940, 952-953 (1997).
Engr. Rubio, Jr. v. Hon. Paras, supra at 643.
Rollo (G.R. No. 174137), p. 117.
Carabeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 178000 and 178003, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 394.
Fabella v. CA, supra at 958.
Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil 580, 594.
Id. at 596.