1

Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
Art. 90. Prescription of crime. Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made
the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third
paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966).
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. The penalties imposed by final
sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto
mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. The period of prescription of
penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give
himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this
Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN

2
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandigan bayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the
entire
period
of
her
suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity
of
a
new
appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during
the
period
of
his
suspension
pendente
lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt
the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason
of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated
or
forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether
before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same

ISSUE:
(1)
Effects
of
a
full
and
absolute
pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.

HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.

3
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable.
A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable
by
reason
of
the
pardoned
conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.

People vs. Abungan

341 SCRA 258

Crime: Murder.

Facts: Death of Abungan while case is pending

Issue: W/N Abungans death pending appeal extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling: YES. The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished
his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex delicto).I
n the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the death of appellant
extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and
before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil
liability\ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be
based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil
action against his estate, as may be warranted by law.

[G.R. No. 141931. December 4, 2000]

ANICETO
RECEBIDO, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs. PEOPLE

RESOLUTION

OF

THE

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KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 21347 entitled People of the Philippines versus Aniceto
Recebido, dated September 9, 1999 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Falsification of Public Document; and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are the following, to wit:
On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her
cousin, petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her
property, an agricultural land with an area of 3,520 square meters located at San
Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad Dorol mortgaged to petitioner sometime in
April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not execute a document on the
mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated
June 16, 1973 (Exhibit A) executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her
property on his claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol
maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her property
was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there exists on
its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit J), allegedly executed by
Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in the latters
name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other
documents (Exhibits K to K-10) with that of the signature of Caridad Dorol on the
questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas, found that the
latter signature was falsified (Exhibits L-1 to L-2).
Thereafter, Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto Recebido with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legaspi City and its Questioned
Documents Division conducted an examination in the original copy of the Deed of
Sale in question allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed
thereon.
Mr. Magbojas report was approved by the Chief of the Questioned Documents
Division, Arcadio Ramos, and the Deputy Director of Technical Services, Manuel
Roura, both of the NBI.[1]
Thus, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information
indicting petitioner for Falsification of Public Document with the Regional Trial Court,
5th Judicial Region, Branch 51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, reading as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1979, in the Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being a private individual, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, falsify and/or imitate the signature
of one Caridad Dorol and/or cause it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed her
name on a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in favor of the herein accused and
Notarized as Doc. No. 680; page No. 54; Boon No. XIV and Series of 1979 of the

5
Registry of Notary Public Dominador S. Reyes, when in truth and in fact accused well
knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said document, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contends that the land in
question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad, on February 25,
1977 and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983 although it was made to
appear that the deed of sale was executed on August 13, 1979. It was also on the
said date that Recebido gave Caridad the amount of P1,000.00 in addition to the
P2,600.00 mortgage price given to Juan Dorol which culminated into the execution of
the Deed of Sale signed by Caridad.[3]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision on December 2,
1996, convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing him as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, accused ANECITO RECEBIDO is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment.
Accused is ordered to pay P5,000.00 damages and to vacate the land in question
owned by the offended party.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the
trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the award for damages is DELETED, the
assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The petitioner raises his case before this Court seeking the reversal of the
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Based on his petition, the
following issues are before this Court:
1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed?
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner?
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grievous error in affirming
the decision of the trial court for the petitioner to vacate the land in
question owned by the offended party?
We rule in the negative on the three issues.

6
On the first issue: While the defense of prescription of the crime was raised only
during the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, there
was no waiver of the defense. Under the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to
assert the ground of extinction of the offense, inter alia, in a motion to quash shall
not be deemed a waiver of such ground. [6] The reason is that by prescription, the
State or the People loses the right to prosecute the crime or to demand the service of
the penalty imposed.[7] Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in the trial,
may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal. [8] Hence, the failure to raise this defense
in the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the
petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The petitioner is
correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed
when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefor,
which in this case is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos. [9] Under the Revised Penal Code,[10] said penalty
is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as
correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe
in ten years.[11] The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning
point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year
prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is
inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x x x. In People v. Reyes,[12] this Court
has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The
record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it
contains.
The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not sell the
subject land to the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime in 1983 the
private complainant mortgaged the agricultural land to petitioner Recebido. It was
only on September 9, 1990, when she went to petitioner to redeem the land that she
came to know of the falsification committed by the petitioner. On the other hand,
petitioner contends that the land in question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol,
the father of private complainant, and was subsequently sold to him on August 13,
1983. This Court notes that the private offended party had no actual knowledge of
the falsification prior to September 9, 1990. Meanwhile, assuming arguendo that the
version of the petitioner is believable, the alleged sale could not have been
registered before 1983, the year the alleged deed of sale was executed by the
private complainant. Considering the foregoing, it is logical and in consonance with
human experience to infer that the crime committed was not discovered, nor could
have been discovered, by the offended party before 1983. Neither could constructive
notice by registration of the forged deed of sale, which is favorable to the petitioner
since the running of the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned
earlier, have been done before 1983 as it is impossible for the petitioner to have
registered the deed of sale prior thereto. Even granting arguendo that the deed of
sale was executed by the private complainant, delivered to the petitioner-accused in
August 13, 1983 and registered on the same day, the ten-year prescriptive period of
the crime had not yet elapsed at the time the information was filed in 1991. The
inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had not prescribed at the time of
the filing of the information.

7
On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioners conviction by the trial court. The
petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged
document as found by the trial and appellate court.[13] Petitioner, nonetheless, argues
that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the
petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his
direction. This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need
of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly
observed by the Solicitor General, the questioned document was submitted by
petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly
in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who
merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessors Office of Sorsogon.
[14]
In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which
purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. Given this
factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of
sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the
forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the
falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the
material author of the falsification.[15] As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
On the third issue: Petitioner submits that the trial court is without jurisdiction to
order petitioner to vacate the land in question considering that the crime for which
he is charged is falsification.[16] The petitioner insists that the civil aspect involved in
the criminal case at bar refer to the civil damages recoverable ex delito or arising
from the causative act or omission. [17] In addition, petitioner argues that he is entitled
to possession as mortgagee since the private complainant has not properly
redeemed the property in question.
These are specious arguments. The petitioner based his claim of possession
alternatively by virtue of two alternative titles: one, based on the forged deed of sale
and, two, as mortgagee of the land. As already discussed, the deed of sale was
forged and, hence, could not be a valid basis of possession. Neither could his status
as mortgagee be the basis of possession since it is the mortgagor in a contract of
mortgage who is entitled to the possession of the property.We have taken note of the
practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession usually
goes with it.[18] Besides, even assuming that petitioner had a right to possess the
subject land, his possession became unlawful when the private complainant offered
to redeem the property and petitioner unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot profit from
the effects of his crime. The trial court, therefore, did not commit any error in
ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit
any reversible error in its Decision dated September 9, 1999 and its Resolution dated
February 15, 2000.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

8
[G.R. No. 131966. August 31, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
as Ombudsman, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., MARIA CLARA L.
LOBREGAT, ROLANDO DELA CUESTA, JOSE M. CONCEPCION, JOSE R.
MENDOZA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, EMMANUEL M. ALAMEDA,
AMADO C. MAMURIC, DOUGLAS LU YM, JAIME GANDIAGA, NARCISO M.
PINEDA, DANILO S. URSUA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration and the Second Motion for
Reconsideration filed by private respondent Cojuangco, Jr. as well as the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
On September 23, 2002, the Court, in the above-entitled case, granted the
petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines. The resolution of the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2811 dismissing the Republics complaint was set aside,
and the Ombudsman was ordered to proceed with the preliminary investigation in
said case and to exclude respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as
defendants. Respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and petitioner Republic of the
Philippines then filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision. Both were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated August 16, 2004.
Respondent Cojuangco, Jr. filed a second motion for reconsideration on the
ground, among others, that the Resolution dated August 16, 2004, was promulgated
without the requisite division of five as required by A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC. The Court in
its Resolution dated April 25, 2005 recalled the Resolution dated August 16, 2004 and
the (first) Motion for Reconsideration together with the Second Motion for
Reconsideration is deemed submitted for resolution.
In his first Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Cojuangco argues that:
a. It was because of lack of evidence or probable cause that the Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-90-2811, not because the offense has prescribed
or that LOI 926 and PD Nos. 961 and 1468 precluded prosecution under RA No. 3019
and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the Court in its decision of
September 23, 2002 did not overturn the Ombudsmans finding of lack of probable
cause, the Ombudsmans Resolution of June 2, 1997 may not be nullified.
b. No evidentiary basis exists for the Courts finding that the offense had not
prescribed; it was, consequently, error for the Court to have found that the offense
charged had not prescribed.
c. It was also error for the Court to have found that PD Nos. 961 and 1468, LOI No.
926 may not be taken into account in determining whether the respondent violated
R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.

9
d. The Court, apparently, overlooked respondents contention that his constitutional
right to speedy disposition of his case has been violated warranting dismissal of OMB0-90-2811.[1]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, for its part, questions the Courts ruling
ordering the exclusion of respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as
defendants in OMB-0-90-2811.[2]
The Court will first resolve respondent Cojuangcos motions for reconsideration.
In his second Motion for Reconsideration, respondent raises the same issues
which were earlier submitted in his first Motion for Reconsideration, i.e., as to the
existence of probable cause and the matter of prescription.[3]
The Court denies both motions of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.
Graft Investigation Officer II Aleu A. Amante, in his Resolution dated June 2, 1997,
recommended the dismissal of the case on the finding that there is no sufficient
evidence to engender a well-founded belief that violation of the Anti-Graft Law was
committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. [4] Contrary to
respondents argument, such conclusion is basically premised on the finding that the
acquisition by UNICOM of the sixteen oil mills was done in accordance with P.D. No.
961,[5] and not because there was no sufficient evidence that private respondents are
probably guilty of the charges against them. Amantes recommendation specifically
stated that respondents cannot be made criminally liable for implementing a
government policy because there is no element of evident bad faith or malice. [6] And,
as is stated in the assailed Decision, the validity of LOI No. 926, and P.D. Nos. 961 and
1468 will not protect respondents from criminal prosecution for violations of R.A. No.
3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Moreover, we categorically held in the Orosa case that the fact the transactions were
done pursuant to P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 will not shield the respondents from being
charged considering that prosecution for violations of R.A. 3019 involves
questions as to whether the contracts or transactions entered pursuant
thereto by the private respondents were manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government; whether they caused undue injury to
the government; and whether the private respondents were interested for
personal gain or had material interests in the transactions.
Similarly in the present case, contrary to the Ombudsmans belief, LOI No. 926 and
P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 cannot protect private respondents from criminal prosecution
as they are being charged with commission of acts tantamount to violations of R.A.
3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.[7](Emphasis supplied)
In other words, while P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 may have sanctioned UNICOMs
acquisition of the sixteen oil mills, it should not deter the Ombudsman from
determining in the preliminary investigation whether such acquisition caused undue
prejudice, disadvantage and injury to the government, or that private respondents
had a material and personal interest in the acquisition thereof, acts which are defined
as corrupt practices and declared unlawful under R.A. No. 3019. These questions
have not been taken into consideration by the Ombudsman when he concluded that

10
there is no sufficient evidence to engender a well-founded belief that violation of the
Anti-Graft Law was committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof.
If the Court were to adhere to private respondents argument that valid laws shall
be taken into account in determining whether there was a violation of R.A. No. 3019
and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, then the validity of laws would create a
blanket shield and there would be no prosecution for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as all acts committed by public officers will be
beyond reach, despite the undue damage, injury and prejudice to the government,
and the personal gain and material interest of the public officers involved.
Moreover, it is not true that the Court has no evidentiary basis for its finding that
the offense had not prescribed. As stated in the assailed Decision, since the ten-year
prescriptive period in violation of R.A. No. 3019 is governed by Section 2 of Act No.
3326, and applying further the ruling in Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan,[8] the complaint
in this case, which was filed on March 2, 1990, was well within the prescriptive
period. The counting of the applicable ten-year prescriptive period in this case
commenced from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been
between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution, and the filing of the complaint
with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on March 2, 1990.
Between these dates, at the most, only four (4) years had lapsed. Hence, the
complaint was timely filed.
The Court likewise finds respondents contention in his motions that the sevenyear delay in the disposition of the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman
warrants the dismissal of the case against him, without merit.
In the case of Dela Pea vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] the Court had the occasion to restate the doctrine that:
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Despite the finding that there was a considerable delay by the Sandiganbayan in
the disposition of the petitioners case, the Court did not dismiss their case for the
reason that the failure of the petitioners therein to assert their right to a speedy
disposition of their case amounts to a waiver of such right. Thus, the Court held:
Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case
was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss,
[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing. Also, in their petition, they
averred: Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits,
petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the preliminary
investigation. They slept on their right a situation amounting to laches. The matter
could have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they showed

11
signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made
some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not
waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of
such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was insensitive to the
implications and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against
him by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter,
which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have
been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his acquiescence. [10] (Emphasis
supplied)
In respondent Cojuangcos case, records shows that the last pleading filed prior to
the Ombudsmans Resolution dated June 2, 1997 was respondents Motion to Suspend
Filing of Counter-Affidavit, which was filed on May 15, 1991. [11] Between 1991 and
1997, respondent did nothing to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Clearly, his silence during such period amounts to a waiver of such right.
Moreover, respondents right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work
against and preclude the people's equally important right to public
justice[12] considering that the funds used to acquire the 16 moth-balled oil mills came
from the coconut levy funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are,
in fact, prima facie public funds.[13]
It is noted that the Courts decision in the Orosa case,[14] which is cited in the
decision of the present case, was set aside per Resolution dated July 7, 2004, on the
ground that two of the respondents therein, Ma. Clara Lobregat and Jose C.
Concepcion, were deprived of their right to file their comments on the petition, and
as such, the case was not yet ripe for resolution when the Court rendered its
decision. Be that as it may, said resolution does not bear any consequence on the
present case as the jurisprudence relied upon in theOrosa case are still valid and
binding precedents.
As regards petitioner Republics motion that the assailed Decision be
reconsidered insofar as the exclusion of respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C.
Concepcion as defendants in OMB-0-90-2811 is concerned, the Court finds the same
bereft of merit.
According to petitioner, respondents Regala and Concepcion should not be
excluded as respondents because they are being charged for illegal acts committed
in their official capacity as members of the Board of Directors of UNICOM and UCPB,
in conspiracy with the other private respondents. [15] Such argument, however, has
already been overruled by the Court in both the Regala[16] and Castillo[17] cases,
wherein the Court ordered the exclusion of petitioners therein from the acts
complained of in connection with the legal services they rendered to the other
respondents. Thus, the Court held in the Castillo case that:
It is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in the present case is not being required to
name his clients. However, the case of Regala is still applicable to the present case
because the two cases are the same in more important aspects.
The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants
Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised by petitioner as one of his
affirmative defenses. In the same vein, in Regalathe professional relationship was

12
raised merely as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proved during the
trial. This notwithstanding, this Court struck out the complaint against the lawyers.
The respondent Republic argued in its Comment that:
Moreover, the rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a valid
ground to dismiss a complaint against a party. It is merely a ground for
disqualification of a witness (Section 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be
invoked at the appropriate time, such as, when a lawyer is under compulsion to
answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned on
such confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to
produce, through subpoena duces tecum to otherwise, letters or other documents
containing the same privileged matter. But defendant is not being required to testify
about or otherwise reveal any confidential communication made by the client to him
or his advice given thereon. What is clear from the complaint is that defendant is
being sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy with the other defendants
in the commission of the acts complained of.
Besides, the attorney-client privileged communication does not apply if the
confidence received by an attorney is for the purpose of advancing a criminal or
fraudulent purpose.
This was the same argument raised by the Republic in the case of Regala. In
overruling the Republics position, this Court ruled:
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that
they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners
are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged illgotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they
are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to
maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. [18]
In this case, respondents Regala and Concepcion were constituted as Members of
the Board Directors of UNICOM and UCPB in the course of their duties as counsel, and
following the ruling in the Regala and Castillo cases, they should be excluded as
defendants to the case.
Finally, during the pendency of this petition, respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat
died on January 2, 2004.[19] The death of an accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
[20]
Consequently, the case against respondent Lobregat should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the first and second Motions for Reconsideration filed by private
respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., and the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
The Decision dated September 23, 2002 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
charges against deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in OMB-0-90-2811,

13
pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, is ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999]

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS
represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and
ORLANDO C. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman;
JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ;
FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, Members of the
Board of Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc.; CONCERNED MEMBERS
OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The core issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether public
respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (hereafter OMBUDSMAN) committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offenses with which the other
respondents were charged in OMB-0-96-0968 had already prescribed.
This case originated as G.R. No. 129763, the docket number given to the Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review filed by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG).[1] The motion was granted. However, what was filed
was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (hereafter
COMMITTEE)
as
petitioner. The
petition
was
docketed
as
G.R.
No.
130140. Accordingly, G.R. No. 129763 is now deemed functus officio.

14
Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But,
upon petitioners motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the
respondents were required to comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment), [2] the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) manifested that it would rel[y] on the evaluation and exercise of the
discretionary power conferred on Petitioner in the prosecution of the instant petition.
In its Manifestation and Motion [3] of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) informed the Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for
the following reasons: (a) the Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of petitioner
COMMITTEE; (b) being an agency of the Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be
represented by the OSG; and (c) the petition was signed by Associate Solicitor
Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with the PCGG, and by
Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of the PCGG, which is also a client of the
OSG. The Court then required the OMBUDSMAN to file his own comment, which he
did on 11 June 1998.[4]
Copies of the resolution requiring comment on the petition sent to the other
respondents were returned to sender because the said respondents had MOVED.
Since the challenged resolution and order of the OMBUDSMAN were issued before
said other respondents were even required to submit their counter-affidavits,
impleading them in this case is not necessary; hence, this case can be resolved
without their inclusion as respondents.
As culled from the initiatory pleadings and MEMORANDA of the COMMITTEE and
the OMBUDSMAN, the undisputed facts are as follows:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the
Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one
representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of
Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine
National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. The
Committee was directed to perform the following functions:
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including
the principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as
the persons responsible for granting the loans or who influenced the grant
thereof;
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted friendly waivers, as well as the
government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of
these waivers.
3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to
recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office
of the President within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61
directing the COMMITTEE to include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non-

15
performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-behest loans. It likewise
provided for the following criteria which might be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining a behest loan, to wit:
a. It is undercollateralized.
b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized.
c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence
of marginal notes.
d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified
as cronies.
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended.
f. Use of corporate layering.
g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought.
h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
xxx
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that
while both may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former
may likewise entail criminal liability.
In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated
15 July 1993,[5] the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter
PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the
twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans.
In his instructions handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned Report,
President Ramos directed COMMITTEE Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter
alia, proceed with administrative and judicial actions against the twenty-one firms
(out of 21) in this batch with positive findings ASAP.[6]
On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG
consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn
complaint[7] against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos,
Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and the
Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for
violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, which read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
...

16
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
...
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited
or will profit thereby.
The complaint, later docketed as OMB-0-96-0968, alleged as follows:
4. The evidence submitted to us show that:
a) Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI) obtained its initial loan guarantee on April 17,
1969 under B/R 2805 (Annex 1, Evidence 3) with an aggregate amount of
$3,452,535. or P13,568,463. (P3.93 to $1) . . . .
Based on the foregoing DBP approved Guarantee Loans, PSI still had a
collateral deficiency of P5,444,432, and likewise DBP infused the amount
of P3,824,911 as against the corporations paid-up capital of P2,225,000
only.
b) Subsequent loans/guarantees were extended by DBP for the benefit
and/or advantage of PSI under the following Board Resolutions:
1) B/R 3353 dated August 13, 1975 (Annex 2, Evidence 4) for the following
purposes:
(a) DBP to extend a loan of P215,000 at 12% interest per annum for
repairs & rehabilitation of the PSI plant within a period of four (4)
months from the full release of the amount.
(b) DBP to extend a short term of P6 million at 12% interest per annum
for its working capital.
(c) DBP to assume PSI loans with commercial banks.
(d) DBP to restructure PSI existing obligations if after 6 months of trial
period, operations proved profitable and viable.
(e) DDBP to suspend foreclosure for 10 months.
2) B/R 883 series 1978, (Annex 3, Evidence 9) DBP Board approved a P2.9
million loan for the following purposes:
(a) P1.9 million to liquidate PSIs obligation with other creditors.
(b) P1.0 million to finance PSIs special projects.

17
(c) DBP initiated PSI foreclosures starting March 1975 but it was not
implemented by virtue of then President Marcos marginal notes dated
April 1975 (Annex 4, Evidence 6) and June 1995 (Annex 5, Evidence
7).
(d) Pacifico Marcos and Eduardo Romualdez, relatives of the late
President Marcos, were the principal stockholders and officers of the
subject firm.
5. As a private entity, Philippine Seeds, Inc., did not deserve the concessions
given it without sufficient collateral for the loan and adequate capital to
ensure not only the viability of its operations but its ability to repay all its
loans.
In the resolution[8] dated 14 May 1996 and approved on 9 June 1996, the
OMBUDSMAN dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968 on the ground
of prescription. Relying on People v. Dinsay,[9] a case decided by the Court of Appeals,
he ratiocinated that since the questioned transactions were evidenced by public
instruments and were thus open for the perusal of the public, the prescriptive period
commenced to run from the time of the commission of the crime, not from the
discovery thereof. Reckoning the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970, 1975, and
1978, when the disputed transactions were entered into, the OMBUDSMAN ruled that
the offenses with which respondents were charged had already prescribed.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the OMBUDSMAN in the
Order[10] of 19 May 1997, the COMMITTEE filed this case raising this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE
COUNTED FROM THE DATE OF THE GRANT OF THE BEHEST LOANS INVOLVED, AND
NOT FROM THE DATE OF DISCOVERY OF THE SAME BY THE COMMITTEE.
The COMMITTEE argues that the right of the Republic of the Philippines to
recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate
of Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and his
cronies accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to
recover. Besides, even assuming ex gratia that the right to file criminal charges
against the respondents is prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted
from
the discovery of
the
crimes
charged,
and not from
the
date
of
their commission. The ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to the case at bar. First, it is a
decision of the Court of Appeals; hence, it does not establish a doctrine and can only
have a persuasive value. Second, it involved a prosecution for estafa in that the
accused disposed of his property claiming that it was free from any lien or
encumbrance despite the fact that a notice oflis pendens was registered with the
Registry of Deeds. The sale, cancellation of the accuseds title, and issuance of a new
title to the buyer could not have been concealed from the offended parties or their

18
lawyers because these transactions took place when the civil case involving the said
property and the offended parties was in progress. Third, Dinsay involved private
parties, while the instant case involves the Government and public officers. Fourth,
the ruling is not absolute, since no less than this Court in People vs. Monteiro[11] said:
[T]he period of prescription for the offense of failure to register with the SSS shall
begin from the day of the discovery of the violation if this was not shown at the time
of its commission. A contrary view would be dangerous as the successful
concealment of an offense during the period fixed for its prescription would be the
very means by which the offender may escape punishment. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, in People v. Duque,[12] which involved a prosecution for illegal recruitment under
Article 38 of the Labor Code, this Court held:
Even if it be assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence required that a person
seeking overseas employment ought to check the authority or status of persons
pretending to be authorized or to speak for a recruitment or placement agency, the
offended parties failure to do so did not start the running of the prescriptive period. In
the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or
obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that
if the violation of the special law is not known at that time, the prescription begins to
run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the COMMITTEE asserts that even assuming that the discovery rule does
not apply, still, because of the principle of equitable tolling, prescription has not yet
set in for the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0960 were charged. This
principle is based on the doctrine contra non valentem agere nulla currit
praescriptio, i.e., no prescription shall run against a person unable to bring an action.
The COMMITTEE was unable to bring the action, for the cause therefor was not known
or reasonably known to it owing to the fact that (1) the loans, being behest, were
concealed; (2) both parties to the loan transactions were in conspiracy to perpetrate
the fraud against the State; and (3) the loans were granted at the time then President
Marcos was at the threshold of his authority when no one dared question, much less
investigate, any of his orders.
The OMBUDSMAN takes a different view. For one, he asserts that Section 15 of
Article XI of the Constitution is not applicable, since what the COMMITTEE seeks in
OMB-0-96-0968 is not to recover the unlawfully acquired wealth from the
respondents therein but to hold them criminally liable for violation of R.A. No.
3019. The dismissal of the case is not a bar to the institution of forfeiture proceedings
against the concerned former government officials and cronies.
For another, the OMBUDSMAN insists that the offenses with which the
respondents were charged had already prescribed. As a matter of fact it prescribed in
ten years pursuant to the original provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, which
fixed the prescriptive period at ten years. B.P. Blg. 195, which increased the
prescriptive period to fifteen years, became effective only on 16 March 1982 and
cannot be given retroactive effect; hence, the offenses which might have arisen from
the grant of the assailed loans in 1969, 1975 and 1978 prescribed in 1979, 1985 and
1988, respectively.

19
The OMBUDSMAN points to Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which governs prescription
of crimes under special laws and which reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof . . .
According to him, the computation of the prescriptive period from the date of
discovery would only be resorted to if the commission of the crime be not known at
the day of the commission. The phrase if the same be not known does not mean lack
of actual knowledge, but that the crime is not reasonably knowable by reason of the
nature of the crime or the environmental circumstances thereof. In the case filed by
the COMMITTEE, the crimes alleged to have been committed were reasonably
knowable because the transactions were never conducted clandestinely ... [but]
carried out in the open, leaving a trail of public instruments/documents accessible
and susceptible to evaluation. Moreover, as can be drawn from the allegation in the
COMMITTEEs complaint that the DBP initiated PSI foreclosures starting March 1975,
the corresponding mortgages were executed and registered. Hence, the doctrine laid
down in Dinsay is applicable. Likewise, in People v. Sandiganbayan,[13] this Court ruled
that the prescriptive period for the violation of R.A. No. 3019, which was allegedly
committed by Paredes by misrepresenting in an application for land patent that the
subject land was disposable, started to run from the date of the filing of the
application. Yet, in said case the falsity of Paredes representation regarding the
disposability of the land was not capable of being drawn from the application alone;
nevertheless, this Court was not deterred from holding that prescription started to
run from the filing of the application.
Finally, the OMBUDSMAN maintains that any confidential relationship between
the former strongman and the respondents DBP officials ceased altogether after the
February 1986 EDSA revolution. Even assuming then that the running of the 10-year
period of prescription was suspended by reason of the said confidential relationship,
the same re-started in February 1986 and went on to lapse in February
1996. However, the complaint of the COMMITTEE in OMB-0-96-0968 was filed only on
2 March 1996.
We agree with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal
cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear
from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986.
What is now Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution was originally Section 13
of the proposed Article on Accountability of Public Officers in Committee Report No.
17 submitted to the Constitutional Commission by its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers,[14] viz:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees shall not be barred by prescription.
At the plenary session, Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., succeeded in having that
Section amended. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

20
MR. DAVIDE. Would the proponent accept some amendments?
MR MAAMBONG. Gladly.
MR. DAVIDE. The amendment of Section 13 will consist of the following: On line 25,
after the word employees, add the following: OR THEIR CO-PRINCIPALS,
ACCOMPLICES OR ACCESSORIES OR TO PROSECUTE OFFENSES IN
CONNECTION THEREWITH; then on line 25, after the word prescription, add a
comma (,) and the words LACHES OR ESTOPPEL. So the entire Section 13 will
read as follows: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees OR THEIR CO-PRINCIPALS,
ACCOMPLICES OR ACCESSORIES OR TO PROSECUTE OFFENSES IN
CONNECTION THEREWITH shall not be barred by prescription, LACHES OR
ESTOPPEL.
...
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to insist on my proposal for the plain and simple reason
that the republic act on forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth would cover only the civil
aspect. As a matter of fact, any prosecution for the criminal aspect of that will
have to be taken under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. That is why it
is necessary to include here, specifically, the criminal action and
the imprescriptibility of the criminal action. Besides, what is stated in the law
on ill-gotten wealth and recovery thereof would refer to prescription or statute
of limitations. We know for a fact that there are two other concepts in Civil
Law. We have laches and estoppel. Laches, for instance, is a concept entirely
different from prescription. While an action may not prescribe, it may be
barred by laches and while an action may not prescribe or may not be barred
by laches, it may also be a limitation because of estoppel. So, if we really want
to strengthen this particular concept, we should be very specific in having it
related to both criminal and civil actions. In addition to prescription, we should
also include laches and estoppel.
...
THE PRESIDENT. Is it accepted by the Committee?
MR. NOLLEDO. After consultations, the Committee is happy to announce that we
are accepting the amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President; I also thank the members of the
Committee.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved.[15] (Emphasis supplied).
As shown, the amendment made the provision applicable as well to criminal
actions arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth.
However, on motion for reconsideration by Commissioner Christian Monsod, who
explained that the intention of the Committee was to limit the proposed Section 13 to
civil actions, and without objection on the part of Commissioner Davide, the motion

21
for reconsideration was granted. As a consequence, the amendment of Commissioner
Davide regarding the applicability of the Section to criminal actions was
deleted. After further proceedings the Section was further amended by the insertion
of the phrase from them or from their transferees. Thus:
MR. BENGZON. There is just one loose thread hanging in the Article on
Accountability of Public Officers and I would like to get this out of the way. May
I suggest that Commissioner Monsod be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. We circulated to the Commissioners a memorandum that was
unanimously endorsed by the members of the committee, except for one
member who [was] absent. In this memorandum, we suggested the deletion
of a phrase which we consider redundant in the context of the intent of the
committee. We wanted to ask the body for any comment it may have on it
because we feel we do not need to reopen the article if the body agrees with
us that it is not a substantial change, but a change to reflect the intention of
the body and the committee on this matter.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). On what article is that, Commissioner
Monsod?
MR. MONSOD. It is on the Article on Accountability of Public Officers which was
circulated a couple of days ago.
On Section 13, lines 7 and 8, we propose to delete the phrase or to prosecute
offenses in connection therewith. The committee considers this phrase
redundant with its intent on the recovery of property illegally acquired. The
action contemplated by the committee is a civil action. However, since
jurisprudence considers such action for recovery as partaking of a criminal
action, we believe that it is not necessary to mention or to prosecute offenses
in connection therewith. Hence, we ask the body if there is any objection to
delete that phrase.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod, what is the
phrase sought to be deleted?
MR. MONSOD. The phrase or to prosecute offenses in connection therewith.
...
MR. MONSOD. May we ask Commissioner Davide, the proponent of some of these
amendments, on this article?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes) Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
After deeper reflection on the consequences of the amendments which I
introduced and which are now sought to be deleted, and taking into account
the massive consensus of opinions on the part of the committee which is now

22
seeking for its reconsideration, I would have no objection to it. However, there
is a point to be taken up and I understand that Commissioner Regalado has
also a point to take up on this.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I move for the deletion of the phrase co-principals, accomplices or accessories,
because what is contemplated in that amendment is a civil action. The phrase
co-principals, accomplices and accessories is proper only in a criminal
action. So, I have asked the committee to delete those words.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). So, how will the section now read?
MR. MONSOD. The section as amended by deletion will now read: Sec. 13. The
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). So for the information of the Members
of the Commission, what phrases are deleted?
MR. MONSOD. The phrases that are deleted are as follows: or to prosecute
offenses in connection therewith and or their co-principals, accomplices or
accessories.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). So, in effect, the Commissioner is
asking for a reconsideration.
MR. MONSOD. It has been suggested that that would be appropriate in order to
make sure that this is properly regularized.
RECONSIDERATION OF APPROVAL
OF PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 456
(Article on the Accountability of Public Officers)
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). As many as are in favor of
reconsidering Section 13, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand).
The results show 27 votes in favor and 1 against; the reconsideration is approved. [16]
Commissioner Monsod is again recognized.
MR MONSOD. I propose that we delete the phrases: or their co-principals,
accomplices or accessories and or to prosecute offenses in connection
therewith. So, the entire article will now read: The right of the State to recover

23
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees shall not be
barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
...
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Is there any objection to the
amendment of Commissioner Monsod?
Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.
MR AZCUNA. Mr. Presiding Officer, the phrase co-principals, accomplices and
accessories refers to criminal cases. So I propose to insert the phrase OR
THEIR TRANSFEREES IN BAD FAITH in order to be able to recover these
properties even from transferees of the public officers if they are done in bad
faith.Hence, the amended section will read: The right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees OR THEIR
TRANSFEREES IN BAD FAITH.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. We have no objection to that, but I understand there is a comment
on this matter.
...
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR MONSOD. In order to clarify the intent of the amendment, we suggest that the
amendment be stated this way: FROM THEM OR FROM THEIR TRANSFEREES.
So, the entire section will read: The right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees FROM THEM OR FROM
THEIR TRANSFEREES shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.
MR AZCUNA. I accept the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER
recognized.

(Mr.

de

los Reyes). Commissioner Maambong is

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I recall I presented an amendment precisely

on this provision. I gave way to Commissioner Davide at that time because the
imprescriptibility provision was supposed to cover both criminal and civil
actions. I just want to clarify this from Commissioner Monsod or from
Commissioner Davide if in the present formulation, what is covered is only
imprescriptibility of civil action and not of criminal action. Commissioner
Davide can probably answer that.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

24
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is just the imprescriptibility of the civil action.
MR. MAAMBONG. If only civil action, it does not cover imprescriptibility of criminal
action.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, that is right.
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Is the Commission now prepared to
vote on the issue?
MR. RAMA. Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Is there any objection to the
amendment of Commissioner Monsod? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved.[17] (Emphasis supplied).
Then, on motion of the Committee on Style, the Section 13 which became
Section 15, was approved; thus:
MR. RODRIGO. In Section 15, we inserted: FROM THEM OR FROM THEIR NOMINEES
OR TRANSFEREES and we deleted co-principals, accomplices or accessories or
to prosecute offenses in connection therewith. So, Section 15 reads: The right
of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, FROM THEM OR FROM THEIR NOMINEES OR TRANSFEREES shall
not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
I move for its approval.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Is there any objection? (Silence). The Chair
hears none; the amendment is approved.[18]
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the prosecution of offenses arising
from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15,
Article XI of the Constitution may be barred by prescription.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of
Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the
computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, [19] as amended,
which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive
period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.

25
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived
or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE
that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-960968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the OMBUDSMAN that the phrase if the same be not known in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean lack of knowledge but that the crime is not
reasonably knowable is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or
negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language
and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application.
The OMBUDSMANs reliance on Dinsay is misplaced. The estafa committed by the
accused was known to the offended party from the very start; hence, it could even be
said that the commission and the discovery of the offense were simultaneous.
[20]
Neither is People v. Sandiganbayan[21] of any help to OMBUDSMAN. We ruled
therein that the prescriptive period commenced to run from the filing of the
application for the following reasons:
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon
the filing of Paredes application because no one could have known about it except
Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan
pointedly observed: it is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the
disposability of public land x x x other public officials pass upon the application for a
free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable character
thereof (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who had a
hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector
who inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who
prepared its technical description; (3) the regional director who assessed the
application and determined the land classification; (4) the Director of Lands who
prepared the free patent; and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could...
have helped discovering that the subject of the application was non disposable public
agricultural land.
There was no showing that Paredes had connived with all the department personnel,
who had a hand in processing and approving the application of
Paredes. Consequently, such personnel could have easily discovered the falsity in
Paredes claim and denounced it. It would have been entirely different if the public
officials concerned conspired with him, in which case, they would have hidden the
misdeed to escape culpability.
People v. Duque[22] is more in point, and what was stated there stands
reiteration: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently
not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable
statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
In the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint in Case
No. OMB-0-96-0968 without even requiring the respondents to submit their counter-

26
affidavits and solely on the basis of the dates the alleged behest loans were granted,
or the dates of the commission of the alleged offense was committed.
Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal
action should commence from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly
acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-960968. It should have first received the evidence from the complainant and the
respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the date of
discovery of the offense.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING
the petition, and SETTING ASIDE the resolution of 14 May 1996 and the Order of 19
May 1997 of the public respondent OMBUDSMAN in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968.
The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary
investigation of the case OMB-0-96-0968 taking into account the foregoing
disquisitions.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO,

Presiding Judge, RTC of Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution
dated June 14, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn)[2] of the
1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur. The Information alleged:
That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay
Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there
unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and
two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is
located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room in
complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board
of Election Tellers.[3]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known
as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as
maximum.

27
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which
eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final
and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987.
On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was
submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the
presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his
bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to
quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty
imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the warrant of
arrest and motion for reconsideration.
On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was filed
before us.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the penalty
imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The
Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial
legislation when it added the phrase by escaping during the term of the sentence
thereto, so petitioner claims.
Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:
Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence
prescribed as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto
mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows:
Computation of the prescription of penalties The period of prescription of penalties
shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his

28
sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which his Government has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period
of prescription.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum
to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum.
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978 Election
Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the case,
We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the
application of said code in suppletory character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article 25 in
relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it
prescribed in ten (10) years.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such judgment
would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for
such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24,
1996.
The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has
prescribed.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or
committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the
evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.
(p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.)
From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed
because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy the second element,
to wit That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the
service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single
minute of his sentence.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this
Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,[4] where we declared that, for prescription of
penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape
during the term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to
deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.

29
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the
felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code,
evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner
from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner
begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace
and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But
it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only
to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be
rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and
applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the
pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription
never started to run in his favor.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
B. Particular Rules
(1) Article 89
Cristobal vs Labrador, 71 Phil 34
Cristobal vs Labrador is a petition for a review of the lower courts decision on an election case.

On March 15 1930, Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and sentenced to 6 months
imprisonment and the accessories, and to return the amount taken. Despite this, Santos
continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal, and between 1934 and 1937 even served
as municipal president. On August 22 1938 the Election Code was approved, which had a
provision that disqualifies Santos from voting, having been declared by final judgment guilty of a
crime against property. Santos applied with the President for an absolute pardon, which was
given him on December 24 1939. The pardon said that his full civil and political rights were
restored except that his right to hold public office was limited only to positions which involved no
money
or
property
responsibility.
On November 16, 1940, Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos excluded from the voters list on
the basis of sec 94 of the Commonwealth Act no. 357. The court ruled that the pardon given
Santos excluded him from the disqualification created by the New Election Code.
Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not extend to the enjoyment of
political rights, for that would allow the President to encroach on the powers of the legislature, in
effect exempting some people from the effects of the law. Cristobal said the pardoning power of
the Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions and would amount to an unlawful exercise
of
the
Executive
of
a
legislative
function.
The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the power of clemency: that it be
exercised after conviction, and that it does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the

30
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative
action.

Held: Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would lead to the impairment of this power.

Pelobello vs Palatino, 72 Phil 441

In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to imprisonment
for 2 years, four mos and one day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor General and on Dec 25,
1940,
an
absolute
pardon
by
the
President.
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his right to hold office as mayor elect
of Torrijos, Marinduque province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the disqualification
incident to criminal conviction under paragraph a of sec 94 of the Election Code, the pardon
having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office.
Ratio: Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning power is only subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative
action.
HELD: thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos,
Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality
three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the
election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the
purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference
to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and
before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for
defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant
to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at
bottom is a technical objection. JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AFFIRMED.

People vs. Nery

10 scra 244

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental convicting
Soledad Nery for estafa. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Supreme Court, the one and only
issue raised in the appeal being one of law.

The accused-appellant, Soledad Nery, conforms to the following findings of fact of the trial court:

31
On 15 November 1954, in a market stall in Bacolod City, the said accused received from Federico
Matillano two [2] diamond rings to be sold by her on commission. The agreement was for the
accused to deliver on the following day, the sum of P230.00 to her principal, to whom the accused
had represented having a ready buyer, and whatever overprice could be obtained in the sale
would be retained by the accused as her commission.

Soledad Nery failed to show up on the following day; after several days, in a casual encounter
with Federico Matillano, she claimed that her prospective buyer withdrew from the transaction
and that she was looking for another buyer. Days, weeks, and months passed; and, his patience
exhausted, Federico brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities of Bacolod on 5
January 1955. In no time, Soledad was found and brought to the police station; then and there,
she promised, in writing [Exh. "A"], to deliver the price of the rings or the rings on 25 January
1955.

When the last-mentioned date arrived and Soledad failed to comply with her promise, the City
Attorney, at the instance of Federico Matillano, filed on 12 February 1955 a complaint with the
Municipal Court. The case was either withdrawn or dismissed, however, the accused making two
payments of P20.00 each to Federico. After these payments, the accused failed to pay further;
hence, the fiscal filed the corresponding information, dated 30 June 1958, with the court of first
instance.

On 10 October 1958, during the pendency of the case in the court of first instance, the accused,
assisted by counsel, Atty. Marcos Gomez, executed a deed, which is copied hereunder, as
follows:
"Bacolod City

"October 10, 1958.

"I hereby promise to pay Mr. Federico Matillano, the sum of One Hundred Ninety Pesos
(P190.00) Philippine Currency, to be paid in the following manner:
For the month of Nov. 1958 P 50.00
For the month of Dec. 1958 40.00
For the month of Jan. 1959 100.00

"In the event that I fail to comply with the above compromise, the complaint for estafa filed against
me by Mr. Matillano will be push through.

32

"[Sgd.] Soledad Nery.

"I hereby bind myself jointly and severally to the above-mentioned obligation of Soledad Nery.

"[Sgd.] Atty. Marcos S. Gomez

"Witness:
"[Sgd.] Leopoldo Lopez."

During the month of March, 1959, the accused Soledad Nery tendered a P50.00-payment to
Federico Matillano, which the latter accepted, but the balance of the price of the two rings was
never paid.

Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, the trial Court
imposed an indeterminate sentence of no less than two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor to no more than one (1) year and one (1) day of prisin correccional; to indemnify Federico
Matillano the sum of P140.00, representing the unpaid balance, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency at the rate of P2.50 a day but not exceeding a third of the principal penalty;
and to pay the costs.

The only issue is defined in the appealed Decision as follows:

"La cuescion mas importante que se plantea ante la consideracion del Juzgado, es si la
transaccion original habida verbalmente entre la acusada y el ofendido es la maana del 15 de
Noviembre de 1954, formalizada mas tarde el 5 de Enero de 1955, por medio del documento de
compromiso, Exh. A, ha sido movada por virtud de los pagos parciales de a P20. cada uno, Exhs.
1 y 2, y del otro documento de compromiso, Exh. E, de manera que la responsabilidad criminal
de la acusada originada por la infraccion de la transaccion originada ha venido a convertirse en
una simple responsabilidad civil."

Borrowing from a theory expressed in four Decisions of the Court of Appeals, namely: People vs.
Galsim, CA-G.R. No. 531-R, Feb. 26, 1948, 45 O. G. 3466, Aug. 1949; People vs. Trinidad, 53 O.
G., 731, Feb. 15, 1957; People vs. Doniog, CA-G.R. No. 16993-R, 53 O. G., No. 15, 4500; and
People vs. de la Rama, CA-G.R. No. 17677-R, May 21, 1958, the accused in the present case

33
insists that there is no prohibition in our law to prevent the parties to a contract to novate it so that
any incipient criminal liability under the first is thereby avoided.

The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal Information in Court by
the state prosecutors because up to that time, the original trust relation may be converted by the
parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to
insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
instituted action in Court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to
exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the
state, only the latter can renounce it [People vs. Gervacio, 54 Off. Gaz., 2898: People vs.
Velasco, 42 Phil., 76; U.S. vs. Montaes, 8 Phil. 620].

It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal
Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to
either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility,
as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to
[Cf. Abeto vs. People, 90 Phil. 581; U.S. vs. Villareal, 27 Phil. 481].

Even in civil law, the acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the original
relation between the complainant and the accused, cannot produce novation. For the letter to
exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and such intent can not
be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments on account of what is totally due. Much less
can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the nullification of a criminal
liability that is fully matured, and already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this Court has ruled
that the offended party's acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the amount misapplied
does not obliterate the criminal offense [Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48 Off. Gaz., 3898].

The Court of Appeals Decisions conform to the views here expressed. In the Galsim case, the
principal had accepted the sub- agent to answer for the jewelry, thereby releasing the agent. In
the case of Trinidad, the Court expressly found that the compromise had taken place
"immediately after the loss of the money in question, and long before the case was brought to
court". In the case before Us, however, the alleged novation occurred after the criminal case had
been instituted, and while it was pending trial. In fact, the novation theory advanced by the
accused has been rejected, time and again, by this Supreme Court, in a legion of decisions. Of
late, We stated:
"It is well-settled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of
contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on
its own motion though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by
the offended party [U.S. vs. Mendozona, 2 Phil. 353; U.S. vs. Ontengco, 4 Phil. 144; U.S. vs.
Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 153; People vs. Leachon, 56 Phil. 739; Javier vs. People, 70 Phil. 550]. As was
said in the case of People vs. Gervacio 102 Phil. 687, 'a criminal offense is committed against the
People and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law
imposes for the commission of the offense'. The fact, therefore, that the accused herein had, with

34
the consent of the offended party, assumed the obligation of paying the rentals, which he
collected, out of his own salary after he had committed the misappropriation, does not obliterate
the criminal liability already incurred." [People vs. Benitez, L-15923, June 30, 1960].

Nor is the case altered by the dismissal of the first charge in the Municipal Court, since under the
law in force in 1955 [Rep. Act 296] that court had no jurisdiction over the offense, which was
properly cognizable in the Courts of first instance that had original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
in which the penalty is more than six months or fine of more than P200.00 [Sec. 44 (f)].

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed Decision should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with
costs against the accused-appellant.

[G.R. No. 99032. March 26, 1997]

RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition to review the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 8538653 convicting petitioner of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of one (1)
year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to reimburse Leon Gaw the amount of
P186,500.00 plus the costs of suit.
The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, together with Jacinto Pascual, was charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and pleaded not guilty of the crime charged.
Accused Jacinto Pascual remained at large. Thus trial on the merits was conducted
against accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, only.
Accused Ricardo Llamado and his co-accused Jacinto Pascual were the Treasurer and
President, respectively, of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation.
As found by the trial court, private complainant, Leon Gaw, delivered to accused the
amount of P180,000.00, with the assurance of Aida Tan, the secretary of the accused
in the corporation, that it will be repaid on 4 November 1983, plus interests thereon
at 12% plus a share in the profits of the corporation, if any.

35
Upon delivery of the money, accused Ricardo Llamado took it and placed it inside a
deposit box.Accused Jacinto Pascual and Ricardo Llamado signed Philippine Trust
Company Check No. 047809, postdated 4 November 1983, in the amount of
P186,500.00 in the presence of private complainant.
The aforesaid check was issued in payment of the cash money delivered to the
accused by private complainant, plus interests thereon for sixty (60) days in the
amount of P6,500.00.
On 4 November 1983, private complainant deposited the check in his current account
with the Equitable Banking Corporation which later informed the complainant that
said check was dishonored by the drawee bank because payment was stopped, and
that the check was drawn against insufficient funds. Private complainant was also
notified by the Equitable Banking Corporation that his current account was debited
for the amount of P186,500.00 because of the dishonor of the said check.
Private complainant returned to Aida Tan to inform her of the dishonor of the
check. Aida Tan received the check from private complainant with the assurance that
she will have said check changed with cash. However, upon his return to Aida Tan,
the latter informed him that she had nothing to do with the check.
Thereupon, private complainant went to accused Ricardo Llamado on 11 November
1983 to inform him of the dishonor of the check. Accused offered in writing to pay
private complainant a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15
November 1983, and the balance to be rolled over for a period of ninety (90)
days. This offer was accepted by private complainant.
Accused, however, failed to remit to private complainant the aforesaid 10% on or
before 15 November 1983 and to roll over the balance of the money.
Private complainant then demanded from the accused the payment of P186,500.00
but accused failed to pay and instead, accused offered to return to private
complainant only 30% of his money which was refused by the latter. Thus, the filing
of the complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 against the accused. [2]
On the other hand, petitioners version of the relevant facts, is as follows:
It was the practice in the corporation for petitioner to sign blank checks and leave
them with Pascual so that Pascual could make disbursements and enter into
transactions even in the absence of petitioner.
One of the checks which petitioner signed in blank and gave to Pascual is the check
in question, Exhibit A.
The check was later issued to private complainant, filled up with the amount
P186,500.00 and date November 4, 1983.
The check was dishonored on November 7, 1983 when private complainant
presented it for payment because its payment had been stopped (Exhibits A-6 and A7). However, there were also no sufficient funds in the account to cover the amount
of the check.

36
Private complainant went to see Aida Tan, the Secretary of Pan-Asia Finance
Corporation, about the dishonor of the check because she was the one who handled
[sic] the check and gave it to me. He returned the check to Aida Tan who gave him a
receipt for it (Exhibit C), and promised to return the cash money. However, she did
not do so. Instead, she returned the check to private complainant (pp. 9-11, tsn,
January 6, 1986; p. 9, tsn, January 6, 1986).
On November 11, 1983, private complainant entered into an agreement (Exhibit H)
with petitioner whereby Pan-Asia Finance Corporation would pay private complainant
10% of the P186,500.00 by November 14, or 15, and the balance will be rolled over
for 90 days (pp. 1-4, tsn, June 30, 1986). Private respondent was not however paid as
agreed upon.
In late 1985, petitioner was charged with violation of BP 22 under the following
Information: xxx[3]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused
of violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused Ricardo A. Llamado
guilty of Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of
P200,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Accused is
likewise condemned to reimburse Leon Gaw the aforesaid amount of P186,500.00
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
In this petition, petitioner alleges that:
1. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it convicted petitioner of the charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 although the check was only a contingent
payment for investment which had not been proven to be successful, thus the check
was not issued to apply on account or for value within the contemplation of the
batas;
2. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it convicted petitioner of the charge for
merely signing the check in question without being actually involved in the
transaction for which the check was issued, in disregard of the pronouncement of this
Court in Dingle vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 595;
3. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it refused to apply the novation theory
recognized by this Court in Ong v. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 578, and Guingona,
Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 128 SCRA 577, despite admission by private complainant
that before the charge was filed in court or even the prosecutor he had entered into a
new agreement with petitioner supplanting the check in question;
4. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it held petitioner personally liable for
the amount of the check in question, although it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance
Corporation and he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation.

37
The petition is without merit.
For clarity, petitioners second allegation shall be discussed first. Petitioner argues
that respondent court erred in disregarding the pronouncement in Dingle vs. IAC,
[4]
that absent knowledge by the maker or drawer of the issuance of a check much
less of the transaction and the fact of dishonor, the accused should be acquitted.
The respondent court did not err. In Dingle vs. IAC, the petitioner was acquitted
because: 1.) from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness, it was established
that he dealt exclusively with petitioners co-signatory; 2.) nowhere in the prosecution
witness testimony was the name of petitioner ever mentioned in connection with the
transaction and the issuance of the check; and, 3.) the prosecution witness therein
categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle, petitioners co-signatory who received
his two letters of demand. These lent credence to the testimony of petitioner that she
signed the questioned checks in blank together with her husband without any
knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of
dishonor. Moreover, while Paz Dingle and her husband Nestor Dingle owned the
business, the business was managed by Nestor, petitioner Pazs co-signatory.
The above circumstances in Dingle vs. IAC do not obtain in the case at bar. Here,
the private complainant testified that upon delivery of the money, petitioner took it
and placed it inside a deposit box; that Jacinto Pascual and petitioner Ricardo
Llamado signed the questioned check, postdated November 4, 1983, in the amount
of P186,500.00 in the presence of private complainant; notice of the fact of dishonor
of the check was made on petitioner, who offered in writing [5] to pay private
complainant a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15
November 1983, and the balance to be rolled over for a period of 90 days.
Petitioner denies knowledge of the issuance of the check without sufficient funds
and involvement in the transaction with private complainant. However, knowledge
involves a state of mind difficult to establish. Thus, the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption,i.e., that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his
funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the checks
presentment for payment.[6] Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption by paying the
amount of the check within five (5) banking days from notice of the dishonor.[7] His
claim that he signed the check in blank which allegedly is common business practice,
is hardly a defense. If as he claims, he signed the check in blank, he made himself
prone to being charged with violation of BP 22. It became incumbent upon him
toprove his defenses. As Treasurer of the corporation who signed the check in his
capacity as an officer of the corporation, lack of involvement in the negotiation for
the transaction is not a defense.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent court erred when it convicted petitioner of
violation of BP 22 when the check was only a contingent payment for investment
which had not been proven to be successful, thus the check was not issued to apply
on account or for value within the contemplation of the batas. This contention is
untenable.
The check was issued for an actual valuable consideration of P180,000.00, which
private complainant handed to Aida Tan, a secretary in petitioners office. In fact,
petitioner admits that private complainant made an investment in said amount with
Pan-Asia Finance Corporation. Petitioner contends that the money which private

38
complainant gave the corporation was intended for investment which they agreed
will be returned to private complainant with interests, only if the project became
successful. But then, if this were true, the check need not have been issued because
a receipt and their written agreement would have sufficed.
True, it is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue
checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment, or as evidence of
indebtedness, if not a mode of payment. But to determine the reason for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode
the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
[8]
So, what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose
for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[9]
With regard to petitioners third allegation, the novation theory recognized by this
Court in certain cases, does not apply in the case at bar. While private complainant
agreed to petitioners offer to pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November
14 or 15, 1983 and the balance to be rolled over for 90 days, this turned out to be
only an empty promise which effectively delayed private complainants filing of a case
for Violation of BP 22 against petitioner and his co-accused. As admitted by petitioner
in his Memorandum, private complainant was never paid as agreed upon.
Petitioners argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount
of the check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he
signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also
untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states:
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of
respondent court AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

(2) Prescription of Offenses Art 90, 91

People vs. Puno
Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

39
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from
her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to
issue a check for P100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned
the car again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to
Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of
the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had
gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (AntiPiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
No.
No.
Ratio:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors
was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of
another offense primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving
bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was
inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is
the origin of the law on highway robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a
highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
This is not justified by the accused's intention

40
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

(3)

Prescription

of

Penalties

Article

93

Acceptance of a conditional pardon (People v. Puntilos)

G.R. No. L-45267

June 15, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
REMIGIO PONTILLAS, defendant-appellee.
Undersecretary
of
Jose Belmonte for appellee.

Justice

Melencio

for

appellant.

DIAZ, J.:
The appellee was charged in the lower court upon an information reading as follows:
The undersigned accuses Remigio Pontillas of violation of conditional pardon,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of December, 1935, in the City of Manila,
Commonwealth of the Philippines, the said accused, having been granted on
September 8, 1922, by His Excellency, the Governor-General, a pardon remitting the
unexecuted portion of this sentence of six years one day of prision correccional
imposed upon him in criminal case No. 21823 of the Court of First instance of Manila
for the crime of illegal marriage, which he began to serve on February 14, 1921,
subject to the condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands, which condition was accepted by him on September 8, 1922,
causing thereby his immediate release on that date from the Bilibid Prisons, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the conditions of such pardon,
by then and there committing the crime of damage to property thru reckless driving,
for which he was received again in Bilibid Prisons on June 26, 1936, to suffer thirty
days' subsidiary imprisonment in lieu of P61 fine and P60.30 indemnity imposed upon
him by the Municipal Court in criminal case No. H-47583, by virtue of the judgment
rendered by the said court, which judgment has become final and executory.
Contrary to law.
(Sgd.)
LOPE
Provincial
Fiscal
in the city Fiscal's Office

on

CONSING
detail

41
He interposed a demurrer based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute a public offense and, if true, would exempt him from criminal liability.
The lower court sustained the demurrer, holding that the penalty of six years and one
day of prision correccionalimposed upon the accused on February 14, 1921, of which
he was pardoned on September 8, 1922 on condition that he would not again commit
another offense, had long prescribed on June 26, 1936, when he was convicted and
commenced serving a subsidiary imprisonment of thirty days for failure to pay a fine
of P61 and an indemnity of P60.30 to which he was sentenced for having damaged
another's property. The opinion of the lower court was that the first penalty imposed
upon the accused having already prescribed when he committed his second offense,
he could no longer be prosecuted for violation of conditional pardon inasmuch as the
latter did not mean to impose upon him for life the duty of fulfilling its conditions,
which would be cruel and unusual. The fiscal, however, did not agree with the
resolution of the court, from which he appealed, and now submits the following
question:
May a person who has been conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive for
illegal marriage or bigamy after the has served nineteen months of the penalty of six
years and one day of prision correccional imposed upon him be criminally
prosecuted for violation of a conditional pardon on the sole ground that, contrary to
the condition that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine
Islands", he has committed the crime of damage to another's property through
reckless imprudence, for which he has been sentenced to pay a fine of P61 and an
indemnity of P60.30 with thirty days' subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency?
It must first be observed that a manifest error has been committed in describing the
penalty imposed upon the accused for bigamy as " prision correccional" when it was
and is clearly prision mayor not only by reason of the duration of the penalty, which
is six years and one day, but also of the crime for which it had been imposed. The law
styles prision correccional all imprisonment above six months, but not exceeding six
years; and prision mayor, all imprisonment above six years, but not more than
twelve. (article 27, paragraphs 4 and 3, of the Revised Penal Code; and article 28,
paragraphs 5 and 3, of the old Penal Code.) The duration of penalties, and not term
by which they may be designated, is what determines their nature. And it is known
that the crime of bigamy is punished, as it was before the Revised Penal Code was in
force, with prision mayor to its full extent (article 471 of the old Penal code; article
349 of the Revised Penal Code).
The question of whether at the time of the commission by the appellee of the crime
of damage to property, or on December 24, 1935, the penalty of six years and one
day imposed upon him for bigamy, had prescribed, is easily ascertainable by
considering the interval between the two occasions. From February 14, 1921, when
said penalty was imposed on him, to December 24, 1935, when he committed the
crime of damage to another's property, only fourteen years, ten months and ten days
had elapsed; and alike under the provisions of article 132 and 25 of the old Penal
Code and those of article 92 and 25 of the Revised Penal Code corresponding thereto,
the penalties ofprision mayor prescribe only in fifteen years.
The fact that when his conditional pardon was granted the appellee and accepted by
him, he had already extinguished nineteen months of his penalty of six years and one
day, thus leaving only four years, five months and one day to be served by him, does

42
not alter or change the nature thereof from prision mayor to prision correccional.
Besides, the period of prescription of his penalty of six years and one day was
interrupted by the mere fact of his acceptance of his pardon, which acceptance was
precisely subject to the condition that he could enjoy and would continue to enjoy is
liberty without being obliged to serve the remainder of his sentence so long as he did
not violate any of the penal laws of the country. It is true that article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code article 132 of the old Penal Code from which the first was
derived, which enumerates the causes for the interruption of the period of
prescription of penalties, does not mention conditional pardon as one of said causes;
but it is equally true that by the appellee's acceptance of his pardon, he was able to
avoid serving his sentence, which he may be said to have done in much the same
way as one who cannot be compelled to serve his sentence because he has fled to a
foreign country with which the Government has no extradition treaty.
In the case of State vs. Barnes (6 L. R. A., 743, 744), the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, in deciding a similar question, said:
. . . while it is quite true that the term of two years' imprisonment, to which
the defendant had been sentenced in 1883, has long since expired, yet it is
equally true that the defendant has not yet suffered imprisonment for that
length of time; and, as the pardon which he pleads as been adjudged
insufficient to relieve him from suffering the whole punishment originally
imposed upon him, it follows necessarily that he is still liable to be required to
complete the term of imprisonment originally imposed, just as if he had
escaped during that term; and such is the clear result of the authorities, both
English and American.
In this jurisdiction a conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties:
the Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does
not become perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all
its conditions. (De Leon vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil., 60.) Accordingly, if it is a
contract, it cannot be doubted that the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its
conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its
strict terms. Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation as before he was
pardoned and he could be compelled to serve the remainder of his sentenced, which
he has not yet served. (People vs. Ponce de Leon, 56 Phil., 386; U.S. vs. Ignacio, 33
Phil., 202.)
In the appealed resolution it is stated that the crime of damage to property
committed by the appellee is not one which shows moral perversity on his party,
meaning thereby that, strictly speaking, he did not infringe any condition of his
pardon. The above reason has no weight at all because the condition of the pardon
did not consist in that he would not commit any crime, more or less grave, which
might denote perversity, but in any violation of any penal law of the Philippines. The
crime of damage to property of another, through reckless imprudence, is a crime
expressly punished and considered as such by article 356 in relation to article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Since the question and the facts before us are different, it is not necessary for us to
decide whether an action may be brought for the purpose of enforcing the service of
a part of a sentence, which was not extinguished on account of conditional pardon,
after the usual period of prescription of the penalty.

43
In view of all the foregoing, the question raised must be answered in the affirmative.
Wherefore, the appealed resolution is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the trial
proceed in accordance with law. With costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-27191

February 28, 1967

ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, and the CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.
Ramon
V.
Sison
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

for

petitioner.

RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Pressed upon us in this, an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, is the
problem of when prescription of penalty should start to run. The controlling facts are:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner appealed. Found
guilty once again by the Court of First Instance,1 she was sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of
P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.2 We declined to review on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution
of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was
deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner
failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to
issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested.1wph1.t
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of
arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has
prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon
the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and,
instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present
petition.
Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. 4 By Article 92 of the
Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year.

44
The period of prescription of penalties so the succeeding Article 93 provides
"shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of
his sentence".5
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence Article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who
shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment 6 by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or
escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys,
disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final
judgment; (2) he "is servinghis sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and
(3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.7 This
must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his
sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by
the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by
breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false
keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "8 Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking".9
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of
1870 in its Article 134 from whence Articles 92 and 93 of the present Review Penal
Code originated reads:
Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:
Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte aos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Las leves, al ao.

El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se
notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o desde el quebrantamiento
de la condena si hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. x x x
Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en que se notifique
personalmente al reo la sentencia firme", written in the old code, were deleted. The
omission is significant. What remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code is solely "quebrantamiento de la condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or evasion
meansescape.10 Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started
service of sentence.

45
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of
imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run when he escapes from
confinement. Says Viada:
El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido
lugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850
no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126
se consigna que el termino de la prescripcion se cuenta desde que se
notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena
respectiva. Luego ausente el reo ya no podra prescribir hoy la pena, pues que
la notificacion personal no puede ser suplida por la notificacion hecha en
estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion
personal, es obvio que en las penas que consisten en privacion de libertad
solo porda existir la prescripcion quebrantando el reo la condena pues que si
no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su
encerramiento en el acto de serle notifirada personalmente la sentencia. 11
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final
sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentenced to
imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter never placed in confinement.
Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.
For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari and
prohibition. No costs. So ordered.

(4) Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides that
"violations penalized by special laws shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but
less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or
more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years", so that
perjury which is punishable by imprisonment of from four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months prescribes after eight years.
Chapter Two
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. Criminal liability is extinguished
partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his
sentence.
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditionalpardon.chanrobles virtual

46
law library Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the
obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his
non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of
the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him.
Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. The commutation of the original
sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of
substituting
the
latter
in
the
place
of
the
former.
Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. The good conduct of any prisoner in any
penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his
sentence:
1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
five days for each month of good behavior;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.
Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. A deduction of one-fifth of the period of
his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his
sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself
up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article.
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of
Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall
not be revoked.

G.R. No. L-13223

May 30, 1960

OSCAR MENDOZA ESPUELAS, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF BOHOL, respondent-appellant.
Rolando
Butalid
G.
for
appellee.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio
Villamor for appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
The respondent appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol
granting the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus filed by Oscar Mendoza Espuelas and
ordering his release from the custody of the respondent (special proceedings No.
343).
Then petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bohol with the crime of
inciting to sedition defined and penalized in article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.
After trial, on 22 September 1947 the Court found him guilty as charged and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccional as minimum to 5 years, 4 months and 20 days of prision
correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty in case of insolvency, and to pay the

47
costs (criminal case No. 576).1 He commenced to serve his sentence, but before
serving it to its full extent, on 17 March 1954, upon recommendation of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, the President of the Philippines granted him conditional pardon
by remitting the unexpired period of his sentence and payment of the fine of P1,000,
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On 25 March 1954 he accepted the conditional pardon and was released from
confinement (Exhibit A). Sometime thereafter, in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, he was charged with the crime of usurpation of authority or official
functions defined and penalized in article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic
Act No. 10. After trial, on 29 August 1956 the Court found him guilty as charged and
sentenced to suffer 4 months and 1 day ofarresto mayor as minimum to 2 years, 1
month and 1 day of prision correccional as maximum, the accessories of the law, and
to pay the costs. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. On 5 July 1957
the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion stating that one of the important witnesses for the
prosecution was in Manila and could not appear on the day of the trial (5 July) and
praying that the case be dismissed provisionally and the bond filed for the provisional
release of the petitioner cancelled. On the same day, 5 July 1957, the Court granted
the motion and dismissed the case (Exhibit B). On 8 November 1957, upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President ordered his
recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his sentence (Exhibit 1). On
9 November 1957 the petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine
Constabulary in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and confined in the provincial jail. On 20
November 1957 he filed a petition for habeas corpusin the Court of First Instance of
Bohol. After hearing, on 22 November 1957, as stated at the beginning of this
opinion, the Court granted his petition. On 23 November 1957 the respondent has
appealed. On the same day, 23 November, the petitioner filed a bond for his
provisional release pending appeal.
The question to determine is whether the President may order the reincarceration of
the appellee, upon violation by the later of the terms of the conditional pardon
granted to and accepted by him, to serve the unexpired term or period of his
sentence. The Solicitor General maintains that the President may do so; whereas the
appellee contends that he may not.
In the case of Tesoro vs. The Director of Prisons, 68 Phil., 154, quite similar to the
case under consideration, this Court held:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he

has committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as
having violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole,
petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct
himself in an orderly manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere
commission not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was
necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his
parole. And under section 64(i) of the Administrative Code the Chief Executive
is authorized to order "the arrest and reincarceration of any such person, in
his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his
pardon, parole or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis ours.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

48
Under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President is empowered
"to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment,
shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence." The arrest and confinement of the appellee were ordered by
the President upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole (Exhibit
1). In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil., 492; 48 Off. Gaz., 576, and in Infante vs.
Provincial Warden, 92 Phil., 310; 48 Off. Gaz., 5228, this Court held:
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains
a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other Acts
sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not
repeal section 64(i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code,
in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President
by section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the
President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who
violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the
enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection, we
observe that section 64(i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under
which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and to serve the
unexpired portion of the original sentence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The condition of the pardon granted by the President to the petitioner is "that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philip[pines. Should this condition
be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."
Due process is not necessarily judicial.2 The appellee had had his day in court and
been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of
inciting to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his
conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercised by the Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carries with it the
authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of
the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government
such power has been entrusted. In Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, supra, this Court
held:
. . . where, as in the instant case, the determination of the violation of the
conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief
Executive, the court will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his
findings. . . .
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, supra, this court further held:
xxx

xxx

xxx

49
It is contended by the petitioner that the power vested in the President by
section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the arrest and
reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon is repugnant to the due
process of law granted by the Constitution (sec 1, Article III). A similar
contention was advanced by the petitioner in the case of Fuller vs. State of
Alabama (45 L.R.A., 502), and was rejected by the Supreme Court of that
state, speaking thru Chief Justice McClellan, in the following language:
But it is insisted that this statute, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the
governor to determine that the condition of the parole has not been complied
with and the summary arrest of the convict thereupon by the direction of the
governor, and his summary return or remandment to servitude or
imprisonment under the sentence, is violative by organic guaranties of jury
trial, that no warrant shall be issued to seize any person without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, etc. This position takes no account of
the fact that the person being dealt with is a convict, that he has already been
seized in a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the
witnesses against him, been tried by the jury of his peers secured to him by
the Constitution, and by them been convicted of crime, and been sentenced
to punishment therefor. In respect of that crime and his attitude before the
law after conviction of it, he is not a citizen, nor entitled to invoke the organic
safeguards which hedge about the citizen's liberty, but he is a felon, at large
by the mere grace of the executive, and not entitled to be at large after he
has breached the conditions upon which that grace was extended to him. In
the absence of this statute, a convict who had broken the conditions of a
pardon would, it there were no question of his identity or the fact of breach of
the conditions, be subject to summary arrest, and remandment, as matter of
course, to imprisonment, under the original sentence by the court of his
conviction, or any court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction, a purely
formal proceeding. ... But the statute supervenes to avoid the necessity for
any action by the courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is
extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those
conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a
certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine
when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency
to bind himself in the premises had expressly contracted and agreed that,
whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the condition to
prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. . . .
The judgment appealed from is reversed, with costs against the appellee.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46437

May 23, 1939

EUFEMIO P. TESORO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellee.

50
Antonio
Barredo
y
Padagas
for
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Kapunan, Jr. for
appellee.
MORAN, J.:
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (100), or undergo
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October
28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy granted
the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions:
1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence
without first obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;
2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an
orderly manner;
3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive
Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once
a month, and thereafter, once every three months.
Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect.
On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San
Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one
Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were
attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco
Nagar. The case was thereafter forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where
the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information which, however, was
dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant.
Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint
with Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the
criminal action aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the
conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear
before the board for a hearing on the aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for
postponement until the day following. On February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a
letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife
the included therewith the supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter
had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole officer
assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the
strength thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board
addressed a communication to the President of the Philippines, recommending the
arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner. And on February 19, 1938, the President
issued the following order:
To any lawful officer:

51
Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila
of the crime of falsification of an official document, and sentenced to an
indeterminate term of from 2 years to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days'
imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on parole by His
Excellency, the Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain
conditions, one of which provides that he will not commit any other crime and
will conduct himself in an orderly manner, and
Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the
latter part of September, 1937, and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the
confidence of his brother-in-law, Jose Nagar, by maintaining adulterous
relations with the latter's wife, under the following circumstances: Upon the
death on September 18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose Nagar)
and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family and to help in the
keeping of the house and caring of the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar
and his wife came to live with the parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking
advantage of the frequent absences of Jose Nagar from the house, parolee
Tesoro made advances to Jose Nagar's wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded in
having illicit relations with her and even went to the extent of taking away the
woman from her legitimate husband, after the couple had moved from his
home, and he is now living with her in adultery.
Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio P.
Tesoro and to commit him to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila,
who is hereby authorized to confine said person for the service of the
unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison.
By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of
the Director of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against
the Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present
appeal.
Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was
granted parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:
To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit
fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to
such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence.
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as
follows:
The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses,
except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such

52
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so
far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has
been impliedly repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter
omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the
President of the Philippines. This contention is untenable. The power to pardon given
the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and
revoke paroles. (20 R.C.L., 577; 46 C.J. 1205.) If the omission of the power of parole in
the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect
would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the
Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. That such
effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond
question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal
authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation
of his parole. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive
secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his parole, and,
thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has
placed himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of
the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into
his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with
it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such
power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental
power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded
by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or
even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the
President chose to intrust his power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the concern of persons
released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.
Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having
violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed
that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction
by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be
deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of
any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Emphasis ours.)
Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the
conditional parole. He claims that, according to the weight of the evidence, the
violation took place, not "in the latter part of September, 1937," as found by the
President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to
expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the determination of the
violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief

53
Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The
petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment
of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after
October 28, 1937, when his maximum penalty was to have expired, we still find no
error in the order of the arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention
that, upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional
parole also expires, and, therefore, his liberty becomes absolute subject to no
conditions contained in his parole. In other words, he holds the view that the period
during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original
sentence. We do not subscribe to this contention.
In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said:
When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state
in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested
and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204;
U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in
requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his
original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court
should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of
the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (20 R.C.L., p. 570;
State vs. Horne [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719,
725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss., 282.)
This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C.J., 1209.)
The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the
duration of the penalty he has yet to serve after his recommitment. Act No. 1561
provided that a convict released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its
conditions, shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole has ever
been granted him, the time between the parole and the subsequent arrest not being
considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the period of his
subsequent confinement. But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative Code,
and section 64 (i) thereof omitted such provision. Act No. 4103, section 8, provides
that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof, shall, upon
re-arrest and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence for which he was originally committed to prison. This Act is not, however,
applicable to the present case, as the petitioner was paroled not under the provision
thereof, but by virtue of section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code. There is, thus, no
statutory provision squarely governing the case with respect to the duration of the
petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. In the absence of such statutory
provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the parole
that "should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect," it is evident that the petitioner herein should serve
the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

54
Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
Chapter One
PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.

[G.R. No. 154579. October 8, 2003]

MA. LOURDES R. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the Decision [1] of the Court
of Appeals dated November 29, 2001 and the subsequent Resolution dated August 1,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 145 in Criminal Case No. 961226,[2] finding herein petitioner, Ma. Lourdes de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Theft.
The Information filed on July 9, 1996 reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain
and without the consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away several
pieces of jewelry valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine Gongora, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned amount
of P4,600,000.00.[3]
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its judgment on December 11, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been sufficiently established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby finds the accused MA. LOURDES DE
GUZMAN GUILTY of the present charge of THEFT and committed without aggravating
circumstance charged nor mitigating circumstance proved and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences her to suffer the minimum penalty of FOUR
(4) YEARS and NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional, and the
maximum penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as well as the
penalties accessory thereto.
The Court further finds the accused MA. LOURDES DE GUZMAN civilly liable and
orders her to pay the private offended party, JASMINE GONGORA the sums of FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P4,640,000.00) representing the
value as proven of the stolen jewelries; FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

55
(P500,000.00) in moral damages and TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) as reasonable attorneys fees and litigation expenses. [4]

PESOS

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but reduced the award of damages, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, We AFFIRM the decision appealed from with the
MODIFICATION that the award for actual damages is reduced to P1,500,00 and moral
damages to P100,000. The award for attorneys fees is DELETED.[5]
Hence, this petition filed on September 24, 2002, raising the same issues in the
CA that the decision of the trial court was tried and decided by a biased judge; and
that the judgment of conviction was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment.
On January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a Manifestation informing
the Court that the petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003. [6] The death of the
petitioner resulted from a vehicular accident, as indicated in the Certificate of Death
attached thereto.[7]
At issue now before the Court is the effect of petitioners death on the instant
petition.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code clearly provides that:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally
extinguished;
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
The issue as to whether an action on the civil liability can survive and proceed
against the estate of the deceased has been settled in the case of People v.
Bayotas[8] where it was held that:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.[9]
The pecuniary liabilities adjudged against the petitioner are undeniably ex
delicto. The petitioner was ordered to pay actual damages, which is the value of the
pieces of jewelry allegedly taken from the private complainant in the amount of
P1,500,000, as modified by the Court of Appeals; and moral damages of P100,000 for
the fear and trauma caused to the complainant because of the petitioners intrusion
into her bedroom. These civil liabilities arose from the crime of Theft and are based
solely on said delict.
Although both the trial and the appellate courts found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, she had the right to appeal her case to this Court of last resort and

56
challenge the findings of the two courts below. The judgment of conviction was
pending review until her untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained
finality. Thus, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon
the Court to dismiss the instant petition for review. The Court is dismissing the case
because there is no longer a need to continue with the review of the appeal. The
lower courts decision has thus become ineffectual.[10]
Needless to state, the civil liability attendant to the crime which includes the
restitution of personal or real property [11] is also extinguished. A substitution of heirs
in petitioners stead is no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. In view of the death of the
petitioner, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Sapiera vs Court of Appeals

[G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Remedios Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, was issued by one Arturo de
Guzman checks as payment for purchases he made at her store. She used said
checks to pay for certain items she purchased from the grocery store of Ramon
Sua. These checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for
payment the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already
closed. Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both
failed to pay the value of the checks. Petitioner was acquitted in the charge of estafa
filed against her but she was found liable for the value of the checks.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable for the value of the checks even if she signed the subject
checks only for the identification of the signature of Arturo de Guzman.
RULING:
Petitioner is liable for the value of the checks. As she (petitioner) signed the subject
checks on the reverse side without any indication as to how she should be bound
thereby, she is deemed to be an unqualified indorser thereof. Every indorser who
indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course that,
on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid or both, according to its tenor, and
that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be
compelled to pay it.
G.R. Nos. L-47994-97 September 24, 1986
LIDELIA MAXIMO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR., Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court, 12th Judicial District, Bacolod City and CONCHITA
PANGHILASON, respondents.

57
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner Lidelia Maximo
to compel the public respondent Judge Nicolas Gerochi, Jr. to include in his judgment
of acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-XII-1067, 1073, 1074 and 1129, the civil
liability which the private respondent Conchita Panghilason admitted in court.
On June 28, 1976, the City Fiscal of Bacolod filed with the Circuit Criminal Court, 12th
Judicial District, Bacolod City, four (4) informations for estafa against respondent
Conchita Panghilason. The informations alleged that Panghilason willfully issued four
(4) checks amounting to P35,586.00 drawn against the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank in favor of the petitioner; that the checks were dishonored for lack of
funds or that her account with said bank had been closed and that she refused to
make the necessary deposit within three (3) days from receipt of notice to redeem
the said checks.
The petitioner intervened in the case through her private prosecutor on July 10, 1976.
On December 5, 1977, the respondent judge rendered the following judgment:
Verily, for all said, the Court strongly believes that in the case at bar,
the prosecution, to say the least, failed to establish the guilt of accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. That, herein, it appears that if accused had
any obligation, it is simply civil in nature that could be properly
ventilated within the context of civil law.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and considering that the
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused Conchita
Panghilason beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court finds accused
Conchita Panghilason NOT GUILTY of all the above-entitled four (4)
criminal information, and ACQUITS her therefrom, with costs de oficio.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the
decision regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered and thereafter the
accused who had admitted her civil liability be ordered to pay the sum of P33,586.00
plus 12% interest from the filing of the information. "
This motion was denied by the court in an order dated February 20, 1978. The order
stated that the award of civil liability "would not have been a problem if the accused
was convicted, for then, this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in the
offense proved, but the question is not indubitable because the accused was
acquitted in all the four (4) informations she was charged of."
The petitioner, therefore, came to this Court with the present petition.
The lower court is wrong.
If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising
from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment.
The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. Court
of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable

58
doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case
without need for a separate civil action. This ruling was reiterated in the case
of People v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where the accused formally admitted the
amount of civil damages.
The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows:
There appears to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still
be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact,
exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys
and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious
implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a
separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
The aforementioned case further declared that:
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has
been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or
even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the
case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action.
These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by
the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
filed.
The evidence taken in this case is summarized by the lower court as follows:
Prosecution evidence tends to show that on January 31, 1976, accused
purchased rice from Mrs. Maximo and paid her the amount of P11,775.00 in a
form of a check which she accepted after the accused assured her that the
check was covered by sufficient funds which check when presented
encashment to the bank was dishonored for reason of "account closed."
Exhibit "A", PCIB Check No. 161478; Exhibit "A-1", signature of accused;
Exhibit "B", the return slip: Exhibit "B-l," remark "account closed;" all for Crim.
Case No. CCC-XII-1129;
That on February 1, 1976, accused again purchased rice from her in the
amount of P 7,000.00, and in payment for which accused issued a check
dated the same day, February 1, 1976, which she accepted after the accused
assured her that it was supported by sufficient funds hence accused again
was able to secure the rice in the amount of P 7,000.00; that she (accused)
issued PCIB Check No. 165511, Exhibit "A" in CCC-XII-1073; that when the
check was deposited by a certain Enrique Oh to whom she indorsed the check,

59
the same was also dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" the
check; Exhibit "A-l," the signature of the accused; Exhibit "B," the return slip;
and Exhibit "B-l," remark "account closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII1073;
That on February 6, 1976, accused again bought rice from her in the amount
of P ll,500.00, and in payment of which was made in check dated the same
day February 6,1976, PCIB Check No. 161479, which she accepted after the
accused assured her that the same was likewise supported by sufficient funds,
hence, again on February 6, 1976, accused was able to secure rice from her in
the amount of P11,500.00; that the said check when deposit (sic) by Mr. Oh to
whom she indorsed it, it was similarly dishonored for reason of "account
closed." Exhibit "A," the check; Exhibit "A-l," the signature of the accused;
Exhibit "B," the return slip; and Exhibit "B-I," reason for return, "account
closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1074;
Again on February 7, 1976, accused purchased rice from her in the amount of
P5,300.00 and with the same assurance given her as the previous checks, she
accepted a check which when deposited by Mr. Oh to whom she indorsed the
same, the same was dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A"
PCIB Check No. 161490; Exhibit "A-1," signature of accused; Exhibit "B," return
ship; and Exhibit "B-l," reason of return, "closed account." All for Crim. Case No.
CCC-XII-1067;
That all these sale transactions of rice occurred at the Capitol Shopping Center,
Bacolod City, and that all these checks were signed in the presence of
complainant Mrs. Maximo; that accused, despite repeated demands failed to
settle the matter with her hence she was compelled to bring the matter to the
Court, and, in the process, retain the services of counsel to which she
covenanted to pay as attorney's fee for P3,000.00; that the actual total
damage incurred by Mrs. Maximo as a result of the dishonor of the checks in
question summed up to P35,500.00; that out of these four transactions,
accused merely made partial payment of P500.00 on December 17, 1975, as
shown by Exhibit "l ".
Defense evidence, on the other hand, tends to show that accused came to
know complaining witness sometime in 1973; that it was her late husband who
used to have transactions with the latter who allowed her husband to purchase
rice on credit; that she took over the business of buying and selling rice when
her husband got sick; that likewise Mrs. Maximo allowed her to purchase rice
on a 15- day credit basis; that she was allowed to issue postdated checks
dated 15 days after the actual purchase; that consequently, she purchased rice
from Mrs. Maximo weekly; that after she got the rice, she would issue a check
for the previous purchases she made, as evidenced by the checks she had
issued to Mrs. Maximo, Exhibit "2" up to Exhibit "21," although all these checks
did not represent all the transactions she had with her amounted
approximately to P 480,000.00; that all the checks in question involved in the
above-entitled criminal cases were all issued on January 15 and 21, 1975, and
not on the dates they appeared therein; that the check dated January 31, 1976,
covered in Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1129 involved a transaction that transpired
on January 15, 1975, and the check was issued on January 21, 1975, and
actually postdated January 31, 1975; that the check dated February 1, 1976, in

60
the amount of P7,000.00 was in payment of a rice transaction that took place
on January 15, 1975, and actually postdated February 1, 1975; that the check
dated February 6, 1976, was also in payment of a rice transaction that
occurred on January 21, 1975, and postdated February 6, 1975; that the check
dated February 7, 1976, in the amount of P5,000.00 involved a transaction that
actually transpired on January 21, 1975, and a check was issued in payment for
it on January 31, 1975, and also postdated February 7, 1975; that at the time
she was not able to make the necessary deposits because her husband was
then hospitalized and she pleaded to Mrs. Maximo not to encash the checks,
and the latter consented thereto as Mrs. Maximo know that her husband was
really sick, and in fact, he later died on December 3, 1976; that consequently
Mrs. Maximo brought the matter to the PC at the PC Headquarters at Bacolod
City, and they agreed before the PC that she would pay in installment, and on
December 17, 1975, she deposited the amount of P500.00 with her, Exhibit "l,"
that later, Mrs. Maximo tried to collect thru the Silay Police, and again later
thru the PC, and she offered to pay up to Pl,000.00 but Mrs. Maximo refused
unless she would pay P5,000.00 which she went to the PC again in the
accompany (sic) of her eight-year old girl but Mrs. Maximo was not there, and
then Sgt. Villanueva asked her to initial all the questioned checks to be dated
1976; that first she refused but later on she consented after the assurance of
Sgt. Villanueva that no case will be filed against her.
The private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. Her
defense was directed only towards proving the fact that the checks were issued in
payment of a pre-existing obligation, not that the obligation is non-existent or paid in
full. We further note that the private respondent failed to submit her answer to this
petition despite several notices from this Court. She has waived her defenses to the
petition. In his answer, the trial judge justified his refusal to award civil liability with a
statement that the civil liability did not arise from any criminal act but only from a
civil contract connected to the crime. He stated in his denial of the motion for
reconsideration that the action for civil liability must be filed in a "civil court."
The foregoing argument is erroneous in view of the Padilla v. Court of
Appeals and People v. Jalandoni rulings earlier cited which are applicable to the facts
of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The order of the lower court denying the
motion for reconsideration is set aside. The private respondent Conchita Panghilason
is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P33,586.00 with 12% interest from July 10,
1976 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, CJ., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Cruz, Paras
and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
People vs Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067
Facts:
Mamerto Miranda was charged before the court of first instance of Quezon City with
the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. The court finds that
the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has also failed to show that the accused
had taken advantage of his position and abused the confidence reposed on him by

61
the complainant. The court acquits the accused Mamerto Miranda of estafa, however,
the court finds Miranda civilly liable and orders the accused to pay for the said
amount.
Issue:
WON the accused is liable to pay for civil indemnity arising from a criminal liability.
Held:
When an accused, who has been charged with estafa, has been acquitted on the
ground that his liability is civil in nature, no civil liability arising from the criminal
charges may be imposed on him. In view of the foregoing, the portion of the decision
appealed from, which orders the accused to pay P2,000.00 to the complainant is set
aside, reserving the offended party the right to institute the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of the said amount.
People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil., 252
In People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil., 252, where the defendant was found guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence and the trial court, upon motion of the private
prosecution, refused to enter judgment with respect to the civil liability of the
defendant for the reason that the appeal taken by him divested the trial court of
jurisdiction to pass upon the question of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, we
held:
The trial court's resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the
accused, it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration
filed by the private prosecution nine days after the date of the judgment, is
unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution
and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 107,
General Orders No. 58), necessarily implies that such right is protected in the
same manner as the right of the accused to his defense. If the accused has
the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the
offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be
made dependent on that of the accused. If upon appeal by the accused the
court altogether losses its jurisdiction over the cause, the offended party
would be deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen days have not yet
elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his appeal before
the expiration of said period. Therefore, if the court, independently of the
appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the
judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to
pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in
connection with the civil liability of the accused. (p. 254-255.)
and remanded the case to the lower court for determination of the civil liability.
G.R. No. 190610
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, -versusSATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ,
Accused. JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, Accused-Appellant.

62
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an Appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y
Lopez (Brillantes) assailing the Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 8 July
2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11556,
11557 and 11558 convicting accused Brillantes and Saturnino de la Cruz (De la Cruz)
for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 entitled An Act Instituting the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Of 2002.[3]
In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 11556
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have in his possession, control and custody one (1) plastic
sachet containing shabu weighing more or less 0.1 gram including
plastic container without prescription or authority to possess the same
in violation of the aforecited law.[4]
On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in Criminal Case Nos.
11557 and 11558 with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of dangerous drug
of shabu. The two separate Informations follow:
Criminal Case No. 11557
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of
Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, sell and deliver to a Public Officer, who acted as poseur
buyer 0.1 gram including plastic container of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, without
any license or authority to do so, in violation of the aforecited law. [5]
Criminal Case No. 11558
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have in his possession, control and custody two (2) big
plastic sachet containing shabu weighing more or less 2.6 grams
including plastic container without being authorized and permitted by
law to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.[6]
When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.
The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof
in the cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, in this
case methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu. The trial court
relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police
officials who conducted the buy-bust operation. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the]
accused Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
charged in Criminal Case No. 11556 for illegal possession of shabu with
a weight of 0.0619 gram and is therefore sentenced to serve the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as
maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

63
Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.11557 for illegal sale of shabu
and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00. Said accused is likewise found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.
11558 for illegal possession of shabu with an aggregate weight of
0.2351 gram and is therefore further sentenced to serve the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as
maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited, the
same to be disposed of as the law prescribes. [7]
The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling of the trial
court. It upheld that all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs were
present and the
finding against
Brillantes well
established
by the
prosecution. Further, it also found that all the elements constituting illegal possession
of prohibited or regulated drugs were established beyond reasonable doubt to convict
De la Cruz and Brillantes. On all the three charges, great weight was given to the
testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team and arresting officers SPO3
Rovimanuel Balolong and PO2 Celso Pang-ag, who also acted as the poseur-buyer.
On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal [8] was filed by Brillantes through counsel
before the Supreme Court. His co-accused De la Cruz, did not appeal his conviction.
While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security Division Officer-inCharge Romeo F. Fajardo[9] informed the Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died
while committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a
copy of death report[10] signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical Officer
Benevito A. Fontanilla, III.
Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his conviction of
accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities.
The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1)
that:
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of
fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the
lower courts.
We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,[11] to wit:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other thandelict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts

64
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
xxx
There is no civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.[12] No private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to
civil liability in the decision of the trial court.
The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal liability
does not have any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of
appeal. The Rules on Criminal Procedure on the matter states:
RULE 122 - Appeal
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court isfavorable and applicable to the latter;
(emphasis ours)
xxx
The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary liabilities is
predicated on his death and not on his acquittal. Following the provision, the appeal
taken by Brillantes and subsequent extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable
to De la Cruz.
WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the appeal of accusedappellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8
July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 convicting him of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby
declared MOOT andACADEMIC, his criminal and pecuniary liabilities having been
extinguished. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
Facts:
An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused D ante Andres
and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto
inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and
die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the respondents
liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their
liability for Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals
insofar as the civil aspect of th e case was concerned. The CA ruled that the acquittal
in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the
accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to
the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper.
Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the
judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts
imputed to them. Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent it the extinction
of their civil liability that criminal liability carries with.
Held:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserve s the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The prime purpose

65
of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of the civil
action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party
for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the
petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to
kill the deceased and as held by the the trial court and the C A, the prosecution failed
to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the
respondents for damages.
Chua v. CA
GR No. 150793, 19 November 2004
Facts:
A criminal complaint for falsification of public document was filed against Chua based
on the complaint of Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation. Chua moved to
exclude Haos counsels as private prosecutors in the case for failure to allege & prove
any civil liability in said case. The RTC allowed the intervention of the private
prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. The CA
affirmed the order of the trial court. Petitioner avers that where from the nature of
the offense or where the law defining & punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of
the offense. He further contends that since no personal damages were proven in the
inferior court, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were
supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case is not necessary & is w/o basis.
Issue: Whether the private prosecutors should be allowed to participate in the trial of
the criminal case in pursuance of its civil aspect
Held:
Yes. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
w/ the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Since Hao did not waive the civil action, nor reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense
charged, private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action. An act
or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability
not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of
his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity
which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of the crime.
The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.
Evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability
arising from the offense committed, & the private offended party has the right to
intervene through the private prosecutors.
The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal
proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not
reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.

66
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]

LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision
sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 166, denying due course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal
Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary
indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double
homicide and double physical injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double Homicide and
Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate no.
NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck
in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which said
dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following
vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto
Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota
Corona with plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in
the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by
Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an
automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto
thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with
plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the
driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete
were hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2 passengers,
namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi
Jr. sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less
than nine days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.

67
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991,
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months, as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00,
as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning
capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the
costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment
became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident
accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by
petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special
Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated
February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and
subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The
motion was denied for lack of merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the
subsidiary civil liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course
and dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
[10] The other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the
enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on
February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated
September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner
was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ
of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he
was not afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992,
disposing as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE and
should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect."[13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992.
This was denied in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for
review.

68
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF 4
FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE
PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN COURT IN
VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AUXILIARY RELIEF OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE
UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by
petitioner against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the
following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and
executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil
liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary
injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court
to prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and
accused. Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as
an employee at the time of the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we
shall give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made.[18] However, before execution against an employer
ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4)
that said employee is insolvent.[19]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a
party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we
held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this
Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the

69
same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the
passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of
the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution
of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."[20]
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of
an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his
truck that was involved in the incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company,
with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant
to the stipulations in their contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal
proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced
evidence to show employer-employee relationship.[24] With the convicts application
for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our
view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due
process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove
that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement
of judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the
motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an
opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that
there was no employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the
latter was not discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the
incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on
December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for
the grant of the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on December 13,
1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court
ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on
January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-manifestation[27] that
belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution
of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting
the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing
circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him due
process of law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the
judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Maniks
Philippine Rabbit vs. People
G.R. No. 147703
April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court
further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable

70
for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from
the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accusedemployee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps
bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the
criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising
from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may
-- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist
their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend
the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind
the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending,

71
nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary
civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become
final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability
has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the
concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

72
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the
penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions
of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. (1092a)
CHAPTER 2
QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action

73
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein.
If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal

74
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action,
the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried
and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription
of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has
been suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. In the cases provided
for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from
other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the
case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of
the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice
to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil
action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action
against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension
of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the

75
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)