Professional Documents
Culture Documents
fleshmatter draft 5
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INTHEHIGHCOURTOFJUDICATUREATBOMBAY
CIVILAPPELLATEJURISDICTION
WRITPETITIONNO.5731OF2015
Petitioner
Respondents
ig
h
ShaikhZahidMukhtar
Versus
TheStateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Mr.FirozA.AnsariforthePetitioner.
WITH
WRITPETITIONNO.9209OF2015WITH
CIVILAPPLICATIONNO.3183OF2015
om
ba
y
IndianUnionMuslimLeague
Petitioner
Versus
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
Ms.GayatriSingh,SeniorAdvocatea/wMr.ZaminAlii/byMr.Mohd.
RehanSayeedChhapraforthePetitioner.
Mr.RajivR.Guptai/byDhanuka&PartnersfortheApplicantinCA.
WRITPETITIONNO.9996OF2015
JamatulQureshMinorityAssociation
ThroughitsPresident
MohammedArifChowdharyandOrs.
Petitioners
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
Mr. Ravindra Adsure i/by Mr. Sidheshwar Namdev Biradar for the
Petitioner.
ash
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WITH
WRITPETITIONNO.11744OF2015WITH
C
ou
AnnaBaburaoNigadeandAnr.
Petitioners
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
Mr.DineshRamchandraShindeforthePetitioners.
ig
h
WITH
CIVILAPPLICATIONNO.3326OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.11744OF2015WITH
Mr.RameshDhanrajPurohit
Inthematterbetween
Applicant/
ProposedIntervener
om
ba
y
AnnaBaburaoNigadeandAnr.
Petitioners
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
Mr.ShashikantDamodarlalChandakfortheApplicant.
WITH
PUBLICINTERESTLITIGATIONNO.127OF2015
Mohd.HishamOsmani
s/oMohd.YusufOsmaniandAnr.
Vs.
TheStateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Mr.S.S.KaziforthePetitioners.
Petitioners
Respondents
ash
fleshmatter draft 5
Petitioners
C
ou
Mr.SheikhAasifSheikhRashidandAnr.
Vs.
MalegaonMunicipalCorporationandOrs.
Ms.ShamaMullai/byM/s.JayandCo.
Mr.G.H.KeluskarfortheRespondentNo.1.
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WITH
PUBLICINTERESTLITIGATIONNO.133OF2015
Respondents
ig
h
Mr.S.G.Aney,AdvocateGeneral,Mr.A.B.Vagyani,GovernmentPleader,
Mr.V.S.Gokhale,AGP,Mr.V.B.Thadhani,AGP,Ms.Tintina Hazarika,
AGPforStateinalltheabovePetitions.
om
ba
y
WITH
ORDINARYORIGINALCIVILJURISDICTION
WRITPETITIONNO.1314OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.139OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.374OF2015WITH
NOTICEOFMOTION(L.)251OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONSNO.264OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1314OF2015
HareshM.Jagtiani
Vs.
TheStateofMaharashtra
Petitioner
Respondent
WP/1314/2015
Mr.AspiChinoy,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.NavrozSeervai,Senior
Counsel along with Ms. Gulhar Mistry, Mr. Khalid Khurani, Miss.
RushikaRajadhyaksha,Miss.TarunaJaiswal,Mr.RyanMendesandMr.
RoydenFernandesi/bNikhilMilindSansare,AdvocateforPetitioner.
CHSW(L.)/139/2015
Mr.RamApte,Senior Counsel a/wMr.HarishPandya, Mr.Rajendra
KookadaandMr.RajuGuptai/byMr.RajuGuptaforIntervenor.
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CHSW(L.)/374/2015
Mr.SwarajS.JadhavandSaipanShaikhforApplicant.
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ou
NMW(L.)/251/2015ANDCHS/264/2015
Mr.SubhashJhaa/wMr.GhanashyamUpadhyay,Ms.RushitaJain&
Mr. Ashish Shukla and Ms. Priyanka Jangid i/by Law Global for
Applicant.
ig
h
WITH
WRITPETITIONNO.1379OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.106OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.109OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.416OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1379OF2015
Petitioners
Respondents
ba
y
Mr.VishalSheth&Ors.
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
om
WP/1379/2015
Mr.SunipSenalongwithVishwajitP.Sawanti/byPrabhakarManohar
Jadhav,AdvocateforPetitioners.
Mr.H.S.Venegaonkar,AdditionalGovernmentPleaderalongwithMrs.
AnjaliHelekar,AGPforRespondentState.
CHSW(L.)/106/2015
Mr.SubhashJhaa/wMr.GhanashyamUpadhyay,Ms.RushitaJain&
Mr.AshishShuklai/byLawGlobalforApplicant.
CHSW(L.)/109/2015
Mr.AshishMehtaalongwithMr.SarbariChatterjeea/wAvaniRathod
i/byAshishMehta,forIntervenor.
CHSW(L.)/416/2015
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.PrafullaB.Shah,for
applicantIntervenor.
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WITH
PUBLICINTERESTLITIGATIONNO.76OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.389OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.419OF2015
IN
PUBLICINTERESTLITIGATIONNO.76OF2015
ig
h
GautamBenegalandOrs.
Petitioners
Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
Respondents
PIL/76/2015
Mr.SunipSenalongwithV.P.SawantalongwithVishalShethandRuben
Fernandes, Ms. Tanayya Patankar and Mr. Veerdhaval Kakade, for
Petitioners.
Mr.H.S.Venegaonkar,AdditionalGovernmentPleaderalongwithMrs.
AnjaliHelekar,AGPforRespondentNo.1State.
om
ba
y
CHSW(L.)/389/2015
Mr.HarishPandyaa/wRajendraKookada,Mr.RajuGuptai/byMr.Raju
GuptaforIntervenors.
CHSW(L.)/419/2015
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.PrafullaB.Shah,for
applicantIntervenors.
WITH
WRITPETITIONNO.1975OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.306OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.417OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1975OF2015
AnsariMohamedUmarandAnr.
Petitioners
Vs.
TheStateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
Mr.MukeshM.Vashi,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.MakarandKaleand
Ms.AparnaDeokar,PanthiDesaiandA.A.Siddiquii/byA.A.Siddiqui
andAssociatesforPetitioners.
Mrs.AnjaliHelekar,AGPforRespondentState.
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CHSW(L.)/306/2015
Mr.M.P. Rao,Senior Counsela/wMr.RajendraKookada,Mr. Harish
PandhyaandRajuGuptai/byRajuGuptaforIntervenor.
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ou
CHS(L.)/417/2015
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.PrafullaB.Shah,for
applicantIntervenors.
ig
h
WITH
WRITPETITIONNO.2680OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.455OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMON(L.)NO.420OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.2680OF2015
ba
y
AslamAlamgirMalkaniandAnr.
Petitioners
Vs.
TheStateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
WP/2680/2015
Mr. A.A. Siddiqui i/by A.A. Siddiqui and Associates, Advocate for
Petitioners.
om
Mr. Prakash Gada i/by Dhanuka & Partners for Mohd Faiz Khan
Intervenor.
CHSW(L.)/455/2015
Mr. P.R. Diwan a/w Mr. Rajendra Kookade, Mr. Aditya Khanna i/by
KookadeandAssociates&AdityaKhannaforIntervenor.
CHSW(L.)/420/2015
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.PrafullaB.Shah,for
applicantIntervenor.
WITH
WRITPETITION(L.)NO.2566OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.456OF2015
HuzaifaIsmailElectricwalaandOrs.
Vs.
TheStateofMaharashtraandAnr.
Petitioners
Respondents
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CHSW(L.)/456/2015
Mr.P.R.DiwanalongwithRajendraKookadaandMr.AdityaKhannai/by
Kookada&Associates&AdityaKhannaforIntervenor.
ig
h
WITH
WRITPETITION(L.)NO.1109OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.418OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.315OF2015
IN
WRITPETITION(L.)NO.1109OF2015
om
ba
y
SwatijaParanjpeandOrs.
Petitioners
Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
ThroughtheDepartmentof
AnimalHusbandryandOrs.
Respondents
WP(L.)/1109/2015
Mr.MihirDesaia/wMs.RebeccaGonsalves,Ms.UshajeePeri,Sariputta
P.Sarnath,Chetan Alai,VinamraKopariha,DevyaniKulkarni,Chetan
Malii/byVijayHiremath,AdvocateforPetitioners.
Mrs.AnjaliHelekar,AGPforRespondentNo.1State.
CHSW(L.)/418/2015
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.PrafullaB.Shah,for
applicantIntervenor.
CHSW(L.)/315/2015
Mr.M.P.Rao,SeniorCounsela/wShriRajendraKookada,Mr.Harish
PandhyaandRajuGuptai/byRajuGuptaforIntervenor.
WITH
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONSNO.277OF2015WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.138OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
ArifUsmanKapadia
Vs.
TheStateofMaharashtraandAnr.
Petitioner
Respondents
ash
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WP/1653/2015
Mr. Firoz Bharucha i/by Pratap Manmohan Nimbalkar, Advocate for
Petitioner.
Mrs.AnjaliHelekar,AGPforRespondentNo.1State.
CHSW/277/2015
Mr.SatyaPrakashSharmai/byAbdi&Co.forapplicant.
ig
h
CHS(L)/138/2015
Mr.RakeshKumaralongwithMs.LaxmiNarayanShukla,MissShobha
Mehra and Mr. Shivkumar Mishra i/by Legal Venture for Applicant
Intervenor.
WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.132OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
om
ba
y
JayostuSwarajyaPrathishthan
Applicant
Inthematterbetween
ArifUsmanKapadia
Petitioner
Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
ThroughtheMinistryof
AnimalHusbandry
Respondent
Mr.SampannaWalawalkara/wMr.DhrutimanJoshii/byBafnaLaw
AssociatesforIntervenor.
WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.120OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
AbrarQureshi
Applicant
Inthematterbetween
ArifUsmanKapadia
Petitioner
Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
ThroughtheMinistryof
AnimalHusbandry
Respondent
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounsela/wMr.P.B.Shah,KayvalP.Shahfor
ApplicantIntervenor.
ash
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WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.125OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
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ig
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BharatvarshiyaDigamberJain
Applicant
Inthematterbetween
ArifUsmanKapadia
Petitioner
Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
ThroughtheMinistryof
AnimalHusbandry
Respondent
Mr.J.S.Kinii/byShriSureshDubeyfortheApplicant.
om
ba
y
WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.110OF2015IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
AllIndiaJainJournalistAssociation(AIJJA)
Applicant
Inthematterbetween
ArifUsmanKapadia
Petitioner
Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
ThroughtheMinistryof
AnimalHusbandry
Respondent
Mr.A.V.Anturkar,SeniorCounselalongwithMr.P.B.Shah,KayvalP.
ShahforApplicantIntervenor.
WITH
CHAMBERSUMMONS(L.)NO.105OF2015
IN
WRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
AkhilBharatKrishiGosevaSangh
Inthematterbetween
ArifUsmanKapadia
Applicant
Petitioner
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Vs.
StateofMaharashtra
ThroughtheMinistryof
AnimalHusbandry
Respondent
Mr. A.V. Anturkar, Senior Counsel along with Mr. P.B.Shah, Kayval P.
ShahforApplicantIntervenor.
ig
h
WITH
WRITPETITION(L.)NO.3395OF2015
ba
y
MayurColdStoragePrivateLimited
Petitioner
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
Mr.MihirDesai,SeniorCounselalongwithinstructedbyAmitSurvase,
AdvocateforPetitioner.
om
WITH
WRITPETITION(L.)NO.3396OF2015
MaharashtraColdStorageOwnersAssociation
Petitioner
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Respondents
WITH
WRITPETITION(L.)NO.3422OF2015
Mr.WarisPathan
Vs.
StateofMaharashtraandOrs.
Petitioner
Respondents
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NoneforthePetitioner.
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CORAM:A.S.OKA&S.C.GUPTE,JJ.
JUDGMENTRESERVEDON
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JUDGMENT:
PERA.S.OKA,J
:6THMAY2016
JUDGMENTISPRONOUNCEDON
:8THJANURARY2016
1.
Aspertheadministrativeorderdated17thNovember2015
hasbeenspecificallyassignedtothisspeciallyconstitutedBench.
OVERVIEW
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passedbytheHon'bletheActingChiefJustice,thisgroupofPetitions
2.
provisionsoftheMaharashtraAnimalPreservationAct,1976(forshort
Animal Preservation Act) as amended by the Maharashtra Animal
Preservation(Amendment)Act,1995 (for short the Amendment Act).
The Amendment Act received the assent of the Hon'ble President of
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Indiaon4thMarch2015.BytheAmendmentAct,inadditiontoexisting
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3.
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thetrialofcertainoffences,anegativeburdenwasputontheaccused.
challengestherein,itwillbeconvenient tohaveanoverviewofthe
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1978.ThePreambleoftheunamendedAnimalPreservationActreads
thus:
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AnActtoprovidefortheprohibitionofslaughterof
cowsandforthepreservationofcertainotheranimals
suitable for milch, breeding, draught or agricultural
purposes.
Andwhereasitisexpedienttoprovideforthe
prohibition of slaughter and to provide for matters
connectedtherewith
4.
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certificateinwritingfromtheCompetentAuthoritythattheanimalisfit
forslaughter.AsperSection7,ascheduledanimalinrespectofwhich
apermissionunderSection7hasbeengrantedcanbeslaughteredonly
at the place specified by such authority or such officer the State
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Governmentmayappointinthatbehalf. Forthesakeofconvenience,
we are reproducing Sections 5 to 7 of the Animal Preservation Act
beforeitsamendmentwhichreadthus:
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5. Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinanyother
lawforthetimebeinginforceoranyusageor
custom to the contrary no person shall
slaughterorcausetobeslaughteredoroffer
forslaughteranycow,inanyplaceintheState
ofMaharashtra.
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6.
(2)
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thescheduledanimal,ifmale,isoris
likely to become economical for the
purposeofbreeding;
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(b)
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(3)
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(c) thescheduledanimal,iffemale,isor
islikelytobecomeeconomicalforthe
purpose of giving milk or bearing
offspring.
(5)
Subjecttotheprovisionsofsubsection(3),
any order passed by the competent
authority granting or refusing to grant a
certificate, and any order passed by the
State Government under subsection (3),
shall be final and shall not be called in
questioninanyCourt.
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(4)
7.
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Section3.Clause(e)ofSection3readsthus:
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5.
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6.
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(e) Scheduledanimalmeansanyanimalspecified
inthe Schedule;andtheStateGovernmentmay,by
notification in the Official Gazette, add to the
Scheduleanyspeciesofanimals,afterconsideringthe
necessityforpreservationofthatspeciesofanimals;
andtheprovisionsofsubsection(3)ofsection16,in
so far as they shall apply in relation to such
notificationastheyapplytoanyrulemadeunderthat
section.
TheSchedulereadsthus:
[Section3(e)]
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Bovines(bulls,bullocks,famalebuffaloesandbuffalo
calves.)
7.
providedforpenaltieswhichreadsthus:
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8.
Intheyear1995,theMaharashtraStateLegislaturepassed
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AmendmentActwasbroughtintoforceon4 th March,2015.TheLong
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TitleofthePrincipalActaswellasthePreamblewereamendedbythe
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toSection9ofthePrincipalAct.Sections9Aand9Bwereaddedbythe
AmendmentAct.TherewereamendmentsmadetoSections10,11and
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14bytheAmendmentAct.
9.
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relevantprovisionsoftheamendedAnimalPreservationAct.Thelong
titleandpreamblereadthus:
AnActtoprovidefortheprohibitionofslaughter of
cowsandforthepreservationofcertainotheranimals
suitable for milch, breeding, draught or agricultural
purposes and preservation of cows, bulls and
bullocks useful for milch, breeding, draught or
agricultural purposes and for restriction on
slaughter for the preservation of certain other
animalssuitableforthesaidpurposes.
WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the
prohibition of slaughter of cows and for the
preservationofcertainotheranimalssuitableformilch,
breeding, draught or agricultural purposes and
preservationofcows,bullsandbullocksusefulfor
milch, breeding, draught or agricultural purposes
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andforrestrictiononslaughterforthepreservationof
certainotheranimalssuitableforthesaidpurposesand
toprovideformatterconnectedtherewith.
10.
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(addedportioninboldletters&deletedportions
struckout)
TheamendedSubSection(4)ofSection1readsthus:
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(4)Itshallapplytocows,bullsandbullocksandto
scheduledanimals.
(portioninboldlettersaddedbytheAmendmentAct)
TheamendedSection5readsthus:
11.
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12.
readthus:
5A. (1) No person shall transport or offer for
transport or cause to be transported cow, bull or
bullockfromanyplacewithintheStatetoanyplace
outside the State for the purpose of its slaughter in
contraventionoftheprovisionsofthisActorwiththe
knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so
slaughtered.
(2) Nopersonshallexportorcausetobeexported
outsidetheStateofMaharashtracow,bullorbullock
forthepurposeofslaughtereitherdirectlyorthrough
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hisagentorservantoranyotherpersonactingonhis
behalf,incontraventionoftheprovisionsofthisActor
with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be
slaughtered.
5B. No person shall purchase, sell or otherwise
dispose of or offer to purchase, sell or otherwise
dispose of any cow, bull or bullock for slaughter or
knowing or havingreason to believe that suchcow,
bullorbullockshallbeslaughtered.
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5D. Nopersonshallhaveinhispossessionfleshof
anycow,bullorbullockslaughteredoutsidetheState
ofMaharashtra.
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13.
Sections8and9asamendedreadthus:
8. (1) For the purpose of this Act, the competent
authorityoranypersonauthorizedinwritinginthat
behalfbythecompetentauthority(hereinafterinthis
section referred to as the authorized person) shall
havepowertoenterandinspectanyplacewherethe
competent authority or the authorized person has
reason to believe that an offence under this Act has
been,orislikelytobe,committed.
(2) Every person in occupation of any such place
shall allow the competent authority or authorized
personsuchaccesstothatplaceasmaybenecessary
fortheaforesaidpurposeandshallanswertothebest
ofhisknowledgeandbeliefanyquestionputtohimby
thecompetentauthorityortheauthorizedperson.
(3) AnyPoliceOfficernotbelowtherankofSub
Inspectororanypersonauthorizedinthisbehalfby
theStateGovernment,may,withaviewtosecuring
complianceofprovisionsofSection5A,5B,5Cor
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5D,forsatisfyinghimselfthattheprovisionsofthe
saidsectionshavebeencompliedwithmay
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(b) seizeorauthorizetheseizureofcow,
bullorbullockinrespectofwhichhe
suspects that any provision of
sections,5A,5B,5Cor5Dhasbeenis
being or is about to be contravened,
alongwith the vehicles in which such
cow, bull or bullock are found and
there after take or authorize the
taking of all measures necessary for
securing the production of such cow,
bull or bullock and the vehicles so
seized, in a court and for their safe
custodypendingsuchproduction.
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Providedthatexceptforspecialandadequate
reasonstoberecordedinthejudgmentofthecourt
such imprisonment shall not be of less than six
months and such fine shall not be less than one
thousandrupees.
(portioninboldlettersaddedbyAmendment)
14.
Sections9Aand9Basamendedreadthus:
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9B.
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15.
Section10asamendedreadsthus:
10. NotwithstandinganythingcontainedintheCode
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, all offences under this
Actshallbecognizableandnonbailable.
(portioninboldlettersaddedbyAmendment)
16.Forthesakeofcompletion,wemayalsomakeareferenceto
thestatementofobjectsandreasonsoftheAmendmentActwhichreads
thus:
1. The Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, 1976
(Mah.IXof1977),hasbeenbroughtintoforcein
theStatefromthe15thApril1978.TheActtotally
prohibits in any place in the State, slaughter of
cowswhichalsoincludeheiferandmaleorfemale
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calfofcowandprovidesforpreservationofcertain
otheranimalsspecifiedinthescheduletotheAct,
like bulls, bullocks, female buffaloes and buffalo
calves.Section6oftheActempowersthepersons
appointedascompetentauthorityunderthisActto
issue certificate for slaughter of the scheduled
animals,butsuchcertificateisnottobegrantedif
in the opinion of that competent authority the
animalisorislikelytobecomeusefulfordraught,
agricultural operations, breeding, giving milk or
bearingoffspring.
The economyof the State of Maharashtra isstill
predominantly agricultural. In the agricultural
sector,useofcattleformilch,draught,breedingor
agriculturalpurposesalwayshasgreatimportance.
It has, therefore, become necessary to emphasis
preservationandprotectionofagriculturalanimals
likebullsandbullocks.Withthegrowingadoption
of nonconventional energy sources like biogas
plants,evenwastematerialhavecometoassume
considerable value. After the cattle cease to be
usefulforthepurposeofbreedingoraretoooldto
dowork,theystillcontinuetogivedungforfuel,
manure and biogas and, therefore, they cannot,
any any time, be said to be useless. It is well
acceptedthatthebackboneofIndianagricultureis,
inamannerofspeaking,thecowandherprogeny
andtheyhave,ontheirback,thewholestructure
oftheIndianagricultureanditseconomicsystem.
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2.
3.
Inordertoachievetheaboveobjectiveandalsoto
ensure effective implementation of the policy of
State Government towards securing the directive
principles laid down in article 48 of the
ConstitutionofIndiaandinlargerpublicinterest,
it is considered expedient by the Government of
Maharashtra to impose total prohibition on
slaughterofalsotheprogenyofcow.Certainother
provisions which it is felt by the Government
wouldhelpineffectingtheimplementationofsuch
total ban are also being incorporated such as
provisionforprohibitiononthetransport,export,
saleorpurchaseoftheabovecategoryofcattlefor
slaughter,inregardtoentry,searchandseizureof
theplaceandvehicleswherethereisasuspicionof
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17.
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completebanonslaughterofbullsandbullocksintheStatehasbeen
imposed by amending Section 5 of the Animal Preservation Act in
additiontocompletebanontheslaughterofCowwhichwasalready
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cow,bullorbullockfromanyplaceintheStatetoanyplaceoutsidethe
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Stateforthepurposeofitsslaughterhasbeenimposed. Bythesame
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Section,acompletebanonexportoutsidetheStateofMaharashtraof
cow,bullandbullockforthepurposeofslaughterhasbeenimposed.
Section5Bprovidesforabanonpurchase,saleorotherwisedisposalof
any cow, bull or bullock for its slaughter. Importantly, Section 5C
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imposesaprohibitiononanypersonpossessingfleshofanycow,bullor
bullock slaughtered in contravention of the provisions of the Animal
PreservationAct.Section5Dprovidesthatnopersonshallhaveinhis
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StateofMaharashtra.
18.
Correspondingly,byintroducingSection9A,itisprovided
om
thatviolationofSections5C,5Dor6shallbeanoffence.Byamending
Section 9, even violation of Sections 5A and 5B has been made an
offence. A very drastic provision putting a negative burden on the
accusedatthetimeoftrialoftheoffencespunishableunderSections9
and9AhasbeenintroducedbywayofSection9B.Section9Bprovides
thatatthetimeofthetrial,theburdenofprovingthattheslaughter,
transport,export,sale,purchaseorpossessionoffleshofcow,bullor
bullock was not in contravention of the provisions of the Animal
PreservationActshallbeontheaccused.
ash
19.
24
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
C
ou
broughtonthestatutebookbytheAmendmentAct.Beforeweadvert
tothesubmissionsmadeacrosstheBar,weproposetobrieflyreferto
thefactsofeachcaseandtheprayersmadetherein.
ig
h
20.
AdvocateofthisCourt.ThechallengeinthisWritPetitionunderArticle
ba
y
226oftheConstitutionofIndiaisconfinedtotheconstitutionalvalidity
ofSections5Dand9AoftheAnimalPreservationActasamendedby
om
ash
25
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
ConstitutionofIndia.Itiscontendedthatthesaidamendedprovisions
C
ou
arecontrarytotheobjectofArticle48oftheConstitutionofIndia.Itis
urgedthattheamendedSectionsputrestrictionsonInterStatetrade
ig
h
amendedprovisionsareinviolationofrightofpreservationofculture
andviolationofrighttolife.
21.
ba
y
Petition.Moreover,inthisPetition,thereisareplydated17 thJuly,2015
filed by the State Government by Shri Shashank Madhav Sathe, the
om
DeputySecretary(AnimalHusbandry),Agriculture,AnimalHusbandry,
DairyDevelopmentandFisheriesDepartmentoftheStateGovernment.
Acontentionhasbeenraisedinthesaidaffidavitthattheimpugned
provisionshavebeenmadeforgivingeffecttoArticles48and51A(g)of
theConstitutionofIndia.Therefore,itiscontendedthatnopartofthe
Amendment Act can be called in question on the ground that it is
inconsistentwithorittakesawayanyoftherightsconferredbyArticles
14and19oftheConstitutionofIndia.Itiscontendedthatthebullsand
bullocks are useful not only as draught animals, for agricultural
operationsandbreedingbuttheyneverbecomeuselessandcontinueto
ash
26
fleshmatter draft 5
beusefulfortheirwastematerialwhichisasourceoffuel,manure,
rt
fertilizerandbiogas.Itiscontendedthatthedungaswellasurineof
C
ou
thecowaswellasitsprogenyarevaluableandareusedforvermi
compostandbiomanurewhichisusedtoimprovethequalityofsoil,
land as well as nutritional value of the agricultural produce. It is
contendedthatthereisascientificevidencetopointoutthattheflesh
ig
h
ofcowanditsprogenycontainshighsaturatedfatsandcholesterol.Itis
pointed out that it can be a major cause of heart disease, diabetes,
obesityandcancer.Wemustnotethatthiscontentionisnotpressed
intoservicebytheStateGovernmentatthetimeoffinalhearing.Inthe
subsequentdetailedaffidavitofthesameofficerfiledafternoticefor
ba
y
om
22.
admittedforfinalhearingbytheJudgmentandOrderdated29 thApril,
2015 by granting limited adinterim relief directing the State
ash
27
fleshmatter draft 5
Governmentnottotakecoercivestepsforthepurposeofinitiatingany
C
ou
rt
prosecutionofthosewhoarefoundtobeinpossessionofbeef.
ORIGINALSIDEPUBLICINTERESTLITIGATION
NO.76OF2015
23.
India,adeclarationissoughtthattheAmendmentActisviolativeof
ig
h
beafilmmakerandthesecondPetitionerwhoishiswifeisclaimingto
be a writer. The third Petitioner is an Advocate by profession. It is
ba
y
om
ash
28
fleshmatter draft 5
Summons(L.)No.389of2013takenoutbyViniyogParivarTrust.The
C
ou
rt
interventionisforopposingthePetition.
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITIONNO.1975OF2015
24.
IndiathereisaprayermadefordeclarationthatSection5oftheAnimal
ig
h
Statetoprohibitslaughterofonlythosebullsandbullockswhichare
notusefulforvariouspurposes.Thereisaprayerforchallengingthe
ba
y
relevantprovisionsoftheAmendmentAct. ThefirstPetitionerinthis
Petitionisinvolvedinthetrade,saleandpurchaseofbullsandbullocks
om
andthesecondPetitionerisabutcherbyprofession.InthisWritPetition
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITIONNO.2680OF2015
25.
amendedSection5oftheAnimalPreservationActinsofarasitprohibits
slaughter of bulls and bullocks by claiming that it is ultravires the
amendedPreambleandlongtitleoftheAnimalPreservationAct.There
ash
29
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
PetitionerinthePetitionisabusinessmanandthesecondPetitionerisa
C
ou
Governmenttoprohibitslaughterofonlythosebullsandbullockswhich
arenotuseful.Thereisalsoaprayermadeseekingawritofmandamus
againsttheStateGovernmentformakingbullsandbullocksavailable
ig
h
forsacrificeontheauspiciousoccasionofBakraEid(IdUlAzha). In
thisPetition,thereisaNoticeofMotiontakenoutprayingforinterim
relief which is confined to occasion of BakraEid held on 25 to 27 th
ba
y
interventionisforopposingtheprayersmadeinthePetition.
om
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITION(L.)NO.2566OF2015
26.
ThisWritPetitionunderArticle226oftheConstitutionof
IndiahasbeenfiledbythePetitionerswhoareclaimingtobeactive
socialworkersengagedinsocial,agriculturalandwelfareactivitiesfor
the upliftment of poor and downtrodden in the society. The prayer
made in this Writ Petition is for a declaration that the Animal
Preservation Act and the Amendment Act are unconstitutional.
Chamber Summons (L.) No.456 of 2015 has been filed in this Writ
Petition for intervention by Karuna Animal Welfare Trust. The
interventionisforopposingtheWritPetition.
ash
30
fleshmatter draft 5
C
ou
27.
rt
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITION(L)NO.1109OF2015
constitutionalvalidityofSections5,5A,5C,5D,6aswellasSections9
and9AoftheAnimalPreservationAct.Thereare29Petitionersinthis
Petition.Someofthemareactivists.Someofthemareclaimingtobe
ig
h
beefeaters.SomeofthemareDoctorsandjournalists. Someofthem
are film producers and womens' rights activist. One of them is the
PresidentoftheBeefMarketMerchants'Association,Sangli.Chamber
SummonsNo.315of2015hasbeenfiledbyViniyogParivarTrustinthis
ba
y
Petitionforintervention.TheIntervenorsdesiretoopposethePetition.
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITIONNO.1653OF2015
om
28.
PetitionforadeclarationthattheprovisionsofSections5Dand9Aof
theAnimalPreservationActareunconstitutional,illegalandnulland
void.ChamberSummons(L.)Nos.132of2015,105of2015,110of
2015, 120 of 2015 and 125 of 2015 have been filed by various
IntervenorsforclaiminginterventionintheWritPetition.Someofthe
IntervenorswanttosupportthePetitionerandsomeofthemdesireto
opposethePetitioner.ThereisadetailedaffidavitinreplyfiledbyShri
ShashankSatheonbehalfoftheStateGovernment.
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31
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29.
C
ou
rt
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITION(L)NO.3395OF2015
whichishavingcoldstorageslocatedintheState.Thebusinessofthe
Petitioner is of running cold storages of perishable food items and
ig
h
areunconstitutional.SimilarprayerismadeinrespectofSections8(3)
(b), 9A and 9B. In the alternative, it is prayed that the word
ba
y
om
ash
32
fleshmatter draft 5
30.
C
ou
rt
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITION(L.)NO.3396OF2015
ThisPetitionisfiledforadeclarationthatSections5Cand
5DoftheAnimalPreservationActareunconstitutional.ThisPetitionis
filedbyan Association of ColdStorage Ownersin Maharashtra.The
ig
h
challengesaresimilartothoseinWritPetition(L.)No.3395of2015.
31.
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITION(L.)NO.3422OF2015
ThisWritPetitionhasbeenfiledbythePetitionerwhoisan
ba
y
Advocatebyprofessionandwhoisclaimingtobeasocialactivist.Heis
alsoanelectedmemberoftheMaharashtraLegislativeAssembly.Inthis
om
Petition,thechallengeistothevalidityoftheentireAmendmentAct
mainly on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights under
Articles21and25oftheConstitutionofIndia.
APPELLATESIDEWRITPETITIONNO.9209OF2015
32.
League.InthesaidPetition,thereisachallengetotheconstitutional
validityoftheAmendmentActbasedonviolationoffundamentalrights
under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that
sacrificeofbullsandbullocksisanessentialpartoffestivalofEidUl
ash
33
fleshmatter draft 5
AdhaandEidulFitr.ViolationofArticle48isallegedinthisPetition.It
rt
iscontendedthattheAmendmentActinfringesthefundamentalright
C
ou
ofthecitizensunderArticles14,21,25and29oftheConstitutionof
India.
APPELLATESIDEWRITPETITIONNO.9996OF2015
ig
h
33.
violatesthefundamentalrightsunderArticles14,19(1)(g),21and25
of the Constitution of India. Various Associations and Educational
ba
y
SocietiesofthemembersoftheQureshCommunityarethePetitioners.
ItisstatedthattheQureshicommunityismainlyengagedinbutcher's
om
tradeanditssubsidiaryundertakingssuchassaleoftannery,etc.There
isanadditionalaffidavitfiledbythePetitionersgivingstatistics.The
Petitionershaverelieduponvariousreports.
APPELLATESIDEWRITPETITIONNO.11744OF2015
34.
ThisPetitionhasbeenfiledbyoneAnnaBaburaoNigade
ash
34
fleshmatter draft 5
fundamentalrightsguaranteedunderArticles14,19(1)(g),21and25
rt
of the Constitution of India. The Petitioners claim that they are the
C
ou
ownersofcows,bullsandbullocksandtheyareengagedinagricultural
activity.ThereisanapplicationforinterventionfiledbyShriRamesh
DhanrajPurohitwhowantstoopposethePetition.
35.
ig
h
APPELLATESIDEPUBLICINTERESTLITIGATION
NO.127OF2015
ThisPILisfiledbyoneMohd.HishamOsmanis/oMohd.
YusufOsmaniandanother.TheprayerinthisPetitionisforquashing
andsettingasidethenotificationdated4 th March,2015bywhichthe
ba
y
om
violationoffundamentalrights.
APPELLATESIDEPUBLICINTERESTLITIGATION
NO.133OF2015
36.
ThisPetitionisfiledbyoneShriSheikhAasifSheikhRashid
andanother.ThefirstPetitionerisamemberoftheLegislativeAssembly
andasocialworker.InthisPIL,thechallengeistotheletterdated17 th
April, 2015 issued by the second Respondent who is a Government
OfficerinformingthefirstPetitionerthattheslaughterofcows,bulls
andbullockshasbeenbannedintheStatewitheffectfrom4 thMarch,
ash
35
fleshmatter draft 5
2015.ThereisachallengetotheconstitutionalvalidityofSection5D
rt
and9AoftheAnimalPreservationActasamendedbytheAmendment
C
ou
Act.Thechallengeisonthegroundofviolationoffundamentalrights
underArticle19(1)(g)oftheConstitutionofIndia.
ORIGINALSIDEWRITPETITIONNO.1379OF2015
ThefirstandthirdPetitionersareAdvocatesbyprofession.
ig
h
37.
ThesecondPetitionerisastudent.Thechallengeinthispetitionunder
Article226istotheconstitutionalvalidityoftheentireAmendmentAct
ba
y
48.
APPELLATESIDEWRITPETITIONNO.5731OF2015
In this Petition, the challenge is to the constitutional
validityofalltheprovisionsoftheUnamendedprovisionsoftheAnimal
PreservationActandtheAmendmentActonthegroundthatthesame
infringeArticles15,16,19,21and25oftheConstitutionofIndia.
om
38.
Detailedsubmissionsweremade bythepartiesincluding
ash
40.
36
fleshmatter draft 5
InWritPetitionNo.1314of2015,ShriChinoy,thelearned
rt
C
ou
unamendedprovisionsoftheAnimalPreservationActandthenatureof
theamendmentsincorporatedbytheAmendmentAct.Healsoinvited
our attention to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
AmendmentAct.HepointedoutthatthenewlyintroducedSection5D
ig
h
prohibitsanypersonfrompossessingfleshofanycow,bullorbullock
slaughtered outside the State of Maharashtra. He pointed out that
violationofthisprovisionismadepunishablewithimprisonmentupto
oneyearand/orfineuptoRs.2,000/.Aftermakingareferencetothe
StatementofObjectsandReasonsoftheAmendmentAct,heurgedthat
ba
y
om
coworbullorbullockisslaughteredataplaceoutsidetheStatewhere
thereisnoprohibitionontheslaughter,thepossessionofthemeatof
suchcow,bullorbullockintheStateismadeanoffence.Heurgedthat
Section5DconstitutesaclearinfringementofthePetitioners'rightto
personalliberty(whichincludesrighttoeatfoodofone'schoice)and
privacyguaranteedunderArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia. He
extensively relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. He urged that the said
decisionholdsthatthetermpersonallibertyusedinArticle21ofthe
ConstitutionofIndiaisacompendioustermwhichincludeswithinitself
1 (1964)1 SCR 332
ash
37
fleshmatter draft 5
allvarietiesofrightswhichgotomakeuppersonallibertiesofaman.
rt
RelyinguponanotherdecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofManeka
C
ou
Gandhiv.UnionofIndia2, heurgedthatArticle21isofthewidest
amplitude anditcoversavarietyofrightswhichgotoconstitutethe
personallibertyofamanandsomeofthemhavebeenraisedtothe
ig
h
underArticle19. HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthe
caseof R.Rajagopalv.StateofTamilNadu3.Hesubmittedthatthe
ApexCourthasheldthattherighttoprivacyisimplicitintherightto
ba
y
privacyisimplicitinArticle21.Thesaidrightofprivacyistherightto
beletalone. HesubmittedthatthisviewtakenbytheApexCourtin
om
thecaseofR.Rajagopalhasbeenreiteratedinitsdecisioninthecase
of District Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank 4. By
pointingoutthedecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofM.P.Sharma
andothersv.SatishChandra5,hesubmittedthattheApexCourthas
notconsideredthequestionwhetherrighttoprivacyisapartofright
topersonallibertyguaranteedunderArticle21oftheConstitutionof
India. He pointed out that in the decision in the case of Hinsa
Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat and others 6, the
2 (1978)1 SCC 248
3 (1994) 6 SCC 632
4 (2005) 1 SCC 496
5 AIR 1954 SC 300
6 (2008)5 SCC 33
ash
38
fleshmatter draft 5
ApexCourthasobservedthatwhatoneeatsisone'spersonalaffairand
rt
itisapartofhisrighttoprivacywhichisincludedinArticle21ofthe
C
ou
ConstitutionofIndia. HereliedupontherecentdecisionoftheApex
ig
h
tobesubjectedtointerferencebyothersandthepositiverightofan
individualistomakeadecisionabouthislife. Theserightsarethe
ba
y
om
Article21isacompendioustermwhichcoversvarietyofrightswhich
constitute the personal liberty of a man. He pointed out the
observationsmadeinParagraph17ofthedecisionoftheApexCourtin
thecaseofKharakSinghtotheeffectthattherighttoprivacyisnota
guaranteed right under the Constitution. He also pointed out the
observationsmadebytheApexCourtinthecaseof M.P.Sharmav.
SatishChandra totheeffectthatthereisnojustificationtoimporta
totallynewfundamentalrightbysomestrainedprocessofconstruction.
HealsopointedoutthattheobservationsmadebytheApexCourtina
recentorderbywhichareferencewasmadetoalargerbench.Thesaid
7
ash
39
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
UnionofIndia8.HeurgedthatthePetitionerisnotclaimingthatthe
C
ou
rightofprivacyasanindependentfundamentalrightasdistinctfrom
the right of personal liberty. He urged that the contention of the
Petitioneristhattherighttoprivacyisimplicitinthepersonalliberty
guaranteedunderArticle21.HesubmittedthatthechallengetoSection
ig
h
5DbythePetitionerisbasedontheviolationofrighttopersonalliberty.
HepointedoutthatwhenthePetitionerisalleginginfringementofright
of privacy, the right is invoked is a component or constituent of
ba
y
ofprivacy.HeurgedthatinthecaseofR.Rajagopal,theApexCourt
hasproceededonthefootingthatrightofprivacywasimplicitinorwas
om
equivalenttopersonallibertyandpersonalautonomy. Heurgedthat
eveninthecaseofHinsaVirodhakSangh,whentheApexCourtheld
thattherighttochooseone'sfoodisapartofrightofprivacy,theApex
Court proceeded on the footing that it is a component or a part of
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Heinvitedourattentiontothemajorityandminorityviewsin
thecaseofKharakSingh.Hesubmittedthattheratioofthedecision
in the case of Kharak Singh is that the personal liberty guaranteed
underArticle21isacompendioustermwhichincludesallvarietiesof
rightswhichgotomakeupthepersonallibertiesof amani.e.the
8
ash
40
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
submittedthatthiswouldincludetherightofanindividualtoeatfood
C
ou
ofhischoice.Heurgedthatifthereisanymaterialtangiblerestriction
on,andinterferencebytheStatewith,thepersonalautonomy/personal
liberty, it would violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He
submittedthatinthedecisioninthecaseof M.P.Sharma,theApex
ig
h
Court observed that right of privacy has not been recognized in the
Constitutionasaseparatefundamentalright.HeurgedthattheApex
Courtinthedecisionsinthecasesof R.Rajagopalv.StateofTamil
ba
y
intrusionsinto,andrestrictionson,personalautonomy/personalliberty.
Hepointedoutthatthesedecisionsholdthatsuch intrusions intoor
om
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41
fleshmatter draft 5
caseofK.S.Puttuswami(Retired)andAnotherv.UnionofIndiawas
rt
dealingwiththerighttoprivacy.HepointedoutthattheApexCourt
C
ou
ig
h
41.
individualwhichviolatesArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndiacanbe
ba
y
sustainedonlyiftheStateestablishestheexistenceofcompellingState
interest. Hesubmittedthateventhepleaofexistenceofcompelling
om
Stateinterestissubjecttoscrutinyonthegroundofreasonablenessand
proportionalityoftheintrusionvisavisthecompellingstateinterest.
42.
tangiblerestriction/prohibitionontherightofthepersonallibertyand
privacy of the Petitioner inasmuch as it purports to prohibit the
Petitionerfromeatingthefoodofhischoice. Heurgedthatthesaid
SectionwhichpurportstoprohibitthePetitionerfromeatingthefoodof
his choice (flesh of cow, bull or bullock) which is not generated by
illegalslaughterintheStateisadirectinterferencewiththePetitioner's
ash
42
fleshmatter draft 5
personalautonomyandpersonalliberty.Heurgedthatitisnotthecase
rt
made out by the State that it is injurious to eat the meat of bulls,
C
ou
thathisrighttopersonallibertywhichincludespersonalautonomy,the
ig
h
righttobeletaloneandtolivehislifewithoutinterference,isinfringed
bySection5D.Hepointedoutthattherighttoprivacywhichisapart
ofthepersonallibertyisinfringed. Relyinguponthedecisionofthe
ApexCourtinthecaseofNationalLegalServicesAuthorityv.Union
ofIndia,hesubmittedthatwhatisheldbytheApexCourtisthatthe
ba
y
personalautonomyincludesboththenegativerightnottobesubjected
tointerferencebyothersandthepositiverightofindividualstomake
om
decisionsabouttheirlife. Hesubmittedthattheconceptofpersonal
autonomyistheessenceofpersonallibertyandtherighttoexercise
personalchoiceregardingdiverseaspectsofhislifeconstitutespersonal
libertyofaman. RelyingupontheprovisionsoftheFoodSafetyand
StandardsAct,2006andtheRegulationsframedthereunder,heurged
thatbovinefleshhasbeenstatutorilyacceptedasanutritiousfood.He
urgedthatinanyeventtheStatehasnotplacedanymaterialonrecord
toshowthattheconsumptionofbovinefleshisharmfultothehuman
health. He submitted that Section 5D violates personal liberty
guaranteedunderArticle21.Asheldinthecaseof DeenaaliasDeen
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43
fleshmatter draft 5
Dayalv.UnionofIndia9,theburdenisontheStatetoplacematerialto
rt
C
ou
supportofSection5D,nosuchmaterialhasbeenplacedonrecordby
ig
h
he urged that the doctrine of pith and substance is not relevant for
determining the question of infringement of the fundamental rights
43.
underArticle21.
Anotherlimbofhisargumentinsupportofthechallengeto
ba
y
Section5DisthatSection5Dhasnonexustotheobjectsandpurposes
oftheAnimalPreservationAct. HepointedoutthatSection5Dnot
om
onlyprohibitsbutcriminalisesthepossessionoffleshofcows,bullsor
bullocks which have been slaughtered elsewhere in India or even
outsidethecountrywherethereisnoprohibitiononslaughter.Relying
uponthedecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofAkhilBharatGoseva
Sanghv.StateofAndhraPradesh&Others 11,heurgedthatnoearlier
judgmentoftheApexCourt holdsthat thelawsandpoliciesofthe
States which permit slaughter of cows, bulls or bullocks are not
unconstitutional.Heurgedthatthepossessionoffleshofcows,bullsor
bullocks which have been lawfully slaughtered outside the State of
9 (1983)4 SCC 645
10 (1991)Supp 1 SCC 600
11 (2006)4 SCC 162
ash
44
fleshmatter draft 5
MaharashtraoroutsidethecountryhasnonexuswiththeArticle48of
rt
C
ou
PreventionofCrueltytoAnimalsAct,1960,heurgedthateventhesaid
Actspecificallypermitsslaughterofanimalsforfood.
44.
ig
h
introducedbytheAmendmentActisheldtobeconstitutionallyvalid,at
thehighest,itcanbesaidthatSections5Ato5Chavebeenenactedfor
theeffectiveimplementationofthebanonslaughterofcows,bullsand
bullocks. However,Section5DisastandaloneSectionwhichhasno
nexuswiththebanonslaughterofcows,bullsandbullocksintheState.
ba
y
HepointedoutthatthebanimposedbySection5oftheAmendment
Actonthe slaughterofcowhasbeen in existence for last40years.
om
However,thereisnomaterialplacedonrecordtoshowthatthesaid
bancannotbeeffectivelyimplementedunlesspossessionofmeatofa
cow slaughtered outside the State or outside the country is not
prohibited and criminalised. He pointed out that even under the
unamendedAnimalPreservationAct,slaughterofbullsandbullockson
thebasisofthecertificateissuedunderSection6waspermittedonlyat
the Municipal or Government Abattoirs. He submitted that there is
nothingplacedonrecordastowhyimportofthebeeffromotherStates
andabroadcannotbeadequatelyregulated,ifthatisfeltnecessaryto
ensurethatitdoesnotcreateanyhindrancesintheimplementationof
ash
45
fleshmatter draft 5
thebanoncows,bullsandbullocks.HealsopointedoutthatSection
rt
5DdoesnotcreatemereprohibitionbuttheamendmenttoSection9
C
ou
whoisfoundinpossessionofsuchmeatwhichisprohibitedbySection
5D.Heurgedthatthisdrasticprovisionwillalsoapplytothefleshof
ig
h
cow,bullorbullockwhichisaproductonslaughterinaStatewhere
thereisabsolutelynoprohibitionontheslaughter.
45.
summarizedhissubmissionsbysubmittingthatSection5Ddirectlyand
ba
y
om
that the State has failed to plead and establish any compelling
public/StateinteresttojustifytheenactmentofSection5D.Heurged
thatSection5Dsubservesnopublicinterestandinanycase,nosuch
publicinterestisdisclosed.Hence,hewouldurgethatSection5Dof
theAmendmentActshouldbedeclaredasunconstitutional.
46.
PetitionNo.1379of2015andPublicInterestLitigationNo.76of2015
submittedthateventheStateGovernmenthasacceptedthatthereis
nothinginherentlywrongoroffensivewithconsumptionofmeatofthe
ash
46
fleshmatter draft 5
cows,bullsorbullocks. Hissubmissionisthatitisnotdisputedthat
rt
beefwasthecheapestmeatavailableand3.99crorekgofdomestically
C
ou
ig
h
beforetheunamendedprovisionsoftheAnimalPreservationAct.The
Statehasnotstatedthatthereisaneedforenhancementofprotection
to bulls or bullocks in addition to the protection which is already
availableunderSection6oftheunamendedAnimalPreservationAct.
HepointedoutthatintheaffidavitoftheState,itisadmittedthatthere
ba
y
isanexcessofbullsandbullockswhichareusedneitherforbreeding
norfordraughtpurposes.HeurgedthatitisnotthecaseoftheState
om
thattherewasashortageofbullsorbullocks. Hissubmissionisthat
eventheStatehasacceptedthatthereisashortageoffodderasclaimed
in the affidavit that the State is trying to cope up with the fodder
requirements. HepointedoutthatthePetitionershavegivenfigures
showing the acute shortage of fodder. He submitted that the bulls,
bullocks and buffaloes which are useful for agricultural and draught
purposes were always protected. Only for the purposes of banning
consumptionofmeatthatablanketbanhasbeenimposedonslaughter
ofbullsandbullocksaswell.
ash
47.
47
fleshmatter draft 5
HissubmissionisthattheStateGovernmenthassoughtto
rt
defend the validity of the Amendment Act only by relying upon the
C
ou
directiveprinciplesofStatepolicywhichattractapresumptionthatthe
legislationisinpublicinterest. However,thefactualissuesraisedby
thePetitionershavenotbeendealtwithbytheState. Hesubmitted
thatevenassumingthattheAmendmentActisrelatabletodirectives
ig
h
principlesoftheStatepolicy,itisnotnecessarytopresumethatthe
restrictionsimposedbytheprovisionsthereofonthefundamentalrights
arereasonable.RelyinguponadecisionoftheApexcourtinthecaseof
ba
y
requiredtobeindependentlyexamined.Heurgedthatthedecisionof
theApexCourtinthecaseofPathummav.StateofKerala 13willnot
om
helptheState. Hissubmissionisthatthedirectivesprinciplesofthe
Statepolicy perse cannevernegatetherequirementsofPartIII. He
submittedthatinthefactsofthecase,itwasnecessaryfortheStateto
establishreasonablenessofrestrictionsandtheexistenceofcompelling
publicinterest.
48.
protectingbullsandbullockswithoutanyreason,therebyinfringingthe
fundamental rights, merely because the law is relatable to the
12 (1981)1 SCC 246
13 AIR 1978 SC 771
ash
48
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
cannotcurtailfundamentalrights.Thesubmissionisthatthedirective
C
ou
principlesoftheStatepolicybythemselvesdonotconstituteanyreason
forinfringingthefundamentalrights. Learnedcounselappearingfor
the Petitioners also dealt with the factual case made out by the
IntervenorssuchasViniyogParivarTrust.Healsomadesubmissionon
ig
h
thattherighttoprivacyisa fundamentalright,thequestionaroseof
making a reference. He also referred to the majority view in the
ba
y
decisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofKharakSingh.Hesubmitted
that the Apex Court has dealt with the issue of pith and substance
om
ash
49
fleshmatter draft 5
oftheConstitution,heurgedthatbeefisthecheapestanimalprotein
rt
availabletothepoor.HesubmittedthattheargumentoftheStatethat
C
ou
buffalomeatisstillavailabledoesnotentitletheStatetosupportthe
Amendment Act by relying upon Clause (g) of Article 51A of the
ConstitutionofIndia.
HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
ig
h
49.
ba
y
observationsmadebytheApexCourtinthecaseof Javedv.Stateof
Haryana15,heurgedthatthejudgmentdoesnotsuggestthatthetestof
om
ash
50.
50
fleshmatter draft 5
InWritPetition(L)No.3396of2015,thechallengeistothe
rt
constitutionalvalidityofSections5Cand5DaswellasSubsection(3)
C
ou
ig
h
unconstitutional. AnothersubmissionisthatSection9Bisultravires
the Constitution of India as the negative burden cast by it virtually
means that there is a burden to prove that the accused is innocent.
AnothercontentionisthatSections5Cand5Ddefeattheconstitutional
righttocarryontradeandcommerceandhence,theyareviolativeof
ba
y
Article301readwithArticle304B.ItispointedoutthatthePetitioners
inthisPetitionareeitherownersofcoldstoragesortheyrepresentsuch
om
ownersofthecoldstorages.Theirbusinessistostoreperishablefood
items including meat products in their cold storages. It is their
contentionthatthemeatproductsarestoredintheircoldstoragewhich
aremeantforexport.Itispointedoutthattheyreceivemeatproducts
in a vehicle having refrigeration facilities along with a consignment
noteandacertificateofaGovernmentVeterinaryDoctorfromaplace
outside the State from where the meathas originated. The learned
seniorcounselpointedoutthataspertheinstructionsoftheownersof
themeatproducts,thesamearestoredintheircoldstoragefacilities
and released on payment of necessary charges for the purposes of
ash
51
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dispatchtothePortforthepurposesofexport.Itispointedoutthatthe
rt
C
ou
51.
ig
h
descriptiononthepackagesofmeatproducts.
pointedoutthatthe3ListsintheSeventhScheduleoftheConstitution
ofIndiaaretobereadtogether.ItiscontendedthatunderEntry33of
ListIII,theStatelegislatureiscompetenttoenactthelawintradeand
ba
y
om
ash
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
52.
52
C
ou
Thecontentionisthatthesaidburdenhasnotbeendischargedbythe
State in the present case. It is contended that the restrictions under
ig
h
ba
y
tobeachieved.
nexusbetweentherestrictionsimposedandtheobjectwhichissought
53.
ThelearnedcounselappearingforthePetitionersinWrit
om
PetitionNo.9996of2015urgedthaton8 th January2007,theAnimal
Husbandry Department wrote a letter to the Law and Judiciary
DepartmentstatingthatthebilloftheAmendmentActbewithdrawn
andhearingmustbegiventoalltheconcerned.Notwithstandingthis
view, there were no deliberations made by the Government of
Maharashtra. RelianceisplacedonthedecisionoftheApexCourtin
thecaseofManoharS/oManikraoAnchulev.StateofMaharashtra
andAnother17.ItispointedoutthatthereasoningoftheGovernment
in the legislative process has to be reflected on the file of the
Government at the relevant time and reasonscannotbe suppliedby
17 (2012)13 SCC 14
ash
53
fleshmatter draft 5
filinganaffidavitinreplyinthepresentPetition. Itisurgedthatthe
rt
StateGovernmenthasnotbroughtonrecordanymaterialtojustifythe
C
ou
recordfiledbytheStateGovernmentdonotsatisfythetest.Inviting
theattentionoftheCourttoadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and
ig
h
inadequate.RelianceisplacedonthereportoftheStudyGroupdated
12th December2013annexedtothe WritPetitionfromPages193to
ba
y
205.ItisurgedthattheStudyGroupshowsthatenoughmechanismis
availabletoregulateandcontroltheslaughteringofbullsandbullocks
om
ash
54
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
counselrelieduponthefundamentalrightsguaranteedunderArticle25
C
ou
oftheConstitutionofIndia.HereliedupontheextractofholyQuran
ig
h
ConstitutionofIndia. HeurgedthedecisionoftheApexCourtinthe
caseofStateofWestBengal&Othersv.AshutoshLahiri19refersonly
tothesacrificeofthecowsandholdsthatitisnotessential religious
practice. HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
RatilalPanachandGandhiv.StateofBombay 20 bycontendingthat
ba
y
om
ash
55
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
C
ou
uneconomicalbullocks,thereisanecessityof300moreGoshalas.He
pointed out that the National Commission on Cattle in its report
recordstheproblemsfacedbyGoshalas. Hepointedoutthefactthat
stray old livestock including bulls are endangering human life and
ig
h
thatonceastatuteisshowntotransgressonfundamentalrights,the
onus is on the State to establish reasonableness of the restrictions
ba
y
imposedbythestatute.Herelieduponthespecificcontentionsraised
intheWritPetition. Hepointedoutthattherestrictionsimposedby
om
theAmendmentActarenotforthebenefitofthepublicandcannotbe
calledasreasonablebyanystretchofimagination.
54.
ThelearnedseniorcounselappearingforthePetitionerin
WritPetitionNo.9209of2015hasinvokedClause(1)ofArticle25of
theConstitutionofIndia. Hersubmissionisthattheslaughteringof
cattle on the occasion of Bakri Eid and every festival is a religious
practice which is protected under Clause (1) of Article 25 of the
ConstitutionofIndia.Hersubmissionisthattheslaughteringofcattle
onthereligiousoccasionsbeingthecoreactivityitself,thesamecannot
ash
56
fleshmatter draft 5
beregulatedunderClause(2)ofArticle25oftheConstitutionofIndia.
rt
SheurgedthattheAmendmentActdoesnotpurporttofurtherpublic
C
ou
order,moralityandhealth.Invitingourattentiontotheaffidavitsfiled
bytheState,sheurgedthatwhiletheStateseekstoprotectcattlefor
ig
h
topesticidesalonerangesfrom50to75percent.Hersubmissionisthat
thedecisioninthecaseofStateofGujaratv.MirzapurMotiKureshi
KassabJamat is foundedonthedatamadeavailablebytheGujarat
Governmentwhichshowsthattherewasanabundanceoffodderinthe
StateofGujarat.Ontheotherhand,inthereplygivenbytheMinistry
ba
y
ofAgricultureintheRajyaSabha,itwasstatedthattherewasahuge
shortageoffodderintheStateofMaharashtra.Sheurgedthatthough
om
theAmendmentActisoftheyear1995,nosurveywascarriedoutto
determine the situation before arriving at the conclusion that a
completebanontheslaughterofbullsandbullocksisnecessary.She
relieduponvariousdecisionsoftheApexCourtincludingthedecisions
in the cases of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay &
Others and Seshammal and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu. In
addition,sherelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
Commissioner, Hindu Religion Endowments, Madras v. Sri
LakshmindraThirthaSwamiarofSriShirurMutt 22.Shereliedupon
adecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof Dr.M.IsmailFaruqui&
22 AIR 1954 SC 282
ash
57
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
positiveconceptofequaltreatmentofallreligions. Sheurgedthat
C
ou
impositionoftotalbanontheslaughterofbullsandbullocksamounts
toviolationofClause(g)ofArticle19(1)oftheConstitutionofIndia
and,therefore,theburdenofproofthatatotalbanontheexerciseof
the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the general public
ig
h
interestliesheavilyupontheStateGovernment.Sheurgedthatlaws
permittingslaughterofbovinecattlebyitselfarenotunconstitutional.
ShereliedupontheextractofHollyQuraninsupportofhercontention
thattheslaughterofbullandbullocksonthereligiousoccasionisan
ba
y
essentialpracticeofmuslimreligion.
55.
om
No.9209of2015bywayofwrittenarguments,urgedthatthereligious
scripturesreferonlytothespecifiedanimalswhichcanbesacrificed.It
wassubmittedthatajudicialnoticecanbetakenofthefactthatthe
majorityofmuslimcommunityispoorandtherefore,themajorityof
muslimsarenotinafinancialpositiontosacrificeagoat. Therefore,
unlesstheyarepermittedtosacrificethebullsorbullocks,theywillnot
beabletoperformessentialpracticeoftheirreligion.Relyingupona
decisionoftheConstitutionalBenchoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
I.R. Coelho, since deceased by the legal representative v. State of
ash
58
fleshmatter draft 5
TamilNadu24,sheurgedthatwheninfringementoffundamentalrights
rt
isshown,thereisnoburdenonthePetitioneralleginginfringementto
C
ou
showthattheinfringementisnotreasonableoriscontrarytomorality.
ItisfortheStatetojustifythelawbyshowingthattheinfringementof
righttopracticereligionunderClause(1)ofSection25canbesavedon
the ground of morality, public health and any other ground. She
ig
h
ofIndia&Others25, secularismformsapartofbasicstructureofthe
Constitution. ThesubmissionisthatviolationofArticle25wouldbe
ba
y
tantamounttoaviolationofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.It
issubmittedthatbybanningtheslaughterofcowandherprogeny,the
om
StateisfavouringonereligionagainstotherundertheguiseofArticle
48oftheConstitutionofIndia.Thesubmissionisthatinthecaseof
StateofGujaratv.MirzapurMotiKureshiKassabJamat,theissueof
violationofArticle25oftheConstitutionofIndiawasnotconsidered.
56.
ShehasspecificallyrelieduponVerseNo.1underSurahAl
MaidahinPart6inHollyQuran. Shesubmittedthatitprovidesthat
Eid Ul Adha marks the end of the Haj pilgrimage wherein cattle
(includingbullsandbullocks)issacrificed.ShealsorelieduponVerse
24 (2007)2 SCC 1
25 (1994)3 SCC 1
ash
59
fleshmatter draft 5
36. ShepointedoutthattheMuslimreligionprovidesforsacrificeor
rt
slaughterofcows,bullsandbullocksontheauspiciousoccasionofEid
C
ou
UlAdha.Itfacilitateseventheeconomicallyweakersectionsofmuslim
communitytoperformtheirreligiousobligation.Shepointedoutthat
thesacrificeofagoatiscountedandtreatedasasinglequrbaniper
personwhereas, sevenmature muslimscanjointogetherincaseof
ig
h
sacrificeofonecow,bullorbullock.Thesubmissioninshortisthatthe
sacrificeofbullsandbullocksformsanintegralandessentialpartofthe
religion of Islam and therefore, a complete ban imposed by the
AmendmentActbyintroducingSection5oftheAnimalPreservation
Act infringes fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 25 of the
ba
y
ConstitutionofIndia.
om
57.
ThelearnedseniorcounselappearingforthePetitionersin
Writ Petition (L) No.3395 of 2015 urged that the possession under
Sections5Cand5Dwillhavetobeaconsciouspossession.Herelied
uponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofMohanLalv.Stateof
Rajasthan26. Healsorelied uponthedecisionsoftheApexCourtin
thecasesofPeople'sUnionforCivilLibertiesandAnotherv.Unionof
India27, Sanjay Dutt v. State Through C.B.I., Bombay (II) 28 and
Gopaldas Udhavdas Ahuja and Another v. Union of India and
ash
60
fleshmatter draft 5
Others29.Whileadoptingthesubmissionsoftheotherlearnedcounsel
rt
madeinsupportofattackonSection9B,herelieduponadecisionof
C
ou
ig
h
establishesthebasicfactthatthemeatistheproductofillegalslaughter
withintheStateandthatthepersonfoundinpossessionwashavingthe
knowledgeofthesaidfact,Section9Bwillnotcomeintopicture. His
submission isthatunlessSections5Cand5DalongwithSection9B
incorporatedbytheAmendmentActarereaddown,thesamewillbe
ba
y
exposedtotheviceofunconstitutionality.Hesubmittedthatunlessthe
possessioncontemplatedbySections5Cand5Disheldtobeconscious
om
possession,anegativeburdenwillbeputontheaccused.Heurgedthat
inthecasescoveredbySections5Cand5D,itwillbeimpossibleforthe
accusedtoprovethatthemeatfoundinhispossessionisnotacreation
ofillegalslaughter.HesubmittedthatSection9Bwillhavetobeheld
tobeadraconianpieceoflegislativeprovision.
58.
ash
61
fleshmatter draft 5
ofKharakSinghlaysdownthattherightofprivacyisnotavailableasa
rt
fundamentalrightunderArticle21oftheConstitution ofIndia. He
C
ou
ig
h
underArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia. Hesubmittedthatnow
theBenchofthreeHon'bleJudgesoftheApexCourtinthecaseofK.S.
Puttaswami hasmade areferencetoalargerBenchontheissueof
availabilityoftherighttoprivacyasafundamentalright.Relyingupon
thedecisionoftheApexCourtofalargerBenchofeightHon'bleJudges
ba
y
inthecaseofM.P.Sharma,heurgedthatthesaiddecisionlaysdown
thattherighttoprivacyisnotincludedintheConstitutionofIndia.He
om
urgedthatsucharightisnotincludedinthefundamentalrightsinPart
IIIoftheConstitutionofIndia.
59.
HeurgedthatArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndiacannot
bereadtoincludeeachandeveryright. Hepointedoutthatinlarge
numberofcases,theApexCourthasrefusedtoreadcertainrightsin
Article21.Hesubmittedthattherightswhichareessentialforlifeare
includedinArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndiaandtherightswhich
arenotessentialarenotincludedtherein. Hesubmittedthatevenif
the righttolifeandlibertyincludeseveryrightwhichmakesthelife
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62
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meaningful,itwouldmeanonlycorerightsoressentialrightsandnot
rt
fringerights.Hesubmittedthatthefringerightsaretheonewhichare
C
ou
merelydesirabletomakethelifecomfortableormorecomfortableor
luxurious.Heurgedthatinthepresentcase,thePetitionerisnotonly
claimingtherighttofoodbutclaimingtherighttoaparticularfoodina
particulargeographicalarea,i.etheStateofMaharashtra,whichrightis
ig
h
notprotectedbytheConstitutionofIndia. Heurgedthatifsucha
rightisheldtobeapartofrightunderArticle21,thesamewouldbe
availableevento foreigners. Heurgedthattherighttohavefoodof
one'schoiceisnotapartofrighttomakethe lifemeaningful. He
relieduponthedirectiveprinciplesoftheStatepolicyinArticles48and
ba
y
48Aand53oftheConstitutionofIndia. Heurgedthatthesamewill
havetobereadwithClauses(g)and(h)ofthefundamentaldutiesof
om
thecitizensinArticle51A.HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourt
in the case of Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja &
Others32andinparticularParagraphs67and68thereof.Heurgedthat
the directive principles of the State policy as interpreted in the said
judgmentaresoughttobeimplementedbytheimpugnedAmendment
Act. HeurgedthattheAmendmentActincludingSection5Dbrought
bytheAmendmentActisintheinterestofgeneralpublic. Heurged
thatthelawlaiddownbytheApexCourtintheaforesaiddecisionis
that not only Indian cows but even International cows can be
protectedbytheStatuteandthatishowSection5Disbroughtonthe
32 (2014)7 SCC 547
ash
63
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
unconstitutionalaboutSection5D.Relyinguponthedecisionsofthe
C
ou
ApexCourtinthecasesofBhaktawarTrust&Othersv.M.D.Narayan
&Others33andKeshavlalKhemchandandSonsPvt.Ltd.v.Unionof
India34,hewouldurgethatthestatementofObjectsandReasonscan
be looked into only for a limited purpose as laid down in the said
ig
h
60.
reasonablenessoftheSectionswillhavetobeapplied.
HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
ba
y
StateofWestBengalv.AshutoshLahiri. Hesubmittedthatthesaid
decision holds that slaughtering of cow is not an essential part of
om
Muslimreligion.Hesubmittedthatmerelybecauseacertainpracticeis
permissible as provided in religious texts, it does not automatically
meanthatitisanessentialpartofthereligion.Hesubmittedthatthe
thingswhicharemadecompulsoryornecessaryforthepurposesofa
particularreligionarecoveredbytherightguaranteedunderArticle25
of theConstitution of India. He reliedupona decision of theApex
Court in the case of Hinsa Virodhak Sangh vs. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh
Jamat and Ors.
ash
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
61.
64
C
ou
urgedthatinIndia,thereisadrasticshortfalloftherequiredcattle.He
submittedthatagainsttherequirementof88,21,660bullocks,thereare
ig
h
84.495 metric tonnes. He pointed out that the India is the largest
exporterofbuffalomeat. Relyingupontheaffidavitinreplyfiledby
theStateGovernmentinPILNo.76of2015,hewouldurgethatthe
Statehasmadenecessaryprovision forprovidingfodderandcareof
cattle.HesubmittedthatinthecaseofStateofGujaratv.Mirzapur
ba
y
MotiKureshiKassabJamatandOthers,theApexCourthastermed
theactofslaughterofcattleinitsoldageasanactofreprehensible
om
ingratitude.HesubmittedthattheAmendmentActissavedbyArticle
31CanditisinfurtheranceofArticles48andClause(g)ofArticle51
AoftheConstitutionofIndia.
62.
ash
65
fleshmatter draft 5
BookbytheAmendmentActassuchnegativeburdencanbefoundin
rt
severalStatutesincludingSection57oftheWildLife(Protection)Act,
63.
C
ou
1972.
meaningfullifeisnottheprerogativeonlyofmeateaters. Heurged
ig
h
thatthosewhoworship thecowanditsprogenyandthosewhoare
dependentuponthecowandthecowprogenyhavealsoarighttolive
ameaningfullife. Heurgedthattheirrighttolivecannotbetaken
awaytosatisfytastebudsoffewindividuals.Itisurgedthattheright
tolifeisfarsuperiorthantherighttokill.Hewouldurgethatrightto
ba
y
possessbeefandtoeatbeefcanbynostretchofimaginationbetermed
asafundamentalright. Heurgedthatthesocalledbeefeatershave
om
ash
66
fleshmatter draft 5
cows,calvesandoxenisprohibited. Heurgedthatonlyexportfrom
rt
IndiaisofmeatofBuffalo.Heurgedthatthelawlaiddowninthesaid
64.
C
ou
decisionwillapplytothechallengesinthepresentPetitionsaswell.
ShriM.P.RaoandShriR.S.Apte,learnedseniorcounsel
havemadesubmissions. ShriRaorelieduponadecisionoftheApex
ig
h
pointedoutthattheSupremeCourtupheldthesaidbanontheground
that it was necessary to implement the ban on poaching of Indian
ba
y
elephants. Heurgedthatthebanonimportwasnecessarytoavoid
om
evasionoftakingrecoursetocamouflage.
65.
ThelearnedcounselappearingfortheIntervenorinWrit
PetitionNo.9209of2015pointedoutthatatleastin14Statesinthe
country,thereisatotalbanontheslaughterofentirecowprogeny.Itis
contendedthatpracticallyinalltheStatesinNorthernIndia,exceptthe
NorthEast,thereisatotalbanontheslaughterofentirecowprogeny.
HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof Stateof
Gujaratv.MirzapurMotiKureshiKassabJamat.RelyinguponArticle
48oftheConstitutionofIndia,heurgedthatthereisnoconstitutional
mandateinfavourofslaughteringofanimals. Hesubmittedthatthe
36 (2003)7 SCC 589
ash
67
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IntervenorhimselfisafollowerofIslamreligionandispractisingthe
rt
C
ou
interpretationputbythePetitionertothe HollyQuraniscompletely
erroneous.
66.
ig
h
representingthePetitionerrelieduponadecisionoftheHouseofLords
in the case of Regina v. Johnstone37. Reliance was also placed on
Lambert38.
ba
y
67.
WelfareTrust(theApplicantinChamberSummons(L)No.456of2015
om
inWritPetition(L)No.2566of2015)aswellasappearingforEkata
Foundation(theApplicantinChamberSummons(L)No.455of2015in
WritPetitionNo.2680of2015)urgedthatasfarasArticle304ofthe
ConstitutionofIndiaisconcerned,asthereisasubsequentsanctionto
thestatutebythePresidentofIndia,noillegalitiesareattracted. He
urgedthatifanyreasonablerestrictionisimposedonfreedomoftrade
forsecuringthedirectiveprinciplesoftheStatePolicy,itwillbeheldas
reasonable.Heurgedthatimplementationofthedirectiveprinciplesof
theStatePolicyisalwaysconsideredtobeintheinterestofgeneral
37 (2003)1 WLR 1736
38 (2002)3 Appeal Cases 545
ash
68
fleshmatter draft 5
public.Hesubmittedthattheveryfactthatthepresidentialassenthas
rt
beenreceivedtotheAmendmentActwillshowthattheAmendment
C
ou
Actisinthepublicinterest.ThesubmissionisthatArticle304Bofthe
Constitution of India itself permits the State Legislature to legislate
imposingreasonablerestrictionsonthefreedomoftrade,Commerceor
intercoursewithorwithinthatparticularStateasmayberequiredin
ig
h
publicinterest.Heurgedthattheframersdidnotcontemplateaconflict
betweenthefundamentalrightsandthedirectiveprinciplesoftheState
Policy.HeurgedthattheAmendmentActisenactedforgivingeffectto
thedirectiveprinciplesoftheStatePolicyinArticles48and48Aofthe
ConstitutionofIndia.HeurgedthatitisnotpermissiblefortheCourt
ba
y
toreadintotheConstitutionofIndiarighttoprivacyasafundamental
rightcoveredbyeitherunderArticle21oranyotherArticleinChapter
om
ash
69
fleshmatter draft 5
68.
C
ou
constitutionalvalidityoftheAmendmentAct.
rt
IntervenorsinWritPetitionNo.1653of2015urgedthattherightsof
the animals which are sought to be slaughtered for the purposes of
ig
h
ba
y
isbenefitedbymilkandmilkproducts,somehumanbeingswantthe
Court to permit the cattle to be slaughtered. He urged that the
om
ash
70
fleshmatter draft 5
priorityoverthefundamentalrightsasourcountryhasalwaysbeena
rt
countrygivingprecedencetothedutyratherthanseekingrights. He
C
ou
ig
h
thatthelegislationispresumedtobevalidunlesscontraryisproved.
HereliedupontheobservationsmadeinthatbehalfbytheApexCourt
in the case of Namit Sharma v. Union of India41. He invited our
attentiontothephotographoftheoriginalpreambleoftheConstitution
ofIndiaonwhichapictureofprogenyofcowisprinted.Heurgedthat
ba
y
om
AmendmentActhasbeenmadetofurtherthefundamentaldutiesand,
therefore,itcannotbesaidthatanyprovisionoftheAmendmentActis
ultravirestheConstitutionofIndia.Herelieduponcertaindocuments
such as Charak Sanhita. He submitted that while interpreting the
ConstitutionofIndiaasheldbytheApexCourtinitsdecisioninthe
caseof UnionofIndiav.NavinJindal 42,theCourtwillhavetokeep
thedoctrineofflexibilityinmind.
fleshmatter draft 5
SomeofthelearnedcounselappearingfortheIntervenors
C
ou
69.
71
rt
ash
pointed out that in the State of Delhi under the provisions of Delhi
Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 1994, there is a complete
prohibitionofpossessionoffleshofagriculturalcattleslaughteredin
ig
h
contraventionofthesaidActof1994. Itprohibitsthepossessionof
fleshofagriculturalcattleslaughteredoutsideDelhi.Itispointedout
thatthereisacompleteprohibitiononthesale,storageandtransportof
ba
y
om
submissionisthatabanonpossessionoffleshofcow,bullorbullockin
theStateissomethingwhichisnecessary.
70.
LearnedcounselappearingfortheApplicantsinChamber
ash
72
fleshmatter draft 5
exceptionalcircumstances.Therefore,iftheslaughterofanyanimalis
rt
notprevented,itwillbediscriminatorytootheranimals. Relianceis
C
ou
isinjurioustohealth. Thelearnedcounselhasalsogivenahistorical
perspective of Muslims and British Rules as well as Independence
ig
h
Movement. HehasalsoreferredtovarioustenetsofMuslimreligion.
Thesubmissionofsaintshavelaidgreatemphasisonleadinganoble
lifeandalifeofrenunciationandcompassion,eatingsimplefoodand
abstainingfromconsumingmeat.Hissubmissionisthatthereisnota
single verse in Holly Quran which allows killing cows or bulls. He
ba
y
relieduponvariousversesinQuran.
THESUBMISSIONSOFTHEADVOCATEGENERAL
om
71.
ThelearnedAdvocateGeneralappearingfortheStateof
ash
73
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof Deenav.
C
ou
ig
h
pointedoutthatwherethechallengeisbasedontheinfringementof
Article 21, the Petitioners will have to establish that imposing
restrictions on dealing with cows, bulls and bullocks or the flesh of
ba
y
thereexistsundertheConstitution,arighttoprivacywhichisapartof
thefundamentalrighttolifeandpersonalliberty.Thereafter,theymust
om
establishthattherighttoconsumebeefisapartoffundamentalrightto
privacy.Further,theywillhavetoshowastohowtherestrictiononthe
transport,sell,purchaseandpossessionoffleshofanimalsisviolative
of the fundamental right to life. He, thereafter, made detailed
submissionsonvariousdecisionsrelieduponbythePetitioners.
72.
ash
74
fleshmatter draft 5
essentialingredientofpersonalliberty. Sincepersonallibertyunder
rt
C
ou
restrictionsandencroachmentsonhisperson,aviolationoftherightto
privacyshouldbeunderstoodalsotobeanencroachmentofhisperson
andthereforeaviolationofArticle21. Ayyangar,J.forthemajority
refers to the right of privacy as an aspect of personal liberty under
ig
h
Article21.Heurgedthatthemajorityjudgmentclearlysaysthatour
constitutiondoesnotintermsconferanylikeconstitutionalguarantees.
Theratioofthemajorityjudgmentisthatinanycase,sucharightto
choice,ifatallitexists,mustbebothdirectandtangibleandmustbe
somethingtangibleandphysicalandnotattributabletoimponderable
ba
y
om
Itgoeswithoutsayingthattherighttoprivacy,whichmeansthesame
as the right to be left alone, is an individual's right subject to non
interferencewheretheprivacyisenjoyedforthedoingofanylawful
activity. If, by virtue of the provisions of the impugned Act, the
provisionsoftheamendedSections5A,5B,5C,andinparticular5D,
consumptionofbeefamountstoanunlawfulactthenitisnotpossible
totreattherighttochoiceasapartofrighttolifeorpersonalliberty
underArticle21.Anotherreasonwhytherighttopersonallibertyunder
Article21shouldnotbeextendedtotherighttochoiceisalsoindicated
inthisjudgment.Inordertoconstituteaninfringement,whilespeaking
ash
75
fleshmatter draft 5
rt
Courtobservesthattheinfringementmustbeboth'directandtangible'.
C
ou
Personallibertyascontainedin Article21isnotintendedtoprotect
'merepersonalsensitiveness'.Inthefactsoftheinstantmatter,thereis
no immediate, direct or tangible nexus between the impugned
provisionsparticularlyofSection5Dandtheactofconsumptionby
73.
ig
h
thePetitioners.
ba
y
om
thoughtfitnottosubjectsuchregulationtoconstitutionallimitationsby
recognitionofaFundamentalRighttoPrivacy,analogoustotheFourth
Amendment,wehavenojustificationtoimportitintoatotallydifferent
FundamentalRightbysomeprocessofstrainedconstruction.
74.
In Gobindv.StateofMadhyaPradeshandAnother 43A,
theSupremeCourtdidnotaccepttheargumentthattherighttoprivacy
wasaFundamentalRight. Theobservationinparagraph22thatthe
lawinfringingaFundamentalRightmustsatisfythetestofcompelling
stateinterestisrelevantonlyiftheCourtdoesfindthataclaimedright
43A (1975)2 SCC 148
ash
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isentitledtoprotectionasafundamentalprivacyright.Therefore,in
rt
C
ou
entitledtoprotection.
TherighttoprivacyasdiscussedinR.Rajagopalv.State
75.
ig
h
FundamentalRighttoLifeandLibertyunderArticle21andtherefore,
ofTamilNaduneedstobeconsidered.Inattemptingtoestablishthat
ba
y
therighttoprivacyisanaspectofFundamentalRight,theSupreme
Courtheldthatitwasestablishedinthefactsofthatcase,asbeing
om
connectedwiththeFundamentalRighttospeechandexpressionunder
Article 19(1)(a). He stated that with great respect, the discussion
attemptingtorelatetherighttoprivacyasapartofrighttolifeunder
Article21wasinconclusive.ReferencewasmadetoAmericanlawand
judgments,mostofwhichhasalreadybeenconsideredinbothKharak
Singh and Gobind. TheU.S.Lawwasmostlyviewedfromthestand
pointofrightsofprivatecitizenswithregardtofreedomofspeechand
expression.Theconclusiondrawninparagraph26isthatevenwhere
it was said that the right to Privacy is implicit in the right to life
guaranteed under Article 21, it was in respect of certain aspects of
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privacysuchasthecitizen'srighttosafeguardtheprivacyofhimself,his
rt
family,marriage,procreation,motherhood,childbearingandeducation
C
ou
ig
h
InRamJethmalaniv.UnionofIndia 44atwoJudgeBench
76.
oftheSupremeCourtobservedthatrighttoprivacywasanintegralpart
ba
y
om
bealloweddomainsoffreedomthatarefreeofpublicscrutinyunless
theyactinanunlawfulmanner.... Thesolution fortheproblemof
abrogationofonezoneofconstitutionalvaluescannotbethecreation
of another zone of abrogation of constitutional values... It may be
notedthatinthiscase,asinmostearliercases,thediscussiononthe
righttoprivacywasinthecontextoftherighttolibertyandfreedomof
movement.Itwasthusrelatabletopoliceactioninmattersofcriminal
procedure. Even in such judgments, the Supreme Court has been
carefultoconsistentlyobservethattherighttoprivacymustnotbeseen
asaprotectiontoanyunlawfulaction. Inotherwords,therightto
44 (2011)8 SCC 1
ash
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privacydoesnotprotectanaccusedwhoisseentohaveviolatedthe
C
ou
77.
rt
law.
In InReRamlilaMaidanIncident,atwoJudgeBenchof
theSupremeCourtwasdealingwiththeforcibleevictionofthesleeping
public from Ramlila Maidan by the police authorities. The Bench
ig
h
ba
y
FundamentalRighttolifeandlibertyunderArticle21. Ineffect,the
Division Benchmade observationswhichwere contrarytothoselaid
om
downbylargerBenches.Heurgedthattheseobservationsthereforedo
notconstitute theratioofthatjudgmentnorholdanyprecedentiary
value.Theyarenotbinding.Seenfromthiscontext,themeremention
ofcertainrightssuchastherighttoeatwasnothingmorethanabroad
equationofcertainunspeltrightslikerighttosleeporrighttobreathe
orrighttodrink. Itisclearfromtheinclusionofthewordsrightto
blinkthatthisexpositionoftherighttoprivacyismoreinthenatureof
aliteraryexercisethanajudicialfinding.Theconclusionthattheright
toprivacyandtherighttoeatshouldbetreatedlikeaFundamental
Rightwaswithoutanyreasoning.
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Hecontendedthatthewordsrighttoeat,whenequated
rt
78.
79
C
ou
withthewordsliketherighttosleep,breatheordrink,carryaspecific
emphasis. Theyareconcernedwiththerightofeverypersontohave
access to food in order to nourish his body and sustain his life. It
cannot be stretched by any means to cover the right to choose a
ig
h
particularkindoffood.Assumingthereforethattherighttoeatisapart
oftherighttoprivacy,whichmightbeapartoftherighttolifeand
liberty,itcannotbeextendedtomeanthattherighttoeatbeefisa
fundamentalrighttoeat.Therighttoeatthefoodofone'schoicehas
beenheldtobeanaspectofaperson'srighttoprivacybyatwoJudge
ba
y
BenchoftheSupremeCourtin HinsaVirodhakSanghv.Mirzapur
MotiKureshiJamat.
om
onanassumptionthattherighttoprivacyisincludedinArticle21of
the Constitution. Since it has been demonstrated that the right to
privacyisnotincludedinArticle21,therighttoeatthefoodofone's
choiceasapartoftherighttoprivacycanalsonotbereadintothe
fundamental right to life or personal liberty. He urged that the
observationisnotcentraltothejudgmentwhichwasconcernedwith
totalbanonslaughterhouses.Itwasinthatcontextthatthejudgment
merelymadeapassingobservation,moreinthenatureofanobiter,and
certainlynotasratio,thatwhatonechoosestoeatisone'spersonal
affairandtherefore,partofhisrighttoprivacy. Thenegativetoneof
ash
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rt
79.
C
ou
precedentiaryvalue.
ig
h
seekinglegaldeclarationoftheirrighttochoosetheirgenderidentity.
Inthesaidjudgment,therighttoprivacyisthusseenasbeinganaspect
of life which goes to make a person's life meaningful. Article 21 is
consideredtobeaprotectorofsuchaspectsoflife.Assuch,Article21
isdistinctandseparatefromavarietyofsubordinaterightssuchasthe
ba
y
righttoprivacy,andcanonlybeunderstoodasaguardianofthelesser
constituentrights.Hereiteratedthattheredoesnotappeartobeany
om
authoritativejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtwhichlaysdowntheratio
thattherighttoprivacyshouldbeconsideredafundamentalright.As
righttoprivacycannotexistdehorsArticle21,thentherighttochoice
of food also cannot be elevated to the status of an independent
fundamentalright.
80.
HereliedupontotheorderoftheSupremeCourtinJustice
K.S.Puttaswamy&Anotherv.UnionofIndia. Bythesaidorder,a
threeJudgeBenchoftheSupremeCourtreferredthedecisionsofthe
respectiveConstitutionBenchesinKharakSinghandM.P.Sharmatoa
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largerBench.Hepointedoutthatthesaidorderrecordsthatthereisa
rt
C
ou
declaredbytheSupremeCourtinregardtotherightofprivacy.The
issue has therefore, been referred to a larger Bench. The order of
reference makes it clear that even the threeJudge Bench of the
Supreme Court isof the view thatnumeroussmaller Bencheswhich
ig
h
declaredthattherighttoprivacyisapartofrighttolifeandpersonal
libertyascontemplatedbyArticle21oftheConstitution,departedfrom
81.
theprincipleslaiddownbytheConstitutionofIndia.
ba
y
om
82.
He,therefore,submitted thatitisasettledlawthatthe
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impugnedlegislationcannotbeattackedforwantofcompellingpublic
C
ou
83.
rt
interest.
ig
h
beenenactedbythelegislaturekeepinginviewthedirectiveprinciples
of the State Policy embodied in Articles 48 and 48A and the
fundamental duties enshrined in Clause (g) of Article 51A of the
ConstitutionofIndia. HerelieduponadecisionoftheApexCourtin
thecaseofAIIMSStudents'Unionv.AIIMS&Others46.Hesubmitted
ba
y
thatthoughthefundamentaldutiesmaynotbeenforceable,itcanserve
asaguidenotonlyforresolvingtheissuebeforetheWritCourtbutalso
om
formouldingthereliefwhichmaybegivenbytheCourt.Hesubmitted
thatadutyofeverycitizenofIndiaiscollectivelyspeakingthedutyof
theState. RelyinguponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
Javedv.StateofHaryana,heurgedthatthefundamentalrightswill
havetobereadalongwiththedirectiveprinciplesoftheStatePolicy
andfundamentalduties.RelyinguponadecisionoftheApexCourtin
the case of Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh v. Unionof
India, he urged that the laws made in furtherance of the subjects
mentionedinPartIVandIVAoftheConstitutionmustbeassumedtobe
incompellingpublicinterest.Hesubmittedthatifrestrictionsimposed
46 (2002)1 SCC 428
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rt
Constitution,thesamewouldbeupheldasbeinginpublicinterestas
C
ou
theindividualinterestmustyieldtotheinterestofthecommunityat
ig
h
AnimalWelfareBoardv.A.Nagraja. HepointedoutthattheApex
Court has held that as far as the animals are concerned, life means
somethingmorethanmeresurvivalorexistence.Hesubmittedthatthe
ApexCourtheldthatthe animalshaverighttoleadlifewithsome
intrinsicworth,honouranddignity.HesubmittedthatintheStatement
ba
y
ofObjectsandReasonsintheAmendmentAct,thereisajustificationin
compellingpublicinterest.HeurgedthattheStatementofObjectsand
om
ReasonsintheAmendmentActpartakesthecolourofArticle48ofthe
ConstitutionofIndia.WhilerelyinguponadecisionofthisCourtinthe
caseofDhariwalIndustriesLtd.v.UnionofIndia 47,heurgedthatthe
compellingpublicinterestisinherentlyconnectedtopublicgood. He
pointedoutthatthereisareasonablenexusbetweentheenactmentand
theobjectsoughttobeachievedbytheActof1976andtheimpugned
provisionsofSections5Dand9B.
ash
84.
84
fleshmatter draft 5
RelyinguponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof
rt
IntellectualForumv.StateofAndhraPradesh 48,heurgedthatArticle
C
ou
48AandArticle51Aarenotonlyfundamentalinthegovernanceofthe
countrybutthatitisadutyoftheStatetoapplytheseprinciplesin
making the laws. These two Articles are to be kept in mind to
understandthescopeandpurportofthefundamentalrightsguaranteed
ig
h
bytheConstitutionofIndiaincludingArticles14,19and21thereof.
RelyinguponadecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof Municipal
CorporationoftheCityofAhmedabad&OthersV.JanMohammed
ba
y
order,publichealth,publicsecurity,morals,economicwelfareofthe
communityandtheobjectsmentionedinPartIVoftheConstitution.He
om
submittedthatsincetheimpugnedprovisionsoftheAmendmentAct
areinfurtheranceofthedirectivessoughttobeachievedunderPartIV
of the Constitution, they are in the general public interest. He
submittedthatnofurtherproofoftheircharacteroroftheirquantum,
ordegreeofcompellingpublicinterestneedstobeestablishedbythe
State.
85.
ThelearnedAdvocateGeneralsubmittedthatthereisno
requirementoflawthatthestatementofObjectsandReasonsmustbe
48 (2006)3 SCC 549
49 (1986)3 SCC 20
ash
85
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restrictedintheBillandthelawthatmaybefollowed.Relyingupona
rt
decisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofKeshavlalKhemchand&Sons
C
ou
v.UnionofIndia,heurgedthatiftheenactmentisotherwisewithin
the constitutionally permissible limits, the fact that there was a
divergencebetweentheobjectsappendedtotheBillandthetenorof
86.
ig
h
theActcannotbeagroundfordeclaringthelawasunconstitutional.
ThelearnedAdvocateGeneralalsodealtwiththeargument
basedontheviolationoffundamentalrightsguaranteedunderArticle
25oftheConstitutionofIndia.Hereliedupontheobservationsmade
bytheApexCourtinthecaseof MohmmedHanifQuareshiv.The
ba
y
StateofBihar50(forshortQuareshiI).TheApexCourtheldthatthe
slaughterofcowsonBakrIddaywasnotanessentialreligiouspractice
om
forMuslimsand,therefore,atotalbanoncowsslaughteronalldays
including BakriEid daywouldnotbeviolativeofArticle25(1)ofthe
ConstitutionofIndia.Hesubmittedthatthelawisverywellsettledby
theApexCourtinthecaseofDr.M.IsmailFaruquiv.UnionofIndia.
He submitted that the protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution is with respect to only to such religious practice which
formsanessentialandintegralpartofthereligion.Healsoreliedupon
adecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofAshutoshLahiriwhereinthe
ApexCourtheldthatitisoptionalforaMuslimtosacrificeagoatfor
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onepersonoracoworacamelforsevenpersons.TheApexCourtheld
rt
thattherewasnofundamentalrightofaMuslimtoinsistonslaughter
87.
C
ou
ofacow.
ig
h
submittedthatacustomaryrightshouldnotbeconfusedwithculture.
Article29isconcernedwithpreservationofessentialcultureofpeople
andnotwithperipheralcustomswhichoftenhavenorelationtoan
existingculturetowhichtheyclaimaffinity.Heurgedthattheculture
refers to the underlying characteristics that is shared in common by
ba
y
om
slaughteringofcows,bullsandbullocksorconsumptionoftheirfleshis
suchacommonunderlyingcharacteristicsofaparticularclasstowhich
they belong. He urged that in any event, assuming that the
fundamentalrightsunderArticle29oftheConstitutionofIndiahave
beenrestricted,suchrestrictionisinpublicinterest.
88.
ThelearnedAdvocateGeneralsubmittedthattheAnimal
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rt
Preservation ActandthePreventionofCrueltytoAnimalsAct,1960
C
ou
operateincompletelyindependentlegislativefields.Hesubmittedthat
thePreventionofCrueltytoAnimalsActhasbeenenactedunderEntry
17oftheConcurrentList.Healsorelieduponthedoctrineofpithand
substance.AsfarastheargumentthatSection5Doperatesbeyondthe
ig
h
territoriesoftheStateofMaharashtraisconcerned,heurgedthatthe
doctrineofnexuscanbeinvokedtosustainthevalidityoftheSection
5D. He relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the Case of
KhyerbariTeaCo.v.StateofAssam 51.Hesubmittedthatinanycase,
evenassumingthattherewasarepugnancy,theStateActhavingthe
ba
y
assentofthePresidentwillprevail.
om
89.
ThelearnedAdvocateGeneraldealtwiththeargumentof
90.
Heurgedthat Section9Bcannotbereadinisolation. A
conjointreadingofSections9Aand9Bmakeitclearthatinatrialfor
anoffenceundertheimpugnedAct,twofoundationalfactswillhaveto
be established by the prosecution viz., (a) the flesh is of an animal
51 AIR 1964 SC 925
52 (2005)6 SCC 281
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protectedundertheActand(b)theaccusedisfoundinpossessionof
rt
thesame.Oncethesefoundationalfactsareestablished,onlythenthe
C
ou
burdenwillshiftontheaccusedtoshowthattheslaughteretcwasnot
incontraventionoftheprovisionstheimpugnedAct.Inresponsetoa
ig
h
possession.
91.AsfarasthechallengetoSection9Bisconcerned,heurged
thatpresumptionofinnocenceisnotafundamentalrightguaranteedby
theConstitution.Hepointedoutseveralpenalstatuteswhichprovide
ba
y
forreverseonusclauseslikeSection9B.
om
[A]
92.
whethertheamendmenttoSection5oftheAnimalPreservationAct
made by the Amendment Act by incorporating the words bull or
bullockafterthewordcowisconstitutionallyvalid?
93.BeforeWedealwiththisissue,itmustbenotedthatin
some of the Petitions, there is also a challenge to the validity of
unamendedSection5whichimposesatotalbanonslaughterofcows.
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However,thischallengewasspecificallyrejectedbyaDivisionBenchin
C
ou
andothers.Thesaiddecisionhasattainedfinality.
rt
thecaseofShaikhZahidMukhtarvsCommissionerofPolice,Thane
STATEOFGUJARATVS.MIRZAPURMOTIKURESHI
KASSABJAMAT
Before we deal with the grounds of challenge and the
ig
h
94.
defenceoftheState,itwillbenecessarytomakeareferencetothe
decisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofStateofGujaratv.Mirzapur
MotiKureshiKassabJamat.Thereasonformakingareferencetothe
saiddecisionisthatbythesaiddecision,aConstitutionBenchofthe
ba
y
ApexCourtupheldthevalidityofasimilarprovisionincorporatedinthe
BombayAnimalPreservationAct,1954(asapplicabletotheStateof
om
Gujarat).ThisActishereafterforconvenienceisreferredasGujarat
Act.Beforeitsamendment,Subsection(1)ofSection5ofGujaratAct
providedthatnopersonshallslaughterorcausetobeslaughteredany
animalunlesshehasobtainedinrespectofsuchanimal,acertificatein
writingfromtheCompetentAuthorityappointedfortheareathatthe
animalisfitforslaughter.Intheyear1961,Section5oftheGujarat
Act was amended. Again in the year 1979, the Gujarat Act was
amendedbyincorporatingaprovisioninSubsection(1)inSection5
thatnosuchcertificateshallbegrantedinrespectofacow.Bythesaid
amendment, Subsection (1) of Section 5A was incorporated which
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providedthatnocertificateunderSubsection(1)ofSection5shallbe
rt
grantedinrespectofacow,acalfofacowaswellasabullorbullock
C
ou
challenged before the Gujarat High Court. The said challenge was
turneddown.Thereafter,thematterwascarriedtotheApexCourtand
the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Haji
ig
h
UsmanbhaiHasanbhaiQureshiv.StateofGujarat 53turneddownthe
challenge.WearereproducingrelevantprovisionsoftheGujaratAct.
UnamendedSections5and6oftheGujaratActreadthus:
95.
om
ba
y
5.(1)Notwithstandinganylawforthetimebeingin
force or any usage to the contrary, no person shall
slaughterorcausetobeslaughteredanyanimalunless
hehasobtainedinrespectofsuchanimalacertificate
inwritingfromthecompetentauthorityappointedfor
theareathattheanimalisfitforslaughter.
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rt
Providedthatacertificateinwritingforsuchslaughter
hasbeenobtainedfromthecompetentauthority.
C
ou
(4)(6)***
6.
Noanimalinrespectofwhichacertificatehas
beenissuedunderSection5shallbeslaughteredinany
placeotherthanaplacespecifiedbysuchauthorityor
officer as the State Government may appoint in this
behalf.
Actwhichreadsthus:
ig
h
Intheyear1961,theActwasamendedbySection4oftheAmendment
ba
y
om
(2) insubsection(2),forthewordsNocertificate
thewords,brackets,figureandletterInrespectofan
animaltowhichsubsection(1A)doesnotapply,no
certificateshallbesubstituted;
(3) in subsection (3), for the words religious
purposesthewords,religiouspurposes,ifsuchanimal
isnotacowshallbesubstituted.
96.
Thereafter,atotalbanontheslaughterofcowwasbrought
aboutby1979AmendmentAct.Section1Awassubstitutedasunder:
(1A)
Nocertificateundersubsection(1)shall
begrantedinrespectof
(a)
acow;
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thecalfofacow,whetheramaleorfemaleand
ifmale,whethercastratedornot;
(c)
abullbelowtheageofsixteenyears;
(d)
abullockbelowtheageofsixteenyears.
rt
(b)
C
ou
97.
92
Thencamethe1994AmendmenttotheGujaratActwhich
furtheramendedSubsection(1A)ofSection5bysubstitutingClauses
ig
h
(c)and(d).TheSection2oftheAmendmentActof1994readsthus:
(d)
abullock.;
(2)
insubsection(3)
om
ba
y
(c)
(i)
inclause(a),subclauses(ii)and(iii)shall
bedeleted;
(ii) inclause(b),afterthewordscalfofacow,
thewordsbullorbullockshallbeinserted.
98.
Thus,unamendedGujaratActcontainedSubsection(1)of
Section5whichprovidedthatnopersonshallslaughterorcausetobe
slaughteredanyanimalunlesshehasobtainedinrespectofsuchanimal
acertificateinwritingfromtheCompetentAuthoritythattheanimalis
fitforslaughter.Bythe1979Amendment,Subsection(1A)ofSection
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5wasenactedwhichimposedacompletebanonslaughterofacow,
rt
calfofthecowandbullorbullockbelowtheageof16years.Bythe
C
ou
Amendmentoftheyear1994whichwasthesubjectmatterofchallenge
before the Apex Court, Clauses (c) and (d) of Subsection (1A) of
ig
h
ba
y
1994amendmenttoSection5wasstruckdownbyGujaratHighCourt.
TheStateofGujaratfiledAppealbeforetheApexCourt.Themajority
om
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fleshmatter draft 5
rt
Gujaratwererequiredtobedecided.Thesaidcontentionsreadthus:
ig
h
C
ou
QuareshiI holdsDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicy
to be unenforceable and subservient to the
Fundamental Rights and, therefore, refuses to assign
any weight to the Directive Principle contained in
Article48oftheConstitutionandrefusestoholdthat
itsimplementationcanbeavalidgroundforproving
reasonability of the restriction imposed on the
FundamentalRightguaranteedbyArticle 19(1)(g) of
theConstitutionatheorywhichstandsdiscardedina
seriesofsubsequentdecisionsofthisCourt.
om
ba
y
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ig
h
C
ou
rt
onthefindingoffactsthatcowprogenyceasedtobe
usefulafteraparticularage,thatpreservationofsuch
'uselesscattle'byestablishmentofgosadanwasnota
practical and viable proposition, that a large
percentage of the animals, not fit for slaughter, are
slaughtered surreptitiously outside the municipal
limits,thatthequantumofavailablefodderforcattle
added with the dislodgement of butchers from their
traditionalprofessionrendersthetotalprohibitionon
slaughternotinpublicinterest.Thefactualsituation
hasundergoneadrasticchangesincethenandhence
thefactualfoundation,onwhichthelegalfindinghas
beenconstructed,ceasestoexistdeprivingthelaterof
allitsforce.
TheApexCourtalsodealtwiththeissuewhethertheban
ba
y
restriction.
99.
ConclusionsoftheApexCourtonthesaidsixcontentions
canbesummarizedasunder:
om
Question1
The restriction which can be placed on the rights
listedinArticle 19(1) arenotsubjectonlytoArticles
19(2) to 19(6); the provisions contained in the
chapteronDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicycan
alsobepressedintoserviceandreliedonforthe
purpose of adjudging the reasonability of
restrictionsplacedontheFundamentalRights.
(emphasisadded)
Question2
It is thus clear that faced with the question of
testingtheconstitutionalvalidityofanystatutory
provision or an executive act, or for testing the
reasonableness of any restriction cast by law on
the exercise of any fundamental right by way of
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Question3
ig
h
C
ou
rt
om
ba
y
Inouropinion,theexpression'milchordraught
cattle' as employed in Article 48 of the
Constitutionisadescriptionofaclassificationor
species of cattle as distinct from cattle which by
theirnaturearenotmilchordraughtandthesaid
words do not include milch or draught cattle,
whichonaccountofageordisability,ceasetobe
functionalforthosepurposeseithertemporarilyor
permanently. The said words take colour from the
precedingwords"cowsorcalves".Aspecieofcattle
which is milch or draught for a number of years
duringitsspanoflifeistobeincludedwithinthesaid
expression. On ceasing to be milch or draught it
cannotbepulledoutfromthecategoryof"other
milchanddraughtcattle."
(emphasisadded)
Question4
The facts stated in the Preamble and the
StatementofObjectsandReasonsappendedtoany
legislation are evidence of legislative judgment.
They indicate the thought process of the elected
representativesofthepeopleandtheircognizanceof
theprevalentstateofaffairs,impellingthemtoenact
thelaw.These,therefore,constituteimportantfactors
whichamongstotherswillbetakenintoconsideration
by the court in judging the reasonableness of any
restrictionimposedontheFundamentalRightsofthe
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C
ou
rt
om
ba
y
ig
h
Inthepresentcase,wefindthattheissuerelates
toatotalprohibitionimposedontheslaughterof
cowandherprogeny.Thebanistotalwithregard
totheslaughter ofone particular classofcattle.
The ban is not on the total activity of butchers
(kasais);theyareleftfreetoslaughtercattleother
than those specified in the Act. It is not that the
respondentwrit petitioners survive only by
slaughteringcowprogeny.Theycanslaughteranimals
otherthancowprogenyandcarryontheirbusiness
activity. Insofar as trade in hides, skins and other
allied things (which are derived from the body of
deadanimals)isconcerned,itisnotnecessarythat
theanimalmustbeslaughteredtoavailthesethings.
The animal, whose slaughter has been prohibited,
woulddieanaturaldeathevenotherwiseandinthat
casetheirhides,skinsandotherpartsofbodywould
be available for trade and industrial activity based
thereon.
Weholdthatthoughitispermissibletoplaceatotal
ban amounting to prohibition on any profession,
occupation,tradeorbusinesssubjecttosatisfyingthe
testofbeingreasonableintheinterestofthegeneral
public, yet,inthepresentcasebanningslaughter
of cow progeny is not a prohibition but only a
restriction.
(emphasisadded)
Question6
The Legislature has correctly appreciated the
needsofitsownpeopleandrecordedthesamein
thePreambleoftheimpugnedenactmentandthe
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C
ou
rt
StatementofObjectsandReasonsappendedtoit.
Inthelightofthematerialavailableinabundance
beforeus,thereisnoescapefromtheconclusion
that the protection conferred by impugned
enactment on cow progeny is needed in the
interestofNation'seconomy.Merelybecauseitmay
cause 'inconvenience' or some 'dislocation' to the
butchers, restriction imposed by the impugned
enactmentdoesnotceasetobeintheinterestofthe
generalpublic.Theformermustyieldtothelatter.
(emphasisadded)
Inparagraph81,theApexCourt,observedthus:
ig
h
100.
(a)
ThefactscontainedinpreambleandtheStatementof
Objects and Reasons in the impugned enactment
highlightthefollowingfacts:
Cow and her progeny sustain the health of the
nation;
Workingbullsareindispensableinagricultureas
theysupplypowermorethananyanimal;
(c)
(d)
(e)
om
ba
y
(b)
Whiledealingwiththeissuewhetherthebanonslaughterofacowor
her progeny is in the public interest, the Apex Court, in addition,
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99
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consideredtheaffidavitsfiledonrecordandinparticulartheaffidavits
rt
C
ou
DevelopmentDepartmentandtheJointDirectorofAnimalHusbandry.
Reliancewasplacedonareportonthedraughtability ofbullsabove
the16yearsofage.EventhereportoftheWorkingGrouponAnimal
HusbandryandDairyFarmingandtheTenthFiveYearPlan20022007
ig
h
were dealt with by the Apex Court. The report of the National
CommissiononCattlewasalsoreferred. InParagraph108,theApex
Courtobservedthattheutilityofthecowcannotbedoubtedatall.The
ApexCourtnotedthattheimportantrolethatthecowandherprogeny
playintheIndianeconomyhasbeenacknowledgedinitsdecisionin
ba
y
thecaseofQuareshiI.Afterconsideringallthefacts,theApexCourt
heldthatthebanonslaughterofcowandherprogenyisintheinterest
om
ofgeneralpublicwithinthemeaningofClause(6)ofArticle19ofthe
ConstitutionofIndia.
InthelightofthelawlaiddownbytheApexCourt,itis
necessarytoexaminethefactualdetailsplacedonrecordbytheState
Governmentinthepresentcase.Thoughthereareearlieraffidavitsin
replyfiledbytheStateGovernmentinsomeofthePetitions,thelearned
AdvocateGeneralhasmainlyrelieduponanaffidavitofShriShashank
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Agriculture,dated1stDecember2015inPILNo.76of2015.Inthesaid
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66.20lakhbovineanimalswerevaccinatedandintheyear201415,
455.21lakhbovineanimalswerevaccinated.Inthesaidaffidavit,he
ba
y
pleadedthataccordingtothestatisticaldataquotedbyNationalDairy
DevelopmentBoard,initsreportDairyinginMaharashtraStatistical
om
Profile2015,theareaunderfoddercropsinMaharashtraintheyear
20102011was9,01,000hectaresandtheareaofpermanentpasture
andgrazinglandswas12,45,000hectares. Inthesaidaffidavit,he
pleaded that in addition, there is a sizable production of coarse
foodgrains like bajra, raagi, jowar, millet etc. The plant residue of
thesecropsisusedasafodder. Allthesefacilitiesputtogethertryto
cope up with the fodder requirement of cattle population of
MaharashtraState. However,theuncertaintiesinmonsoonrainspose
difficulties in availability of green as well as dry fodder. The State
Governmentthroughvariousmeasuresispromotingproductionaswell
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cattle.Thesaidmeasuressetoutintheaffidavitareasunder:
C
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ig
h
seedoftheorderof6782MThasbeendistributedin
theyear20142015. Besidesthis,foddersaplingsof
the order of 13.52 lakh pertaining to multicut
ba
y
distributedintheyear20142015.
(b) Distributionofchaffcuttersforpreventingwastageof
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farmer'slevelforpreservationofgreenfodder.
102. Inthesaidaffidavit,itiscontendedthattherewere290
GoshalasandPanjarpolsintheStatewhichtakecareofprovidingfeed
ig
h
andfoddertothecattleshelteredwiththem.Hehasalsosetoutthe
funds allocated for drought relief for the years 20102011 to 2015
2016. Hehasgivenareasonastowhythereisaproblemoffodder
shortageinsomeareas.Intheaffidavit,thedetailsofthelandholding
in theStateofMaharashtraaresetout.Paragraph6ofthe affidavit
ba
y
readsthus:
om
6. Inreplytopara8oftheAffidavitinrejoinderIsay
thatinWesternCountrieslikeCanada,USA,European
Countries, Australia etc. the land holding is huge, as
comparedtothelandholdingintheState.
LandholdingstatusinMaharashtraisasfollows:
Area(000)Ht Number(000) Category
01Ht
3186
6709
Marginal
Farmers
12Ht
5739
4052
Small
Farmers
24Ht
5765
2159
Semi
Medium
410Ht 3993
711
Medium
10 Ht & 1084
above
68
Large
Total
19767
13699
(Source:AgricultureCensus20102011)
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Isaythat,fromtheaboveinformation,itisclearthat
averageland holding inMaharashtra State islow.
The farm sizes are such that the farmers cannot
afford use of tractors and more than 90% of the
farmers(below4Htofland)dependonbullocksto
plough the land. The concept of tilling the land
withmechanicaltillersisapplicableincaseoflarge
farms. This is not the position in the State. An
averagesmallfarmercanreadyhisfarmwithproper
tillingin2/3days'timebeforetherainsareexpected.
The farmer is not caught unawares. Further,
mechanical tilling with tractors has got its own
disadvantage.Themechanicaltillerbreaksthecrustof
the soil up to the depth of 12 to 15 inches. This
exposesthecrustof12to15inchestooutsidedryness
and the humus of the entire crust is lost. In this
situation, unless there is good rain or irrigation to
makethecrustof12to15incheswet,sowingcannot
take place. Onthe other hand,ploughingwiththe
conventionalploughwiththehelpofbullocksbreaks
thecrustuptothedepthof5to6inchesonlyandthe
humusbelowthislevelisretained. Inthissituation,
evenasmallamountofrainmakesthecrustwetand
suitable for sowing. I say that the Petitioners have
givenexamplesofunusualphenomenaofrainthisyear
in Western Maharashtra. The phenomena being
unusualcannotjustifytheircontention.
ExtensiverelianceisplacedbyShriSatheinhisaffidaviton
thedecisioninthecaseofStateofGujaratv.MirzapurMotiKureshi
KassabJamat.InParagraph9oftheaffidavit,emphasisislaidonthe
cowdung.Hestatedthatthedungofcowanditsprogenyiscollected
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byvillagersandfarmersforuseasafuelaswellasfertilizer.Relevant
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portionofParagraph9readsthus:
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104.
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Paragraph10oftheaffidavitofShriSathedealswiththe
ig
h
methaneemission.Itiscontendedasunder:
105.
Belchingorbreakingwindsarenaturalthingswith
anylivingbeing.Evenhumanbeingsbelchandbreak
wind.Thusthisfactorcannotbemaderesponsiblefor
eliminationofthelivestockpopulation.
In Paragraph 11, it was contended that the shortage of
ba
y
dungwhichisthesourceoforganicmanurehascompelledtheuseof
chemicalfertilizers.Itiscontendedthattheshortagecanbeovercome
om
onlybyincreasingdungavailabilityandthatispossibleonlyifthecattle
issaved.ItiscontendedthatundertheIndianAgricultureandAnimal
Husbandry Practices, yielding of dung by cattle enjoys the topmost
positionamongstalltheyieldsfromcattle. Itispointedoutthatthe
dungfuelisextensivelyusedforcookingpurposesaswellasforlining
thewallsandfloorsofhousesinvillages.Itiscontendedthatthedung
usedforliningofthewallsandfloorsactsasadisinfectantandalso
performsathermoregulatoryfunction.Itiscontendedthatthereports/
articlesannexedtotheaffidavitinrejoinderofthePetitionerwhichare
relieduponinParagraph16areprimarilyinrelationtoagriculturaland
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animalhusbandrypracticesmainlyinwesterncountries.Itiscontended
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thattheeffectofgrazingbycattleinpasturelandsisthatitenrichesthe
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ou
pasturelandsbyexcretaandurineofthecattlegetsspreadintothe
pasturelands.InParagraph14,relianceisplacedonthefiguresofthe
cattlepopulationasperthelastfourcensusesof1997,2003,2007and
2012.Paragraph14readsthus:
ig
h
1997
2003
2007
2012
Indigenous
AdultMale
6763
6243
6092
5748
Indigenous
AdultFemale
4643
3840
3650
3302
11406 10083
9742
9050
ba
y
Cattle
om
Subtotal
(in
000's)
CrossbredAdult
Male
226
280
235
212
CrossbredAdult
Female
1243
1483
1734
2138
Young
Male*
Stock
2371
1994
1846
1264
Young
Female*
Stock
2825
2897
2627
2820
Total
*Bothindigenous&crossbredanduptotheageof2
to3years.
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h
106.
overpopulationofcattleinthefaceofdecliningcattlepopulation.It
ba
y
propersteps.
107.
Wemustnoteherethatatthestageofadmission,thesame
DeputySecretaryShriShashankSathehadfiledanaffidavitinreply.In
om
Paragraph16ofthesaidaffidavit,itiscontendedthatfleshofcowand
itsprogenyleadstodiabetes,obesityetc.Wemustnoteherethatthe
saidcontentionisnotpressedintoserviceinthesubsequentaffidavit
dated1st December2015ofShriSathe. Wemustalsonotethatthe
learmedAdvocateGeneralhasnotpressedthesaidcontentioninthe
earlier affidavit of Shri Shashank Sathe. In the affidavit dated 1 st
December2015,hehasstatedthus:
17. Inreplytopara21oftheAffidavitinRejoinderI
submit that it is not the intention of the State to
impose a vegetarian regime or dictate/force food
habits. The nonvegetarians are free to have their
ownfoodchoicesbutcannotinsistasamatterofright
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108.
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onaparticulartypeofmeatbeefinthepresentcase.
As regards the effect of nonvegetarian food on
health, the consumers are free to havetheir own
informed choices. The aim and object of the
impugned act is to preserve cattle for their
undeniable utility in agriculture and draught
sectors.
(emphasisadded)
Comingbacktotheaffidavitdated1st December2015of
ig
h
thebutchersslaughterotheranimalsaswell.Lastly,itiscontendedthat
after the Amendment Act came into force, 155 cases have been
ba
y
registeredintheStateallegingcommissionofoffenceundertheAnimal
PreservationAct.Itispointedoutthatsomeofthecasesareofbreach
om
oftheamendedprovisionsoftheAnimalPreservationAct.
109.
ItmustbenotedherethatevenundertheunamendedAct,
underSection6,therewasaprohibitionontheslaughterofbullsand
bullockswhichwerescheduledanimalswithoutobtainingacertificate
inrespectofsuchanimalfromtheCompetentAuthoritythattheanimal
wasfitforslaughter.Subsection(2)ofSection6readsthus:
6(2).
Nocertificateshallbegrantedundersub
section (1), if in the opinion of the competent
authority,
(a)
thescheduledanimal,whethermaleorfemale,
is or likely to become economical for the
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(b)
thescheduledanimal,ifmale,isorislikelyto
becomeeconomicalforthepurposeofbreeding;
(c)
thescheduledanimal,iffemale,isorislikelyto
become economical for the purpose of giving
milkorbearingoffspring.
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ou
110.
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purposeofdraughtoranykindofagricultural
operations;
ig
h
deletedfromthescheduleandnowacompletebanontheirslaughter
has been imposed. The ban imposed by Section 5 is essentially
challengedonthegroundofviolationoffundamentalrightofbutchers
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and breach of
ba
y
om
ofthePetitionershaveseriouslypressedthechallengebasedonArticle
21.Section5doesnottakeawaytheright,ifanyofanyindividual,of
eatingmeatofcow,bullorbullock.Thesaidprohibitioncomesbyway
ofSection5Dwhichwillbedealtwithseparately.So,essentiallythe
challengetothe amendedportionofSection5willhavetobedealt
with onthebasisofthe allegationsofviolationofArticle19(1)(g),
Article25andArticle29.WemustnotethatthedecisionoftheApex
Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur dealt with the
challenge to similar Gujarat enactment, basically on the ground of
infringementofrightsofbutchersandtradersinmeatunder Article
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19(1)(g)andArticle14oftheConstitutionofIndia.However,theApex
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CourthasobservedthattheissueofviolationofArticle25hasnotbeen
111.
C
ou
dealtwith.
PreservationAct,Butcherscancontinuetoslaughterotheranimalsand
ig
h
traderscancontinuetotradeinmeatoftheotheranimals.Thus,what
isdonebytheimpugnedamendmenttoSection5isarestrictionand
not prohibition. Hence, the question is whether the restriction is
reasonableintermsofArticle19(6).
ba
y
112.WehaveextensivelyreferredtothedecisionoftheApex
CourtinthecaseofStateofGujaratv.MirzapurMotiKureshiKassab
om
Jamat.Inthesaiddecision,theConstitutionBenchoftheApexCourt
hasquotedthedecisioninthecaseof Pathummav.StateofKerala
withapproval. InParagraph39,theConstitutionBenchoftheApex
CourthasanalysedthedecisioninthecaseofPathummaandthesame
hasbeensummarized.Summaryofthesaiddecisionreadsthus:
(1)Thecourtsinterprettheconstitutionalprovisions
againstthesocialsettingofthecountrysoasto
show a complete consciousness and deep
awarenessofthegrowingrequirementsofsociety,
the increasing needs of the nation, the burning
problemsofthedayandthecomplexissuesfacing
the people, which the legislature, in its wisdom,
throughbeneficiallegislation,seekstosolve.The
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judicialapproachshouldbedynamicratherthan
static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic
rather than rigid. This Court while acting as a
sentinel on thequi viveto protect fundamental
rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country
must try to strike a just balance between the
fundamental rights and the larger and broader
interests of societyso that when such a right
clasheswithalargerinterestofthecountryitmust
yieldtothelatter.
(para5)
om
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thestatute.Inotherwords,theCourtmust
see whether the social control envisaged
byArticle19(1)isbeingeffectuatedbythe
restrictions imposed on the fundamental
right.However important the right of a
citizenoranindividual maybeit hasto
yieldtothelargerinterestsofthecountry
orthecommunity.
(para24)
Wehavealreadyreferredtotheconclusionsdrawnbythe
113.
ig
h
ApexCourtdealingwithsixissuesinthecaseoftheStateofGujaratvs
ba
y
Mirzapur. TheApexCourthasheldthattheCourtwouldbeginwith
thepresumptionregardingreasonabilityofrestrictions.Thefactsstated
om
inthepreambleandtheStatementofObjectsandReasonsappendedto
anylegislationareevidenceofthelegislativejudgment.Theyindicate
the thought process of the elected representatives of the people and
their cognizance of the prevalent state of affairs, impelling them to
enact the law. These, therefore, constitute important factors which
amongstotherswillbetakenintoconsiderationbythecourtinjudging
thereasonablenessofanyrestrictionimposedonthefundamentalrights
oftheindividuals. Hence,itwillbenecessarytoreproducetheObjects
and Reasons of the impugned Amendment Act. Clauses 1, 2 and 3
thereofreadthus:
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ba
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2.
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h
C
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1. TheMaharashtraAnimalPreservationAct,1976
(Mah.IXof1977),hasbeenbroughtintoforcein
the State from the 15th April 1978. The Act
totally prohibits in any place in the State,
slaughterofcowswhichalsoincludeheiferand
male or female calf of cow and provides for
preservationofcertainotheranimalsspecifiedin
the Schedule to the Act, like bulls, bullocks,
femalebuffaloesandbuffalocalves.Section6of
the Act empowers the persons appointed as
competent authority under this Act to issue
certificateforslaughterofthescheduledanimals,
butsuchcertificateisnottobegrantedifinthe
opinionofthatcompetentauthoritytheanimalis
or is likely to become useful for draught,
agriculturaloperations,breeding,givingmilkor
bearingoffspring.
3.
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ig
h
C
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114.
InthepreambleoftheAnimalPreservationActbeforeits
amendment, it is stated that the Act has been made to provide for
prohibition of slaughter of cows and for the preservation of certain
other animals suitable for milch, breeding, draught or agricultural
purposes. Clause 1 of the Statement of Objects and Reasonsof the
Amendment Act refers to Section 6 which empowers the Competent
Authoritytoissueacertificateforslaughterofscheduledanimals. It
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alsoreferstothefactthatsuchcertificateisnottobegrantedifinthe
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opinionofthatCompetentAuthority,theanimalisorislikelytobecome
C
ou
usefulfordraughtoragriculturaloperations,breedingorgivingmilkor
bearingoffspring.Clause2providesthattheeconomyoftheStateof
Maharashtraisstillpredominantlyagricultural.Itisstatedthatinthe
agricultural use of cattle for milch,draught,breeding or agricultural
ig
h
purposeshasagreatdealofimportance.Italsoreferstothegrowing
adoption of nonconventional energy sources like biogas plants and
evenwastematerial. Therefore, Clause2recitesthatafterthecattle
ceasetobeusefulforthepurposesofbreedingoristoooldtodowork,
it still continues to give dung for fuel, manure and biogas and,
ba
y
therefore,theycannotatanytimebesaidtobeuseless. Itisfurther
statedthatitiswellacceptedthatthebackboneofIndianagricultureis
om
inamannerofspeakingthecoworherprogeny.Clause3recordsthat
withaviewtoachievetheaboveobjectandalsotoensureeffective
implementationofthepolicyoftheStateGovernmenttowardssecuring
thedirectiveprincipleslaiddowninArticle48oftheConstitutionof
India and in larger public interest, it is considered expedient by the
GovernmentofMaharashtratoimposetotalprohibitiononslaughterof
the progeny of cow as well. It is provided that for effective
implementation of such total ban, it is necessary to provide for
prohibitiononthetransport,export,saleorpurchaseofthecategoryof
cattle,theslaughterofwhichisproposedtobebanned. Itisfurther
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providedthatforeffectiveimplementationoftheban,thereisaneedto
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provideforentry,searchandseizureoftheplaceandvehicleswhere
placingtheburdenofproofonaccused.
115.
C
ou
thereisasuspicionofsuchoffencesbeingcommittedandaprovisionof
Thus,thelegislaturefeltthatitisnecessarytopreserveand
ig
h
protectagriculturalanimalslikebullsandbullocks.Evenafterbullsor
bullocksceasetobeusefulforthepurposesofbreedingorevenafter
bullsorbullocksbecometoooldtodowork,itisstatedthatsuchbulls
orbullocksstillcontinuetogivedungforfuel,manureandbiogas,and
ba
y
therefore,theycannotbesaidtobeuseless.
116.
ThestatementofObjectsandReasonsoftheAmendment
incorporatedinPartIVoftheConstitutionofIndiawhichreadsthus:
om
(emphasisadded)
117.
ThesecondpartofArticle48enjoinstheStatetoprohibit
theslaughterofcowsandcalvesandothermilchanddraughtcattle.
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principlesoftheStatepolicy. Article48AoftheConstitutionofIndia
C
ou
readsthus:
ig
h
Clause(g)ofArticle51AoftheConstitutionreadsthus:
ba
y
everycitizenofIndia
***
om
(g) toprotectandimprovethenaturalenvironment
including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to
havecompassionforlivingcreatures;
Atthisstage,itwillbenecessarytomakeareferenceto
Paragraphs48to52and68ofthedecisionoftheApexCourtinthe
case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat.
Whatisheldthereincanbesummarizedasunder:
(i)
theexpressionmilchordraughtcattleasemployed
inArticle48oftheConstitutionisadescriptionofa
classificationorspeciesofcattleasdistinctfromcattle
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whichbytheirnaturearenotmilchordraughtand
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thesaidwordsdonotexcludemilchordraughtcattle,
C
ou
ig
h
cannotbepulledoutfromthecategoryofother
milchanddraughtcattlementionedinArticle48.
ba
y
Hence,bullsandbullocksonceasingtobemilchor
om
draughtcontinuetobecoveredbyArticle48.
(ii) Article48consistsoftwoparts.Thefirstpartenjoins
theStatetoendeavourtoorganiseagriculturaland
animal husbandry and that too on modern and
scientific lines. The emphasis is not only on
organisation but also on modern and scientific
lines. The subject is agricultural and animal
husbandry. India is an agriculturebased economy.
According to the 2001 census, 72.2% of the
populationstilllivesinvillages(seeIndiaVision2020,
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p.99)andsurvivesforitslivelihoodonagriculture,
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C
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secondpartofArticle48enjoinstheState,dehorsthe
generalityofthemandatecontainedinitsfirstpart,to
takesteps,inparticular,forpreservingandimproving
thebreeds,andprohibitingtheslaughter,ofcowsand
ig
h
calvesandothermilchanddraughtcattle.
(iii) Cowprogenyexcretaisscientificallyrecognisedas
ba
y
manure.Thishelpsinimprovingthequalityofthe
earth and the environment. The impugned
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categoryofcattlespokenofspecificallyinArticle48.
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h
citizenofIndiais,collectivelyspeaking,thedutyof
theState(seealsoAIIMSStudent'sUnionvs.AIIMS).
(v) Itisthusclearthatfacedwiththequestionoftesting
theconstitutionalvalidityofanystatutoryprovisionor
ba
y
anexecutiveact,orfortestingthereasonablenessof
any restriction cast by law on the exercise of any
om
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118.
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Inthecaseof Javedv.StateofHaryana,theApexCourt
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heldthatthefundamentalrightscannotbereadinisolationbutalong
C
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119.
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ba
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120.
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C
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areprimarilyaimedatassuringpoliticalfreedomtothe
citizens by protecting them against excessive State
action while the directive principles are aimed at
securingsocialandeconomicfreedomsbyappropriate
State action.TheFundamental rights are intendedto
fostertheidealofapoliticaldemocracyandtoprevent
theestablishmentofauthoritarianrulebuttheyareof
no value unless they can be enforced by resort to
courts. So they are made justiciable. But, it is also
evident that notwithstanding their great importance,
the directive principles cannot in the very nature of
thingsbeenforcedinacourtoflaw.Itisunimaginable
thatanycourtcancompelalegislaturetomakealaw.If
the court can compel Parliament to make laws then
parliamentarydemocracywouldsoonbereducedtoan
oligarchy of Judges. It is in that sense that the
Constitutionsaysthatthedirectiveprinciplesshallnot
be enforceable by courts. It does not mean that
directive principles are less important than
Fundamentalrightsorthattheyarenotbindingonthe
various organs of the State. Article 37 of the
Constitution emphatically states that directive
principles are nevertheless fundamental in the
governanceofthecountryanditshallbethedutyof
theStatetoapplytheseprinciplesinmakinglaws.It
followsthatitbecomesthedutyofthecourttoapply
thedirectiveprinciplesininterpretingtheConstitution
andthelaws.Thedirectiveprinciplesshouldservethe
courtsasacodeofinterpretation.Fundamentalrights
shouldthusbeinterpretedinthelightofthedirective
principles and the latter should, whenever and
whereverpossible,bereadintotheformer. Everylaw
attacked on the ground of infringement of a
Fundamental Right should, among other
considerations,beexaminedtofindoutifthelaw
does not advance one or other of the directive
principlesorifitisnotindischargeofsomeofthe
undoubtedobligationsoftheState,constitutionalor
otherwise, towards its citizens or sections of its
citizens,flowingoutofthepreamble,thedirective
principlesandotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.
(emphasisadded)
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121.
124
C
ou
MirzapurMotiKureshiKassabJamatheldthatthefactsstatedinthe
preamble and the Statements of Objects and Reasons constitute
importantfactorswhichwillhavetobetakenintoconsiderationbythe
Courtwhilejudgingthereasonablenessofanyrestrictionsimposedon
ig
h
thefundamentalrights.WhatisstatedintheStatementofObjectsand
ReasonsoftheimpugnedAmendmentActcanbesummarizedasunder:
(i)
predominantlyagricultural.Intheagriculturalsector,
ba
y
om
(ii) Afterthecattleceasetobeusefulforthepurposeof
breedingoraretoooldtodowork,theystillcontinue
to give dung for fuel, manure and biogas and,
therefore,theycannot,anyanytime,besaidtobe
useless.
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(iii) ThebackboneofIndianagricultureis,inamannerof
C
ou
speaking,thecowandherprogenyandtheyhave,on
their back, the whole structure of the Indian
agricultureanditseconomicsystem.
ig
h
(iv) Inordertoachievetheaboveobjectiveandalsoto
ensureeffectiveimplementationofthepolicyofState
Governmenttowardssecuringthedirectiveprinciples
laiddowninarticle48oftheConstitutionofIndia
and in larger public interest, it is considered
ba
y
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progenyofcow.
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thehealthofthenationbygivingthemthelifegiving
milkwhichissoessentialan item in ascientifically
balanceddiet.
ba
y
ig
h
C
ou
om
123.
Inthecaseof MirzapurMotiKureshiKassabJamat,in
paragraph81,theApexCourthasanalyzedtheStatementofObjects
andReasonsoftheGujaratAmendmentwhichwasimpugnedbeforeit.
Thesaidparagraphreadsthus:
81.The facts contained in the Preamble and the
Statement of Objects and Reasons in the impugned
enactmenthighlightthefollowingfacts:
(i)
(ii)
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(iv)
itisestablishedthatthebackboneofIndian
agricultureisthecowandherprogenyand
theyhaveontheirbackthewholestructure
of the Indian agriculture and its economic
system;
(v)
theeconomyoftheStateofGujaratisstill
predominantly agricultural. In the
agriculturalsectoruseofanimalsformilch,
draught, breeding or agricultural purposes
has great importance. Preservation and
protection of agricultural animals like bulls
and bullocks needs emphasis. With the
growing adoption of nonconventional
energysourceslikebiogasplants,evenwaste
materialhavecometoassumeconsiderable
value.Afterthecattleceasetobreedorare
toooldtowork,theystill continue togive
dung for fuel, manure and biogas and,
therefore,theycannotbesaidtobeuseless.
Apartfromthefactthatwehavetoassume
theabovestatedfactsastobecorrect,there
is also voluminous evidence available on
record to support the above said facts. We
proceedtonoticefewsuchdocuments.
om
ba
y
ig
h
C
ou
(iii)
124.IfwecomparetheStatementofObjectsandReasonsof
the impugned Amendment Act with the Statement of Objects and
Reasonsof the Gujarat Amendment, both appear tobe similar.The
ApexCourtreliedupontheStatementofObjectsandreasonsofGujarat
Acttoupholdbanonslaughterofbullsandbullocks. TheApexCourt
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also held that what was stated in the Statement of Objects and
125.
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materialplacedonrecord.
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Hence,weturntothematerialplacedonrecordbythe
ig
h
ofShriShashankM.Sathe,theDeputySecretary(AnimalHusbandry
Department)oftheStateGovernmentinthePILNo.76of2015.What
ba
y
isstatedintheaffidavitcanbesummarizedasunder:
(a)
Asperthe2012Census,thecattlewhichisnotused
om
eitherfordraughtorbreedingwasonly61,439which
was one percent of the total indigenous male
population and less than half percent of the total
cattlepopulation. Thepercentageoftheindigenous
male cattle as per the 2012 Census which was not
used either for draught or breeding was
approximatelyonly1%ofthetotalindigenousmale
populationandlessthanhalfpercentageofthetotal
cattlepopulationintheyear2012. Itis,therefore,
incomprehensiblethatsuchaninsignificantportionof
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(b)
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availablepastureandgrazinglands;
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thetotalcattlepopulationwillcreatepressureonthe
In1993,therewere53mobileveterinaryunitswhich
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(c)
numberincreasedto65bytheyear2014;
(d)
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year20132014;
(e)
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(f)
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Paragraph5bdealswithvariousschemeswhichare
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availableforsupplyanddistributionoffodderseeds.
C
ou
ig
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Therearemorethat290GoshalasandPanjarpolesin
(g)
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y
(h)
om
shortageoffeedandfodderinthesaidInstitutions;
housednearly27,479animals;
(i)
AscomparedtothedevelopedcountrieslikeCanada,
USA, etc, the average land holding in Maharashtra
Stateisverylowandmorethan90%ofthefarmers
are holding the land having area of less than 4
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afforduseoftractorsormechanicaltillersandthey
(j)
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mostlydependonbullockstoploughtheland.
(k)
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affidavit;
Thefiguresof1997,2003,2007and2012havebeen
setoutin Paragraph14whichshowthatthecattle
populationintheStateissteadilydecreasing;
Thedungofcowsandprogenyofcowiscollectedby
ba
y
(l)
thevillagersandthesameisusedasfuelaswellas
om
organicfertilizer.Similarly,urineofthecattleisused
as pesticide after processing with neem leaves.
Hence,the cattle which is not useful for milch or
draught does not cease to be useful to the
agriculturists;
(m) Similarly,organicmanuremaybeavailableatcertain
price but its value is much more. It restores the
fertilityofsoiltowhichnopricecanbeattributed.It
isdevoidoftheseriousadversefeaturesofchemical
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C
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pollutethesoil,thecrop,thesubsoilwatertable,and
arehugefinancialburdenonthefarmers.Consistent
use of chemical fertilizers has ruined the soil in
Punjab and other parts of the country and has
ig
h
notneedthehugeinfrastructureforproductionand
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y
distributionofchemicalfertilisers:
(n)
Thedeclineinmalepopulationisclearlyattributable
om
tothepolicyofslaughterofcowprogeny.
126. Inthepresentcase,theStateGovernmenthasjustifiedthe
prohibition imposed on slaughter of a cow, bull or bullock by
contendingthatthecowprogenyexcretaisrecognizedasasourceof
rich organic manure which enables the farmers to avoid the use of
chemicalsaswellasinorganicmanurewhichhelpsinimprovingthe
qualityofearthandtheenvironment.Inparagraph50ofitsjudgment
inthecaseofMirzapur,theApexCourthasacceptedthisbyobserving
thatCowprogenyexcretaisscientificallyrecognisedasasourceofrich
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organicmanure.Itenablesthefarmersavoidtheuseofchemicalsand
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inorganicmanure.Thishelpsinimprovingthequalityoftheearthand
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h
usedasanorganicmanureisveryrelevantastheuseofsuchmanureis
infurtheranceoftheobjectspecifiedinArticle48AoftheConstitution
ofIndia.ThepreventionofslaughterisforgivingeffecttoArticle48.
ThedutyoftheStateunderArticle48isofpreservingandpreventing
theslaughterofcowsandothermilchanddraughtanimals.Wehave
ba
y
alreadynotedthattheApexCourtheldthatonceasingtobemilchor
draught,suchanimalscannotbepulledoutofthe categoryofother
om
milchanddraughtanimals.
127.InthecaseofQuareshiI,theApexCourtacceptedthatcow
andherprogenyplayanimportantroleinIndianEconomy.TheApex
Courtobservedthus:
Thediscussionintheforegoingparagraphsclearly
establishes the usefulness of the cow and her
progeny. They sustain the health of the nation by
givingthemthelifegivingmilkwhichissoessential
aniteminascientificallybalanceddiet.Theworking
bullocksareindispensableforouragriculture,forthey
supply power more than any other animal. Good
breedingbullsarenecessarytoimprovethebreedso
that the quality and stamina of future cows and
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InParagraph86ofthedecisioninthecaseof Mirzapur,
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128.
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workingbullocksmayincreaseand theproductionof
foodandmilkmayimproveandbeinabundance.The
dung of the animal is cheaper than the artificial
manures and is extremely useful. In short, the
backboneofIndian agricultureisinamannerof
speaking the cow and her progeny. Indeed Lord
LinlithgowhastrulysaidThecowandtheworking
bullockhaveontheirpatientbackthewholestructure
of Indian agriculture. (Report on the Marketing of
CattleinIndia,p.20.)If,therefore,wearetoattain
sufficiency in the production of food, if we are to
maintainthenation'shealth,theefficiencyandbreed
of our cattle population must be considerably
improved. Toattainthe above objectiveswe must
devote greater attention to the preservation,
protection and improvement of the stock and
organise our agriculture and animal husbandry on
modernandscientificlines.
(emphasisadded)
theApexCourtnotedtheconclusionsoftheStudyGroupappointedby
om
GujaratUniversity.Thestudyreportsubmitteditsconclusionsasunder:
"1. Theagedbullocksabove16yearsofagegenerated
0.68horsepowerdraftoutputperbullockwhilethe
prime bullocks generated 0.83 horsepower per
bullockduringcartinghaulingdraftwork.
2. Theagedbullocksworkedsatisfactorilyforthelight
workforcontinuous4hoursduringmorningsession
and total 6 hours per day (morning 3 hours and
afternoon3hours)formediumwork.
3. The physiological responses (Rectal temperature,
RespirationrateandPulserate)andhemoglobinof
aged bullocks were within the normal range and
alsomaintainedtheincrementalrangeduringwork.
However, they exhibited the distress symptoms
earlierascomparedtoprimebullocks.
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5. Theagedbullockswereutilizedbythefarmersto
performagriculturaloperations(ploughing,sowing,
harrowing, planking, threshing), transporthauling
of agricultural product, feeds and fodders,
constructionmaterialsanddrinkingwater.
129.
ig
h
(emphasisadded)
Thus,thestudyshowsthat93%oftheagedbullocksabove
16yearsofagearestillusefultothefarmers.Theargumentbasedon
lackofadequate supplyoffodderwillnotbesufficienttoinvalidate
ba
y
Section5.Thereismaterialplacedonrecordtoshowthatthebullsand
bullocks,aftertheyceasetobedraughtanimals,continuetobeuseful
inmanywaysforagricultureandfarmers.Thedungcanbeusedfor
om
multiplepurposes.Allthishastobeappreciatedinthelightofthefact
thateconomyoftheStateispredominantlyagricultural.
130.InParagraph132ofthedecisioninthecaseof Stateof
Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, the Apex Court
rejected the argument that the poor will suffer only because of the
prohibitionofslaughterofcowprogeny.Ultimatelyinparagraph137,
theApexCourthasobservedthus:
137. ..TheLegislaturehascorrectlyappreciated
theneedsofitsownpeopleandrecordedthesamein
the Preamble of the impugned enactment and the
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StatementofObjectsandReasonsappendedtoit.In
thelightofthematerialavailableinabundancebefore
us, there is no escape from the conclusion that the
protectionconferredbyimpugnedenactmentoncow
progenyisneededintheinterestofNation'seconomy.
Merelybecauseitmaycause'inconvenience'orsome
'dislocation'tothebutchers,restrictionimposedbythe
impugned enactment does not cease to be in the
interestofthegeneralpublic.Theformermustyieldto
thelatter.
ig
h
131.
effecttoArticle48withtheobjectofsustainingtheeconomyofthe
Statewhichispredominantlyagricultural.Effectissoughttobegiven
ba
y
toArticle48bybanningslaughterofcow,bullorbullock.Inourview,
apart from the conclusions recorded by the Apex Court on the
om
usefulnessoftheprogenyofcowevenafteritceasestobeamilchor
draughtanimal,theStateofMaharashtrahasplacedonrecordfacts
and data to support what is stated in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Amendment Act. The State has placed on record
materialtosupportthestandthatitisnecessarytopreservecows,bulls
andbullocksandtopreventitsslaughterintheState.Consideringthe
legalandfactualpositionandwhatwehavediscussedabove,wefind
thatthestandoftheStateGovernmentthatprohibitingtheslaughterof
cows,bullsandbullocksisinpublicinterestwillhavetobeaccepted.
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132. ThequestioniswhethertherestrictionimposedbyArticle
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19(1)(g)isunreasonable.Wefindnothingunreasonableaboutthesaid
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restriction.ItisforgivingeffecttoArticle48andClause(g)ofArticle
51AoftheConstitutionofIndia.Therestrictionsarenotarbitraryand
therefore,donotinfringeArticle14.Therefore,thechallengebasedon
violationof Article19(1)(g)totheamendmentmadetoSection5of
ig
h
amendmenttoSection5willhavetobeupheld.
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y
Now,wedealwiththechallengetotheamendedportionof
om
Section5onthebasisofArticle25oftheConstitutionofIndia. The
contentionraisedisthattheslaughterofabullorbullockisanessential
partofMuslimreligion.ItiscontendedthatalargenumberofMuslim
populationispoorandtheycannotaffordtosacrificeonegoatevenon
theoccasionofBakrI'dinsteadsevenpersonscanaffordtosacrificeone
coworaprogenyofcow. RelianceisplacedbythePetitionersonthe
extractsofholyQuranandothermaterialinsupportoftheircontention
thatthesacrificeofacow,bullorbullockisanessentialpartofthe
Muslimreligion.Itiscontendedthattocommemoratetheoutstanding
actofsacrifice(Quarbani)byProphetAbraham,peoplesacrificealamb,
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goat,ram,cow,bull,bullockorcamelonEidulAdha.Itiscontended
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inWritPetitionNo.9209of2015thattheanimalsacrificeiscompulsory
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accordingtoIslamicJurisprudenceanditisobligatoryforeverymature
Muslimtosacrificeacow,goat,lamborabullaccordingtohisfinancial
statustoalmightyGod. Wemustnoteherethatthesaidissueisno
longerresintegra.InthecaseofAshutoshLahiri,athreeJudgeBench
ig
h
oftheApexCourtobservedthatitisoptionalforaMuslimtosacrificea
goatforonepersonoracoworacamelforsevenpersons.TheApex
Courtheldthatitis,therefore,notobligatoryforamuslimtosacrificea
8. Theaforesaidrelevantprovisionsclearlyindicate
thelegislativeintentionthathealthycowswhich
are not fit to be slaughtered cannot be
slaughteredatall.ThatisthethrustofSection4
of the Act. In other words there is total ban
against slaughtering of healthy cows and other
animalsmentionedinthescheduleunderSection
2oftheAct.ThisistheveryessenceoftheAct
anditisnecessarytosubservethepurposeofthe
Acti.e.toincreasethesupplyofmilkandavoid
the wastage of animal power necessary for
improvement of agriculture. Keeping in view
these essential features of the Act, we have to
construeSection 12whichdealswith power to
grantexemptionfromtheAct.Aswehavenoted
earlier the said section enables the State
Government by general or special order and
subjecttosuchconditionsasitmaythinkfitto
impose,toexemptfromtheoperationofthisAct
slaughter of any animal for any religious,
medicinalorresearchpurpose.Nowitbecomes
clearthatwhenthereisatotalbanundertheAct
sofarasslaughteringofhealthycowswhichare
notfittobeslaughteredasper Section 4(1)is
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ba
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readthus:
coworprogenyofcow. TheParagraphs8and9ofthesaiddecision
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concerned,ifthatbanistobeliftedevenfora
day,ithastobeshownthatsuchliftingofbanis
necessaryforsubservinganyreligious,medicinal
or research purpose. The Constitution Bench
decision of this Court inMohd. Hanif Quareshi
case[AIR1958SC731:1959SCR629]at(SCR)
page650ofthereportspeakingthroughDas,C.J.
referred to the observations in Hamilton's
translation ofHedaya, Book XLIII at page 592
that it is thedutyof every free Mussalman
arrived at the age of maturity, to offer a
sacrificeontheI'dKurban,orfestivalofthe
sacrifice, provided he be then possessed of
Nisab and be not a traveller. The sacrifice
establishedforonepersonisagoatandthat
for seven a cow or a camel. It is, therefore,
optional for a Muslim to sacrifice a goat for
one person or a cow or a camel for seven
persons. It does not appear to be obligatory
thatapersonmustsacrificeacow.Oncethe
religious purpose of Muslims consists of
makingsacrificeofanyanimalwhichshould
be a healthy animal, on BakrI'd, then
slaughtering of cow is not the only way of
carrying out that sacrifice. It is, therefore,
obviouslynotanessentialreligiouspurposebut
anoptionalone.InthisconnectionMrTarkunde
for the appellants submitted that even optional
purpose would be covered by the term any
religiouspurposeasemployedbySection12and
shouldnotbeanessentialreligiouspurpose.We
cannotacceptthisviewforthesimplereasonthat
Section12seekstoliftthebaninconnectionwith
slaughterofsuchanimalsoncertainconditions.
Forliftingthebanitshouldbeshownthatitis
essentialornecessaryforaMuslimtosacrificea
healthy cow on BakrI'd day and if such is the
requirement of religious purpose then it may
enabletheStateinitswisdomtoliftthebanat
leastonBakrI'dday.Butthatisnottheposition.
It is well settled that an exceptional provision
whichseekstoavoidtheoperationofmainthrust
of the Act has to be strictly construed. In this
connectionitisprofitabletorefertothedecisions
ofthisCourtinthecasesUnionofIndiav.Wood
PaperLtd.[(1990)4SCC256:1990SCC(Tax)
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9.
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purpose,asenvisagedbySection12.Itbecomes
obvious that if for fructifying any medicinal or
researchpurposeitisnotnecessaryoressential
to permit slaughter of healthy cow, then there
would be no occasion for the State to invoke
exemptionpowerunderSection12oftheActfor
suchapurpose.Similarlyithastobeheldthatif
itisnotnecessaryoressentialtopermitslaughter
of a healthy cow for any religious purpose it
wouldbeequallynotopentotheStatetoinvoke
itsexemptionpowerunderSection12forsucha
religiouspurpose.We,therefore,entirelyconcur
withtheviewoftheHighCourtthatslaughtering
of healthy cows on BakrI'd is not essential or
required for religious purpose of Muslimsor in
other words it is not a part of religious
requirement for a Muslim that a cow must be
necessarilysacrificedforearningreligiousmerit
onBakrI'd.
(emphasisadded)
ThisissuewasdealtwithbytheConstitutionBenchofthe
ba
y
134.
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AshutoshLahiri.ItiswellsettledthatwhatisprotectedbyArticles25
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h
essentialpartofthereligion.ItisheldinthecasesofAshutoshLahiri
and QuareshiI that the sacrifice of a cow or its progeny is not an
essentialpartofthemuslimreligion.Hence,violationofArticle25(1)
oftheConstitutionofIndiaisnotatallattracted.
ba
y
135.
Thenweturntothechallengeonthegroundofviolationof
om
Article29.Itisallegedthatthebanonslaughterofbullsandbullocks
isviolativeofthefundamentalrightsofthePetitionerstoconservetheir
culture. The learned Advocate General rightly submitted that no
culture can claim perpetual and inflexible existence beyond the
character of the civilization that created it. He submitted that a
customaryrightcouldnotbeconfusedwiththeculture.Article29is
for preservation of the essential culture of the people and not with
peripheralcustomswhichhavenorelationtoanexistingculture. He
rightly gave an example of the abolition of the practice of Sati or
untouchability whichcanbesaidtobeapartoftraditionalpractice.
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destroyingculture. ThePetitionerswhoareagitatingtheviolationof
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Article29havefailedtoestablishthattheslaughterofcows,bullsor
bullocksisapartoftheessentialcultureofanyreligionorcommunity.
Cultural right cannot be confused with right to religion. Common
threadinArticle29(1)islanguage,scriptandcultureandnotreligion.
ig
h
Therefore,theargumentbasedontheviolationofArticle29iswithout
anymerit.
ba
y
[B]
validityofamendedSection5oftheAnimalPreservationActmustfail.
136.
THEVALIDITYOFSECTIONS5A,5BAND5C
OFTHEANIMALPRESERVATIONACT
SECTION5A
om
Section5Areadsthus:
5A(1)
No person shall transport or offer for
transport or cause to be transported cow, bull or
bullockfromanyplacewithintheStatetoanyplace
outsidetheState forthepurposeofitsslaughterin
contraventionoftheprovisionsofthisActorwiththe
knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so
slaughtered.
137.
Subsection(1)ofSection5Aincorporatesaprohibitionon
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any place outside the State for the purposes of its slaughter in
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contraventionoftheprovisionsoftheAnimalPreservationActorwith
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theknowledgethatitwillbeoritislikelytobesoslaughtered. The
banimposedbytheamendmenttoSection5onslaughterofcows,bulls
orbullocksisapplicableonlywithintheStateofMaharashtraasthelaw
ismadebytheStateLegislature. Therefore,thereisnoquestionof
ig
h
ActwillnotapplyoutsidetheState.Ifanyonetransportscow,bullor
bullocktoanyplaceoutsidetheStateandslaughtersitatthatplace,
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y
suchslaughtercannotbeinbreachoftheAnimalPreservationActas
theStateActcannotanddoesnotdeclareaslaughtermadeoutsidethe
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138. However,theobjectoftheamendmenttoSection5isto
preservecows,bullsorbullocksinsidetheState.Itcanbesaidthatthis
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provisionhasadirectandproximatenexuswiththeobjectsoughttobe
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achievedbymakingamendmenttoSection5forimposingprohibition
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onslaughterofcows,bullsandbullocksintheState.Thisprovisioncan
besaidtohavebeenmadefortheeffectiveimplementationofSection
5.Therefore,subjecttowhatwehaveobservedabove,thereisnomerit
139.
ig
h
inthechallengetoSubSection(1)ofSection5A.
Subsection(2)ofSection5Areadsthus:
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(2) Nopersonshallexportorcausetobeexported
outsidetheStateofMaharashtracow,bullorbullock
forthepurposeofslaughtereitherdirectlyorthrough
hisagentorservantoranyotherpersonactingonhis
behalf,incontraventionoftheprovisionsofthisActor
withtheknowledgethatitwillbeorislikelytobe
slaughtered.
Subsection(2)ofSection5Aimposesaprohibitiononany
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147
TheSection5Bprovidesthatnopersonshallpurchase,sale
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141.
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SECTION5B
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orotherwisedisposeoforoffertopurchase,sellordisposeofanycow,
bullorbullockforslaughterorknowingorhavingreasontobelievethat
suchcow,bullorbullockshallbeslaughteredincontraventionofthe
ig
h
provisionsoftheAct.Thisrestrictionisnaturallyapplicablewithinthe
State of Maharashtra which appears to be in furtherance of the
intentionofthelegislaturetoputacompleteembargoonslaughterof
cows,bullsorbullockswithaviewtoimplementArticle48.TheSub
section5Bhasdirectandproximateconnectionwiththebanimposed
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y
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enactedwithaviewtoensurethatthebanimposedbySection5is
effectivelyimplemented.Hence,thesaidrestrictionisreasonableand
cannotbeunconstitutional.
SECTION5C
142.
providesthatnotwithstandinganythingcontainedinanyotherlawfor
thetimebeinginforce,nopersonshallhaveinhispossessionfleshof
anycow,bullorbullockslaughteredincontraventionoftheprovisions
ofthisAct. Astheprohibitionofslaughterofcow,bullorbullockis
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withintheState,Section5Cwillapplytoapossessionoffleshofany
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cow,bullorbullockslaughteredwithintheState.Againthisprovision
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seemstobeinfurtheranceoftheintentionofthelegislaturetoensure
thatthecows,bullsorbullocksintheStateshouldbepreserved.
143.
ig
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144.
149
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AnotherchallengetoSection5Cisonthegroundthatthe
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saidprovisionisnotanancillaryorincidentalprovision. Onaplain
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h
slaughterofcow,bullorbullockisconstitutional,wedonotseehow
theviceofunconstitutionalityisattractedtotheprovisionwhichseeksa
banonapersonconsciouslypossessingthefleshofcow,bullorbullock
whichisslaughteredinsidetheState. Thesaidprovisionensuresthe
banimposedbySection5isproperlyimplemented.Therefore,itcanbe
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y
saidthatthesaidprovisionishavingadirectnexustotheprovisionof
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Section5.
145.
General,notwithstandingtheprovisionsofSection9B,statedthatinthe
prosecutionforanoffencepunishableunderSection9or9A,theinitial
burdentoprovethebasicexistenceoffactsconstitutingtheoffenceof
violation of Sections 5A, 5B and 5C will be always on the State. In
short, the offence will be attracted if the possession is a conscious
possession.
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146.
150
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ThechallengetoSection5Cessentiallybytheownersof
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coldstoragesintheState isbasedonviolationoffundamentalrights
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underArticle19(1)(g)oftheConstitutionofIndia.Thecontentionis
thatSection 5CviolatestheirfundamentalrightsunderArticle19(1)
147.
ig
h
ConstitutionofIndia.
ThecontentionisthattheburdenisontheStatetojustify
thelawincaseswherethereisanallegationofviolationofArticle19of
theConstitutionofIndia.RelianceisplacedonthedecisionoftheApex
ba
y
om
anycow,bullorbullockslaughteredincontraventionoftheprovisions
oftheAnimalPreservationAct.Section5Cappliestothefleshofany
cow,bullorbullockwhichisslaughteredinsidetheState.Suchfleshis
aproductofaslaughterofcow,bullorbullockwhichisbannedunder
Section 5. Section 5C puts restrictions on the owners of the cold
storagesofstoringfleshofcow,bullorbullockslaughteredintheState.
Thestorageofothercategoriesofmeatisnotprohibited.Thestorage
ofotheritemsoffoodisnotprohibited.Wehavealreadyacceptedthe
submissionoftheStateGovernmentthatthebanonslaughterofacow,
bullorbullockisinpublicinterest.Ifbanonslaughterofprogenyof
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148.
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imposedbySection5Cisinpublicinterest.
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Thereisanotherargumentcanvassedbytheownersofthe
coldstorages.TheargumentisthatSection5Ccanbemisusedasitis
impossiblefortheownersofcoldstoragestoknowwhetherthemeat
ig
h
whichisstoredbytheircustomersintheircoldstoragesistheproduct
oftheillegalslaughterofanimalswhichisprohibitedunderSection5.
Perhaps,thisargumentisinthecontextofnegativeburdenputonthe
accusedinatrialforoffencesunderSections9and9A. Firstly,the
possibilityofalegalprovisionbeingmisusedisnogroundtoholdit
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y
unconstitutional.Secondly,inthesubsequentpartofthedecision,we
haveheldSection9Btobeanunconstitutional.Anotherargumentis
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thatifthepossessioncontemplatedbySection5Cisnotconstruedas
consciouspossession,apersonwhoisfoundinpossessionoffleshof
cow,bullorbullockwithouttheknowledgeofthefactthatthesameis
thefleshofanimalsslaughteredincontraventionoftheSection5will
beconvictedforanoffencepunishableunderSection5C.
149.
AnotherlimbofargumentisthatifSection5Ccannotbe
struckdown,thewordpossessionwillhavetobereaddowntomean
consciouspossession.Asstatedearlier,thelearnedAdvocateGeneral
onbehalfoftheStatehassubmittedthatinitialburdenwillbeonthe
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offenceunderSections9and9A. TheburdenwillbeontheStateto
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provethattheaccusedwasinpossessionoffleshofanycow,bullor
bullockillegallyslaughteredwithintheState.IntheabsenceofSection
9B,theprosecutionwillhavetoprovethattheaccusedwhoischarged
forviolationofSection5Cwasfoundinpossessionoffleshofcow,bull
ig
h
orbullockslaughteredwithintheStatewiththeknowledgethatitisa
fleshofcow,bullorbullocksoslaughtered. Onthisaspect,itwillbe
necessarytomakeareferencetowhatisheldbytheApexCourtinits
decisioninthecaseof People'sUnionforCivilLiberties(PUCL)v.
UnionofIndiaandAnother.TheApexCourtwasdealingwithSection
ba
y
4ofthePreventionofTerrorismAct,2002.Section4readthus:
om
4.Possessionofcertainunauthorizedarms,etc.
Where any person is in unauthorized possession of
any,
(a)armsorammunitionspecifiedincolumns(2)and
(3)ofCategoryIorCategoryIII(a)ofScheduleIto
theArmsRules,1962,inanotifiedarea,
(b) bombs, dynamite or hazardous explosive
substances or other lethal weapons capable of mass
destruction or biological or chemical substances of
warfareinanyarea,whethernotifiedornot,
he shall be guilty of terrorist act notwithstanding
anythingcontainedinanyotherlawforthetimebeing
inforce,andbepunishablewithimprisonmentfora
term which may extend to imprisonment for life or
withfinewhichmayextendtorupeestenlakhorwith
both.
Explanation.In this section notified area means
such area as the State Government may, by
notificationintheOfficialGazette,specify.
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WhiledealingwiththeoffenceunderSection4,inparagraphs26and
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27ofthedecisioninthecaseofPeople'sUnionforCivilLibertiesand
Anotherv.UnionofIndia,theApexCourthasheldthus:
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26. Section4providesforpunishingapersonwhois
in unauthorised possession of arms or other
weapons. Thepetitionersarguedthatsincethe
knowledge element is absent the provision is
bad in law. Asimilar issue wasraised beforea
ConstitutionBenchofthisCourtin SanjayDuttv.
State (II) (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
1433].HerethisCourtinpara19observedthat:
(SCCp.430)
Even thoughthe wordpossessionisnot
precededbyanyadjectivelikeknowingly,
yetitiscommongroundthatinthecontext
thewordpossessionmustmeanpossession
withtherequisitementalelement,thatis,
consciouspossessionandnotmerecustody
withouttheawarenessofthenatureofsuch
possession. There is a mental element in
theconceptofpossession.Accordingly,the
ingredientofpossessioninSection5ofthe
TADAActmeansconsciouspossession.This
is how the ingredient of possession in
similar context of a statutory offence
importingstrictliabilityonaccountofmere
possession of an unauthorised substance
hasbeenunderstood.
27. ThefindingofthisCourtsquarelytotheeffect
thatthereexistsamentalelementintheword
possession itself answers the petitioners'
argument. The learned Attorney General also
maintains the stand that Section 4 presupposes
consciouspossession.Anotheraspectpointedout
by the petitioners is about the unauthorised
possessionofarmsandarguedthatunauthorised
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Thus,eveninacaseofalegislationwhichmakesunlawful
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h
possessionofarmsandammunitionanoffence,theApexCourtreadthe
possession as a conscious possession and not merely a custody. The
meaningofthewordconsciousisawarenessofafact.Itisastateof
mindwhichisdeliberate. Section5Cmakespossessionoffleshasan
offence.MentalelementisalsoapartofpossessionunderSection5C.
ba
y
TheknowledgeelementiscertainlyapartofpossessioninSection5C.
ThelawlaiddownbytheApexCourtwillapplytoSection5Caswell.
om
Tothatextent,thePetitionersarerightincontendingthatconscious
possessionwillhavetobereadintoSection5C.Ifthepossessionunder
Section5Cisnottreatedasaconsciouspossessionandistreatedas
mere custody, there is every possibility of an innocent person being
convictedforanoffencepunishableunderSection9A.
151.
Thenextlimbofargumentinsupportofthechallengeto
Sections5Ato5CisbasedonArticle301readwithArticle304B.The
contentionisthattheprohibitionimposedbytheSectionshasadirect
andimmediateeffectonthetrade,commerceandintercourseoffleshof
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cows,bullsorbullocksamongstates.Articles301providesthattrade,
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free.Itisnotafundamentalrightbutisanordinaryrightconferredby
theConstitutionofIndia.Article301isspecificallysubjecttotheother
provisions of the Constitution. Moreover, Article 304B permits
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h
slaughterofcowanditsprogenyintheStateisvalid. Thebanon
possessionoffleshofcows,bullsorbullocksillegallyslaughteredinthe
Statehasadirectcorrelationornexuswiththeprohibitionimposedby
Section5.Therefore,assumingthattheprovisionsoftheAmendedAct
violaterightsconferredbyArticle301oftheConstitutionofIndia,the
ba
y
(C)
Section5Dwhichreadsthus:
om
prohibitionofslaughterofcows,bullsorbullocksisinpublicinterest.
5D. Nopersonshallhaveinhispossessionfleshof
anycow,bullorbullockslaughteredoutsidetheState
ofMaharashtra.
152.
prohibitiononpossessingfleshofcow,bullorbullockeventhoughthe
fleshisofcow,bullorbullockwhichisslaughteredoutsidetheStateof
Maharashtra.TheeffectofthesaidSection5Disthatifacow,bullor
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bullockisslaughteredinanotherStateorinaforeigncountrywhere
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thereisnorestrictiononslaughterofcow,bullorbullock,eventhen
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possessionoffleshofsuchcow,bullorbullockisprohibitedintheState.
NotonlythatitspossessionisprohibitedintheState,butthepossession
ismadeanoffencebyvirtueoftheAmendmentAct.Themainchallenge
to the constitutional validity of the Section 5D is on the basis of
ig
h
infringementofrightofthePetitionersguaranteedbytheArticle21of
theConstitutionofIndia.
ThecontentioninsupportofthechallengetoSection5Dis
153.
ba
y
om
fundamentalrightguaranteedunderArticle21oftheConstitutionof
India.Iftheanswertothesaidquestionisinthenegative,thequestion
willbewhetherSection5Dinfringesthesaidfundamentalright.
WHETHER RIGHT OF PRIVACY IS A PART OF
PERSONALLIBERTYGUANTEEDBYARTICLE21
154.
Thefirstrelevantdecisionwhichneedsconsiderationisin
thecaseofKharakSinghv.StateofU.P.andOthers.Itisadecisionof
the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court consisting of six Hon'ble
Judges.ThemajorityviewinthesaiddecisionisbyAyyangar,Jandthe
minorityviewisbySubbaRao,J.ThechallengebeforetheApexCourt
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survelliance.Paragraph7ofthesaiddecisionreferstothedefinition
ofsurvellianceinRegulation236whichreadsthus:
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ba
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thecollectionandrecordonahistorysheetofall
informationbearingonconduct."
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Asnotedinparagraph9ofthesaiddecision,theargument
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ofthePetitionerwasthat Regulation236infringesthefundamental
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ou
rightsguaranteedunderClause(d)ofArticle19(1)anditalsoinfringes
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In
ig
h
TheApexCourtobservedthatwhileArticle19(1)dealswithparticular
speciesorattributesofthefreedom,personallibertyunderArticle21
takesinandcomprisestheresidue. TheApexCourtinthemajority
viewheldthatClause(b)ofRegulation236isviolativeofArticle21of
theConstitutionofIndia. Inparagraphs15and16themajorityview
om
ba
y
holdsthus:
Therightofthepeopletobesecurein
theirpersons,houses,papers,andeffects,
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause,supportedbyoathoraffirmation,
andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobe
searched,andthepersonsorthingstobe
seized.
and that our Constitution does not in terms
confer any like constitutional guarantee.
Nevertheless,theseextractswouldshowthatan
unauthorisedintrusionintoaperson'shomeand
thedisturbancecausedtohimthereby,isasit
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weretheviolationofacommonlawrightofa
mananultimateessentialoforderedliberty,if
not of the very concept of civilisation. An
EnglishCommonLawmaximassertsthatevery
man'shouse ishiscastleandin Semaynecase
[5Coke91:1SmLC(13thEdn)104atp.
105]wherethiswasapplied,itwasstatedthat
thehouse ofeveryone istohimashiscastle
andfortressaswellasforhisdefenceagainst
injuryandviolenceasfor hisrepose.Weare
notunmindfulofthefactthatSemaynecase[5
Coke91:1SmLC(13thEdn)104atp.105]
was concerned with the law relating to
executions in England, but the passage
extracted has a validity quite apart from the
contextofthe particular decision. Itembodies
an abiding principle which transcends mere
protection of property rights and expounds a
conceptofpersonallibertywhichdoesnotrest
onanyelementoffeudalismoronanytheoryof
freedomwhichhasceasedtobeofvalue.
156.
InParagraph17,themajorityviewobservesthus:
17. ..Asalreadypointedout,therightofprivacyis
not a guaranteed right under our Constitution and
thereforetheattempttoascertainthemovementsof
an individual which is merely a manner in which
privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a
fundamentalrightguaranteedbyPartIII.
om
ba
y
16.
157.
IntheminorityviewofSubbaRao,J,itwasheldthatunder
theConstitution,thoughrighttoprivacyisnotexpresslydeclaredas
fundamentalright,thesaidrightisessentiallyaningredientofpersonal
liberty.RelevantpartofParagraph28ofthesaiddecisionreadsthus:
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28. NowletusconsiderthescopeofArticle21.The
expression life used in that Article cannot be
confinedonlytothetakingawayoflifei.e.causing
death.InMunnv.Illinois[(1877)94US113],Field,
J.,definedlifeinthefollowingwords:
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h
om
ba
y
Theexpressionlibertyisgivenaverywidemeaning
inAmerica.Ittakesinallthefreedoms.In Bolling v.
Sharpe [ (1954) 347 US 497, 499] , the Supreme
Court of America observed that the said expression
was not confined to mere freedom from bodily
restraintandthatlibertyunderlawextendedtothe
fullrangeofconductwhichtheindividualwasfreeto
pursue,Butthisabsoluterighttolibertywasregulated
toprotectothersocialinterestsbytheStateexercising
itspowersuchaspolicepower,thepowerofeminent
domain,thepoweroftaxationetc.Theproperexercise
ofthepowerwhichiscalledthedueprocessoflawis
controlledbytheSupremeCourtofAmerica.InIndia
the word liberty has been qualified by the word
personal,indicatingtherebythatitisconfinedonly
tothelibertyoftheperson.Theotheraspectsofthe
libertyhavebeenprovidedforinotherArticlesofthe
Constitution.Theconceptofpersonallibertyhasbeen
succinctly explained by Dicey in his book on
Constitutional Law, 9th edn. The learned author
describestheambitofthatrightatpp.20708thus:
The right not to be subjected to
imprisonment, arrest or other physical
coercioninanymannerthatdoesnotadmitof
legaljustification.
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InA.K.Gopalancase[1950SCR88],itisdescribedto
meanlibertyrelatingtoorconcerningthepersonor
body of the individual; and personal liberty in this
senseistheantithesisofphysicalrestraintorcoercion.
Theexpressioniswideenoughtotakeinarighttobe
freefromrestrictionsplacedonhismovements.The
expression coercion in the modern age cannot be
construedinanarrowsense.Inanuncivilizedsociety
wheretherearenoinhibitions,onlyphysicalrestraints
maydetractfrompersonalliberty,butascivilization
advances the psychological restraints are more
effective than physical ones. The scientific methods
used to condition a man's mind are in a real sense
physical restraints, for they engender physical fear
channelling one's actions through anticipated and
expectedgrooves.Soalsothe creationofconditions
which necessarily engender inhibitions and fear
complexes can be described as physical restraints.
Further,therighttopersonallibertytakesinnotonly
a right to be free from restrictions placed on his
movements,butalsofreefromencroachmentsonhis
private life. It is true our Constitution does not
expressly declare a right to privacy as a
fundamentalright,butthesaidrightisanessential
ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic
countrysanctifiesdomesticlife;itisexpectedtogive
him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and
security.Inthelastresort,aperson'shouse,wherehe
liveswithhisfamily,ishiscastle;itishisrampart
against encroachment on his personal liberty. The
pregnantwordsofthatfamousJudge,FrankfurterJ.,
inWolfv.Colorado[[1949]238US25]pointingout
theimportanceofthesecurityofone'sprivacyagainst
arbitrary intrusion bythe police,could have noless
applicationtoanIndianhomeastoanAmericanone.
Ifphysicalrestraintsonaperson'smovementsaffect
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158.
ig
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Gobindv.StateofMadhyaPradeshandAnother.InParagraphs22to
om
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24ofthesaiddecision,theApexCourtheldthus:
22. Therecanbenodoubtthatprivacydignityclaims
deservetobeexaminedwithcareandtobedenied
onlywhenanimportantcountervailinginterestis
showntobesuperior.IftheCourtdoesfindthata
claimed right is entitled to protection as a
fundamentalprivacyright,alawinfringingitmust
satisfythecompellingStateinteresttest.Thenthe
questionwouldbewhetheraStateinterestisof
such paramount importance as would justify an
infringement of the right. Obviously, if the
enforcement of morality were held to be a
compellingaswellasapermissibleStateinterest,
the characterization of a claimed right as a
fundamental privacy right would be of far less
significance.Thequestionwhetherenforcementof
moralityisaStateinterestsufficienttojustifythe
infringementofafundamentalprivacyrightneed
notbeconsideredforthepurposeofthiscaseand
therefore we refuse to enter the controversial
thicket whether enforcement of morality is a
functionofState.
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23. Individualautonomy,perhapsthecentralconcern
ofanysystemoflimitedGovernment,isprotected
in part under our Constitution by explicit
constitutionalguarantees.Intheapplicationofthe
Constitutionourcontemplationcannotonlybeof
what has been but what may be. Time works
changesandbringsintoexistencenewconditions.
Subtlerandfarreachingmeansofinvadingprivacy
willmakeitpossibletobeheardinthestreetwhat
is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a
definitionofprivacyraisesseriousquestionsabout
theproprietyofjudicialrelianceonarightthatis
notexplicitintheConstitution.Ofcourse,privacy
primarily concerns the individual. It therefore
relatestoandoverlapswiththeconceptofliberty.
Themostseriousadvocateofprivacymustconfess
that there are serious problems of defining the
essenceandscopeoftheright.Privacyinterestin
autonomy must also be placed in the context of
otherrightsandvalues.
om
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24. Anyrighttoprivacymustencompassandprotect
the personal intimacies of the home, the family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation and child
rearing.Thiscatalogueapproachtothequestionis
obviously not as instructive as it does not give
analyticalpictureofthedistinctivecharacteristics
oftherightofprivacy.Perhaps,theonlysuggestion
that can be offered as unifying principle
underlyingtheconcepthasbeentheassertionthat
a claimed right must be a fundamental right
implicitintheconceptoforderedliberty.
Thereafter,inparagraph28,theApexCourtheldthus:
28. Therighttoprivacyinanyeventwillnecessarily
have to go through a process of casebycase
development.Therefore,evenassumingthattheright
topersonalliberty,therighttomovefreelythroughout
theterritoryofIndiaandthefreedomofspeechcreate
anindependentrightofprivacyasanemanationfrom
them which one can characterize as a fundamental
right, we do not think that the right is absolute.
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RajagopalaliasR.R.GopalandAnotherv.StateofTamilNaduand
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Others.ThequestionswereframedbytheApexCourtinParagraph8.
TheQuestionNo.1inParagraph8readsthus:
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y
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om
variousdecisionsofForeignCourts.InClause(1)ofParagraph26,the
ApexCourtsummarizedtheprinciples.Clause(1)readsthus:
1. Therighttoprivacyisimplicitintherightto
life andliberty guaranteed to the citizens of this
countrybyArticle21.Itisarighttobeletalone.
Acitizenhasarighttosafeguardtheprivacyofhis
own, his family, marriage, procreation,
motherhood, childbearing and education among
othermatters.Nonecanpublishanythingconcerning
the above matters without his consent whether
truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or
critical.Ifhedoesso,hewouldbeviolatingtheright
to privacy of the person concerned and would be
liable in an action for damages. Position may,
however be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts
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himselfintocontroversyorvoluntarilyinvitesorraises
acontroversy.
(emphasisadded)
C
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160.
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tobeletalone.
fundamentalrightswasagainconsideredbytheApexCourtinthecase
ba
y
thatinourConstitution,thereisnospecificprovisionasregardsthe
privacy. Whileinterpretingthedecisioninthecaseof KharakSingh,
om
theApexCourtinParagraph36observedthus:
36. TwolatercasesdecidedbytheSupremeCourt
ofIndiawherethefoundationsfortherightwerelaid,
concernedtheintrusionintothehomebythepolice
underStateregulations,bywayofdomiciliaryvisits.
Suchvisitscouldbeconductedanytime,nightorday,
to keep a tab on persons for finding out suspicious
criminalactivity,ifany,ontheirpart.Thevalidityof
these regulations came under challenge. In the first
one,KharakSinghv.StateofU.P[(1964)1SCR332:
(1963)2CriLJ329]the U.P.Regulationsregarding
domiciliary visits were in question and the majority
referredto Munn v. Illinois [94US113:24LEd77
(1877)]andheldthatthoughourConstitutiondidnot
refer tothe righttoprivacyexpressly,still itcan be
tracedfromtherighttolifeinArticle21.According
to the majority, clause 236 of the relevant
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Thereafter,theApexCourtconsideredthedecisioninthe
caseof Gobind. Ultimately,inParagraphs39and40,theApexCourt
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heldthus:
39. Wehavereferredindetailtothereasonsgivenby
Mathew,J.inGobind[(1975)2SCC148:1975
SCC(Cri)468]toshowthat,therighttoprivacy
hasbeenimpliedinArticles19(1)(a)and(d)and
Article21;that,therightisnotabsoluteandthat
any State intrusion can be a reasonable
restriction only if it has reasonable basis or
reasonablematerialstosupportit.
40. AtwoJudgeBenchinR.Rajagopalv.StateofT.N.
[(1994)6SCC632]heldtherightofprivacyto
be implicit in the right to life and liberty
guaranteedtothecitizensofIndiabyArticle21.
Itistherighttobeletalone.Everycitizenhasa
right to safeguard the privacy of his own.
However, in the caseof amatter being partof
publicrecords,includingcourtrecords,theright
of privacy cannot be claimed. The right to
privacy has since been widely accepted as
implied in our Constitution, in other cases,
namely, People's Union for Civil Liberties v.
Union of India [(1997) 1 SCC 301], X v.
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161.
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RamlilaMaidanIncident,inParagraph318,theApexCourtobserved
ig
h
thus:
162.
318. Thus,itisevidentthatrightofprivacyandthe
right to sleep have always been treated to be a
fundamental right like a right to breathe, to eat, to
drink,toblink,etc.
Anotherdecisionontheaspectwhethertherighttoprivacy
ba
y
isafundamentalrightguaranteedunderArticle21oftheConstitution
ofIndia,isinthecaseof HinsaVirodhakSanghv.MirzapurMoti
om
KureshJamatandOtherswhereinagaintheissueofrightofprivacyas
afundamentalrightarosebeforetheApexCourt.InParagraph27,the
ApexCourtobservedthus:
27. Hadtheimpugnedresolutionsorderedclosureof
municipalslaughterhousesforaconsiderableperiodof
timewemayhaveheldtheimpugnedresolutionstobe
invalidbeinganexcessiverestrictionontherightsof
the butchers of Ahmedabad who practise their
profession of meat selling. After all, butchers are
practising a trade and it is their fundamental right
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution which is
guaranteedtoallcitizensofIndia.Moreover,itisnota
matter of the proprietor of the butchery shop alone.
Theremaybealsoseveralworkmenthereinwhomay
becomeunemployediftheslaughterhousesareclosed
foraconsiderableperiodoftime,becauseoneofthe
conditionsofthelicencegiventotheshopownersisto
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163.
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ThenextjudgmentonthisaspectisinthecaseofNational
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y
ofanindividual.Inparagraphs73and75,theApexCourtheldthus:
om
73. Article21oftheConstitutionofIndiareadsas
follows:
21. Protection of life and personal
liberty.Nopersonshallbedeprivedofhis
lifeorpersonallibertyexceptaccordingto
procedureestablishedbylaw.
Article 21 is the heart and soul of the Indian
Constitution, which speaks of the rights to life and
personal liberty. Right to life is one of the basic
fundamental rights and not even the State has the
authoritytoviolateortakeawaythatright.Article21
takesallthoseaspectsoflifewhichgotomakea
person's life meaningful. Article 21 protects the
dignity of human life, one's personal autonomy,
one'srighttoprivacy,etc.Righttodignityhasbeen
recognisedtobeanessentialpartoftherighttolife
and accrues to all persons on account of being
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(emphasisadded)
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164.
ThelearnedAdvocateGeneralrelieduponanotherorderof
theApexCourtinthecaseof K.S.Puttaswami(retd.)andOthersv.
UnionofIndiawhereintheApexCourtmadeaprimafacieobservation
that the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Kharak
SinghhasnotbeencorrectlyreadbysmallerBenchesand,therefore,a
referencehasbeenmadetoalargerBenchtodecidethequestionasto
whether the right of privacy is guaranteed by Article 21 of the
ConstitutionofIndia.TheApexCourtinthesaidorderobservedthat
theviewtakeninseveraljudgmentssubsequenttothedecisioninthe
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caseofKharakSinghisthattherightofprivacyisapartofArticle21
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165.
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oftheConstitutionofIndia.
Anotherdecisionwhichisonthisaspectisinthecaseof
ig
h
the Apex Court was that the right of privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 19(1) and Article 21. The Apex Court
consideredthedecisionsinthecasesofKharakSingh,GobindandR.
Rajagopal.InParagraphs11to13,theApexCourtquotedthemajority
andminorityviewsinthecaseofKharakSinghandinParagraph14,it
om
ba
y
wasobservedthus:
14. Article 21 of the Constitution has, therefore,
been interpreted by all the seven learned Judges in
KharakSinghcase[(1964)1SCR332:AIR1963SC
1295](majorityandtheminorityopinions)toinclude
that right to privacy as a part of the right to
protectionoflifeandpersonallibertyguaranteed
underthesaidArticle.
(emphasisadded)
TheultimatefindingoftheApexCourtisinParagraphs17
and18whichreadthus:
17. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding
thatrighttoprivacyisapartoftherightto
lifeandpersonallibertyenshrinedunder
Article21oftheConstitution.Oncethefacts
in a given case constitute a right to privacy,
55 (1997)1 SCC 301
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Article21isattracted.Thesaidrightcannotbe
curtailed except according to procedure
establishedbylaw.
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C
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18. Therighttoprivacybyitselfhasnotbeen
identifiedundertheConstitution.Asaconceptit
may be too broad and moralistic to define it
judicially. Whether right to privacy can be
claimedorhasbeeninfringedinagiven case
woulddependonthefactsofthesaidcase.But
therighttoholdatelephoneconversationinthe
privacy of one's home or office without
interferencecancertainlybeclaimedasrightto
privacy. Conversations on the telephone are
often of an intimate and confidential character.
Telephoneconversationisapartofmodernman's
life.Itisconsideredsoimportantthatmoreand
more people are carrying mobile telephone
instruments in their pockets. Telephone
conversation is an important facet of a man's
private life. Right to privacy would certainly
includetelephoneconversationintheprivacyof
one's home or office. Telephonetapping would,
thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of
Indiaunlessitispermittedundertheprocedure
establishedbylaw.
(emphasisadded)
166.
Withaviewtoanswerthequestionwhethertherightto
privacyisapartofArticle21,theanalysisofthedecisionsoftheApex
Courtwhicharequotedabovewillbenecessary.InthecaseofKharak
Singh,themajorityviewisbyAyyangar,J.InParagraph13,theApex
CourtexaminedtheexpressionpersonallibertyunderArticle21.The
majority judgment observes that Article 19(1) deals with particular
species or attributes of specific freedoms incorporated therein and
Article21comprisestheresidue. TheApexCourtobservedthatthe
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purviewaninvasiononthepartofthepoliceofthesanctityofaman's
C
ou
homeandanintrusionintohispersonalsecurityandhisrighttosleep
whichisthenormalcomfortandadirenecessityforhumanexistence.
Clause(b)ofRegulation236oftheU.P.PoliceRegulationsprovidedfor
domiciliaryvisitsatnightwhichwasapartofsurveillanceonsuspects.
ig
h
ThesaidClause(b)wasdeclaredasplainlyviolativeofArticle21as
observedinParagraph16.Thus,themajorityviewasisapparentfrom
Paragraph13appearstohaveacceptedthatanintrusionintopersonal
securityandrighttosleepwillbeapartofpersonallibertyguaranteed
underArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia.Intrusionintoaperson's
ba
y
homewasalsoheldtobeapartofpersonalliberty.Themajorityview
om
inparagraph13readsthus:
We have already extracted a passage from the
judgmentofField,J.inMunnv.Illinois[94US113:24
L Ed 77 (1877)] US at p. 142, where the learned
Judge pointed out that life in the 5th and 14th
AmendmentsoftheU.S.Constitutioncorrespondingto
Article 21, means not merely the right to the
continuanceofaperson'sanimalexistence,butaright
tothepossessionofeachofhisorganshisarmsand
legsetc.Wedonotentertainanydoubtthattheword
lifeinArticle21bearsthesamesignification.Isthen
the word personal liberty to be construed as
excludingfromitspurviewaninvasiononthepartof
the police of the sanctity of a man's home and an
intrusion into his personal security and his right to
sleepwhichisthenormalcomfortandadirenecessity
forhumanexistenceevenasananimal?Itmightnot
be inappropriate to refer here to the words of the
preamble to the Constitution that it is designed to
assurethedignityoftheindividualandthereforeof
those cherished human values as the means of
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ensuringhisfulldevelopmentandevolution.Weare
referringtotheseobjectivesoftheframersmerelyto
draw attention to the concepts underlying the
Constitutionwhichwouldpointtosuchvitalwordsas
personal liberty having to be construed in a
reasonable manner and to be attributed that sense
which would promote and achieve those objectives
andbynomeanstostretchthemeaningofthephrase
tosquarewithanypreconceivednotionsordoctrinaire
constitutional theories. Frankfurter, J. observed in
Wolfv.Colorado[338US25:93LEd1782(1949)]:
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andthatourConstitutiondoesnotintermsconferany
like constitutional guarantee. Nevertheless, these
extracts would show that an unauthorised
intrusionintoaperson'shomeandthedisturbance
causedtohimthereby,isasitweretheviolationof
a common law right of a man an ultimate
essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very
concept of civilisation. An English Common Law
maximassertsthateveryman'shouseishiscastle
and inSemaynecase[Semayne's case, (1604) 5 Co
Rep91a],wherethiswasapplied,itwasstated
thatthehouseofeveryoneistohimashiscastle
and fortress as well as for his defence against
injuryandviolenceasforhisrepose. Wearenot
unmindful of the fact thatSemayne case[Semayne's
case,(1604)5CoRep91a]wasconcernedwiththe
lawrelatingtoexecutionsinEngland,butthepassage
extractedhasavalidityquiteapartfromthecontextof
the particular decision. It embodies an abiding
principle which transcends mere protection of
propertyrightsandexpoundsaconceptof personal
liberty which does not rest on any element of
feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has
ceasedtobeofvalue.
In our view clause (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly
violativeofArticle21andasthereisnolawonwhich
thesamecouldbejustifieditmustbestruckdownas
unconstitutional.
(emphasisadded)
167.
WhiledealingwithClauses(c),(d)and(e)ofRegulation
236 of the U.P. Police Regulations, the majority view observes that
Article21hadnorelevanceasfarastheseclausesareconcerned.From
the last sentence in Paragraph 17 which we have quoted earlier, it
appears that the majority view has not specifically considered the
questionwhethertherighttoprivacyisapartofArticle21. Whatis
heldisthatthe rightofprivacyisnota guaranteedrightunderthe
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ConstitutioninPartIII.But,themajorityviewholdsthataninvasionon
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thepartofthepoliceofthesanctityofaman'shomeandanintrusion
C
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intohispersonalsecurityandhisrighttosleepwhichisthenormal
comfort and a dire necessity for human existence will be an
infringementofpersonallibertyguaranteedunderArticle21.Perhaps,
thatishowinthecaseofDistrictRegistrarandCollector,Hyderabad
ig
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168.
righttolifeinArticle21.
TheminorityviewofSubbaRao,Jholdsthat therightto
ba
y
personallibertytakesinnotonlyarighttobefreefromrestrictions
placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his
om
privatelife. ItobservesthatitistruethatourConstitutiondoesnot
expresslydeclarearighttoprivacyasafundamentalright,butthesaid
rightisanessentialingredientofpersonalliberty.
169.Itwillbenecessarytoconsiderwhatisheldbytheeight
JudgeBenchoftheApexCourtinthecaseof M.P.Sharmav.Satish
Chandra.Wehavecarefullyperusedthesaidjudgment.Thechallenge
inthePetitionsunderArticle32oftheConstitutionofIndiawastothe
search warrants for simultaneous searches at 34 places. From
Paragraph1ofthejudgment,itappearsthatthecontentionraisedwas
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ofviolationofArticles20(3)and19(1)(f).Wefindthattherewasno
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specificcontentionraisedbythePetitionersthatthereisaviolationof
C
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therightofprivacybeingapartofrightofpersonallibertyconferredby
Article21.
170.
InthecaseofR.Rajagopal,QuestionNo.1wasframedon
ig
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theinfringementofrightofprivacy. InParagraph9,theApexCourt
extensivelyexaminedboththemajorityandminorityviewsinthecase
ofKharakSinghandinParagraph26whichwehavequotedabove,the
ApexCourtheldthattherighttoprivacyisimplicitintherighttolife
andlibertyguaranteedbyArticle21.Infact,theApexCourtheldthat
ba
y
om
ApexCourtspecificallyconsideredthequestionofrightofprivacyqua
thesearchandseizure.InParagraph24,theApexCourtobservedthat
our Constitution does not contain a specific provision either as to
privacyorevenastounreasonablesearch.Thereafter,theApexCourt
inParagraph35referredtothe decisioninthecaseof M.P.Sharma.
Thereafter,inParagraph36,areferencewasmadetothedecisioninthe
case of Kharak Singh. Thereafter,inParagraph39,the ApexCourt
referred to the decision in the case of Gobind and ultimately, in
Paragraph40,theApexCourtheldthattherightofprivacyisimplicitin
therighttolifeandlibertyguaranteedtothecitizensofIndiabyArticle
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21oftheConstitutionofIndia. Itwasheldthatitisarighttobelet
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C
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consideredthescopeofArticle21inthecontextofrightofprivacy.The
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fundamentalrightofthecitizenbeinganintegralpartofArticle21of
theConstitutionofIndia.TheApexCourtobservedthatinexceptional
circumstances, the surveillance in consonance with the statutory
provisionsmaynotviolatethatright.Ultimately,inParagraph318,the
ApexCourtheldthatrightofprivacyandtherighttosleephavealways
ba
y
beentreatedtobeafundamentalrightlikearighttobreathe,toeat,to
drink, to blink, etc. In the decision in the case of Hinsa Virodhak
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deliveredafterconsideringthedecisionsoftheConstitutionBenchesin
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thecasesofKharakSinghandM.P.Sharmaconsistentlytakingaview
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171.ThencomestheorderoftheApexCourtinthecaseofK.S.
ig
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andbiometricdataoftheresidentsofthecountry.Oneofthegrounds
ofattackontheSchemewasagroundbasedonarighttoprivacyby
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12. Weareoftheopinionthatthecasesonhandraise
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13. Therefore,inouropiniontogiveaquietustothe
kindofcontroversyraisedinthisbatchofcases
onceforall,itisbetterthattheratiodecidendiof
M.P.Sharma (supra)and KharakSingh (supra)
isscrutinizedandthejurisprudentialcorrectness
ofthesubsequentdecisionsofthisCourtwhere
therighttoprivacyiseitherassertedorreferred
be examined and authoritatively decided by a
Benchofappropriatestrength.
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makeareference.
172.
Tosumup,thefollowingarethecasesinwhichtheApex
Courtupheldtherightofprivacyaspartofpersonallibertyguaranteed
ig
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underArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia.
R.Rajagopalv.StateofTamilNadu;
(b)
DistrictRegistrar&Collectorv.CanaraBank;
(c)
ReRamlilaMaidanIncident;
(d)
PeoplesUnionofCivilLibertiesv.UnionofIndia;
HinsaVirodhakSanghvs.MirzapurMotiKuresh
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(e)
(a)
JamatandOrs;
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(f)
NationalLegalServicesAuthorityv.UnionofIndia
(g)RamJethmalani
173.
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theseriesofbindingdecisionsisthattherightofprivacyis partof
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
ba
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India.
om
174.
challengetoSection5Disthatitinfringestherightofprivacywhich
includestherighttobeletaloneandtherighttoconsumethefoodof
one'schoiceprovideditisnototherwiseprohibitedbyavalidlaw.In
thesecondaffidavitofShriShashankSathe,theStateGovernmenthas
madeitveryclearthatitisnottheintentionoftheStateGovernmentto
preventthecitizensfromeatingnonvegetarianfood.Itisnotthecase
madeoutbytheStateatthetimeoffinalhearingthatbeefasanitem
offoodiseitherobnoxiousorharmfulanditsconsumptionissoughtto
bepreventedforthatreason.
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SomeoftheRespondentshavecompletelymisunderstood
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175.
182
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theargumentcanvassedinWritPetitionNo.1314of2015bycontending
thatthePetitionercannotcompeltheStatetosupplythefoodofhis
choice. Infact,thatisnottherightclaimedbythePetitionerinWrit
PetitionNo.1314of2015.Itisnotclaimedthatacitizenhasarightto
176.
ig
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compeltheStatetosupplymeatofcow,bullorbullock.
concerned,thecitizensarerequiredtobeletaloneespeciallywhenthe
foodoftheirchoiceisnotinjurioustohealth.Asobservedearlier,even
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arighttosleepisheldasapartofrighttoprivacywhichisguaranteed
underArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia.InfacttheStatecannot
om
control what a citizen does in his house which is his own castle,
providedheisnotdoingsomethingwhichiscontrarytolaw.TheState
cannot make an intrusion into his home and prevent a citizen from
possessingandeatingfoodofhischoice.Acitizenhasarighttoleada
meaningfullifewithinthefourcornersofhishouseaswellasoutside
his house. This intrusion on the personal life of an individual is
prohibitedbytherighttoprivacywhichis partof personalliberty
guaranteed by Article 21. The State cannot prevent a citizen from
possessing and consuming a particular type of food which is not
injurioustohealth(orobnoxious).InthedecisioninthecaseofHinsa
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VirodhakSangh, theApexCourthasspecificallyheldthatwhatone
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eatsisone'spersonalaffairanditisapartofprivacyincludedinArticle
C
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21oftheConstitutionofIndia.Thus,iftheStatetellsthecitizensnot
toeataparticulartypeoffoodorpreventsthecitizensfrompossessing
and consuming a particular type of food, it will certainly be an
infringementofarighttoprivacyasitviolatestherighttobeletalone.
ig
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Ifaparticularfoodisinjurioustohealthoraparticularfoodisillegally
manufactured,itwillbeacaseofcompellingpublicinterestwhichwill
enabletheStatetodeprivecitizensoftherighttoprivacybyfollowing
ba
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bullorbullockevenifitisfleshofacow,bullorbullockslaughteredin
territorieswheresuchslaughterislegal.Hence,Section5Discertainly
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177.
Itwillbenecessaryonthisaspecttomakeareferenceto
thedecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseofDeenaaliasDeenDayal
andOthersv.UnionofIndiaandOthers.InParagraph17,theApex
Courtheldthus:
17.Thus,thereisafundamentaldistinctionbetween
casesarisingunder Article14andthose which arise
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. In a
challengebasedontheviolationofArticles19and
21, the petitioner has undoubtedly to plead that,
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forexample,hisrighttofreespeechandexpression
isviolatedorthatheisdeprivedofhisrighttolife
andpersonalliberty.Butonceheshowsthat,which
reallyisnotapartoftheburdenofproof,itisfor
theStatetojustifytheimpugnedlaworactionby
proving that, for example, the deprivation of the
petitioner'sright to free speech and expression is
savedbyclause(2)ofArticle19sinceitisinthe
natureofareasonablerestrictiononthatrightin
theinterestsofmattersmentionedinclause(2),or
that,thepetitionerhasbeendeprivedofhislifeor
personal liberty according to a just, fair and
reasonableprocedureestablishedbylaw.Incases
arisingunderArticle19,theburdenisneveronthe
petitioner to prove that the restriction is not
reasonable or that the restriction is not in the
interests of matters mentioned in clause (2).
Likewise, in cases arising under Article 21, the
burdenisneveronthepetitionertoprovethatthe
procedureprescribedbylawwhichdepriveshimof
his life or personal liberty is unjust, unfair or
unreasonable.Thatiswhytheratioofcaseswhich
fall under the category of the decision inRam
KrishnaDalmia[RamKrishnaDalmiav.JusticeS.R.
Tendolkar,AIR1958SC538:1959SCR279:1959
SCJ147]mustberestrictedtothosearisingunder
Article14andcannotbeextendedtocasesarising
underArticle19orArticle21oftheConstitution.
(emphasisadded)
178.
InParagraph21,theApexCourtheldthus:
21. TheobservationsmadebyGajendragadkar,J.,in
regardtothepositionarisingunderArticle304(b)are
apposite to cases under Article 21. Article 304(b)
providesthat,notwithstandinganythinginArticle301
orArticle303,thelegislatureofaStatemaybylaw
imposesuchreasonablerestrictionsonthefreedomof
trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that
State as may be required in the public interest.
AccordingtothelearnedJudge,inthecaseofalaw
passed under Article 304(b), the position on the
questionofburdenofproofissomewhatstrongerin
favourofthecitizen,becausetheveryfactthatthelaw
is passed under that article means clearly that it
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(emphasisadded)
Inparagraph22,theApexCourtheldthus:
179.
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C
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purportstorestrictthefreedomoftrade.Byanalogy,
thepositionisalsosomewhatstrongerinfavourof
the petitioners in cases arising under Article 21,
because the very fact that, in defence, a law is
relied upon as prescribing a procedure for
depriving a person of his life or personal liberty
meansclearlythatthelawpurportstodeprivehim
oftheserights.Therefore,assoonasitisshown
thattheActinvadesarightguaranteedbyArticle
21,itisnecessarytoenquirewhethertheStatehas
provedthatthepersonhasbeendeprivedofhislife
or personal liberty according to procedure
establishedbylaw, thatistosay, byaprocedure
whichisjust,fairandreasonable.
om
ba
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22. Anotherdecisioninthesamecategoryofcases
isMohd.Farukv.StateofMadhyaPradesh[(1969)1
SCC853:AIR1970SC93:(1970)1SCR156]in
which the State Government issued a notification
cancelling the confirmation of the municipal bye
lawsinsofarastheyrelatedtothepermissiontothe
slaughteringofbullsandbullocks.Dealingwiththe
challengeofthepetitionertothenotificationonthe
groundthatitinfringedhisfundamentalrightunder
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution Shah, J., who
spoke for the Constitution Bench, observed: (SCC
pp.85657,para8)
Whenthevalidityofalawplacingrestrictionupon
theexerciseoffundamentalrightsinArticle19(1)is
challenged,theonusofprovingtothesatisfactionof
theCourtthattherestrictionisreasonabletiesupon
theState....Impositionofrestrictionontheexercise
ofafundamentalrightmaybeintheformofcontrol
or prohibition, but when the exercise of a
fundamental right is prohibited, the burden of
provingthatatotalbanontheexerciseoftheright
alone may ensure the maintenance of the general
publicinterestliesheavilyupontheState.(SCRpp.
16061)
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When,inamatterarisingunderArticle21,the
person aggrieved is found to have been totally
deprived of his personal liberty or is being
deprivedofhisrighttolife,theburdenofproving
that the procedure established by law for such
deprivation is just, fair and reasonable lies
heavilyupontheState.
(emphasisadded)
AgaininParagraph30,theApexCourtreiteratedthatwhen
ig
h
violationofArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndiaisalleged,theburden
of proof does not lie on the Petitioner to prove that the procedure
prescribedbythestatutoryprovisionisunjust,unfairandunreasonable.
TheStatemustestablishthattheprocedureprescribedbythestatutory
ba
y
provisionisjust,fairandreasonable.
om
180. Itwillbenecessarytoconsiderherethedecisionofthe
ConstitutionBenchinthecaseof Mrs.ManekaGandhiv.Unionof
India. In Paragraph 5 of the judgment delivered by Bhagwati, J for
himselfandonbehalfofUntwaliaandS.MurtazaFazalAli,JJ,theApex
CourtreferredtothemajoritydecisioninthecaseofKharakSinghv.
StateofUttarPradeshwhereinitwasobservedthatArticle19(1)deals
withparticularspeciesorattributesofthatfreedom,personallibertyin
Article21takesinandcomprisestheresidue.Theminorityviewinthe
decisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof KharakSingh wasthatthe
fundamentalrightoflifeandpersonallibertyhasmanyattributesand
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someofthemarefoundinArticle19oftheConstitutionofIndia.The
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ApexCourtobservedinviewofitsdecisioninthecaseofR.C.Cooper
C
ou
v.UnionofIndia57thattheminorityviewonthisaspectinthecaseof
KharakSingh willhavetoberecordedascorrectandmajorityview
mustbeheldtohavebeenoverruled.TheApexCourtinParagraph5
observedthattheexpressionpersonallibertyinArticle21isofwidest
ig
h
amplitudeanditcoversvarietyofrights.Paragraph7ofthejudgment
deliveredbyBhagwati,Jisrelevantforourconsiderationwhichdeals
withthenatureandrequirementoftheprocedureunderArticle21of
theConstitutionofIndia.WhatisheldbytheApexCourtisthatthe
procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of
om
ba
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reasonableness.InParagraph5,theApexCourtheldthus:
5. ItisobviousthatArticle21,thoughcouchedin
negative language, confers the fundamental right to
lifeandpersonalliberty.Sofarastherighttopersonal
libertyisconcerned,itisensuredbyprovidingthatno
one shall be deprived of personal liberty except
according to procedure prescribed by law. The first
questionthatarisesforconsiderationonthelanguage
ofArticle21is:whatisthemeaningandcontentof
the words personal liberty as used in this article?
Thisquestion incidentally came up for discussion in
some of the judgments in A.K. Gopalan v. State of
Madras [AIR1950SC27:1950SCR88:51CriLJ
1383]andtheobservationsmadebyPatanjaliSastri,
J.,Mukherjea,J.,andS.R.Das,J.,seemedtoplacea
narrowinterpretationonthewordspersonalliberty
soastoconfinetheprotectionofArticle21tofreedom
of the person against unlawful detention. But there
was no definite pronouncement made on this point
sincethequestionbeforetheCourtwasnotsomuch
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Article19(1)andyetitwasheldbyaBenchofseven
JudgesofthisCourtinShambhuNathSarkarv.State
ofWestBengal[(1973)1SCC856:1973SCC(Cri)
618:AIR1973SC1425]thatsuchalawwouldhave
tosatisfytherequirementinteraliaofArticle19(1),
clause (d) and inHaradhan Sahav.State of West
Bengal[(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 :
(1975)1SCR778]whichwasadecisiongivenbya
Bench of five Judges, this Court considered the
challenge of clause (d) of Article 19(1) to the
constitutionalvalidityoftheMaintenanceofInternal
Security Act, 1971 and held that that Act did not
violatetheconstitutionalguaranteeembodiedinthat
article.Itisindeeddifficulttoseeonwhatprinciple
wecanrefusetogiveitsplainnaturalmeaningtothe
expressionpersonallibertyasusedinArticle21and
read it in a narrow and restricted sense so as to
excludethoseattributesofpersonallibertywhichare
specificallydealtwithinArticle19.Wedonotthink
thatthiswouldbeacorrectwayofinterpretingthe
provisionsoftheConstitutionconferringfundamental
rights. The attempt of the Court should be to
expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental
rights rather than attenuate their meaning and
contentbyaprocessofjudicialconstruction.The
wavelength for comprehending the scope and
ambit of the fundamental rights has been set by
thisCourtinR.C.Coopercase[(1970)2SCC298:
(1971) 1 SCR 512] and our approach in the
interpretationofthefundamentalrightsmustnow
beintunewiththiswavelength.Wemaypointout
even atthe cost ofrepetitionthatthisCourt has
saidinsomanytermsinR.C.Coopercase[(1970)
2SCC298:(1971)1SCR512]thateachfreedom
has different dimensions and there may be
overlappingbetweendifferentfundamentalrights
andthereforeitisnotavalidargumenttosaythat
theexpressionpersonallibertyinArticle21must
besointerpretedastoavoidoverlappingbetween
that article and Article 19(1). The expression
personal liberty in Article 21 is of the widest
amplitudeanditcoversavarietyofrightswhichgo
toconstitutethepersonallibertyofmanandsome
ofthemhavebeenraisedtothestatusofdistinct
fundamentalrightsandgivenadditionalprotection
underArticle19.Now,ithasbeenheldbythisCourt
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inSatwantSinghcase[AIR1967SC1836:(1967)3
SCR525:(1968)1SCJ178]thatpersonalliberty
withinthe meaningofArticle21includeswithinits
ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no
personcanbedeprivedofthisrightexceptaccording
toprocedureprescribedbylaw.Priortotheenactment
of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no law
regulatingtherightofapersontogoabroadandthat
wasthereasonwhytheorderofthePassportOfficer
refusingtoissuepassporttothepetitionerinSatwant
Singhcase[AIR1967SC1836:(1967)3SCR525:
(1968)1SCJ178]wasstruckdownasinvalid.Itwill
beseenatoncefromthelanguageofArticle21that
theprotectionitsecuresisalimitedone.Itsafeguards
therighttogoabroadagainstexecutiveinterference
whichisnotsupportedbylaw;andlawheremeans
enacted law or state law (videA.K. Gopalan
case[AIR1950SC27:1950SCR88:51CriLJ1383]
).Thus,nopersoncanbedeprivedofhisrighttogo
abroad unless there is a law made by the State
prescribingtheprocedureforsodeprivinghimandthe
deprivationiseffectedstrictlyinaccordancewithsuch
procedure.Itwasforthisreason,inordertocomply
with the requirement of Article 21, that Parliament
enacted the Passports Act, 1967 for regulating the
righttogoabroad.Itisclearfromtheprovisionsof
the Passports Act, 1967 that it lays down the
circumstancesunderwhichapassportmaybeissued
or refused or cancelled or impounded and also
prescribesaprocedurefordoingso,butthequestionis
whetherthatissufficientcompliancewithArticle21.
Istheprescriptionofsomesortofprocedureenough
or must the procedure comply with any particular
requirements? Obviously, the procedure cannot be
arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. This indeed was
concededbythe learnedAttorneyGeneralwhowith
his usual candour frankly stated that it was not
possible for him to contend that any procedure
howsoever arbitrary, oppressive or unjust may be
prescribed by the law. There was some discussion
inA.K.Gopalancase[AIR1950SC27:1950SCR88:
51 Cri LJ 1383] in regard to the nature of the
procedurerequiredtobeprescribedunderArticle21
andat least three of the learned Judgesout of five
expressed themselves strongly in favour of the view
thattheprocedurecannotbeanyarbitrary,fantasticor
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181.
Inparagraph7,Bhagawati,J.heldthus:
7. Now,thequestionimmediatelyarisesastowhat
istherequirementofArticle14:whatisthecontent
andreachofthegreatequalisingprincipleenunciated
in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a
founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the
pillaronwhichrestssecurelythefoundationofour
democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be
subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic
approach.Noattemptshouldbemadetotruncateits
allembracingscopeandmeaning,fortodosowould
be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a
dynamicconceptwithmanyaspectsanddimensions
and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and
doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was
pointedoutbythemajorityinE.P.Royappav.Stateof
TamilNadu[(1974)4SCC3:1974SCC(L&S)165:
(1974)2SCR348]namely,thatfromapositivistic
pointofview,equalityisantithetictoarbitrariness.In
factequalityandarbitrarinessareswornenemies;one
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182.KrishnaIyer,JinParagraph85summedupbyholdingthat
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theprocedureinArticle21mustmeanfairandnotaformalprocedure.
Themajorityviewtakeninthesaiddecisionisthatthefundamental
rightsunderPartIIIarenotdistinctandmutuallyexclusiverightsand,
om
therefore,thelawaffectingpersonallibertyunderArticle21willhave
tosatisfythetestunderArticle14andClauses(2)to(6)ofArticle19of
theConstitutionofIndia.TheprocedurecontemplatedbyArticle21of
the Constitution of India has to satisfy the test of fairness and
reasonableness.
183.ThequestioniswhatistheburdenwhichtheStatewill
havetodischarge.AsheldinthecaseofDeenawhenthereisviolation
ofArticle21,theburdenisontheStatetoprovethattheprocedure
followedisjustfairandreasonable.Inaddition,inparagraphNo.318
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inthecaseofRamlilaMaidanIncidentInRe,theApexCourtobserved
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thus:
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184.
NowthequestioniswhethertheStatehasdischargedthe
burden.Article31CwillnothelptheStateasitisnotapplicablewhen
thereisachallengebasedonviolationofArticle21.TheStatementof
Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act is completely silent as
regards the necessity of enacting the drastic provision of Section5D
which prevents a person from possessing flesh of any cow, bull or
bullock lawfully slaughtered outside the State of Maharashtra. As
pointedoutearlier,evenifapersonisfoundinpossessionoffleshof
cow,bullorbullockwhichisslaughteredoutsidetheStatewherethere
isnoprohibitiononslaughter,therewillbeaviolationofSection5D
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whichismadeanoffence.Wehavecarefullyperusedtheaffidavitsfiled
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bytheStateGovernment.Eveninthesaidaffidavits,itisnotthecase
C
ou
ig
h
hascompletelyprohibitedtheslaughterofcowexistedforlastseveral
years.ItisnotthecaseoftheStateGovernmentthatonthebasisofits
pastexperience,itwasfeltnecessarytoimposesuchadrasticrestriction
asprovidedinSection5Dforachievingtheobjectwhichissoughttobe
ba
y
achievedbybanningslaughterofcow,bullorbullockintheState.
185.
TheobjectofenactingamendmenttoSections5and5A,
om
5Band5Cappearstobetoprotect cows,bullsandbullocksinthe
State of Maharashtra from slaughter. Section 5D is a stand alone
provisionwhichhasnonexuswiththesaidobject. Itisnotthecase
made outbythe State thatthe banon slaughterof cows,bullsand
bullocks was to ensure that no one should eat the flesh of the said
animalsasitisinjurioustohealth.Theobjectistoprotectcowandits
progenyfromslaughteringwithintheState.Theobjectisnottoprevent
thecitizensfromeatingfleshofcoworitsprogenywhichisbrought
fromaStateoracountrywherethereisnoprohibitiononslaughter.
Thequestioniswhethersuchadrasticprovisionwouldstandtothetest
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ofcompellingStateinterest.Infact,theStatehasmadenoattemptto
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showanycompellingpublicorStateinterestforenactingSection5D.
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Wehavealreadyheldthatrightofprivacyisanintegralpartofthe
personallibertyunderArticle21.InthecaseofAkhilBharatGoseva
Sangh, the Apex Court observed that it is not held in the case of
Mirzapur that laws/policies permitting slaughter of progeny of cow
ig
h
wereunconstitutional. Asstatedearlier,theburdenwasontheState
Governmenttojustifytheconstitutionality.Thereisnoeffortmadeto
discharge the said burden. The State has not come out with any
materialtoshowwhatisthecompellingStateinteresttopreventan
individualfrompossessingorconsumingthemeatofcoworitsprogeny
ba
y
whichisaproductofslaughteroutsidetheState.Preventingacitizen
frompossessingfleshofcow,bullorbullockslaughteredoutsidethe
om
Stateamountstoprohibitingacitizenfrompossessingandconsuming
foodofhischoice.InSection5D,thefocusseemstobegenerallyon
consumptionofbeef,asanitemoffood.Consumptionoffoodwhich
notinjurioustohealthisapartofanindividual'sautonomyorhisright
tobeletalone.Hence,itisaninfringementofhisrightofprivacy.In
ourview,Section5Dviolatestherightofprivacybeinganintegralpart
ofthepersonallibertyunderArticle21. ViolationofSection5Dby
possessingmeat ofcow,bullorbullockwhichislawfullyslaughtered
outsidetheStateismadeanoffenceandunderSection9A,aperson
canbepunishedwithimprisonmentforatermwhichmayextendto
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ou
186.
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oneyearorfinewhichmayextendtoRs.2,000/.
Section5DisbyoneoftheIntervenorsbyrelyinguponadecisionofthe
ApexCourtinthecaseofIndianHandicraftsEmporiumandOthersv.
UnionofIndiaandOthers.ThechallengeinthiscasewastoSection
ig
h
49CoftheWildLife(Protection)Act,1972. BySection49C,atotal
prohibitiononthetradeofimportedivorywasimposed.Evenimportof
Ivorywasprohibited.Thesaidprovisionwaschallengedonthebasisof
violationofArticle19(1)(g)oftheConstitutionofIndia.Thevalidityof
theprovisionwhichbannedimportwasupheldonthegroundthatit
ba
y
wasnecessarytodosowithaviewtopreventpoachingofelephantsin
India.Wehaveexaminedthesaiddecision.Theslaughterofelephants
om
had been totally prohibited in India from the year 1980 under the
provisionsofWildLife(Prevention)Act,1972
187.
TheApexCourtconsideredtheStatementofObjectsand
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research,scientificmanagementandcaptivebreeding,
wouldcontinue.Itisbeingmademandatoryforevery
transporter not to transport any wildlife product
without proper permission. The penalties for various
offencesareproposedtobesuitablyenhancedtomake
them deterrent. The Central Government Officers as
wellasindividualsnowcanalsofilecomplaintsinthe
courtsforoffencesundertheAct.Itisalsoproposedto
provide for appointment of honorary Wild Life
Wardensandpaymentofrewardstopersonshelpingin
apprehensionofoffenders.
om
ba
y
ig
h
Tocurblargescalemortalitiesinwildanimalsdueto
communicable diseases, it is proposed to make
provisionsforcompulsoryimmunisationoflivestockin
andaroundnationalparksandsanctuaries.
***
ItmayberecalledthatthepartiestotheConvention
onInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWild
FaunaandFlora(CITES),beinggreatlyconcernedby
thedeclineinpopulationofAfricanelephantsdueto
illegal trade in ivory, have included this animal in
AppendixIoftheConventioninOctober1989.Dueto
thischange,theimportandexportofAfricanivoryfor
commercialpurposeshasbeenprohibited.Asaresult,
importofivorywouldnolongerbepossibletomeet
the requirements of the domestic ivory trade. If the
ivory trade is allowed to continue, it will lead to
largescalepoachingofIndianelephants.Withthis
pointinview,thetradeinimportedivorywithinthe
countryisproposedtobebannedaftergivingdue
opportunity to ivory traders to dispose of their
existingstock.
(emphasisadded)
188.
Inparagraph45and46,theApexCourtobservedthus:
45. ParliamentwhileenactingthesaidamendingAct
tooknoteofseriousdimensionsofpoachingof
wildanimalsandillegaltradegivingexponential
riseofwildanimalsandtheirproducts.
46.
TheHon'bleMinisterofStateoftheMinistryof
EnvironmentandForestsintheHousestated:
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Inparagraph53,theApexCourtobservedthus:
189.
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C
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(emphasisadded)
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ba
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53. Itis,therefore,difficulttoacceptthecontention
of Mr Sanghi that protection and preservation of
wildlifewouldnotbeinpublicinterestand/orcannot
beextendedtoimportedivory.Wildlifeformspartof
our cultural heritage. Animals play a vital role in
maintaining ecological balance. The amendments
have been brought for the purpose of saving the
endangered species from extinction as also for
arresting depletion in their numbers caused by
callousexploitationthereof.
(emphasisadded)
190.
Ultimately,inparagraph56,theApexCourtheldthus:
56. ThestandoftheStatethatbyreasonofsaleof
ivorybythedealers,poachingandkillingofelephants
wouldbeencouraged,cannotbesaidtobeirrational.
Mr Sanghi, as noticed hereinbefore, has drawn our
attentiontothechangessoughttobeeffectedinCITES
attheinstanceofBotswana,SouthAfrica,Namibiaand
Zimbabwe. The question as to whether a reasonable
restrictionwouldbecomeunreasonableandviceversa
woulddependuponthefactsituationobtainingineach
case. In the year 1972 when the said Act was
enacted,theremightnothavebeenanynecessityto
preserve the elephant as also ivory. The species
mightnothavebeenonthebrinkofextinction.The
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Thusinthefactsofthatcase,theApexCourtfoundthatban
ontradeofimportedivorywasnotonlyjustifiedbytheStatementof
ba
y
ObjectandReasons,buttheStateplacedonrecordenoughmaterialto
justifythetotalban.Thebanontradeofimportedivorywasimposed
on the basis of past experience which showed that prevention of
om
poachingcanbeachievedonlybyimposingacompletebanontradein
ivory. Inthefactsofthepresentcase,thedrasticprovisionofSection
5DisjustifiedneitherbytheStatementofObjectandReasonsnorby
placinganymaterialonrecordtojustifythecompellingstateinterest.In
thefactsofthecasebeforeus,itisnotthecaseoftheStateGovernment
thattheimportedfleshofcow,bullorbullockwillbeusedasacoverfor
illegal slaughter of the animals of the said category in the State of
Maharashtra.Moreover,thechallengetotheSection49Cwasonthe
groundofinfringementofrightunderArticle19(1)(g).Inthiscase,the
violationofArticle21isalleged.Hence,theStatemustprove
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OtherswillnothelptheRespondents.
191.
C
ou
Inthecaseof IndianHandicraftsEmporiumandOthers
ig
h
v. Union of India and Others, the Apex Court has quoted with
approval,thefollowingportionoftheCommentaryon Constitutional
LawbyD.D.Basu,whichreadsthus:
om
ba
y
Itisnowsettledthatnoinflexibleanswertothis
questionispossible,andthatitisthenatureofthe
business or property which is an important
element in determining how far the restriction
mayreasonablygo:
(A)Inthecaseofinherentlydangerousornoxious
trades,suchasproductionortradinginliquors
orcultivationofnarcoticplants,ortraffickingin
women,itwouldbeareasonablerestrictionto
prohibitthetradeorbusinessaltogether.
(B) Wherethetradeorbusinessisnotinherently
bad, as in the preceding cases, it must be
shownbyplacingmaterialsbeforethecourt
that prohibition of private enterprise in the
particular business was essential in the
interestsofpublicwelfare.ThusInorderto
prevent speculative dealings in essential
commodities(suchascotton),duringaperiodof
emergency, the State may impose a temporary
prohibition on all normal trading of such
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ClauseBabovewouldcoverthefactsofthecaseinhand.
ig
h
Inthepresentcase,Section5Dseekstoprohibitsomethingwhichisnot
otherwiseillegal.But,theStatehasnotsupporteditbyshowingthatit
192.
isintheinterestofpublicwelfare.
Tosummarize,Section5Dwillhavetobestruckdownas
ba
y
om
ConstitutionofIndia.
193.
Article21hasbeenexpandedbytheApexCourtfromtimetotime.It
includestherighttoleadameaningfullife.Itprotectsthecitizenfrom
unnecessarystateintrusionintohishome.Forleadingameaningfullife,
acitizenwillhavetoeatfoodandpreferablyfoodofhischoice.Ifthe
statetellshimnottoeataparticularkindoffoodthoughthesameis
not injurious to health, it will prevent the citizen from leading a
meaningfullife.IftheStatestartsmakingintrusionintothepersonal
lifeofanindividualbypreventinghimfromeatingfoodofhischoice,
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suchactmaywellaffecthispersonalliberty.Hence,evenassumingthat
C
ou
ofpersonallibertyguaranteedbytheState.
rt
theremaynotbeanyrightofprivacy,suchinterferencewillbeviolation
SUBSECTIONS(3)AND(4)OFSECTION8
194.
toSection8,readthus:
ig
h
AmendmentAct.Subsection(3)andSubSection(4)whichareadded
om
ba
y
(3) AnyPoliceOfficernotbelowtherankofSub
Inspectororanypersonauthorizedinthisbehalf
by the State Government, may, with a view to
securing compliance of provisions of Section 5A,
5B, 5C or 5D, for satisfying himself that the
provisionsofthesaidsectionshavebeencomplied
withmay=
(a) enter,stopandsearch,orauthorizeany
person to enter, stop and search and
searchanyvehicleusedorintendedto
be used forthe exportof cow,bullor
bullock;
(b) seizeorauthorizetheseizureofcow,
bullorbullockinrespectofwhichhe
suspects that any provision of
sections,5A,5B,5Cor5Dhasbeenis
being or is about to be contravened,
alongwith the vehicles in which such
cow, bull or bullock are found and
there after take or authorize the
taking of all measures necessary for
securing the production of such cow,
bull or bullock and the vehicles so
seized, in a court and for their safe
custodypendingsuchproduction.
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(4) TheprovisionsoftheSection100ofCodeof
Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to search and
seizure and shall, so far as may be, apply to
searchesandseizuresunderthisSection.
195.
(portioninboldlettersaddedbyAmendment)
AswehaveheldthatSection5Disunconstitutional,the
ba
y
referencetoSection5DinsubSection(3)willhavetobestruckdown.
Clause(a)ofSubsection(3)ofSection8conferspoweronthepolice
officernotbelowtherankofSubInspectororanyofficerauthorizedin
om
thatbehalfbytheStateGovernment toenter,stopandsearch,orto
authorize any person to enter, stop and search any vehicle used or
intendedtobeusedfortheexportofcow,bullorbullock.Thispower
canbeexercisedonlyforsecuringcompliancewithSubsection(2)of
Section 5A. Clause (b) of Subsection (3) of Section 8 authorizes
seizureofanycow,bullorbullockprovidedtheofficerssuspectthatany
provision of Sections 5A, 5B or 5C is being or is about to be
contravened along with the vehicles in which such cows, bulls or
bullocksarefound.Subsection(4)ofSection8isveryclear.Itrecords
thatSection100oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure,1973willapplyto
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anysearchcarriedoutunderSection8. Section100oftheCodeof
C
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CriminalProcedure,1973readsthus:
ba
y
(3)
Ifingressintosuchplacecannotbesoobtained,
the officer or other person executing the
warrant may proceed in the manner provided
bysubsection(2)ofSection47.
(2)
ig
h
BeforemakingasearchunderthisChapter,the
officer or other person about to make it shall
call upon two or more independent and
respectableinhabitantsofthelocalityinwhich
the place to be searched is situate or of any
otherlocalityifnosuchinhabitantofthesaid
localityisavailableoriswillingtobeawitness
tothesearch,toattendandwitnessthesearch
andmayissueanorderinwritingtothemor
anyofthemsotodo.
(5)
Thesearchshallbemadeintheirpresence,and
alistofallthingsseizedinthecourseofsuch
search and of the places in which they are
respectively found shall be prepared by such
officer or other person and signed by such
witnesses; but no person witnessing a search
under this section shall be required to attend
the Court as a witness of the search unless
speciallysummonedbyit.
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(4)
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(7)
Whenanypersonissearchedundersubsection
(3),alistofallthingstakenpossessionofshall
be prepared, and a copy thereof shall be
deliveredtosuchperson.
(8)
ig
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C
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(6)
196. Therefore,allthesafeguardswhichareincorporatedinSection
om
ba
y
100areapplicabletoasearchunderSubsection(3)ofSection8.
197.
ThewordsuspicionusedinClause(b)ofSubsection(3)
ofSection8cannotbeameredoubt.Itissomethingmuchmorethana
ameredoubt.WehavealreadyheldthattheprovisionsofSections5A,
5Band5Chavebeenenactedforthepurposesofachievingtheobjectof
protecting cows,bullsandbullocksintheStatefromslaughter. The
violationofSections5A,5Band5Chasbeenmadeanoffencebyvirtue
oftheAmendmentAct.Therefore,theprovisionsofsearchandseizure
have been incorporated in Subsection (3) of Section 8 for securing
compliance with the provisions of Sections 5A, 5B and 5C of the
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AmendmentAct. Ifthereisillegalseizure,theremediesarealways
198.
C
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Procedure,1973toapplyforreturnoftheproperty.
rt
ProvisotoSection3laysdownthatpendingtrial,seized
ig
h
theyremainincustodywithanyotherinstitutionsororganizationsas
pertheordersoftheCourt.Apartfromthefactthattheremediesare
ba
y
om
maintenanceoftheanimals.ItisobviousthattheconcernedCourthas
discretiontopassanorderdirectingthepaymentofmaintenancebythe
accused.Inanyevent,theexistenceofsuspicionasprovidedinClause
(b) of Subsection (3) of Section 8 of likely contravention of the
provisions of Section 5C will have to be in the context of the
interpretationputbythisCourttoSection5C.Beforetheamendment,
Subsections(1)and(2)ofSection8werealreadypartoftheAnimal
PreservationActwhichreadthus:
8. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the competent
authorityoranypersonauthorisedinwritinginthat
behalfbythecompetentauthority(hereinafterinthis
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199.
ig
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(2) Everypersoninoccupationofanysuchplaceshall
allow the competent authority or the authorised person
such access to that place as may be necessary for the
aforesaid purpose and shall answer to the best of his
knowledge and belief any question put to him by the
competentauthorityortheauthorisedperson.
Perhaps, incorporation of Subsections (3) and (4) of
ba
y
upholdingthevalidityoftheamendedSection5and Sections5A,B5
and5CwillsquarelyapplytothechallengetoSection8.Therefore,we
om
findnomeritinthechallengetothevalidityofSubsections(3)and(4)
ofSection8oftheAnimalWelfareAct.
[D]
200.
VALIDITYOFSECTION9B
Thenextquestionwhichsurvivesforconsiderationisthe
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onthisquestion.
201.
C
ou
PERS.C.GUPTE,J
Section9BoftheActcaststheburdenofprovingthatthe
slaughter,transport,export,sale,purchaseorpossessionofbovineflesh,
ig
h
asthecasemaybe,wasnotincontraventionoftheprovisionsoftheAct
ontheaccusedinanytrialforanoffencepunishableunderSection9or
9A.ThePetitionerschallengethisprovisionasillegalandultraviresthe
ConstitutionofIndia.Itissubmittedthatpresumptionofinnocenceisa
constitutionalguaranteetoeveryaccusedfacingatrialandinsofaras
ba
y
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supportofhissubmission.RelyingonthecaseofBholaSinghvs.State
rt
ofPunjab58,healsosubmittedthatitisonlyafterthestatedischarges
C
ou
itsinitialburdenofprovingfoundationalfactsthattheburdencanbe
shiftedontotheaccused.Mr.Kumbhakonisubmittedthatthereareno
foundationalfactstobeestablishedbytheStateinthecaseofatrialof
offencesundertheAct,byvirtueofSection9B.Hesubmittedthateven
ig
h
beprovedbytheaccusedandtheirimportancerelativetothematters
required to be proved by the prosecution, which ordinarily sustain
ba
y
castingofareverseburden,arenotsatisfiedinthiscase.
om
202.
Ontheotherhand,itissubmittedbythelearnedAdvocate
Generalthatpresumptionofinnocenceisnotarightguaranteedbythe
Constitution and cannot per se be extended within the purview of
freedomoflifeandlibertyguaranteedunderArticle21.Itissubmitted
thatthoughtherighttoafreeandfairtrialisanimportantrightinthe
criminallegalsystem,suchrightcannotincludetherighttopresume
innocence.LearnedAdvocateGeneralsubmitsthattheruleofreverse
burden of proof, or, in other words, shifting of the burden on the
accusedtoproveinnocence,isnotforeigntoIndianlegalsystem. He
relies on several enactments such as Essential Commodities Act,
58 (2011)11 Supreme Court Cases 653
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NarcoticDrugsandPsychotropicSubstancesAct,WildLifeProtection
rt
C
ou
ig
h
NoorAga(supra)andP.K.KrishnaLalvs.StateofKerala59insupport
of validity of casting of such reverse burden. It is submitted that
Section9Bcomeswithintheexceptionstothegeneralrulerequiringthe
ba
y
accusedfordischargingtheburdenwithinthemeaningofSection9B
om
arespeciallywithinhisknowledgeandcanbeprovedbyhim.
203.
Thesanctityofhumanlifeandlibertyisprobablythemost
fundamentalofhumansocialvaluesandArticle21,whichformsthe
pivotofthisfundamentalvalueenshrinedinourConstitution,prevents
anyencroachmentuponthisrighttolifeandpersonallibertybythe
executive, save in accordance with a procedure established by law.
Everypunishmentmetedouttoanindividualbywayofimprisonment
bytheStatemustsatisfythetestofArticle21. Thatisprobablythe
least of the content of that Article. Such punishment must be in
accordancewiththeprocedureestablishedbylaw. Itissimilartothe
59 (1995) Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 187
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AmericancaseofChambersvs.Florida60inthefollowingwords:
ba
y
ig
h
om
Therearebothproceduralandsubstantiveaspectsofthis
dueprocess.Procedurally,itmeansthatindealingwithindividuals,the
Statemustproceedwith'settledusagesandmodesofprocedure'. For
example,therulesthatnobodyshouldbeconvictedwithoutahearing
or that the judge must be impartial or that an orderly course of
procedure must be adopted in the trial, are part of procedural due
process. This is what the court said in the old case of Hagar vs.
ReclamationDist.61:
Bydueprocessoflawismeantonewhich,followingthe
formsof law, isappropriate tothe case andjustto the
60 (1940)309 US 227
61 (1884)111 US 701
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partiestobeaffected.Itmustbepursuedintheordinary
modesprescribedbylaw,itmustbeadaptedtotheendto
beattained,wheneveritisnecessaryfortheprotectionof
thepartiesitmustgivethemanopportunitytobeheard
respecting the justness for the judgment sought. The
clause,therefore,meansthattherecanbenoproceeding
against life, liberty or property which may result in
deprivation of either, without the observance of those
generalrulesestablishedinoursystemofjurisprudencefor
thesecurityofprivaterights.
ig
h
Ontheotherhand,substantivedueprocessmandatesthat
acriminallawdoesnotcomeintoconflictwiththerightsguaranteedby
the First Amendment, e.g. the freedom of speech and of the press,
freedomofassembly,ofassociation,etc.Acriminalstatute,which,for
example, is either vague or gives contradictory commands, offends
ba
y
againstthissubstantiveaspectofdueprocess.
om
204.
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In R.C.Coopervs.UnionofIndia,ShahJ.,speakingforthemajority,
rt
C
ou
ig
h
lawauthorisingsuchdetentionhastosatisfythetestoftheapplicable
freedoms under Article 19. Then, in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of
ba
y
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referencetoArticles14and19.ThisiswhattheSupremeCourtsaidin
C
ou
rt
ManekaGandhi'scase(supra).
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C
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testedbeforetheSupremeCourtonthetouchstoneof
Article 14 and in one case, namely, Kathi Raning
Rawat'scase,thevaliditywasupheldandintheother,
namely,AnwarAliSarkar'scase,itwasstruckdown.
It was held in both these cases that the procedure
establishedbythespeciallawmustnotbeviolativeof
theequalityclause.Thatproceduremustanswerthe
requirement of Article 14. The nature and
requirementoftheprocedureunderArticle21.
ig
h
Article14,e.g.ifitisarbitrary,oppressive orfanciful,itwouldbeno
procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21 (See District
Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad vs. Canara Bank). So also,
consideringthattheconceptofreasonablenesspermeatesArticle14,a
procedurewhichisunreasonablecannotbetermedasaprocedureso
ba
y
establishedbylaw.Insum,afterManekaGandhi'scase,thelawcan
betakenasfullysettledthatpersonallibertiescannotberestrictedeven
om
bylawexceptaftersatisfyingArticles14and19.Therightoflifeand
libertyunderArticle21,thus,clearlycoversthesubstantialdueprocess
aspectenvisagedintheAmericanjurisprudence.
205.
AfterconsideringthusthereachofArticle21,wemaynow
focusonthepresumptionofinnocenceanditsplaceinacriminaltrial
from the standpoint of a reasonable and fair procedure which could
passmusteroftheconstitutionalscheme.Presumptionofinnocenceis
universallyregardedasanimportanthumanright.Article11(1)ofthe
UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsprovidesthateveryonecharged
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withapenaloffencehastherighttobepresumedinnocentuntilproved
rt
guiltyaccordingtolawin apublictrialatwhichhehashadallthe
C
ou
withacriminaloffenceshallbepresumedinnocentuntilprovedguilty
accordingtolaw.TheSupremeCourt,inKrishnaJanardhanBhatvs.
ig
h
DattatrayaG.Hegde63putthematterthus:
om
ba
y
44. Thepresumptionofinnocenceisahumanright.
(SeeNarenderSinghv.StateofM.P.(2004)10SCC
699, Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of
Maharashtra (2005) 5SCC 294 andRajeshRanjan
Yadav v. CBI (2007) 1 SCC 70) Article 6(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights provides :
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law". Although India is not bound by the
aforementionedConventionandassuchitmaynotbe
necessary like the countries forming European
countries to bring common law into land with the
Convention,abalancingoftheaccused'srightsandthe
interest of the society is required to be taken into
consideration. In India, however, subject to the
statutoryinterdicts,thesaidprincipleformsthebasis
ofcriminaljurisprudence.
206.
innocentuntilheisprovedguilty.Correspondingly,itisthedutyofthe
prosecutiontoprovetheguiltoftheaccused. Thatbringsustothe
question of the burden of proof and its role in a criminal trial
particularly in reference to the presumption of innocence of the
accused. Burdenofproofitself,asunderstoodbythelaw,isoftwo
63 (2008)4 SCC 54
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fleshmatter draft 5
rt
C
ou
whomsuchburdenliesfails;andtwo,evidentialburdenortheburden
ofgoingforwardwithevidence.Underthetraditionalview,burdenof
pursuationnevershiftsfromonepartytotheotheratanystageofthe
proceedings,whereasevidentialburdenmaywellshiftbackandforth
ig
h
burdentoprovetheguiltoftheaccused.Traditionallyconceived,every
criminaloffencehastwoessentialelements actusreus,thatistosay,
ba
y
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thepursuasiveburdenrestuponhimtoestablishthefactsconstituting
rt
suchdefence. Itmaystillbesufficient,however,forhimtodischarge
C
ou
suchburdenonabalanceofprobabilities;(3)Thethirdwellknown
exceptionisthestatutoryinterdictreferredtobytheSupremeCourtin
KrishnaJanardhanBhat'scase(supra).Astatuteitselfmayexpressly
placeapursuasiveburdenontheaccused.Forexample,ifcontraband
ig
h
offenceundertheNarcoticDrugsandPsychotropicSubstancesActlies
on such person. If the person fails to account for such possession
om
ba
y
satisfactorily,Section54ofthatActdrawsapresumptionoftheoffence.
207.
exception. Thestatute,namely,Section9B,doescastthepursuasive
burdenontheaccusedtoprovethattheslaughter,transport,export,
sale, purchase or possession, as the case may be, was not in
contravention of the provisions of the Act. If the State holds the
accusedguiltyandpunisheshimonhisfailuretodischargethatburden,
the personal liberty of the accused is taken away by a procedure
established by law. But does this procedure satisfy the mandate of
Articles14and19,asitmustasdiscussedabove.TheaspectofArticle
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19insofarastheoffencesthemselvesareconcerned,hasalreadybeen
rt
consideredabove.Hereweareessentiallydealingwiththeprocedure
C
ou
passing the muster of Article 14. Does the procedure violate the
equalityclause?Isitreasonable,fairandjust?Orisitisarbitraryor
fanciful? To answer these questions, we must first consider the
rationablebehindtherequirementofcastingareverseburdenonthe
ig
h
accused,andthenseethetestswhichmustbesatisfiedbyanyprovision
ofsuchreverseburden,beforeweconsiderhowthestatuteinquestion
208.
faresinthatrespect.
ba
y
personallibertyandtheconsequentialentitlementtodueprocessina
criminaltrial,inthefirstplace,istobalancetheinterestsofthestateto
om
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ThisbalanceisachievedbyallowingtheStatetorelyonpresumptions
209.
C
ou
accusedtorebutthosepresumptions.
rt
basedonrecognisedprinciples,whilstatthesametime,permittingthe
Therearevariousrecognizedreasonswhystatutesprovide
forpresumptionsoffactorlawandcastaburdenontheaccusedto
ig
h
ba
y
respectofproofofnegativefacts.TheEnglishCourtofAppealinRvs.
Edwards64,whilstconsideringtheprovisionsoftheLicenceActof1964,
om
heldthatwhentheaccusedwasconvictedofsellingintoxicatingliquor
withoutalicence,theburdenwasonthedefendant(accused)toprove
that he held a licence and as he had not done so, he was rightly
convicted. After following a number of precedents on the statutory
exceptions, the Court held that it was no part of the duty of the
prosecutiontoproveanegativefactthattheaccuseddidnothavea
licence.Theotherareaiswheretheparticularfactiswithinthespecial
knowledge of the accused. Criminal courts are familiar with the
problempresentedbytheproofofapurposeforwhichanactisdone,
wheneversuchpurposeisanecessaryingredientofthe offencewith
64 [1974]2 All ER 1085 at 1095
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whichtheaccusedischarged.Generally,intheabsenceofanexpress
rt
admission by the accused, the purpose with which he did the act
C
ou
complainedofisamatterofinferencefromwhatheactuallydid.Ong
AhChuanvs.PublicProsecutor65wasacasearisinginconnectionwith
the Drugs Act of Singapore which raised a statutory presumption,
wheneverthequantityofacontrolleddrugwasfoundtobebeyonda
ig
h
certainquantity(presumablycommensuratewithselfconsumption),of
thedrugbeingpossessedforthepurposeoftraffickinginprohibited
drug(heroin,inthatcase). Iftheaccusedisfoundinpossessionof
controlled drugs and to have been moving them from one place to
another,themereactofmovingdidnotofitselfamounttotrafficking
ba
y
undertheAct.Butifthepurposeforwhichtheywerebeingmovedwas
totransferpossession from the mover tosomeotherperson attheir
om
intendeddestination,themoverwasguiltyoftheoffenceoftrafficking
under Section 3of thatAct. If the quantityof the controlleddrugs
beingmovedwasinexcessofacertainminimumspecifiedinSection
15, a rebuttable presumption was created that the purpose of such
movingwastosotransferpossession.Theonuslieduponthemoverto
satisfytheCourt,uponbalanceofprobabilities,thathehadnotactually
intendedtopartwiththepossessionofthedrugstoanyoneelse,butto
retainthemsolelyforhisownconsumption.ThePrivyCouncilupheld
theconvictionholdingthatthematerialbeforetheCourt,namely,that
thepersonwasfoundinpossessionofandmovingacertainquantityof
65 [1980]3 W.L.R. 855
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purposeoftransferringpossession.Thepossessionofprohibiteddrugs
C
ou
wasinitselfunlawful,butmoreheinouswasthecrimeoftraffickingin
suchdrugs. Upontheprosecutionprovingthatcertainactsconsistent
withthepurposeoftrafficking(i.e.transferringpossessiontoanother)
werecommittedbytheaccused,namely,carryingofaquantityoverthe
ig
h
knowledgeandtherewasnothingunfairinrequiringhimtosatisfythe
Courtthathedidtheactwithsomeotherlessheinouspurposeifsuch
ba
y
be thefact. LordDiplockheldthatpresumptionsofthiskindarea
commonfeatureofmodernlegislationconcerningpossessionanduseof
om
210.
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Kong,whichprovidedfortheoffenceofbeinginpossessionofwhatis
C
ou
Section30wasinthefollowingterms:
rt
ig
h
had,onaparticulardayandatanamedplace,inhispossessioncashof
$HK1.76m,reasonablysuspectedofhavingbeenstolenorunlawfully
ba
y
obtained.TheCourtwasalsoconcernedwithanotheraccusedcharged
underSection25ofDrugTrafficking(RecoveryofProceeds)Ordinance
om
ofHongKong,whichprovidedforanoffenceofenteringintoorbeing
concernedinanarrangementtofacilitateretentionorcontrolofsale
proceedsofdrugtraffickingonbehalfofthetrafficker.Subsection(1)
of Section 25 defined the offence. A person who enters into or is
otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or
control by or on behalf of another (the relevant person) of the
relevantperson'sproceedsofdrugtraffickingisfacilitated,knowingor
having reasonable grounds to believe that the relevant person is a
person who carries on or has carried on drug trafficking or has
benefitedfromdrugtrafficking,commitstheoffenceunderSection25.
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rt
C
ou
someonewhomonekneworhadreasonablegroundstobelieveasa
personwhocarriedonorbenefitedfromdrugtrafficking.Therewere
exceptionsprovidedforinSubsection(3)andaspecialdefencewas
containedinSubsection(4).Theexceptionsweredisclosuresmadeby
ig
h
theaccusedinaccordancewithsubsection(3)toanauthorizedofficer
ofanysuspicionorbeliefthatanyfundsorinvestmentswerederived
fromorusedindrugtrafficking.IfdisclosuresintermsofsubSection
(3) were made, the person doing an act in contravention with sub
section(1) could not be said to have committed the offence. Sub
ba
y
section(4)providedforaspecialdefence,namely,adefencetoprove
either that (a) the accused did not know or suspect that the
om
arrangementrelatedtoproceedsofdrugtraffickingor(b)hedidknow
thatbysucharrangementtheretentionorcontrolbyoronbehalfofthe
trafficker was facilitated or (c) he actually intended to make a
disclosureundersubsection(3)butthattherewasareasonableexcuse
for his failure to do so. Both accused were convicted and their
convictionswereupheld,buttheHighCourtquashedtheindictmentin
both the cases on the ground that the convictions were violative of
Article11oftheBillofRights.(Article11(1)oftheHongKongBillof
Rightsprovided:Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallhave
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
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law.)OnappealbytheAttorneyGeneral,thePrivyCouncilupheldthe
rt
judgmentinthefirstcase,butsetasidetheconvictioninthesecond
C
ou
case.AfteranalysingtherespectiveSections(Sections25and30)and
Article 11(1)of the Bill of Rights, the Privy Council held that the
ig
h
hisinnocentpossessionoftheproperty,whichwasthemostsignificant
element of the offence. It actually reduced the burden on the
prosecutiontoprovepossessionbythedefendantandfactsfromwhich
areasonablesuspicioncanbeinferredthatthepropertyhadbeenstolen
orobtainedunlawfully,matterswhicharelikelytobeaformalityina
ba
y
majorityofcases.Therefore,itwasheldthatSection30contravened
Article 11(1) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. But with regard to
om
Section25,itwasheldthattheonuswasontheprosecution. Unless
the prosecution proved that the defendant has been involved in a
transactioninvolvingtherelevantperson'sproceedsofdrugtrafficking
withinthewidetermsofSection25(2)andthatatthattimehehadthe
necessaryknowledgeorhadreasonablegroundstobelievethespecified
facts,thedefendantwasentitledtobeacquitted. ThePrivyCouncil
heldasfollows:
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ba
y
ig
h
C
ou
rt
Article11(1)oftheHongKongBillofRights,observedthattheArticle
om
didnotprohibitpresumptionsoffactoroflaw,whichoperateinevery
legalsystem,andhadanimplicitdegreeofflexibilityinthatbehalf.It
furtherheldasfollows:
Thisimplicitflexibilityallowsabalancetobedrawn
betweentheinterestofthepersonchargedandthe
state.Therearesituationswhereitisclearlysensible
and reasonable that deviations should be allowed
fromthestrictapplicationsoftheprinciplethatthe
prosecutionmustprovethedefendant'sguiltbeyond
reasonabledoubt. Take an obvious example in the
caseofanoffenceinvolvingtheperformanceofsome
actwithouta licence. Common sensedictatesthat
the prosecution should not be required to shoulder
the virtually impossible task of establishing that a
::: Uploaded on - 06/05/2016
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C
ou
rt
om
ba
y
ig
h
Someexceptionswillbejustifiable,otherswill
not. Whether they are justifiable will in the end
depend upon whether it remains primarily the
responsibilityoftheprosecutiontoprovetheguiltof
anaccusedtotherequiredstandardandwhetherthe
exceptionisreasonablyimposed,notwithstandingthe
importance of maintaining the principle which art
11(1) enshrines. The less significant the departure
fromthe normalprinciple,the simpleritwillbe to
justify an exception. If the prosecution retains
responsibilityforprovingtheessentialingredientsof
theoffence,thelesslikelyitisthatanexceptionwill
beregardedasunacceptable.Indecidingwhatarethe
essential ingredients, the language of the relevant
statutoryprovisionwillbeimportant.However,what
willbedecisivewillbethesubstance andrealityof
thelanguagecreatingtheoffenceratherthanitsform.
If the exception requires certain matters to be
presumeduntilthecontraryisshown,thenitwillbe
difficult to justify that presumption unless, as was
pointedoutbythe UnitedStatesSupremeCourtin
LearyvUS(1969)395US6at36,'itcanatleastbe
saidwithsubstantialassurancethatthepresumedfact
ismorelikelythannottoflowfromtheprovedfact
onwhichitismadetodepend'.
211.
burdentobeupheldasapermissiblelimitationuponthepresumption
ofinnocence,whatisimportantistoseeiftheprosecutionhasproved
the basic foundational facts, which have a rational connection with
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presumedfacts,soastomakethemhighlyprobable.Insuchacase,it
rt
maybelegitimatetocasttheburdenofdisplacingthosepresumedfacts
C
ou
ontheaccused,keepinginmindthevariousconsiderationsdiscussed
above,suchastheruleagainstdischargingofanegativeburden,the
rule for discharging of a positive burden of establishing facts within
one'speculiarknowledge,therelativeeaseofdischargingsuchburden,
ig
h
Section8oftheNarcoticControlAct,1970ofCanadaontheanvilof
Section11(d)oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,which
ba
y
om
narcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking(providedbySection4(2)ofthat
Act),iftheCourtfoundtheaccusedtobeinpossessionofthenarcotic
(whichwasitselfanoffenceunderSection3ofthatAct),hewouldbe
givenanopportunityofestablishingthathewasnotinpossessionofthe
narcoticforthepurposeoftraffickingandifhefailedtosoestablish,he
would be convicted of the (higher) offence of trafficking and be
sentenced accordingly. The Court struck down the Section since it
established a mandatory presumption of law and by using the word
'establish' imposed a legal burden of proof on the accused and not
merelyanevidentiaryburden,byrequiringtheaccusedtoproveonthe
67 26 DLR (4th) 200
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230
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balanceofprobabilitiesthathewasnotinpossessionofthenarcotic
rt
drugforthepurposeoftrafficking,itcompelledhimtoprovethathe
C
ou
was not guilty of the offence of trafficking. It was held that the
Sectionfailedtorationalisetheconnectionbetweenthebasicfactof
possession and the presumed fact of possession for the purpose of
212.
ig
h
traffickingofpersonsguiltyofpossessiononlyofnarcoticdrugs.
SupremeCourtin Morrisonetal.vs.PeopleofStateofCalifornia 68
referredtobyourSupremeCourtinP.N.KrishnaLal.Thatwasacase
wheretheindictmentchargedthatthetwoappellantshadfeloniously
ba
y
conspiredtoplaceaperson,whowassaidtobeanalienJapanese,in
thepossessionandenjoymentofagriculturallandwithintheStateof
om
California,whichwasprohibitedunderthestatutesoftheState.Onthe
trial,theStateprovedthat theparticularperson(whowassaidtobe
analien)hadgoneuponthelandanduseditunderanagreementwith
theappellant,butdidnotattempttoprovethathewasnotacitizenof
UnitedStatesorthathewasineligibleforcitizenship.Thestatutesof
California provided that as to this particular element of the crime
(namely,the personnotbeingacitizenoreligibletobeacitizenof
UnitedStates)theburdenofprovingthesamewasonthedefendant.
The observationsofCadozo,J.in thatcase,quotedbyourSupreme
CourtinP.N.KrishnaLal,arequotedbelow:
68 291 U.S. 82 (1934)
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fleshmatter draft 5
C
ou
rt
ig
h
This,then,givesusonemoretesttoevaluatethevalidityof
astatutorypresumption. HastheStateprovedenoughbasicfactsto
raise a presumption, considering the probative connection between
thesebasicfactsandthefactspresumedonthebasisthereof,soasto
make it just for the defendant to be required to displace such
ba
y
presumption?Itisnotwithintheprovinceofalegislaturetodeclarean
individualpresumptivelyguiltyofacrime,butitislegitimatetodraw
presumptionsonthebasisoffactsprovedbytheStateandrequirethe
om
accusedtodisplacethem. 'Thesepresumptionsarenotevidenceina
propersense',asobservedinthecaseofP.N.KrishnaLal,'butsimply
regulationsoftheburdenofproof'.
213.
Wemaynowsummarizethevarioustestswhichwehave
discussedabovefor sustainingareverseburdeninacriminaltrialas
constitutionallyvalid.Theyareasfollows:
(i)
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probativeconnectionbetweenthesebasicfactsand
thepresumedfacts)tobringhometheguiltofthe
ontheaccused?
(ii)
C
ou
accused,andtodisprovewhichtheburdeniscast
ig
h
burdentoproveanegativefact?
(iii)
(iv)
easefortheaccusedtodischargeitortheStateto
ba
y
Onlywhenthesetestsaresatisfied,canonesaythatthe
om
214.
Section9B,toseeifitsatisfiesthesetests.Letusfirsttaketheoffences
ofSections5Cand5DoftheAct.Section5C,aswehavenotedabove
whilstdealingwiththeconstitutionalvalidityoftherelevantSections,
makespossessionofthefleshofanycow,bullorbullockslaughteredin
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contraventionoftheprovisionsoftheActanoffence,whilstSection5D
rt
makespossessionofthefleshofanycow,bullorbullockslaughtered
C
ou
outsidetheStateofMaharashtraanoffence.Thus,thesetwoprovisions,
betweenthem,exhaustallcasesofpossessionofbovineflesh,eachof
whichamountstoanoffence. Inotherwords,themomentanyoneis
foundtobeinpossessionofbovinefleshintheStateofMaharashtra,
ig
h
contraventionoftheActistheverypossessionofbovineflesh.Ifthat
bethecase,Section9B,inasmuchasitcaststheburdenofprovingthat
ba
y
thepossessionofsuchfleshwasnotincontraventionoftheAct,makes
nopracticalsenseonthetermsofSections5Cand5Dontheonehand
om
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boxthathedidnotknowthatitwasbovineflesh. Greaterdifficulty
rt
wouldbefacedifonthebasisofpossessionofsuchflesh,theStatewere
C
ou
toprosecutehimforanoffenceunderSection5C,thatistosay,for
possession of the flesh of a cow, bull or bullock slaughtered in
contraventiontotheAct,i.e.inMaharashtra.Prayhowistheaccusedto
dischargetheonusofprovingthathedidknowthattheanimalwas
ig
h
notcommensuratewiththebalanceofdifficultyfacedrespectivelyby
theprosecutionandtheaccusedinestablishingtheingredientsofthe
ba
y
offenceorthelackthereof. Itisrelativelyeasyfortheprosecutionto
beartheburdenofestablishingthattheslaughterwasincontravention
om
of the Act than for the accused to bear the burden of showing
otherwise.Besides,theessenceoftheoffenceunderSection5Cconsists
ofpossessionofbovinefleshwhichisproducedoutofcontraventionof
theAct,i.e.byslaughterwithintheState.Howcanthisessentialfact
belefttotheaccusedtocontrovert?Thebasisofanypresumptionin
lawinacriminaltrial,aswehaveseenabove,isthesubstantialcausal
orprobativeconnectionbetweenthefactsfoundprovedandthefacts
presumed. Thatconnectionisabsentinthiscase. Merelybecausea
person is found in possession of bovine flesh does not make his
knowledgeofslaughterwithintheStateinanywayprobable. There
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rt
illegal. Even within India, there are States where such slaughter is
C
ou
perfectlylegal.Infact,theonlyslaughterwhichisincontraventionof
theActistheslaughterwithinMaharashtra. Nowifapersonwereto
obtainbeeffromtheseotherCountriesorStatesinIndia,canitbesaid
thathismerepossessionmustleadtoapresumption oftheplaceof
ig
h
Stateas wellaswithintheState,isavailableinthemarket,thereis
practicallynowayofdistinguishingonefleshfromtheother.Thereis
ba
y
om
slaughterwithintheStateontheaccused.
215.
Initswrittensubmissions,theStatehastakenupaposition
thatonaconjointreadingofSections9Aand9B,inatrialofanoffence
undertheAct,twofoundationalfactswouldhavetobeestablishedby
theprosecution,viz.(a)theflesh isofananimalprotectedunderthe
Actand(b)theaccusedisfoundinpossessionofthesame;andonce
thesefoundationalfactsareestablished,theburdenwouldshiftonthe
accusedtoshowthattheslaughterwasnotincontraventionoftheAct.
Aswehaveshownabove,theprooftenderedbytheStateisnotenough
toleadtoapresumptionthattheslaughterwasincontraventionofthe
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Act. Theprovedfoundationalfactsdonothaveasufficientprobative
rt
C
ou
ig
h
(iii)slaughteroftheprotectedanimalwithintheStateforproducing
suchflesh,wouldhave tobe establishedbythe prosecution.Weare
ba
y
om
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237
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purpose.Forexample,thesepresumptionsareappliedtopossessionof
rt
deadlyfirearms,narcoticorpsychotropicsubstances. Thatisnotthe
C
ou
casewithbeef.NoonehastoldusattheBar,inthefirstplace,ofthere
beinganywayofdistinguishingthefleshofcow,bullorbullockfrom
thefleshofotherbovinespecies,e.g.buffalo.Itisinconceivablethatan
ordinaryconsumerwouldknowthedifference.Ontopofit,theState
ig
h
wouldhavetheCourtpresumenotjusttheknowledgeoftheaccusedof
thenatureoftheflesh,namely,ofananimalprotectedundertheAct,
but even the manner of its production, namely, by slaughter in
contraventionoftheAct,andcasttheburdenofshowingotherwise,a
ba
y
purenegativefact,ontheaccused.Thisisclearlyimpermissible.
om
216.
ThesameisalsotrueofoffencesunderSections5Aand5B.
Section5Aprohibitsthetransportofacow,bullorbullockfromany
placewithintheStatetoanyplaceoutsidetheState'forthepurposeof
itsslaughterincontraventionoftheprovisionsoftheAct'or'withthe
knowledgethatitwillbe,orislikelytobe,soslaughtered',andmakes
such transport an offence. Transporting of cattle (i.e. cow, bull or
bullock)perseevenifitbewiththeknowledgethatsuchtransportis
forsaleoutsidetheStatecanhardlyevermaketheknowledgeofits
slaughter(andforthatmatter,itsslaughterwithintheState),ifsuchbe
the case, out of such sale, probable. The two have no probative
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rt
C
ou
slaughterincontraventionoftheAct.Thatitselfcannotbepresumedor
belefttotheaccusedtodisprove.Inotherwords,byprovingthefact
oftransportperse,theStatedoesnotproveenoughofbasicoressential
factstoraiseapresumptionoftheintendedultimatepurposeofthe
ig
h
transportoritsknowledge.Secondly,asinthecaseofoffencesunder
Sections5Cand5D,whatiscastontheaccusedistheburdentoprove
purelynegativefacts,namely,thattheultimateintendedpurposeofthe
transportwasnottoslaughterthecow,bullorbullockincontravention
oftheActorthattheaccuseddidnotknowthatsuchpurposewasto
ba
y
om
217.
slaughteredor(underSection5)offeringforslaughterany(a)cow,bull
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239
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andbullock,or(b)scheduledanimalwithoutthecertificatereferredto
rt
inSection6(underSection6),inanyplaceintheStateofMaharashtra.
C
ou
ingredientsoftheoffenceunderSections5and6readwithSections9
and 9A are (1) slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered or (under
Section 5) offering for slaughter any cow, bull or bullock or (under
ig
h
Section6)anyscheduledanimal,(2)suchslaughterbeinginanyplace
in the State of Maharashtra and (3) in the case of Section 6, such
slaughter being without obtaining the certificate referred to in that
Section.Thesearenecessarilyfoundationalfacts,theonustoestablish
which,itisnotdisputedbythelearnedAdvocateGeneral,liessquarely
ba
y
ontheState.Ifso,thereisnofurtheringredienttobeestablishedbythe
prosecutionordisprovedbythedefence.Onthisanalysis,Section9B
om
insofarasitappliestotheoffencesunderSections5and6readwith,
respectively,Sections9 and 9Ahas practically nocontent. If,onthe
otherhand,ifanyofthesefoundationalfactsaretobepresumedand
onus to disprove them is cast on the accused, the provisions would
attractthesameviceasinthecaseoftheotheroffencesunderSections
5A,5B,5Cand5DreadwithSections9and9A,asdiscussedabove.The
burdenofproofcastontheaccusedreadwiththedefinitionsofthe
crimesunderSections5and6,wouldfaileverytestsetoutaboveto
determinethevalidityofanegativeburden.Thereasonsdiscussedin
respectofSections5A,5B,5Cand5Dsquarelyapplyinthecaseof
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Hence,theprocedureprescribedbySection9Bforthetrial
C
ou
218.
rt
Sections5and6insofarastheburdenofproofisconcerned.
ofoffencescannotbesaidtobefair,justandreasonable. Wemust,
therefore,holdSection9BasunconstitutionalwhichinfringesArticle21
219.
ig
h
oftheConstitutionofIndia.
PerCourt
ba
y
220.
otheraspectsofthecase.
om
appearingfor the parties. Mostof them were very brief and to the
point. WemustnotethatShriJha,thelearnedcounselappearingfor
one of the Intervenors made a submission on 23 rd December 2015,
whichwasthelastworkingdaybeforetheChristmasVacation,when
thehearingwasconductedwiththeconsentofthepartiestill6.30p.m.
During the course of the arguments, after the Court hour on 23 rd
December2015,heurgedthatwhenalargenumberoflitigantsare
waitinginaqueue,itwasagraveerroronthepartofthisCourttohave
givenprioritytothehearingofthisgroupofPetitions. Hehadtosay
somethingabouttherecusalofalearnedJudgewhowasapartofthe
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Benchhearingthisgroup.HepointedoutthatafteronelearnedJudge
rt
(G.S.Patel,J)whowasapartoftheDivisionBenchhearingthismatter
C
ou
recusedhimself,anewBenchwasimmediatelyconstituted.Wemust
noteherethatG.S.Patel,Jrecusedhimselffollowinghighesttraditions
maintainedbythisCourt.Hehadwrittenanarticleasamemberofthe
BaronasimilarstatuteofanotherStateinwhichhehadexpressedhis
ig
h
orderofaCoordinateBenchforgivingoutofturnprioritytothefinal
hearingof the WritPetitionsandin factaperemptorydate forfinal
ba
y
hearingwasfixed.Apartfromthat,theHon'bletheActingChiefJustice
byanorderdated17th November2015constitutedthisSpecialBench
om
forhearingthisgroupofPetitions.ItisobviousthattheSpecialBench
wasconstitutedwithaviewtoensurethatthereisearlydisposalofthis
groupofmatters.
CONCLUSIONS:
221.
Judgments.Theconclusionsareasunder:
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rt
ActmadebytheimpugnedAmendmentAct;
and5B;
C
ou
(b) WeupholdtheconstitutionalvalidityofSections 5A
ig
h
However,thepossessioncontemplatedbySection5C
shallbeconsciouspossession. Itwillbeapossession
withtheknowledgethatthefleshisofcow,bullor
ba
y
Section5oftheAnimalPreservationAct;
om
(d) Weholdthatrightofprivacyisapartofthepersonal
libertyguaranteedbyArticle21oftheConstitutionof
India. WeholdthatSection5Dinfringestherightof
privacywhichispartofArticle21oftheConstitution
ofIndiaandtherefore,itisliabletobestruckdown;
(e) Accordingly,referencetoSection5Dinclause(b)of
Subsection (3) of Section 8 is liable to be struck
down.Similarly,areferencetoSection5DinSection
9Aisliabletostruckdown;
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243
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(f)
fleshmatter draft 5
C
ou
ig
h
Hence,wedisposeofthePetitionsbypassingthefollowing
222.
ba
y
order:
(a)
ORDER:
WeherebyholdanddeclarethatSection5,Section
5A,Section5B,Section5C,Subsections(3)and(4)
om
(b)
However,weholdthatthepossessionintermsofthe
Section 5C of the Maharashtra Animal Preservation
Act,1976shallbeconsciouspossession;
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244
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(c)
fleshmatter draft 5
C
ou
Act,1976isstruckdownonthegroundthatthesame
Accordingly,whereverthereisareferencetoSection
ig
h
(d)
(e)
PreservationAct,1976,thesamestandsdeleted;
ba
y
om
ConstitutionofIndia;
(f)
Theprayerswhicharenotspecificallygrantedshall
bedeemedtoberejected;
(g)
TheRuleispartlymadeabsoluteinabovetermswith
noordersastocosts;
(h)
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Atthisstage,thelearnedGovernmentPleaderseeksstayof
rt
223.
245
C
ou
thatpartofthejudgmentbywhichSections5Dand9Bareheldtobe
unconstitutional.ShriJha,thelearnedcounselappearingforoneofthe
Intervenors joins Shri Vagyani, the Government Pleader. We have
declaredthesaidSectionsunconstitutionalastheyinfringeArticle21of
(A.S.OKA,J)
om
ba
y
(S.C.GUPTE,J)
ig
h
theConstitutionofIndia.Therefore,theprayerforstayisrejected.