Case 1

A.M. No. MTJ-91-565 October 5, 2005

Patricio T. Junio, Complainant,
vs.
Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr., MTC, Alaminos, Pangasinan, Respondent.
FACTS:
Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr. pleading for judicial clemency relative to our Resolution dated August
30, 1993 dismissing him from the service for kissing his boarders daughter while he was drunk during
his birthday party, which act constitutes gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the Judiciary.
After more than 11 years or on November 17, 2004, respondent Judge sent a letter to this Court,
stating that he did not file a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution because he "accepted the
verdict, in all humility." But he pleaded that based on humanitarian considerations and in the spirit of
forgiveness, we grant him his monetary benefits corresponding to his long years of service in the
government; and allow him to work in any government agency or government-owned or controlled
corporations as a consultant. He further stated that he was acquitted in the criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness filed against him; that he served the government for more than thirty-five (35) years,
four (4) years of which was in the Judiciary; and that this is his first administrative offense.
On June 17, 2005, respondent Judge again wrote this Court reiterating his plea for judicial clemency
"in the light of my present personal circumstances." He stated that he is undergoing intensive medical
treatment for cataract, prostatic enlargement, postural vertigo, hypertension and arthritis; that he is
"under heavy financial crisis;" and that his ardent wish is "to reap the fruits" of his long years of
service to the government.
Issue: Whether or not a judge dismissed from service may be granted a judicial clemency
considering his length of service and his financial, and physical conditions?
Ruling: Yes, Judicial clemency must be granted.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes ones personal conduct and imposes upon him certain
restrictions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted
position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be
free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His conduct must be able to withstand the
most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system. We certainly do not require
judges to measure up to the standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to
be like Caesars wife in all their actions. Hence, their faithful adherence to the Code of Judicial
Conduct is strictly demanded. A lackadaisical attitude towards these judicial standards is
impermissible.

In respondents case, we note certain significant factors that spur us to consider his present plea for
judicial clemency and reexamine with compassion the penalty imposed on him. Respondent Judge
has rendered more than thirty five (35) years of government service. This is his first and only
administrative offense. He demonstrated sincere repentance. He was dismissed from the service
more than ten (10) years ago and "has come to terms with reality and learned (his) lesson." His
regressing physical condition caused by various illnesses and old age necessitate financial support.
CASE NUMBER 2
ADVANCE TEXTILE MILLS INC, PETITIONERS
VS WILLY TAN, doing business under the name WCT Manufacturing, Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Advance Textile Mills, Inc., allegedly sold textile materials to Willy Tan of WCT
Manufacturing. After few attempts at collecting the unpaid balance of P1,751,892.67, on November
11, 1993, petitioner sent respondents a final demand and letter giving him ten days to settle his debt
on pain of legal action. Respondent still failed to pay. Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action for
collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent denied
purchasing fabric materials on credit from the petitioner and alleged that all he purchases were paid
in cash basis. He likewise denied receiving any demand letter from the petitioner.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on March 6, 1995. On motion of respondents counsel, the trial
court granted the motion to cancel and reset the pre-trial conference on April 5, 1995. Both on said
date respondent and counsel failed to appear, so the trial court, upon petitioners motion, declared
respondent in default and thereafter allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent appealed the decision in Court of
Appeals and ruled that default was null and void, for failure of the trial court to serve respondent with
the notice of pre-trial and ordered the lower court a quo for further proceedings. Then petitioner raised
the case to Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a separate notice resetting pre-trial date is required before the party litigant
can be declared in default for his failure to attend the reset pre-trial?
RULING: Yes, the party and his counsel must be served with separate notices of pre-trial conference.
The proceedings before the lower court happened in the years 1994 to 1995, and that governed by
the old Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the old rules, particularly Rule 20, Section 1; a notice of pretrial must be served on the party affected, separately from his counsel, otherwise the proceedings will
be null and void. The general rule that notice to counsel is notice to parties has been held insufficient
and inadequate for purposes of pre-trial, such that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party
through or care of his counsel or counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the
obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring
that the party either appear thereat or deliver to counsel a written authority to represent the party with
power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do as may be non-suited or
declared in default. Before a party is non-suited or is declared as in default, it must be shown that
said party and his counsel were duly served with separate notices of the pre-trial conference.

CASE NUMBER 3

CASE NUMBER 4

CASE NUMBER 5
ALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005

Facts: Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following
entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr, to wit: (1) the surname Herrera
as appended to the name of the said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the

father of Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to all
childs mother, Armi A. Alba He averred that such challenged entries are false.
Private respondent contended that he married only once, as evidenced by certification from
NSO and Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong.
The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance the hearing was set. On
the scheduled hearing the counsel from the OSG appeared but filed no opposition, Armi was
not present.
The court a quo rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certification
of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.
Armi filed a petition for the annulment of the judgment, contending that she came to know of
the decision of the RTC where the school where her son was enrolled, was furnished by
private respondent with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioners surname
from Herrera to Alba. Armi contended that she and private respondent cohabited and after
their separation, he continued to give support to their son.
Private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with
Armi.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child shall use the surname of their mother.

Held: Under Art. 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA No. 9255, w/c took effect on March
19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother , unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in w/c case they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang vs. Cebu
Civil Registrar it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiations is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mothers surname. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may
use his fathers surname, reflecting his status us an acknowledged illegitimate held.

CASE NUMBER 6
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INC., ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 157611. August 9, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that
operates and maintains a country club and various sports and recreational facilities for the
exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI,
requested its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability of ACCIs Food and

Beverage Department (F & B Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to
1993, F & B Department had been incurring substantial losses. Realizing that it was no longer
profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the management decided to cease
from operating the department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a
concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its own food and beverage business within
the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employees individual letters informing them
that their services were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The
Union in turn, with the authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not the clubs right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause,
particularly to secure its continued viability and existence is valid.

Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same to
a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated
the employment of all personnel assigned at the department.
Petitioners failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial
losses notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the
ground of closure or cessation of an undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The closure of
operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses includes both the complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of
a companys activities.

CASE NUMBER 7
G.R. NO. 155784, OCTOBER 13, 2005
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, PETITIONER, VS.
RANULFO P. ALBAO, RESPONDENT.
[AZCUNA]

Facts:
On September 1, 1998, the Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines
issued an original and permanent appointment for the position of Executive Assistant IV to
respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. Respondent was then a contractual employee at said Office. In a
letter dated September 28, 1998 addressed to the Director of the Civil Service Commission

Field Office, Manila, the Office of the Vice President requested the retrieval of the said
appointment paper. Instead of heeding the request, petitioner CSC-NCR disapproved the
appointment.

On October 5, 1998, petitioner issued an order that a prima facie case against respondent for
Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents by declaring in his Personal Datasheet
(PDS) to support his appointment that he passed the Assistant Electrical Engineer
Examination with a rating of 71.64% and attaching thereto a Report of Rating purportedly
issued by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC). Upon validation with the PRC,
petitioner found that his name does not appear in their list and the examinee number as
appearing in the report belongs to one Bienvenido Anio, Jr.

In his answer on February 18, 1999, respondent contended that the CSC has no jurisdiction
over the matter since his appointment was disapproved, and he has already resigned from
government service since the closing hours of October 30, 1998. As he is no longer with the
civil service, the Commission has no disciplinary jurisdiction over him as a private person.

The Court of Appeals decided in favor of the respondent.

Issue/s:
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to institute administrative proceedings over respondent and
whether the power of the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases includes the power to
initiate and prosecute said cases.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the following are the relevant provisions of the law which will give light to
the resolution of the issue:
1.

Title A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292

i.
Section 12, paragraph 11 on the Powers and Functions of the commission
states that it has the power to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. . . .
ii.
Section 47, on the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC provides that The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from

office. . . (par. 1). Paragraph 2 of the same section states that the Secretaries and heads of
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction.
iii.
Section 48 provides the procedure in administrative cases against nonpresidential appointees which may be commenced by the Secretary or head of office of
equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or
upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
2.
Article IX-B, Section 3 of the Constitution also provides that The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career
service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.

From the foregoing provisions of the law, it is the Vice-President who is vested with
jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action against respondent. However, the court ruled
that petitioner can act directly and motu proprio, on the alleged acts of dishonesty and
falsification of official document committed by respondent in connection with his appointment
to a permanent position in the Office of the Vice President.

The present case partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil service
system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls
under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This
is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and
protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from
its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from
ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or
omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service.

The petition was GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

CASE NUMBER 8
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on
May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107
and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on
sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January
1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long
been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or
the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

CASE NUMBER 9
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October 5,
2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign
law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.

CASE NUMBER 10

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO

G.R. No. 168445

November 11, 2005

Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping
Agency, Inc., which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and
Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested
while his nephew remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the
decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that he cant be held
liable for illegal recruitment because he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He
also claimed that he was not aware of the law against prohibition on bonds and deposits
under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. 8042.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment.

Ruling:
There is no merit in appellants contention that he was just a mere employee of the
manning agency because he was the companys crewing manager. As testified by the
witnesses, the accused appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from
receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agencys
requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme
Court held further that appellants defense of ignorance is not commendable as provided for
by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because the appellant
failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.

CASE NUMBER 11
GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA
G.R. No. 156841

Facts:

June 30, 2005

GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired

Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of
employment. He was tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska
team, coach exhibition games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending
every event conducted, play-off games, etc.

He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its
team and players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the
corporation in good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully
attired in public and to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest
standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything
detrimental to the best interest of the corporation.

He also agreed to endorse the corporations products in commercial advertising,

promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion
pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him
with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting
January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during the
contract, the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the
contract can be terminated by the corporation. (Paragraph 3)

Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the
contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had
trust and confidence in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity.

Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was
advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988,
invoking their right as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service
vehicle no later than September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for
his services. Six (6) years after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzonas counsel demanded from GF
Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his
employment. But GF Equity refused the claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a
complaint for breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to
fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the
contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed award for damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of the suit. He challenged the
condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear
transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and
arbitrary dismissal.

GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to preterminate Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event,
complaint should be instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on June 28, 1997 and it declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the
RTCs decision and ordered GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity
abused its right by arbitrarily terminating Valenzonas employment, finding Valenzonas claim
for damages as valid. The court ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative
of applicable laws and established jurisprudence.

Ruling:
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract
to law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is
guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years.

In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the
contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its
opinion. To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for
void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the statutory
period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for breach of
contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the
action six (6) years from the date of his cause of action.

Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner. Attorneys fees are awarded because GF
Equity refused to pay the balance of Valenzonas salaries therefore to protect himself, was
compelled to litigate.

CASE NUMBER 12
EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE
GR. No. 165842

November 29, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996
when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married
through a civil wedding in BaguioCity without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of
bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in
his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an
amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward
for moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

a)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
b)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed
the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or
good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent
spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy
as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest
and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be
just and reasonable.

CASE NUMBER 13
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577

September 21, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr.,

Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In
1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel
in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in
1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.
Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs.
Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between
them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70,
and 72, of the Family Code.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming
the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

Issues:
a)
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support
the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b)
Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable to the case at bar?

Ruling:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between

respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince
this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now,
do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

CASE NUMBER 14
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 159614

December 9, 2005

Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia
(Lea) A. Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by
the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening
and he berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported
for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the
day, Lea was nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house
anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother
asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for

the fiesta. He failed to find out Leas whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan
decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas
disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor
General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court
rendered judgment granting the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what
is meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which
may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of
men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize
their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.In sum, the Court
finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before
he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.

CASE NUMBER 15
EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165842

November 29, 2005

Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in
Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City
to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas
resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on
several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still
single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However,
starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or
thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap
her.Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he
stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and
humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged
their own vows.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the
Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article
41 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the
law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without
the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution
for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense
of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial
declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard
and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.The laws
regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of
the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State
touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to
the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means
calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first
spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided
for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court
of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse.

CASE NUMBER 16
VILLALON vs. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206

November 18, 2005

Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage
to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it
was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited
his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.On
September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answerdenying petitioners allegations. She asserted
that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment
and hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their marital squabbles were normal
based on community standards. Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in
performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners
commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova
Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed,
the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his
emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with
Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to
another.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision which was
denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to
prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological
incapacity of the husband.

Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident
is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time

prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family.
Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear
to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations.
The same appears as the result of a general
dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners
personal history. The petition has no merit.

CASE NUMBER 17
NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and
ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787

November 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are

brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both
deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic
Agreement of Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents.

Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application

Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers.Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition
precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a
complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an
allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of
the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may
be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed

in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score
may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments
of a defective complaint.

CASE NUMBER 18
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO
vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537

October 14, 2005

Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and
Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela
Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said
rice lands while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) of the property.

Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owners
copy of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was
issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was
sold at a public auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband,
Hinahon together with their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is
their family residence and is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Respondents assert that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as
their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972

Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home
shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things,
debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends
that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in
1972, it is not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was
instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before
the levied property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by
Marietta falls within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

CASE NUMBER 19
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 123450

August 31, 2005

Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A year
later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his
marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma.
Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage
of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma.
Theresas marriage was bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It
declared the child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts
decision but on appeal, reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.

Issues:
a)

Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.

b)

Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would
come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that
bigamous marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to
Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since
the so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately
married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the

illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy. He has no standing in law
to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,
his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he
never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her
child.

CASE NUMBER 20
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798

September 2, 2005

Facts:
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind
four parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Aleli claims
that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together
with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving
heirs of the decedent. For this matter, respondent prays that she be made administratrix of
Franciscos estate. Petitioner Belen opposed respondents claim, alleging that the respondent
could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos
legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen
petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco Angeles.

Ruling:
No, respondents legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish the presumption of her
legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased. The
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis- that the childs parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. In the case at
bar, respondent failed to prove such legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any
marriage certificate or marriage contract. She failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or
other solemnizing authority to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage
between her parents. Clearly, therefore, respondent could not be vested with the legal
presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage
between Francisco and Genevova.

Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of a child can be
established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage
of his/her supposed parents. But respondent failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect.
Respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate
dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth
certificate was not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate,
to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be
signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

CASE NUMBER 21
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311

March 31, 2005

Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using
her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the
Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion
for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname

of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to
use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17
of Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of
the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

CASE NUMBER 22
PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994

June 28, 2005

Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their
almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and
his school when she left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to
appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care
for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child.
Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian
relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded
the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall
take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of
the Civil Code, which reads: Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and
property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such
measure.

CASE NUMBER 23
NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005 (EN BANC)

Facts:
The petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the Bureau
of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo. In the course of the proceedings both parties filed various motions with
the RTC. Among there were :(1)motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)motions to dismiss
filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines. The trial court granted the
petitioners motion to declare the respondents in default but denied as against the heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons was improper; the Land Banks motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied; and the motion to dismiss filed by respondent

heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied. On February 12, 1998 the trial
court dismissed the petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners allegedly
received the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day or on March 18, 1998,
filed a motion for reconsideration.

On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed
a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the CA
denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that the petitioners Notice of Appeal was filed out of time?

RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the petitioners. To standardize the appeal periods provided
in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998, the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration. To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or
five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.

CASE NUMBER 24

SPOUSES QUE VS CA
G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Arrieta filed a complaint against the spouses Que and Adela Urian for the
annulment of a quit claim over a lot she inherited from her grandfather. After petitioners
received the complaint together with the summonses, they hired the services of Atty. Ranot.
However, Atty. Ranot failed to file petitioners Answer. Therefore, respondent moved to declare
petitioners in default. Only Urian appeared during the hearing of respondents motion and he
also manifested that Atty. Ranot was still preparing the Answer. Respondent presented her
evidence ex parte, and the case was submitted for judgment. The quit claim was declared null
and void. The petitioners moved for reconsideration or a new trial on the ground that there
was mistake and fraud as they were allegedly under the impression that their lawyer had
prepared and filed the necessary pleading. The trial court dismissed their motion and so did
the Court of Appeals when they appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners petition.

Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Because they were
allegedly under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed the necessary pleading,
petitioners, in their petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, alleged that judgment
was entered against them through mistake or fraud. However, that is not the fraud or
mistake contemplated under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Mistake, under
Section 1 of Rule 38, refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. Fraud,
on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, the kind which prevented the aggrieved
party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court. Obviously, petitioners mistaken
assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither mistake nor
fraud.
Moreover, under Section 1, negligence must be excusable and generally imputable to
the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a
contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.

What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring
counsel and not ask for the reversal of the courts ruling.
In this case, the Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence
and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case based on the following instances:
(1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (2) when the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty
or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. However, none of these
exceptions are present in the case at bar.
Therefore, petition must be dismissed for lack of merit.

CASE NUMBER 25
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146486

March 4, 2005

Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The
Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable.

On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees:
James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing
P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for
release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially
recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of
impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman
and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The
Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite
the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.

Issues:

a)

Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable.

b)
Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.

Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0616
and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The
Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
states that The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the
members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.

Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators

in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his
Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether
or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration
impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their
belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved
was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous
case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.

Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private
respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an
impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute
grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no
longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no
bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative
investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by
the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the
provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

CASE NUMBER 26

HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES

GR. No. 154259

February 28, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of
Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages
through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees.

Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October
13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached
him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotels former managers birthday
was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party, when he was
helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and
asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then,
a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he
claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the
celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr.
Filart denied Amay Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.

The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that
when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other.

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave
the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could
have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiffs reaction to
the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them.
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him
out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code.

CASE NUMBER 27