Why Being Mindful May Have More

Benefits Than You Realize: Mindfulness

Improves Both Explicit and Implicit Mood
Regulation
Carina Remmers, Sascha Topolinski &
Sander L.Koole

Mindfulness
ISSN 1868-8527
Mindfulness
DOI 10.1007/s12671-016-0520-1

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Mindfulness
DOI 10.1007/s12671-016-0520-1

ORIGINAL PAPER

Why Being Mindful May Have More Benefits Than You Realize:
Mindfulness Improves Both Explicit and Implicit
Mood Regulation
Carina Remmers 1,2 & Sascha Topolinski 3 & Sander L. Koole 4

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract Prior research has consistently observed that mindfulness facilitates emotion regulation. However, this research
mainly examined explicit, self-reported emotion. Does mindfulness also facilitate regulation of implicit emotional responses? To address this question, the authors induced sadness among a group of healthy volunteers (N = 72), after
which participants performed a mindfulness, distraction, or
rumination exercise. Implicit mood changes were assessed
with the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test and explicit mood changes were assessed with the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule. Participants implicit and explicit negative
mood improved in the mindfulness and distraction groups, but
not in the rumination group. The mindfulness group displayed
greater congruence between implicit and explicit mood than
the other groups. Trait mindfulness was associated with lower
implicitbut not explicitnegative mood across the whole
sample both before and after the strategy induction but did not
moderate the effects of the strategy induction on mood improvement. These findings indicate that mindfulness can facilitate emotion regulation on both implicit and explicit levels.

* Carina Remmers
remmers.carina@gmail.com

Clinical Psychology, University of Hildesheim, Universittsplatz 1,

31141 Hildesheim, Germany

Vivantes Wenckebach Clinic, Clinic for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy

and Psychosomatics, Wenckebachstrae 23, Berlin, Germany

Social Cognition Center Cologne, University of Cologne,

Richard-Strauss-Str. 2, 50931 Kln, Germany

Clinical Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Van der

Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, Netherlands

Keywords Mindfulness . Emotion regulation . Implicit

mood . Rumination

Introduction
When people are mindful, they are focusing on their present
feelings, thoughts, and bodily sensations in a open, accepting,
and non-judgmental manner (Segal et al. 2002). Over the past
decades, many studies have observed positive associations
between mindfulness and life satisfaction (Brown and Ryan
2003). Moreover, mindfulness-based interventions have been
used to treat a wide array of psychological as well as physical
problems (Keng et al. 2011). It is therefore important to learn
more about the psychological mechanisms that can explain the
effects of mindfulness.
One key mechanism by which mindfulness has its beneficial effects is by promoting effective emotion regulation
(Hoelzel et al. 2011; Roemer et al. 2015). When people are
in a mindful state, they are sensitive to emotional cues in their
experiential field (Teper et al. 2013). Moreover, mindfulness
encourages people to non-judgmentally view their emotions
as transient mental events rather than reflections of reality
(Segal et al. 2002). This accepting attitude may thus keep
people from using dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies
such as experiential avoidance (Hayes et al. 1996) and rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008). In short, mindfulness
may allow people to deal with their emotions in a more adaptive manner (Roemer et al. 2015).
In line with the foregoing, trait mindfulness is consistently
correlated with adaptive emotion regulation (e.g., Coffey et al.
2010; Desrosiers et al. 2013; Hill and Updegraff 2012).
Moreover, experimental studies using brief mindfulness inductions in meditation nave participants have supported the
idea that mindfulness fosters adaptive emotion regulation

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(e.g., Arch and Craske 2006; Broderick, 2005; Remmers et al.

2015; Sauer and Baer 2012; Singer and Dobson 2007).
Huffziger and Kuehner (2009), for example, induced negative
mood in patients with depression and found that subsequently
encouraging patients to engage in a mindfulness exercise
resulted in lower negative mood. Based on these and other
studies, Roemer et al. (2015) concluded that, Bbrief mindfulness manipulations in meditation nave participants may reduce negative emotional responses.^ (p. 54).
So far, researchers have mostly examined the effects of
mindfulness on explicit, self-reported emotion. However,
there are reasons to suspect that mindfulness may also regulate
implicit emotional responses (Koole et al. 2015; Mauss et al.
2007). First, the non-judgmental awareness in mindfulness
may interrupt automatic reactions to (emotional) experiences
(Segal et al. 2002). Indeed, Moore and Malinowski (2009)
found decreased Stroop interference in meditators, suggesting
that mindfulness interrupts otherwise automatically operating
processes (but see Sauer et al. 2011 for no association between
trait mindfulness and Stroop task performance).
Second, mindfulness may alter emotional responding at
very early, presumably implicit stages of information processing. Empirical support for this idea was found by Teper and
Inzlicht (2013), who observed that mindful acceptance among
experienced meditators was related to a greater (compared to
non-meditators) error-related negativity (ERN), a neural response that occurs within 100 ms after making an error and
is associated with negative emotion (Hajcak 2012). This finding suggests that mindfulness meditation leads to an early and
open engagement with present negative emotions, which may
foster subsequent downregulation of negative emotions. In a
similar vein, Greenberg and Meiran (2013) found that experienced meditators took twice as long than non-meditators to
generate memories that were opposite in valence to a prior
mood induction, indicating that mindfulness fosters increased
emotional engagement.
Other studies on mindfulness and non-self-report indicators
of emotion regulation included measures such as emotional
interference (Ortner et al. 2007), behavioral avoidance (Arch
and Craske 2010), or heart rate recovery after a laboratory
stressor (Bullis et al. 2014). However, the aforementioned
studies did not experimentally manipulate mindfulness, did
not compare mindfulness to other emotion regulation strategies and, crucially, they did not directly measure changes in
implicit emotion regulatory processes following an active
mindfulness exercise. Therefore, an important next step would
be to directly investigate the causal relationship between manipulated mindfulness (and not only trait mindfulness) and
implicit emotional states.
To understand how mindful emotion regulation works, it
further seems important to explore its underlying processes.
For example, the question arises how implicit and explicit
emotional responses orchestrate when being mindful.

Regarding this question, prior research has indicated that

mindfulness increases the congruence between implicit and
explicit responses (Brown and Ryan 2003; Crescentini and
Capurso 2015; Koole et al. 2009). It seems that in a mindful
state, people are more inclined to interpret implicit responses
as valid intuitions (Jordan et al. 2007; Koole et al. 2009).
Consequently, any conflicts between such intuitions and more
explicit beliefs may be more actively confronted with and
resolved during mindfulness (Teper et al. 2013). The result
of this integrative process becomes evident in a higher correlation between implicit and explicit measures. Other emotion
regulation strategies seem to differ from mindfulness in this
respect. Distraction, for example, leads to disengagement
from emotional meanings (Sheppes and Levin 2013),
and rumination tends to block access to emotional experiences by favoring verbal processing of emotional
events (Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008).
Based on these considerations, the aim of the current study
was to link mindfulness more directly to implicit emotion
regulation and its underlying processes. Our main hypothesis
was that mindfulness improves both implicit and explicit negative mood. To test this, we induced sad mood among our
participants and compared the effects of a subsequent mindfulness exercise on implicit and explicit mood measures
against two other emotion regulation strategies, namely, distraction or rumination. As distraction tends to be a rather effective way to quickly down-regulate negative feelings (Van Dillen and Koole 2007) and rumination tends
to prolong negative feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema et al.
2008), we predicted that similar to mindfulness, distraction would lead to mood improvement (Remmers et al. 2015)
whereas rumination would lead to maintenance of negative
mood. Furthermore, we predicted that compared to distraction
and rumination, mindfulness would lead to a higher correlation between implicit and explicit negative mood measures.
Using a homogeneous student sample with overall little mindfulness experience, we did not assume that trait mindfulness
would influence any of the predicted effects.

Method
Participants
Seventy-eight students of the University of Hildesheim as well
as individuals of other professional backgrounds were recruited through flyers on campus. Participants were rewarded by
entering them in a raffle for a 15 AMAZON voucher. Six
participants were excluded as they prematurely terminated the
experiment (n = 3) or refused to undergo the sad mood induction (n = 3). This resulted in a sample of n = 72 (63 female)
participants, who completed the whole experiment. All participants reported German as their native language. The mean

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age of the sample was 22 years (SD = 3.6, range 1835 years,
three participants did not report their age). The majority of
participants (72 %) had no experience with any meditation
or mindfulness practice. Randomization to the three strategy
induction groups leads to the following distribution: mindfulness n = 22 (20 female, mean age 23), distraction n = 27 (23
female, mean age 22), and rumination n = 23 (20 female, mean
age 22).
For our main prediction, the present two (within-subjects)
X 3 (between-subjects) interaction on implicit emotional responses, we conducted a power analysis for the required sample size and assumed a medium effect size (Cohens f = 0.25;
Cohen 1988). Using G*Power (Faul et al. 2007), we determined the required sample size to be Nrequired = 42 to detect
this interaction with a power of 1 = 0.80. The present study
was thus appropriately powered.
Procedure
At the arrival in the lab, participants were seated at a desk with
a computer and were asked to report demographics and to fill
out a questionnaire measuring trait mindfulness. Then, informed consent was obtained from all individual participants
included in the study. After this, participants put on headphones provided on the desk. To induce sad mood, we used
a well-established multi-modal procedure in which participants first listened to a piece of sad music (Adagio in gminor by Tomaso Albinoni, arranged for strings and organ
by Remo Giazotto). At the same time, the Velten technique
(Teasdale and Russell 1983) was realized by asking participants to concentrate on sentences (e.g., I feel hopeless), which
were presented on the screen. After the music had finished,
participants were asked to recall personal events in which they
had felt sad and to concentrate on this feeling. The efficacy of
this procedure of 6 min in length has been supported in previous studies (e.g., Remmers et al. 2015). After the sad mood
induction, participants completed the implicit as well as the
explicit mood measure (sequence counter-balanced across
participants, time 1).
Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
three strategy inductions, namely, mindfulness (n = 22), distraction (n = 27), or rumination (n = 23), each lasting about
5 min. The procedure for inducing rumination and distraction
was based on Morrow and Nolen-Hoekema (1990). The procedure to induce mindfulness was based on recent extensions
of the aforementioned procedures (e.g., Huffziger and
Kuehner 2009; Remmers et al. 2015). In the original paradigm, participants are asked to focus their attention on
sentences printed on cards (Huffziger and Kuehner 2009). In
the present study, however, we used an audio induction, in
which a research assistant verbally read these sentences to
participants via headphones (Singer and Dobson 2007). In this
way, participants could more easily concentrate on and

achieve the respective inner stance, which is an important

methodological aspect of mindfulness inductions (Remmers
et al. 2015). The sentences of each condition were read out by
the same voice in equal pitch and tone to ensure that conditions were parallelized and differential mood regulation effects were not due to mood contagion regarding the voice
(Neumann and Strack 2000).
In the mindfulness condition, sentences prompted participants to adopt a moment-to-moment awareness in an
accepting manner, such as BTake note of your current feelings
and accept them from moment to moment.^ The mindfulness
prompts used in the present study had been pre-tested with
respect to their content validity in an expert-rating study by
Happe (2009). All in all, the present mindfulness prompts are
in accordance with typical instructions taught in mindfulnessbased interventions (Segal et al. 2002). Participants in the
distraction condition were instructed to focus on sentences
drawing the attention away from present feelings, such as
BThink of two birds sitting on a branch.^ In contrast, participants in the rumination condition were asked to realize selfand emotion-focused thoughts such as BThink about what kind
of person you are and who you would like to be.^ To assess
expected changes in explicit and implicit mood, participants
again completed the mood measures after the strategy induction (time 2). Participants completed the mood measures in the
same order as they had done at time 1. Finally, participants
were thanked and debriefed. The whole experimental session
lasted about 45 min.

Measures
We used the Implicit Positive Affect and Negative Affect Test
(IPANAT; Quirin et al. 2009) to measure current implicit
mood. The IPANAT consists of six artificial words
(SAFME, VIKES, TUNBA, TALEP, BELNI, SUKOV),
which are neutral in their affectivity. During the test, each
artificial word is paired with an adjective describing an affective state (positive: happy, cheerful, energetic; negative: helpless, tense, inhibited). Before completing the IPANAT, participants received the following text that introduced them to the
phenomenon of Bonomatopoeia^ and to the task: BIn the following, you will see words from an artificial language. They
are intended to express various moods. In all languages, there
are words that help to express their meanings by the way they
sound (for example the word rattle almost sounds like something rattles). In poetry and literature, this phenomenon is
known as onomatopoeia. Please indicate for each of the following words, how well each artificial words expresses different moods (for example to what extent does the sound of the
artificial word FILNU convey each of the following moods:
happy, helpless, energetic, tense, cheerful, inhibited?). In making these ratings, let yourself be guided by your spontaneous

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feelings.^ (the whole procedure is identical with Quirin et al.

2009, see p. 503).
Participants were asked to indicate for each of the resulting
36 word-adjective combinations to what extent the respective
artificial word (e.g., TUNBA) and the affective adjective (e.g.,
tense) fit to each other on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = does not
fit at all, 2 = fits somewhat, 3 = fits well, 4 = fits very well),
with all these combinations presented in random order. We
computed implicit negative and positive mood scores by averaging over the responses for the 3 negative and 3 positive
adjectives, respectively. Internal consistencies (Cronbachs alphas) ranged from .83 (time 1) to .89 (time 2) for the negative
subscales and from .86 (time 1) to .87 (time 2) for the positive
subscales.
The German version of the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al. 1988; German version:
Krohne et al. 1996) served as a measure for current explicit
mood. Participants could indicate on a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = not at all 5 = very much) to what extent 10 positive
(e.g., alert) and 10 negative (e.g., distressed) words described
their current mood state. We computed mean explicit negative
and positive mood scores by averaging ratings across all adjectives, respectively. Cronbachs alphas ranged from .82
(time 1) to .87 (time2) for the negative scale and from .89
(time 1) to .92 (time 2) for the positive scale.
Trait mindfulness was assessed with the Kentucky
Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS, Baer et al. 2004;
German translation by Strhle et al. 2010). The KIMS
contains 39 items. These, in turn, can be subdivided in
four subscales measuring different components of mindfulness, namely, acting with awareness (AWA, e.g.,
When I am doing something, I am only focused on what
I am doing, nothing else), acting without judgment (AWJ,
e.g., I tend to evaluate whether my perceptions are right
or wrong, reverse-scored item), observing (OBS, e.g., I
notice the smells and aromas of things), and describing
(DES, e.g., I am good at finding the words to describe
my feelings). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale.
The KIMS generally has satisfactory psychometric qualities (Strhle et al. 2010). In the present sample, internal
consistency for the entire KIMS scale was = 0.87
(AWA = 0.70, AWJ = 0.90, OBS = 0.83, DES
= 0.88).
Data Analyses
To test our hypothesis that induced mindfulness and distraction would improve negative mood, whereas induced rumination would prolong negative mood both on implicit and explicit mood measures, we conducted parallel sets of 2 (time:
time 1, time 2, within participants) X 3 (strategy induction:
mindfulness, distraction, rumination; between participants)
analyses of variance (ANOVA) for implicit and explicit mood,

respectively. To further explore the interaction effects between

time and strategy on mood, we conducted planned paired t
tests for each group separately.
To explore participants congruence between implicit and
explicit mood measures, we first conducted several correlation
analyses both across the whole sample and for each strategy
induction group separately. To formally test whether the congruence between implicit and explicit negative mood differed
between strategy groups, we adopted a regression approach
that is commonly used in research on the congruence between
implicit and explicit measures (e.g., Job and Brandstaetter
2009; Koole et al. 2001; Koole et al. 2009;
Schultheiss and Brunstein 1999). Here, implicit negative
mood (z-transformed) is regressed on explicit negative mood,
manipulation condition, and their interaction term. We conducted this analysis to compare mindfulness against distraction and rumination, separately, as well as taken together (see
Results section). The advantage of the regression approach is
that it allows for the statistical testing of interactions between
the effects of experimental factors and implicit-explicit
congruence.

Results
Mood Levels
As a randomization check, we first analyzed whether participants differed with respect to negative and positive mood directly after the sadness induction. As expected, because all
participants underwent the sad mood induction prior to randomization to the respective strategy conditions, the results of
separate ANOVAs showed that participants of the three conditions did not differ in terms of implicit negative and explicit
negative mood, Fs < 1. Likewise, there was no significant difference between groups with regard to implicit positive and
explicit positive mood Fs < 1.7.
Implicit Mood Levels
We first ran a 2 (time) X 3 (strategy induction) mixed ANOVA
on implicit negative mood. Participants generally showed a
decline in implicit negative mood from time 1 (M = 2.02,
SD = 0.41) to time 2 (M = 1.91, SD = 0.44), F(1,69) = 10.69,
p = .002, 2 = .13. Furthermore, the interaction between time
and strategy induction was significant, F(2,69) = 3.67, p = .03,
2 = .1 (other effects F < 1). As shown in in Table 1,
planned t tests revealed that in the mindfulness as well as in
the distraction condition, implicit negative mood decreased
from time 1 to time 2. In contrast, in the rumination condition,
there was no significant change in implicit negative mood (see
also Fig. 1).

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Table 1 Mean scores and standard deviation in parentheses of implicit
and explicit negative mood at time 1 and time 2 for each strategy
induction group
Time 1
M (SD)

Time 2
M (SD)

2.02 (0.35)
2.08 (0.52)

1.82 (0.45)
1.90 (0.50)

3.09
2.63

< .01
.01

1.98 (0.33)

2.00 (0.37)

.42

.68

Mindfulness

1.93 (0.69)

1.45 (0.48)

3.91

< .01

Distraction
Rumination

1.84 (0.59)
1.89 (0.33)

1.40 (0.51)
1.71 (0.65)

5.73
1.75

< .01
.10

Implicit negative mood

Mindfulness
Distraction
Rumination
Explicit negative mood

A 2 (time) X 3 (strategy induction) mixed ANOVA showed

that implicit positive mood increased in all groups from time 1
(M = 2.39, SD = .39) to time 2 (M = 2.52, SD = .41), F(1,
69) = 12.56, p = .001, 2 = .15. Apart from a marginally significant main effect of strategy, F(2,69) = 3.00, p = .056, 2 = .08,
there were no other effects on implicit positive mood, Fs < 1.
Although we did not a priori predict this increase in implicit
positive mood, this finding is in line with research showing that
healthy people often use positive emotions to counter-regulate
against stressful encounters (Tugade and Fredrickson 2004).
Explicit Mood Levels
We next analyzed the effect of strategy induction on explicit
mood. A 2 (time) X 3 (strategy induction) mixed ANOVA on
explicit negative mood revealed a statistically significant effect of time on explicit negative mood, F(1,69) = 40.08,
p < .001, 2 = .37. All participants showed a decline in explicit
negative mood from time 1 (M = 1.88, SD = .58) to time 2
(M = 1.52, SD = .55). The interaction between time and strategy was marginally significant, F(2,69) = 2.71, p = .07, 2 = .07
(other effects F < 1). The results of planned paired t tests are
shown in Table 1. Those indicate that in the mindfulness as
well as in the distraction condition, explicit negative emotional responses decreased from time 1 to time 2. In the rumination
condition, there was no significant change in explicit negative
mood.

Negative Mood

3.00

Time 1

Time 2

2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
implicit

explicit

Mindfulness

implicit

explicit

Distraction

implicit

explicit

Rumination

Fig. 1 Implicit and explicit negative mood as a function of strategy

induction group and time point. Error bars signify 1 standard deviation

A 2 (time) X 3 (strategy induction) mixed ANOVA on

positive mood yielded a general increase in explicit positive
mood from time 1 (M = 2.27, SD = .74) to time 2 (M = 2.55,
SD = .84), F(1,69) = 14.91, p < .001, 2 = .18 (other effects,
Fs < 1). As for implicit positive mood, this increase in explicit
positive mood may reflect a general resilience pattern (Tugade
and Fredrickson 2004).
Congruence Between Explicit and Implicit Mood
Our second hypothesis was related to the congruence between
implicit and explicit mood. In a preliminary analysis, we first
explored participants congruence between implicit and explicit mood after the sadness induction (and prior to the strategy induction). Across the whole sample, implicit and explicit
negative mood was weakly but significantly associated at time
1, r = .24, p = .04. The correlation between implicit and explicit positive mood across the whole sample was marginally significant, r = .20, p = .08. Across the whole sample, there was a
significant correlation between implicit and explicit negative
mood after the strategy induction (time 2), r = .30, p = .01.
There was a weaker and non-significant correlation between
implicit and explicit positive mood across the whole sample at
time 2, r = .19, p = .11.
To explore whether the three strategy groups differed in
terms of congruence before the strategy manipulation, we
computed further analyses. Regarding negative mood, correlational analyses revealed non-significant or marginal correlations (mindfulness r = .38, p = .08, distraction r = .21, p = .29,
rumination r = .15, p = .49). To formally test whether the congruence between implicit and explicit negative mood differed
between strategy groups, we next regressed implicit negative
mood (z-transformed) at time 1 on explicit negative mood,
manipulation condition (dummy-coded 1 for mindfulness
and 1 for rumination and distraction, taken together), and their
interaction term. The only significant effect was found for
explicit negative mood, b = .25, t(68) = 2.05, p = .04. Neither
condition nor the interaction significantly predicted implicit
negative mood in this model, R2 = .06, p = .25. Thus, implicit
and explicit negative moods were equally associated in all
conditions at time 1. We ran the same analyses for positive
mood. Correlational analyses revealed that in none of the
groups implicit and explicit positive mood were significantly
correlated (distraction r = .34, p = .09, mindfulness r = .05,
p = .83, rumination r = .26, p = .23). Thus, prior to the strategy
induction, participants did not differ in terms of congruence
between implicit and explicit positive mood.
Recall that we predicted that one means by which the mindfulness exercise leads to down-regulation of negative mood is
by promoting a higher congruence between implicit and explicit negative mood. The hypothesis was therefore that implicit and explicit negative mood would be more strongly
associated in participants who had completed the mindfulness

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exercise than in participants from the distraction and rumination conditions. Correlational analyses for each group separately indicated that in none of the groups there was a significant association between implicit and explicit positive mood.
However, in line with our predictions, we found that in the
mindfulness group, implicit and explicit negative mood scores
were strongly and significantly associated, r = .58, p < .006,
whereas implicit and explicit negative moods were not significantly associated in the distraction group, r = .12, n.s., and the
rumination group, r = .27, n.s.
We proceeded by exploring whether the congruence between implicit and explicit negative mood was significantly
stronger in the mindfulness condition than in the distraction
and rumination conditions by again using the regression
approach suggested by Job and Brandstaetter (2009) and
Koole et al. (2009). We first examined whether the distraction
and rumination conditions differed in terms of their associations between implicit and explicit negative mood. We
regressed implicit negative mood on explicit negative mood,
manipulation condition (dummy-coded 1 for rumination and
1 for distraction), and their interaction term. None of the variables significantly predicted implicit negative mood in this
model, R2 = .05, p = .53, indicating that distraction and rumination did not differ in terms of congruence between explicit
and implicit levels of mood. Therefore, in the next analysis,
we combined the latter two conditions and compared them
jointly against the mindfulness condition.
We ran the same analysis by entering explicit negative mood
(z-transformed), manipulation condition (coded 1 for mindfulness and 1 for rumination and distraction, taken together),
and their interaction term. The analysis revealed a significant
main effect for explicit negative mood, b = .45, t(68) = 3.21,
p < .003. The interaction between manipulation condition and
explicit negative mood was marginally significant, b = .26,
t(68) = 1.86, p = .06 (inserting explicit negative mood at time
1 still yielded an interaction of p = .08). The overall fit of the
model was R2 = .15, p = .01. In a parallel set of follow-up analyses, we compared the mindfulness condition against the rumination and distraction conditions, separately. These analyses
yielded significant main effects of explicit negative mood,
ts > 2.4, ps < .003, and marginal interaction effects between
condition and explicit negative mood for the comparison between mindfulness and rumination, b = .28, t(40) = 1.94,
p = .06, and the comparison between mindfulness and distraction, b = .24, t(45) = 1.65, p = .11. Thus, although the predicted pattern was only marginally significant, implicit and explicit
negative mood was more strongly associated in the mindfulness
condition than in the distraction and rumination conditions.
Effects of Trait Mindfulness
Recall that our third hypothesis was that the effects of trait
mindfulness would be largely independent of the effects of

induced mindfulness. We examined this hypothesis separately

for mood levels and for congruence between implicit and explicit mood.
Trait Mindfulness and Mood Levels
As a preliminary step, we examined how trait mindfulness was distributed across the experimental groups:
mindfulness M = 3.4, SD = .40, distraction M = 3.4,
SD = .43, rumination M = 3.4, SD = .38. The results of
an ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference in trait mindfulness between the three strategy induction groups, F < 1. We next investigated whether trait
mindfulness moderated the effects of our experimental
induction on implicit mood changes. Results revealed
that this was not the case, Fs < 1. The only significant
effect to emerge from the analyses was a simple main
effect: trait mindfulness and implicit negative mood
were negatively associated at time 1, r = .45,
p < .001, and time 2, r = .36, p < .003. Thus, across
both time 1 and time 2, participants with higher levels
of trait mindfulness displayed less implicit negative
mood compared to participants with lower levels of trait
mindfulness. With regard to explicit mood changes, results revealed that trait mindfulness did not qualify the
effect of our experimental manipulations, F < 1.
Furthermore and in contrast to implicit mood, there
were no significant associations between trait mindfulness and explicit mood.
Trait Mindfulness and Congruence Between Implicit
and Explicit Mood
We explored whether participants levels of self-reported
mindfulness were related to congruence between implicit
and explicit negative mood after the sadness induction (time
1) and at the end of the session (after the strategy induction;
time 2). For this, we regressed implicit negative mood at each
time-point on explicit negative mood, trait mindfulness, and
their interaction term. At time 1, the only significant effect was
found for trait mindfulness, b = .30, t(68) = 2.62, p = .01,
showing that participants with higher levels of self-reported
mindfulness reported lower implicit negative mood at time 1.
At time 2, there was a significant main effect for explicit
negative mood, b = .28, t(68) = 2.62, p = .01 and trait mindfulness, b = .32, t(68) = 2.87, p < .01. The interaction between
trait mindfulness and explicit negative mood was significant at
neither of the time points, ts < 1. These findings suggest that
even though trait mindfulness was related to lower implicit
negative mood at both times points, it did not affect the extent
to which participants levels of implicit and explicit negative
mood were associated.

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Discussion
In the present experiment, we examined whether a short mindfulness induction improves not only explicit, self-reported
negative mood, but also implicit negative mood. To address
this question, we investigated changes in implicit and explicit
mood after a sad mood induction among participants who
engaged in either a mindfulness, distraction, or rumination
exercise. Results revealed that positive mood increased in all
conditions across both implicit and explicit measures. With
regard to down-regulation of negative mood, results confirmed our main hypothesis and showed that only participants
in the mindfulness and distraction groups displayed significant mood improvement. Participants in the rumination condition maintained their negative mood, a finding that is in line
with previous research on the effects of rumination on mood
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008). Importantly, we observed this
pattern of results across both implicit and explicit measures of
negative mood. Thus, the present experiment extends previous empirical research on the interplay between mindfulness
and emotion regulation and demonstrates that a short mindfulness exercise leads to the down-regulation of negative
mood on both explicit and implicit levels by directly assessing
implicit mood changes.
The current findings fit with the idea that the non-judgmental, non-reactive attitude that people adopt during mindfulness
practice may interrupt otherwise automatically operating processes (Crescentini and Capurso 2015; Moore and
Malinowski 2009; Segal et al. 2002). This de-automization
process may help people to accept negative feelings rather
than automatically being drawn into self-perpetuating cycles
of dysfunctional responding to negative emotions. Notably,
we do not assume that the mood-regulatory effect of mindfulness is the result of repression of negative emotions. Cousin
and Crane (2015) for example found that a mindfulness-based
intervention leads to a decreased use of disengagement coping
styles. Thus, in a mindful state it is BOK^ to have negative
feelings (Segal et al. 2002). Correspondingly, recent work has
shown that during very early processing stages (i.e., within
100 ms of encountering an emotional stimulus), mindfulness
fosters sensitivity to negative emotion (Teper et al. 2013).
Combined with our findings, we tentatively conclude that
the down-regulation of negative emotional responses in a state
of mindfulness might be based on an early and accepting
detection of negative emotional cues, which fosters subsequent integrative cognitive processing. Future work is needed
to assess which ingredient of the mindfulness exercise (e.g.,
acceptance or present-moment awareness) may lead to the
observed mood changes.
One empirical marker of mindfulness-induced integrative
processing may be a higher congruence between implicit and
explicit mood, evidenced by the higher correlation between implicit and explicit emotional responses (Brown and Ryan 2003;

Koole et al. 2009). Indeed, in our study, participants from the

mindfulness group displayed higher congruence between implicit and explicit negative mood measures compared to participants in the distraction and rumination conditions. Thus,
the latter findings suggest that even though distraction and
mindfulness are comparably successful in mood improvement, they may down-regulate negative emotion through different psychological mechanisms. From prior research, we
know that distraction blocks cognitive processing of emotional information (Van Dillen and Koole 2007) and leads to disengagement from emotional meanings (Sheppes and Levin
2013). Mindfulness, in contrast, seems to down-regulate negative emotion in a more complex and dynamic manner, by
facilitating cognitive access to implicit negative emotional
responses (through openness and acceptance), which is
followed by subsequent down-regulation of negative emotion.
An important consequence of this processing sequence is that
mindfulness may bring implicit emotional responses into
awareness. In so doing, mindfulness may foster a more balanced mental state, in which conflicts between different levels
of processing are resolved (Baumann et al. 2007; Crescentini
and Capurso 2015).
With regard trait mindfulness, the current findings revealed
in line with our hypotheses that trait mindfulness did not affect
the impact of strategy induction on mood improvement. The
only significant effect that emerged for trait mindfulness was
that higher levels of trait mindfulness were overall associated
with lower levels of implicit negative mood.
Furthermore, the present findings did not confirm earlier
findings by Brown and Ryan (2003, Study 3), who found that
trait mindfulness predicted congruence between implicit and
explicit affect. However, the present study was not explicitly
designed to provide a close replication of Brown and Ryan
(2003, Study) and, indeed, differed in several notable respects
from that research, by (a) including different measures of implicit and explicit affect; (b) including an experimental induction of mindfulness, distraction, and rumination. Also, it could
be that higher congruence between implicit and explicit mood
may only be found in participants with more mindfulness
experience or in a sample with a higher range or trait mindfulness. In the current sample, the majority of participants
were inexperienced with mindfulness practice. Thus, more
research is needed to address the generalizability of the link
between trait mindfulness and congruence between implicit
and explicit measures.
The present experiment inevitably has limitations. First, it
should be noted that even though our sample size was appropriately powered with respect to the expected interaction between manipulation and time on implicit negative mood, the
observed effects were rather small and it is therefore desirable
to confirm the robustness of our findings in subsequent studies.
Even though mood changes were statistically significant, the
meaning of the current findings for real-life or clinical samples

Author's personal copy

Mindfulness

still needs to be examined. Moreover, as the current mindfulness exercise was rather brief and our participants had little
experience with mindfulness meditation, generalizing our
findings to clinical samples or samples with extensive
mindfulness experience should be done with care. According
to this, Chiesa et al. (2013) suggest that neural correlates underlying mindful emotion regulation depend on mindfulness
practice. Overall, future research should disentangle the potentially differential effects of long-term mindfulness experience
versus short-term mindfulness interventions used in our study.
In addition, as a manipulation check was missing the in the
current study, it may still be that observed implicit and explicit
mood changes were the result of natural recovery. We suggest
that upcoming research should investigate whether short mindfulness interventions used in laboratory settings effectively alter
levels of state mindfulness or not. More generally, in future
studies, researchers would do well in clearly defining whether
they investigate mindfulness as a state or trait. It should be
explored whether the effects deriving from active mindfulness
exercises are comparable to processes related to measures of
trait mindfulness. Consequently, future research should clearly
distinguish between research on trait mindfulness and research
investigating the effects of mindfulness interventions designed
to increase mindfulness (Cousin and Crane 2015).
A further critical point is the unexpected increase in explicit
and implicit positive mood that we observed across the session
in all participants. We tentatively suggest that the observed
increases in positive mood reflect a general resilience mechanism that counter-regulates the effects of negative emotion
(Tugade and Fredrickson 2004). However, we cannot rule out
that the increase in positive mood signifies that the negative
mood induction lost potency from time 1 to time 2.
Furthermore, we would like to state that the IPANAT as a measure for implicit negative mood has limitations. Some emotion
regulation processes might operate within milliseconds (Quirin
et al. 2009; Mauss et al. 2007). If these processes come into
question, researchers should draw on reaction time (e.g., the
IAT) or physiological measures. Additionally, the IPANAT
does not prescribe a restricted time window within which participants have to provide their responses. Therefore, deliberate
processes may disturb the measurement. Finally, the present
experiment, it did not include a condition without specific emotion regulation instructions. Future research in this domain
would do well to include an uninstructed regulation condition.
These caveats notwithstanding, the present research sheds
important new light on the interface between mindfulness and
emotion regulation. It appears that mindfulness fosters emotion
regulation not only on explicit levels but also on implicit levels.
Especially with regard to highly prevalent forms of psychopathology such as depression, it may be of clinical relevance, to
bring implicit mood states under control by preventing the activation of dysfunctional, negative automatic feelings. Recent dual process models of depression (Beevers 2005) suggest that

dysfunctional automatic processes (Teasdale 1988) play a key

role when it comes to relapse in depression. Even though the
current findings are preliminary, one mechanism by which
mindfulness exhibits its beneficial effects may be that mindfulness not only down-regulates negative mood on an implicit level
but that mindfulness also helps to establish congruence between
implicit and explicit emotional states. The emotional benefits of
being mindful may thus be greater than people realize.
Acknowledgments This work was supported by a Consolidator Grant
from the European Research Council (ERC-2011-StG_20101124).
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Informed Consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual
participants included in the study.
Ethical Approval All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the
institutional research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration
and its later amendments.

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