SC upholds hierarchy of courts in dismissing directly filed certiorari petition

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
05 - Paloma v. Mora, et al (2005)

Doctrines:
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty.
Facts:
Nilo Paloma was appointed the General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District by its Board of Directors
in 1993. In 1995, his services were terminated by virtue of a Resolution. The resolution was passed by the members of the
Board of Directors. Mora was one of the members.
Pained by his termination, Paloma filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction with
damages and with the prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager. He filed this petition before the RTC.
Paloma argued that his dismissal was a capricious and arbitrary act of the Board. He claimed that he was denied due
process since the grounds relied upon to terminate him were never made a subject of a complaint nor was he notified and
made to explain. Mora and the other members of the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and want of
cause of action. The RTC then dismissed the petition for being a premature cause of action.
Meanwhile, Paloma also filed a Complaint with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) against the same
respondents for alleged violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for illegal dismissal. The CSC dismissed Palomas
complaint as well.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the appeal filed by Paloma. The CA upheld the RTC decision,
dismissing the case for lack of merit.
Hence, Paloma filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
Issues:
1. W/N the CA committed any reversible error
2. W/N mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors to reinstate Paloma as General Manager
3. W/N the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal
Held/Ratio:
1. NO
2. NO
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court defines mandamus. It provides that When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered command the respondent, immediately or at some other time
to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of respondent.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of
a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.
In the case at bar, PD 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 provides that the general manager shall
serve at the pleasure of the board of directors. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors
of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate Paloma because the board has the discretionary power to
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remove him. Palomas appointment was temporary and co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors.
Paloma was at the mercy of the appointing powers since his appointment can be terminated at any time for
any cause. Although as a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law, there was no need for prior notice or due hearing before Paloma could be
separated from office. The special enabling charter of Local Water Districts serves as an exception to the
mentioned general rule.
The SC also cited Section 14 of the Administrative Code of 1987 which states that a co-terminus appointment is
based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure. The SC has
previously sustained the validity of dismissal of civil servants who serve at the pleasure of the appointing power.
The SC also referred to RA 9286, a relatively recent law which amended PD 198. RA 9286 provides that the
General Manager of Water Districts shall not be removed form office, except for cause and after due process.
Unfortunately for Paloma, RA 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law to pending cases and must be taken
to be of prospective application.
3. YES
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical matters. Hence, the SC held that quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC
are better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees in the Civil Service.
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06 - Quesada v. DOJ (2006)

Doctrines:
The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Extraordinary writs by the SC should only be exercised when absolutely necessary or where important and serious
reasons exist.
Facts:
TERUEL filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (Mandaluyong) an affidavit-complaint charging QUESADA
(Petitioner), CAMACHO and CORGADO with the crime of estafa under Art 315 Sec 2 and 3 of the RPC. TERUEL
alleges that he paid group, who represented themselves as officers of VSH Group Corporation (VSH), P65,000 relying
on their representation that 2 units of an internet access devise (via television) shall be delivered to him. However, none
was delivered despite repeated demands.
It was only petitioner-QUESADA who filed a counter-affidavit. He stated that he and the others formed VSH, for
the purpose of pooling the commissions that they will receive as Star Consultant Trainers for FOM Philippines and then
dividing the profits according to their agreement. But although he admitted that there was a failure to deliver the 2 units to
TERUEL, the same was not due to their alleged fraudulent representations since they were merely agents of FOM
Philippines and that it was the latter who had difficulties in delivery due to the shortage of supplies of the device, which
the group only learned after the sale.
Assistant City Prosecutor TACLA issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against QUESADA, CAMACHO
and CORGADO, and recommended for the filing of the information. Consequently, the information of estafa was filed
with the RTC of Mandaluyong and later raffled to Branch 208.
Meanwhile, QUESADA filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review challenging Investigating Prosecutor
TACLAs Resolution. The DOJ issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. The MR subsequently filed was also
dismissed.
While the RTC was hearing the estafa case, petitioner filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari alleging that the
Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its dismissal of
QUESADAs petition. The latter contends, that the element of fraud or deceit was not present and there was no evidence
that will prove that the accuseds promise to deliver the purchased items was made in bad faith.
Issues:
1. W/N the SC should take charge of the petition for certiorari?
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the present petition was directly filed with the SC, in utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure must be filed with the CA whose
decision may then be appealed to the SC by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. A direct
recourse to the SC is warranted only where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the
petition to justify such actions.
Jurisprudence state that the SC is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. As a rule, it should not be burdened
with causes in the first instance. Exception to that, are extraordinary writs which should be exercised only when
absolutely necessary or where important and serious reasons exist.
It is worthy to remember, that the SCs original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is shared with the RTC
and the CA. However, the hierarchy of courts must still be strictly maintained, in the determination of the venue
of appeals, and also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs.
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In the present case, the SC was not able to discern any special and compelling reason to justify the direct filing
with it of the petition. It clear that the petition should be dismissed.
Even assuming that the petition can be filed directly with the SC, the same must fail. The issue raised by the
QUESADA on the absence of fraud or deceit is both a question of fact and a manner of defense, better left to the
trial court after the parties have adduced their respective evidence. Note that the preliminary investigation is
merely an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there was sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be heard for
trial. A finding of probably cause is merely concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty.
The SC thus holds that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse his discretion (performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction)
07 - Ngo Bun Tiong v. Judge Sayo (CFI of Caloocan) & Galauran and Pilares Construction (1988)
(Doctrine of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts, CFI of Manila and CFI of Caloocan)
Doctrines:
Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate
courts should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
Facts:
February 1976, the CFI of Manila rendered a decision in the case of Caltex vs Pilares Construction ordering
the defendant to pay plaintiff P67,052.32 plus interest, attorneys fees and costs. Having become final and executory,
the court issued a Writ of Execution on August 1976 and an Alias Writ of Execution on December 1976 to collect
the balance of the judgment debt.
But before the issuance of the Alias Writ of Execution, Galauran and Pilares Construction (private
respondent) filed with the same court an Opposition to the Motion for Writ of Execution and a Motion for
Reconsideration and To Set Aside Decision. Both motions were denied by the CFI of Manila and even its motion for new
trial filed later. Elevating it to the CA for certiorari and mandamus, the petition was dismissed.
January 6, 1977, the deputy sheriff served a notice of levy and a copy of the Alias Writ of Execution on Galauran
and Pilares Construction. After due posting of notices of sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued to the Ngo Bun Tiong
(petitioner), who was the highest bidder for P80,000.
The dismissed petition in the CA was elevated to the SC on review for certiorari but was also denied. But, before
the issuance of the SC decision and despite the pendency of the case, private respondent filed a complaint with the CFI
of Caloocan City, against Ngo Bun Tiong and the deputy sheriff for Declaration of Nullity of the Auction Sale and
Damages and Motion to Annul Certificate of Sale and to declare alleged auction sale with the CFI of Manila, as null and
void.
On the same date, the CFI of Caloocan issued a temporary restraining order enjoining deputy sheriff and Ngo
Bun Tiong, and all other persons acting for and in their behalf, from taking out any equipment from Galauran & Pilares
Construction Company, and from moving out the equipment and also prohibiting them from selling the same.
Petitioner filed and MR of the temporary restraining order but CFI of Caloocan declared the motion moot
and academic. Aside from this, other orders were issued by CFI of Caloocan wherein it declared petitioner in contempt of
court for refusal to return the properties of Galauran and Pilares Construction despite petitioners assurance while on the
witness stand, that he is ready to comply with the court order and an order declaring deputy sheriff and petitioner Ngo
Bun Tiong, in default, for their failure as defendants to file any responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
Thus the instant petition in the SC.
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Issues:
1. W/N a Court of First Instance or any of its branch, has jurisdiction to annul or set aside, decisions rendered by
another CFI or any of its branch?
Held/Ratio:
1. NO!
It has long been settled that no court has the power to interfere by injunction, with the judgments or decrees
of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by
injunction.
Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. For the simple reason that the power to open, modify or
vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to the court in which the judgment was
rendered.
In this case, private respondent Galauran and Pilares Construction, insists that the CFI of Caloocan has the
authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance and to act on the alleged irregularities of the execution sale already
rendered final and executory by another Court of First Instance, CFI of Manila, and subsequently to order the
return of the properties sold at public auction to them. This contention is untenable.
Also, the SC has ruled in a long line of decisions that the filing of several cases against the same party over the
same issue, after the appellate court has decided adversely against them, constitutes contumacious defiance
of the authority of and flagrant imposition on the courts and impedes the speedy administration of justice.
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08 - Ella v. Judge Salanga (1970) (Jurisdiction)

Doctrines:
The different branches of a Court do not have separate jurisdictions. Jurisdiction is given to the court, not upon
any particular branch or Judge thereof. Proceedings may be continued before another branch.
However, the branches being coordinate and co-equal, one branch cannot unduly interfere with the processes and
proceedings of another branch.
Facts:
The plaintiffs Ella et. al. entered into negotiations with the Secretary of Public Works through the Highway
District Engineer of Ilocus Sur to sell a parcel of land in Vigan to the government for use as a sanitarium. The government
was then allowed to occupy the land, but the Highway District Engineer did not pay the purchase price. He also began
discussions to buy another piece of land for use as sanitarium.
A complaint was filed by plaintiffs and raffled to Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance in Vigan presided by
Judge Dumaual, asking that defendants comply with their agreement. Subsequently, the following happened: Judge
Dumaual died; Judge Nicolas took over the case; Branch 2 was moved to the city of Narvacan; trial began; Judge Nicolas
was transferred to Mindoro.
Since the property was located in Vigan and the parties lived there, a Motion Ex Parte to Return the Case to
Vigan and Set the Same for Trial was filed by the defendants with Judge Salanga, who was both the Executive Judge of
the CFI of Ilocos Sur and Judge of Branch 3, which was in Vigan. He issued an order directing the transfer of the records
of the case to his Branch 3 until further proceedings.
The plaintiffs filed a motion questioning this order on the ground that after the hearing had been commenced in
Branch 2, jurisdiction to hear and decide the case had been firmly lodged in said branch to the exclusion of other
branches. Judge Salanga sustained his own order. Thus, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed seeking
to set aside his orders.
Issue:
1. W/N different branches of the same court exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others
2. W/N there was undue interference between courts in this case
Held:
1. NO. The different branches of a Court of First Instance of one province do not possess jurisdictions independent
of and incompatible with each other. Jurisdiction is given to the court, not upon any particular branch or Judge
thereof.
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of are coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which
is only one Court of First Instance. Trial may be held or proceedings continued by and before another branch or
judge. The apportionment and distribution of cases do not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction; the
jurisdiction continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any
branch or judge of the court.
2. NO. One question here is whether the transfer of the said case from Branch 2 to Branch 3 constituted undue
interference with the processes of the former. For the branches being coordinate and co-equal, one branch or the
judge thereof cannot unduly interfere with the processes and proceedings of another branch.
Here, however, the petitioners charge that the transfer was part of a deliberate and concerted scheme is not borne
out by the record. The petitioners have not cited any evidence of undue interest in the case on the part of said
Judge. Branch 2 had no judge. Judge Salanga, although at the time of the motion had already been appointed to
Branch 4, had authority from the Department of Justice to continue holding court at Vigan, where he was
Presiding Judge of Branch 3 prior to his appointment to Branch 4. The property and the parties were in Vigan.
The transfer of the case was not an unusual one under the circumstances.
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09 - Villamor v. Salas (1991) (recovery of ownership of land, administrative case)

Doctrines:
The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now RTC) being co-equal, may NOT interfere with each
others cases, judgments and orders.
A judge is NOT liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it
Facts:
[This case entails a lot of petitions and dismissals (file lang nang file) VERY CONFUSING. I think just stick to the main
issue]
A civil case (Naval v. Carlos) for recovery of ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and raffled to the
sala of Judge Villamor (Petitioner). While the civil case was pending, Carlos filed criminal cases for qualified theft
against Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor. Due to the pendency
of the civil case, the criminal cases were temporarily archived.
Naval won the civil case and was declared the lawful owner so Carlos was ordered to vacate the land. Carlos
wanted to activate the archived criminal case. But since Naval was declared the lawful owner, Judge Villamor dismissed
the criminal cases. Judge Villamor also granted execution pending appeal of his decision.
Carlos filed an administrative case against Judge Villamor charging him with illegal orders and an unjust
decision. The SC dismissed this case. Dissatisfied, Carlos filed a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor.
Summons were given but instead of answering, Judge Villamor filed a case for direct contempt against Carlos and his
lawyer (Atty. Guerrero) for degrading the dignity of the court and was sentenced to 5 days imprisonment and pay P500.
Carlos filed a petition for certiorari against the Judge. The SC promptly restrained Judge Villamor from
enforcing order of contempt against Carlos and Atty. Guerrero. SC later annulled the contempt order.
Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and the trial court granted
the motion. CA and SC affirmed. UNFAZED BY SETBACK (di talaga tumitigil), Carlos and Atty. Guerrero filed
separate complaints for damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt.
IMPORTANT (issue comes out from this): Atty. Guerreros complaint for damages was raffled and presided
over by Judge Aleonar (RTC) while Carlos complaint was raffled and presided over by Judge Salas (RTC). Judge
Villamor filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by Judge Aleonar so he filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with restraining order. The SC issued a restraining order against Judge Aleonar to stop him from
proceeding. Judge Villamor filed motion to dismiss with Carlos complaint but was denied ALSO by Judge Salas. He
filed a second petition for certiorari and prohibition and the SC restrained Judge Salas from proceeding.
Issues:
1. W/N Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages against Judge Villamor for
allegedly having rendered an unjust orders of direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer
Held/Ratio:
1. NO
No RTC can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a judgment of ANOTHER RTC and
sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul with the principle that only higher appellate
courts, CA and SC, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.
To allow Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against Judge Villamor, a
co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the judgment of a
co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of a RTC
being co-equal, MAY NOT interfere with each others cases, judgments, and orders.
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ONLY AFTER the appellate court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial judges errors were committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be promulgated.
10 - Dela Rosa v. Roldan (2006) (unlawful detainer, 500sqm portion of land)

Doctrines:
The mere fact that defendant raises the defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings does not deprive the
MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case.
Facts:
Spouses Rivera sold their lands to Arsenio and Asuncion Dulay. Spouses Dulay took possession of the lots,
except a 500sqm portion which was occupied by Gideon (Asuncions brother) and Angela dela Rosa and Corazon
Medina. Subsequently, spouses Dulay made demands to dela Rosa, et al, to vacate the premises because it will be used by
Dulays daughters. Spouses Dulay filed a complaint for recovery of possession with the CFI of Tarlac. Dulay contended
that the occupation by the defendants were at their mere tolerance only. Dela Rosa contended that they were co-owners
with Dulay and they only agreed that the name of the lot shall be placed under Dulays (TRUST). Asuncion denied having
bought the land with her brother and said that her signature in dela Rosas documents was forged. CFI ruled in favor of
spouses Dulay. Spouses dela Rosa appealed to CA. Meanwhile, Gideon died, and his wife continued residing without
paying rentals. Arsenio Dulay and his children (Asuncion already died) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
dela Rosa and Medina in the MTC. Dela Rosa filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of
title and damages on the other hand. MTC rendered a judgment in favor of dela Rosa and Medina and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (the court held that this is not a case about unlawful
detainer but about the ownership of the land). RTC reversed the decision, CA affirmed this decision.
Issues:
1. W/N the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of Dulay
Held/Ratio:
1. MTC had jurisdiction of the case.
SC agreed with CA that the action of the respondents against the petitioners was one of unlawful detainer, and
that the MTC had jurisdiction over the same. It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an
action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for. Though the petitioners
claimed ownership over of the property in their answer to the complaint and alleged that respondents were
merely trustees thereof, these did not divest the MTC of its inceptial jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful
detainer of respondents.
Section 3 of RA 7691, amending section 33(2) of BP 129, which was the law in effect when respondents filed
their complaint against petitioners, provides that MeTC, MTC, MCTC exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; provided that, when in such cases, defendant raises the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issues of possession.
It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution, independent of any claim of
ownership by any party litigant, is: who is entitled to the physical and material possession of the property
involved? The mere fact that defendant raises the defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings does not
deprive the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where defendant raises the
question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. However, the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final, as it may be
the subject of separate proceeding specifically brought to settle the issue. Hence, the bare fact that petitioners, in
their answer to the complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the property as trustors of a constructive
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trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case and decide the same on its merit.
11 - Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (1968) (jurisdiction fifteen years after)

Doctrines:
Exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings:
Laches
Facts:
In 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 or RA 296 was enacted. It mandated that civil cases involving claims less than
P2000 will be under the original jurisdiction of the lesser courts (Justice of the Peace). Barely a month after its effectivity,
on July 19, spouses Serafin and Felicitas Tijam filed a money collection suit against spouses Magdaleno and Lucia
Sibonghanoy for P1,908 at the CFI of Cebu. They prayed for a writ of attachment but it was dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by the defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.
The Tijams won the suit, and the court issued a writ of execution against the defendants, but it remained
unsatisfied so the Tijams moved to issue a writ of execution against Manila Surety. Manila Surety opposed the writ,
saying that there was a failure to prosecute and that no demand was made upon them. They also prayed for an affirmative
relief: that they be released of any liability under the bond in question. The Courts denied Manila Suretys opposition, so
they appealed to the CA saying that a summary hearing should have first been conducted pursuant to the Rules of Coart,
but they did not raise lack of jurisdiction. The CA affirmed the lower court. In 1963, or 15 years after the original
case, after receiving the decision, Manila Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss the case, citing lack of jurisdiction for
the first time.
Issues:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, Manila Surety is barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction. It became a quasi-party to the case in
1948, when it filed a counter-bond with the Sibonghanoys. Throughout those 15 years, it actively participated in
the case. Not only did it oppose a motion for execution, it also asked for affirmative relief. These actions show
that it recognized the jurisdiction of the CFI. It cannot now raise the Courts lack of jurisdiction just because an
adverse decision against it was made. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, its too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. This doctrine is founded
on public policy.
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12 - Calimlim v. Ramirez (1982) (Cancellation of TCT, court sitting as cadastral court)

Doctrine:
The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be
presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the
party who filed such suit or proceeding.
When a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action,
such act may not be considered a sufficient basis of estoppel.
Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for
lack of jurisdiction within 10 years from its finality.
Facts:
In 1961, a judgment was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against one Miguel Magali
(one of the children of Domingo Magali and Modesta Calimlim). The Notice of Levy issued in September 1961 indicated
a parcel of land registered under TCT 9138 under the name of Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim
(petitioner). The levy also specified was only against all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the
defendant Miguel Magali over the parcel of land described in the title. The Certificate of Sale issued in favor of
Independent also indicated the same import.
However, the final Deed of Sale issued by the sheriff on January 1963 indicated that the sale was with respect to
the entire parcel of land described in TCT 9138 and NOT over the rights and interests only of Miguel Magali. On
February 1967, Independent filed a petition to compel Miguel Magali to surrender the copy of TCT 9138. Miguel could
not comply because he was not the owner and the title was not registered in his name. Independent then filed an exparte petition for the cancellation of TCT 9138, and this was granted. TCT 9138 and a new TCT, TCT 68568, was
issued in favor of Independent.
On November 1967 petitioner filed with respondent court, sitting as a cadastral court, a petition praying for the
cancellation of TCT 68568. The respondent court dismissed this petition. Petitioners did not appeal this dismissal.
Instead, they instituted a separate civil case (Civil Case SCC 190) praying for the cancellation of the conveyance and
sale to private respondent Francisco Ramos, who bought the land from Independent. Ramos failed to obtain a new title to
the property by virtue of the annotated adverse claim.
Francisco then filed for motion to dismiss Civil Case SCC 180 on the ground of estoppel by former judgment.
This was granted. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the present action.
Issue
1. W/N the dismissal of Civil Case SCC 180 was proper.
2. W/N petitioner was barred by laches.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
Civil Case SCC 180 cannot be barred by res judicata by the prior action instituted by petitioners, because that first
action invoked the courts authority as a cadastral court. As cadastral court, it had limited jurisdiction and
cannot properly pass over the ownership and title to real property. One of the crucial elements of res judicata is
that the tribunal that decided the first action must be clothed with proper authority to resolve the issues therein.
The issues raised by petitioner to cancel TCT 68568 pertain to the ownership and title to the subject property.
This action was presented to the cadastral court in the exercise of a limited jurisdiction. The petition raised a
controversial matter which was beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to decide.
The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is a matter of law and may not be conferred
by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of the court may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal. The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or estoppel.
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2. NO.
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to the property
owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or
person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latters title. It is unfortunate that in
pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court,
instead of its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction.
Upon the first petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or
only two and one-half years after the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. The Court saw no
unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs
to them. They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable
length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an
implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be
deemed barred by estoppel by laches.
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13 - Dela Cruz v. CA (2006) (fire / unlawful detainer)

Doctrines:
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by law to a court to entertain, hear, and determine certain
controversies. Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law.
What determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over a case are the allegations
in a complaint. The defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its determination.
However, there are exceptions.
Facts:
The Reyes family owned a lot in Sampaloc, Manila. Lourdes Dela Cruz was a lessee, paying rent for over 40
years. In 1989, a fire destroyed the premises, including Dela Cruzs home. She returned to rebuild her house. The Reyes
family made verbal and written demands to vacate, and yet, no court action was taken by the Reyes family.
The Reyeses sold the lot to Melba Tan Te in 1996. Tan Te sent a written demand to vacate the premises on
Jan. 14, 1997, which she ignored as well. Unsuccessful at conciliation proceedings on the barangay level, Tan Te filed
an ejectment complaint before the Manila MeTC on Sept. 8, 1997 alleging that prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly
entered the property with strategy and/or stealth, and by refusing to vacate, unlawfully deprived Tan Te of physical
possession of the property. In her answer, Dela Cruz alleges the MeTC had no jurisdiction because the case falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC because more than one year had elapsed from her forcible entry (see footnote 1).
The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Tan Te, ordering Dela Cruz to vacate the premises.
Dela Cruz appealed. The RTC set aside the MeTCs decision on the ground that it was the RTC (not the MeTC)
which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held in favor of Tan Te. Dela Cruz filed a petition for review on certiorari
alleging that the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision, thereby reinstating the MeTC decision which is contradicted by
the evidence on record.
Issues:
1. Whether jurisdiction lies with the MeTC or RTC
Held/Ratio:
1. The MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by law to a court to
entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law.
Sec. 33 of Chapter III on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts of
B.P. 129 provides:
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
...
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession.
Thus, first level courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings forcible entry and
unlawful detainer. Ejectment suits are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts provides:
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Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

...
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1)
accion publiciana (when the dispossession has lasted for more than 1 year or when the action was filed more than
1 year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or defendant); and (2) accion reivindicatoria which
includes the recovery of possession. These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure.
ON CAUSE OF ACTION: What determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over
a case are the allegations in a complaint (The defenses in the anwer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial
in its determination). However, there are exceptions. As cited in Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, while the
allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defense and is
proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be
filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations.
In noting the allegations of the complaint and the answer of petitioner Dela Cruz, it is apparent they are vague in
revealing the nature of the action for ejectment. Circumstances show Lino Reyes has prior physical possession of
the lot and can make a forcible entry complaint (because he was initially in possession but was deprived of it
when Dela Cruz entered by means of stealth and strategy). On the other hand, Dela Cruzs refusal to leave after
demands indicates an action for unlawful detainer, since a written demand is not needed in forcible entry. The
MeTC complaint was filed Sept. 8, 1997 within 1 year from the last written demand on Dela Cruz on Jan. 14,
1997.
The rule previously mentioned is relaxed in this case in view of the special circumstances present: The defense of
lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer when Dela Cruz admitted to being a tenant of the predecessors in
interest of Tan Te (Which is relevant in determining jurisdiction). Moreover, the complaint was filed 9 years ago
and to dimiss it after having litigated so long would be unjust. Justice dictates that allegations in the answer
should be considered in determining the real nature of action. Finally, Sec. 6 Rule 1 Rules of Court empowers
the Court to construe procedural issuances in a liberal manner to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of actions and proceedings.
Based on the complaint and answer, the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer. Dela Cruz as
lessee of the Reyeses was initially the legal possessor of the lot by virtue of the contract of lease. When the fire
destroyed her house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated. The Reyeses tolerated the continued
occupancy by Dela Cruz until demands were made, the last being a written demand on Jan. 14, 1997. Since the
action was filed with the MeTC on Sept. 8, 1997, the action was instituted within the 1 year period
reckoned from Jan. 14, 1997 (see footnote).1 An ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the
owner is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.

1.
In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The
essential requisites are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the possessors right to
hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to possession;
(4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be
filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by the defendant.
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14 - Sta. Clara Homeowners Assoc. v. Spouses Gaston (2002) (non-member denied entry to subdivision)
Doctrines:
A motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint.
Membership in a homeowners association is voluntary and cannot be unilaterally forced by a provision in the
associations articles of incorporation or by-laws, which the alleged member did not agree to be bound to.
Facts:
On 1 April 1998, Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston, private respondents herein, filed a complaint
for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order
before the Regional Trial Court in Negros Occidental at Bacolod City against petitioners Santa Clara Homeowners
Association (SCHA for brevity) thru its Board of Directors.
The complaint alleged that the Spouses Gaston were residents of San Jose Avenue, Sta. Clara Subdivision,
Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They purchased their lots in the said subdivision sometime in 1974, and at the time of
purchase, there was no mention or requirement of membership in any homeowners association. From that time on,
they have remained non-members of SCHA. They also stated that an arrangement was made wherein homeowners who
were non-members of the association were issued non-member gatepass stickers for their vehicles for identification by
the security guards manning the subdivisions entrances and exits. This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime
in the middle of March, 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only its members in
good standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles. Thereafter, on three separate incidents, Victor M.
Gaston, the son of the private respondents herein who lives with them, was required by the guards on duty employed by
SCHA to show his drivers license as a prerequisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite
their knowing him personally and the exact location of his residence. On 29 March 1998, private respondent herein Victor
Ma. Gaston was himself prevented from entering the subdivision and proceeding to his residential abode when
petitioner herein security guards Roger Capillo and a John Doe lowered the steel bar of the KAMETAL gate of the
subdivision and demanded from him his drivers license for identification. The complaint further alleged that these acts of
the petitioners herein done in the presence of other subdivision owners had caused private respondents to suffer moral
damage.
On 8 April 1998, petitioners herein filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act No.
580, as amended by Executive Order Nos. 535 and 90, much less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of the
board of directors of SCHA, the proper forum being the Home Insurance (and Guaranty) Corporation (HIGC). To support
their claim of intra-corporate controversy, petitioners stated that the Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly
approved by the SEC, provides that the association shall be a non-stock corporation with all homeowners of Sta. Clara
constituting its membership. Also, its by-laws contains a provision that all real estate owners in Sta. Clara
Subdivision automatically become members of the association.
On 6 July 1998, the lower court resolved to deny petitioners motion to dismiss, finding that there existed no
intra-corporate controversy since the private respondents alleged that they had never joined the association; and,
thus, the HIGC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners added lack of cause of
action as ground for the dismissal of the case. anchored on the principle of damnum absque injuria as allegedly there
[was] no allegation in the complaint that the private respondents were actually prevented from entering the subdivision
and from having access to their residential abode. The MR was denied. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and
ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. The CA also held that the Complaint had stated a cause of action,
which were determined by the allegations in the complaint and not by the defenses and theories set up in the answer or the
motion to dismiss.
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Issues:
1. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
2. W/N the complaint state a cause of action.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
There existed no intra-corporate dispute. The spouses Gaston were not members of SCHA. The constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will
associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision
guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one. The
approval by the SEC of the documents of the SCHA is not an operative act which bestows membership on the
private respondents. Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between petitioners and private respondents.
Furthermore, Sec. 39. of Act 496 guarantees that every person receiving a certificate of title ... shall hold the
same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a
motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant. The Complaint does not allege that private respondents are members of the SCHA. In point of fact,
they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
2. YES.
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these three essential elements: (1) the legal right of the
plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of the said legal right.
In the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause of action. First, the Complaint alleged that, under the
Constitution, respondents had a right of free access to and from their residential abode. Second, under the law,
petitioners have the obligation to respect this right. Third, such right was impaired by petitioners when private
respondents were refused access through the Sta. Clara Subdivision, unless they showed their drivers license for
identification.
SCHA and other petitioners Motion to Dismiss is denied. The decision of the RTC and the CA are affirmed. Costs
against petitioners.

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15 - Sun Insurance Office v. Asuncion (1989) (docket fees)

Doctrines:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
Facts:
February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati, for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer
within the reglementary period.
March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and later including additional defendants. In the body of the complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 M. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the
refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210
was paid for the docket fee. Petitioners objected which was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then
presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case were under investigation for underassessment of docket fees, were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court
with the directive that they be re-raffled.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, was assigned to the case, asked that the parties indicate the exact amount sought
to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that
he be awarded no less than P10,000,000 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of
his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. On January 24, 1986 Judge Asuncion, admitted the amended,
stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court, , and the private respondent
was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000 in damages, which
private respondent paid. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order
of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000
in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee of P80,396. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987
wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this
petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
P62,132.92.
Petitioner lost in the CA, hence this petition, petitioners calming that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct
and proper docket fee. That although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket
fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about
P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
Issues:
1. W/N that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to the case?
2. W/N the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient ?
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Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, although, at the time the civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet, statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
2. Yes, Although in Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the
correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
This Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific
performance, where the amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount suffered by plaintiff, where the plaintiff was still made to pay the correct
docket fees based on the complaint, where in order to avoid paying the docket fees, the complaint was amended
eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The court Applied the principle
in Magaspi that the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of
filing in court, this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only
P410 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For
all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the
order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were
declared null and void.
The present case, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this
Court together with Manchester. This case is similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the
total amount of damages sought was stated. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The
action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.
The amount of only P210 was paid for the docket fee. Private respondent later amended his complaint, filed a
supplemental complaint, was re-assessed for additional docket fee, which private respondent paid an additional
docket fee every time.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud
the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the
filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court
on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the
court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been
admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the
total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized
docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the
private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same
rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of
the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
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specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
16 - Ballatan v. CA (1999) (residential land, encroachment, good faith owners)

Doctrines:
When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and
filing fees.
In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages
claimed, if any.
If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full
payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.
Facts:
This is a dispute over 42 square meters of residential land owned by Ballatan. The parties in this case are owners
of adjacent lots in Malabon. Lot 24 is registered under Ballatan, Martinez and Chong (petitioners); Lots 25 and 26 are
registered in the name of Gonzalo Go (private respondent). Winston Go, the son of Gonzalo, constructed a house on Lot
No. 25. Lot 27 is registered in the name of Li (private respondent).
In 1985, Ballatan constructed her house on Lot 24. During this period, she noticed that the fence and pathway of
Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. It was discovered that the area of her lot is
actually less that that described in the title. Ballatan informed Go of the discrepancy and encroachment on her property.
Go claimed that his house was built on his fathers lot and that the lot was surveyed by Engineer Quedding, the authorized
surveyor of the Araneta Institute Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Ballatan informed AIA of the discrepancy and AIA authorized another survey by Engineer Quedding. It was
confirmed that there was indeed a discrepancy in Ballatans lot. At the request of the parties, a third survey was made and
different measures resulted.
On the basis of the third survey, Ballatan made a written demand on respondent Go to remove and dismantle the
improvements encroaching on her lot (Lot 24). Respondents Go refused. The parties met several times to agree on this
matter but they failed. As a result, Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay. Respondents Go did not appear.
Subsequently, Ballatan instituted a civil case for the recovery of possession before the RTC of Malabon against
respondents Go. Respondents Go filed their Answer with Third-Party Complaint where they impleaded third-party
defendants Li, AIA and Quedding.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ballatan. It ordered Go to vacate the subject portion of Lot 24, demolish their
improvements and pay actual damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. The third-party complaint was dismissed against
Quedding (no privity of relation), Li (failure to prove that he committed any wrong regarding encroachment) and AIA
(lots were in accordance with the technical description).
Respondents Go appealed. The CA modified the decision of the RTC. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party
complaint against AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li and Quedding. Instead of ordering Go to destroy the
improvements, the CA ordered them to pay Ballatan and Li to pay Go. They were to pay a reasonable amount for the
portion of the lot which they encroached. The value is to be fixed at the time of the taking.
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
Issues:
1. W/N the CA erred on question of law and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
did not dismiss the thirdparty complaint due to non-payment of any filing of docket fee.
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Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The CA correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA.
The third-party complaint arose from the complaint of Ballatan against respondents Go. The complaint filed for
was accion publiciana (the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action). The rule in this
jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property
and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing,
the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant,
barring prescription.
Further, the claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIAs fault was not proved. It was found that it
was Queddings erroneous survey that triggered the discrepancies. Winston Go depended on these surveys. He
had no knowledge that he encroached on Ballatans lot. He is a builder in good faith until the time Ballatan
informed him of the encroachment.
Li is also in good faith. He built his house before Ballatan and Go built theirs. Also, there is no showing that he
was aware of any encroachment at the time his house was built. Good faith is always presumed.
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must be determined in accordance with Art.
448 of the Civil Code on property.
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17 - Yuchengco v. Republic (2000) (wrong amount of docket fee, Marcoses)

Doctrines:
Art. 1154 of the Civil Code: The period during which the obligee was prevented by fortuitous event from
enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.
Facts:
This is a petition for review to set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated October 9, 1996 1 dismissing
petitioners amended-complaint-in-intervention and the subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1997 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Recission,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting, and Damages against Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, and Prime Holdings
Inc. (PHI). Alfonso Yuchengco, herein petitioner, filed a Motion-for-Intervention and Complaint-for-Intervention,
impleading the Republic, the PCGG, the spouses Marcos, and PHI as defendants-in-intervention. He alleged that some of
the properties sought to be forfeited was his. Yuchengco then paid a docket fee2 of P 400. The Sandiganbayan thereafter
approved a resolution granting both motions.
Meanwhile, PHI filed a Manifestation and Motion, stating that Imelda Cojuangco and the Estate of Ramon U.
Cojuangco claim ownership of PHI. Thus, Yuchengco moved for leave to admit amended complaint-in-intervention to
implead the said claimants. The Sandiganbayan admitted the amended complaint-in-intervention. On the other hand, the
Estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco (hereinafter, the Cojuangcos) filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint-in-intervention on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the case, inasmuch as petitioner did not pay the correct docket fees. They argued that the amendedcomplaint-in-intervention failed to state the amount of the claim or the value of the property subject of the complaint, in
violation of the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals. They alleged that
since the amended complaint-in-intervention is substantially an action for the recovery of ownership and possession of
shareholdings in the Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC), Section 7 (a) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court applies, to wit:
Sec. 7 Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
a.) ... For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on
judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in
intervention xxx if xxx the stated value of the property in litigation is:
a. Not more than P20,000
P120
b. More than P20,000 but less than P40,000
P150
c. P40,000 or more but less than P60,000
P200
d. P60,000 or more but less than P80,000
P250
e. P80,000 or more but less than P100,000
P400
f.
P600
P100,000 or more but less than P150,000
g. For each P1,000 in excess of P150,000
P5
Further, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos contend that as the action seeks to litigate the ownership and
disposition of properties consisting of subject shares, the amount of docket fees must be based on the total value of the
same.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder maintaining that no docket fees are payable to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section
11 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, which provides:

2.
Docket Fee - amount collected by a court for placing a case on its docket or calendar
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Proceedings free of charge. - All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no

cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses.
Issues:
1. W/N under the undisputed circumstances at bar, the Sandiganbayan may dismiss the complaint-in-intervention for
alleged failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees on time (prescriptive period 10 years)
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Court ruled that in the case at bar the Sandiganbayan emphasized that when P.D. No. 1606 was issued,
the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court was limited to criminal actions. The Sandiganbayan now tries civil cases.
While we are inclined to sustain the ruling that correct filing fees in civil cases must be paid in all courts,
including the Sandiganbayan, this does not preclude a ruling that, in this case, the petitioner acted in justifiable
good faith. There was ample reason for uncertainty and doubt on the intervenors part not merely as to the
correctness of the amount to be paid but whether or not docket fees should be paid at all. The Court also said that
equitable consideration was to be given to Yuchengco, as he was not trying to evade the payment of said docket
fee. He even asked the Sandiganbayan to come up with the correct amount and paid it accordingly.
In his petition, Yuchengco sought to recover real properties which were forcibly seized from him by the Marcoses
during the Martial Law era. This, the Court ruled, formed a constructive trust. As per the Civil Code, actions must
be filed within 10 years after the right of action accrues. In this case, Yuchengco filed the correct docket fee two
months after the 10-year period has elapsed. However, the Court ruled that two years prior to the expiry of the
said period, Yuchengco already started seeking a resolution to the issue about the docket fees. He even tried
posting a bond in Court in order to make up for any deficiency that might exist. The only reason why his
prescription period ran out is because the Sandiganbayan took a while to come up with the correct amount of
docket fee. This the Court considered as a fortuitous and extraordinary event and prevented Yuchengco from
enforcing his right, however it was ruled that this should not prejudice him.
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18 - Vda. De Murga v. Chan (1968) (unlawful detainer, jurisdiction of MTC, letters)

Doctrines:
When a contract of lease provides that the term thereof is extendible, the agreement is understood as being in
favor of the lessee, and the latter is authorized to renew the contract and to continue to occupy the leased property,
after notifying the lessor to that effect.
The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the
demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases.
Facts:
Vda. De Murga leased to Chan 2 parcels of land (10 year contract, P500/month, lessor has the option to buy the
improvements made by the lessee, automatic renewal of the contract if lessor fails to exercise his option). Before the
expiration of the contract, the lessor and lessee talked about the renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an
agreement.
The lessor sent a letter stating that the rent would now be P700/month, but the lessee did not accept the offer.
After a few correspondences, the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate the premises; however the lessee chose to remain in
possession of the leased premises. Because of this, the lessor filed a complaint for unlawful detainer at the MTC of
Zamboanga City, presenting as evidence the exchange of letters. The lessee admitted to the genuineness of the letters but
raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case (because the notice by the lessor does not constitute
the notice contemplated in the Rules of Court), and the lack of cause of action for unlawful detainer (because the lessee
has the right over the premises following the automatic renewal of the lease).
The MTC ruled in favor of the lessor, so the lessee appealed to the CFI raising the same defenses. CFI ruled in
favor of the lessor, hence this present appeal
Issues:
1. W/N the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer, and confer jurisdiction
over the case to the MTC under the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.3
Held/Ratio:
1. CAUSE OF ACTION ISSUE: The lessor has no cause of action against the lessee since the automatic renewal of
the contract made the possession of the lessee legal. According to Koh v. Ongsiaco, when a contract of lease
provides that the term thereof is extendible, the agreement is understood as being in favor of the lessee, and the
latter is authorized to renew the contract and to continue to occupy the leased property, after notifying the lessor
to that effect. The lessor can withdraw from the said contract only after having fulfilled his promise to grant the
extension of time stipulated therein, unless the lessee has failed to comply with or has violated the conditions of
the contract. It is not necessary that the extension be expressly conceded by the lessor because he consented
thereto in the original contract.
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE: The MTC has no jurisdiction. The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to
pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the RoC in unlawful
detainer cases. In the case at bar, the imposition of a new rental, without any subsequent definite demand to

3.
Section 1 [A] person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied ... may, at any time within 1 year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court.
Section 2 Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions
of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by
posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after 15 days in the case of land, or 5
days in the case of buildings.
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vacate the premises did not make the lessee in default, which would give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to
bring an action of unlawful detainer.
19 - Heirs of Valeriano Concha v. Spouses Lumocso, et al. (2007) (jurisdiction over action for reconveyance)
Doctrines:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong.
Under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein under Section 19 (2) of BP 129 is divided between the first and second
level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark.
Facts:
Petitioners lay claim to three (3) parcels of land in Dipolog City. They filed three separate complaints for
reconveyance with damages against three (3) of the respondents, who were the registered owners of the subject properties.
Allegedly, the petitioners parents acquired a 24-hectare parcel of land in the same place by homestead in 1958.
The petitioners also claim that since 1931, their family had exerted much effort in preserving the forest in the 24-hectare
land, including an excess 4-hectare untitled forest land. Notably, the properties in dispute are within this 4-hectare land,
which petitioners claim to have adversely possessed since 1931 until 1997 when the respondents allegedly entered by
force and intimidation.
All the complaints were lodged in the RTC of Dipolog City.
Respondents moved to dismiss the corresponding complaints against them on the same grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, failure to state causes of action, prescription, waiver, abandonment, estoppel, laches. The trial court denied
these motions. Thereafter, respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied.
Consequently, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining
Order Ex Parte was jointly filed by the respondents with the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the lower
court based on the reasoning that even if the complaints stated a cause of action, they had already prescribed, given that an
action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in 10 years. As to the other issues, the CA found them unnecessary to
resolve.
Issues:
1. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaints (The Court was surprised that the CA did not delve on this
issue when it was determinative of the resolution of the case.)
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Section 19 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 reads:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
...
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
Under the old law, that is before RA 7691 in 1994, the RTC (or the then CFI) had exclusive original jurisdiction
in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein. At present, the
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above phrase is qualified, making it necessary to determine first the assessed value of the property. In this case, it
was found that the properties in question had assessed values less than P20,000. Hence, the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the complaints.
20 - Agustin v. Bacalan (1985) (Amount awarded in excess of jurisdiction)

Doctrines:
Jurisdiction of the city courts in civil cases is limited to P10,000
An appellate court cannot award an amount exceeding the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
Facts:
Bacalan was the lessee of floor space in a building owned by Susana Agustin. Appellant Glicerio Agustin was the
administrator of the estate of Susana Agustin. As administrator, Glicerio filed a case for ejectment against Bacalan for
nonpayment of rentals.
Glicerio prayed that Bacalan be ordered to vacate the premises and pay P2,300 corresponding to arrearages in
rentals. Bacalan the filed a counter-claim saying that Glicerio filed the ejectment suit in bad faith because the latter
knew very well that Bacalan did not owe anything to Susana Agustin. In this counter-claim, Bacalan seeks to recover
actual and moral damages (no less than P50,000), exemplary damages (P10,000), and attorneys fees (P3,500.)
The City Court of Cebu dismissed the counter-claim and ordered Bacalan to pay Glicerio. Bacalan appealed this
judgement to the CFI in Cebu. The CFI ruled in favor of Bacalan, ordering Glicerio to pay Bacalan P16,000. Glicerio
failed to appeal. Hence, the judgment of the CFI in favor of Bacalan became final and executory.
Subsequently, Glicerio filed for the declaration of nullity of the decision in favor of Bacalan alleging that the
CFI of Cebu did not have jurisdiction to render the judgment because it granted a total of P16,000 to Bacalan
which is more than what the City Court of Cebu has jurisdiction to award. (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, limits the jurisdiction of the city courts in civil cases to P10,000)
Bacalan filed a motion to dismiss saying that Glicerio had no cause of action and that the CFI of Cebu had no
jurisdiction to overturn the decision of another CFI branch.
Issues:
1. W/N the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award Bacalans counterclaim in an amount exceeding or
beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
2. W/N the declaration of nullity filed by Glicerio is a proper remedy.
Held/Ratio:
1. No, the appellate court cannot award an amount exceeding the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
Noting that the Bacalan presented his claim voluntarily to the City Court of Cebu, he submitted his claim to the
jurisdiction of that court. Remember that the jurisdiction of City Courts is limited to P10,000 only. When Bacalan
presented his claim to the City Court, he was deemed to have waived the amount in excess of P10,000. In other
words, the City Court did not obtain jurisdiction of the amount in excess of P10,000. (In this case, the excess was
P6,000 because P16,000 - P10,000 = P6,000)
Hence, when the counterclaim was appealed to the CFI, the CFI as appellate court only had jurisdiction over the
amount for which the City Court had jurisdiction (only P10,000). This is because appellate jurisdiction is only a
continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been executed in the court of original
jurisdiction.
Here, the CFI, having awarded judgment in favor of Bacalan in excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of
P6,000 over the maximum allowable award of P10,000, the excess is null and void and of no effect.
2. Yes, the declaration for nullity filed by Glicerio is a proper remedy
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The action for declaration for nullity having been filed after the decision had already become final and executory,
the action would only be proper if the decision was void.
Taking note of the discussion in the previous number, the judgement was void as to the P6,000 in excess of the
P10,000 jurisdiction of the City Court and CFI as appellate court. Such being the case, an action to declare the
nullity of the award as brought by Glicerio before the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a proper remedy.
21 - Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral (2005) (Truck sideswipes tricycle)

Doctrines:
An action for recovery of damages arising from a tortious act, the claim of moral damages is not merely an
incidental or consequential claim but must be considered in the amount of demand which will determine the
courts jurisdiction.
Facts:
On 1999, Apolinario Serquina Jr. filed an action for damages against Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano
claiming that he, Marco de Leon, Abner Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman were on board a tricycle driven by Jayson
Laforte when the truck driven by Solano and owned by Mangaliag sideswiped the tricycle. Serquina was hospitalized and
claims damages of P596,392 plus 25% of total award as payment to his counsel. After the case ensued after the pretrial
conference, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim,
alleging that the MTC has jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392, falls
within its jurisdiction. On April 17, 2000, respondent RTC Judge Catubig-Pastoral issued the first assailed Order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss, relying upon Administrative Circular No. 09-94, paragraph 2.
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19
(8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
On May 19, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the respondent RTC Judge in
her second assailed Order, dated June 13, 2000.
Issues:
1. W/N an action for recovery of damages, does the amount of actual damages prayed for in the complaint provide
the sole test for determining the courts jurisdiction.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a
consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent
actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity
is violated, damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a
separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in determining the
jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance with paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
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RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

01 - Yu v. Pacleb (19xx) (not buyers in good faith)
Doctrine:
The aim and the object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or
quai in rem, is determined by its nature and purpose, and these only. A proceding in personam is a proceding to
enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person . An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property (sic)
to determine its state.
A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the
discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem
deal with the status,, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. (binding only upon parties who joined in the action)
Facts:
Baltazar Pacleb and his deceased first wife Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of a parcel of land in
Langcaan, Cavite. This land became the subject of 3 documents purporting to transfer ownership. It was sold by the
spouses Pacleb and Chan to Rebecca del Rosario. Then sold by Rebecca del Rosario to Javier. Then it was again sold, by
Javier to the spouses Yu. All of these sales were not registered.
In 1993, the spouses Yu instituted an action (Civil Case 741-93) for specific performance and damages. In
their complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the land was untenanted and it wasnt until after they had
made the initial payment that they discovered the land was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb. Acting favorably on this case, the
court directed Javier to deliver to the spouses Yu the certificate of title over the Langcaan property.
In March 1995, Ramon Pacleb (son of Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan), for P 500,000, agreed to waive his
tenancy rights and execute a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa
Karapatan with the spouses Yu. In October 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale
and other documents arising from it, alleging that the first deed of sale, supposedly executed by him and his first wife,
was spurious. Subsequently, the spouses filed an action for forcible entry against Baltazar Pacleb, claiming that they had
prior physical possession through their trustee Ramon Pacleb (by virtue of the above contract).
Finally, in 1996, Baltazar Pacleb filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages to cancel the
entry of the decision in civil case no. 741-93 and its certificate of finality. Then he died and was substituted by his second
wife and children from the first wife. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the spouses were purchasers in
good faith and that civil case 741-93 had already attained finality. The CA ruled that the spouses Yu arent purchasers in
good faith, and that the Decision in Civil Case 741-93 did not transfer ownership to them.
Issues:
1. W/N the spouses are purchasers in god faith and for value.
2. W/N the ownership over the property was properly vested in the petitioner spouses by virtue of the decision in
Civil Case No. 741-93
Held/Ratio:
1. No, the spouses are not purchasers in good faith. There were circumstances that should have put them on inquiry
as to the veracity of the vendors title over the property. Circumstances such as the possession of Ramon Pacleb
and the fact that the two sales had only been two months apart. (land titles)
2. No, it is a judgement in personam and is binding only to the parties properly impleaded therein and given an
opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot be held to bind Baltazar Pacleb, who was not a party therein.
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Civil Case 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by the Spouses against Javier to
compel the performance of the latters undertakings under their Contract to Sell. The object of this action is to
compel Javier to accept full payment and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property. But the obligations
under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan property.
02 - Domagas v. Jensen (2005) (In Rem / In Personam, Summons, Norway)

Doctrines:
The distinction between action in rem, action quasi in rem, and action in personam is important to determine
whether or not jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required and consequently, to determine the type
of summons to be employed.
Facts:
Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Layno - Jensen
before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Domagas alleged that she was the registered owner of the land covered by an
OCT with an area of 827 square meters, and that by means of force, strategy, and stealth, Jensen gained entry into the
property and thereafter constructing a fence thereon. As such, Domagas was deprived of a 68-square meter portion
thereof.
The case was docketed in the MTC but the summons and the complaint were not served to Jensen because she
was apparently in Oslo, Norway, where she was living with her Norwegian husband. The sheriff left the summons and
complaint to Jensens brother, Oscar Layno, who was incidentally at the property at that time. The MTC thereafter
rendered judgment ordering Jensen to vacate the disputed area; however, Jensen failed to appeal the decision.
Consequently, a writ of execution was issued on September 1999.
On August 2000 Jensen filed a complaint before the RTC of Dagupan, Pangasinan for the annulment of the MTC
decision. Jensen alleged that the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person because the Sheriff failed to serve the
complaint and summons to her because she was in Norway, and that serving it through his brother was improper.
The RTC ruled in favor of Jensen. The RTC declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and
summons considering that she left the Philippines for Norway and that her brother Layno was never authorized to receive
the said complaint and summons.
The CA affirmed the decision but held that the complaint was an action quasi in rem. As such, the summons and
complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service and with prior leave of court under Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner Domagas now assails the CA decision insisting that the complaint for forcible entry was an action in
personam, and therefore the substituted service of summons and complaint was valid.
Issue:
1. W/N an action for forcible entry is an action in personam
2. W/N Jensen was a resident of the Philippines
3. W/N there was a valid service of summons to the defendant Jensen
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. The action of Domagas for forcible entry is an action in personam. The ruling of the CA that Domagass
complaint for forcible entry is an action quasi in rem is erroneous.
An action in personam is one which has for its object a judgment against the person. It is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights or obligations. On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. It deals with the status or
ownership of a particular property. Lastly, an action in rem is one where the action is directed against the thing
itself, as in land registration and cadastral proceedings.
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An action for ejectment, forcible entry, or unlawful detainer is a real action because it involves the issue of
possession of real property but it is also at the same time, an action in personam because the action is directed
against a particular person sought to be held liable.
[Action in personam and personal action are not synonymous, in the same way that action in rem and real action
are also not synonymous. The real action-personal action distinction refers to the FOUNDATION of the action,
while the in rem-in personam distinction refers to the object of the action. The first is used to determine the proper
venue of the action while the other is used to determine how the Court acquires jurisdiction over the action.]
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case. Thus, for the MTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the case filed by Domangas, the
defendant Jensen must be first personally served the summons. In contrast, in action in rem and action quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not necessary because jurisdiction over the res (subject
matter) is sufficient.
*In an action in personam, when the defendant is a NON-resident of the Philippines, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the case because summons cannot be served to that non-resident who is out of the country.
2. Yes. Jensen remained a resident of the Philippines on the records even after her marriage to a Norwegian. Jensen
executed contracts (example: mortgage contract) with other people and in these legal documents, she always
indicated that she was a resident of the Philippines.
And because Jensen is a resident of the Philippines and the action is one in personam, it is imperative that there be
service of summons to Jensen herself for the MTC to properly acquire jurisdiction over the case.
SUBSTITUTED service of summons, however, is allowed for justifiable causes, like
o
when the defendant is a resident of the Phils but is temporarily outside the country as in this case; or
when the defendant is unknown or his whereabouts are unknown.
Substituted service may be had in any of two ways provided in Section 7 Rule 14:
a. by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein;
b. by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
In this case, the Sheriff chose to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of Jensen with Oscar Layno, the
brother of Jensen.
But substituted service requires that there is strict compliance with the procedure laid down by the law because if
the rules are not strictly complied with, it is as if there was an ineffective or invalid service of summons.
3. No. There was no valid substituted service of summons to the defendant Jensen such that the court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over her person.
It was NOT shown that the procedure required by law was strictly complied with. Oscar Layno was NOT a
resident at the house of Jensen at the time the summons was served. Another person, Eduardo Gonzales, was the
actual and lawful occupant of Jensens property at that time. Gonzales and Jensen had a lessee-lessor relationship
and this is evidenced by a lease contract between them. It was plain coincidence that at the time the Sheriff went
to Jensens residence, her brother Oscar Layno was there but he was there only to collect rentals from the
tenant/lessee Gonzales.
In other words, Layno was not the some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein that the
law contemplated. Therefore, no strict compliance to rules renders the substituted service of summons ineffective.
Consequently, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction and the MTC decision is null and void.
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03 - Republic v. CA, Hon. Bantugan, and Heirs of Bustria-Tigno (1999)

Doctrines:
An action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. It is binding only between the parties thereto.
Facts:
In 1957, Bustamante filed an application for registration4 with the CFI of Pangasinan of a more of less 880,000
sq.m. land in Brgy. Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan. The Director of Forestry and Director of Fisheries filed oppositions
alleging that all except 97,525 sq.m. is part of Timber Land Block A Land Classification Project 44, which is converted
into fish ponds. Isidro and Julian Bustria (herein respondents predecessors-in-interest), also opposed the application
alleging that they have in 1943 occupied n good faith their respective portions having a total of more or less 50 hectares,
converted portions into fishponds and possessed and occupied them against all persons except the Dir. of Forestry and
Dir. of Fishery.
Lower court ruled in favor of Bustamante.
The Court of Appeals ruled that 783,275 sq.m. of the land were accretions and thus belonged to the State in
accordance with the provisions of the Law on Waters. Only 9.7525 of the land applied for is to be registered to
Bustamante.
The Supreme Court was affirmed in toto.
The land is the subject of this current case. A portion of the declared public domain land is classified/zonified
land for fishpond development. It has been leased to Morado by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Sec. of
Agriculture, for 25 years or up to Dec. 31, 2013, under a Fishpond Lease Agreement.
However, on July 6, 1988 Zenida Bustria (daughter of Isidro) filed a complaint against Morado in the RTC of
Alaminos, Pangasinan for ownership and possession of the land claiming absolute ownership and peaceful possession
of the several lots surveyed in the name of her father. She further asserted that Morado maliciously applied for a
fishpond permit knowing the land had been occupied, possessed and worked. Morado denied this claiming that the land is
of public domain which he converted into a fishpond. However, due to his counsels failure to appear at the pre-trial and
subsequent court hearings, the trial court declared him in default.
Zenaida was declared owner of the land. Morado filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which was denied. A
writ of execution was issued and implemented. Morado and his wife then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which was again denied for lack of merit.
In 1994, petitioner invoked B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) and filed for annulment of the
trial courts decision stating that the land is within the classified alienable and disposable land for fishpond development
and since it was public domain, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has jurisdiction over its
disposition. It was dismissed by the CA, hence, this petition for review.
Issues:
1. W/N the Republic has personality to bring this suit considering that it is not a party thereto?
2. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction to declare the land to belong to private respondent?
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
An action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. It is binding only between the parties thereto. However, in
Islamic Dewag Council of the Phils. v. CA it was held that, a person need not be a party to the judgment sought
to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

4.
Under Act No. 496
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2. NO.
Private respondents do not deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain. The land involved in this
case was classified as public land suitable for public land development. In controversies involving the disposition
of public land the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership lies upon the private claimant.
Private respondents have not discharged this. The disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall
within the jurisdiction of the BFAR in accordance with PD 704, thus making the RTCs decision null and void
because it does not have jurisdiction.
04 - Estrellita Tamano v. Ortiz (1998) (Tamano)

Doctrines:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action.
Personal actions, such as this case, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff
Facts:
On May 13, 1958 then Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano
(Zorayda) in civil rites. Such marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until Tamanos death in May 18, 1994.
Prior to his death, in 1993, Tamano also married petitioner, Estrellita Tamano in civil rites.
On November 23, 1994, Zorayda filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and
Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Zorayda claimed that Tamano never divorced her and that Estrellita was not
single when she married Tamano. The decision annulling Estrellitas previous marriage with one Llave never became
final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC of QC was without jurisdiction over the subject and
nature of the action. She claimed that only a party to the marriage could file an action for annulment of marriage against
the other spouse. Hence, Estrellita alleged that only Tamano could file for annulment of their marriage. Estrellita also
claimed that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims, married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the
case was vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss and ruled that the case was cognizable by the RTC since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied. Estrellita appealed.
The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places
where there are sharia courts. In cases were there are no sharia courts, like QC, the case could properly be filed before
the RTC.
Issues:
1. W/N the sharia court and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. It is the RTC which has jurisdiction.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as this case, may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. In the complaint filed by Zorayda, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano
were married under Muslim laws. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and
Tamano were married under Muslim Laws. She first mentioned it only in her motion for reconsideration.
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Besides, the RTC was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the case despite the allegation in the MR that
Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim law. This is because a courts jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but
only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs causes of action.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not provide for a situation where the parties were married in both civil
and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it
comes to marriages celebrated both under civil and Muslim laws. The RTCs are not divested of their original
jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP 129: RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (6) in all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person, or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.

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05 - La Tondea Distillers Inc. v. Ponferrada (1996) (specific performance, personal action)

Doctrines:
Petition for certiorari can be availed only if the denial of the motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion
A complaint for specific performance involving real property is a personal action which can be filed in the proper
court where the party resides.
Facts:
Defendants: Cotabato Visayan Corporation, vda. de Malojo and Olvido
Private Respondents: Gochangco, E. Dy, Q. Dy, J. Ong and L. Ong
Defendants failed to consummate their contract with the private respondents to sell a parcel of land. For this
reason, the private respondents filed an action for specific performance with damages, and a notice of lis pendens was
annotated with the lands title.
Pending trial, La Tondena Distillers Inc. bought the land from the defendants. LTDI was impleaded in the
amended complaint, alleging that it was not a buyer in good faith. LTDI moved to dismiss the amended complaint on two
grounds: no cause of action (he is a buyer in GF since the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled) and improper
venue (the venue should be in Bago City where the land is situated and not in Bacolod City).
RTC: motion to dismiss denied (as well as the MR) - resolution was received on 20 Jan 1993
3 months later (21 Apr 93), LTDI went directly to SC through a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of its
motions.
Issues:
1. W/N the remedy of LTDI was proper
Held/Ratio:
1. The petition should be dismissed outright because it was filed beyond the reasonable time. (It should have been
filed not more than 60 days from the date of receipt of the judgment. in this case, it was filed more than 3 months
after)
Assuming arguendo that it was filed on time, the dismissal is still warranted on account of the following reasons:
a. An order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither appealable until final
judgment, nor could it be assailed on certiorari. LTDI should have filed an answer according to Section 4
Rule 16 of the RoC5.
b. Petition for certiorari can be availed only if the denial of the motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion
(no GADALEJ in this case, it is within the discretion of the court to defer action if the ground alleged
does not appear to be indubitable)
c. ISSUE ON VENUE: The case is one for specific performance with damages. In Adamos v. J.M. Tuason,
it was held that a complaint for specific performance with damages involving real property was held to be
a personal action which may be filed in the proper court where the party resides. Not being an action
involving title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the
RTC of Bacolod City.

5.
Time to plead. - If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was
entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from his receipt of the notice of the denial. If the
pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended
pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.
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06 - Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction (2002)

Doctrines:
Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance (which is an action in personam, not in
rem)
A suit for breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate, subject to of
the said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees
Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, because parties may be
dropped or added at any stage of the proceedings
Facts:
In 1996, Landcenter, represented by Maghuyop, entered into an agreement with Cabutihan. In the said agreement,
Landcenter engaged the assistance of Cabutihan (as facilitator) for the purpose of facilitating and arranging the recovery
of a parcel of land in Paranaque, absolutely owned by Landcenter. The facilitator shall be responsible for the
arrangements necessary in relation to the squatters presently occupying a portion of the property. In return, the facilitator
would be entitled to 20% of the total area of the property thus recovered for and in behalf of Landcenter.
In 1997, Ponce, armed with a board resolution from Landcenter authorizing her to represent the said corporation,
entered into a Deed of Undertaking agreement with a group composed of Cabutihan (petitioner), Forro, Radan Sr. and
Atty. Anave. In the deed, Landcenter undertook to compensate the following, based on the gross area of land or gross
proceeds of sale as the case may be: Cabutihan, 20%; Forro, 10%; Radan Sr., 4%; Atty. Anave, 2.5%; totaling to 36.5%.
Deeds of assignment would then be subsequently entered.
In September 1999, Cabutihan [and I emphasize, only Cabutihan] demanded upon Landcenter to execute the Deed
of Assignment of the lots as compensation for the services rendered. Landcenter refused to act on the demand and the
property was transferred to and registered in the name of Landcenter. So in October 1999, Cabutihan, before the RTC of
Pasig City [even if the land was located in Paranaque], filed an action for specific performance with damages.
Landcenter filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Maghuyop, including Cabutihan, Forro, Radan, and others,
took advantage of the management mess at Landcenter. According to Landcenter, the aforementioned tried to grab
ownership of the said corporation through fraud, and succeeded in filing with the SEC false papers, installing Maghuyop
as president [Maghuyop was installed so as to have authority to enter into an agreement with Cabutihan and the others].
Furthermore, Landcenter contended that Ponce, then 80 years old, weak, feeble in her mental ability, and having poor
eyesight when she entered the Deed of Undertaking, denies having signed the said instrument freely and voluntarily. In
the motion, Landcenter sought the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of (1) Improper venue, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (3) nonpayment of the proper docket fees.
In (1) Improper Venue, Landcenter alleged that Cabutihans complaint, being an action in rem (because it
involves recovery of land, a real property), the case should have been filed in Paranaque because the land is situated there,
not in Pasig. In (2) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, since Forro, Radan, and Anave werent named as plaintiffs
of the complaint, and Cabutihan allegedly didnt have a special power of attorney to represent them, the beneficiaries
should have been named in the title of the case. In (3) nonpayment of proper docket fees, Cabutihan didnt comply with a
condition precedent as she hadnt paid docket and filing fees worth P180,000,000 (amounting to 36%, of I assume, the
assessed land value). Cabutihan only paid P210. The RTC ruled in Landcenters favor, dismissing the complaint.
Issues:
1. W/N the RTC erred in dismissing Cabutihans complaint on the grounds of (1) improper venue, (2) non-joinder of
necessary parties, and (3) non-payment of proper docket fees.
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Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint.
a. Proper Venue
The action is in personam (being an action for specific performance), not in rem. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Court provide an answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions,
(personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. In the
present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the parties
signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. If
petitioner had filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have
been proper on the ground of lack of cause of action.
b. Non-joinder of Parties
Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courts own initiative at any
stage of the action. And although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim
without impleading the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded
with the case as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent.
This fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can
be had.
c. Correct Docket Fees
The value of the real property has nothing to do with the correct docket or filing fees. It is true that Section 5,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action,
should be considered in computing the filing fees. But the Court has already clarified that the Rule does
not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary
estimation.
Besides, if during the course of the trial, petitioners 20 percent claim on the Fourth Estate Subdivision can no
longer be satisfied and the payment of its monetary equivalent is the only solution left, Sunlife Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion holds as follows: Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

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07 - Gochan v. Gochan (2001)

Doctrines:
A court or tribunals jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The
fact that certain persons are not registered as stockholders in the books of the corporation will not bar them from
filing a derivative suit, if it is evident from the allegations in the complaint that they are bona fide stockholders.
Facts:
Felix Gochan Sr.s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty
from the former. When she died, John Sr. (her husband, father of the respondents), requested Gochan Realty to partition
the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates
in the names of [herein respondents].
Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the
Articles of Incorporation.
Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the rightful
owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers
and directors and damages against respondents.
One of the contentions of Cochan Realty is that the respondents have never been stockholders of record and thus,
cannot be considered as a part-in-interest in an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Section 5, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Procedure in the Securities and Exchange Commission provides:
Section 5. Derivative Suit. No action shall be brought by stockholder in the right of a
corporation unless the complainant was a stockholder at the time the questioned
transaction occurred as well as at the time the action was filed and remains a stockholder
during the pendency of the action
Issues:
1. W/N the Spouses Uy have the personality to file an action before the SEC against Gochan Realty Corporation.
2. W/N the Spouses Uy could properly bring a derivative suit in the name of Gochan Realty to redress wrongs
allegedly committed against it for which the directors refused to sue.
3. W/N the intestate estate of John D. Young Sr. is an indispensable party in the SEC case considering that the
individual heirs shares are still in the decedent stockholders name.
Held/Ratio:
1. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in
the complaint.
For purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss, Cecilia Uys averment in the Complaint that the purchase of
her stocks by the corporation was null and void ab initio is deemed admitted. It is elementary that a void
contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone; it cannot create, modify or extinguish the
juridical relation to which it refers. Thus, Cecilia remains a stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity
of the Contract of Sale. Although she was no longer registered as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the
filing of the case before the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide stockholder
of Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as between said parties.
In any event, the present controversy, whether intra-corporate or not, is no longer cognizable by the SEC, in view
of RA 8799, which transferred to regional trial courts the formers jurisdiction over cases involving intracorporate disputes.
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2. Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence,
and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a single stockholder may institute
that suit, suing on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a
redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders
The Spouses Uy have the capacity to file a derivative suit in behalf of and for the benefit of the corporation. The
reason is that, as earlier discussed, the allegations of the Complaint make them out as stockholders at the time the
questioned transaction occurred, as well as at the time the action was filed and during the pendency of the action.
3. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring
suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of
an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect
the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of
the decedent are violated or dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding
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08 - Go v. UCPB (2004) (real / personal action)

Doctrines:
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real
action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is the same for regional
trial courts and municipal trial courts the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property or any part thereof lies.
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person
or property. The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and municipal trial courts the
court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
Facts:
Jimmy Go and Alberto Looyuko are co-owners of various businesses carrying the name Noahs Ark. They
applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of
Nine Hundred Million (P900,000,000) Pesos, which UCPB subsequently granted. This was secured by real estate
mortgages over 2 parcels of land located in Mandaluyong. Because of nonpayment of obligations, UCPB cancelled Go
and Looyukos Omnibus Line accommodation and filed with the sheriff to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgages. A date
was set for the public auction of mortgaged properties.
To protect his interest, Jimmy Go filed with the RTC of Pasig a complaint for cancellation of the real estate
mortgages. UCPB filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction because of
nonpayment of docket and filing fees and that the complaint was filed in the improper venue. The trial court denied
UCPBs motion to dismiss. UCPB appealed and the CA ruled in the banks favor. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari filed by Go.
Issues:
1. Whether Gos complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of
determining venue.
Held/Ratio:
1. It is a real action.
The cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action, considering that a
real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate
mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be
commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies.
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09 - Manchester Development Corp. v. CA (1987)

Doctrines:
A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in the court.
All complaints, petition, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer.
Facts:
This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for
temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed
P78.75M in damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fee paid was only P410. The petitioner then
amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M only. The Court of Appeals ruled that the basis of assessment
of the docket fee should be in the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not the amended complaint.
Petitioner cited Magaspi v. Ramolete in contending that the filing fee should be based on the amended complaint.
Issues:
1. W/N the courts acquired jurisdiction of the case.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the court only acquires jurisdiction upon payment of the docket fee.
In the Magaspi case the action was not only for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee
for the damages should be the basis of the assessment. Although the docket fee paid was only P60 and was found
insufficient, it was held to be result of an honest differences of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee. The court acquired jurisdiction of the case and the proceeding thereafter were proper and regular. As
the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegation of damages in the amended complaint
should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.
In the present case there is no honest difference of opinion. The designation and prayer clearly states it is an
action for specific performance and damages. The docket fee should be based on the amount of damages in the
original complaint. As a case is deemed filed upon payment of the docket fee, in this case, for legal purposes there
was no such original case that was filed that can be amended.
The Court stated that it frowns on the practice of counsel who files an original complaint in this case omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78M is alleged in the body of
the complaint. This they say in clearly intended to evade the payment of the proper filling fee if not to mislead the
clerk of court in the assessment of the filing fee. All complaints, petition, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer. Any
pleadings that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleadings.
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11 - Negros Oriental Planters Assoc., Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of Negros Occidental (2008)
Doctrines:
A pleading wherein the verification (verified if partys knowledge is alleged under oath to be either personal
knowledge or based on authentic records) is merely based on the partys knowledge and belief produces no legal
effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.
(ito yata yung related sa Rule 1, Sec 5) Where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Facts:
Aniceto Campos entered in 2 separate contracts with Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA)
denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. In 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages
against NOPA before the RTC of Negros Occidental alleging that he paid in full but was only able to receive a partial
delivery due to a disagreement regarding the quality of the molasses being delivered. In 2005, more than 6 years after
NOPA filed its answer, it filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing
fee, stating that Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the exact amount of damages so as to escape payment of
proper docket fees. Campos paid P54,898.50 based on P10,000,000 amount for the molasses, storage fees, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attys fees. NOPA alleges that P602,875.98 representing unrealized profit and excess
storage fee was omitted. RTC issued an Order denying Motion to Dismiss, but after receiving the Order, NOPA filed for
Motion for Reconsideration on the said Order, which was also denied.
Afterwards, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the 2 Orders of the RTC. A resolution
denying the Petition was issued by the CA, on the grounds that NOPA failed to state in its Verification that the allegations
in the petition are based on authentic records in violation of Sec 4 Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure (instead what was
written is true and correct to my own knowledge and belief), failure to append to the petition relevant pleadings and
documents and failure of NOPAs counsel to indicate his IBP Official Receipt Number. NOPA filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration attaching an Amended Petition for Certiorari with the requirements that were previously violated, but
again this was denied by the CA; thus the filing of this Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC.
Issues:
1. W/N CA committed reversible error in ruling that there was no substantial compliance with the procedural
requirements
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the cases cited by NOPA in its claim were inapplicable in this case because the said cases were promulgated
prior to the amendment of Sec 4, Rule 7.6
Accordingly, improper verification of a pleading would render it unsigned thus without legal effect, however the
court may in its discretion allow such deficiency to be remedied if the same is deemed inadvertent or not intended
for delay. In this case, CA in the exercise of discretion refused to allow the deficiency to be remedied.
Furthermore, if CA would reverse the exercise of discretion of the RTC (regarding the dismissal of Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration) it could only be done if there was grave abuse of this discretion or
adverse effect on the substantial rights of the litigant, which is not the case in this instance. [RULE 1 related]
There is no substantial right prejudiced by CAs decision since the alleged deficiency in the payment of docket
fees would not inure to the benefit of NOPA. While NOPA seeks the Manchester Development Corp v CA to be

6.
Prior to amendment: A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.
As amended: A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
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applied in this case, the RTC followed Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v Asuncion in its decision. In the said decision, it
was decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. The court reiterated the rule that in case the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket
fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine in the Sun case and not the strict regulation in Manchester
will apply. In this case, the alleged amount omitted was merely 5.2% of the total amount filed for. Moreover,
Campos pleadings evince willingness to abide by paying additional docket fees.

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12 - Ayala Corporation v. Hon. Judge Madayag (1990) (docket fees, claim not stated)
Doctrines:
Even if the subject of an action for specific performance with damages is a transaction involving real estate, the
applicable rule is still Manchester wherein what is to be considered in computing the docket fees is the
damages claimed.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound
discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the
basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate
docket fees.
Facts:
[This is a very short case. Like, 2 pages short. So, if you want you can read it in its original.]
Private respondents filed against Ayala Corporation and its co-petitioners an action for specific performance
with damages in the Makati RTC. Ayala filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the
private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fees and to specify the amount of the exemplary damages they are
claiming in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. RTC denied their motion. Thus this petition.
Ayala alleges that the docket fee should be P13,061 based on the assessed value of the property and not P1,616.
Moreover, they also allege the failure of the private respondents to allege in their complaint the amount of exemplary
damages sought to be claimed.
Issues:
1. W/N the docket fees should be based on the assessed value of the real property.
2. W/N the amended and supplemental complaint suffers from a material defect for failure to include the damages
sought to be recovered.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Even if the subject of an action for specific performance with damages is a transaction involving real
estate, the applicable rule is still Manchester wherein what is to be considered in computing the docket fees is
the damages claimed.
2. YES. The Court already ruled in Tayag that as a general rule, the amount of damages sought to be
recovered should be stated in the complaint/prayer. The phrase/exception above only applies to damages
arising during trial that were not included in the pleading. In essence, the parties should have already made a
determination of how much they are asking in order that the docket fees be determined, and if the Court awards
more than what was prayed for, the additional filing fees should constitute a lien on the Courts judgment. The
absence of this amount constitutes a material defect on the complaint.
In effect, this material defect allows the Court to either expunge the case from the records as no jurisdiction
was acquired or to allow amendment of the complaint upon motion and the payment of the corresponding
docket fees within a reasonable time.
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13 - Tacay v. RTC of Tagum (1989)

Doctrine:
An action for recovery of possession of real property or the title thereof may be commenced and prosecuted
without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Facts:
Three (3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas) were separately instituted by Godofredo
Pineda against defendants Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.
The complaints all alleged the same essential facts (1) Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land (2) the previous
owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the
property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but
these demands had been refused.
The complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:
1. that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;
2. that defendants and their privies and allies be ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of the land
usurped by them;
3. that each defendant be ordered to pay: P2,000 as monthly rents from February 1987; Actual damages, as
proven; Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix; P30,000, as attorneys fees, and
representation fees of P5,000 per day of appearance;
4. that he (Pineda) be granted such further relief and remedies ... just and equitable in the premises.
Motions to dismiss the complaint were filed by the defendants. They allege that the Trial Court had not acquired
jurisdiction of the case for the reason that the complaint violates the mandatory and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of
the Supreme Court by failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from the defendants and
for the failure to even allege the basic requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute.
Issue:
1. W/N the amount of damages and assessed value of the property is determinative of a courts jurisdiction over
cases of recovery of possession of real property.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in this action is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages
allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the
property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real property may be commenced and
prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action
would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter
alia over all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The rule
applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000 or not. The
rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount of
those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Courts jurisdiction.
Circular No. 7 cannot thus be invoked for it was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer
of their complaints any specification of the amount of damages, the omission being clearly intended for no
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other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the
assessment of the filing fee.
14 - Citizens Surety and Insurance Co. v. Melencio-Herrera (service of summons)

Doctrines:
In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of
Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
Facts:
At the request of Santiago Dacanay, the plaintiff Citizens Surety and Insurance Co. (Surety) issued 2 Surety
Bonds. The first one was in favor of Gregorio Fajardo, to guarantee a P5000-promissory note issued by Dacanay. The
second was for another promissory note of the same amount in favor of Manufacturers Bank and Trust Co. The Dacanay
spouses then executed Indemnity Agreements which indicated that they would indemnify Surety for the losses which it
might sustain in connection with the surety bonds. The spouses also mortgaged their property in Baguio as an additional
security.
The Dacanays failed to pay their debts and as a result, Surety was compelled to pay Fajardo and Manufacturers
Bank. The Dacanays also failed to reimburse Surety. So Surety caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property to pay its total claim of P12,941.69. This amount includes the 2 payments plus the interest and stipulated
damages. Surety was the highest bidder and the land was sold to it for P2000 so there remained an unpaid balance of
around P10,000.
Surety then requested the judge to issue summons to the Dacanays. The summons was made through publication
in the newspaper, Philippines Herald. Despite the publication, defendants still failed to appear within the 60-day period
from the publication, as required by the summons. Surety asked that the defendants be declared in default as the summons
by publication was sufficient and valid under the Rules of Court. However, the judge dismissed the case because the suit
was one in personam and the defendants have not appeared.
Issues:
1. W/N the summons by publication enabled the court to have jurisdiction over the defendants
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The action of Surety, being in personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction over the nonappearing defendants absent a personal service of summons. Due process requires personal service of summons
when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the
parties.
But in this case, the defendants have absconded. So the proper remedy for Surety is to locate the real or personal
properties of the defendants with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57. The attachment
would then convert the suit to an action in rem or quasi in rem, and this would now make the publication effective
and valid. Because the defendants absconded and concealed their properties, the case should not be dismissed and
should be pending until the whereabouts of the defendants or their properties are known so that valid summons
can then be served.
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RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTION

01 - Monzon v. Sps. Relova v. Addio (2008) (absence during presentation of evidence)
Doctrines:
The failure to attend, when committed during hearing dates for the presentation of the complainants evidence,
would amount to the waiver of such defendants right to object to the evidence presented during such hearing, and
to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein. However, it would not amount to a waiver of the defendants
right to present evidence during the trial dates scheduled for the reception of evidence for the defense.
Facts:
On December 1998, Monzon executed a promissory note to spouses Perez for P600,000 w/ 5% interest payable
within a year and secured by a lot in Tagaytay. Days after Monzon executed a deed of absolute sale. On March 1999,
Monson also executed a promissory note to spouses Relova for P200,000 w/ 5% interest payable on the same date as the
first note and also secured by a lot in Tagaytay. On December 1999, Monzon executed a deed of conditional sale to them.
However, October 1999, Coastal Lending Corp. extrajudicially forclosed the properties covered by the deeds of
sale and the bid winner was Addio Properties. Monzon was indebted to Coastal for P3,398,832.35 while Addio paid
P5,001,127. Respondents pray in their petition for injunction to Monzon liable to the spouses Perez in the amount of
P1,215,000 and to the spouses Relova in the amount of P385,000; (2) ordering Atty. Luna to deliver said amounts to
respondents; and (3) restraining Atty. Luna from delivering any amount to Monzon pending such delivery in number (2).
RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the respondent spouses.
Issues:
1. W/N there was a violation of Monzons right to due process of law for the RTC to render its Decision
immediately after respondents presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to present her
evidence.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
It can be seen that despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in default by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless
applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. According to
Justice Regalado, the effects of default are followed only in three instances: (1) when there is an actual default for
failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3) refusal to comply
with modes of discovery under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
The court stated that such failure to attend, when committed during hearing dates for the presentation of the
complainants evidence, would amount to the waiver of such defendants right to object to the evidence presented
during such hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein. However, it would not amount to a
waiver of the defendants right to present evidence during the trial dates scheduled for the reception of evidence
for the defense. It would be an entirely different issue if the failure to attend of the defendant was on a hearing
date set for the presentation of the evidence of the defense, but such did not occur in the case at bar.
The Petition for Injunction in Civil Case No. TG-2069, insofar as petitioner Teresita Monzon is concerned, is ordered
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City for further proceedings.
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02 - Philippine National Construction Corporation v. CA (2007)

Doctrines:
Cause of Action is defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of the other, which
causes the latter injury.
To determine whether a cause of action exists, the following elements must be present:
1. right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created,
2. an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not violate such right, and
3. an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
The cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with his
duty.
Facts:
PNCC and the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) entered into a contract for the construction of
PMMAs Replication Project in Zambales, which included a gymnasium building. The construction of the gymnasium
was subcontracted by PNCC to MCS Construction and Development Corporation under a Subcontract Agreement for
P19,483,572.65. PNCC indicated in a Certificate of Acceptance dated April 6, 2000 that MCS had satisfactorily
completed the construction according to plan as of March 1999.
However despite several written demands by MCS, PNCC failed to pay the balance of the contract price
prompting the former to file a Request for Adjudication from the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
Arbitral Tribunal on September 6, 2002. MCS prayed for P24,988,597.44 as the remaining balance, including interest and
damages. In its defense, PNCC refers to Article IV of their Subcontract Agreement pertaining to the manner of payment
which stated that the price referred toshall be paid by PNCC to Subcontractor in the following manner and subject to
receipt by PNCC of corresponding payment/s from PMMA and computed thru semi-monthly progress billings
computed based on accomplishment as accepted by PNCC. It claims that it was in the process of paying its obligation to
MCS in installments therefore the request for arbitration was premature, there being no cause of action.
PNCC submitted a summary of the accounts payable to MCS and payments made as of October 10, 2002, which
showed a balance of P6,972,043.44, it was yet to receive from PMMA. Unfortunately for PNCC, it also contained the
payments it had already received from PMMA, which amounted to P31,249,223.30. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal held in
favor of MCS, finding PNCC in bad faith for its unwarranted and baseless delay in paying the remaining balance of
P6,352,791.33 to MCS. To the CIAC, it appeared that PNCC chose to reap the benefits from the margins from the PMMA
contract before satisfying its obligations to MCS as no other evidence was presented to show that the payments made to it
by PMMA referred to other accounts between PMMA and PNCC, or that said payments were inadequate to warrant full
payment of the amounts due to MCS. PNCC merely claimed it faced financial difficulties for the delay which it was
unable to justify. MCS was awarded the remaining balance of P6,352,791.33 with interest of 6% p.a. from its first
extrajudicial demand on June 6, 1999 and upon the award being executory, a 12% p.a. until full payment. PNCC was also
ordered to pay the costs of arbitration and attorneys fees (10% of principal claim and interest until full payment).
PNCC filed a Petition for Review in the CA claiming CIAC erred in ruling that the claim of MCS was not
premature. It was dismissed. PNCC then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari still claiming the prematurity of the
action and impropriety of the award of arbitration costs and attorneys fees.
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Issues:
1. W/N MCS had a cause of action
2. W/N the award of arbitration and attorneys fees was improper (minor issue)
Held/Ratio:
1. YES
To determine whether a cause of action exists, the following elements must be present:
a. right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created,
b. an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not violate such right, and
c. an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
MCS has a right to be paid for its services and PNCC recognized this right under the Subcontractors Agreement.
PNCC refusal to expeditiously settle its obligation to MCS, despite the latters satisfactory completion of its
duties under the Subcontract Agreement, is clearly violative of the Subcontract Agreement. Under the contract
PNCC shall pay MCS thru semi-monthly progress billings upon PNCCs receipt of corresponding payments from
PMMA. As found by the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal, based on the evidence presented by PNCC itself, it has already
received from PMMA a total of P31,249,233.30 for the construction of the gymnasium building. This amount is
evidently sufficient to pay the whole subcontract price in the amount of only P19,483,572.65, and still leave
PNCC the amount of P11,765,660.65 as margin/profit from the contract. Failure to fully pay MCS because it still
has a receivable of P6,972,043.44 from PMMA is untenable. Notwithstanding this fact that PNCC still has a
receivable in an amount sufficient to fulfill its remaining obligation to MCS, it is not adequate a reason to justify
the irregular installment payments PNCC has been making to MCS in light of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunals
finding that PNCC had already received more than a substantial amount from PMMA to satisfy the whole of its
obligation to MCS.
2. NO
Findings that PNCC exercised gross and evident bad faith in delaying payments of MCSs claims justify the
award of arbitration costs and attorneys fees.
Furthermore, there is no justifiable reason to disturb the findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal as said quasijudicial body has considered the evidence at hand and the records clearly show that its decision is amply
supported by substantial evidence.
Under the Section 2, Article IV of the Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration
attorneys fees is not an arbitrable issue, yet, the same also provides that it may be the subject of
arbitration if the parties agree to submit the same for arbitration. In the case, under the Terms of
Reference agreed to by the parties during the arbitration proceedings, PNCC agreed that one of the
issues to be determined in the proceedings is who between the parties is entitled to attorneys fees.
Clearly, petitioner has acquiesced to the submission of the issue of attorneys fees to arbitration.
Whats more, in petitioners very own Answer submitted before the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal,
petitioner asked for attorneys fees as part of its own compulsory counterclaim. This act of
petitioner clearly negates its further assertion that it never agreed to submit the issue of attorneys
fees for arbitration.

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03 - Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Roxas (19xx) (written is better than verbal)

Doctrines:
Cause of action is the reason why litigation has come about
In determining cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered
Requisites for Cause of Action: (1) Right in favor of the plaintiff arises or is created. (2) its an obligation of
defendant to respect and not to violate such right and (3) an act or omission of the defendant violates the
plaintiffs right or breach of the obligation the defendant to the plaintiff
Facts:
Viewmaster (petitioner) agreed to act as the guarantor of Allen Roxas (respondent) in exchange for certain
conditions:
1. Roxas sells fifty percent (50%) of his shareholdings in State Investment and
2. Roxas shall undertake a joint venture project with Viewmaster to co-develop the two real estate properties
in Quezon City and Las Pias, and
3. If Roxas shall sell and petitioner Viewmaster shall purchase fifty percent (50%) of the latters total
eventual acquisitions of shares of stock in State Investment.
This was for the loan obtained by Roxas from First Metro Investments, Inc. Respondent then gained control and
ownership of State Investment, but to viewmasters surprise Roxas failed to follow the conditions agreed upon earlier.
With this, petitioner filed complaint for specific performance, enforcement of implied trust and damages against
Roxas and other private respondents before the RTC of Pasig. The trial court then issued an order dismissing the
complaint. After a series of motion for reconsiderations filed by both parties the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari. The CA after setting aside all the motions, then dismissed the initial complaint filed by
Viewmaster.
Issue:
1. W/N there was a cause of Action
Held/Ratio:
1. NO
The Court held that the complaint does not state a cause of action. The relaying of facts alone is not sufficient
enough for the court to arrive at an equitable judgment. The Supreme Court supplied for requisites for a valid
cause of action: (1) Right in favor of the plaintiff arises or is created. (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant
to respect and not to violate such right and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant which violates the
plaintiffs right or breach of the obligation the defendant to the plaintiff. In this case, it was found that the
contract between Viewmaster and Roxas is unenforceable for it did not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
The terms were not to be performed within a year from the making and according to Art 1403 of the Civil Code
agreements like this must be in writing. In the case at bar, agreement between Roxas and Viewmaster were all
verbal thus the contract is unenforceable. With this, no right or claim of Viewmaster arises and the requisites
for cause of action are not complied with.
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04 - Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. CA (2000) (Co-operation in the Pacific)

Doctrines:
In the determination of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action, the annexes attached to the
complaint may be considered, they being parts of the complaint.
Facts:
Sea-Land Services, Inc. and A.P. Moller/Maersk Line (AMML) entered into a contract entitled Co-operation in
the Pacific, a vessel sharing agreement whereby they mutually agreed to purchase, share, and exchange needed space for
cargo in their respective containerships. On May 1991, Florex International, Inc. delivered to AMML a cargo, with
Oakland, California as port of discharge and San Francisco as place of delivery. A corresponding Bill of Lading was
issued. Pursuant to the Agreement with Sea-Land, AMML loaded the said cargo on the vessel owned by the former.
AMML was the principal carrier while Sea-Land was the containership operator.
Subsequently, the consignee refused to pay for the cargo alleging that delivery was delayed. Thus, Florex filed a
complaint against private respondent Filipinas for reimbursement of the value of the cargo and other charges. According
to Florex, the cargo was received by the consignee on June 28 since it was discharged in Long Beach instead of in
Oakland, as stipulated.
In its Answer, AMML alleged that even on assumption that Florex was entitled to reimbursement, it was SeaLand who should be liable. Accordingly, AMML filed a Third Party Complaint against Sea-Land averring that whatever
damages sustained by Florex were caused by Sea-Land, which actually received and transported Florexs cargo on its
vessel and unloaded them.
Sea-Land filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
and lack of jurisdiction, the amount of damages not having been specified therein. It also prayed for either dismissal or
suspension of the Third Party Complaint on the ground that there exists an arbitration agreement between it and AMML.
The lower court and the CA denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Issues:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed on the ground that there exists an agreement to arbitrate.
2. W/N the case should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The CA did not err in reading the Complaint Of Florex and AMMLs Answer together with the Third Party
Complaint to determine whether a cause of action is properly alleged. In the determination of whether or not
the complaint states a cause of action, the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered, they being
parts of the complaint.
2. (arbitration; this is not our topic but I included this parin J) YES. Allowing AMMLs Third Party Claim against
Sea-Land to proceed would be in violation of the Agreement. Clause 16.2 of the Agreement provides that
whatever dispute there may be between the Principal Carrier and the Containership Operator arising from
contracts of carriage shall be governed by the provisions of the bills of lading. It is clear that arbitration is the
mode provided by which AMML as Principal Carrier can seek damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land as
Containership Operator. AMML is barred from taking judicial action against Sea-Land by the clear terms of their
Agreement.
As the Principal Carrier, AMML can and should be held accountable by Florex in the event that it has a valid
claim against AMML. In turn, AMML can seek damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land as Containership
Operator for whatever final judgment may be adjudged against it under the Complaint of Florex. The crucial point
is that collection of said damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land should be by arbitration.
Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the parties expressly provided for by their Agreement, the Third
Party Complaint should have been dismissed.
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05 - San Lorenzo Village Association v. CA (1998) (village restrictions)

Doctrines:
The complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
insufficient.
A complaint states a cause of action where it contains the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
1. the legal right of the plaintiff,
2. the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. If the allegations are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the defendants
recourse is not a motion to dismiss but a bill of particulars.
A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material facts
well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to
conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial
notice.
Facts:
Almeda was the rightful owner of a parcel of land located in Pasay Road, with a corresponding TCT to evince
ownership. The TCT contained certain restrictions on ownership; it stated that the owner was automatically a member of
the San Lorenzo Village Association (SLVA), the lot may not be subdivided, it shall only be used for residential purposes,
only a one-storey building may be erected, there must be an easement, etc. These restrictions were imposed in 1958.
In 1990, the land was sold to Almeda Development and Equipment Corporation (ADEC), evidenced by a Deed of
Sale. ADEC avers that since Pasay Road is not in the same state as it was back then, being now littered with commercial
and industrial establishments, it sought to erase the annotations containing the restrictions on the TCT. ADEC wanted to
build a taller building, and did not want to be a member of the SLVA. ADEC then filed a petition for the issuance of a
TRO and prohibition against San Lorenzo Village Association Inc. (SLVAI), and prayed for the Register of Deeds of
Makati to cancel the annotations.
SLVAI filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of a cause of action and lack of ADECs
personality to sue. It alleged that ADEC was not the owner, as the Deed of Sale was not registered, and so it could not
bind third parties; therefore, ADEC supposedly had no cause of action. This motion to dismiss was denied. SLVAI then
filed a certiorari petition questioning the dismissal. The CA denied the petition, so it went to the SC on a petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. W/N ADEC has a cause of action
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, ADEC has a cause of action.
The complaint asserts that ADEC purchased the property from the person admittedly holding title thereto. It then
infers that by this mode, it became the successor-in-interest of Almeda, if not indeed the owner of the property.
Hence, the restrictions in the title should be nullified not only because it is contrary to law but also because the
conditions under which they were imposed had ceased to exist.
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The averments in the complaint like the title of Almeda, the execution of the sale to ADEC, ADECs status as the
successor-in-interest, and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations well within the
hypothetical-admission principle. These averments satisfy the three elements of a cause of action.
Regarding the issue of whether ADEC is a real party in interest, the issue is not a proper ground for a motion to
dismiss. As the successor-in-interest of the vendor, ADEC has the prerogative to assert all the rights of an owner,
including the impugnation of the restrictions on the title.
SLVAIs allegations regarding the propriety of the sale to ADEC, the non-cancellability of the restrictions, the
granting of the causes of action, etc., are more appropriately mentioned in an Answer and in a full-blown trial, not
in a motion to dismiss. Since the three essential elements of a cause of action are present, the motion to dismiss by
SLVAI was improper.
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06 - Spouses Zepeda v. China Bank (19xx)

Facts:
On June 1995 the spouses obtained a P5,800,000 loan from China Bank secured by a real mortgage. They were
having difficulties in paying their obligation, so they requested for restructuring of the loan which ChinaBank allegedly
granted. BUT their mortgage was still foreclosed in Oct 2001 and ChinaBank emerged as the highest bidder, and upon
failure of the spouses to redeem the property, ownership was consolidated in favor of ChinaBank.
The spouses filed a complaint for nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and loan agreements with damages
on the following grounds: for failure to comply with posting and publication requirements, that they signed the mortgage
and promissory note in blank and that the interest rates thereon were unilaterally fixed by ChinaBank.
The trial court denied ChinaBanks motion to dismiss, as well as their subsequent answer with special affirmative
defenses for lack of merit, and their motion to expunge for being premature. They also filed a set of written
interrogatories.
Aggrieved, ChinaBank filed a petition for certiorari which was granted by the CA. It ruled the dismissal of the
petitioners complaint for they acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the court pertaining to
ChinaBanks affirmative defenses, for failing to answer the written interrogatories, and that the complaint did not have
cause of action. CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence this petition for review.
Issue:
1. Does the petitioners complaint state a cause of action?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes.
A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. As defined in
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
a. A right of the plaintiff
b. An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
c. Act or omission on the part of defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises. In the instant case, petitioners
specifically alleged that respondent bank acted in bad faith when it extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
property despite the approval of the restructuring of their loan obligation, which made them believe that
foreclosure would be held in abeyance. They also alleged that the proceeding was conducted without complying
with the posting and publication requirements.
Assuming these allegations to be true, petitioners can validly seek the nullification of the foreclosure since
the alleged restructuring of their debt would effectively modify the terms of the original loan obligations
and accordingly supersede the original mortgage thus making the subsequent foreclosure void. Similarly,
the allegation of lack of notice if subsequently proven renders the foreclosure a nullity in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
The fact that petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem the property and that the title was consolidated in
respondent banks name did not preclude them from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure. Precisely,
petitioners seek to nullify the proceedings based on circumstances obtaining prior to and during the
foreclosure which render it void.
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NOTE: 2nd issue is about the Written Interrogatories (WI), which is a mode of discovery. Feeling ko wala pa dito so di
pa kailangan ilagay sa digest. Pero just in case, the respondent bank filed WI in the lower court. Petitioner on the other
hand failed to answer the WI. One of the consequences for failing to comply with a WI is that the complaint can be
dismissed by the court upon motion, however, the party moving that the case be dismissed for failure of the other party to
comply with the WI must FIRST ask the court to compel compliance.
In this case, direcho na kagad siya nag-ask for dismissal. Dapat he asked muna the court to compel petitioner to answer
the WI.
So, no the complaint should not be dismissed because of the failure of petitioners to answer the WIs.
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07 - Lorbes v. CA (2001) (equitable mortgage, pleadings)

Doctrines:
Thus, the SC has held that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature
of the action and the SC shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is
prayed for.
Facts:
Spouses Lorbes were the owners of a parcel of land located in Antipolo. They mortgaged this property to
Florencio and Nestor Carlos in the amount of P150,000.
A year later, the mortgage obligation had increased to P500,000. Fearing foreclosure, the spouses asked their sonin-law, Ricardo delos Reyes, for help in redeeming the property. Delos Reyes agreed to redeem the property. But because
he allegedly had no money then, he solicited the assistance of Josefina Cruz, a family friend and an employee of Land
Bank. The parties agreed that the spouses will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of Cruz.
Thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan with Land Bank, using the property as collateral. It was further agreed that
the proceeds of the loan will be used to pay the Carloses and that a new title over the property will be issued in the name
of Cruz.
Subsequently, Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the Carloses, telling them that Cruzs loan had
been approved. A new TCT was issued, in the name of Cruz. The mortgage was then discharged.
Later, the Lorbes spouses informed delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the property. Their offer was
refused. Hence, the spouses filed a complaint for reformation of instrument and damages with the RTC of Antipolo. They
claimed that the deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements of the bank for the housing loan, and that the real
intention of the parties in securing the loan was to apply the proceeds for the payment of the mortgage obligation. They
further alleged that the deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties and that the transaction was not an
absolute sale but an equitable mortgage.
The RTC issued a TRO, enjoining delos Reyes and Cruz from ejecting the petitioners from the property.
Thereafter, a summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon delos Reyes and Cruz. They filed their answer
beyond the reglementary period. They were declared in default. They filed a motion to lift order of default. The RTC
denied such. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the spouses, claiming that the deed did not reflect the true intention
of the parties and that it was an equitable mortgage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision, finding that delos Reyes and Cruz were denied due process by the refusal of
the RTC to lift the order of default against them. The CA also held that it was an absolute sale, not an equitable mortgage.
It also held that the RTC decision was constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based.
Issues:
1. W/N the CA erred in ruling that it was an absolute sale
2. W/N the CA erred in ruling that by declaring delos Reyes and Cruz in default they were denied due process of law
3. W/N CA erred in ruling that the RTC decision violates the constitutional requirement that it should clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, it was an equitable mortgage
The SC held that the true intention between the parties for executing the deed of absolute sale was not to convey
ownership of the property in question but merely to secure the housing loan of Cruz. The sole purpose of the deed
and other documents was to satisfy Land Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to Cruzs application for
a loan was met.
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It should also be noted that this petition filed with the SC originated as a complaint for reformation filed
before the RTC. The CA found the petitioners action for reformation unmeritorious because there was no
showing that the failure of the deed of sale to express the parties true intention was because of mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct, or accident. However, the fact that the complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court
was categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should not preclude the Court from passing upon the
issue of whether the transaction was in fact an equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised in the
complaint and had been the subject of arguments and evidence of the parties. Thus, the SC has held that it is not
the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action and the SC
shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
2. NO.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of default are
frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay.
Issuance of orders of default should be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply
with the orders of the court.
Hence, the default order of the RTC was in violation of delos Reyes and Cruzs due process rights. However, the
SC does not think that the violation was of a degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings to the trial court.
3. YES
The RTC decision clearly complied with the constitutional requirements to state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
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08 - Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Phillipps, Binongcal and Calion (19xx) (totality rule, joinder of parties)
Doctrine:
When two or more plaintiffs sue one defendant in a single complaint or one plaintiff sues several defendants in a
single complaint, based on several causes of action for or against each, respectively, the totality rule applies only
where:
o
The causes of action arose from the same series of transactions; and
There is a common question of fact or law among them.
Facts:
Flores filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio City and Benguet Province (where Hon. Mallare-Phillipps was the
presiding judge) against respondents Binongcal and Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amounts of P11,643 and
P10,212, respectively, representing cost of truck tires which were purchased on several occasions from August to October
1981 (for Binongcal), and from March 1981 to January 1982 (for Calion), respectively, as two separate causes of action.
The counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against him was only P11,643; because under Section 19 of BP 129, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction if
the amount of demand is more than P20,000. Binongcal further averred in the said motion that although another person
(Calion) was allegedly indebted to Flores amounting to P10,212, Binongcals obligation was separate and distinct from
that of Calion. Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Flores, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint following the totality rule
under Section 33 of BP 129 and Section 11 of Interim Rules, provided as follows:
Section 33, BP 129 Provided, that where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arouse out of the same or different transactions ... .
...
Section 11 of Interim Rules Application of the totality rule. In actions where the
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the
aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of
whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for
damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
The RTC concurred with Binongcal and Calion, and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Flores
appealed by certiorari the RTCs dismissal of the complaint, to the SC.
Issue:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the totality rule under Sec. 33 of BP 129 and Sec. 11 of
the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements of a permissive joinder of parties, under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the permissive joinder of parties, the totality rule shall be used as basis of the jurisdictional test if the
causes of action arose from the same series of transaction, or where there is a common question of law or fact.
Applying this doctrine to the present case, there was a misjoinder of parties (defendants) because the claims
against Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and that the amount of each claim did not fall within the
RTCs jurisdiction.
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09 - Progressive Development Corp. v. CA (1999) (one case for forcible entry, another for damages)
Doctrines:
Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committedlike the unlawful taking or
detention of anothers propertythere is only one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that
may have been violated
All such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting a single cause of action
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered in one case, and
the rest in another
If a suit is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a
second action for the residue of the claim
Facts:
Progressive Devt owned a parcel of land w/ a commercial building at Araneta Center, Cubao, QC. In 1989, it
started to lease said property to private respondent Westin Seafod Market, Inc. for P600,000 a month, for a period of 9
years and 3 months. The contract stipulated that should Westin violate any of its terms, then the contract will be
automatically terminated and that Progressive Devt will have the right to take back the property and hold in storage any
of Westins property left in the premises. Upon termination of the contract, Westin should immediately vacate and
redeliver physical possession of the premises.
By October 1992, or barely 3 years after the lease started, Westin owed Progressive Devt around P8M for unpaid
rentals. During that same month, Progressive Devt repossessed the leased premises, inventoried Westins remaining
properties therein, and scheduled a public auction for the sale of movables on 19 Aug. 1993, with notice to Westin. On
November 1992, Westin filed a complaint of forcible entry with damages (P21M) and a prayer for TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction (for the public auction) against Progressive Devt at the MeTC of Quezon City. Westin alleged that
Progressive Devt entered the property without a writ of possession, using brute force. The parties agreed that Westin
would deposit P8M with PCIB in the name of the MeTC to guarantee payment of its back rentals, and that they would
suspend hearing on the merits of the case while they try to negotiate for the restoration of the premises to Westin until
January 1993, among other things.
However, pending the resolution of the MeTC case, Westin filed another action for moral and exemplary damages
against Progressive Devt, with the Quezon City RTC, citing Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, which required the lessor to let
the lessee enjoy the property peacefully for the entire duration of the contract. Progressive Devt filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping. But instead of dismissing the case, the judge issued an order
archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case being heart a the MeTC, with the reason that the
presence of damages depended on whether Progressive committed forcible entry or not. While Progressive Devt moved
for reconsideration, Westin filed an amended complaint for damages, asking for about P1M. So the judge denied
Progressive Devts motion, admitted the amended complaint, and also admitted Westins application for a TRO against
petitioner.
Progressive Devt then filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition w/ the CA, on the ground that
Judge Santiago (who was presiding over the RTC case) acted in excess of his jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of
discretion. However, the CA dismissed the complaint because Progressive Devt failed to file a motion for reconsideration
for Judge Santiagos last order. It also said that there was no litis pendencia because the damages asked for in the MeTC
case was different from those asked for in the RTC case.
Issues:
1. W/N the causes of action before the RTC and the MeTC were identical with each other
2. W/N a motion of reconsideration was required before filing the petition for certiorari and prohibition (not under
this topic, but he may ask because its related to procedure)
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Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The RTC case should be dismissed because there is a pendency of another case w/ the same cause of action
in the MeTC. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, any action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
must be brought not only with a plea for restoration of possession, but also all claims for damages and costs. No
claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of
the claim for restoration of possession. Also, under Sec. 3 of Rule 2, a party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action. And under Sec. 4 of Rule 2, if two or more suits are instituted based on the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits of any one is a ground for the dismissal of the
other.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of another. Both cases under
the MeTC and RTC arise from the same cause of action: the alleged forcible entry of Progressive Devt into the
leased premises. The claim for actual and compensatory damages in the MeTC case, then moral and exemplary
damages in the RTC case thus constitutes splitting a cause of action. Jurisprudence is clear that there is only one
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated.
The RTC case sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. The question of damages is merely
secondary that even the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The rule is that all rights
should be alleged in a single complaint. Thus, those not included therein cannot be the subject of subsequent
complaints. This principle does not only include what was actually determined, but extends to every matter which
the parties might have litigated in the case. A claim cant be divided in such a way that different sets of damages
may be recovered in different cases.
2. NO. Generally, a motion for reconsideration must be filed first before resorting to certiorari. However, there are
exceptions, such as when only a question of law is raised, when the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or
the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
Here, Progressive Devt raised the same issue to the RTC, the CA, and finally to the SC: that there was another
action of forcible entry already pending with the MeTC. Thus, any motion of reconsideration would have been
pointless at this point.
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RULE 3, 1 - 11 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

01 - Rayo v. Metrobank (2007) (party-in-interest, legal personality, substantial interest)
Doctrines:
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. A real party-ininterest is one with a present substantial interest which means such interest of a party in the subject matter of
the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the
legal title to demand.
Facts:
Midas Diversified Export Corp. (Midas), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, obtained six (6) loans from
private respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), amounting to P588,870,000 as evidenced by
promissory notes. To secure the payment of an P8,000,000 loan, Louisville Realty & Development Corporation
(Louisville), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, executed in favor of Metrobank, a real estate mortgage over three
parcels of land situated at No. 40 Timog Ave., Brgy. Laging Handa, Quezon City, with all the buildings and
improvements thereon.
When the debtor-mortgagor failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage in
accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended. Thereafter, in a public auction, Metrobank was the highest bidder. A
Certificate of Sale dated December 11, 2000 was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on December
13, 2000. When Louisville refused to turn over the real properties, on March 17, 2001, Metrobank filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 223, Quezon City, an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
docketed as LRC Case No. Q-13915(01).
ABOUT LEGAL PERSONALITY
Petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, he has the legal personality to institute
the annulment of judgment case against Metrobank, considering that the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment he
entered into with Louisville and Winston Linwy L. Chua makes him a co-assignee over the subject real properties.
For its part, Metrobank claims that it was not a party to the deed of assignment among Louisville, Chua
and petitioner, hence, it has no privity of contract with petitioner Rayo. Moreover, Metrobank points out that the
real properties had already been extrajudicially foreclosed when petitioner and his assignors executed the deed of
assignment.
Issues:
1. W/N petitioner has the legal personality in the annulment of judgment proceedings (Our Topic)
2. W/N Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, unconstitutional (Substantial Issue)
3. W/N respondent guilty of forum shopping
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, Initially, we recognized herein petitioner as the co-assignee of the subject real properties as shown in
the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment. However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit,
we find that petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings
and nullify the order granting the writ of possession.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. A real party-ininterest is one with a present substantial interest which means such interest of a party in the subject matter of
the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the
legal title to demand.
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Rationale (in case Sir will ask)

a. No violation of petitioners right to constitutional due process. In a long line of cases, we have
consistently ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
of a mortgaged property under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended is a ministerial duty of the court.
The purchaser of the foreclosed property, upon ex parte application and the posting of the required bond,
has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period and
with more reason, after the expiration of the redemption period.
b. In the deed of assignment, petitioner also acknowledged that the subject real properties were already sold
at various extrajudicial foreclosure sales and bought by Metrobank. Clearly, petitioner recognized the
prior existing right of Metrobank as the mortgagee-purchaser over the subject real properties. Actual
knowledge of a prior mortgage with Metrobank is equivalent to notice of registration in accordance with
Article 2125 of the Civil Code. Conformably with Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code, a real right
or lien in favor of Metrobank had already been established, subsisting over the properties until the
discharge of the principal obligation, whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be. As petitioner is not
a party whose interest is adverse to that of Louisville, there was no bar to the issuance of a writ of
possession to Metrobank. It does not matter that petitioner was not specifically named in the writ of
possession nor notified of such proceedings.
c. Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case No. Q02-46514, for nullification of real
estate mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale, more than six (6) months after the issuance of the writ
of possession considering the mandate of Section of Act No. 3135, as amended. Hence, even petitioners
action for annulment of judgment cannot prosper as it cannot be a substitute for a lost remedy.
2. Petitioners attempt to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, constitutes a
collateral attack that is not allowed. This Court fully agrees with the appellate courts ruling. For reasons of public
policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked collaterally.
3. NO. Insofar as LRC Case No. Q-13915(01) and Civil Case No. Q02-46514 are concerned, Metrobank is not
guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another. The issuance of the writ of possession being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it
cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits. It is only an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case
for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
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02 - Philippine National Bank v. Mega Prime Realty (2008)

Doctrine:
Fraud is never lightly inferred; it is good faith that is. Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong and that private transactions have been fair and regular. While disputable, these
presumptions can be overcome only by clear and preponderant evidence. Applied to contracts, the presumption is
in favor of validity and regularity.
Facts:
Mega Prime Realty filed a complaint for annulment of contract before the RTC of Malabon. In an amended
complaint, Respondent alleged, among others, that PNB operates a subsidiary by the name of PNB Management and
Development Corporation (PNB-MADECOR). In line with PNBs privatization plan, it opted to sell or dispose of all its
stockholdings over PNB-Madecor to Mega Prime. In September 27, 1996, a deed of sale was executed between PNB
(vendor) and Mega Prime (vendee) whereby PNB sold, transferred and conveyed to Mega Prime, on As is where is
basis, all of its stockholdings in PNB-Madecor for the sum of P505,620,000. In the deed of sale, it provides that:
The sale of the above stockholdings of the Vendor is on a clean balance sheet, i.e. all assets and
liabilities are squared, and no deposits, furniture, fixtures and equipment, including receivables
shall be transferred to the Vendee, except real properties and improvements thereon of PNBMADECOR in Quezon City containing an area of 19,080 sq. m., situated at the corner of Quezon
Boulevard (presently Quezon Avenue) and Roosevelt Avenue covered by five (5) titles, namely:
TCT Nos. 87881, 87882, 87883, 87884, and 160470, per Annexes B, C, D, E, and F
hereof.
A loan agreement was also entered on the same date in which Mega Prime executed in favor of PNB a promissory
note for P404,496,000.
Respondent further alleged that one of the principal inducements for it to purchase the stockholdings of defendant
was to acquire its assets, specifically the one referred to as the Pantranco property. Mega Prime then entered into a joint
venture to develop the Pantranco property. However, its joint venture partner pulled out of the agreement when it learned
that the property covered by TCT No. 160470 was likewise the subject matter of another title registered in the name of the
City Government of Quezon. Moreover, the lot plan of the Pantranco property shows that TCT No. 160470 covers real
property located right in the middle of the Pantranco property rendering nugatory the plans set up by Mega Prime for the
said property.
Mega Prime sought the annulment of the deed of sale on ground of misrepresentation. Respondent likewise
sought reimbursement of the P150,000,000 plus legal interest incurred by Mega Prime as expenses for the development of
the Pantranco property as actual damages and further sought moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In its answer, PNB maintains that the subject matter of the deed of sale was PNBs shares of stock in PNBMadecor which is a separate juridical entity, and not the properties owned by the latter as evidenced by the deed itself.
The sale of PNBs shares of stock in PNB-Madecor to Mega Prime did not dissolve PNB-Madecor. PNB only transferred
its control. Moreover, PNB denied that it is liable for P150,000,000 allegedly incurred by Mega Prime for the
development of the Pantranco property since Mega Prime itself alleged in its amended complaint that no such
development could be undertaken.
As stockholder of PNB-Madecor, PNB did not know nor was it in a position to know, that the Quezon City
Government was able to secure another title over the lot covered by TCT No. 160470. Mega Prime, as buyer, bought the
shares of stock at its own risk. Moreover, the fact that the Quezon City Government was able to secure a title over the
same lot does not necessarily mean that PNB-Madecors title to it is void or outside the commerce of man. Only a proper
proceeding may determine which of the two (2) titles should prevail over the other. Mega Prime, now as the controlling
stockholder of PNB-Madecor, should have instead filed action to quiet PNB-Madecors title over the said lot.
RTC ruled in favor of Mega Prime. CA reversed.
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Issues:
1. W/N there are grounds for the annulment of the deed of sale between Petitioner and Respondent.
2. W/N PNB and Mega Prime are entitled to the damages they respectively claim against each other.
Held:
1. NO. A perusal of the deed of sale reveals that the sale principally involves the entire shareholdings of PNB in
PNB-Madecor, not the properties covered by TCT Nos. 87881, 87882, 87883, 87884 and 160740. Any defect in
any of the said titles should not, therefore, affect the entire sale. Further, there is no evidence that PNB was aware
of the existence of another title on one of the properties before and during the execution of the deed of sale.
In this case, it cannot be said that Mega Prime was able to adduce a preponderance of evidence before the trial
court to show PNBs fraudulent misrepresentation:
First, PNB correctly argued that with Mega Prime as a corporation principally engaged in real estate business, it
is presumed to be experienced in its business and it is assumed that it made the proper appraisal and examination
of the properties it would acquire from the sale of shares of stock.
TCT No. 160470 would show that the property is registered under the name Marcris Realty Corporation and not
under PNB or PNB-Madecor, the alleged owner of the said property. Likewise, it explicitly shows on its face that
it covers a road lot. This fact notwithstanding, Mega Prime still opted to buy PNBs shares of stock, investing
millions of pesos on the said purchase.
Second, Mega Primes remedy is not with PNB. It must be stressed that PNB only sold its shares of stock in PNBMadecor which remains to be the owner of the lot in question. Although, admittedly, PNB-Madecor is a
subsidiary of PNB, this does not necessarily mean that PNB and PNB-Madecor are one and the same corporation.
Third, it is significant to note that the deed of sale is a public document duly notarized and acknowledged before a
notary public. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
Lastly, Mega Prime, using its business judgment, entered into a sale transaction with PNB respecting shares of
stock in PNB-Madecor, in anticipation of owning properties owned by PNB-Madecor. However, it was found out
later that a title in the name of the Quezon City Government casts a cloud over PNB-Madecors title to the socalled Pantranco Properties. This fact alone cannot justify annulment of a valid and consummated contract of sale.
Mega Prime cannot be relieved from its obligation, voluntarily assumed, under the said contract simply because
the contract turned out to be a poor business judgment or unwise investment.
2. NO. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining actual damages, the courts cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures, or guesswork but must depend on competent proof or the best obtainable
evidence of the actual amount of loss.
Aside from the site development plan adduced by Mega Prime, no other proof was presented by Mega Prime to
show that it had incurred expenses for the development of the Pantranco property. There is likewise no basis for
PNB to be liable for exemplary damages and attorneys fees, absent any adequate proof of bad faith when it
entered into the contract of sale with Mega Prime.
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03 - Samaniego v. Aguila (2000) (Office of the President is mere pro forma party)
Doctrines:
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
without that party being impleaded
Facts:
Salud Aguila owned a parcel of land that was around 10 hectares large in Patul (now Malvar), Isabela. He
transferred the title to the lands to his children, Vic Alvarez Aguila and Josephine Taguinod, herein private respondents.
However, they found out that DAR identified the land as part of the Operation Land Transfer Program or PD27. Under
this program, the land would be transferred to the lands farmer-tenants, herein petitioners. Salud then filed a petition for
exemption from the coverage of PD 27. The DAR Regional Director approved the application, but upon motion of
petitioners, the DAR reversed its earlier ruling.
Private respondents appealed to the Office of the President, which set aside the latest ruling and reinstated
the earlier one granting private respondents the exemption. Petitioners then appealed to the CA, which dismissed
their appeal for failure to implead the Office of the President, which, according to the CA, is an indispensable party to
the case.
Issues:
1. W/N the Office of the President is an indispensable party to the case
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Office is merely a nominal or pro forma party or one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not
because it has any real interest in the subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the
technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on record. An indispensable party is one who has
such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect its rights. This interest
must be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree, and not merely to be incidental interest in the
questions involved.
Here, the ruling procedure was embodied in Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provides that it was
unnecessary to implead the court or agencies who rendered the assailed decision. Thus, the petitioners failure to
implead the Office of the President doesnt warrant the dismissal of the case. The SC remanded it back to the CA
for a trial on the merits.
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04 - Aguila v. CA (1999) (Partnership is the proper party)

Doctrine:
Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
The proper party must be the one impleaded. The violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of the
complaint.
Facts:
Alfredo Aguila, Jr. was the manager of AC Aguila & Sons. Co., (Aguila Co.) a partnership that engages in
lending activities. In 1991, the respondent spouses Abrogar, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement which provides
that Aguila Co. will purchase, through a deed of sale, the house and lot of the spouses and that the spouses are given an
option to repurchase the said properties within a period of 90 days for 200,000. Of course, they failed to exercise this
option, which gave rise to all of this. Then an ejectment case was filed against them, they failed to do this as well. A series
of appeals (for nullification of sale and forgery) was taken by the spouses and by then, the widow.
At the Supreme Court, Alfredo Aguila contends that he is not the right party in interest, but Aguila Co.
Issue:
1. W/N A.C. Aguila & Sons. Co, is the real party in interest in this case.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The partnership is the real party in interest in this case. Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership
has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners. The partners cannot be held
liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical
personality is being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes.
The title of the property was under the name of Aguila Co. and the Memorandum of Agreement was with the
Respondent and Aguila Co., only represented by Alfredo Aguila.
Hence, it is the partnership, not its officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involving
property registered in its name. A violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of the complaint. Even the
Supreme Court cannot understand why both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals sidestepped this
issue when it was squarely raised before them by petitioner.
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05 - Vlason Enterprises v. CA (19xx)

Facts:
Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as the local agent of Omega, requested permission for its vessel M/V
Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) while
awaiting transshipment to Hong Kong. The Bureau of Customs approved the request. Despite the approval, the customs
personnel boarded the vessel when it docked, on suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line
and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country. The district customs collector then seized said vessel and its cargo
pursuant. A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading (HK), and its shipper, Dusit International
(Thailand).
While seizure proceedings were ongoing, La Union was hit by three typhoons, and the vessel ran aground and
was abandoned. Thereafter, its authorized representative, Frank Cadacio, entered into a salvage agreement with private
respondent Duraproof to secure and repair the vessel. After some time, finding that no fraud was committed, the District
Collector of Customs, Quiray, lifted the warrant of seizure. However, in a Second Indorsement, then Customs
Commissioner Mison declined to issue a clearance for Quirays Decision; instead, he forfeited the vessel and its cargo.
Accordingly, acting District Collector of Customs Sy issued a Decision decreeing the forfeiture and the sale of the cargo
in favor of the government.
To enforce its preferred salvors lien, Duraproof Services filed with the RTC of Manila a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the actions of Commissioner Mison and District Collector Sy. Also impleaded, as
respondents, were PPA Representative Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line.
Subsequently, Duraproof amended its Petition to include former District Collector Quiray; PPA Port Manager
Adolfo Amor Jr; Petitioner Vlason Enterprises as represented by its president, Vicente Angliongto; Singkong Trading
Company as represented by Atty. Eddie Tamondong; Banco Du Brasil; Dusit International; Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and
Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd. In both Petitions, Duraproof plainly failed to include any allegation pertaining to petitioner,
or any prayer for relief against it.
Summonses for the amended Petition were served on Atty. Joseph Capuyan for Med Line: Angliongto (through
his secretary, Betty Bebero), Atty. Tamondong and Commissioner Mison. Upon motion of Duraproof, the trial court
allowed summons by publication to be served upon the alien defendants who were not residents and had no direct
representatives in the country.
A slew of motions to declare default soon followed. Multiple decisions were rendered, and countless
reconsiderations have been prayed for. Wild!
[Heres the thing: si duraproof, gustong i-enforce yung claim nya. So ang ginawa nya, dinemande nya ang lahat ng ginawa
nya. As in lahat, walang pakundangan. Sobrang daming motions, interpleaders, amendments, compromise agreements,
actions to nullify compromise agreements, declarations of default, etc. Kaya naging magulo. Trust me, sobrang gulo
talaga. Buong CivPro yata na-cover ng case na to. So pinili ko lang yung mukhang applicable sa Rule 3. That said, the
issues here are those pertaining to the topic at hand, parties in a civil case. I suggest look at the issues first and find
enlightenment sa held/ratio part.]
Issues:
1. W/N the mere failure to include the name of a party in a pleading is fatal.
2. W/N summons are required after a complaint is amended.
3. W/N summons served through the Secretary of a corporation is binding to such corporation.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of the complaint is not fatal because the Rules of
Court requires courts to pierce the form and go into the substance and not be misled by a false or wrong name in
the pleadings. The averments are controlling and not the title. Hence, if the body indicates that the defendant as a
party to the action, his omission in the title is not fatal.
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KASI NAKALIMUTAN ILAGAY NI DURAPROOF YUNG PANGALAN NI VLASON SA AMENDED

COMPLAINT.
2. NOT NECESSARILY. Although the original pleading is deemed superseded by the pleading that amends it, it
does not ipso facto follow that the service of new summons is required. Where the defendants have already
appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons in the original complaint, the amended complaint may be
served upon them without need of new summons, even if new causes of action are alleged. A courts jurisdiction
continues until a case is finally terminated once it is acquired. Conversely, when the defendants have not yet
appeared in court, new summons on the amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the change of a
cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended complaint but rather the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over them, a new summons for the amended complaint is required.
KASI NUNG NAG-AMEND NG COMPLAINT SI DURAPROOF, SABI NUNG IBA, HINDI SILA MAGAAPPEAR SA COURT KASI WALANG SUMMONS. BALE, YUNG IBA NAG-APPEAR NA BEFORE (no
need to serve new summons) AND YUNG IBA HINDI PA (there is a need to serve summons).
3. YES. It is based on the rationale that the corporation acts through the acts of its agents. However, this rules in
only applicable if the secretary is an employee of the corporation, duly authorized to receive summons for and in
behalf of the corporation.
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06 - Agro Conglomerates v. CA, Regent Savings Bank (2000) (nego case: accommodation party; only necessary
party)
Doctrine:
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Facts:
A contract of sale was executed:
Seller / Vendor
Buyer / Vendee
Agro Conglomerates
Wonderland Food Industries

Over a farmland for P5 Million
After the contract was executed, Agro and Wonderland executed another agreement with REGENT Savings Bank.
This subsequent agreement stipulated that Agro will obtain a loan from Regent Savings Bank in its own name, and Agro
will receive the proceeds of the loan, but it will be Wonderland which will pay the loan. The loan which Agro will receive
will form part of the payment of the P5M sale price.
To ensure the payment of the loan, Regent asked the president of Agro, Mario Soriano, to sign promissory notes.
And so, the transaction involving Regent was successful. Agro got the money.
Meanwhile, the farmland was never delivered by Agro to Wonderland.
Ultimately, the loan obligation to Regent was never paid by Wonderland so Regent went after Agro and Mario
Soriano as the signatory in the promissory note. Soriano refused to pay. Regent sued Soriano and his company, Agro.
Issues:
1. Extra: W/N Agro/Soriano should pay Regent
2. Main: W/N Wonderland was a necessary party who should have been impleaded by Regent in the suit against
Agro
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes.
a. The subsequent agreement between Agro, Wonderland, and Regent was merely a contract of suretyship.
It did not novate the original contract between Agro and Wonderland.
b. Agro / Soriano is an accommodation party. An accommodation party is liable to the bearer of the PN
regardless of the agreement between the accommodated and accommodation parties.
c. The contract of sale between Agro and Wonderland was in effect rescinded because Wonderland did not
gain possession of the farmland while Agro received all the loan proceeds as part of the purchase price.
2. No. Wonderland is only a necessary party, not an indispensable party. The non-inclusion of a necessary party
does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Indispensable Party
Necessary Party
MUST be joined under any and all conditions
Should be joined only WHENEVER possible
The court cannot proceed without him.
His interest is separate from the interest of the

indispensable party.
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07 - Rufino Co v. Hon. Eficio B. Acosta (1985) (dropped necessary party)

Doctrine:
Where two defendants are sued under a common cause of action, plaintiffs agreement to drop and release and
discharge one of the defendants from the case should extend to the other even if both defendants have not yet filed
an answer.
In all instances where a common cause of action is alleged against several defendants, some of whom answer and
the others do not, the latter or those in default acquire a vested right not only to own the defense interposed in the
answer of their co-defendant not in default but also to expect a result of the litigation totally common with them in
kind and in amount whether favorable or unfavorable.
Facts
Petitioner seeks to annul a.) respondent courts decision ordering him to pay Refrigeration Industries, Inc. and
Delta Motors the sum of P 2,907,535; b.) the order of general default issued against him dated Nov 22, 1982; c.) the exparte presentation of evidence of the respondents and d.) the sheriffs sale conducted March 9, 1983.
On November 1979 Pepsi Cola Bottling Company through C.M Aboitiz issued three purchase orders addressed to
CTC Appliance Center for 12,000 refrigerators for P35,322,900. Petitioner Rufino Co is the proprietor of the center.
Subsequently in a formal deed of assignment, Co assigned his rights and interests on the three purchase orders to
respondent Refrigeration Industries (RII).
Pepsi wrote a letter to the private respondent RII saying that it took notice of the assignment of the
purchase orders but it was not recognizing the same. 10,000 units of refrigerators were delivered and paid. On March
1981 Pepsi wrote another letter to Co requesting for 1,000 more units of refrigerators. Pepsi received these units directly
from RII, and they were valued at P2,907,535.
On June 1981 RII sent a demand letter to Pepsi. Pepsi subsequently wrote RII acknowledging the demand letter
but reiterating that they do not recognize Cos assignment to RII. There followed a series of correspondences in similar
tenor Pepsi denying liability and RII trying to claim payment. Seeing that they wouldnt get anything from Pepsi, RII
sent a demand letter to Co for the P2,907,535 but petitioner didnt pay.
RII was then constrained to initiate an action against Pepsi and Petitioner Co. However, respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint against Pepsi with an instrument entitled Joint Release, Waiver and/or
Quitclaim. After this respondents then moved to declare petitioner Co in default for having failed to file an
answer. Respondent court then decided against Co and levied all of his properties. Co filed four different motions to
restrain the execution but all of them were denied.
Issues
1. W/N petitioner and Pepsi are indispensable parties under a common cause of action, and that if the complaint is
dismissed insofar as Pepsi is concerned, the dismissal of the action against petitioner is warranted as well.
Held/Ratio
1. YES.
Private respondents claim for a sum of money and attachment against Pepsi and Co shows that the two are
indispensable parties to the case. In fact respondents originally sued both Pepsi and Co under one cause of action.
The affidavits filed by respondents were also drafted in such a way that there could not be any doubt as to the
intention to sue both Pepsi and Co.
Citing Lim Tanhu v. Hon. Ramolete, the Court also explained that if the complaint has to be dismissed in so far as
the answering defendant is concerned, then it becomes the inalienable right of the defaulted defendant that the
same action be dismissed against him.
It is to be assumed that when any defendant allows himself to be in default knowing that his co-defendant filed an
answer, he does so trusting in the assurance implicit in the rule that his default is in essence a mere formality that
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deprives him of no more than the right to take part in the trial and that the court would deem anything done by or
for the answering defendant as done by or for him.
The integrity of the common cause of action against all the defendants and the indispensability of all of them in
the proceedings do not permit of any possibility of waiver of the plaintiffs right only as to one or some of them,
without including all of them, and so as a rule, withdrawal must be deemed to be a confession of weakness to all.
08 - Domingo v. Scheer (2004) (Deportation of a German national)

Doctrines:
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the
suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties in itself is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Facts:
Herbert Markus Emil Scheer is a German national who was granted a permanent resident status. He was given an
Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigration Certificate of Residence. In a letter, Vice Consul Hippelin informed
the Philippine Ambassodor to Germany that Scheer had police records and financial liabilities in Germany. The
Department of Foreign Affairs was informed by the German Embassy in Manila that Scheer was wanted by the German
Federal Police and that a warrant was out against him and that his passport was cancelled. A request was given to inform
the relevant Philippine agency. Thereafter, the Board of Commissioner (BOC) issued a Summary Deportation Order
which cancelled Scheers permanent residence status and for his summary deportation. The BOC relied on the
correspondence of the German Vice Consul which said that Scheer would not be issued a new passport because of the
federal warrant, his alleged insurance fraud and that he was an undesirable alien. Solely on this the BOC concluded he
was an undesirable alien.
Scheer explained his side to BID Commissioner Verceles and he was allowed time to remain in the country. He
also filed with the BOC an urgent motion for reconsideration of the summary deportation order. The BOC neither
resolved nor acted on the motion. Upon the dismissal of his criminal case and renewal of his passport, Sheer reiterated his
request to cancel the summary deportation order and the reinstatement of his permanent residence status. Again the BOC
did not act. When Immigration Commissioner Domingo assumed office, she inquired if Scheer was still wanted by the
German police which replied that he was not.
Nevertheless, on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives as well as BID agents arrested Scheer on order of
Commissioner Domingo and was held pending deportation. Scheer filed with a motion to the CA a petitioner for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to prevent the deportation. He said that his deportation was illegal, unjust,
unconstitutional with grave abuse of discretion. He also averred that the BOC has not acted on his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration despite the lapse of 6 years.
On the hearing with the CA, Commissioner commented on the petition saying that the BOC was an indispensable
party, and not impleading the BOC as an indispensable party warranted the denial of the petition. The CA rendered a
decision in favor of Scheer granting the petition of certiorari and prohibition enjoining Domingo from implementing the
deportation. The CA said that there were numerous cases when only the Commissioner of Immigration alone was
impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported.
Issue:
1. W/N the Bureau of Commissioner was an indispensable party to the petitioned.
2. W/N the non-joinder of the Bureau of Commissioner be a ground for dismissal of the petition.
Held:
1. Yes. The SC agrees with the petitioners contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested and
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detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the
respondent in obedience to the said Deportation Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA
annul not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latters Omnibus Resolution, and, thus,
order the respondents immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for
the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the
BOC as the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The
powers and duties of the BOC may not be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but
also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
petitioner/plaintiff.
2. No. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added
by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent (petitioner
therein) to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca, and
Vivo v. Cloribel. The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in
the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a
necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases.
The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The petition should not be
dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first. 54 In Salvador, et al., v. Court of
Appeals, et al., we held that this Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to
amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-ininterest. The Court has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of this case, to order its amendment as to
implead the BOC as party-respondent. Indeed, it may no longer be necessary to do so taking into account the
unique backdrop in this case, involving as it does an issue of public interest. After all, the Office of the Solicitor
General has represented the petitioner in the instant proceedings, as well as in the appellate court, and maintained
the validity of the deportation order and of the BOCs Omnibus Resolution. It cannot, thus, be claimed by the
State that the BOC was not afforded its day in court, simply because only the petitioner, the Chairperson of the
BOC, was the respondent in the CA, and the petitioner in the instant recourse.
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09 - Plasabas v. CA (2009) (Indispensable Parties)

Doctrines:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
plaintiffs/petitioners failure to comply therewith.
Facts:
In 1974, petitioners Nieves and Malazarte, filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before
the CFI of Maasin, Southern Leyte against respondents, Lumen and Aunzo. The subject property was a parcel of coconut
land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, declared under a Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner Nieves with an
area of 2.6360 hectares. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal
title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages.
Respondents, denied petitioners allegation, saying, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their
common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.
During the trial it was found that Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and
absolute owner of the land, but the property was passed on from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam,
petitioner Nieves grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her siblingsJose, Victor and
Victoria.
After resting their case, respondents the argument that the case should have been dismissed for petitioners failure
to implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners Jose, Victor and Victoria.
The trial and appellate court summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following, on
the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties, citing Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties?
Held/Ratio:
1. The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for disposition on the merits.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff
will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this
rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled
to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other coowners who are indispensable parties.
Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is
immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her
siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latters behalf.
Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on
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motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioners failure to comply therewith.
10 - Erna Casals v. Tayud Golf and Country Club (2009)

Doctrines:
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can
be no final determination of an action. An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the
controversy that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
Facts:
After Robert Casals death, the petitioners (his wife, Erna Casals, and kids) tried to locate all Roberts properties
for the settlement of the estate and partition of properties. In their search for the said properties, they approached Antonio
Osmea who at first denied having copies of any deed of sale, tax declarations or other documents relative to any
properties owned and acquired by the decedent. However, he later testified under oath and in the presence of petitioners
that he became the sole owner of all parcels of land that the late Robert owned with him and one Ouano. Petitioners later
found out that Osmea was indeed trying to transfer ownership of the said land co-owned by Osmea, Robert Casalas and
Ouano through the use of an affidavit of quitclaim and waiver. (The affidavit of quitclaim and waiver states: that Robert
and Oauno convey, waive, forgo all their rights and interests and participation in favor of Osmea.)
Petitioners filed a case for declaration of nullity, conveyance, quieting of title, recovery of ownership, accounting
and damages against Osmea and others. The RTC approved a compromise agreement between the parties. The parties
agreed that once a final compromise agreement was made, they would execute an Affidavit of Desistance and/or withdraw
any or all cases already filed against each other and that the final settlement will preclude any further litigation between
them. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, petitioners filed a Motion for Separate Partial Judgment, stating that the 176
parcels of land could already be awarded to the parties under the terms of the agreement. They further prayed that they be
declared owners of share of 100 parcels of land and 1/3 of the 76 parcels. The RTC granted such. The petitioners then
filed for a Motion for Execution. The RTC then issued a Writ of Partial Execution.
However, before the Writ of Partial Execution was issued, Tayud Golf filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment
of Final Orders, seeking to nullify the Motion for Separate Judgment, Motion for Execution of Partial Judgment and Writ
of Partial Execution on the grounds that the orders and writ were obtained through extrinsic fraud and that there was lack
of jurisdiction over the person of respondent Tayud Golf, which was never impleaded as a defendant in the civil case. The
CA granted Tayud Golfs petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent Tayud Golf is an indispensable party to the original action
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can
be no final determination of an action. An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the
controversy that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. As
such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of
parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
The CA found that Tayud Golf had a claim of ownership over 108 parcels of land. In finding that out of the 108
parcels of land being claimed by Tayud Golf, 106 were included in the Affidavit of Quitclaim and waiver.
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The CA also found that 7 parcels of land being claimed by Tayud Golf were included in the Motion for Separate
Judgment filed by petitioners. The CA found that 27 parcels of land were registered under the name of Tayud
Golf.
Based on the above, the CA correctly ruled that Tayud Golf was an indispensable party to the original action.
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RULE 3, 12 - 22 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

01 - Mathay v. Consolidated Bank (1974)
Doctrine:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit
is or is not a class quit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class
action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common
interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might
be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to
determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or
common interest.
Facts:
This is a class suit containing 6 causes of action. Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that they were stockholders in the
Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. The stockholders of the
CMI, passed a Resolution creating the Consolidated Bank & Trust Co. (hereinafter referred to as Bank) be organized with
an authorized capital of P20,000,000. All stockholders of the CMI, who were legally qualified to become stockholders,
would be entitled to subscribe to the capital stock of the proposed Bank at par value to the same extent and in the same
amount as said stockholders respective share holdings in the CMI as shown in its stock books, provided that the right to
subscribe should be exercised within thirty days from the date so fixed
The Board of Organizers caused the execution of the Articles or Incorporation of the proposed Bank indicating an
original subscription of 50,000 shares worth P5,000,000 subscribed and paid only by six, excluding the Mathay and the
other CMI subscribing stockholders who had already subscribed.
Mathay and the others argued that the execution of said Articles of Incorporation was in violation of law and in
breach of trust and contractual agreement as a means to gain control of Defendant Bank by Defendant Individuals and
persons or entities chosen by them and for their personal profit or gain in disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and other
CMI Subscribing Stockholders.
They further alleged under the 2nd cause of action that the stockholders amended the Articles of Incorporation
increasing the number of Directors from 6 to 7, appointing another who was not qualified.
In the 3rd cause of action: plaintiffs-appellants claimed actual damages in an amount equivalent to the difference
between the par value of the shares they were entitled, but failed, to acquire and the higher market value of the same
shares.
4th cause of action: plaintiffs-appellants claimed moral damages
5th cause of action: exemplary damages
6th cause of action: attorneys fees.
Issue:
1. W/N the action could be maintained as a class suit
2. W/N the complaint stated a cause of action
Ratio:
1. NO. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of the
controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court.
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The complaint in the instant case explicitly declared that the plaintiffs- appellants instituted the present class on
behalf of CMI subscribing stockholders but did not state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders so that
the trial court could not determine that the parties actually before it were interests concerned might be fully
protected, and that it was impracticable to bring such a large number of parties before the court.
The statute also requires, as a prerequisite to a class suit, that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common
or general interest to numerous persons. The interest, subject matter of the class suits in the above cited cases, is
analogous to the interest claimed by appellants in the instant case. Each one of the appellants had a right, if any,
only to his respective portion of the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which
another was entitled.
It may be granted that the claims of all the appellants involved the same question of law. But this alone did not
constitute the common interest over the subject matter indispensable in a class suit.
2. NO. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential
elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant,
and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiffs right with consequential injury or damage to
the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. On the
other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must state the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
Appellants first cause of action should have consisted of: (1) the right of appellants as well as of the other CMI
stockholders to subscribe to that portion of the capital stock which was unsubscribed because of failure of the
CMI stockholders to exercise their right to subscribe; (2) the legal duty of the appellant to have said portion of the
capital stock to be subscribed by appellants and other CMI stockholders; and (3) the violation or breach of said
right of appellants and other CMI stockholders by the appellees.
The facts did not even show that appellants were entitled to subscribe to the capital stock of the proposed Bank,
which was, that they were qualified under the law to become stockholders of the Bank, and there was no direct
averment in the complaint of the facts that qualified them to become stockholders of the Bank. The allegation of
the fact that they subscribed to the stock did not, by necessary implication, show that they were possessed of the
necessary qualifications to become stockholders of the proposed Bank.
Plaintiffs-appellants did not state in the complaint the amount of subscription they were each entitled to; hence
there was no basis for the court to determine what amount subscribed to by them was excessive. It is clear that the
ultimate facts stated under the first cause of action are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The allegations in the second cause of action that the calling of a special meeting was falsely certified, that the
seventh position of Director was illegally created and that the person was not competent or qualified to be a
director are mere conclusions of law, the same not being necessarily inferable from the ultimate facts stated in the
first and second causes of action.
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action depended on the first cause of action, which, as has been shown,
did not state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
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02 - Ortigas & Co v Ruiz (1987)

Doctrine:
Rule 3 Sec. 12. Class suit.

When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous
and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any
party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
Facts:
Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent parcels of land situated in Rizal, bounded by Ortigas
Ave., E. Rodriguez, Jr., Ave., and Escarpment Road. Said parcel is a portion of the Mandaluyon Estate [over which
Petitioner, thru its predecessor-in-interest, the Provincial del Santisima Nombre de Jesus de Agustinos Calzados, has
been in continuous possession since 1862 or 125 years ago.
Sometime in 1967, a civil case (first one) was filed against petitioner by a certain Pedro del Rosario and three
others, as a class suit, in their own behalf and in behalf of 104 others seeking the declaration of petitioners titles null and
void, allegedly for lack of publication in the land registration proceeding from which they were derived and for alleged
fraud employed in registering under Act No. 496 certain parcels of agricultural land in Quezon City and Pasig, Rizal
which form part of the Mandaloyon Estate the declaration of plaintiffs thereon as lawful owners and possessors of their
respective landholdings. In this case, respondent Court issued a restraining order ex-parte, still in force and effect when
the instant petition was filed. As a result, petitioner was constrained to go up on certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which
enjoined respondent Court from taking any further action
In view of the adverse decision rendered by respondent Court, petitioner filed a motion for new trial within the
reglementary period on the ground of newly-discovered evidence which motion was denied by the court.
On Aug. 10, 1971, another civil case (second civil case) was filed by Bernardo and 5 others, as a class suit,
similar to the civil case above seeking to declare null and void the titles for lack of publication in land registration
proceedings.
An urgent ex-parte motion of Bernardo and the others opposing among others, petitioners construction of fences
and high walls, roads, streets and canals on the land in dispute, having been filed, respondent Court issued the aforequoted questioned Order of August 13, 1971.
Hence, this petition.
On August 26, 1971, petitioner filed with the lower court an omnibus motion praying for the Court to order the
dropping of persons as plaintiffs, except Inocencio Bernardo for improper class suit pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner argues further that a class suit is not proper in this case as such presupposes a common and
general interest by several plaintiffs in a single specific thing [Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court]. Consequently, it cannot
be maintained when each of those impleaded as alleged plaintiffs has only a special or particular interest in the specific
thing completely different from another thing in which the defendants have a like interest.
Issue:
1. W/N the class suit is not proper
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes.
There is merit in petitioners contention that only the principal plaintiff named in the complaint, Inocencio
Bernardo, can remain as party plaintiff, and all the rest must be dropped from the case, pursuant to Section 11,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. And since Bernardo does not pretend to own almost two million square meters
involved in the case, the restraining order of respondent Judge, granting that it could be maintained, must be co-
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extensive with the boundaries of Bernardos claim. Otherwise stated, respondent Judge cannot restrain petitioner
from performing acts of ownership or dominion over the entire 200 hectares involved in this case.
But more than the foregoing, it will be noted that in respondents complaint, they pray among other things, that
the Original Certificates of Titles in question be declared null and void and the land in dispute, except that portion
being claimed as their own, be declared as properties of the public domain.
On this point, the Supreme Court has already ruled that in all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands
of the public domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The
action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Newsweek v. IAC (1986) (Libel, Newsweek, Sugarcane planters, Negros Occidental)

Doctrines:
In order for there to be a cause of action in a complaint for libel, there must be an identifiable victim. The libelous
article must pinpoint a specific individual.
Facts:
An article entitled An Island of Fear was published in Newsweek magazine in February 1981. This article is
subject of a libel suit filed against Newsweek by the private respondents, incorporated association of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental, as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the area. The sugarcane planters
alleged that Newsweek committed libel against them by portraying Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploit impoverished and underpaid workers and laborers, but also
brutalized and killed them with impunity.
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not contain allegations that state,
much less support a cause of action. Newsweek maintains that the article is not libelous in nature so there is no cause of
action.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss saying that there was a cause of action.
Issues:
1. W/N there is a cause of action
Held/Ratio:
1. No, there is no cause of action
Newsweek correctly argued that there is no cause of action because the complaint filed by the sugarcane planters
did not contain any allegation that anything written in the article referred specifically to any one of the
private respondents. For a complaint of libel to prosper, there must be an identifiable victim.
The rule is: when the libel is alleged to be directed at a group or class, as in the case, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately.
The action brought by the sugar planters is not really a class suit in behalf of the 8300 sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental. Each of the private respondents has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. The
defect that there was no specific victim of libel in the article cannot be cured by filing a class suit.
(Extra: The disputed portion of the article which refers to private respondent Sola and which was claimed to be libelous
never singled out Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that a sugarcane worker had been arrested by
members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This
is merely a reporting of fact. Nothing libelous here.)

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04 - Sulo ng Bayan v. Araneta (1976) (corporation)

Doctrines:
A corporation is a distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from the individual
stockholders or members who compose it, and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and
transactions of its stockholders or members.
A corporation, has no personality to bring an action for and in behalf of its stockholders or members for the
purpose of recovering property which belongs to said stockholders or members in their personal capacities.
Facts:
Sulo ng Bayan Inc. (SNB) filed an accion de revindicacion against Araneta to recover the ownership and
possession of a land in Bulacan registered under the Torrens system. The complaint alleged that SNB is a corporation
organized under the laws of Phil. and natural persons residing in Bulacan composed its membership. Its members
had pioneered in the clearing of the land since the Spanish regime and held the property under the concept of ownership.
They claimed that Gregorio Araneta, through force and intimidation, ejected them from the land. The land was
fraudulently or erroneously included in the OCT. There was also no survey plan and no notice of such proceeding was
given so CFI Bulacan did not acquire jurisdiction over the land. *There were basically 3 transfers Araneta -> National
Waterworks -> Hacienda Caretas.
Araneta filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1) the complaint states no cause of action
and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by prescription and laches.
During the pendency of the motion to dismiss, SNB filed a motion praying that the case be transferred to
another branch sitting at Bulacan. However, Araneta did not receive a copy of this motion. Since the respondents DID
Not receive a copy, the trial court issued an order dismissing the amended complaint.
SNB filed a motion to reconsider the order of dismissal on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to
issue the order of dismissal, because its request for the transfer of the case from Valenzuela Branch to Malolos
Branch had been approved by the DOJ and that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action because the subject
matter of the controversy in one of common interest to the members of the corporation who are so numerous that the
present complaint should be treated as a class suit.
Issues:
1. W/N the trial court acted without authority and jurisdiction in dismissing the amended complaint when the Sec. of
Justice had already approved the transfer
2. W/N plaintiff corporation (Sulo ng Bayan Inc.) may institute an action in behalf of its individual members for the
recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said members
3. W/N this case should be treated as a class suit
Held/Ratio:
1. NO
Jurisdiction implies the power of the court to decide a case, while venue the place of action. There is no question
that respondent court has jurisdiction over the case. The laying of venue is not left to the caprice of plaintiff, but
must be in accordance with the aforesaid provision of the rules.
The mere fact that a request for the transfer of a case to another branch of the same court has been approved by
the Secretary of Justice does not divest the court originally taking cognizance thereof of its jurisdiction, much less
does it change the venue of the action. The indorsement of the Undersecretary of Justice did not order the
transfer of the case to the Malolos Branch of the Bulacan Court of First Instance, but only authorized it
for the reason given by plaintiffs counsel that the transfer would be convenient for the parties. The trial court is
not without power to either grant or deny the motion, especially in the light of a strong opposition thereto
filed by the defendant.
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2. NO
In the amended complaint, the people whose rights were alleged to have been violated by being
deprived and dispossessed of their land are the members of the corporation and not the corporation itself. The
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its members, and this is not a mere technicality but a
matter of substantive law. There is no allegation that the members have assigned their rights to the
corporation or any showing that the corporation has in any way or manner succeeded to such rights. The
corporation evidently did not have any rights violated by the defendants for which it could seek redress.
Even if the Court should find against the defendants, therefore, the plaintiff corporation would not be entitled to
the reliefs prayed for.
The property of the corporation is its property and not that of the stockholders, as owners, although they
have equities in it. Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and
distinct from its members. Conversely, a corporation ordinarily has no interest in the individual property of
its stockholders unless transferred to the corporation, even in the case of a one-man corporation.
Clearly, no right of action exists in favor of plaintiff corporation, for as shown heretofore it does not have any
interest in the subject matter of the case which is material and, direct so as to entitle it to file the suit as a real
party in interest.
3. NO
A class suit DOES NOT lie in actions for the recovery of property where several persons claim ownership of their
respective portions of property, as each one could allege and prove his respective right in a different way for
each portion of the land, so that they cannot be held to have identical title through acquisitive prescription.
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05 - Malolos v. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation and Hon. Jose P. Alejandro (1987)
Doctrine:
Under Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court (1987) the principal proceeding for money claims must be dismissed
if the defendant dies before judgment in the CFI. Due to the non-survival of the claim, writs of attachment which
are to secure the outcome of the trial no longer exist. (Old Rule)
Facts:
On April 16, 1979 Asia Pacific Finance Corporation (APCOR) purchased from E. Francisco Liners Company,
Inc. (Francisco Liner) a postdated Far East Bank and Trust Company check in the amount of P105,000 issued in the
latters favor by herein petitioner, Josephine Cruz Malolos. When deposited on its maturity date, the aforesaid check was
dishonored for the reason that petitioners bank account had already been closed. Thereupon, APCOR demanded from
Francisco Liners and also from petitioner, in her capacity as drawer of the check, the payment of said check, but the
obligation remained unpaid.
As a result APCOR filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment in the CFI of Manila (now
RTC) against E. Francisco Liners, Co., Inc., Elias A. Francisco (as president of Francisco Liners), and herein petitioner (in
her capacity as drawer of said check). In the complaint, APCOR prayed, among others, that a writ of preliminary
attachment be issued against the properties of the defendants to serve as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered therein. Respondent Judge issued an Order of Attachment and thereafter, a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was issued. By virtue thereof, the levy was annotated upon the residential property of petitioner at 2555 Taal
Street, Singalong, Manila.
Josephine Cruz Malolos died on April 27, 1980, and her counsel, on July 10, 1980, filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint as against her pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. When the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it
shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.
Private respondent opposed the aforementioned motion. In a Resolution dated August 29, 1980, respondent Judge
ruled in favor of private respondent and denied the motion to dismiss.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. W/N an attachment levied on some properties of the defendant constitutes an exception to the general rule of nonsurvival of the money claim as provided for in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The language of Section 21 of Rule 3 is too clear in this respect as to require any interpretation or
construction. It very explicitly says that when the action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner specially provided by the rules.
The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant, a testate or intestate proceeding
shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims which shall be
paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased.
Allowing the private respondent to attach petitioners properties for the benefit of her claim against the estate
would give an undue advantage over other creditors against the estate. Therefore, under the same principle, a writ
of attachment already issued in connection with a money claim which has to be dismissed because of the death of
the defendant before final judgment cannot provide an exception to the general rule, and must accordingly be
dissolved.
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Note: 1987 pa ito, sa Rules ngayon, Sec 207 Rule 3 na ang dapat sundin
06 - Regala v. CA (19xx)
Facts:
This case involves the interpretation of Rule 3, Section 21, of the Rules of Court on the effect of the defendants
death on a claim filed against him for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon when he dies before final judgment on
the claim is rendered by the regional trial court.
Private respondent Orville Odicta filed against Agustin Regala in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
for recovery of the sum of P503,048, representing the balance of the purchase price of assorted knocked-down motor
vehicles and spare parts. Judge Luna granted the motion of Odicta for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of Regala. Trial commenced, but while the defense was presenting its evidence, Regala died.
The trial court was informed of his death, but instead of dismissing the case, it gave the defendant 10 days within
which to make a formal offer of his documentary evidence and rest his case. Teresita F. Regala, in representation
of her deceased father, then went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to question the said orders of the trial court. Her petition was dismissed on the finding that the trial court had
not acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
1. W/N a recovery for a sum of money survives the death of the party.
Held/Ratio:
1. No.
The lower courts, in its decision, relied on the Courts ruling in Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Dungao: The rule,
Section 21, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, is not absolute for in the case of Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Dungao,
the Supreme Court held that the attachment levied on some properties of the defendant, on the plaintiffs
motion, to secure payment of its money claim, might constitute an exception to the general rule on claims
that do not survive, as provided for in Section 21 of Rule 3, Rules of Court. But after the discharge of the
attachment upon the filing of a bond by the surety company, the property attached became free from any specific
lien and reverted to its previous condition.
The court had not taken into account the much later case of Malolos v. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation
which held that: It is already a settled rule that an action for recovery of money for collection of a debt is
one that does not survive and upon the death of the defendant the case should be dismissed to be presented in
the manner especially provided in the Rules of Court. This is explicitly provided in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which states that:
Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. Then the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance,
it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.
The language of Section 21 of Rule 3 is too clear in this respect as to require any interpretation or
construction. The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or intestate
proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims which
shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased. The purpose of the rule is to avoid useless
duplicity of procedure the ordinary action must be wiped out from the ordinary court.

7.
Rule 3 Sec 20. Action on contractual money claims. When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, expressed or implied,
and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, It shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment obtained. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased person.
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07 - Aguas v. Llemos (1962)

[NOTE: this is a 1962 case, so in our rules of court refer to Rule 3, Section 20]
Facts:
The case springs forth from the action to recover damages filed by Francisco Salinas and the spouses Guardino
and Aguas before the CFI of Samar. They alleged that herein respondent Llemos caused the petitioners mental anguish
and undue embarrassment by making them believe that a certain writ of possession was issued that compelled them to go
to Samar with their lawyers to appear in court. Llemos, however, died before such complaint could be answered. With
this, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased and the claims for damages chargeable
against the estate of Llemos. The trial court dismissed this claiming that the legal representatives should have been made
the party since this is the action for recovery of money.
Issue:
1. W/N the claims for damages in this case survive the death of the defendant, Llemos.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
The Supreme Court made mention of the two concerned rules under Rules of Court: Rule 87, Sec 5 or claims that
are abated (ended) by death and barred if not filed in the estate settlement proceedings. On the other hand, theres
also Rule 88, Sec 1 or those that survive the death and can be claimed against his executors and administrators.
Rule 87 are said to include purely personal obligation thus the death of the defendant put an end to case actions.
Such claims for money must also be expressed or implied in a contract. The Supreme Court held that what must
be followed in this case is Rule 88, Section 1. This includes action to recover real and personal property from
estate, actions to enforce a lien, and actions to recover damages for injury to person or property. In this case, the
third kind of action is applicable. The defendant maliciously caused the party to incur unnecessary expense, thus it
is injurious to partys property.
NOTE: the case was rendered moot because according to the CFI the parties have arrived at an amicable settle of their
differences and dismissed the appeal.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
08 - Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Deceased Maximo M. Kalaw (1967) (coconuts, surviving death)
Doctrine:
Actions to recover real and personal property, actions to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages
for an injury to person and property and suits based on the alleged tortuous acts of a defendant survive the death
of a party.
Facts:
In 1940, the government established a non-profit government corporation, the National Coconut Corporation or
NACOCO. Maximo M. Kalaw was appointed as general manager. NACOCO was authorized to buy and sell coconut
products like copra, to get rid of mostly foreigner middlemen who employed unscrupulous schemes to earn so much to the
detriment of poor coconut planters. NACOCO, through Maximo Kalaw, entered into copra trading contracts with major
copra buyers here and abroad, including General Foods, Pacific Vegetable Company, and Louis Dreyfus Co.
However, force majeure came in the way. In the fateful year of 1947, three typhoons devastated the country, one
after another. Consequently, coconut trees were severely damaged, copra production decreased, and so, the copra trading
contracts executed by NACOCO became unprofitable. One copra buyer, Louis Dreyfus Company, sued NACOCO for
undelivered copra.
In 1949, NACOCO as a separate juridical personality, sued its own Board of Directors headed by its general
manager Maximo Kalaw, for negligence and bad faith for entering into the unprofitable contracts. In 1950, during the
pendency of the case, NACOCO was abolished and the Board of Liquidators was entrusted with settling and closing its
affairs. Also during the pendency of the case, in 1955, Maximo Kalaw died.
Issues:
1. CivPro: W/N the action was personal to Maximo Kalaw
2. CivPro: W/N the action survived the death of Kalaw
3. W/N Maximo Kalaw was liable for negligence and bad faith for having entered into the unprofitable contracts
4. W/N the Board of Liquidators could pursue the case even if NACOCO has already been abolished
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The action was not personal to Kalaw.
The heirs of Kalaw were contending that the judgment is unenforceable against them because the action was a
claim for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, which must be filed in the estate
proceedings of the deceased. (This was the old rule; now, actions for contractual money claims is governed by
Rule 3 Section 20 shall not be dismissed but instead shall be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment.)
The present case is not a mere action for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising from contract. The
action involves the alleged negligence of Kalaw in entering into the contracts, allegedly to the prejudice of
NACOCO, as well as the bad faith of the Board of Directors for subsequently approving it. The suit thus
involves alleged tortious acts.
2. And so, because it is a tort, yes, the action survived the death of Kalaw.
Tort is an action embraced in suits filed to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
which survive the plaintiff.
Actions to recover real and personal property, actions to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages
for an injury to person and property and suits based on the alleged tortuous acts of a defendant survive the death
of a party.
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3. No. Maximo Kalaw was not liable. He is clear of any stigma of bad faith in executing the contracts. NACOCO is
vulnerable to force majeure like any other business. If the typhoons did not come, the contracts would have
remained profitable for the government. Moreover, he had an implied authority to execute contracts in behalf of
NACOCO because he is its general manager, regardless of a specific grant of authority to him by its Board of
Directors. The Kalaw contracts were valid corporate acts.
4. Yes. The Board of Liquidators was expressly authorized by EO 372 to settle the affairs of the abolished
government corporation NACOCO, without any time limit.
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09 - Dinglasan v. Ang Chia (1951)

Doctrines:
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. (Section 17, Rule 3.)
Facts:
Dinglasan, et al filed a case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia, et al (administratix of the estate of Lee Liong)
to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz, and damages in the amount of P1,000/month.
Plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver to which counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only at
the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs discovered that there was pending in the same court a case concerning the
intestate testate of Lee Liong. In view thereof, the motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the estate, who is the
same widow Ang Chia, who was already a party-defendant in her personal capacity. In order to protect their interests, the
plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention. By their claim in intervention, the
plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case No. V-331 and prayed that the intestate proceedings be
not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated.
The administratrix then filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention. The court issued an order not to close
the intestate proceedings until after civil case No. V-331 shall have been decided, the court stated that it would act thereon
if a motion to close the proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. The court however took
cognizance of the pendency of said civil case No. V-331. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new
bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs
had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the petitioners objected, whereupon the
court issued an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the
decision in said civil case has been rendered.
Issues:
1. W/N the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination
of the separate civil action filed by the petitioner-appellees
Held/Ratio:
1. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that action to recover real or personal property from
the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator. This rule is but a corollary to the ruling
which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by
another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can
be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs. Another rule of court provides that after a party dies
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time
as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing
party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the
court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. (Section
17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an
ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party.
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10 - Sps. Algura v. City of Naga (2006) (pauper litigant)

Doctrines:
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other
hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied
outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
Facts:
On September 1, 1999, Spouses Antonio and Lorencita Algura filed an action for damages against the city
government of Naga for demolishing their house. Allegedly, the house blocked the road right of way and was thus a
nuisance per se. The spouses filed a motion for them to litigate as indigents, attaching thereto documentary proof that
Antonio, a policeman, had a monthly gross income of P10,474 and a net pay of P3,616.99. Initially, the motion was
granted.
The respondents filed a motion to disqualify petitioners from non-payment of filing fees. According to
respondents, the first floor of the petitioners 2-story house had a sari-sari store and a computer shop. The second floor
was the petitioners residence and was also partly rented to boarders.
Petitioners were disqualified as indigent litigants because they were not able to meet the standards under Rule
141, Section 18 (used to be Sec. 16, now Sec. 19) which sets a specific qualifying amount (at that time, those outside MM
having a gross income not exceeding 1,500) for pauper litigants.
Petitioners now challenge this ruling.
Issues:
1. W/N the disqualification ordered by the court was proper
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, Rule 141, Section 19 (previously Sec. 16 and Sec.18) providing for definite standards (gross income) for
pauper litigants does not conflict with Rule 3, Sec. 21.
It is true that the petitioners failed to meet the requirements of Rule 141, Sec.19 but it was wrong to disqualify
them outright. The court should have called for a hearing,` as provided in Rule 3, Sec.21, to ascertain the
petitioners financial status. Only after the hearing can the judge decide on whether or not they qualify to litigate
as indigents.
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RULE 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS

01 - United Overseas Bank of the Philippines v. Rosemoore Mining (One single mortgage contract, properties in
different places)
Doctrines:
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
Facts:
Rosemoor Mining obtained a credit facility of P80 million from Westmont Bank (now known as United Overseas
Bank.) To secure the credit, one real estate mortgage agreement, covering 8 parcels of land, was executed by Rosemoore
in favor of United Overseas Bank. The real agreement was executed in the City of Manila. However, 6 of these parcels of
land were situated in Bulacan and 2 parcels were in Nueva Ecija.
Pursuant to the credit facility, Rosemoore mining obtained numerous letters of credit. Predictably, they were
unable to pay and the mortgage properties were foreclosed. United Overseas Bank was the highest bidder in the auction.
Thereafter, United Overseas Bank caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificates of Sale on the titles of the properties.
Rosemoore then filed 2 complaints against United Overseas: one in the RTC of Manila and another in the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan.
United Overseas then filed a motion to dismiss contending that Rosemoore engaged in forum shopping by filing
a case in Bulacan after filing the case in RTC Manila.
Issues:
1. W/N Rosemoore mining engaged in forum shopping by filing 2 cases against United Overseas Bank
2. W/N the action to invalidate the foreclosure sale was properly brought in the Malolos RTC even as regards
the properties in Nueva Ecija
Held/Ratio:
1. No, Rosemoore mining did not engage in forum shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There must be
sameness in the parties involved, sameness in the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and as a result, a decision
in one case would bar the other on the ground of res judicata.
The case in RTC manila involved the enforcement of the contract between Rosemoore and the Bank.
(Rosemoore says United Overseas did not release the full amount of the loan). The purpose being the enforcement
of a contract, it is a personal action which tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
On the other hand, the case in RTC Malolos was filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank from
consolidating the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured by the mortgage had
not yet become due and demandable. It is an action to annul the foreclosure sale which is a real action, which
should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
Looking at the foregoing, it is apparent that the rights asserted and the reliefs sought are not identical. Rosemoore
mining did not engage in forum shopping.
2. YES. The action to annul the foreclosure sale was properly brought before the RTC Malolos even if it
included properties in Nueva Ecija.
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Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
The venue of the action for nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC even
if two of the properties mortgaged together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Following the
above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different
provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land.
Where said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the
provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.
In the present case, there is a single transaction. There is only one proceeding sought to be nullified and that is the
extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure sale. And there is only one initial transaction which served as the basis of the
foreclosure sale and that is the single mortgage contract which incidentally included properties located in different
areas.
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02 - Nocum v. Tan (2005) (libel)

Doctrines:
In civil cases, venue is not jurisdictional.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint.
Lower court acquires jurisdiction over the case when the case is filed before it.
Facts:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, Airline Pilots Association of
the Philippines (ALPAP) and the Philippine Daily Inquirer. This was filed before the RTC of Makati. Tan sought moral
and exemplary damages for alleged malicious a defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
Nocum and Inquirer filed a joint answer. They claimed: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) the
defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the questioned
news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was
privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiffs or PALs
side of the dispute with the pilots union.
ALPAP and Umali also filed their joint answer and alleged: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) venue
was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest.
The complaint did not state the residence of Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. It also failed
to state the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
The RTC of Makati dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. Tan filed an Omnibus Motion. It
contained the amended complaint that the article and caricature were first printed and published in Makati. The lower
court admitted the amended complaint and set aside its previous ruling.
The petitioners appealed before the CA. Two petitions for certiorari were filed and they were consolidated. The
CA denied their appeal. Petitioners filed an appeal before the SC.
Issues:
1. W/N the lower court acquires jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for
damages.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the case when the case was filed before it. According to Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court of First
Instance is specifically designated to try libel cases. In this case, Tans cause of action is for damages arising from
libel and therefore, jurisdiction of which is vested in the RTC. The changes in the complaint only referred to the
question of venue and not jurisdiction. The additional allegations do not confer jurisdiction on the RTC. Tans
failure to allege these allegations gave the RTC the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that venue was not properly laid. The Court held that objections
Further, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question
of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial, and not
jurisdiction. The purpose is for public convenience to the parties. In criminal cases venue is jurisdictional it being
an essential element of jurisdiction.
(Civil: Venue is not jurisdictional)
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Difference between Jurisdiction and Venue:

(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and,

(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or
agreement of the parties.
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03 - Polytrade Corporation v. Victoriano Blanco (1969)

Doctrines:
GENERAL RULE: Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of
first instance and this is one provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff.
QUALIFYING GEN RULE: Venue may be stipulated by written agreement By written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.
Facts:
A suit was filed before the CFI of Bulacan on 4 causes of action to recover the purchase price of rawhide
delivered by plaintiff-Polytrade to defendant-Blanco. Poltytrade has its principal office and place of business in Makati,
Rizal while Blanco was a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper
venue. He claims that by contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He
did not answer the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was rendered. Defendant appealed.
1st cause of action
P60,845.67
2nd cause of action
P51,952.55
rd
P53,973.07
th
P41,075.22
3 cause of action
4 cause of action
Issues:
1. W/N venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is resident.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, venue was properly laid.
As a general rule, venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found or where plaintiff resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. [Sec 2(b) Rule 4]. Qualifying this provision is Sec 3, which states that venue may be
stipulated by written agreement By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed
or transferred from one province to another.
It is the defendants contention that they (Polytrade and Blanco) stipulated in written contracts that The parties
agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila, hence CFI Bulacan was not the proper venue.
However, on the first 2 causes of action, no such stipulation appears in the contracts. The general rule set forth in
Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the
province of defendants residence,
As to the last 2 causes of action, an accurate reading of the stipulation would merely mean that parties consent to
being sued in Manila, but there is nothing exclusive in the language used. As previously ruled in Engel v. Shubert
Theatrical, They do agree to submit to the Viennese jurisdiction, but they say not a word in restriction of the
jurisdiction of courts elsewhere; and whatever may be said on the subject of the legality of contracts to submit
controversies to courts of certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such agreements should be
strictly construed, and should not be extended by implication.
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04 - Mangila v. CA (2002) (Makati, Metro Manila, sole proprietorship)

Doctrines:
A mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other
venuesthe parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive; Venue stipulations in a contract,
while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court
It is the residence of the proprietor which should be considered as one of the proper venues, not the business
address of the sole proprietorship
Facts:
In 1988, petitioner Anita Mangilas company Seafood Products hired the freight forwarding service of private
respondent Loreta Guinas Air Swift International, a sole proprietorship, to deliver assorted seafood products to Guam.
They agreed that Mangila would pay cash on delivery; however, she requested for seven days within which she would pay
Guina for the first shipment. But after three more shipments, Mangila still hasnt paid, and the shipping charges amounted
to around P100k. The contracted stated that in case of suit, the parties agreed that proceedings would be instituted in
Makati, Metro Manila. However, when Guina sued for collection of sum of money, she did so before the Pasay City
RTC, where Air Swift had its principal place of business.
Mangila moved to dismiss the case on account of improper venue, since the contract stipulates that the case
should have been filed in Makati. Guina argues that Makati was added by mere inadvertence by the printing press. She
furnished an affidavit by the printing presss general manager admitting such inadvertence. She also said that Mangila
knew that Air Swift had its business in Pasay. The RTC ruled that Mangila should pay Guina the P100k plus interest and
attorneys fees. The CA upheld it.
Issues:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed due to improper venue
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, but for different reasons than those alleged by Mangila. While their stipulation as to venue is valid pursuant
to Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, it didnt contain any qualifying or restrictive words that would show their intent
to have Makati as the exclusive venue. As such, it should just be treated as an agreement to an additional forum.
Thus, the courts will allow the filing of any case in any venue as long as the jurisdictional requirements are
followed.
However, the case should still be dismissed because the Pasay City RTC does not have territorial jurisdiction over
the case. Under the Rules of Court, the general rule in personal actions is that the proper venue to file the case is
where the defendant or plaintiff resides. The exception to this rule is when parties agree to an exclusive venue,
which as shown, they did not. In the complaint, it wasnt Guinas personal address that was alleged but the
business address of her sole proprietorship, Air swift. However, sole proprietorships do not have a separate
juridical personality. As such, they cant file a suit. The case should have been filed either in Pasay (where
Guina resides) or Pampanga (where Mangila resides).
The objective of the rules on venue is to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice. This objective wont
be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose where to file the complaint.
JUST IN CASE SIR ASKS: Another issue in this case was w/n there was a proper implementation of a writ of preliminary
attachment. The SC decided that there was not because the lower court implemented the writ before it had jurisdiction
over the person of Mangila. When they served the summons to her household help in Pampanga, she was in Guam. While
Guina could have availed of provisional remedies, and while the writ was properly issued, it was improperly
implemented. Well-settled is the rule that while a writ can be issued even if the court did not have jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, it cannot be implemented until such jurisdiction is attained.
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05 - Spouses Lantin v. Hon. Lantion (1992)

Doctrine:
The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place.
Facts:
Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin took several peso and dollar loans from respondent Planters Development
Bank (PDB) and executed several real estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. They defaulted on the
payments so PDB foreclosed the mortgaged lots and were sold at a public auction where Planters was the winning bidder.
Spouses Lantin filed against PDB and its a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale with the RTC
of Lipa City, Batangas. The spouses alleged that only their peso loans were covered by the mortgages and that these had
already been fully paid, hence, the mortgages should have been discharged. They challenged the validity of the
foreclosure on the alleged non-payment of their dollar loans as the mortgages did not cover those loans.
PDB moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since the loan agreements restricted
the venue of any suit in Metro Manila, Judge Lantion granted the dismissal for improper venue. Spouses Lantin
sought reconsideration. The spouses claim that since the validity of the loan documents were squarely put in issue,
necessarily this meant also that the validity of the stipulation as to the venue also was at issue and in dismissing the case
because of the alleged violation of the stipulated venue, the trial court prejudged the validity of the agreement. Moreover,
according to the spouses, the venue stipulation in the loan documents is not an exclusive venue stipulation under Section
4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because venue in the loan agreement was not specified with
particularity.
Issue:
1. W/N Judge Lantion committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the case for improper venue.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that the general rules on venue of actions
shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive
venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a
case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
The pertinent provisions of the several real estate mortgages and promissory notes executed by the petitioner
respectively read as follows:
The parties hereto agree to bring their causes of auction (sic) exclusively in the proper court of
Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving
for this purpose any other venue.
I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action arising out of this note shall exclusively be
at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila, Philippines or any other venue chosen by the BANK,
waiving for this purpose any other venue provided by the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the words exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue are restrictive and used
advisedly to meet the requirements. Judge Lantion did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed
the case.
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06 - Unimasters Conglomeration Inc v. CA (1997) (wording of the stipulation)

Doctrine:
Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff
Facts:
Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc (KUBOTA) and Unimasters Conglomeration Inc (UNIMASTERS)
entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services in Samar and Leyte. The contract stated:
1. a stipulation reading: All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of
Quezon City, and
2. a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Five years later, Unimasters filed in the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota for damages for breach of contract. The
RTC issued a restraining order enjoining Metrobank from paying any alleged obligation of Unimasters to Kubota out of
the purchases made by Go against the credit line established by Unimasters for P2million. Kubota then filed two motions,
one for dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue and transfer of the injunction hearing.
UBOTA claims that notwithstanding that its motion to transfer hearing had been granted, the Trial Court went
ahead with the hearing on the injunction incident.
The Trial Court handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a
bond of P2,000,000. And on February 3, 1994, the same Court promulgated an Order denying KUBOTAs motion to
dismiss.
Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
1. Whether all suits arising from the agreement should be filed within the proper courts of QC
Held/Ratio:
1. No.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban City,
and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach
of contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.
But the contract between them provides that ** All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in
the proper Courts of Quezon City, without mention of Tacloban City. The question is whether this stipulation
had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and limiting litigation between
UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties desire and intention
that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention the stipulation should be construed, not as
confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon
City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
About KUBOTAs theory that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of **
(UNIMASTERS) action considering that venue was improperly laid. This is not an accurate statement of legal
principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal
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actions. This is fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of damages in an amount considerably in excess
of P20,000, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court.
07 - Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Klaus K. Schonfeld (2007) (agreements as to venue)
Doctrine:
While they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named
by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save
, particularly, nowhere else but/except , or words of equal import were stated in the contract. It cannot
be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the
employment contract.
Facts:
Respondent Klaus K. Schonfeld was a Canadian citizen, who worked as a consultant in the field of environmental
engineering, water supply and sanitation. Petitioner Pacific Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly organized and registered in the
country, and a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ). PPI was engaged in the business of
providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the Philippines. PCIJ subsequently decided to engage in
consultancy services for water and sanitation in the country and sought to engage respondents services. The company
president, Henrichsen, then sent respondent a letter of employment. The pertinent provision of the letter for our topic is as
follows:
This Letter of Employment with the attached General Conditions of Employment constitutes the
agreement under which you will be engaged by our Company on the terms and conditions defined
hereunder. In case of any discrepancies or contradictions between this Letter of Employment and
the General Conditions of Employment, this Letter of Employment will prevail.
You will, from the date of commencement, be [seconded] to our subsidiary Pacicon
Philippines, Inc. in Manila, hereinafter referred as Pacicon.
...
21 - Arbitration
Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of
employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee and the Company which
is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and which can
not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties through written
submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London.
Respondent arrived in the country and applied for a permit with the DOLE. He assumed the post of Sector
Manager and accorded the status of resident alien. In respondents alien employment permit, he indicated PPI as his
employer.
On May 1995, respondent was informed by Henrichsen that his employment was terminated because PPI and
PCIJ were not successful in the business in the country. He filed money claims against the company, which paid only $5,
635.99 and refused to pay the rest. Respondent was then constrained to initiate a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
Illegal Dismissal and prayed for his backpay and other benefits. Petitioners countered that the venue was improperly laid
because respondent was employed by PCIJ, not PPI, and that they had agreed that any action was to be brought to
London. The Labor Arbiter ruled for petitioners. The NLRC upon appeal affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. However,
the CA reversed, hence this present action.
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Issues:
1. W/N venue was properly laid in the Philippines.
2. W/N respondent was employed by PPI, not PCIJ.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an
agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather
permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named
by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save
, particularly, nowhere else but/except , or words of equal import were stated in the contract. It cannot
be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the
employment contract.
By enumerating possible venues where respondent could have filed his complaint, however, petitioners
themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely permissive.
A Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
2. YES.
There was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner PPI and respondent using the four-fold test.
Jurisprudence is firmly settled that whenever the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four
elements constitute the reliable yardstick: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employees conduct. Stated
otherwise, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end.
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08 - Dacoycoy v. IAC (1991)

Doctrine:
Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have
been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
Facts:
Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed a complaint against de Guzman praying for the annulment of
2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, as well as damages for de
Guzmans refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioners demand.
Before summons could be served on de Guzman, the Executive Judge Benedicto issued an order requiring counsel
for Cacoycoy to confer with him on the matter of venue. After the conference, the court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of improper venue. It argued that, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioners action is a real action
as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject
parcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Dacoycoy claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs to the defendant and that the court or its
magistrate does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the venue was improperly laid, as venue
is waivable. He asserts that without the defendant objecting that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless
to dismiss the case motu proprio.
Issue:
1. W/N the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The motu proprio dismissal by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error,
obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction treats of the
power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may
be had.
Even granting that the action of Dacoycoy is a real action, trial court would still have jurisdiction over the case, it
being a regional trial court vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein ... . in accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. There is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction over the Dacoycoy the moment he filed his
complaint for annulment and damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant,
now private respondent, either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the
coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.
Although Dacoycoy contends that he requested the City Sheriff of Olongapo City to serve the summons on de
Guzman at his residence, it does not appear that said service had been properly effected or that respondent had
appeared voluntarily in court or filed his answer to the complaint. At this stage, trial court should have required
petitioner to exhaust the various alternative modes of service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
such as, personal service under Section 7, substituted service under Section 8, or service by publication under
Section 16 when the address of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
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RULE 5 UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

&
RULE 6 KINDS OF PLEADINGS
01 - Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation (2001) (Insurance Agent)
Doctrine:
A compulsory counterclaim is one arising out of, or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting
the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Facts:
Evangeline Alday was an insurance agent for FGU Insurance Corporation. On May 5, 1989, FGU filed a money
claim against Alday before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The claim represents unliquidated cash advances,
unremitted insurance premiums, and other charges incurred by Alday as FGUs insurance agent, together with
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. On the other hand, Alday, by way of counterclaim, demanded her
direct commissions, profit commissions, contingent bonuses, and premium reserves. She also prayed for attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages.
FGU subsequently filed two motions to dismiss, one after the other. The first was a Motion to Strike Out Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim and to Declare Defendant in Default. This was based on the premise that Aldays answer
and counterclaim was filed out of time. This motion was denied. On the other hand, the second motion to dismiss was
based on the argument that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over Aldays counterclaim due to non-payment of
docket fees. As a defense, Alday argued that her counterclaim was compulsory in nature, and thus, exempt from payment.
However, the court disagreed with Alday, finding that her counterclaim was merely permissive and therefore, not subject
to exemption. Thus, the counterclaim was dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the wording of the
counterclaim clearly revealed that it was permissive in nature. This was because Aldays pleading stated that FGUs main
claim was based on a self-serving statement of account, while her counterclaim sought to enforce her Special Agents
Contract with FGU, an entirely separate instrument. Aggrieved, Alday filed this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. W/N FGU is estopped from questioning Aldays non-payment of docket fees
2. W/N FGU is estopped from questioning the CAs jurisdiction over Aldays appeal
3. W/N Aldays counterclaim is permissive and thus, exempt from payment of docket fees
Held/Ratio:
1. No. FGU is not estopped from questioning non-payment of docket fees.
Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. FGU cannot
be estopped from assailing the RTCs jurisdiction over Aldays counterclaim since this issue was raised early in
the course of proceedings, before both parties presented evidence. Indeed, FGU was able to raise the issue of
jurisdiction within a reasonable time.
2. Yes. FGU is estopped from questioning the CAs jurisdiction over Aldays appeal.
While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the action, a partys failure to raise the issue
before actively taking part in the very proceeding he/she intends to question may effectively give rise to estoppel.
Since FGU actively participated in proceedings before the CA, it is now estopped from objecting to the CAs
jurisdiction.
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3. No. Aldays counterclaim is partly permissive and compulsory. Therefore, it cannot be completely exempt
from payment of docket fees.
The SC defined a compulsory counterclaim as one which arises out of or is connected with the transaction
or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim, and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
There are two tests that may be used to determine the nature of a counterclaim. The first was capsulized in
Valencia v. Court of Appeals, which lays down four questions8 that examine the logical relation between the main
claim and the counterclaim. The second test was applied in Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
asked whether or not conducting separate trials for the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court.
A close scrutiny of Aldays counterclaim reveals that it is composed of two groups. The first group consists of
unliquidated cash advances, unremitted insurance premiums, direct commissions, profit commissions, and
contingent bonuses. As stated, these amounts are based on the Special Agents Contract. The second group
consists of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages in connection with FGUs main claim.
The evidence required to substantiate Aldays claim for the first group of amounts differs from that needed to
prove FGUs main claim against her. There is no logical connection between the two. Thus, the first group
assumes the nature of a permissive counterclaim, for which docket fees must be paid. On the other hand,
Aldays claim for attorneys fees and damages allegedly suffered as a result of FGUs claim is evidently
compulsory, and thus exempt from payment of docket fees, for such would not have been incurred in the absence
of FGUs suit.
Applying Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, the SC ordered the RTC to require Alday to pay docket fees with respect to
her permissive counterclaim within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable reglementary period.
Only then shall the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Aldays claim for the first group of amounts.

8.
(1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well
as defendants counterclaim? (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
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02 - International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. CA (19xx)

Doctrine:
We have consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (2) it does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (3)
the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Facts:
Private respondent, Sharp filed for an injunction against Philippine Ports Authority and herein petitioner CCTSI.
Initially the trial court granted the injunction by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction after Sharps filing a bond of
P10,000,000 posted by Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. On that same day, the petitioner filed an answer
with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp for its unfounded and frivolous action.
The writ of preliminary injunction was nullified by the SC. SC held that Sharp was not a proper party to stop the
negotiation and awarding of the contract for the development, management and operation of the Container Terminal at the
Port of Manila. Moreover, the petition was premature because Sharp had not exhausted the administrative remedies open
to it from the PPA, the Bidding Committee, and the Office of the President. The PPA, taking its cue from this decision,
filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint on the above-stated grounds. This motion was adopted by petitioner CCTSI
in a manifestation.
Judge Edilberto G. Sandoval dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. Petitioner filed for a motion for
reconsideration with respect to the counterclaim. Petition was denied. Petitioner argues that such dismissal was contrary to
Sec 2 Rule 17. Respondent Argues that as it was a Compulsory counterclaim, Sec Rule 17 will not apply.
Rule 17, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. - Except as provided in the preceding section, an action
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court may deem proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
Issue:
1. W/N the dismissal of the complaint upon petitioners motion necessarily entailed the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. We have consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys
claim; (2) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (3) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint: or put passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private respondents complaint. Secondly, the
compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in the first
place. As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioners own motion) operated to also dismiss
the counterclaim questioning that complaint.
The counterclaim was not permissive. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of nor is it necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. It is not barred even if not set up in the
action. The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Most importantly, it had no
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independent existence, being merely ancillary to the main action. The petitioner knew all this and did not object to
the dismissal of the complaint. On the contrary, it actually moved to dismiss that main action, and in so doing also
moved, in effect, for the dismissal of its counterclaim.
03 - Spouses Mercader and Maderazo v. DBP and the Manreals (1928) (Supplementary pleading)
Facts:
This petition for review impugn the CAs decision ordering petitioners to deliver the possession of a certain lot to
the DBP without right to reimbursement for the improvements introduced therein.
A lease was originally executed between Juan Maderazo and Spouses Manreal in order to comply with DBPs
requirement for the approval of Maderazos loan. This lease was not registered due to the Manreals failure to deliver the
TCT to Maderazo. A few years thereafter, the MERCADERS (children of Maderazo) executed another long-term contract
of lease over the unused portion of the same lot. This was also not registered due to the Manreals continued failure to
deliver the TCT. However, they were assured by the latter not to worry since nothing will go wrong.
Believing Manreals assurance, Mercader intensively cultivated the leased lot (planted calamansi trees, fenced the
lot, constructed a canal and introduced other improvements) spending an amount not less than P25,000.
The Mercaders later on discovered that the reason why the Manreals failed to deliver the TCT was because they
offered the said lot including improvements as collateral for a P150,000 deap-sea fishing loan with the DBP. The
Mercaders also alledge that DBP had actual knowledge of their interest over the property considering the several ocular
inspection and investigation conducted over the property.
The Manreals defaulted on their loan, so the DBP took steps to foreclose the land, including the improvements
introduced by the Mercaders. The latter prayed among others, for the DBP to respect their interest by excluding these
from the foreclosure proceeding or reimburse them the cost of improvements and loss of income amounting to
P210,000
In the Manreals answer, they admitted of the unregistered contracts of lease (which they reason to be in the hands
of their lawyer) and the calamansi trees planted by the Mercaders. They also claim that the Mercaders were aware of their
intention to offer as security for the their loan the property. On DBPs part, they only acknowledge their knowledge over
the 2 loans (Maderazo and Manreal) and denied any knowledge of the Mercaders interest over the lot.
During the pre-trial, the trial court acknowledged the possibility of a compromise agreement and hence gave time to
the parties to study the proposals and counter-proposals and ordered the documents pertinent thereto deemed parts of
records of the case. Through a series of communications between the parties, the DBP offered 3 options (sale, leasepurchase or lease) to the Mercaders to which the latter chose the lease-purchase option. With this development, the trial
court ordered the parties to submit their compromise agreement for the approval of the BoD.
Mercader requested DBP for a grace period in the payment of the amortization for the option chosen, to wit DBP
informed Mercader that the request was rejected but informed him to visit the bank for a possible conference. Other
recommendations were proposed by Mercader which were merely noted by the DBP. Later on, DBP withdrew their
agreement, reasoning that the original conditions packaged no longer apply because the MV of the property increased.
With this, the trial court terminated the pre-trial setting forth the following things resolved in the pre-trial:
That the plaintiffs claim that they have come into an agreement with defendant bank for the
purchase of the lot, payable in 10 years on a quarterly basis. The counsel of the defendant
however claim that the agreement was merely a proposal.
As such, the trial court included in issues for resolution during the trial, the Mercaders entitlement for
specific performance of the agreement
The Mercaders filed a Supplemental Pleading insisting the consummation of the lease-purchase option with the
payment of the earnest money. The DBP filed an opposition.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Mercaders. However, on appeal the CA found the trial court erred in treating the
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lease-purchase option as a controversial issue considering that it was outside the parties pleading and thus
reversed the trial courts decision.
Issues:
1. W/N the CAs decision contravened Sec 4 Rule 20 and Sec 5 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court by holding that the
trial court should have not taken cognizance of the lease-purchase option as a controversial issue since it was not
raised in the pleadings.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, the SC agrees with the Merceders and found that the CA erred in disregarding as material the leasepurchase option on the ground that it was not raised in the pleadings.
The CA question the lack of reference of the option in the initiatory pleadings, but then the trial court only took
cognizance thereof when it became an integral component of the pre-trial proceedings. That is the reason why
the agreement was only mentioned starting from the pre-trial order, as well as in supplemental pleading filed by
Mercader.
As a supplemental pleading, it served to aver supervening facts which were not originally ripe for judicial
relief when the original pleading was filed. It is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading.
Thus it was erroneous for the CA to pronounce that the lease-purchase option was not raised in the pleadings. The
DBP was even aware and knowledgeable of the supplemental pleading because it filed an opposition thereto.
Even assuming arguendo that the Mercaders failed to file a supplemental pleading, evidence relative to the leasepurchase option may be legitimately admitted by the trial court in conformity with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court on Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. After all, departures from procedure
may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.
Recent jurisprudence also shows that:
The court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though the
relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is
thereby caused to the adverse party.
As stated above, the DBP was not and would not be prejudiced by the incorporation of the lease-purchase option
as one of the controverted issues. Moreover, it had been afforded ample opportunity to refute and object to the
evidence germane thereto, thus, the rudiments of fair play had been properly observed
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04 - Pinga v. Santiago (2006)

Doctrines:
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of
plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the
dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
Facts:
The Heirs of Santiago, filed a complaint for injunction against Pinga, allegedly, for unlawfully entering the coco
lands of the Santiagos, and harvesting coconuts and bamboos.
In Pingas answer with counterclaim, he said that the land in question has been in his fathers possession since
1930, and that In 1968 the Santiagos has been ordered ejected, and the Santiagos free patent application has been denied.
Pinga in his counter-claim claims damages based on Santiagos re-entry and irresponsible and reckless filing of a suit.
Pinga then asked that the case be dismissed, since the Santiagos failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time, which was granted by the RTC.
The counter-claim of Pinga was also dissmised by the RTC, upon motion of the Santiagos.
Issue:
1. W/N The dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that if a complaint is
dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. therefore the dismissal of the complaint due to the
fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In
fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
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05 - Gojo v. Goyala (1970) (compulsory counterclaim)

Doctrines:
It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be
declared in default, principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by
the allegations of the complaint.
SECTION 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. xxx The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Facts:
In 1951, records show that a parcel of land belonging to respondents Segundo Goyala and his wife Antonina
Almoguera was sold under a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale to petitioner Faustino Gojo for P750 and a one-year
redemption period. 10 years later (1961), Gojo filed a petition for consolidation of ownership of the land with CFI
Sorsogon, claiming that because the spouses Goyala failed to utilize the redemption period, he should now be the
recognized owner of the parcel of land.
In 1961, respondent Goyala, by way of counterclaim, alleged that the transaction was not a sale but a mortgage; it
was meant to secure the P750 (plus an additional P60) borrowed by Goyala from Gojo. Goyala also alleged that he and his
wife tried to give the P810 to Gojo, but the latter refused to accept the payment. Goyala petitioned the dismissal of the
Gojos petition, and to compel him to accept the P810 consigned in court. Goyala also pointed out that his wife died in
1959.
In 1962, 3 years after Antonina Almoguera died, Goyalas counsel filed a manifestation ordering Gojo to
substitute, in place of Almoguera, one or all of their heirs. RTC granted this and ordered Gojo to submit an amended
complaint. Gojo ignored the order, which prompted Goyala to file a petition to dismiss Gojos complaint for his refusal to
obey. This, too, was granted by the same RTC. Goyala then wanted to declare Gojo in default for failing to answer
respondents counterclaim. The RTC declared the sale as a mortgage and restore ownership of the land to the Goyalas.
Gojo finally filed an appeal to CA, which certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. W/N the said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not require an
independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations.
2. W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for Gojos failure to substitute Almoguera.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not
be declared in default, principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined
by the allegations of the complaint. The counterclaim is a compulsory one which arises from the complaint
filed by petitioner Gojo. Appellant Gojos original complaint stood as the answer to appellee Goyalas
counterclaim; hence, the incorrectness of the trial courts order declaring the appellant in default in regard to said
counterclaim is evident.
2. YES. It is true that under Section 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the
plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, but it is obvious that the said provision cannot apply when the
order supposedly ignored is a void one, as in this case. As decided in Casenas v. Resales, SC held that when
certain of the parties to a civil case died and due notice thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the
said court to order, not the amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the legal representatives of
the deceased in accordance with the procedure and manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court.
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06 - Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla (1998) (kid fell out; forum shopping)
Doctrine:
The requirement of attaching a certificate of non-forum shopping to counterclaims does not apply to compulsory
counterclaims; it only applies to permissive counterclaims.
Facts:
In 1995, Cesar and Evangeline Surla filed a complaint for damages against Santo Tomas University Hospital with
the RTC of Quezon City predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar, while confined at the
said hospital for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing serious harm
on the child. The hospital countered, filing its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that the spouses still owed
to it the hospital bills for the kids confinement at the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary damages by
reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against it.
In March 1996, the hospital received a copy of the spouses Reply to Counterclaim that sought the dismissal of
the formers counterclaim for its non-compliance with SC Admin. Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a complaint and other
initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a
certificate of non-forum shopping. Now, the hospital countered again; through its Rejoinder to the spouses Reply to
Counterclaim, the hospital contended that the subject circular should be held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an
initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim but not to a
compulsory counterclaim spawned by the filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and logically related thereto
that it verily could not stand for independent adjudication. Petitioner concluded that, since its counterclaim was
compulsory in nature, the subject circular did not perforce apply to it.
The trial court held that since the circular does not specify to which of the two kinds of counterclaims it applies,
then the circular applies to both. It dismissed the counterclaim of the hospital. The hospital elevated it to the Court of
Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion in finding that the circular applies
to compulsory counterclaims as well. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Unfazed, the hospital now tries its luck
with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. W/N a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it
with a certificate of non-forum shopping?
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The provisions of the SC Admin. Circular in question do not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The
language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an
incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. The circular in question must not be contemplated to
include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving
its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not
remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the main case is pending.
Notes:
What is a compulsory counterclaim? A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief that a
defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs complaint. It is
compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be
barred in the future if not set up. [Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997).]
What is forum shopping? It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
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civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
07 - Judge Torres and Spouses Laico v. CA, Marta Chivi (1973) (free patent, secret compromise, counterclaim)
Doctrine:
A cross-claim which is purely defensive in nature could not prosper or stand once the original claim has already
been dismissed.
Facts:
This case involves two sales transactions over a parcel of land in Rizal between mid-1950s and early 1960s.
Spouses Sierra
The original owners

Marta Chivi

Spouses Laico

Marta Chivi purchased the land from the Spouses Sierra only upon the assurance that the land was NOT subject to
a free patent. Marta Chivi knew that lands covered by free patents were subject to the right of repurchase provided in the
Public Lands Act. So, the Spouses Sierra, the seller, claimed that they filed for a free patent before the war but the
application was denied. In other words, the land is not covered by free patent and neither was it registered.
The sale was perfected between the Spouses Sierra and Chivi but they agreed that full payment shall only be made
once the land is already registered. Chivi filed an application for land registration over the land. Pending this, Chivi sold
her rights and interests over the land to the Spouses Laico. In their deed of sale, it was stipulated that if Chivi failed to
secure and transfer title to the Laicos, Chivi would return to the Laicos twice the amount of their purchase price.
After the successful sale between Chivi and the Spouses Laico and pending registration, the latter discovered that
the land was actually already covered by a free patent under the name of the Spouses Sierra as early as 1932.
And so,
Case One
Spouses Sierra vs. Marta Chivi
And Spouses
For repurchase of the land

Laico
Case Two: Counterclaim

Not important in this case
Chivi and the Laicos vs. Sierras
For damages for bad faith and fraud of
Sierras
Case Three: Cross-Claim

Spouses Laico vs. Marta Chivi
For Collection of twice the amount of the
purchase price for failure to deliver title to
the Laicos
However, without the knowledge of Marta Chivi, the Spouses Sierra and Spouses Laico entered into a
compromise which led to the dismissal with prejudice, of the civil action for repurchase of land filed by the Spouses
Sierra against Spouses Laico and Marta Chivi (Case One), again without the knowledge of Chivi. A new action was
then instituted by the Spouses Sierra against only Marta Chivi not anymore for repurchase but for collection of the
balance of the purchase price Chivi continued to owe the Sierras.
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Case One
And Spouses
For repurchase of the land

Laico
Dismissed with
prejudice and
converted to
JUDGE DELA ROSA
Case Four / Case One V.2

Only
For collection of balance of
purchase price and damages

Also, the Laicos and the Sierras agreed that the counterclaim of the Laicos against Chivi (Case Three) would
still be pursued.
Issue:
1. W/N the cross-claim (Case Three) stand after the original claim/action (Case One) was dismissed with
prejudice
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The cross-claim did not and should not stand.
Based on the circumstances around the sales transactions between them all, the warranty of Chivi to the Laicos
referred to the transfer of ownership over the land, NOT to the transfer of registered title to the Laicos. The
original action of the Sierras was in fact for the repurchase of the land and NOT for recovery of ownewrship,
which meant that even the Sierras themselves recognized that the ownership over the land has already been
validly transferred to her. And so, when the second sale was perfected between Chivi and the Laicos, Chivi was
indeed the owner of the land. She did not therefore breach her warranty in favor of the Laicos because the
ownership of the land has been validly transferred from the Sierras to her and from her to the Laicos.
Moreover, the Laicos and the Sierras entered into a compromise where ultimately, the Laicos became the true
owner of the land regardless of who the transferor was, whether Marta Chivi because of the sale between them, or
the patentee Sierras who through the compromise, transferred their ownership to them.
The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the complaint filed by the
Sierras against the Laicos and Chivi and the cross-claim would prosper only if the Sierras succeeded in the
original complaint. The cross-claim cannot be the subject of independent adjudication once it lost the nexus
upon which its life depended.
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08 - Balbastro v. CA and Hon. De Los Angeles and Francisco Fernandez (1972) (rentals, third-party
complaint)
Doctrine:
Section 12, Rule 6 does not authorize a defendant to bring into the case any person not a party to the action, who
is not secondarily liable to the said defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in
respect to the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant.
It merely permits the inclusion of parties, not compelling the same
Rules on joinder of parties must be allowed considerable flexibility to meet the requirements of justice and
convenience
Facts:
This controversy involves a 10 door apartment. Fernandez and Butte were fighting over the ownership of the 10
door apartment and the right to collect the rentals therefrom. The lessees of 3 doors filed a complaint for interpleader and
consignation against private respondent Francisco Fernandez and Angela Butte before the CFI of Rizal, QC (the court of
Judge De Los Angeles). In their complaint, they alleged that they have no means of knowing definitely to whom they
should pay rentals- whether to Butte of Francisco. Francisco, in his answer, alleged that he was granted an ad interim
authority to collect and deposit the rentals with the court. Butte claims that since she is the owner, she has the right to
collect the rentals.
Fernandez filed a Third-Party Complaint against herein petitioners Balbastro et al as lessees of the remaining
doors because of their refusal to recognize his authority to collect rentals from them. Balbastro et al filed a Motion to
Strike Out and/or Dismiss the third party complaint on the ground that it violated Section 12 of Rule 6. The motion was
dismissed so they filed an MR which was also dismissed. They elevated it to the CA which also dismissed the same.
Issue:
1. W/N Judge De Los Angeles committed grave abuse of discretion in accepting Franciscos third-party complaint
and allowing the inclusion of Balbastro et al as parties to the interpleader case
Held/Ratio:
1. No. Section 12, Rule 6 authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of his opponents claim. It does not compel
the defendant to bring the third-parties into the litigation; rather it simply permits the inclusion of anyone
who meets the aforementioned standard in the rule. The secondary or derivative liability of the third-party is
central to whether the basis [for his inclusion] is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied
warranty or some other theory. The interpleader of new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to
relief is exists under the applicable substantive law. Section 12, Rule 6 does not authorize a defendant to bring
into the case any person not a party to the action, who is not secondarily liable to the said defendant for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect to the claim of the plaintiff against the
defendant.
In this case, Balbastro et al are not secondarily liable to Francisco. But, because of countervailing policy
considerations, and in view of the equity rule on the multiplicity of suits, the Court refuses to reverse the
decision. The Court ruled that the respondent Judge and the CA did not gravely abuse their discretion because
although their inclusion as third-party defendants was not proper, they are however PROPER PARTIES in
the action because there is a question of law or fact common to the right or duty in which they are interested and
another right sought to be enforced in the action. Permitting their joinder is sanctioned by Section 6, Rule 3.
Section 6 is based on trial convenience and is designed to permit joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever
there is a common question of law or of fact. Their inclusion is therefore does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion since it will allow the controversy (to whom the rentals should be paid) to be settled in the most
convenient manner in a single proceeding.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 7 PARTS OF PLEADINGS

01 - Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. CA (2000) (Banco Filipino loans)
Doctrines:
It has been ruled that it is the material allegations of the fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusion made
therein or the prayer that determines the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. It is the allegations of the pleading
which determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof
even if no such relief is prayed for.
Facts:
Elsa and Calvin Arcilla, secured on 3 occasions loans from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank in the
total amount of P107,946 as evidenced by a promissory noteexecuted in favor of Banco Filipino. To secure the payment
of these loans, the Arcillas executed Real estate mortgages in favor of Banco Filipino over their parcels of land in BFParanaque. Under these deeds, Banco Filipino may increase the rate of interest, on said loans, within the limits allowed by
law, as Banco Filipinos Directors may prescribe for its borrowers. At that time, under the Usury Law, Act 2655,
maximum rate of interest for loans secured by real estate mortgages was 12% per annum. On January 10, 1975, the
parties executed a Deed of Consolidation and Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage where the loans of the Arcillas and
the Real Estate Mortgage were consolidated and the loan increased to P188,000. Another Promissory note was executed
dated January 15, 1975, whereby the Arcillas bound and obliged themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the amount of
P188,000 with interest rate of 12% per annum, in nineteen (19) years from date thereof.
On January 2, 1976, the Central Bank issued CB Circular no. 494 indicating that the maximum rate of interest on
loans with maturity of more than 730 days by banking institutions shall be 19% per annum.
Calvin Arcilla, as President of Skyline Builders, secured another loan from BPI which was insured by FGU
Insurance Corporation with a bond.
Banco Filipino prepared and issued a Statement of Account to the Arcillas on their loan account, the
balance of their loan account, inclusive of interests, computed at 17% per annum, amounted to 284,490.75. It turned
out that the Appellant unilaterally increased the rate of interest on the loan account of the Appellees from 12% per annum,
to 17% per annum on the authority of the Central Bank Circular.
Arcillas failed to pay their monthly amortizations to Banco Filipino. The latter filed with the Provincial Sheriff,
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage inclusive of the 17% per annum. Banco Filipino was the highest bidder in
the auction. The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale over the properties in favor of Banco Filipino.
Banco Filipino filed a Petition for Writ of Possession with the RTCwhich it granted. CA affirmed.
Meanwhile, FGU Insurance Corp redeemed the properties from Banco Filipino inclusive of the interest of 17% per annum
by virtue of a Deed of redemption executed between Banco Filipino and FGU insurance corp.
Arcillas filed a complaint for the Annulment of the loan contracts, foreclosure sale with prohibition and
injunction. In their complaint they claim that the loan contracts and mortgages were null and void because the (a) the
interest charges were deducted in advance from the face value of the promissory notes executed by them (Arcillas) and (b)
the rate of interests charge by Banco Filipino were usurious. Banco Filipino, on the other hand, claims that the complaints
filed by the Arcillas had already prescribed because the causes of action accrued on the date of the execution of the
promissory note and deed of mortgage on January 15, 1975 and not October 30, 1978 as found by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, private respondents cause of action has already prescribed inasmuch as the case was filed on September 2, 1985 or
more than ten years thereafter.
Issues:
1. W/N the action of the Arcillas have prescribed
2. W/N the respondents are entitled to a refund of the alleged interest overpayments (paid for them by FGU)
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3. W/N Banco Filipino could increase the stipulated interest pursuant to CB Circular 494 from 12% to 17%
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there is no
special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Thus, the period of
prescription of any cause of action is reckoned only from the date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of
action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is
done. The period should not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the contract on January 15, 1975 as
claimed by the petitioner for at that time, there would be no way for the respondents to know of the violation of
their rights. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly found that respondents cause of action accrued on October
30, 1978, the date they received the statement of account showing the increased rate of interest, for it was only
from that moment that they discovered the petitioners unilateral increase thereof.
2. YES. Although there is an absence of prayer therefor, this Court has ruled that it is the material allegations
of fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusion made therein or the prayer that determines the relief to
which the plaintiff is entitled. It is the allegations of the pleading which determine the nature of the action
and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed
for. Thus, even if the complaint seeks the declaration of nullity of the contract, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the factual allegations contained therein ultimately seek the return of the excess
interests paid.
The amended complaint of herein private respondents specifically allege that the contracts of loan entered into by
them and the petitioner were contrary to and signed in violation of the Usury Law and consequentially pray that
said contracts be declared null and void.
3. NO. Pursuant to PD 1684, to be valid the escalation clauses should provide: 1.) that there can be an increase in
interest if increased by law or by the Monetary Board; and 2.) in order for such stipulation to be valid, it must
include a provision for the reduction of the stipulated interest in the event that the maximum rate of interest is
reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. The escalation clause in the loan contract indicates .to such an
increase, within the limits allowed by law, as the Board of directors of the mortgage may prescribe for its
debtors.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
02 - Gochan v. Gochan (2001)

Facts:
The Respondent Gochans are stockholders in the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corp and Mactan Realty
Development Corp who offered to sell to Petitioner Gochans their shares of stock for P 200 Million. Petitioner Gochans
paid and the Respondent Gochans in turn issued receipts and their respective release, waiver and quitclaim. Through
Crispo Gochan Jr., Respondent Gochans also made the Petitioner Gochans execute promissory notes not to divulge the
amount they paid for the said shares, however, the promissory notes were later on altered by Crispo adding the phrase
said amount is in partial consideration of the sale. The Respondent Gochans filed for specific performance and damages
against Petitioner Gochans stating that the real deal was in exchange for the of 254 shares in the Felix Gochan and Sons
Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty Development, the consideration for the sale are: P
200M, 2 hectares of the fishpond in Gochan compound, a 999 sq. m. lot in Gochan Compound, 3,000 sq m of Villas
Magallanes in Mactan, Cebu and the New Gem Building, as stated in the Provisional Memorandum of Agreement that the
parties executed. The answer of Petitioner Gochans raised several affirmative defenses such as lack of jurisdiction by the
trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees, unenforceability of the obligation to convey real properties due to
lack of a written memorandum thereof, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, extinguishment of the obligation by payment,
waiver, abandonment and renunciation by respondent of all their claims against petitioners and non-joinder of
indispensable parties. Subsequently, Petitioner Gochans filed for a motion of preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defenses but the trial court dismissed this. Petitioner Gochans filed for MR which was again denied. And afterwards, they
filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA which was again dismissed. An MR was thereafter filed but was also dismissed.
And lastly, they filed this petition for review.
Issues:
1. W/N the proper docket fees were paid
2. W/N the Petitioner Gochans committed forum shopping
[there were other issues but I think ito yung mga related sa Rule 7]
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Respondents Gochan say that they paid the correct docket fees while Petitioner Gochans,
contend that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties; hence, respondents
should have alleged therein the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the
correct docket fees. Even if the caption of the complaint was denominated as one for specific performance
and damages. the relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the
execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case was actually a real action, affecting as it
does title to or possession of real property. Therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature
of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for
determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof.
2. NO. Although the Petitioner Gochans filed two petitions in the CA, there was no identity of issues or identity of
reliefs sought in the two petitions. The first one was about the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by
Petitioner Gochans and the second was questioning whether Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality
warranting his inhibition from further hearing of the (original) civil case. What is truly important to consider in
determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant
by a person who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation (2006) (unsigned pleading)

Doctrine:
Rule 7, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency
to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel
who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous
or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to
appropriate disciplinary action.
Facts:
Respondent Kenrick Development Corporation (Kenrick) built a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of
land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) sometime in 1996. The
ATO was dispossessed of some 30, 228 sq meters of land. Respondent justified the fencing by claiming ownership over
the properties. It presented TCTs 135604, 135605 and 135606. These TCTs allegedly originated from TCT 17508
registered under one Alfonso Concepcion. Upon inquiry with the LRA by ATO, it was found that there existed no TCT
17508. The lands covered by Kenricks titles were located in the Villamor Air Base in Pasay City.
With this information, the OSG initiated an action for revocation, annulment and cancellation of titles in behalf of
the Republic against Alfonso Concepcion. Concepcion could not be located and served with summons thru publication.
While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was conducting a hearing in aid of legislation on the
matter of land registration and titling. The focus was how entities like respondent acquired their fake titles. One of the
persons summoned for the hearing was respondents former counsel, Atty. Garlitos. He testified that he prepared
respondents answer and gave an unsigned draft to Kenricks president, Mr. Victor Ong. Atty. Garlitos also stated that the
pleadings used by respondent were signed, but not by him. He also did not authorize anyone to sign on his behalf.
The Republic them moved to have Kenrick declared in default on its failure to file a valid answer, and pursuant to
Rule 7 Sec. 3, the unsigned pleading produced no legal effect. The trial court granted the Republics motion. However, the
CA reversed.
Issues:
1. W/N respondent Kenrick was properly declared in default by the trial court.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Rule 7, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure is clear that the pleading must be signed by the party or
his counsel. Thus, only the signature of either the party itself or the counsel validly operates to convert the
unsigned pleading to one that is signed. The counsels duty and authority to sign is personal to him, and may not
just be delegated to any person. The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice
of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of
a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. Moreover, a signature by agents of a
lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket
authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that
authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent
acts. Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial
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court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
04 - Argallon-Jocson and Tusing v. CA (2009) (pleading not properly signed by one of two petitioners)
Doctrines:
Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no legal effect.
Facts:
(The facts are not that related to the issue. There was a debt that needed to be satisfied so a sale of the debtors property
was done. It was sold to a third person but the debtor wanted the sale cancelled because it was claiming that it was only
jointly liable. The issue concerns procedure, though. One of the two creditors did not sign the pleading and other
documents.)
Ceferina Argallon-Jocson (Jocson) filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel Corp.
(MSC) & Ma. Cristina Fertilizer Corp (MCFC) which were represented by its President Marcelo. The trial courts
judgment was for Jocson, ordering the 2 companies to pay her P2,004,810.42 and attorneys fees. The corporations
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the trial courts decision. The companies did not appeal so the judgment became final
and executory. A Writ of Execution was issued to the Sheriff, commanding him to implement it. The sheriffs levied upon
the properties of the Marcelo Steel Corp. and an execution sale was scheduled. However, Midas International
Development Corp (Midas) filed a third-party claim alleging that the properties executed were mortgaged to it. The sale
was postponed and Joscon filed a P36 Million bond so that the properties would not be released to Midas. The sale was
executed and a Certificate of Sale was issued to Rodolfo Tusing (Tusing) as highest bidder.
MSC filed an Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for annulment of the sale and the issuance of an order
to not deliver the properties alleging that 1) its obligation was merely joint with MCFC and 2) the price was
unconscionably inadequate. The trial court then declared the sale null and void. Jocson moved for reconsideration
claiming that the obligation of the companies were solidary. MSC filed a Manifestation and Motion on Satisfaction of
Judgment and deposited P4,260,198.11 representing full satisfaction of its debt. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that
MSCs obligation is only joint.
Issues:
1. W/N the proper procedure for filing the petition was followed
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
The proper procedure for filing the petition was not followed. The Supreme Court held that there was a fatal flaw
when the petition supposedly filed by Jocson and Tusing was not signed by Jocsons council. Tusings council
signed for Jocsons council without a Special Power of Attorney to do so. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, otherwise the pleading
produces no legal effect.
Only Tusing signed the Verification and Certification for Non-Forum Shopping. A pleading required to be
verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. After 4 months, Tusing
submitted an SPA allegedly from Jocson, but the Court will not relax the rule except for compelling reasons.
Jocson was the principal party in the original case and her signature was actually the one needed.
Furthermore, Jocson filed of a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution to implement the decision as against
MCFC even before this appeal, which clearly indicates that she already acceded to the Court of Appeals no
longer intended to move for its reconsideration.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
05 - Vicar International Construction Inc and Carmelita V. Lim v. FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation (2005) (63 Subdivision lots, heavy equipment)
Doctrines:
Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
Facts:
Vicar obtained loans from FEB for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of
Absolute Sale with a lease-back provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to
FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the same time, leased them back. Vicar claims to have paid
FEB an aggregate amount of P19,042,908 of the total loan of P 30,315,494.
Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about P22,000,000, despite the
extrajudicial foreclosure of 63 subdivision lots. The auction sale produced P17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should have
been applied to its loans.
In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining to the possession of
eight units of the subject equipment. In an Order dated Aug. 2002, the RTC quashed the property counterbond filed by
Vicar and denied the latters Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In a subsequent
order dated Sept. 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition of the trial judge.
On October 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, to stop the implementation of the Writ of
Replevin issued against the subject equipment. However, this was dismissed because the Verification and the Certification
against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority
to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation.
On November, 2003, Vicar filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached
Secretarys Certificate which attested that Carmelita had the authority to sign. However, this was again denied because it
was filed late and petitioner did not have any compelling reason for failure to comply at the first instance with the required
certification. Hence, this Petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES
The court sees no circumvention of the law. In fact, a Verification/Certification, stating the information
required, was attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. Petitioners merely missed attaching to
their Petition a concrete proof of Lims authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its
behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretarys Certificate having submitted it the
day right after its petition was denied. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution did exist at the time
the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was only due to
inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the Secretarys Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain (1999)

Doctrine:
Generally, lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not
divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the
unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
with in order to serve the ends of justice.
Facts:
Robern Development Corporation (Robern) is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the National Power
Corporation (NPC) is seeking to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project in Inawayan,
Binugao, Toril, Davao City.
NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern who countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging:
a) that the Complaint did not have the approval of the NPC board of directors;
b) that Atty. Caete, who certified and verified the Complaint, was not the president, the general manager or
an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395);
c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper and arbitrary, as it had already been intended
for use in a low-cost housing project and that there were similar properties available within the area.
Before this could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession and deposited P
6,121.20 at the Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch.
The trial court denied the Roberns Motion to Dismiss, stating that NPC has the privilege as a utility to use the
power of eminent domain. The court granted the Writ of Possession to NPC but before Roberns counsel received any
order from the trial court directing the implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed property.
Issue:
1. W/N the court had jurisdiction over the case even if the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was NOT signed
by the president or general manager of the NPC. (Rule 7, CivPro Question)
2. W/N the subject property can still be expropriated since it was already committed to be used in a low-cost housing
project.
3. W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPCs Motion for the issuance of the
Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.
Ratio:
1. YES. Generally, lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence
does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the
unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
with in order to serve the ends of justice.
The purpose certificate of non-forum shopping is to prevent a party-litigant from pursuing simultaneous remedies
in different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. As regional in-house legal
counsel, Atty. Caete was the officer who was in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of
the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. He was also in the best position to know and to
certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and pending with the courts. Even if he is not the
general counsel, he has residual authority to prepare, verify and certify the Complaint for expropriation.
Besides, he was joined by Comie Doromal and Catherine Pablo, both of whom signed on behalf of the solicitor
general in accordance with the NPC charter. Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel and the solicitor
general approved the filing of the Complaint for expropriation.
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2. YES. Roberns argument in this case is premised on the old rule, prior to the 1997 amendment. Under the old
rule, the hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence followed. However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure no longer requires such extraordinary motion to dismiss.
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had already taken effect.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the
allotment of the disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a mere easement of right-of-way in
the complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those specifically mentioned in
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground authorized by this
provision.
However, the court decided that in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an opportunity
to file its answer to the Complaint for expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3. YES. The provisional deposit of NPC is insufficient. Although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June
6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the
Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. With the revision of the Rules, the trial courts issuance of the Writ of
Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited.
Thus, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPCs Motion for the issuance
of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit. Under Section 2, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be in an amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the
property to be condemned, not merely ten percent of it.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
07 - Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corp. v. CA, Oabel, Manila Resource Devt Corp (2009)
Doctrine:
The filing of the certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. For juridical persons, only those
specifically authorized by a duly issued board resolution or special power of attorney shall be allowed to institute
petitions and execute certification of non-forum shopping.
Facts:
Sheryl Oabel was initially hired by Maranaw as an extra beverage attendant on April 1995 (until February 1997)
to work at Century Park Hotel. In September 1996, Maranaw contracted Manila Resource Devt corp. (MANRED) to
provide for personnel services. She was later transferred by Maranaw to MANRED, the latter acting as her employer. On
1998, she filed a petition for regularization of employment against Maranaw with the Labor Arbiter. However, she was
later dismissed, so she converted her petition into a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint because the LA held that even though she alleged that she has been
working for Maranaw, the nature of her employment was on a per function basis or on a need basis co-terminus with
the function she was hired for. This decision was reversed by the NLRC upon appeal by Oabel.
[Relevant facts for Civpro] This was appealed before the CA, but was dismissed because of the failure of
Maranaw to attach the board resolution authorizing the counsel for Maranaw to file the petition before the CA. The CA
held that Maranaw failed to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping because the attached
certification was subscribed and verified by the Personnel Director of Maranaw, without attaching any board resolution or
special power of attorney authorizing the said Personnel Director to subscribe and verify the said certification. A motion
for reconsideration (MR) was filed wherein the certification of non-forum shopping was attached.
In their appeal to SC, Maranaw contends that the filing of the MR with the certification attached constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirement.
Issue:
1. W/N the filing of MR with the attached certification of non-forum shopping will cure the defect in the pleading
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, it wont.
It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of
the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar parties with the one filed
before the said court. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons. The SC also ruled that a
juridical person may still comply with the requirement through duly authorized officers or directors as proper
signatories of the certificate of non-forum shopping. However, the Court (citing BPI v. CA) emphasized that the
lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation, to institute
petition and execute the certification (of non-forum shopping), through a board resolution issued by the
corporations Board of Directors. So, the SC dismissed the petition on this ground.
On the issue of Oabels illegal dismissal, the Court ruled that the employment of Oabel with MANRED was a
mere ploy to circumvent the law on regularization of employees with Maranaw. The Court also noted that
although Oabels tasks vary on a per need basis, Maranaw exercises control over the assignment of tasks, which
led the SC to determine Maranaw as the real employer. Finally, since Oabel has rendered more than one year of
service, she must already be considered as a regular employee.
117 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
08 - Veronique Huibonhoa v. Concepcion and Hon. Annang (2006)

Doctrine:
To determine forum shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of:
a. parties,
b. rights or causes of action,
c. reliefs sought.
Facts:
Concepcion filed a complaint for accounting and damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction from
performing her duties, against Huibonhoa as manager of Poulex Supermarket. Presiding Judge Annang issued a TRO
effective for 72 hours. Upon the lapse of the 72-hour period, Judge Annang declared the expiration of the TRO, however,
he ordered that the Supermarket be padlocked in order to avoid any confusion as to the case. Huibonhoa filed a petition
for review on certiorari assailing Annangs issuance of the TRO and the order locking the supermarket.
Meanwhile, Huibonhoa, along with other stockholders of the corporation holding the supermarket (CHAS Co.),
also filed an intra-corporate complaint and derivative suit against Concepcion.
Case 1
Concepcion against Huibonhoa
Case 2
Huibonhoa and Stockholders against Concepcion
Case 3
Huibonhoa petition for certiorari against Annangs orders
The CA dismissed case no. 3 on the ground of forum shopping. Meanwhile, Case no. 2 reached a settlement and
was dismissed by the court. On the other hand, the issue on the issuance of the TRO is already moot because of its
expiration. Huibonhoa now assails the validity of the dismissal by the CA, contending that despite the issues being
moot, the dismissal based on forum shopping would place sanctions on her and on her lawyer.
Issue:
1. W/N Huibonhoa is guilty of forum shopping.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. There is forum shopping when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion, other than by appeal or certiorari in another. Forum shopping is prohibited because it tends to degrade
the justice system by creating a situation where two courts of justice render conflicting decisions. However, for
there to be forum shopping, the presence of litis pendentia must first be established. Otherwise stated, to
determine forum shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
In the case at bar there is no identity of parties because Case No. 2 is a derivative suit by the stockholders while
case no. 3 is a suit instituted solely by Huibonhoa. There are also different causes of action: Case 2 relates to the
interference by respondent Concepcion in the operations of the supermarket, causing damages to the corporations
and the stockholders, while in Case 3, the petition was aimed to nullify the judges orders which Huibonhoa
claimed were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Lastly the reliefs sought were different, in Case 2, the relief
sought was for the awarding of damages, while Case 3 sought the nullification of the orders.
There is no forum shopping.
118 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
09 - San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa (2005)

(This is primarily a labor case. I will just discuss on the CivPro aspect since we havent taken up Labor yet.)
Doctrine:
In cases where it is highly impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping, it
is sufficient, in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of the plaintiffs, acting as representative, to sign the
certificate provided that xxx the plaintiffs share a common interest in the subject matter of the case or filed the
case as a collective, raising only one common cause of action or defense.
Facts:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Sunflower) entered
into a one-year Contract of Services, to be renewed on a month-to-month basis until terminated by either party.
Pursuant to this, Sunflower engaged private respondents (Prospero Aballa was only one of the 97 respondents in this
case) to render services at SMCs Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant.
After more than a year of service, private respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC, praying that they be
declared as regular employees of SMC, with claims for recovery of all benefits and privileges enjoyed by SMC rank and
file employees. In their amended complaint, private respondents included illegal dismissal as additional cause of action
due to the closure of SMCs Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant, which resulted in the termination of their services. In the
meantime, SMC filed with the DOLE a Notice of Closure of its aquaculture operations due to serious business losses.
Labor Arbiter Drilon dismissed private respondents complaint for lack of merit and ruled for SMC. Aballa
appealed to the NLRC but the same dismissed the case. Private respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. Before the CA, SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for non-compliance with the Rules
on Civil Procedure and failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. On appeal, CA reversed the
NLRC decision and found for private respondents.
Issue:
1. W/N the CA erred in giving due course and granting respondents patently defective petition for certiorari.
Held:
1. NO. SMC contends that the CA should have outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari as only three out of
the ninety seven named petitioners signed the verification and certification against forum-shopping.
While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the Court stressed that the rules on
forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. There could
be substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
The Court, citing HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association says that in cases where it is highly impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping, it is sufficient, in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of the plaintiffs, acting
as representative, to sign the certificate provided that xxx the plaintiffs share a common interest in the subject
matter of the case or filed the case as a collective, raising only one common cause of action or defense.
Given the collective nature of the petition filed before the CA by herein private respondents, raising one common
cause of action against SMC, the execution by private respondents Winifredo Talite, Renelito Deon and Jose
Temporosa in behalf of all the other private respondents of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules. That the three indeed represented their co-petitioners before the appellate
court is, as it correctly found, subsequently proven to be true as shown by the signatures of the majority of the
petitioners appearing in their memorandum filed before Us.
119 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 8 MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS

01 - Canete v. Genuino Ice Co.
Facts:
On January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title of OCT No. 614 and its derivative
TCTs, alleging that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued under mysterious circumstances, considering that the
holders thereof including their predecessors-in-interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the
property, a friar land known as Piedad Estate, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar
Lands Act.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA (for the denial of the motion to dismiss, so parehong
grounds ng motion to dismiss yung sa certiorari), which was granted for the failure of petitioners to state a cause of action.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Did the petitioners complaint fail to state a cause of action?
2. Are petitioners real parties-in-interest
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, petitioners failed to state a cause of action.
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading shall contain a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense.
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the action, and consequently, the
jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and must specify the relief sought. Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished
from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is
just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable,
invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere
conclusions of law.
Ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action, or such facts as are so
essential that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Cause of
action has been defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; If
any of its elements are lacking, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, where only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in such case
is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant
to the prayer therein.
Petitioners Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary
or other exhibits; the allegations therein partake of conclusions of law unsupported by a particular averment
of circumstances that will show why or how such inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with
sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are not found therein.
120 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
There is no explanation or narration of facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be fictitious or
spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated
with particularity
2. NO, they are not real parties-in-interest.
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite their alleged adverse possession but only
to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the
property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for
cancellation of the subject titles.
Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has
nevertheless stated therein several causes of action based on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over
the improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land. In the case at bar, the
plaintiffs own averments negate the existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right
might have been violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff.
121 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
02 - Toribio v. Bidin (1985) (evidentiary nature, actionable)

Doctrines:
Actionable documents must be denied under oath.
Facts:
Francisco and Esteban were the registered owner of parcels of land in Zamboanga. Upon their death, their kids
inherited the estate. The property was subdivided among the heirs and a portion was allotted to Justa Francisco. Justa died
and was survived by her 8 kids (Dionisio, Eufremia, Rafael, Segundino, and Eusebia). Euferemia, Alfonoso and Petrona
sold their shares to Ramon Ledesma. Rafael sold his share to Dionisio. Dionisio later sold this share to Ramon Ledesma.
Dionoso sold his share to Juanito Camacho.
Segundino, Eusebia, and Olegario (petitioners) filed a case against Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos
(respondents) for recovery of hereditary rights. They claimed that their shares had never been sold and that they did not
know how Camacho became entitled to 931 square meters of the land and Ramos of the share of the property. The
respondents alleged that the shares of the petitioners were also sold to Dionisio. Dionisio, in turn, sold the land to
Camacho and Ramos. The alleged sale from the petitioners to Dionisio and the sale from Dionisio to the respondents were
evidenced by deeds of sale.
While testifying during trial, Eusebia was asked whether she executed any sale of her share. The counsel for
private respondents objected, raising the proper mode of contesting the genuineness of which they had to prove. Hence,
the petitioners filed a constancia with a motion for reconsideration, stating that the documents submitted by the
respondents were merely evidentiary in nature, not a cause of action or defense, the due execution and genuineness of
which they had to prove. The lower court denied this motion.
Issues:
1. Whether the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in favor of Dionisio and appended to the
respondents answer are merely evidentiary in nature OR the very foundation of petitioners defense which must
be denied under oath by petitioner
Held/Ratio:
1. The deeds of sale are actionable documents which must be denied under oath. Respondents anchor their
defense on the deeds of sale by virtue of which the rights to the land were sold. The deed of sale executed by
petitioners in favor of Dionisio is an essential and indispensable part of the petitioners defense to the allegation
that they never disposed of their property.
Section 8, Rule 8 provides that
[w]hen an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when
the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an
order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
Petitioners are the parties to the deeds of sale which are sought to be enforced against them. The complaint was
filed by the petitioners. They filed suit to recover the properties. The respondents introduced the deeds as their
main defense. The petitioners brought the issue upon themselves and must follow Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8.
Hence, the proper procedure was for petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what they claim to be the facts.
122 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - La Mallorca v. CA (1966)
Doctrines:
The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of
carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege
causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in
controversy may be resolved and determined.
Facts:
Mariano Beltran and his wife, together with their 3 daughters boarded a La Mallorca- Pambusco bus. At the time,
they were carrying 4 pcs. of baggage. The conductor, who happened to be their uncle, issued 3 tickets covering the full
fares for Mariano, his wife and their eldest child. No fare was charged on the two younger ones since both were below the
height restriction.
After an hour riding the bus, the bus stopped. Mariano, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down
from the bus, followed by his wife and children. He led them to a shaded spot 4-5 meters away from the bus. Apparently,
he left one of his bayongs in the bus so he went back, but he didnt know that his 4 yr. old daughter followed him. The
motor of the bus was not shut off while unloading, so the bus suddenly started moving forward notwithstanding the factor
that the conductor did not give the go-signal since he was looking for Marianos bayong. His daughter was run over.
For the death of their child, Mariano and his wife filed a suit against La Mallorca seeking to recover P16,000 to
cover moral damages, actual damages, and attorneys fees.
RTC found La Mallorca liable for breach of contract of carriage and damages. CA found La Mallorca guilty of
quasi-delict and damages.
Issues:
1. W/N La Mallorca is liable for quasi-delict considering that the complaint was one for breach of contract
2. W/N in raising the award of damages from P3,000 to P6,000 although the Beltran family did not appeal from the
decision of the RTC
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. As a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger leaves
the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. And, what
is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca can be held liable
for the negligence of its driver since Par. 7 of the complaint reads That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs
daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and
their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their
vehicle.
This is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible
with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of
Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or
not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and determined.
The Beltrans sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence in the complaint.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2. NO. The increase of the award of damages from P3,000 to P6,000 cannot be sustained. The appellate court can
only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised in the brief. The Beltrans did not appeal from that
portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them P3,000 damages.
04 - Hibberd v. Rhode and McMillan (1915) (promissory note for liquor)

Doctrines:
If you are using SCRA, this is the italicized part of the syllabus before the facts.
Also, check the course syllabus for the doctrine/topic your case is under.
As much as possible, do not include facts from the case. This should be a principle which can be applied to a
number of cases.
Facts:
McMillan was engaged in the retail liquor business, and he go a stock of merchandise from Brand & Hibberd
worth P1,200, secured by a promissory note. When McMillan failed to pay, Brand & Hibberd sued him for estafa. Rhode
appeared as defense counsel. According to Rhode, he believed that McMillan was innocent and that the case would not
prosper. Due to an agreement between the parties, Rhode signed the promissory note as an indorser, and Brand & Hibberd
moved to dismiss the case, which was approved.
Afterwards, Brand & Hibberd sought to enforce the promissory note against Rhode and McMillan. Defendants
now interpose the defense that the suit cannot prosper for illegality of consideration. They allege that Rhode signed the
promissory note on the consideration that Brand & Hibberd would prevent or actively assist in preventing the due
investigation of the criminal case by suppressing evidence. However, according to Hibberd, Rhode and McMillan cant
claim that the note is not genuine or was not duly executed because under Sec. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if an
action is based on a written instrument and the complaint is annexed w/ a copy of such instrument, then the genuineness
and due execution of said instrument shall be deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath in the answer.
Issues:
1. W/N Rhode and McMillan can properly raise the defense that the promissory note was not duly executed
2. W/N there was an illegal consideration in the execution of the promissory note so as to make it void
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Court has held before that Sec. 103 is not applicable to an indorsement in a promissory note in a suit
against the maker. It has been held that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of the instrument does
not bar the defense of want of consideration. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a
prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits
which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.
2. NO. The Court held that Brand & Hibbered entered into that agreement in order to better enforce their pecuniary
claim against McMillan. Moreover, the Court held that Rhode, as a lawyer, was able to persuade Brand &
Hibberd that McMillan wasnt criminally liable. The latters agreement to withdraw the criminal case cannot be
interpreted to mean that they agreed to suppress evidence and prevent the due investigation of the case. That
would be stretching it too far.
124 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Central Surety and Insurance Company v. C. N. Hodges (1971)

Doctrine:
Failure to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document generally
implies an admission of the same by the other party. However, such implied admission is deemed waived if the
party asserting the same has allowed the adverse party to present evidence contrary to the contents of such
document without objection.
Facts:
C. N. Hodges sold to Vicente M. Layson 2 lots located in Negros Occidental for the sum of P43,000.90, payable
on installments. While Layson was in the process of paying for said lots, he applied for a loan and now plans to use the
lots as security. So he persuaded Hodges to execute in his favor a Deed of Absolute Sale. Hodges obliged with the
understanding that Layson would put up a surety bond to guarantee the payment of said balance. Accordingly, Layson
executed, in favor of Hodges, a promissory note covering the remaining installments for the payment of the lots and a
surety bond executed by Central Surety Insurance Company through its Manager Mrs. Mesa.
When Layson defaulted in the discharge of his aforesaid obligation, Hodges demanded payment from Layson.
Despite repeated demands, Layson still failed to pay so Hodges filed an action for recovery of money against Layson and
Central Surety in the CFI of Iloilo. In its answer, Central Surety disclaimed liability under the surety bond in question,
upon the ground (a) that the same is null and void, it having been issued by Mrs. Rosita Mesa after her authority had been
withdrawn and (b) that even under her original authority Mrs. Mesa could not issue surety bonds in excess of P8,000
without the approval of Centrals main office. In the course of the trial, Central failed to deny under oath the authenticity
of the copy of the contract Hodges attached to his pleading. Hodges, in his part, did not object to the evidences introduced
by Central Surety proving Mrs. Mesas lack of authority.
The trial court decided in favor of Hodges but limited Central Suretys liability to P8,000 ( Instead of 15,000).
Hodges as well as Central Surety appealed to the CA. Hodges was assailing Centrals limited liability while Central
Surety appealed on the ground that the court erred in making it liable under a void contract. The CA ruled against Central
Surety and ordered them to pay Hodges the full amount of the surety bond. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. W/N Central Surety should be held liable for the full amount of the surety bond.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. (Dapat Yes. Sayang, pero dahil sa katangahan ituloy mo lang ang pagbasa)
There appears to be no showing that the revocation of authority was made known to the public in general by
publication, nor was Hodges notified of such revocation despite the fact that he was a regular client of the firm.
Also, some surety bonds issued by Mrs. Mesa in favor of Hodges after her authority had allegedly been curtailed,
were honored by the Central Surety despite the fact that these were not reported to the main office at the time of
their issuance. In essence, Central Surety ratified the acts of Mrs. Masa, thus they should be liable for the full
amount.
HOWEVER:
Both parties acted in disregard of Sec 8, rule 8 of the ROC which states that: When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the pleading, the genuineness and due execution of
the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets
forth what he claims to be the facts.
Central Surety failed to deny the authenticity of the contract presented by Hodges. Centrals omission to deny it
constitutes an admission of the genuineness and due execution of the document as well as of the agents authority
to bind the defendant. However, despite this implied admission rule, Hodges still presented witnesses to prove the
due execution of the document as well as the agents authority; He also did not object to the defendants evidence
in refutation. Thus the rule should be considered waived.
125 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Since Hodges had neither objected to the evidence introduced by Central Surety in order to prove that Mrs. Mesa
had no authority to issue a surety bond, and took no exception to the admission of said evidence. He must be
deemed to have waived the benefits of the above-mentioned rule and Central Surety cannot be held liable in
excess of the sum of P8,000.
07 - Guevarra v. Eala (2007)

Doctrines:
Respondents denial is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression, which carries with it in
affirmation, or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. (see Beda notes, page 32)
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted.
CivPro Codals (walang sinabi sa case directly na CivPro, so assumption ko lang to - Jay)
Sec. 10. Specific Denial. A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support
his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder
Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than
those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied
Facts:
Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala (a.k.a. Noli Eala, former PBA Commissioner and
sportscaster), for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath.
Guevarra found out that Noli Eala has a relationship with his wife, Irene Moje. He witnessed the exchange of
love texts between the two. He also saw Moje and Eala together in 2 occasions. In the 2nd occasion, he confronted Moje,
to which Moje reacted by leaving their conjugal home. Guevarra later found a letter from Eala addressed to Irene, dated
October 7, 2000, the date of Guevarra and Mojes wedding. And for mushiness sake, I quote:
Not even a piece of paper (Note: referring to the marriage, or as Eala alleged, only to the marriage contract), with the man
you chose to walk down the aisle with will stop me from loving you forever. I LOVE YOU FOREVER AS LONG AS IM
LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE!
Moje also gave birth to a child. And according to the birth certificate, Noli Eala was the father.
In the complaint, Guevarra averred that Eala and Moje FLAUNTED THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP.
Eala in his ANSWER specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship. Their relationship was only
low profile and known only to the immediate members of their families. Also, by referring to the marriage as a mere
piece of paper. So Guevarra, in his complaint, stated that Ealas grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage and degrades the legal profession.
(so basically, Guevarra used the Canons 1.01 (immoral conduct) and 7.03 the disbarments isnt really important since
this is not a case for legal ethics, but for civPro)
Issues:
I.
W/N Atty. Noli Eala should be disbarred? If yes, how come?
126 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Held/Ratio:
I.
Yes. Atty. Noli Eala should be disbarred.

In his answer, Eala specifically denied having ever flaunted his relationship with Moje, their relationship being
only low profile and only known to the immediate members of their respective families. Eala, in his answer,
also described his relationship with Moje as not being under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct. So in effect, Eala admitted that he has a special relationship with Moje. Furthermore, when
the issue on Mojes child was presented, Eala didnt categorically deny that the child was not his.
In other words, Ealas denial is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts
in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression, which carries with it in
affirmation, or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
[Beda Notes Definition: Negative Pregnant is a form of denial, which at the same time involves an affirmative
implication favorable to the opposing party. It is in effect, an admission of the averment to which it is directed. It
is said to be a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to. Under
Section 10, Rule 8, of Beda Notes]
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted. (Perhaps even Section 11, Rule 8 could be applied here)
In this case, there were two instances of negative pregnant, the having flaunted their relationship and Ealas
denial of having personal knowledge of Mojes daughter, as he never denied being the father of the child.
So Eala was disbarred, due to preponderance of evidence, for having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7), and essentially, even the lawyers oath, the constitution, and the Family
Code.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 9 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

01 - Ferrer Family v. Judge Ericta and Pfleider Family (1968) (Ford car accident, prescription)
Doctrine:
The defense of prescription is not waived by mere failure to plead it in the answer or motion to dismiss. The court
shall dismiss the claim if prescription can be ascertained on the face of the pleadings or evidence on the record.
Facts:
This involves a claim for damages arising from a vehicular accident.
On December 30, 1970 (before New Years Eve), in Negros Oriental, Dennis Pfledier who was then 16 years
old, drove the Ford pick-up car owned by his parents. Among the passengers who rode in the Ford car he drove was
Annette Ferrer, also a minor.
Clearly, Dennis did not have a drivers license at that time and so, he did not have proper authority to drive.
Unfortunately, because of his alleged lack of due regard to traffic rules and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent injury to persons or damage to property, the car overturned and Annette suffered physical injuries.
On January 6, 1975, Annettes family filed a case for damages against Dennis and his parents based on Article
2180 of the OLD Civil Code which holds parents solidarily liable for their childs wrongdoing.
An order of default was rendered against the Pflediers for failure to appear in court. Both In their motion to set
aside order of default and in their subsequent motion for reconsideration when this motion was denied, the Pflediers never
raised the defense of prescription. Nonetheless, the judge rendered a judgment freeing them of liability.
Issue:
1. W/N the defense of prescription was deemed waived by the respondent Pfleiders failure to plead prescription in
their motions
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The court shall dismiss the claim if prescription can be ascertained on the face of the pleadings or evidence on
the record.
In this case, Article 1146 of the Civil Code applies: actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of
a tort must be filed within four years. The four year-period started on December 30, 1970. The action for damages
was filed long after the four-year period.
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02 - Garcia v. Mathis (1980)

Doctrines:
An action will not be held to have prescribed if prescription is not expressly invoked. However an exception to
this rule is when the plaintiffs own allegations in his complaint show clearly that the action has prescribed.
Facts:
In Civil Case No. D-4097 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Sulpicio Garcia, sued Colonel Paul C.
Mathis in his capacity as Base Commander, CAFB, acting for and in behalf of the United States of America. Garcia
alleged that he was a civilian employee at Clark Air Force Base from May 26, 1949, to August 23, 1956, when he was
dismissed for alleged bribery and collusion. He prayed that he be reinstated to his former position, and paid back
wages, moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit.
Defendant Mathis entered a special appearance and filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint upon the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person because he was being sued as the representative of a
foreign sovereign.
The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription. The plaintiff was terminated in 1956 while the
complaint was filed in 1977.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription which the defendant did not raise in any of his
pleadings.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. An action will not be held to have prescribed if prescription is not expressly invoked. However an
exception to this rule is when the plaintiffs own allegations in his complaint show clearly that the action
has prescribed. In this case the complaint shows clearly that the plaintiffs action had prescribed for he alleged
that he was removed on August 23, 1956 (par. 5) but the case was filed only on November 18, 1977, after a lapse
of more than 21 years. Therefore, the defense of jurisdiction which is apparently meritorious, the complaint was
properly dismissed.
Because of the special appearance which the defendant had entered, he was constrained to confine himself to
showing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his person and had to exclude all other nonjurisdictional grounds in his motion to dismiss otherwise he could be deemed to have abandoned his special
appearance and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
03 - Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago (see Case #4, Rule 5 & 6)
129 of 277
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04 - Sps. Ponciano v. Judge Parentela (2000) (Compulsory Counterclaim, No Certificate)

Doctrine:
Administrative Circular 04-94, requiring an affidavit of non-forum shopping for all initiatory pleadings in
court, does not apply to compulsory counterclaims, which are not initiatory in nature.
Facts:
Private respondents, Sps. Clamosa, filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Sps. Ponciano for
unpaid costs of labor and materials. The Poncianos filed their compulsory counterclaim and asserted that they be paid
the amounts prayed for. Sps. Clamosa prayed that the counterclaim be stricken off the record because it was not
accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping pursuant to AC 04-94 which required the certificate for all
initiatory pleadings. The court granted the prayer. The Poncianos filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the
counterclaim was compulsory therefore it is not an initiatory pleading, but Judge Parentala denied the same.
The Poncianos then filed with the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The SC denied the petition
stating that, in issuing the said circular, the court did not distinguish between permissive and compulsory counterclaims,
and we need not make a distinction in this regard as well. They held that there was nothing wrong with Judge
Parentalas order to remove the counterclaim from the records.
The Poncianos were left with no other choice but to file an Amended Compulsory Counterclaim with an
attached certificate of non-forum shopping. Judge Parentala did not accept the amended counterclaim stating that the
SCs dismissal was with prejudice to the filing an amended complaint.
The Poncianos are now asking the the SC to rule that the dismissal of their previous certiorari action by the SC is
without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint.
Issues:
1. W/N a certificate of non-forum shopping is required for compulsory counterclaims.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The circular provides that
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the
original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
In interpreting this provision, the SC held in the case of Sto. Tomas Hospital that the language of the circular
distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a
party asserting a claim for relief. It does not include claims which cannot be independently set-up.
Compulsory counterclaims are claims which must necessarily be asserted in the same case, which would be
barred in the future if not set up. The counterclaim in question is, no doubt, compulsory in nature. Petitioners
need not file a certification of non-forum shopping since their claims are not initiatory in character.
05 - Gojo v. Goyola (see Case #5, Rule 5 & 6)
130 of 277
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06 - Meliton v. CA (1992) (contract of lease; kitchenette; re-filed counterclaim)

Doctrines:
A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.
Where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be dismissed on the ground of (1)
litis pendentia or (2) res judicata, depending on the status of the other suit.
There is no need to pay docket fees for compulsory counterclaims.
Facts:
Nelia Ziga filed a complaint in the RTC of Naga City against Lydia Meliton for rescission of a contract of lease
over a parcel of land alleging that Meliton, as lessee, failed to deposit the one month rental and to pay the monthly rentals
due; that she constructed a concrete wall and roof on the site of a demolished house on the leased premises without Zigas
written consent; and sublet the property to a third party without authority. Meliton filed an answer and set up three
counterclaims: (1) for recovery of the value of her kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was
demolished by Ziga; (2) the value of the improvements introduced to the kitchenette; and (3) the value of furniture and
fixtures purchased for use in the kitchenette. She also prayed for moral damages and attorneys fees.
On May 29, 1989, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had already become moot and
academic by the expiration of the lease contract (remember that the complaint was for rescission). The counterclaims of
Meliton were also dismissed for nonpayment of the docket fees and therefore, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the same.
On December 6, 1989, Meliton filed a complaint against Ziga for recovery of the same amounts involved and
alleged in the counterclaims (in the first case). Ziga filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment. The court denied the motion to dismiss. The CA reversed.
Issues:
1. W/N the counterclaims of Meliton are compulsory in nature. (important because according to Rule 9 Sec. 2 - A
compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.)
2. W/N Meliton is already barred from asserting the dismissed counterclaims in another action.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Melitons counterclaim is compulsory in nature.
Rule 9 Sec. 4 of ROC (now Rule 6 Sec. 7) - A counterclaim is compulsory if
(a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the opposing partys claim;
(b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and
(c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The test in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive is the logical relationship between
the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaimwhere conducting separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they
involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues.
In this case, both the claims arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as
well as their potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation. Melitons right to claim
damages for the unlawful demolition of the improvements they introduced on the land was based on their right of
possession under the contract of lease which is precisely the very same contract sought to be rescinded by Ziga in
her complaint.
131 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2. NO. Meliton is not barred from filing a separate suit.

The rule that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred is not applicable in this case.
(a.) It cannot be said that Meliton failed to fully interpose his causes of action as counterclaims in the previous
action. The counterclaims were duly set up in the prior case but the same were dismissed by reason of
nonpayment of docket fees.
(b.) Where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be dismissed on the ground of
litis pendentia or on the ground of res judicata, depending on the status of the other suit.
In this case, there is no litis pendentia as there is no other pending action between the same parties and for the
same cause.
Also, the case cannot be dismissed because of res judicata since one of the requisites is that the judgment must be
on the meritswhich was not met here. A dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction does not constitute res
judicata, there having been no consideration and adjudication of the case on the merits.
(c.) Even assuming that the bar under the rule on compulsory counterclaims may be invoked, the peculiar
circumstances of this case warrant the relaxation of such rule.
The trial court dismissed the counterclaims for nonpayment of docket fees pursuant to the ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. The ruling in Manchester applies specifically to
permissive counterclaims only. Under the Rules, there is no need to pay docket fees for compulsory
counterclaims. Melitons failure to seek reconsideration of or to appeal the order of dismissal of the counterclaim
should not prejudice his right to file his claims in a separate action as he was made to believe in the order of
dismissal that the counterclaims were merely permissive and could be the subject of a separate and independent
action.
The case was REINSTATED and the RTC was ordered to proceed in the adjudication thereof.
132 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
07 - Korea Technologies Co Ltd v. Hon. Alberto Lerma and Pacific Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(2008)
Facts:
Petitioner: Korea Technologies Co Ltd (Kogies)
Respondents: Hon. Alberto Lerma and Pacific Steel Manufacturing Corporation (PGSMC)
Petitioner Korea is a Korean corporation which is engaged in the supply and installation of LPG Cylinder
manufacturing plants, while private respondent is a domestic corporation. The parties executed a contract in the
Philippines whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The parties
executed in Korea an Amendment of the Contract regarding the terms of payment.
However, gleaned from the Certificate executed by the parties after the installation of the plant, the initial
operation could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus
forcing the parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and conditions of
the contract. For the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the installation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMC
issued two postdated checks.
When KOGIES deposited the checks, they were dishonored. KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC threatening
to file a case for BP22. The wife of PGSMCs President faxed a letter to KOGIES President complaining that KOGIES
delivered a different brand of hydraulic press and did not deliver several equipment parts.
PGSMC informed KOGIES that it will be cancelling their contract on grounds of alteration in the quantity and
lowered quality of the machineries. PGSMC filed an Affidavit-Complaint for Estafa against the President of Kogies.
KOGIES informed PGSMC that the latter could not unilaterally rescind the contract. It also insisted that the disputes
should be settled by arbitration pursuant to the contract. KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before the
Korean Commercial Arbitration Board pursuant to Art 15 of the Contract.
KOGIES also filed a complaint for specific performance before the Muntinlupa RTC. KOGIES averred that
PGSMC violated Art. 1510 of their Contract by unilaterally rescinding the contract without resorting to arbitration.
PGSMC filed an opposition to the TRO arguing that KOGIES was not entitled to the TRO since Art. 15, the
arbitration clause, was null and void for being against public policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction over the
instant controversy. The RTC issued an Order denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning that
PGSMC had paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000, the value of the machineries and equipment as shown in the contract such
that KOGIES no longer had proprietary rights over them. And finally, the RTC held that Art. 15 of the Contract as
amended was invalid as it tended to oust the trial court or any other court jurisdiction over any dispute that may arise
between the parties. Later, the trial court issued an Order (1) granting PGSMCs motion for inspection; (2) denying
KOGIES MR of the July 23, 1998 RTC Order; and (3) denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory
counterclaims as these counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
KOGIES filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying that PGSMC be enjoined from dismantling the
machineries and that the RTC enforce the specific agreement on arbitration to resolve the dispute.
The CA affirmed the RTC Orders and dismissed the petition. On the issue of the validity of the arbitration clause,
the CA agreed with the lower court that an arbitration clause which provided for a final determination of the legal rights of
the parties to the contract by arbitration was against public policy.
Issue:
1. W/N PGSMCs counterclaims to be all compulsory not necessitating to payment of docket fees and certification
of non-forum shopping
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Kogies argus that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a
certificate of non-forum shopping, and that is failure to do so was a fatal defect. However, the counterclaims of
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance with Sec. 8 Rule 11 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim
was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim that a
defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.
At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against Kogies, it was not liable to pay filing
fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. However, effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule
141 as amended by A.M. No. 04-204-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or
cross claims.
As to failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMCs Answer is not an initiatory pleading which
requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It
is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts did not commit reversible error in denying Kogies motion to dismiss
PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims.
Note: Since there is no mention of Rule 9 in the case, I think this case is relevant to Sec. 2, A compulsory
counterclaim, or a cross claim, not set up shall be barred. Or I could be wrong haha.
134 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
08 - Baclayon v. Court of Appeals (1990) (party-in-interest, legal personality, substantial interest)

Doctrines:
Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for
reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure
by the private respondents to set it up bars their right to raise it in a subsequent litigation
Facts:
There were 3 filed cases/motions (recovery of ownership, execution, writ of possession)
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
In 1969, Baclayon and Abellare filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession and damages against
spouses Bacalso and Sabandeja of a lot of the Cebu Cadastre. (Bacalso Baclayon Baclayon)
RTC (1982): Winner: Bacalso
CA (1986): REVERSED - declared Baclayon as heirs of the late Matias Baclayon the owners
SC (1987): Petition For Review DENIED (so winner parin si Baclayon).
Thus, the decision in favor of the petitioners having become final and executory, petitioners filed a motion for
execution of judgment and possession which was opposed by the private respondents (ayaw parin sumuko nina
Bacalso). The opposition was based on the pronouncement of the respondent court in its decision dated July 29, 1986, to
wit:
Property Topic: No fraud or bad faith could be imputed on the part of the Bacalso spouses. They believed the lot they
bought from Segundo Baclayon was the land they occupied. The private respondents argued that since they were found by
the respondent court as builders and/or planters in good faith and Article 546 of the Civil Code ordains that the necessary
and useful expenses for the improvements must be paid to the builders/planters in good faith with right of retention, a
reception of evidence to determine the correct value of the necessary and useful improvements must be done first before
ordering the execution.
MOTION FOR EXECUTION - MARCH 8, 1988 ORDER
RTC of Cebu (March 8, 1988) granted the motion for execution of judgment and possession.
Again, Bacalso appealed this order but still dismissed by Judge Lee.
MOTION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION AND DEMOLITION AUGUST 19, 1988
On April 29, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for writ of possession and demolition to which motion the
private respondents filed their opposition reiterating the ground in the opposition to the motion for execution
and possession.
AUGUST 19, 1988: Judge Lee issued the order
On September 19, 1988, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the
respondent court concerning the orders dated March 8, 1988 and August 19, 1988 (hindi talaga susuko sina Bacalso).
On April 28, 1989, CA granted the petition (si BACALSO naman ang winner now and allowed pa to present
evidences).
Order March 8 and August 19 set aside and annulled
There will be a hearing supplementary to execution.
The Court is ordered to receive petitioners evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the
improvements and the valude of the said improvements introduced by them
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Petitioners allege that the orders dated March 8, 1988 and August 19, 1988 are legitimate having been issued by a
judge presiding a court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant to his duties which are ministerial in nature, to enforce a
decision which is already final and executory.
Issues:
1. W/N the private respondents should be allowed, in a hearing supplementary to execution, to present evidence to
prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements.
2. W/N the private respondents can still file a separate complaint against the petitioners on the ground that they are
builders in good faith and consequently, recover the value of the improvements introduced by them on the subject
lot. (Rule 9 issue)
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. For this issue, the court cited 2 cases9 Naga Dev Corp. v. CA and Vda. De Chi v. Tanada (Sir might ask,
check footnote). The rule is well established that once a decision has become final and executory the only
jurisdiction left with the trial court is to order its execution. To require now the trial court in a hearing
supplementary to execution, to receive private respondents evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith
of the improvements and the value of said Improvements, is to disturb a final executory decision; which may
even cause its substantial amendment. It appears that the private respondents opposition to the motion for the
execution of the judgment, possession and demolition is their last straw to prevent the satisfaction of the
judgment. Sad to say, We have to cut this straw.
We disagree with the respondent court that any counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the improvements
thereon by reason of private respondents being builders in good faith, which presupposes that they are not the
owners of the land, would run counter to the defense of ownership and therefore could not have been set up before
the trial court. It should be emphasized that Rule 8, Section 2 of the Rules of Court allows a party to set forth two
or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or
in separate causes of action or defenses. (Rule 8 topic but this case is under Rule 9)
2. NO. Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for
reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure
by the private respondents to set it up bars their right to raise it in a subsequent litigation (Rule 9, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court I think this is based from the old Rules of Cour,t because now, no Section 4 anymore this
is Sec. 2 of the current ROC). The rule on compulsory counterclaim is designed to enable the disposition of the
whole controversy at one time and in one action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits.
(Si BACLAYON na ang ultimate winner)
SEPARATE OPINION
NARVASA: In the case at bar, the defendants should have alleged their status as builders in good faith with respect to the
land in dispute and presented evidence thereon during the original proceedings in the RTC. Assuming they were
precluded from doing so by some insuperable cause, they should have in the appellate proceedings, or after being
declared to be builders in good faith by the judgment of the CA and before it became final sought leave to present
proof of the value of the necessary and useful expenses put up by them on the land in line with Article 546 of the Civil
Code. To offer to do so after the judgment had become executory and been remanded to the Trial Court for enforcement,
is much too late. The law no longer affords them any other remedy, not even the filing of a separate suit for the
purpose, as suggested by the Trial Court, because the subject of that separate action had been, or should have been

9.
The aforementioned reliance on these two cases was misplaced. The common denominator between these two cases is the existence of a
defense/claim which has been raised/tried before the trial court. In the Naga case, the defense of payments made to Pacific which are properly
deductible from the principal sum ordered to be paid by Naga to Pacific was part of the issues which Naga was not allowed to prove, being
already in default. In the Vda. de Chi case, her claim of hospitalization expenses incurred in the respondent hospital has been litigated and
adjudged. The respondent court failed to appreciate that this shared denominator does not obtain in the present case. The defense of builders in
good faith of the improvements and evidence of the value of said improvements were not raised/ presented before the trial court.
136 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the original suit (alternatively to the defense of ownership [Sec. 2, Rule 8,
Rules of Court]) and not having been so set up, became forever barred (Sec. 4, Rule 9, Rules of Court).
09 - Cavili v. Florendo (1987) (Negros action for partition)

Doctrines:
An order of default cannot prevent a person from participating in trial as a witness.
Facts:
This is a controversy between the Cavilis (Perfecta, Quirino, Primitivo v. Clarita, Ulpiano, Estrella, Placida) of
Negros over real property left by the late Bernardo Cavili.
Clarita, et al. filed a case for Partition, Accounting, and Damages against Perfecta, et al. Summons were issued by
the trial court. The process server went back and reported a failure to contact Quirino and Primitivo. On her part, Perfecta
said that her brothers were in Negros Occidental (the case was filed in Negros Oriental). Atty. Alamino, counsel for
Perfecta, et al., moved for an extension to file an answer with the assurance that Perfecta will notify her brothers regarding
the summons. The answer was not filed within the extension given. Perfecta and her brothers were declared in default on
the motion of Clarita, et al and a judgment by default was promulgated.
Perfecta, et al. moved for a new trial on the basis of a written agreement of partition previously executed by the
parties predecessors who were the direct descendants of the late Bernardo Cavili. Said motion was granted. The case was
re-raffled to another court, where the order granting the new trial was set aside and the judgment by default was restored.
Thereafter, Perfecta, et al. filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The petition was granted and an
order to proceed with the trial was issued. This time the case went to the sala of respondent Judge Florendo (Note that by
this time, the case had passed through 2 trial courts and the Supreme Court. Recap: Trial Court 1 where the case was
originally filed and where Perfecta, et al. were declared in default, Trial Court 2 where the order granting the motion
for new trial was set aside and where the judgment by default issued by Trial Court 1 was revived.). Perfecta was
presented as the first witness. The adverse party moved that she be barred from the witness stand as she already lost her
standing when she had been declared in default. The motion was granted.
Issues:
1. W/N Perfecta was rightfully disqualified from testifying as witness
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, she can still participate in the proceedings as a witness.
An order of default operates as a forfeiture of the right to take part in the trial as a party litigant. However, it does
not render a person incapacitated so as to disqualify him or her as a witness. In this case, Perfecta, who acted as
the sole possessor and administrator of the property in dispute, holds valuable information crucial to the resolution
of this controversy. Her brothers cannot be deprived of the right to adduce evidence in their defense.
[It seems that the only person affected by the order of default was Perfecta. The reason for this may be an earlier
manifestation by Atty. Alamino to the effect that he was only acting on behalf of Perfecta as he had not met Primitivo and
Quirino.]
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
10 - Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank (2006) (order of default)

Doctrines:
Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence
offered and the facts proven by the presenting party.
Facts:
Danilo Chua obtained a loan from Traders Royal Bank (TRB). It was secured by a real mortgage on a parcel of
land owned in common by the Gajudos. Chua failed to pay the loan so TRB commenced extrajudicial proceedings on the
property. The Sheriff eventually sold the property to the highest bidder, TRB. Chua questioned the validity of the sale, so
he and the Gajudos filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure
and sale and prayer for damages and issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Chua contends that the sale was
made without his knowledge and that the price was unconscionably low. He also asserted that after the expiration of the
redemption period, he offered to buy back the property and TRB agreed so they had the right to purchase the property
through conventional redemption.
TRB filed an answer with counterclaim. After months of trial, a big fire happened in the QC City Hall and
destroyed the records. After reconstitution of the records, Chua found out that the property was already sold to Ceroferr
Realty and that the notice of lis pendens was canceled. Thus, Chua re-filed the complaint and included Ceroferr as
defendant and included an additional cause of action (TRB conspired with Ceroferr). Summons was then served on TRB.
A year after, Chua filed a motion to set pretrial but it was denied because TRB had not yet filed its answer. Chua said that
he received the answer of TRB and it was already attached to the motion. It turned out that TRB had really filed an
answer. However it was actually for another pending civil case.
So Chua filed a motion to declare TRB in default because no answer was filed. An order of default was issued
by the RTC and Chua was allowed to present evidence ex parte, under Rule 9 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. The RTC
rendered a partial decision and ordered TRB to pay damages. TRB filed a motion to set aside the partial decision and
admitted that the erroneous filing of the answer was due to the honest mistake of the typist and the counsel. The Court of
Appeals favored TRB and set aside the partial decision on the ground that the foreclosure did not violate any
procedure and that Chua failed to present evidence to prove that TRB agreed to sell the property back to them. The CA
ruled that even if TRB is declared in default, Chua should still establish his claim for damages by preponderance of
evidence under Section 1, Rule 133.
Issues:
1. W/N the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 1, Rule 133 instead of Section 3, Rule 9
2.
W/N the Court of Appeals failed to apply the conventional redemption rule provided for under Article 1601 of
the Civil Code
3. W/N damages should be awarded to the complainants

Held/Ratio:
1. NO. There is no incompatibility between the two rules. Section 3, Rule 9 provides for the procedure when a
defendant is declared in default while Section 1, Rule 133 talks about preponderance of evidence. In reconciling
the two provisions, it must be remembered that in civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of evidence. Even if the defendant TRB is declared in
default, it does not automatically entitle the complainants to the reliefs prayed for. Not in every case of default by
the defendant is the complainant entitled to win automatically. Evidence should still be presented and the facts
must first be proven before the court renders judgment. Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of
rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in court. While complainants were allowed to
present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims
for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133.
138 of 277
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2. NO. Two requisites must concur before conventional redemption may occur: 1) voluntary agreement of the
parties to extend the redemption period; and 2) the debtors commitment to pay the redemption price on a fixed
date.
The letters presented in court clearly show the absence of any agreement between Chua and TRB. The letter sent
by Chua regarding the purchase of the property was a mere offer that was refused by TRB. As indicated in TRBs
reply to Chua, it denied the offer of purchase due to the lapse of the 1-year redemption period. Also, there was no
showing that Chua had committed to pay the redemption price on a fixed date.
3. NO. The evidence presented by the petitioners did not support the grant of damages. As mentioned above, the
repurchase agreement was not proven. Also, petitioners were not deprived of their property without just cause
because personal notice to the mortgagor regarding the foreclosure is not required.
11 - Pascua v. Florendo (1985)

Facts:
Jordan and Magdalena Dumadag have five children (Alberto, Alejandra, Crispina, Martin and Sotera). The
children acquired 1.02 hectares of land located at Dacalafugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan. However, they soon discovered
that their brother, Martin, sold the property to Clemente Castro. The siblings went to the Agrarian office in Tuguegarao to
complain about the sale of the property. Castro showed them a copy of the deed of sale. Alberto Pascua (one of the
siblings) claimed that the signature on the deed of sale was not his and that he and his siblings never consented to the sale
of the land. Alberto and Sotera claim that they have been deprived of the fruits of the land for more than twenty years.
Pascua, et al. filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against the Castros. Instead of filing an answer,
the Castros filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complains failed to state a cause of action and that it was
already barred by the statute of limitations.
The CFI ruled that even if Martin Pascua committed fraud when he sold the entire property to the Castros, the
claim will not prosper because it has long prescribed. Martin could only sell 1/5 of the property. However, the action for
relief on the ground of fraud prescribed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In this case, the complaint was
filed 22 years after the execution of the deed of sale. The Pascuas appealed to the SC.
Issues:
1. W/N relief may be automatically granted to plaintiffs in the event defendants are declared in default.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
Pascua, et al. claims that the CFI must grant the relief prayed for in the complaint. They based their allegations on
the summons issued, which state: ... if you fail to appear within the time aforesaid, the plaintiff will take
judgment against you by default and demand from this Court the relief applied for in said complaint. ... They
further support their claim with the provision under Rule 18, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Sec. X).
However, neither summons nor the rule provide that Pascua, et al. are automatically entitled to the relief prayed
for in the even respondents are declared in default.
To grant favorable relief, they court must consider the evidence offered and facts presented. Otherwise, it will be
tantamount to a violation of the Rules of Court and due process clause. It does not mean that once a party is
declared in default that the relief asked for by the non-defaulting party will be automatically granted. Further, if
evidence presented is insufficient to justify a judgment, then the complaint must be dismissed. If an unfavorable
judgment should be justifiable, then it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in
the complaint.
In this case, the evidence presented warrants the dismissal of the complaint. It has already prescribed.
139 of 277
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12 - Laus v. CA (1993)
Doctrines:
The period for filing of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the defendants person does
not commence to run until defendant voluntarily submits to courts jurisdiction. (from the case syllabus)
Facts:
Torres alleges that Laus executed a promissory note in favor of him under which Laus promises to pay Torres
P66,000 after 3 months. However, only P11,000 was paid after maturity and despite the repeated demands. Thus, he filed
this complaint for the collection of a sum of money.
On October 10, 1989, the deputy sheriff proceeded to Laus home (122 Molave Par Subdivision, Paraaque) to
serve the summon and a copy of the complaint. However, after waiting for Laus for 10 minutes, he resorted to substituted
service (because of failure to serve the summons personally) through Josephine Areola, who purportedly represented
herself to be the maid of Laus.
The petitioners did not file any answer so through an order issued on December 29, 1989, Laus was declared in
default and the ex parte presentation of evidence by Torres was set on January 16, 1990. However, Laus claimed that they
received this Order only on January 22, 1990.
The RTC rendered a judgment by default against Laus and ordered him to pay the remaining balance of his debt
plus interest. Before receiving a copy of this decision, Laus filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over
their persons. They allege that the service of summons was ineffective because it was not indicated in the return that the
sheriff had first exerted efforts to serve the same personally before resorting to substituted service.
The motion was dismissed and a writ of execution was issued. They filed an MR reiterating there contentions and
further stating that Areola is not related to Laus, that she is only a guest of their maid and that she was only 11 or 12 years
old at that time the summons were served. The MR was denied, so as the petition for certiorari with the CA. Ground: Rule
16, Section 1a a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants is
proper only when made within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading and before such responsive
pleading is filed. The motion to dismiss in this case was filed 5 months after the complaint was filed and only after a
default judgment had already been rendered by the Court. And, even if the motion to dismiss was filed on time, and yet,
was still denied by the Court, the order of the court denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be a subject
of a petition for certiorari. The denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a petition for certiorari, which is an
extraordinary writ that is not allowed as a substitute for ordinary appeal.
Issues:
1. W/N the Court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners by virtue of the substituted summons (important so that
we will know when the prescriptive period for filing an MD will start)
2. MAIN ISSUE: W/N the motion to dismiss was filed on time
Held/Ratio:
1. No. As a general rule, summons must be personally served to defendants by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him (Rule 14, Section 7). However if this
cannot be effected within a reasonable time, a substituted service may be resorted to10. A perusal of the sheriffs
return in this case reveals that it does not (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
time; (b) specific the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners; and (c) state that it was served on a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing therein. (Kasi nga nag-substituted service sya after 10 minutes of waiting
tapos sa isang bata na hindi nya talaga alam kung nakatira dun sa bahay na un.)

10.
RULE 14, SECTION 8. Substituted Service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
140 of 277
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2. Yes. If a defendant has not been properly summoned, the period to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
over his person does not commence to run until he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court, since the
court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy as to him until such time. In this case, Laus did not
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, the period to file a responsive pleading did not
even commence to run. Also, although the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a petition for
certiorari, this rule admits exception such in the case when the trial court clearly acted outside of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss (as in the case).
13 - Philippine British v. Judge de los Angeles (1975) (late Answer despite Holy Week)
Doctrines:
Section 3(b) Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on declaration of default provides: Relief from order of
default. - A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
Facts:
A fire broke out in the premises of respondent Moises Tapia in Quezon City in 1970. Being holders of fire
insurance policies from various insurers, among whom were petitioners Philippine British Co. (British) and Cibeles
Insurance Corp. (Cibeles). Having failed to secure extrajudicial settlement of their claims, Tapia filed corresponding civil
actions in the CFI of Quezon City. All the cases were assigned to Judge de los Angeles. The proper summons were served
to both British and Cibeles (insurers). Their answers were due April 13 and 17 [year of 1971], respectively.
On April 13, 1971, Atty. Alfonso Felix, counsel for British, filed by mail a motion asking for fifteen (15) days
extension of its time to answer, claiming that due to the intervening Holy Week and pressure of other works [sic], he
would be unable to prepare his answer within the reglementary period. He was granted only five (5) days ending April 19.
Both British and Cibeles filed [which means mailed by registered service] their joint answers on April 22, 1971
[obviously, they were both late]. On April 24, Tapia filed that they be declared in default, which the court granted.
Evidence was received from April 26-28. Judgment was rendered against the insurers on April 28.
Meanwhile, the aforestated answers of the insurers (those which were mailed on April 22) arrived and were
received by the court on April 28. On May 26, 1971, Atty Felix filed a motion to lift order of default which was
unverified and unaccompanied by any affidavit of merit.
According to Atty. Felix, the motion to set aside the Order of Default could not be heard on June 1 the day on
which it was set for hearing for the reason that that day had been declared a public holiday, undersigned counsel went to
respondent court the next day, June 2, 1971, consulted the expedients [this means records] and seeing respondent Judge de
los Angeles showed him a copy of the Joint Motion Annex D to lift the Order of Default. Judge de los Angeles after
reading in the presence of undersigned counsel that Joint Motion Annex D asked him to set it for hearing anew and told
him that it was always his practice to give parties a chance to present evidence. [parang na-1-2-3 si Judge dito, imo]
Thus, on June 10, 1971, a notice was received by Atty. Felix, Jr. Advising him that the motion had been set for
hearing on June 30, 1971, but on June 22, 1971, Judge de los Angeles issued an order cancelling this notice for the reason
that for failure of defendants in the above-entitled cases to comply with the requirement imposed by Section 3 of
Rule 18 [of Old Rules of Court; now Section 3 of Rule 9]. On July 1, insurers filed a petition for relief of judgment before
the lower court. On July 2, insurers filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the
decision in the default proceedings. The SC gave due course to the petition because it presented a situation x x x strongly
hinting of possible irregularities x x x.
Issues:
1. W/N the motion to set aside order of default should be granted.
141 of 277
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Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The filing of a motion to set aside must comply with the requirements of under the provision Section 3 Rule
18. Considering, therefore, that counsels joint motion to lift the order of default in the subject cases did not
comply with Section 3 of Rule 18, there is no justification at all for his gripe that he was declared in default,
and thus was not entitled to be notified of further proceedings.
Facts show the answer was filed out of time. The court records support such fact. Even his own secretary testifies
to the facts that support such. So also with the messengers who delivered them. Also, Atty. Felix suggests that he
was not given enough time, considering that there was the Holy Week to take into account, but Judge delos
Angeles ruled that precisely, counsel would have more time because of the holidays, to which the SC agrees.
As to the alleged directive of respondent judge to him to have the hearing of his said motion reset because it is the
judges practice to give parties a chance to present evidence, the SC takes it, however, that seemingly what
happened then must have been that the Judge was just trying to figure out how counsel could be helped out of his
self-imposed predicament, but, evidently, upon further reflection, he must have realized the legal obstacles on the
way and consequently found no alternative than to rule that the motion to lift did not have to be reset for hearing
anymore.
Besides, [the old] Section 3 Rule 18 expressly provides that motions to lift orders of default may be filed only
before judgment, and petitioners joint motion was filed only on May 26, 1971, whereas the judgments in
question were rendered on April 28, 1971.
As to the allegations of irregularity in the proceeding, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. Atty. Felix has not overturned such presumption. No evidence was proved of any irregularity in the
performance of the courts duties. [Daming evidence diniscuss sa case. For example, may allegation of fraud and
arson by Tapia. Pero may evidence din na wala naman talaga. Even Atty. Felix wrote at one time to British
advising them that the case is far from strong. But the court held that it cannot begrudge any lawyer of his
right to be assiduous and zealous, even tenacious, in the prosecution or defense of the cause of his client. Basta
yan ang conclusion. No proof of fraud.] Thus, the SC dismissed the petition.
142 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
14 - De Guia v. De Guia (2001)

Doctrines:
Pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandated separate service of the notice of pre-trial upon the parties and
their lawyers. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void and the judgement therein cant acquire
finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

o
Sec 3, Rule 18 notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, who is charged with the duty of notifying
the client
(in relation to Rule 9: Pleadings and Practice I think. Mmmm) There is no need to attach an affidavit of merit
to the Motion to Lift Order of Default where the defences of the party had been set out in his Answer
(NOTE: Sec 1, Rule 9 of Rules of Court - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived.)
Facts:
(The Decision was rendered in 2001 but the Court based their decision on the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
This case involves another family dispute over inheritance. In this case, Group 1 De Guia (Mariano, Apolonia,
Tomasa) filed a complaint against Group 2 De Guia ( Ciriaco , Leon, Victorina and Pablo) for the partition of real
properties which they all inherited from their ancestors. The case arose from the refusal of the defendants De Guia to have
the properties subdivided among them. Copies of notice for pre-trial conference were sent by registered mail to parties and
their counsel. Both, however, failed to attend the pre-trial conference and so upon plaintiffs motion the defendants were
declared in default. With this, the defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration wherein they explained that they only
received the Notice of Pre-trial only in the afternoon of the date for Pre-trial (June 18,1992 at 8:30am). Note that the
defendants counsel received its copy on June 17, 1992. The plaintiffs De Guia opposed the motion claiming that
defendants De Guia failed to support their Motion with an affidavit of merit.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered the partition of the said lands. The CA reversed the
decision of RTC declaring that the Notice of Pre-trial was not properly served to the defendants De Guia. The CA ordered
for the case to be remanded back to the RTC.
Issue:
1. W/N the Notice of Pre-trial was properly served to the defendants De Guia
2. W/N the lack of affidavit of merit renders Motion to Lift the Order of Default pro forma
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The events happened in 1992 before the passing of 1997 Rules of Court, thus in this case the Court based
their decision in the pre-1997 Rules of Court. According to the pre-1997 Rules of Court, notice of pre-trial
must be separately served upon the parties and their lawyers. If ever it is served only to the counsel, the notice
must expressly direct him to inform the client. In this case, there is no such direction to the counsel, thus the
receipt of the notice by the lawyer alone is incomplete. With this, the failure of service to defendants De Guia
renders the proceedings void.
2. NO. In this case the Court held that there was no need to attach an affidavit of merit to the Motion because the
defences of defendants De Guia were already stated in their Answer. With this the Court sustained the
decision of the CA to remand the case to the trial court.
143 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
15 - Lina v. CA (1985) (motion for extension denied)

Doctrines:
The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Facts:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the respondent judge in a collection suit instituted by Northern
Motors Inc against Alex Lina.
Northern Motors filed a case for sum of money with damages in the CFI of Rizal. Lina was served with the
summons, but he didnt file an answer or motion to dismiss so Northern Motors filed a motion to declare him in default.
But Lina countered this by pointing out that he has already filed a motion for extension of time within the reglementary
period.
But the judge declared Lina in default and rendered a decision in favor of Motors. Hence this petition for
certiorariwhich was denied on the ground that Lina did not file an answer within the reglementary period and so there
was actually a valid ground for the motion. Also, the court deemed that when Lina was declared in default, that the motion
to file for an extension was actually taken into consideration and that it was denied by the court.
Issues:
1. W/N the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to
adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective law, the defense should
never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second request for extension to file an answer,
the appellate courts will grant relief.
In this case, it was two days before the expiration of the 15day period to file the pleading when the petition
moved for an extension of the twenty days from the 15th day from which to file his answer. Under the rules
of court, the remedies of the defendant should be:
a. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3,
Rule 18)
b. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of
Rule 37;
c. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
But Lina did not avail himself of the above remedies, rather, he went to the appellate court on certiorari. Thus, the
court dismissed his petition.
Separate Opinion by Justice Melencio-Herrera:
Clearly, petitioners Motion for extension to file Answer was already before the Court when it declared
petitioner in default. What is more, the Answer had already been filed within the extended period requested when
judgment by default was rendered. It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that cases should be resolved on the
144 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
merits rather than on technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities
Respondent Trial Court should have resolved the Motion for Extension before declaring petitioner in
default.
16 - Torres v. CA (see Case #7, Rule 5 & 6)

17 - Lorbes v. CA (see Case #7, Rule 2)
145 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 10 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

01 - Paeste and Carpio v. Jaurigue (1953)
Doctrine:
A party may still file his amended complaint (even though the original complaint has already been dismissed) as
long as the judgment is still not rendered final
In cases involving force and intimidation, prescription will not run until the threat has ceased and the aggrieved
party is absolutely free to go to court.
Facts:
This case was brought to the CFI of Quezon, praying for the annulment of two documents allegedly obtained and
signed through the use of force and intimidation. The first document is an affidavit signed by Carpio, certifying that his
father, Felix Carpio, was indebted to Jaurigue in the sum of P3900 and that the former had agreed to execute a deed
conveying 4 hectares of coconut land by way of sale with pacto de retro to the latter. The other document was a deed
executed by Felix Carpio on May 3, 1945, conveying to defendant, by way of sale with pacto de retro, a piece of land in
barrio Ilayang Rizal, Unisan, Tayabas, for the sum of P1,000. The CFI dismissed the case on the grounds that the action
had already prescribed since under Article 1391 of the new Civil Code, an action for nullity in cases of intimidation or
duress must be brought within 4 years from the date the cause of action accrued.
Paeste and Carpio filed a motion for reconsideration by way of an amended complaint but the same was denied.
The two elevated the case to the Supreme Court, alleging that the appeal involves a purely legal question. They contended
that the lower court erred in not admitting their amended complaint and in holding that their action had already prescribed.
Issue:
1. W/N the CFI erred in not admitting the amended complaint
2. W/N the action had already prescribed
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Court held that under section 1 of Rule 17, Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course, that is, without leave of court, at any time before a responsive pleading. As Paeste and Carpio
amended their complaint before it was answered, the motion to admit the amendment should not have been
denied. It is true that the amendment was presented after the original complaint had been ordered dismissed, but
that order was not yet final for it was still under reconsideration.
2. NO. Jaurigue had allegedly been threatening Paeste and Carpio with death if they took the matter to the
authorities and that these threats lasted until 1951. The Court opined that the action does not appear to have
prescribed, for in these cases prescription does not begin to run until the party affected is perfectly free to go to
court as he wishes.
146 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
02 - Bautistia v. Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. (2005) (amended complaint)

Doctrines:
Before the service of a responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of
whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.
Even if the motion to dismiss is still granted by the court the plaintiff may still amend his complaint as a matter of
right before the dismissal becomes final as long as no answer has yet been served.
Facts:
Spouses Bautista are registered owners of a lot in Batangas, covered by an OCT in their name. Maya-Maya
Cottages filed a complaint for cancellation of their title (Civil Case #1). The Spouses Bautista filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action - because Maya-Maya is a corporation and cannot own land in
the Philippines. The TC granted the Motion to Dismiss.
Maya-Maya filed a Motion for Reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for
quieting of title, alleging the technical description in Bautistas title does not cover the disputed lot. The Bautistas
opposed, claiming it stated no cause of action and that Maya-Mayas theory of the case is substantially modified if it is
admitted. The TC issued an order denying Bautistas Motion to Dismiss, (thus reversing the previous order of
dismissal of the complaint).
Spouses Bautista appeal to the CA alleging that Maya-Mayas amended complaint did not cure the defect in its
original complaint. CA issued an Order saying the TC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in admitting MayaMayas complaint. [CA also dismissed Bautistas motion for reconsideration. So the Bautistas file a petition for review
on certiorari.]
Issues:
1. W/N the CA erred in holding that the TC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lace or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting Maya-Mayas complaint
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The CA correctly held that in issuing the Order admitting the amended complaint, the TC did not gravely
abuse its discretion.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
As can be seen from above, before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to
amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. It is settled
that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule.
The Bautistas had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Case #1. What they filed
was a Motion to Dismiss. Thus, Maya-Maya may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was
ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal in not yet final, as in this case.
NOTE: Bautistas contention that Maya-Maya cannot hold the lot can only be determined at a full-blown trial.
147 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Alpine Lending Services v. Corpuz (2006) (Pleading Amendment as a Right)

Doctrines:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right (Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court)
1. at any time before a responsive pleading is served or,
2. in the case of a reply, at any time within 10 days after it is served.
3. It is the Courts policy to be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in order that the real
controversies between or among the parties may be presented and for case to be decided on the merits
without delay.
Facts:
Estrella Corpuz filed a complaint for replevin against Alpine Lending Investors and Zenaida Lipata. Corpuz
claimed that Lipata, who was her former neighbor, obtained the original registration papers of her Toyota Tamaraw FX
because the latter offered to help her secure a Garage Franchise from the Land Transportation Office. Unknown to her,
Lipata pretended to be the owner of the vehicle and retrieved it from Richmond Auto Center where it was being repaired.
Lipata disappeared and upon inquiry found that the vehicle was mortgaged with Alpine. Alpine promised to release the
vehicle if Lipata was criminally charged, which she was, for falsification of private document and estafa before the MeTC
of Caloocan city. Still, Alpine refused to return the vehicle. Instead of filing an answer to Corpuzs complaint, Alpine
filed a motion to dismiss before the RTC claiming that it was not a juridical person and therefore not the proper party in
the case. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the succeeding the motion for reconsideration, directing Corpuz to file her
amended complaint within 10 days. She filed her Amended Complaint accompanied by a Motion to Admit Complaint
2 days late. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge the amended complaint on the ground that it was not accompanied by a
notice of hearing, which however was denied for lack of merit. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration, this
petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Issues:
1. W/N the trial court erred in admitting Corpuzs Amended Complaint.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Corpuz could amend her complaint as a matter of right. It was the duty of the court to accept it; otherwise
mandamus would lie against it. In fact, she did not even have to file a motion to admit her amended complaint.
According to Sec 2 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at
any time before a responsive pleading is served or in the case of a reply, at any time within 10 days after it is
served. What Alpine filed was a motion to dismiss and not an answer to Corpuzs complaint. For purposes of Sec.
2 Rule 10, a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
05 - Mercader v. DBP (see Digest #3, Rule 5/6)
148 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Philippine Ports Authority v. William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (2008) (Lease Agreement, Substantial
Amendments)
Doctrines:
The 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure now allows amendments in complaints that may substantially alter the causes
of action or defenses of a party
Facts:
In an appeal for certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals, William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.(WG&A), a
shipping corporation, asking to reverse the courts decision.
Upon the expiry of the lease for the use of the Marine Slip Way facility in the North Harbor between Veternas
Shipping Corporation and the Philippine Ports Authority(PPA) on December 2000, WG&A and PPA will enter into a
lease contract for the use of the Marine Slip Way facility pursuant to a memorandum by President Erap, which has the
following stipulations:
1. The lease shall take effect on January 1 to June 30, 2001, or until such time that PPA turns over its
operation to the winning bidder for the North Harbor modernization.
2. Rent of P12.15 per sq. meter, or an aggregate amount of P886,950
3. All structures/improvements introduced in the leased premises shall be turned over to PPA
4. Utility expenses shall be on the account of WG&A
5. Real Estate tax/Insurance and other government dues and charges shall be borne by WG&A
On November 12, 2001, PPA asked WG&A to vacate the premises and turnover all improvements believing that
the lease contract has already expired. WG&A wrote to reconsider its decision. PPA denied such request.
On November 28, WG&A filed an Injunction Suit with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
demand of evacuation of PPA. WG&A claims that PPA illegally and prematurely terminated the lease contract (I think
this is the first cause of action claimed by WG&A). In their complaint, they also asked for recovery of damages for
breach of contract and attorneys fees(This is the second cause of action).
On December 11, WG&A amended its complaint, though the complaint was still denominated as an Injunction
with TRO, they incorporated statements that PPA was estopped from denying that the correct period of the lease is until
PPA turns over its operation to the winning bidder for the North Harbor modernization. The amendment also
included a third cause of action, that if WG&A should be evicted from the premises, they are entitled to a refund on the
value of the improvements therein.
The RTC of Manila denied the TRO by way of order on January 16, 2002. Then PPA filed its answer on January
23.
WG&A filed for Reconsideration of such order denying the TRO and a Motion to Admit Attached Second
Amendment Complaint. This means that WG&A filed another amendment to his complaint. The amended complaint is
now captioned as an Injunction with TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or Reformation
of Contract (Take note: Before it was only an Injuction with TRO). In addition to this, it included a fourth cause of
action, which was for the reformation of the contract as it failed to express the true intent of the contracting parties.
PPA strongly opposed the second amendment stating that it was a substantial amendment and this will this will
substantially alter WG&As cause of action and theory of the case. The RTC denied the admission of the second
amendment of WG&A.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered the admission of the second amendment of
WG&A.
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Issues:
1. W/N WG&A second amendment be allowed to be admitted
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. After the case is set for hearing, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the
cause of action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
The applicable rule should have been Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which amended
the old rule by striking off the phrase: or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered.
With the application of this new rule, courts may now admit amendments in complaints that may substantially
alter causes of actions and defenses to serve the higher ends of justice.
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08 - Young v. Spouses Sy (2007) (mother and daughter dispute)

[sorry nakakalito yung case kasi consolidated cases eh. Sana maintindihan nyo ito.]
Facts:
Lilia Dy Young (Lilia) is the natural mother of Genalyn D. Young (petitioner). In the case, Genalyn alleged that
the extra-judicial partition executed by Lilia who adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favour of the latter is
unenforceable since at the time of the execution, petitioner was only 15 years old and no court approval had been
procured. Subsequently upon partition and upon registration of the partition with the Register of Deeds, Lilia obtained
obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the subject property. She was not
able to pay thus; the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, Manuel Sy. The Certificate of Sale for this
purpose had been registered with the Register of Deeds and soon thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax
declaration over the property in question.
Madami nangyari. Bottomline, there were two petitions filed which are deemed important in the case, Petition
regarding Supplemental Complaint and Petition regarding Non-Suit.
We will focus on Petition regarding Supplemental Complaint kasi dito diniscuss yung topic sa outline J At
first, the courts a quo held that the Supplemental Complaint must fail because it constituted a substantial amendment of
the original complaint; that the relief prayed for in the former is inconsistent with the latter; and that the causes of action
of both are likewise different.
Issues:
1. W/N the supplemental complaint must fail
2. W/N there was forum shopping
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. It does not replace
that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and
that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. Any supplemental facts
which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of
supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.
In this case, the consolidation of title over the subject property in the name of respondent Manuel Sy and the issue
as to whether it precluded petitioner as alleged co-owner from exercising the right of legal redemption, are new
matters that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. The relief prayed for in the Supplemental
Complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legal redemption accorded to co-owners of property, is germane
to and intertwined with the cause of action in the Complaint for the nullification of the Second Supplemental to
the Extrajudicial Partition on the ground that it lacked the approval of a guardianship court.
The petitioners right to redeem the property is dependent on the nullification of the partition which is the subject
of the original complaint. Unless the partition is nullified or declared without any force or effect, the petitioner
will not be considered a co-owner of the property and, consequently, she will be unable to exercise any right of
legal redemption. The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is merely a natural
consequence of co-ownership. Hence, the petitioners cause of action for legal redemption as embodied in her
Supplemental Complaint stems directly from and is an extension of her rights as co-owner of the property subject
of the Complaint. Furthermore, the evidence required to prove petitioners right of legal redemption in the
Supplemental Complaint will be exactly the same evidence required to prove the nullification of the partition in
the Complaint.
If a separate action is filed for the subject covered by the Supplemental Complaint, there will be multiplicity of
suits. Should a separate complaint be filed before the nullification of the partition, the same would be dismissed
for being premature pending the resolution of the Complaint for nullification.
151 of 277
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It is important to note that no right of the respondents will be violated as they have the right to file a supplemental
answer to the Supplemental Complaint, conformably with Section 7, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court.
2. YES. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is Successful would amount to res judicata.
The petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping.
When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition
(re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. Both suits are founded on
exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matter - the RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The
parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same.
152 of 277
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09 - Campos Rueda Corporation v. Hon. Jose Bautista (1962) (complaint amended to acquire jurisdiction)
Doctrines:
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations made in the
complaint or petition. On the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle applies to proceedings in
the Court of Industrial Relations.
A complaint cannot be amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of action
originally set forth was not within the courts jurisdiction.
Facts:
Respondent Muyot was employed by petitioner corporation at its gasoline station with a monthly salary of P200
from May 21, 1949 to May 31, 1953, and at P230 from June 1 to December 31, 1953. On November 26, 1958, he filed a
complaint against petitioner with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) for recovery of alleged overtime pay,
Sunday and holiday services.
Campos Rueda moved to dismiss the complaint claiming that they were barred by the statute of limitations, and the
decision rendered by other courts. Muyot opposed alleging that the court decisions made were rendered by courts that had
no jurisdiction over the subject-matter so they did not constitute res judicata and that his causes of action were not barred
by the statute of limitations.
Campos Rueda filed a supplementary motion to dismiss alleging that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the
complaint did not seek the reinstatement of Muyot who, according to the complaint, was not an employee anymore
of Campos Rueda since December 31, 1953. In other words, the claim merely involved collection of pay for
overtime, Sunday and holiday work.
The CIR denied petitioners motion to dismiss and required him to answer the complaint. It also denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Campos Rueda filed its answer denying Muyots claim for overtime and Sunday and holiday
services pay. Among other affirmative defenses it reiterated its claim that CIR had no jurisdiction.
During the trial, upon motion of Muyot, CIR issued a subpoena ordering petitioner to bring the Daily Time Records of
employees working at the Super Service Station for the years 1952-1953. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the subpoena
on the ground that it did not reasonably designate the particular employee or employees daily time record concerned, but
gave a blanket description which the rules do not allow, that the records did not appear to be prima facie relevant to the
issue and that Muyot had not offered or tendered the reasonable cost of producing the records sought to be produced.
The CIR through Judge Jose S. Bautista, denied the motion to quash, and the court, in banc, also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence the present case for Certiorari, and Prohibition filed by Campos Rueda
Corporation, to annul the CIRs orders.
Issues:
1. Whether there was a labor dispute for the CIR to acquire jurisdiction over Muyots claim for overtime,
Sunday holiday pay?
2. (CIVPRO Rule10 related) Whether the insufficiency of allegations in the complaint can be amended to
acquire court jurisdiction?
Held/Ratio:
1. NONE. The allegations made in Muyots complaint clearly show that his employment with Campos Rueda was
terminated on December 31, 1953 almost five years before said complaint was filed. That, without asking for
his reinstatement, he only sought to collect what, in his opinion, was due and payable to him for overtime Sunday
and holiday services he had rendered to his former employer during the period of his employment. The court,
citing several cases, made it clear that the CIR does not have jurisdiction over Muyots claims because he is not
an employee anymore and does not seek reinstatement.
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2. NO. The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyots complaint to place his action within the jurisdiction of the
CIR could not be cured by amendment. In, Rosario v. Carandang, the court held that a complaint cannot be
amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of action originally set
forth was not within the courts jurisdiction.
Muyot must have finally realized that the CIR had no jurisdiction over his claims as seen in his answer, filed in
the present case on July 14, 1961 more than two years after the filing of his action a motion for leave to
amend his complaint and to admit the amended complaint attached to his motion, the amendment consisting
precisely in the addition of a third cause of action where he alleged that on May 31, 1953, he was illegally
dismissed by Campos Rueda and that, as a consequence he was entitled to reinstatement, with back wages from
the date of his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.
Obviously the purpose of the amendment was to make his case fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent
court. This attempt is, in the courts opinion, of no avail.
154 of 277
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10 - Baralin v. Gumabay (1977) (Amended complaint, from forcible entry to quieting of title)
Doctrine:
Rule 10 Section 1. Amendments in general Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation
or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of the party or a mistaken or inadequate
allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Facts:
Celestina Gumabay sued Juliana Baralin et al in the CFI of Cagayan over possession of a parcel of land located in
Enrile, Cagayan. Gumabay alleged that Baralin forcibly entered her land. She filed a motion to and was allowed by the
court to sue as pauper litigant. Baralin filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction, saying that cases of forcible
entry should be filed with the first level court and not the CFI. Without waiting for a resolution from the court, Gumabay
filed an amended complaint where she alleged that Baralin was now claiming possession of the land, so she transformed
her action from forcible entry to an action to quiet title. A copy of the amended complaint was served to the defendant.
The court admitted the amended complaint and ordered Baralin to answer it. Soon after a copy of the order was mailed to
Baralin. Because Baralin did not give an answer to this order, Gumabay motioned for the defendant be placed in default.
This was opposed by Baralin saying they never received the order. The motion for default was denied and Baralin again
was asked to answer the amended complaint, but the latter again did not give an answer to the amended complaint. The
court, on motion of Gumabay, declared Baralin in default and ordered the clerk of court to receive Gumabays evidence.
The CFI ruled in favor of Gumabay and declared her the owner of the property and for Baralin to restore possession to
her. Thereafter, Baralin filed a motion of relief from judgment and a motion to lift order of default which was denied by
the court. This was appealed to the CA which elevated it to the SC because the appeal was of a question of law.
Issue:
1. W/N the CFI erred in admitting the amended complaint.
2. W/N, assuming the CFI was justified in admitting the amended complaint, new summons should have been made
based on the amended complaint.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The original complaint for forcible entry contained a prayer that the plaintiff be declared the absolute owner
of the land in question. This was retained in the amended complaint. The latter only adding an additional
allegation that the defendant now assert to claim title and absolute ownership of the land in question which is
adverse and against the interest of the plaintiff. The SC held that the trial courts admitting the amended
complaint was in consonance with the object of the Rules of Court to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings. To dismiss the original complaint and to require
Gumabay to file a new one would have resulted in a repetitive, dilatory and expensive proceeding, which in a case
of a pauper litigant, should be avoided.
2. NO. The SC said, for the same reason as above, new summons are no longer needed. The trial court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the defendants when they were served summons based on the original complaint and
when they appeared and filed a motion to dismiss. They were personally served a copy of the amended complaint
and were ordered twice to answer it. Under those circumstances, there is no basis for the contention that new
summons should be issued. This would be making fetish of a technicality. The Court mentioned approvingly the
comment of Chief Justice Moran if the defendant had already appeared in court in response to the first summons,
so that he was already in court when the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary service of that pleading upon
him, personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon him. (Morans
Comments on the Rules of Court)
155 of 277
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11 - Azolla Farms v. CA (2004)

Doctrine:
Courts are given the discretion to allow amendments of pleadings to conform to the evidence presented during the
trial.
Section 5 Rule 10 envisions two scenarios first, when evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings and no objection was interjected and second, when evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings but this time an objection was interpolated. In cases where an objection is made, the court may
nevertheless admit the evidence where the adverse party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a
continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence.
Facts:
Yuseco is the Chairman, President and Chief Operating Officer of Azolla Farms International Philippines (Azolla
Farms.) In 1982, Azolla Farms participated in the National Azolla Production Program wherein it will purchase all
the Azolla produced by the Azolla beneficiaries in the amount not exceeding the peso value of all the inputs provided
them. To finance this undertaking, Azolla farms applied for a loan with Credit Manila, Inc. Credit Manila, Inc. then
endorsed the application to Savings Bank of Manila (Savings Bank) which approved the loan. To secure the loan,
Yuseco executed a real estate mortgage and 3 promissory notes the first one worth P1.4M, the second one worth P300k
and the 3rd one also worth P300k.
Eventually, the project collapsed. Azolla Farms filed a complaint for damages against Savings Bank alleging that
the failure of the project was due to Savings Banks unjustified refusal to release the remaining P300k which
impaired the time table of the project resulting in its collapse which resulted in Azolla farms failure to pay off the loan.
Savings Bank, in their answer, alleged that Yuseco was using the loan proceeds for expenses unrelated to the
project so they decided to withhold the remaining amount until Yuseco gave the assurance that the diversion of the
funds will be stopped.
Trial ensued. After Savings Bank rested its case, Azolla Farms filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
alleging that the testimony of Savings Banks witness, Jesus Venturina, raised the issue of the invalidity of the
promissory notes and real estate mortgage. (Venturina testified that indeed there was incomplete and invalid
consideration of the promissory notes and the mortgage. The case did not further elaborate on this matter.) Azolla Farms
sought the amendment of the complaint to conform to the issues and evidence presented. Azolla Farms contend that
Savings Bank unilaterally reduced the agreed amount of P4M to P2M and the delay of releasing the P300k novated the
promissory notes and the real estate mortgage. The trial court admitted the amendment complaint and rendered a
decision in favor of Azolla Farms. CA reversed.
Issues:
1. W/N the trial court commited an error when they admitted the Amended Complaint.
2. W/N the promissory notes and real estate mortgage were novated.
Held:
1. NO. The amendment of the complaint was made pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, governing
amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, to wit:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence .When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
156 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon
the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.
The foregoing provision envisions two scenarios first, when evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in
the pleadings and no objection was interjected and second, when evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings but this time an objection was interpolated. In cases where an objection is made, the court may
nevertheless admit the evidence where the adverse party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a
continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence.
As can be gleaned from the records, it was the belief of Azolla Farms that Savings Banks evidence (Venturinas
testimony) justified the amendment of their complaint. The trial court agreed thereto and admitted the amended
complaint. On this score, it should be noted that courts are given the discretion to allow amendments of
pleadings to conform to the evidence presented during the trial.
Verily, the trial court cannot be faulted for admitting the amended complaint as it had the discretion to do
so.
2. NO. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a
subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or,
by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. For
novation to take place, the following requisites must concur:
a. there must be a previous valid obligation
b. there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract
c. there must be extinguishment of the old contract
d. validity of the new contract
All these requisites are patently lacking in the case. There was only one single loan agreement in the
amount of P2M. Plaintiffs claim of novation from P4M to P2M was based on their loan application (they
applied for P4M but only P2M was approved.) It cannot be said that the loan application of Azolla Farms
or their initial representations with Savings Bank was already in itself a binding original contract that was
later novated by the bank. Yuseco being himself a banker, cannot pretend to have been unaware of banking
procedures that normally recognize a loan application as just that, a mere application. Only upon the banks
approval of the loan application in the amount and under such terms it deems viable and acceptable, that a
binding and effective loan agreement comes into existence. Without any such first or original loan
agreement as approved in the amount and under specified terms by the bank, there can be nothing
whatsoever that can be subsequently novated.
157 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
12 - Verzosa v. CA (1998)
Doctrine:
There cannot be a compromise regarding support thus, there is a cause of action even without alleging the failure
of reaching a compromise.
Facts:
Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza filed a verified complaint, later amended, for P1,500 monthly support, support
in arrears, and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite against Jose Ma. Versoza.
Defendants answer attacked the complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that it states no cause of action.
Plaintiffs argue that the Civil Code requirement of attempt to reach a compromise and of its failure need not be
alleged in the complaint. They claim that some such fact may be proved either at the main hearing or at the preliminary
hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Article 222 of the Civil Code is this: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to
the limitations in article 2035. failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
Issue:
1. W/N the Civil Code requirement of attempt to reach a compromise and of its failure need not be alleged in the
complaint.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Article 2035 firmly maintains the ancient injunction against compromise on matters involving future support.
There cannot be a compromise regarding support thus, there is a cause of action even without alleging the failure
of reaching a compromise.
The lower court, in the interest of justice, should have allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint instead of
granting the motion to dismiss. This it could have done under Section 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. For, the
defect in the complaint is curable.
158 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 11 WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

&
RULE 12 BILL OF PARTICULARS
01 - Naga Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals & Pacific Merchandising (1971) (Public Market)
Doctrine:
Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
(Sec. 11, Rule 11)
The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to
the sound discretion of a trial court.
Facts:
Naga Development Corporation (NDC) entered into a supply agreement with Pacific Merchandising, concerning
materials necessary for the construction of Naga Citys public market. Under the terms of the agreement, NDC bound
itself to make a down payment upon signing the contract. The balance would be payable 45 days after completion of
delivery and installation of roofing materials, but not later than 95 days after delivery in case of delay attributable to NDC.
It was further agreed that NDC would furnish Pacific with a deed of assignment with respect to the proceeds of the loan
NDC obtained from GSIS. The proceeds will serve as NDCs payment to Pacific. Such assignment was executed so that
direct payment could be made to Pacific, without need for NDC to initially collect the proceeds.
Pacific made deliveries to the job site, in accordance with the agreement. However, not long after, Pacific filed a
collection suit against NDC, claiming that the latter failed to pay the balance of the contract price, as agreed.
NDCs camp filed two motions requesting for an extension to file its answer. The first was a request for a 15-day
extension, due to equally, if not more urgent professional work on the part of counsel. The second was a request for an
additional extension of 10 days, alleging that there was still a need to verify certain material facts relative to Pacifics
complaint that were essential to the completion of the answer. This second motion, unlike the first, was denied. NDC
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, this was also denied. Because of this, Pacific filed a motion to declare NDC
in default, which was granted. Upon receiving the default order, NDC hurriedly filed an answer accompanied by a
motion for its admission.
Naturally, NDC filed a motion, alleging, among others, that the default order should be set aside, since it had
already tendered its answer to Pacifics complaint. This motion was denied by the CFI, attributing NDCs failure to
answer within the 15-day extended period to its own fault and negligence. The CFI reasoned that the excuse given by
NDC to substantiate its request for a second extension was flimsy, at best. Thus, after an ex parte reception of Pacifics
evidence, judgment was rendered against NDC. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. W/N CA erred in affirming CFIs default order
2. W/N CA erred in affirming CFIs judgment by default, allegedly awarding an amount higher than what was
actually due Pacific
Held/Ratio:
1. No. CFIs default order was proper, since granting motions for extension are discretionary on its part. Thus,
CA correctly affirmed the said order.
The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, NDC was initially granted an extension of 15 days.
Thereafter, it submitted a second request for extension. The inability to file the answer within the extended period
was supposedly due to the need to verify the correctness of the amounts claimed by Pacific. NDC claims to have
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made partial payments that should have been deducted from the total amount claimed in the present suit, thus, its
camp claimed they had to verify the number of payments made, and those still due.
The SC found the excuse to be flimsy. This was due to the fact that NDCs defense, as expressed in its belated
answer, was basically premised on the claim that the complaint was pre-mature, since the GSIS loan, the proceeds
of which were supposedly intended to settle the balance owing to Pacific, had not yet been released. Expressing
this defense on paper could not have taken too long. In fact, the Court observed that NDC was able to file its
belated answer days after being notified of the default order. (It is also worth noting that such defense doesnt
really seem to be connected to the prior payments that were used as an excuse in NDCs second request for
extension. It doesnt really have anything to do with what NDC claimed it had to verify)
2. No. It must be noted that the SC cannot pass upon the correctness of the amount assessed, as it is not a trier of
facts. However, while the SC cannot pass upon the correctness of the assessment made by the CFI and
thereafter affirmed by the CA, NDC cannot be compelled to pay more than it actually owes Pacific, in
violation of the principle of unjust enrichment. Thus, during the execution phase of the judgment, NDC must
be allowed to present proof of payments it claims it made to Pacific, so that such amounts can be properly
deducted from principal amount it owes.
Separate Opinion: Barredo, J.
NDC should no longer be allowed to present evidence of partial payments during execution of judgment. The
judgment by default must stand, as is. NDC, through its own fault, lost the opportunity to prove such partial
payments before the CFI. The matters of equity, which can be raised during the execution phase, cannot refer to
those matters the court already passed upon before judgment.
*There was a side issue about the computation of interest. Basically the Court held that the interest should start to
run 45 days after completion of the installation, as stated in the agreement, not on the date of delivery.
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02 - Amante v. Suga (1975) (motion to extend time of filing an answer)

Doctrines:
The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where notice to the
adverse party is necessary but an ex parte motion.
An ex parte motion is made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence
and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.
The Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to permit the submission of an answer even after the time fixed in the
rules for its presentation.
GR: notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles
of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
(Hindi talaga kinwento ung original case)
Amante filed a written motion with the trial court requesting for an extension of 15 days within which to file its
answer. This motion was addressed only to the Clerk of Court. CFI granted the motion. Then Amante filed a Motion for
Bill of Particulars, a copy of which was sent to the counsel of Vigaan Agricultural Development Corporation (private
respondent corporation).
VADC filed a motion to set aside the CFIs order and to declare Amante in default alleging that the Amantes
motion is defective because there was no notice given to them. The 2 motions (bill of particulars and to set aside) where
heard. Amante withdrew the Motion for Bill of Particulars so only VADCs motion needs to be resolved by the court.
Amante filed his answer to the counterclaim to the complaint (on the same day he withdrew his motion). CFI granted
VADCs motion on the basis that the notice in the motion of Amante was defective. So it ordered that the order be set
aside and Amante to be declared in default.
Issues:
1. W/N the Amantes motion is defective.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The court held that the motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion
where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application. This
motion is an ex parte motion which is made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in
the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.
Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 11 of the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to permit the submission of an
answer even after the time fixed the rules for its presentation. The granting of extension to plead is a matter
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Also, under the Rules, after service of the bill of particulars, or after denial of his motion, the moving party shall
have the same time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is permitted by the rules, as that to which he was
entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than 5 days in any event (So, the pendency of the motion for
a bill of particulars in effect interrupts the period within which to file a responsive pleading). Although Amante
withdrew his motion, he also filed his answer on the same day.
161 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Andres Sarmiento v. Judge Juan, Belfast Surety (1983) (LBM, answer to compulsory counterclaim)
Doctrines:
A compulsory counterclaim need not be answered anymore before the court can schedule a pre-trial of the action.
By definition, a compulsory counterclaim is intimately related to the complaint such that to answer it would
merely result to a repetition of the allegations contained in the original claim / complaint.
Failure to answer a compulsory counterclaim is not a cause for a default declaration.
Facts:
1
No Date
Belfast Surety v. Andres Sarmiento and his father Benjamin Sarmiento
Belfast Surety filed an action for indemnification against the Sarmientos under an
indemnification agreement between them for a bail bond.
The presiding judge was Judge Celestino Juan.
December 21 1979
The Sarmientos filed their answer with a (compulsory) counterclaim.
In response, original plaintiff Belfast Surety filed

a. a motion to dismiss as far as Benjamin Sarmiento is concerned
(for unknown reasons; unimportant detail)
b. a motion to schedule the case for pre-trial (now with only Andres Sarmiento as
defendant)
Judge Juan grants the motions and schedules the case for pre-trial on February 5 1980
(over a month and a half after December 21 1979)
Day of Pre Trial : February 5 1980

Only the counsel of Belfast appears in court. It was discovered that Andres Sarmiento
could not appear because he was suffering from a severe stomach pain and LBM that
very day. He filed for an urgent motion for postponement.
Judge Juan denies the urgent motion for postponement and instead, declares Andres in
default.
Andres is now contending that pursuant to the OLD Rules of Court (Rule 20 Section 1), a pre-trial shall be
conducted only when the last pleading has been filed. Andres is saying that the last pleading in this case refers to none
other than what should be the reply or answer of Belfast Surety to Andres compulsory counterclaim filed on
December 21 1979 (event # 2). In other words, because Belfast Surety has not filed its answer to Andres compulsory
counterclaim, then Judge Juan could not proceed to pre-trial and eventually declare him in default.
Issue:
1. W/N an answer to the compulsory counterclaim is required
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
a. If no answer (to the counterclaim) is timely filed, the judge may proceed to the pre-trial. Otherwise,
an unscrupulous party litigant can hold court processes by the simple expedient of failing to answer.
162 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
The OLD Rule 20 Section 1 must be construed to mean that there is an element of time that must be
considered in waiting for the last pleading (i.e. answer to counterclaim).
b. The last pleading referred to in the Rules is any pleading that a party will file as a reply to any
other pleading which asserts a claim. As long as a pleading is one that interposes a claim, then this
pleading must be answered, and this subsequent answer / reply in turn shall be considered the last
pleading the Rules requires and refers to. If any pleading asserting a claim is left unanswered,
then the failure to answer may be a ground for declaration of default of that party who failed to
answer.
c. However, there is an exception to this general rule that failure to answer a pleading asserting a claim
can hold the failing party in default, such as the failure to answer a complaint in intervention or a
compulsory counterclaim so intimately related to the complaint such that to answer to same
would merely require a repetition of the allegations contained in the complaint.
In other words, Belfast Surety will not be declared in default simply because it failed to answer the
counterclaim interposed by Andres Sarmiento.
163 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
04 - Spouses Barraza and Yolanda Gatchalian-Barraza v. Campos (presiding judge) and Renato
Gatchalian (1983) (lechon, motion to dismiss filed instead of an answer)
Doctrines:
It appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the period for filing defendants answer
as extended by the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants in default.
Interruption of the running of the period CAN REFER TO THE EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE
ANSWER, not just to the original period of 15 days
Facts:
This case evolved from a dispute between brother and sister over the use of the business name GATCHALIAN
THE HOUSE OF NATIVE LECHON.
Spouses Barraza are alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Campos.
They prayed for the annulment of Judge Campos judgment by default rendered against them, as well as his Order
declaring them in default in a civil case. This original case for damages and injunction was entitled Renato Gatchalian
vs, Spouses George Barraza and Yolanda Gatchalian.
From the original case:
Renato Gatchalian filed a complaint for damages based on Spouses Barrazas use of his trade name and style
of Gatchalian The House of Native Lechon and Restaurant. Spouses Barraza were properly served with summons
together with the corresponding complaint and annexes.
Oct. 30, 1978 Spouses Barraza filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for extension of time of 15 days within which
to file an Answer which the court granted in its Order, which reads
Finding the reasons stated on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, filed by defendants through counsel, to
be well taken, the same is hereby granted as prayed for. Wherefore, defendants are given an
extension of fifteen (15) days or until November 18, 1978 within which to file their Answer.
Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of 15 days, Spouses Barraza filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
Nov. 29, 1978 Renato Gatchalian filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default on the
ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period.
Dec. 1, 1978 Court granted the Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default. Court allowed Renato
Gatchalian to present evidence exparte before a Hearing Commissioner. The hearing was held on Jan. 8, 1979
whereat Renato Gatchalian presented his evidence, ex parte.
Jan. 29, 1979 Judge Campos rendered his decision in favor of Renato Gatchalian due to preponderance
of evidence. Judge Campos ordered Spouses Barraza to desist from the use of the business name Gatchalian
The House of Native Lechon.
Feb. 20, 1979 The court also caused the issuance of a writ of execution. (sale of properties)
Spouses Barraza wants an injunction to restrain the execution of Judge Camposs decision, particularly the sale of
their properties and for them to be allowed to file an Answer.
Issues:
1. W/N the Order of Judge Campos declaring Spouses Barraza in default for failure to file their Answer within the
reglamentary period was issued with grave abuse of discretion
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Under the facts of the case at bar, Judge Campos granted Spouses Barraza an extension of 15 days to file
their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of filing the answer, Spouses Barraza filed a Motion to Dismiss
164 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
the Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended by the court.
This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint. A
motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 8 (now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of
Court, must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer.
There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the
period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the
court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and NOT to the extension of time to file the answer as
granted by the court.
(So interruption of the running of the period CAN REFER TO THE EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE
ANSWER, not just to the original period of 15 days)
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows Spouses Barraza to file their answer not
only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within a different period (as) fixed by the court.
Without resolving the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Judge Campos declared Spouses Barraza in default in his
Order. This is clearly in contravention of the Rules for under Section 3, Rule 16, the court after hearing may deny
or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion
until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is only from the time that the
movant receives notice of the denial or deferment of the motion to dismiss that the period within which he shall
file his answer is computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court provides a different period.
(So basically since the Spouses Barraza filed a motion to dismiss, they were entitled to have that motion resolved
FIRST. A motion to dismiss INTERRUPTS the time to plead. So, they were incorrectly declared in default and the
holding of the trial in their absence, was a denial of due process.)
So the order of default and the judgment of default by Judge Campos were set aside. This also includes the writ of
execution. The case remanded to the lower courts for the resolution of their Motion to Dismiss.
165 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
05 - Luna v. Hon. Mirafuente (2005) (Unlawful detainer, unverified+late answer )

Doctrines:
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however,
That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive
or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, if there are two or more defendants. (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Facts:
Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Florencio and Alex Sadiwa. The case was filed in the
MTC of Buenavista, Marindueuque presided by Hon. Mirafuente. Note that the applicable set of rules to the case was the
Rules on Summary Procedure. According to Section 5 of the rules, an answer must be filed within a period of 10 days
from service of summons. (In ordinary actions, the period is 15 days.)
Anyway, the Sadiwas filed an unverified answer to the complaint 17 days after the service of summons.
They filed 7 days beyond the reglementary period. Thereafter, Dr. Lunas counsel filed a Motion for
Judgment, invoking Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Judge Mirafuente denied the motion.
After the denial, Luna filed this administrative complaint against Judge Mirafuente for grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law. Luna argues that Judge Mirafuente should have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs
rendered judgment as warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint because the Sadiwas filed an unverified answer
which was 7 days late.
Issues:
1. W/N Judge Mirafuente was guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for accepting the Sadiwas
late and unverified answer
Held/Ratio:
1. No, Judge Mirafuente is not guilty of grave misconduct nor of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Mirafuene contends that the admission of the answer was proper because the delay was negligible. They
were only 4 days late because 2 days of the 7-day delay were non-working holidays. Also, he said that the
Sadiwas may have only been confused because the usual period for filing an answer is 15 days. Furthermore, the
Sadiwas prepared their answer without the benefit of legal assistance, and their acts did not show that it was for
the purpose of delaying.
The Court agreed with Judge Mirafuente that judges are enjoined to decide cases as soon as practicable. Such a
requirement is especially needed in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases such as the instant case because
they involve disturbances in the social order. To restore order, technicalities or details of procedure which may
cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided.
In Sections 5 and 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the word shall is used. (Section 5: Within ten (10) days
from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint. Section 6: the court, motu
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.) This emphasizes the mandatory character of the
requirements.
In the present case, Judge Mirafuente gave a liberal interpretation of Section 6. Liberal interpretation, however, is
not always allowable. It must be applied only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
166 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Respondents act, albeit a disregard of procedural rules, does not, however, constitute grave misconduct. Neither
does it constitute gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance transcends a simple error in the application of legal
provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
As for the issue of the answer being unverified, Section 3 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requires
that all pleadings shall be verified, the requirement is formal, not jurisdictional. The court may 1) order the
correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking or 2) act on the pleading even if it is unverified, if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in the interest of
justice.
Despite the acceptance of Judge Mirafuente of the late and unverified answer, he is not guilty of grave misconduct
nor of gross ignorance of the law.
167 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Go Occo & Co. v. de la Costa (1936) (vague pleading)

Doctrines:
While pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties, courts should
not be left to conjectures in the determination of issues submitted by the parties litigant or their attorneys. Where
the pleading is vague and uncertain, courts will not allow themselves to be led to the commission of error or
injustice by exploring in the midst of uncertainty and divining the intention of the parties of their counsel.
Facts:
The plaintiff, Go Occo & Co., filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court against Judge dela
Costa of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The complaint alleges the following:
1. Go Occo & Co. filed an action with the justice of the peace for recovery of money from Peoples Bazaar due
to the goods that were purchased on credit. Then Reyes, administrator of the estate of Laureana Antonio, filed
a complaint-in-intervention. Reyes was claiming unpaid rent from Peoples Bazaar. The CFI rendered
judgment and declared that Go Occos claim was preferred to that of the intervenor. The intervenor appealed
the decision to the Court of First Instance without paying enough for the docket fees. (The docket fee was P20
but only P16 was paid).
2. The CFI entertained the appeal of the intervenor even without the proper payment of docket fees. Judge dela
Costa issued an order of default against Go Occo. Go Occo filed a motion for the reinstatement of the case
and the dismissal of the intervenors complaint.
3. Go Occo also filed another motion for reconsideration after the hearing for his first motion was postponed.
But Judge dela Costa denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered the execution of the judgment.
4. There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the plaintiff.
Go Occo prays to the Supreme Court to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring Judge
dela Costa to recall the order he issued.
Issue:
1. W/N the complaint of Go Occo is vague
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The complaint of Go Occo is vague and indefinite. The original civil case was Go Occo & Co., plaintiff, v.
Peoples Bazaar, defendant, versus Alejandro S. Reyes, administrator of the estate of the deceased, Laureana
Antonio, intervenor. Judge dela Costa has issued various orders with regard to the case: 1) order of default
against Go Occo, 2) denial of Go Occos motion for reconsideration and order for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
The petition does not state which of the two orders is being assailed or which has been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Moreover, the complaint did not even contain a general averment that the CFI of Cebu acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in accepting the case.
The complaint simply alleged: There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, adequate remedy for the plaintiff.
So the petition was dismissed.
168 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
07 - Jose Santos v. Lorenzo Liwag (1980) (bill of particulars)

Doctrine:
The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial
discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard
will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Santos sued respondent Lorenzo Liwag for the annulment of certain documents which he alleges
were drawn with deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation and threats. Respondent asked for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that certain allegations in petitioners complaint were vague, and also so he could be well
informed of the charges against him to prepare an intelligent and proper pleading. The trial court granted the motion and
directed petitioner to prepare a bill of particulars, which he failed to do. Respondent then moved for the dismissal of the
case, which was granted.
Issue:
1. W/N the dismissal of the complaint was proper on the failure to submit a bill of particulars.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound
judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial
court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly
erroneous order.
The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the petitioner merely averred
that all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular facts on which alleged
fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. . Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant
the defendants motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial
court correctly dismissed the complaint.
169 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
08 - Filipinas Fabricators & Sales Inc v. Magsino (1998)

Doctrines:
A motion for bill of particulars extends the period to file an answer only if all the requirements of such motion are
strictly complied with.
The subsequent action of the court does not cure a fatally defective motion
Facts:
By virtue of a dealership agreement, Filipinas Fabricators and Sales, Inc., (Filipinas) purchased on credit several
products of Atlas Copco (Phils.), Inc., (hereafter Atlas).
Filipinas had accumulated on outstanding balance of P620,266.70. To settle that account, Filipinas, entered into
an agreement with Atlas, assigning with recourse in favor of the latter some of its accounts receivables from personal
debtors amounting to P361,745.98, the same to be deducted from its outstanding balance.
A collection suit against Filipinas and its sureties was commenced by Atlas before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal alleging that Filipinas total outstanding balance of P139,295.95 became due and demandable.
On March 2, 1977, counsel for Filipinas, et. al., requested a ten-day extension to file answer. However, before
respondent Judge Celso L. Magsino could act on said motion, the petitioners filed on March 11, 1977, a motion for bill
of particulars alleging insufficiency of the complaint and requested for a more precise statement of the matters
alleged therein.
In its order dated April 6, 1977, the respondent court required the petitioners to set for hearing the motion
for bill of particulars with notice to adverse party, otherwise said motion shall be treated ... as a mere scrap of paper.
The petitioners received this order on April 20, 1977.
In an order dated May 6, 1977, Judge declares them in default and allows the presentation of evidence ex
parte.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioners motion for bill of particulars had definitely suspended the period within which to answer as
provided in Section 1 rule 1211
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The petitioners argue that, by virtue of Section 1 Rule 12, they were still allowed at least five (5) days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for bill of particulars within which to file answer and, to find them in
default within this period is really premature and highly irregular for being contrary to the Rules
This statement is, of course, accurate only if the filed motion is sufficient in form and substance, meaning, it
complies with the general requirements of motions under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which explicitly require a motion to accompanied by a notice of hearing, to be served by the movant
on the adverse parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing, and to state therein the exact time and
place of hearing. Section 6 of the same Rule further commands that no motion shall be acted upon by the court,
without proof of service of the notice thereof except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party
or parties are not affected. These requirements under Rule 15 are mandatory.
Petitioners motion for bill of particulars filed on May 12, 1977, did not contain the notice of hearing and
proof of service required by the Rules. A defective motion of this kind does not interrupt the running of the
period within which to file answer. As the motion filed by the petitioners was nothing but a useless scrap of
paper which did not affect at all the running of the reglementary period to answer, the petitioners, who had not

11. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his
motion, the moving party shall have the same time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is permitted by these rules, as that to which he was
entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event.
170 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
filed their answer to the complaint of respondent Atlas, should, as early as May 14, 1977 (the last day of the
extended period to answer), have been declared in default.
Petitioners also argue that that ... the matters sought to be alleged in the complaint [were] evidentiary in nature
which may be presented at the trial, the respondent court had in effect clearly entertained the defective motion.
However, the fact that the court had taken cognizance of the defective motion first, by requiring the parties to set
it for hearing and second, when it denied the same for lack of merit in its omnibus motion, did not cure the defect
nor alter the nature of the defective motion. The subsequent action of the court hereon does not cure the
flaw, for a motion with a notice fatally defective is a useless piece of paper.
09 - Dumanon v. Butuan City Rural Bank (1982)

Doctrine:
The time to file a motion to dismiss is coterminous with the period to answer. This is expressly provided by the
Rules of Court, Section 1, Rule 16. Hence, as long as the time to file the answer has not lapsed, a motion to
dismiss may be filed within such time, instead of an answer.
Filing a motion for a bill of particulars suspends the running of the period to answer, and is resumed upon the
filing of the amended complaint in compliance with the courts order granting the motion for a bill of particulars.
Facts:
[The only important part in this case is the doctrine, as the facts are very convoluted.]
The petitioners [marami kasi sila, and family members, so mas madali kung walang names] wanted to annul a
deed of donation of a piece of land and its registration. Upon filing the complaint, the respondents asked for a motion for a
bill of particulars. Upon the granting of said motion, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
action had already prescribed [it had been 32 years since the donation, and 15 years since registration of the deed]. The
court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
The petitioners now challenge the dismissal. One of their contentions is that the ground invoked in their motion to
dismiss was already available in the original complaint, even before it was amended through the motion for a bill of
particulars. Hence, they filed the motion to dismiss out of time, and should therefore have not been sustained for not
having been raised within the time to file the answer.
Issue:
1. W/N the dismissal of the original complaint was proper
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, the dismissal was proper. The time to file a motion to dismiss is coterminous with the period to answer, as
expressly provided in the Rules of Court. Hence, as long as the time to file the answer has not lapsed, a motion to
dismiss may be filed within such time, instead of an answer.
In the present case, the defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The running of the period to answer
was thereby suspended. It is resumed upon the amended complaint being filed in compliance with the courts
order granting the motion for a bill of particulars.
As the time to answer the amended complaint had not yet lapsed, the filing of a motion to dismiss was still within
the reglementary period. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is not barred for failure to invoke it, since it was being
invoked in the first and only motion to dismiss filed with demonstrated timeliness.
171 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
10 - Baritua v. Mercader (1953) - bus in river, late filing

Doctrine:
A defendant has 10 days to file his motion for Bill of Particulars, counted from the day a pleading is served. This
is because the defendant must also file such motion before responding to a pleading (as per Rule 11, defendant
has 10 days to file a Reply so dapat talaga on or before day 10 yung pag file ng bill of particulars, or else hindi na
siya makakafile ng answer and he will be declared in default)
Facts:
The late Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the buy and sell of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar,
boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line bounded from Manila to N. Samar. However, while said bus was traversing
the Beily Bridge in N. Samar, the bus fell into the river, as a result, D. Mercader died. Petitioner alleges, among others,
that there is no statement in the complaint of Mercader that he was issued any passenger-freight ticket, that their driver
exercised proper caution, and the accident was caused by the poor maintenance of the bridge that collapsed. JB line filed a
motion for a Bill of Particulars as Jose Baritua (owner) was not impleaded when he was an indispensable party, as well as
the information about JB Line stated in the complaint was erroneous. Respondents filed an amended complaint,
impleading Baritua and asking for a whole lot of damages. The lower court admitted the amended complaint and ruled in
favor of Mercaders heirs. CA affirmed.
Issue:
1. W/N Baritua and JB line are liable forthe death of Mercader
2. W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it remained silent about the fact that the RTC did not
render judgment on their plea for a Bill of Particulars (Rule 12 related)
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. JB Line failed to transport D. Mercader to his destination, because the bus fell into a river while traversing
the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the fall, he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The
Court agreed with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that fateful morning. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
2. No. When JB Lines counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars (for the
original Complaint), the RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however, filed
the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such
motion was already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, they had already filed their answer and several
other pleadings to the amended Complaint.
172 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

01 - De los Santos v. Elizalde (2007) (land dispute, failure to file MR on time)
Doctrine:
Service upon the parties counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service upon
the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers.
Facts:
On December 15, 1986, Delos Santos - petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and
Attorneys Fees before the Kalibo, Aklan RTC, involving four (4) adjoining lots located in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan.
There were three sets of intervenors in the said case, 1st set the Elizaldes, 2nd set the Casimeros, and 3rd set
the de los Santos. After due hearing of the case, the trial court decided that 2/3 of the disputed lots shall go to the Delos
Santos-intervenor and the 1/3 to the Elizaldes-1st set intervenor.
Thus, Delos Santos-petitioners and Elizalde-intervenor filed their separate Notices of Appeal dated June 6,
1996 and May 16, 1996, respectively. Subsequently, the CA issued the June 2, 1998 Notice to File Brief, requiring Delos
Santos-petitioners and Elizalde-intervenor to file their briefs within 45 days from receipt of said notice.
Delos Santos-petitioners received their Notice to File Brief on June 15, 1998. However, the Delos Santospetitioners filed several Motions for Extension of Time to File Brief which totaled to 180 days from July 27, 1998, when
they filed the first motion for time extension, until January 27, 1999.
In the meantime, Elizalde-2nd set intervenor and Delos Santos-intervenor filed an October 6, 1998 Joint
Manifestation and Motion, which states that Elizalde shall withdraw the appeal because of an amicable settlement
between the parties in the May 27, 1997 Agreement.
Delos Santos-intervenor opposed the motions for extension of Delos Santos-petitioners and moved for the
dismissal of the appeal for petitioners failure to file the required appellants brief.
However, on April 8, 1999, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an ExParte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The said motion sought the withdrawal of the appeal on the ground that Delos Santospetitioners and Delos Santos-intervenor entered into an amicable settlement, wherein Delos Santos-petitioners would be
paid the amount of P 4M, in consideration of their leaving the disputed lots peacefully. Notably, the Agreement was
signed by 39 of the 46 petitioners, and duly notarized. More so, it was alleged that the counsel for Delos Santos-intervenor
executed a promissory note on October 15, 1998 on behalf of Delos Santos-petitioners, for the said amount.
On May 11, 1999, the CA dismissed the cases filed before it and considered them withdrawn because of the
Motion of Elizalde-1st set intervenors, and Motion to Withdraw Appeal and failure of Delos Santos-petitioners to file
Appellants Brief.
On June 17, 1999, an Entry of Appearance was filed by Atty. Cesar T. Verano, allegedly in representation of
petitioners. The entry contained the solitary conformity of petitioner Vicente delos Santos. On the same day, Delos
Santos-petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Decision with Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal, which was
verified solely by petitioner Vicente delos Santos. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners alleged that they did
not have any knowledge of the promulgation of the assailed Decision of the CA; they never entered into any amicable
settlement with Delos Santos-intervenor; their alleged signatures in the May 27, 1997 Agreement were forged; and they
never authorized their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, to withdraw their appeal.
On July 16, 1999, Delos Santos-intervenors then filed an Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. Delos
Santos-petitioners subsequently filed a Reply (To Opposition) on July 30, 1999, refuting the allegations made by Delos
Santos-intervenor.
On January 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution, wherein it was ruled that the motion for
reconsideration is denied for being late by 9 days because plaintiffs-appellants counsel of record, Atty. Napoleon M.
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Victoriano, who has not filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel, received copy of the Courts Decision dated May 11,
1998, on May 24, 1999.
Issue:
1. W/N the CAs decision/resolution is erroneous
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The fifteen (15)-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration begins to run upon receipt of
notice of the decision or final order appealed from. Such period has been considered to begin upon receipt of
notice by the counsel of record, which is considered notice to the parties. Service of judgment on the party is
prohibited and is not considered the official receipt of the judgment. Thus, the 15-day period should run
from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA, and not from June
2, 1999, when petitioners claimed to have been informed of the CA decision.
To reiterate, service upon the parties counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but
service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers. The reason is simplethe
parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure, specifically, the mechanics of
an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant
relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the
interest of orderly procedureeither the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself if s/he does not
intend to hire a lawyer.
Even assuming that petitioners had replaced Atty. Victoriano prior to his receipt of the assailed Decision, the
reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration would still be reckoned from his receipt of the
Decision because the petitioners did not comply with the requirements when there is a change in counsel of
record.
Also, the petitioners were negligent in not monitoring the developments in their case. Petitioners acts are
considered inexcusable negligence. Thus, their late filing shall not be liberally considered.
Assuming arguendo that the withdrawal of the appeal was groundless, the CA still did not commit a reversible
error in dismissing the appeal for petitioners failure to file an appellants brief.
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02 - Rodolfo de Leon v. Court of Appeals and Sps. Batungbacal (2002) (Notice to counsel, notice to client)
Doctrines:
General Rule: When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made
upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law.
Exception: Service upon the party himself has been ordered by the court.
Facts:
Rodolfo de Leon filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary attachment against the Estelita and Avelino Batungbacal. De Leon contends that Estelita executed a
promissory note in his favor for a P500,000 loan plus interest, but soon after, the note was dishonored. Estelita admitted
the loan obligation but Avelino denied the allegations. De Leon moved for the RTC to issue a partial judgment based on
Estelitas admission. The RTC granted the motion and issued a partial judgment (Judgment 1) against Estelita on May
1996. Their counsel received the judgment on May 21, 1996 but no appeal was taken therefrom.
On June 2, 1997 (Judgment 2), the RTC issued a judgment against Avelino to pay the loan plus interests.
Counsel for the spouses received a copy of the judgment on June 6, 1997. Avelino filed a notice of appeal on June 19,
1997.
On June 25, 1997, Estelita, through a new counsel, filed a notice of appeal, appealing Judgments 1 and 2. De
Leon filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Estelitas appeals were filed beyond the reglamentary period.
The CA denied the motion to dismiss explaining that Estelitas appeals were filed within the period because
judgment was served upon Estelita only on June 10, 1997. As regards judgment 1, the CA explained that a partial
judgment may only be appealed together with the main judgment.
Table of Dates:
May 14, 1996
Partial Judgment against Estelita (Judgment 1)
May 21, 1996
Counsel for Spouses received a copy of Judgment 1
June 2, 1997
Judgment against Avelino (Judgment 2)
June 6, 1997
Counsel for Spouses received a copy of Judgment 2
June 10, 1997
Estelita received a copy of Judgment 2
June 19, 1997
Avelino filed a notice of appeal
June 25, 1997
Estelita filed a notice of appeal, appealing both Judgments 1

and 2
Issue:
1. W/N the CA erred in ruling that Judgment 1 may still be appealed.
2. W/N the reglamentary period started to run when the counsel for the Spouses received a copy of Judgment 2.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. A partial judgment is an interlocutory order, which cannot be appealed. It can only be appealed together with
the final order issued by the court. In this case, Judgment 1 may only be appealed together with Judgment 2,
because together, these two issuances constitute one integrated decision.
2. YES. Estelitas contention that the period commences to run from the date she received a copy of the judgment is
untenable. The date from which the reglamentary period started to run is on June 6, 1997, when the counsel
received a decision and not on June 10, 1997 when Estelita received a copy. According to Sec 2, Rule 13, service
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of orders and notices must be made upon the counsel of record and notice to the client and to any other
lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. An exception would be when the court requires that
personal service to the party be made.
However, it must be noted that Avelino filed an appeal on June 19, 1997, 13 days from their counsels receipt of
the judgment. Estelitas filing on June 25 is a mere superfluity because her husband had already perfected an
appeal earlier.
03 - Duque v CA (2002) (2 cases: Duque v CA and Valenzuela v CA)

Facts:
Duque and Valenzuela
Fortunata Duque filed a complaint before the RTC of Valenzuela against the spouses Bonifacio. She alleges that
the spouses negotiated with her certain checks in exchange for cash. She also alleges that they represented themselves to
be holders in due course and for value, and claimed that the checks were sufficiently funded. However upon presentation
of the checks on their respective dates of maturity, the same were dishonored. Duque then gave notices of dishonor to the
spouses. However, despite repeated demands, the spouses refused and continued to refuse to honor the said checks or
replace it with cash.
Valenzuela alleged the same circumstances in her complaint, except that the amount involved is different.
Spouses Bonifacio
In their answer, the spouses denied: having personally negotiated with the plaintiffs any of the checks annexed to
the complaints; representing to both plaintiffs that they were holders in due course and for value of said checks;
representing to both plaintiffs that the same had sufficient funds; having drawn or issued all the checks alluded to by
plaintiffs; and refusing to honor the checks or replace it with cash after being informed of the dishonor thereof.
Duque then filed a Request for Admission and furnished to counsel for private respondents, specifically
requesting that they admit that:
1. They negotiated with the plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed to the respective complaints
2. Edna Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes acknowledging that she is indebted to Duque and
Valenzuela
3. That the spouses received the letters of demand sent by Duque and Valenzuela.
RTC
For failure of the spouses to respond to the request, the RTC held that the spouses impliedly admitted the matters
of which admission is requested. Thus, The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Duque and Valenzuela.
On Appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC
Issues:
1. W/N The failure of the spouses to respond to the request for admission by the petitioners is tantamount to an
implied admission under section 1 and 2 of Rule 26
2. (Rule 13) W/N There was personal service of the request for admission to private respondents
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The 1st and the 3rd items in the request for admission were already denied in the answer of the spouses. Thus,
a subsequent denial is no longer required.
On the other hand, the 2nd item pertains to the promissory notes while the answer of the spouses that we do not
owe that much (as quoted by the CA) pertains to the amount owed. A subsequent denial should have been
required because the answer of the spouses does not necessitate a reply to the admission. But because of the
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failure of Duque to attach copies of the said notes to the request for admission, as required in Section 1 of Rule
26, then the request is not valid.
2. No. The general rule (Section 2, Rule 13) cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notices must
be served upon a definite person. The service should have been made directly upon the person mention in the
law and upon no other in order that for the notice to be valid. Thus, the request for admission made by Duque
delivered to the counsel of the spouses was deemed not validly served. Therefore, the spouses Bonifacio cannot
be considered to have admitted the truth of the matters upon which the admissions was requested.
RULE 26 - ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
Section 1. Request for admission.
At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a
written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the
request unless copies have already been furnished.
RULE 13 - FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS, AND OTHER PAPERS
Sec. 2. Filing and service, defined.
Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several
parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
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04 - PHCC v. Tiongco (1964)

Facts:
Tiongco and Escasa occupied a lot, built houses, and declared it for tax purposes. PHCC declared it for
subdivision purposes later on and considered Tiongco & Escasa as bona fide squatters. They applied to purchase the lot
from PHCC but found out it was awarded to a relative of a Congressman (who didnt even occupy the property nor build
anything on it). They filed a complaint. Two officers of the PHCC Investigating Committee even submitted reports
recommending that Tiongco and Escasa should be given priority rights. However, no action was taken.
Four months after the filing of the complaint, PHCC filed an action for Recovery of Possession. The case was set
for hearing; however, Atty. Taega (counsel for Tiongco & Escasa) failed to notify them of the scheduled Hearing.
The case was heard without them. Judgment was rendered in favor of PHCC as owner.
Said Judgment was received by Atty. Taega but he, again, never informed his clients. Neither did he take steps
to protect their interests like file a Motion for Reconsideration nor petition to set aside judgment. Tiongco & Escasa only
found out about the judgment when the sheriff served them a copy of a writ of execution. They employed Atty. Sayson,
who presented the court with a Petition for Relief from Judgment. Atty. Taega admitted to the court that he did not
inform Tiongco & Escasa of both the hearing and the judgment because he forgot about them, explaining he was
handling so many cases that it just escaped his attention.
PHCC opposed the Petition for Relief claiming that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from
the date Atty. Taega received a copy of the decision. NOTE: Petition was filed 2 months after. (Decision was received by
Atty. Taega on March 7, 1961. Petition was presented only May 9, 1961.)
Issues:
1. W/N the petition for relief from judgment was filed within the reglementary period
2. W/N under the circumstances the acts of appellants former counsel should bind them
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Petition for Relief from judgment was presented outside the reglementary period of 60 days from notice
of the judgment. However, due to the many peculiar circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the rule was
substantially complied with. The rules should be liberally interpreted to promote their object and obtain a just and
speedy determination for the parties.
2. NO. The parties are absolved from the effects of the negligence of their counsel.
It is a settled doctrine that notice to the attorney of a party litigant is equivalent to a notice to the party
itself represented by said attorney and the mistake or negligence of an attorney is binding upon his client.
There would be no end to suit if such ground were to be admitted (i.e. can always re-open a case with new
counsel to say old counsel was negligent). However, the application of the doctrine depend on the
circumstances. Here, one should not insist that notice to the irresponsible lawyer is notice to his clients.
Atty. Taegas actions were suspicious. He gave no significance to the processes of the court and gave a flimsy
explanation thus prejudicing the rights of his clients. If he had informed them of the courts processes, Tiongco &
Escasa could have attended trial, moved for reconsideration, or taken an appeal.
The case should be returned to the court of origin so that Tiongco & Escasa may be given a chance to prove their
defenses. The order of the lower court is set aside.
NOTE: Sec. 2 of Rule 38, Revised Rules does not only refer to judgments, but also to orders or any other
proceedings. Thus the petition for relief from judgment may even be considered as one for relief from the order of
execution, which was filed within the reglementary period.
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05 - Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation v. CA (2008) (NAPOCOR)

Doctrines:
SCRA syllabus: Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which
must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with, and in adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of
the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11.
Facts:
On June 1, 1999, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp.
(MMIC) for the construction of the AGUS VI Kauswagan 69 KV Transmission Line Project. NAPOCOR sought to
expropriate 7,875 sq.m. of MMICs property.
Dec. 5, 2001 Decision: TC fixed the fair market value of the 7,875 sq.m. lot at P115/sq.m.
March 19, 2002 Supplemental Decision: TC declared that the dangling area (I think ito yung remaining portion
nung lot) has a fair market value at P65/sq.m. The trial court ruled that the expropriation impaired the value of the
dangling area and deprived MMIC of the ordinary use of their property and thus, they are entitled to consequential
damages.
April 2, 2002: (important) NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal of the March 19 decision.
April 26, 2002: TC issued the writ of execution for the Dec. 5 decision.
April 29, 2002: (important) MMIC filed a motion to strike out or declare as not filed the notice of appeal
dated April 2. MMIC argued that NAPOCOR violated Rule 13, Sec. 11 of the ROC because NAPOCOR filed and
served the notice of appeal by registered mail.
NAPOCOR opposed the motion and alleged that its legal office is severely undermanned with only one vehicle
and one employee, acting as secretary, handling 300 active cases in Mindanao.
The trial court granted the motion and considered the notice of appeal as not filed at all. The CA reversed noting
that service by registered mail was previously resorted to by both parties and yet, this was the first time MMIC questioned
NAPOCORs mode of service.
Issues:
1. W/N NAPOCOR violated Rule 13, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general
rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the other
modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no
explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the
pleading comes into play.
In this case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCORs notice of appeal sufficiently explained why
the notice of appeal was served and filed by registered mail - due to lack of manpower to effect personal
service. This explanation is acceptable for it satisfactorily shows why personal service was not practicable.
*Another issue in this case was regarding NAPOCORs failure to file a record on appeal. The Court held that
there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal. When NAPOCOR filed its notice of appeal, the trial
court at that stage had no more issues to resolve and there was no reason why the original records of the case must
remain with the trial court. Therefore, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal because the
original records could already be sent to the appellate court.
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06 - United Pulp and Paper Co. Inc. v. United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers
(2004) (no explanation of why personal delivery was not effected, compounded salary increase)
Doctrines:
Service of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally, if practicable. If not possible, one can resort to
other modes of delivery but it must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. If one violates such Rule, the violation may cause to consider the paper as not filed.
Facts:
United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. (The Corporation) implemented a Promotions Policy. The policys guidelines
offer that for union employees, the promotion increase shall be 5%, which shall be compounded for every pay class
jump. However, the resulting effect of the 5% increase shall not cause the promoted employees salary to exceed the
lowest paid incumbent holding the same position where the employee is being promoted to.
Teodorico Simbulan, a union member, was promoted from Welder I to Welder II, with the corresponding
movement from Pay Class V to Pay Class VIII. Unfortunately, Simbulan did not receive a compounded increase in his
salary upon his promotion. Now, the United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers (The Union) questioned
the correctness of the salary increase granted by the company. They claim that Simbulan is entitled to a 5% increase for
every class jump (This means 5%+5%+5% because Simbulan moved from Pay Class V to VIII. Thats three stages up.)
and such increase is not more than the salary of the lowest paid incumbent holding the same position. They also claim that
Simbulan is being discriminated because other employees, namely, Cruz and de Castro enjoyed such compounded
increase when they received their promotion.
The complaint was elevated to a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), which ordered The Corporation to pay Simbulan of such increase in salary.
The Corporation appealed the decision of NCMB to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review under
Rule 43. The CA dismissed their petition outright because of the following grounds:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by the counsel of the corporation,
rather than by a duly-authorized officer thereof;
2. The affidavit of service is inadequate, as evidences of mailing the copies of the petition was not attached;
3. Absence of the mandatory written explanation required under Sec. 11, Rule 13 to explain why personal
service upon the Union of the copies of the petition was not resorted to.
Issues:
1. W/N the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for Review outright based on mere technicalities
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The petition has violated two rules in Civil Procedure. One of which is Sec 5, Rule 7, which requires that a
counsel, in signing a certificate of non-forum shopping must show that he is duly authorized by The
Corporation. He failed to prove such.
The Corporation also failed to attach with the petition a written explanation why the service or filing was not
done personally, which violates Sec 11, Rule 13. The SC has already ruled that where there is no explanation to
justify the service of pleadings by other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading
becomes mandatory.
The Court of Appeals correctly considered the petition as not having been filed.
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07 - MC Engineering and Hanil Dev. Corp. v. NLRC and Baldameca (2001) (mail; no explanation)
Doctrines:
We adhere to our pronouncement in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: To our
mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be
indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonso v. Villamor and other analogous cases, then Section
11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated. [In Alonso, Court was liberal because the RoC had
been in effect only for a few mos.]
Facts:
Hanil Development Co., Ltd. (Hanil) is the overseas employer of all contract workers deployed by MC
Engineering, Inc. (MC) under a Service Contract Agreement between the two. Contract workers deployed by MC for
Hanil for overseas work enter into an employment contract with MC.Aristotle Baldameca entered into an Employment
Agreement with MC for deployment as a plumber in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia. For some reason, Aristotle Baldameca was not
able to finish the full term of his contract and he was repatriated back to Manila. On October 19, 1993, he filed a
complaint with the POEA against MC and Hanil for illegal dismissal. In his complaint, he prayed for the payment of his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment agreement and the reimbursement of his airfare.
The case was referred to the NLRC (which by then had jurisdiction by then due to the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). The labor arbiter decided in favor of Baldemeca. MC and Hanil appealed to the NLRC,
but was denied. MC and Hanil appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the two grounds: (1) there is no
certification against forum shopping by co-petitioner Hamil Development Co., Ltd.; and (2) there is no written
explanation why the service of the pleading was not done personally (Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 11, Rule 13,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The MR to the CA was also denied. Thus the petition for review on certiorari of the CA
resolution.
Issues:
1. W/N the dismissal on the grounds of non-compliance with the requirements of non-forum shopping was proper.
2. W/N the dismissal on the grounds of lack of explanation of service by registered mail was proper. (Rule 13)
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The certification was signed only by the corporate secretary of MC. No representative of Hanil signed the
said certification. As such, the issue to be resolved is whether or not a certification signed by one but not all of the
parties in a petition constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements regarding the certification of nonforum shopping. Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that petitioner Hanil is being sued
by Baldemeca in its capacity as the foreign principal of MC. It was MC, as the local private employment agency,
who entered into contracts with potential overseas workers on behalf of petitioner Hanil. It must be noted that
local private employment agencies, before they can commence recruiting workers for their foreign principal, must
submit to the POEA a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer
empowering the local agent to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreign-based employer
for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and contract of employment. Considering that the local
private employment agency may sue on behalf of its foreign principal on the basis of its contractual undertakings
submitted to the POEA, there is no reason why MC cannot likewise sign or execute a certification of non-forum
shopping for its own purposes and/or on behalf of Hanil.
2. YES. it is not disputed that MC and Hanils Petition for Certiorari filed in the CA did not contain an explanation
why resort was made to other modes of service of the petition to the parties concerned. In the exercise of its
discretion granted under Section 11 of Rule 13, the Court of Appeals considered the same as not having been filed
and dismissed the petition outright. The utter disregard of the rules made by petitioners cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction and substantial compliance.
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08 - Zaida Ruby Alberto v. CA (2000) (Natalia Realty)

Doctrines:
The whole point of the action initiated by that complaint was and is to vindicate petitioners right to an undivided
portion of the lands subject of the questioned sale, of which she had been deprived by the fraudulent machinations
of private respondents.
Rule 13 Sec 14 Notice of Lis Pendens-In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property,
the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action.
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano got the legal Services of Atty. Zaida Alberto to represent them
before the SEC in an action to recover real properties, money and other assets that may pertain to them by virtue of their
stockholdings in Natalia Realty Inc. Both parties formalized their conformity in a retainer agreement which indicates that
the Alanos will pay Atty. Alberto the following: a.) 10% of whatever real estate may be awarded and b.) P 200,000.
Atty. Alberto filed on behalf of the respondents a cases in the SEC an action for the liquidation, accounting, and
damages against Eugenio S. Baltao and 5 others from Natalia. She also appeared at the hearings.
Eventually, Atty. Alberto learned that the Alanos moved to dismiss the SEC case. It appeared that during the
pendency of the case, the Alanos and Natalia Realty reached a settlement without consulting the petitioner. Atty. Alberto
learned of the settlement when she received a copy of the SEC order. Baltao and Natalia Realty joined the Alano Spouses
in their motion to dismiss by virtue of a satisfactory settlement reached between them. The Case was dismissed.
Spouses Alano admitted the settlement and that they expect to receive 35 hectares of land. Atty. Alberto
demanded the payment of fees based on the retainer agreement but the Spouses refused to pay despite repeated demands.
This prompted Atty. Alberto to file a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages against the spouses. RTC
decided in favor of Alberto. Atty. Cause the decision to be executed. However, per sherrifs return, only P 3,500 of the
personal properties of the spouses were levied.
Apparently, Natalia Realty, Inc. had sold to private respondent Yolanda Alano, respondent-spouses daughter, a
little over 23 hectares out of the 32.4 hectares given to them as settlement of the SEC case. The sale was executed six days
before the spouses moved to dismiss the SEC case. This discovery prompted petitioner to file a complaint, and thereafter,
a second Amended Complaint to declare the deed of sale null and void ab initio on the ground that the transfer of the
subject parcels of land to Yolanda Alano was simulated. Atty. Alberto likewise caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens the transfer certificates of title.
RTC dimissed petitioners complaint for insufficiency of cause of action. Due to this, the notice of lis pendens
and attorneys lien on the TCTs were cancelled. CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because it did not state a sufficient cause of action
2. W/N the action does not affects title to or possession of real property and hence not a proper subject of a
notice of lis pendens
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. The sufficiency of petitioners cause of action in the
second amended complaint is readily apparent. A right in her favor was created by virtue of the retainer
agreement executed between her and the Spouses Alano. The spouses had the obligation to honor and not to
violate the provisions of the retainer agreement it entered into with the petitioner. Unfortunately, they breached
this obligation when they refused to pay Atty. Albertos attorneys fees. When Atty. Alberto moved for the
execution of the judgment, she discovered that the spouses had no more leviable properties except those
amounting to P 3,500. They also made it appear that it was Natalia Realty which sold the 23 hectares to
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respondent Yolanda P. Alano. Clearly, all these instances which were alleged and enumerated in the 2nd amended
complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action on the part of Alberto.
The TC and CA should not have been too rigid in applying the rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, only the averments in the complaint and no other are to be consulted.
The rule admits of exceptions:
First: All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not
denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence thereon. Second: Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the
complaint, may be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.
A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action unless it appears clearly from the face of
the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within
the facts alleged therein. A reading of said complaint plus the attached documents and pleadings show that
petitioner is entitled to relief.
2. NO. It is a proper subject of lis pendens. Atty. Alberto argues that based on Rule 13 Sec14 of the ROC and Sec 76
of the Property Registration Decree,the whole point of the action initiated by that complaint was and is to
vindicate petitioners right to an undivided portion of the lands subject of the questioned sale, of which she had
been deprived by the fraudulent machinations of private respondents. Such is a real action affecting title or
possession of real property in which a notice of lis pendens is proper and justified.
The prayer in the 2nd amended complaint shows that it directly affects the title to or possession of said real
properties. It is specific enough as it refers to a portion covered by the TCTs of the real property. The Notice of
Lis Pendens is necessary to protect petitioners right especially since respondents allegedly intended to defraud
petitioner as shown by the sale under suspicious circumstances of the respondent-spouses settlement share of
subject property by Natalia Realty, Inc. to the formers daughter, respondent Yolanda P. Alano.
The misapplication of the rule of the RTC and CA on lis pendens will leave petitioners claim unprotected.
183 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
09 - Romero v. CA (2005)
Doctrine:
Lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, it is
intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole
world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
A notation of lis pendens does not create a non-existent right or lien. It serves merely as a warning to a person
who purchases or contracts on the subject property that he does so at his peril and subject to the result of the
pending litigation. It is not even required that the applying party must prove his right or interest over the property
sought to be annotated.
Facts:
Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell with Saturnino Orden, a property locaed at
Denver cor. New York Sts., Cubao, Quezon City for the amount of P 17M. Orden will pay the Romeros P 7M upon the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, P 10M not later than December 19, 1996 and that he shall shoulder the expenses to
evict the squatters on the property.
When Orden failed to pay the down payment, Corona told him that she was rescinding the contract to sell. Orden
then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the Romeros, alleging that he has complied with his
obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to demand from petitioners the performance of their
obligation under the contract. Simultaneously, he also caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens the property.
The Romeros eventually sold the property to Manuel Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius Santos who filed a motion for
leave to intervene with the RTC and were admitted as defendants-intervenors. They filed a motion for the cancellation of
lis pendens. Orden filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullity of the resolutions of the RTC and asked
for the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT.
Issue:
1. W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the lis pendens.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. To put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens, all a party has to do is to assert a claim of
possession or title over the subject property. It is not necessary that ownership or interest over the property is
proved.
The complaint for specific performance and damages filed by Orden specifically prayed that the Romeros be
bound by the terms and conditions of their letter-contract. By praying thus, Orden in effect asks the court to order
petitioners to fulfill their promise to sell the propertyfor the amount of P17M. While private respondent did not
explicitly state that he was running after the ownership of the property, a simple reading of the complaint would
show that such was his intent. This is sufficient for purposes of annotating lis pendens.
There is nothing in the rules which requires a party seeking annotation of lis pendens to show that the land
belongs to him. There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation must prove his right or interest
over the property sought to be annotated. Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against the
certificate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal
effect similar to a lien. The rules merely require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a notation of lis
pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It only protects the applicants rights
which will be determined during trial.
184 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 14, 1 - 10 SUMMONS

[TO FOLLOW]
185 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 14, 11 - 20 SUMMONS

1 - Delta Motor Sales Corp v. Mangosing (1976)
Doctrine:
Failure to serve summons to the proper corporate officers does place the domestic corporation under jurisdiction
of the court.
As per 1997 Rules of Court Sec. 11, the proper officers to be served summons are its president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer and in house counsel. This enumeration is exclusive.
The rule on the service of summons to domestic corporate entities is not to be liberally construed.
Facts:
Pamintuan bought from Delta Motors a Toyota car in June 1974. Finding that there was leaks in the windshield,
doors and windows it was brought back to Delta to be serviced as per its warranty which it failed to do. For failure of
Delta Motors to fulfill its warranty obligation, Pamintuan sued Delta Motors for the recovery of sum of money and
damages. On April 19, summons for Delta Motors was served and acknowledged by a certain Miranda. Delta did not
answer the complaint within the within the reglementary period. Pamintuan filed a motion to declare Delta in default
which was granted. The trial court ruled in favor of Pamintuan. Lawyers for Delta filed a motion to lift order of default, to
set aside judgment and for a new trial. Delta alleged that Miranda was not a corporate secretary but the secretary of the
Mr. Ramos of the personnel department. The lower court denied the motion on the ground that Miranda was a person of
suitable age and discretion who could receive the summon for another person or a substitute summon. Pamintuan filed for
a motion of execution which was granted by the court. The sheriff executing the writ levied a Toyota Mini-bus and a car
belonging to Delta to satisfy the judgment.
Issue:
1. W/N Delta Motors was properly served with summons.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of court over corporation.
Under the old Rules of Court Rule 14 Sec 13 (now Rule 14 Sec 11, 1997 Rules of Court), a registered domestic
corporation or partnership could only be placed in the jurisdiction of a court if summons are served to its
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. The liberal construction rule cannot be
invoked and utilize for the legal requirement as to the manner in which summons should be served to domestic
corporations. In the case at bar, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor because it was not properly
served with summons. The service of summons on Miranda, who is not among the persons mentioned in Rule 14
Sec 13 was insufficient. It did not bind Delta. Consequently, the order of default, and judgment of default in the
civil case are void and should be set aside.
Note: Under the 1997 Rules of Court Rule 14 Sec 11, the proper corporate officer to be served summons are its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate treasurer and in house counsel.
186 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2 - E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Hon. Benito (1999)

Doctrine:
The service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of
upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation.
The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is
insufficient.
Facts:
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. (Villarosa) is a limited partnership with a principal office address in Davao
City and branch offices at Paraaque and Cagayan de Oro City. It entered into a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement with Imperial Development Corporation (Imperial) to develop certain parcels of land in Cagayan de Oro
belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They agreed that the
venue shall be in the courts of Makati in case any dispute arose.
On April 3, 1998, Imperial filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Villarosa before the
RTC of Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low
cost houses, there were no substantial developments in the parcels of land.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon Villarosa, through its Branch Manager Engr. Sabulbero
at the old Cagayan de Oro City office address but the Sheriffs Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served
on May 5 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of
the original copy of the summons.
Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that the summons intended for the limited
partnership was served upon Sabulbero, an employee of its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City on May 6. Villarosa
contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its
employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and thus, did not acquire jurisdiction over Villarosa.
Imperial filed an Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss alleging that the records show that Villarosa
actually received the summons and the complaint, through Sabulbero, its branch manager, on May 8 as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the copy of the summons and not on May 5 or 6.
Hon. Benito decided that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation
through its branch manager Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and
consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Villarosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 restricted the service of summons
on persons enumerated and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word manager was changed to
general manager, secretary to corporate secretary, and excluding agent and director.
Issue:
1. W/N the Court acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons or
officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states general
manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of
cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
187 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with
the rules has been enjoined. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firms branch office has
been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firms principal office.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that
such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. The liberal construction rule cannot be
invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be
served on a domestic corporation.
Also, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the Villarosa precisely objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the court cannot take cognizance of a case
for lack of jurisdiction over Villarosa. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and
void.
3 - Paramount Insurance Corp. v. AC Ordoez Corp. (2008)

Doctrine:
Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on behalf of a
corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporations president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.
Facts:
Paramount Insurance Corp is the subrogee of Maximo Mata, the a registered owner of a Honda City involved in a
vehicular accident with a truck mixer owned by respondent corporation and driven by respondent Suspine in Cavite.
Paramount filed a complaint for damages against AC Ordonez Corp and Suspine (respondents). Based on the
Sheriffs Return of Service, summons remained unserved on respondent Suspine, while it was served on respondent
corporation and received by Samuel D. Marcoleta of its Receiving Section on April 3, 2000.
Paramount filed a motion to declare defendants in default but ,respondent corporation filed an Omnibus Motion
(And Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default) alleging that summons was improperly served
upon it because it was made to a secretarial staff who was unfamiliar with court processes; and that the summons
was received by Mr. Armando C. Ordonez, President and General Manager of respondent corporation only on June 24,
2000. Respondent corporation asked for an extension of 15 days within which to file an Answer. Paramount filed a second
motion to declare defendants in default. Respondent corporation filed a Motion to Admit Answer alleging honest mistake
and business reverses that prevented them from hiring a lawyer. Metropolitan Trial Court issued an Order admitting the
answer and setting the case for pre-trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that the Metropolitan Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in admitting the
answer which did not contain a notice of hearing, contrary to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. It also
assailed respondent corporations Omnibus Motion for being violative of Section 9, Rule 15 because while it sought leave
to file an answer, it did not attach said answer but only asked for a 15-day extension to file the same. Petitioner also
averred that assuming the Omnibus Motion was granted, the Motion to Admit Answer and the Answer with Counterclaim
were filed 26 days beyond the extension period it requested.
Issues:
1. Whether there was valid service of summons in AC Ordonez Corp (rule 14 related)
2. Whether the AC Ordonez Corp has legal personality to file an appeal
3. Whether the court erred in not calling the parties into mediation
188 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Held/Ratio:
1. No. Service of summons to someone other than the corporations president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on behalf of a
corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporations president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.
Thus, the service of summons to respondent corporations Receiving Section through Samuel D. Marcoleta is
defective and not binding to said corporation.
Moreover, petitioner was served with a copy of the Sheriffs Return which states:
MANNER OF SERVICE: DULY SERVED thru SAMUEL D. MARCOLETA (receiving
section-A.C. Ordonez Construction Corp.,) and who was authorized by A. C. Ordonez
Construction Corp., management to receive such court processes.
On its face, the return shows that the summons was received by an employee who is not among the
responsible officers enumerated by law. Such being invalid, petitioner should have sought the issuance and
proper service of new summons instead of moving for a declaration of default.
2. Yes. Although the cancellation of a corporations certificate of registration puts an end to its juridical personality,
Sec. 122 of the Corporation Code, however provides that a corporation whose corporate existence is terminated in
any manner continues to be a body corporate for three years after its dissolution for purposes of prosecuting and
defending suits by and against it and to enable it to settle and close its affairs
3. No. the decision to refer a case to mediation involves judicial discretion. Although Sec. 9 B, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A. M. No. 04-2-04-SC, requires the payment of P1,000.00 as mediation fee upon
the filing of a mediatable case, petition, special civil action, comment/answer to the petition or action, and the
appellees brief, the final decision to refer a case to mediation still belongs to theponente, subject to the
concurrence of the other members of the division.
189 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
4 - Litton Mills, Inc., v. Court of Appeals and Gelhaar Uniform Company, Inc. (1996)
Doctrine:
The allegations in the complaint is sufficient to prove that a foreign corporation is doing business in order for
summons be served in accordance with Rule 14 14.
Facts:
Litton Mills, Inc. (Litton) entered into an agreement with Empire Sales Philippines Corporation (Empire), as local
agent of Gelhaar Uniform Company (Gelhaar), a corporation organized under the laws of the United States. Litton agreed
to supply Gelhaar 7,770 dozens of soccer jerseys. The agreement stipulated that before Litton could collect from the bank
on the letter of credit, it must present an inspection certificate issued by Gelhaars local agent, Empire, that the goods were
in satisfactory condition. Litton sent four shipments between December 2 and December 30, 1983. A fifth shipment was
inspected by Empire from January 9 to January 19, 1984, but Empire refused to issue the certificate of inspection.
On January 23, 1984, Litton filed a complaint for an action for specific performance with RTC of Pasig alleging
that Empires refusal to issue a certificate was without valid reason. Litton also sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to compel Empire to issue the inspection certificate. The trial court issued the writ on
January 25, 1984. The next day, Empire issued the inspection certificate, so that the cargo was shipped on time.
On February 8, 1984, Atty. Noval filed in behalf of the defendants (Empire and Gelhaar) a Motion for Extension
of Time to File an Answer/Responsive Pleading. He filed ten other motions for extension, all of which were granted by
the court, except to the last, which the Court denied. On his motion, the court later reconsidered its order of denial and
admitted the answer of the defendants. On September 10, 1984, Atty. Noval filed the pretrial brief for the defendants.
On January 29, 1985, the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano and Hernandez entered a special appearance for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over Gelhaar. It moved to dismiss the case and to quash the summons
on the ground that Gelhaar was a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and as such, was beyond the
reach of the local courts. It contended that Litton failed to allege and prove that Gelhaar was doing business in the
Philippines, before summons could be served under Rule 14, 14.
On September 24, 1986, the trial court issued an order denying for lack of merit Gelhaars motion to dismiss and
to quash the summons. It held that Gelhaar was doing business in the Philippines, and that the service of summons on
Gelhaar was therefore valid. Gelhaar filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied. On appeal to the CA,
the appellate court ruled that it must be proven first that a foreign corporation must be doing business in the Philippines
before the service of summons.
Issue:
1. W/N jurisdiction over Gelhaar was acquired by the trial court.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over Gelhaar by service of summons upon its agent, Empire, pursuant to
Rule 14, 14. A court need not go beyond the allegations in the complaint to determine whether or not a
defendant foreign corporation is doing business for the purpose of Rule 14, 14. In the case at bar, the allegation
that Empire, for and in behalf of Gelhaar, ordered soccer jerseys from Litton and for this purpose Gelhaar caused
the opening of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Litton is a sufficient allegation that Gelhaar was doing
business in the Philippines.
Gelhaar contends that it was a single, isolated transaction not constituting doing business. The Court ruled that
Gelhaars act in purchasing soccer jerseys to be within the ordinary course of business of the company
considering that it was engaged in the manufacture of uniforms. The acts indicate a purpose to do business.
The appearance of Atty. Noval in behalf of Gelhaar was not binding on the latter because Atty. Noval was not
authorized by Gelhaar to represent itself in the said case. Thus, there was no voluntary appearance by Gelhaar
through the appearance of Atty. Noval. Furthermore, Atty. Novals representations in the answer will not be
considered binding on Gelhaar. Gelhaar was allowed a new period for filing its own answer.
190 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
5 - Wang Laboratories v. Mendoza (1976) (ACCRALAW; not doing business in Phils; voluntary appearance)
Doctrine:
Modes of effecting service of summons upon private foreign corporations: (1) by serving upon the agent
designated in accordance with law to accept service of summons; (2) if there is no resident agent, by service on
the government official designated by law to that office; (3) by serving on any officer or agent of said corporation
within the Philippines.
If a single act or transaction of a foreign corporation is not merely incidental or casual but distinctly indicates a
purpose to do other business in the State, such act constitutes doing business under which a foreign corporation
may be served with summons.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of formal notice.
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person it
must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court. If the appearance is for any
other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Facts:
Wang Laboratories is a corporation organized under the laws of the United States. Its principal address is at One
Industrial Avenue, Lowell, Massachusetts, U.S.A. It manufactures and sells computers worldwide. In the Philippines,
Wang Laboratories sells it products to Exxbyte Technologies Corporation (Exxbyte). Exxbyte sells computer products to
the public in its own name for its own account.
Exxbyte and ACCRALAW entered into two contracts with Exxbyte. The first contract is for acquiring and
installing a Wang 2200 US Integrated Information System at ACCRALAWs office. Exxbyte delivered and installed the
hardware. The second contract is for developing a data processing software program (ISLA) for the purpose of
computerizing the ACCRALAW office. However, the contract program was not implemented.
(CIV PRO PART)
ACCRALAW filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages, replevin and attachment in the RTC of
Makati. Wang Laboratories filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the summons was improperly served, therefore,
the court had not obtained jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Wang Laboratories also filed a Motion for
Deposition by Oral Examination in order to present testimonial evidence in support of it motion to dismiss. The RTC
ordered the taking of the deposition by oral examination. ACCRALAW opposed the motion to dismiss. Wang
Laboratories filed it reply.
ACCRALAW filed an Ex-Abudante Cautela Motion for leave to Effect Extraterritorial Service of Summons
on Wang Laboratories. Judge Mendoza granted the Ex-Abundante Cautela Motion to Effect Extraterritorial Service of
Summons, denied the petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground that it had voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, and thus declined to consider the legal and factual issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss.
Motion to Dismiss
Denied
Ex-Abundante Cautela Motion to Effect

Extraterritorial Service of Summons
Granted
Wang Laboratories filed this petition against Judge Mendoza before the SC. The Second Division of this Court
required Judge Mendoza to comment and to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Mendoza from
proceeding with the case.
Wang Laboratories claimed that the court has no jurisdiction over its person because it is not domiciled in the
Philippines, it does not have any office or place of business in the Philippines, and it is not licensed to engage and is not
engaging business in the Philippines. It further attested that Exxbyte does not represent Wang Laboratories. It is a local
company completely separate and distinct from Wang Laboratories.
191 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Issues:
1. W/N respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, a foreign corporation.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. According to the rules on civil procedure, there are three modes of effecting service of summons upon
private foreign corporations: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance with law to accept service of
summons; (2) if there is no resident agent, by service on the government official designated by law to that office;
(3) by serving on any officer or agent of said corporation within the Philippines.
In this case, the summons intended for Wang Laboratories was sent to Exxbyte. Exxbyte is deemed as the
formers duly authorized and exclusive representative and distributor in the Philippines. This is evinced by public
advertisements, letterhead and invoices of Exxbyte, which show that it is Wangs representative. Further, in its
Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Wang admitted that it deals exclusively with Exxbyte.
Wang cannot claim that it is not doing business in the Philippines. If a single act or transaction of a foreign
corporation is not merely incidental or casual but distinctly indicates a purpose to do other business in the State,
such act constitutes doing business under which a foreign corporation may be served with summons. When
ACCRALAW filed a motion for leave to effect extraterritorial service of summons on Wang, it submitted that
Wang has trademarks registered with the Philippine Patent Office. Further, Wang designated Rafael E.
Evangelista as its Resident Agent upon whom notice or process affecting the mark may be served. Other
instances, which prove that Wang is doing business in the Philippines are: it has installed, at least 26 different
products in several corporations in the Philippines since 1976; It has registered its trade name with the Philippine
Patents Office; Mr. Yeoh, petitioners controller in Asia, visited the office of its distributor for at least four times
where he conducted training programs in the Philippines; Wang has allowed its registered logo and trademark to
be used by Exxbyte; and made it known that there exists a designated distributor in the Philippines as published in
its advertisements.
Even assuming that Wang is not doing business in the Philippines, it may be sued for acts done against person in
the Philippines. Further, by alleging non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleading, Wang has waived lack of
jurisdiction of the court. A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of formal notice. When the
appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
[In case asked]
Wang prayed for the following in its Motion to Dismiss: (1) for authority to take testimony by way of deposition
upon oral examination; (2) for extension of time to file opposition to plaintiffs motion to effect Extraterritorial
Service of Summons; (3) to hold in abeyance any and all proceedings relative to plaintiffs foregoing motion and
(4) to consider as a mere scrap of paper plaintiffs motion to strike out Deposition.
In addition, the records show that petitioner also prayed for: (1) authority to reset date of taking of deposition; (2)
admission of the formal stenographic notes and (3) suspension of time to file responsive pleadings, not to mention
its various participation in the proceedings in the court other than for the purpose of objecting to lack of
jurisdiction
192 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
6 - Carmelita Sahagun v. CA (1991)

Doctrine:
Service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of
physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play.
Facts:
Abel Sahagun (husband of the petitioner), was the manager of Rallye Motor Co., Inc. He sold a motor vehicle to
one Ernesto Salazar who issued a promissory note as payment and executed a chattel mortgage on the motor vehicle in
favor of Rallye. Subsequently, Rallye, through Abel, assigned the note and the chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corp.
for valuable consideration. When the note matured, Salazar failed to pay Filinvest, compelling it to sue.
When Filinvest brought suit against Abel, he was already in the United States. Filinvest failed to serve summons
extra-territorially upon Abel because his whereabouts in the US were unknown. Carmelita on the other hand, also failed to
file her complaint in intervention. Thus, the court declared the Sahaguns in default.
Carmelita appealed to the CA which ruled that she was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence. Filinvest
filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publication on defendant Abel Sahagun. The summons was served on Abel
Sahagun through publication in the Manila Evening Post on March 7, 14, and 21, 1986, with a confusing entry that his last
known address was at Las Pias, Metro Manila, clearly contradicting the address stated in the order of the trial court,
which was at Makati.
Despite the defect in the summons, the CA ruled in favor of Filinvest, declaring Abel Sahagun in default for
failure to file his answer. Carmelita assails the decision and contends that the local publication of summons was not
enough for the court to acquire jurisdiction over Abel since there is no way he could have read it.
Issue:
1. W/N the court acquired jurisdiction over Abel Sahagun by the publication of summons in the Manila Evening
Post
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. It was posited during the deliberations that the publication should have been made in a newspaper published
in the state and county of the US where Abel Sahagun now allegedly resides. Such publication in a foreign
newspaper, it is claimed, would most likely give notice to the person to be served, although it is also
conceded that such condition has not been incorporated in Section 17 of Rule 14.
It must be remembered that service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country
is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of
the requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him be subjected to a judgment, and that he may thereby
be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, if he be so minded.
However, despite the decision that publication in the Philippines is sufficient, the service of summons in this
case is still defective, there being no showing that copies of the summons and the amended complaint were duly
served at the defendants last known correct address by registered mail, as a complement to the publication. The
failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the
summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.
The case is, however, remanded to the lower court for proper extra-territorial service of summons to defendant
Abel Sahagun.
Separate Opinion of Justice Sarmiento:
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority would sustain the correctness of extrajudicial service of summons by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, ordered by the court. I hold that extrajudicial
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service of summons by publication, to be valid, must be effected in the territory in which the absent defendant
may be found. I believe that the Rules support this view.
Note that the newspaper in which publication has to be made must be one most likely to give notice to the person
to be served. For obvious reasons, publication in a newspaper circulating in the Philippines is not likely to
provide notice to a U.S. resident, and while publication in a newspaper in the United States is no assurance either
that the defendant actually residing there will be actually notified, it is more likely, than where the publication
was done here, to give the notice in question.
7 - Erlinda Velayo-Fong v. Spouses Velayo (2006) (Resident of Hawaii, served summons in Intercon)
Doctrines:
See Section 15 of Rule 14 of the current Rules of Court on extra-territorial service.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that is, an action against the thing
itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. The
rationale for this is that in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Facts:
The spouses Raymond Velayo and Maria Velayo filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for
writ of preliminary attachment against Erlinda Velayo-Fong, Rodolfo Velayo, Jr., and Roberto Velayo. Ramond is the
half-brother of all the defendants. The spouses allege that Erlinda (a resident of Honolulu, Hawaii), Rodolfo, and
Roberto, (both of the latter are residents of the Philippines), made it appear that Erlinda and their common father Rodolfo
Velayo, Sr. had filed a complaint against Raymond before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), accusing Raymond
of the crimes of estafa and kidnapping a minor, and that the Spouses be included in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation. The hold departure order was granted. The spouses aver it prevented them from leaving
the country, thus resulting in the cancellation of respondents trips abroad and caused all of respondents business
transactions and operations to be paralyzed to their damage and prejudice. The spouses also alleged that the defendants
filed a petition in the SEC which caused respondents funds to be frozen, paralyzing the latters business transactions and
operations to their damage and prejudice.
Since Erlinda was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, respondents prayed for a writ of preliminary
attachment against petitioners properties located in the Philippines. Before respondents application for a writ of
preliminary attachment can be acted upon by the RTC, respondents filed on September 10, 1993 an Urgent Motion
praying that the summons addressed to petitioner be served to her at her Sunset View Towers Condominium, Roxas
Boulevard in Pasay City and at her Towers Condominium unit in Makati. This motion was granted by the RTC. The
Process Server submitted the Officers Return stating that after several attempts and failure to serve the summons in the
aforestated addresses, he was able to serve the summons at the instance of the spouses through counsel not at her
two (2) given addresses, but at the lobby of Intercontinental Hotel, Makati, Metro Manila, right in the presence of
lobby counter personnel by the name of Ms. A. Zulueta, but said defendant refused to sign in receipt thereof. Summons
were also served upon Rodolfo and Roberto.
Upon motion, the defendants were declared in default, and thereafter judgment rendered awarding damages in
favor of spouses. Erlinda filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was prevented from filing a
responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents complaint because of fraud, accident or mistake; that
contrary to the Officers Return, no summons was served upon her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute
respondents material allegations. This motion was denied by the RTC. CA affirms. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari seeking reversal of the CA decision. Erlinda argues that summons should have been served through
extraterritorial service since she is a non-resident.
Issues:
1. W/N the Erlinda was validly served summons.
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Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Under this Section 17 of Rule 14 of the then applicable old Rules of Court, when the defendant is a
nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially. The case analyzed the
provision:
There are only four instances when extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely:
i. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs;
ii. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in
which the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
iii. when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
iv. when the defendants property has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by
i. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
ii. publication, also with leave of court; or
iii. any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that is, an action against the
thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.
The rationale for this is that in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. The
instant case is an action in personam. Thus, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The instant case is and action for damages, which is an
action in personam. Therefore, it was necessary for the process server to serve the summons personally.
A process servers certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. There is a
presumption of regularity. Erlindas bare allegation that the statement in the Officers Return that she was
personally served summons is inaccurate is not sufficient. Since petitioner failed to show that her failure file an
answer was not due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect; and that she had a valid and meritorious
defense, there is no merit to her prayer for a liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Petition denied. CA decision
is affirmed.
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8 - Jose v. Boyon (2003)

Doctrines:
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service of summons was
not legally possible. Also, service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in
personal suits.
Facts:
Spouses Jose filed a complaint for specific performance against the Boyons to compel them to facilitate the
transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was lodged before the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa which is presided by herein public respondent Judge N.C. Perello. Judge Perello then issued
summons to the Boyons.
Substituted service and, eventually, Summons by Publication was resorted to by the sheriff. Judge Perello
declared the Boyons in default for failure to file their respective answers and allowed ex parte presentation of evidence.
Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the US, was surprised by the resolution issued by the respondent court.
The Boyons then filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected
by the court.
The CA decided in favor of the Boyons.
Issues:
1. W/N the service of summons on the respondents was valid
Held/Ratio:
1. No. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
substituted service. In addition, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.
The proof of service of summons must:
a. indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time
b. specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant
c. state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant
The pertinent facts proving these circumstances should also be stated in the proof of service or in the officers
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service
renders the service of summons ineffective
The Return of Summons12 shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the
process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return
merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a
person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of
the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof
of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed.

12. "That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and
unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol
thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court."
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Extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action isin rem or quasi in
rem. The case filed in the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against the respondents.
While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue,
since they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, the Court has consistently declared that an action
for specific performance is an action in personam
9 - La Naval Drug Corporation v. CA (1994) (arbitration regarding lease)

Doctrines:
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of
an affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The
assertion, however of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as estoppel or as waiver of such defense.
Facts:
La Naval was leasing a portion of a commercial building owned by La Proveedora, Inc. Meanwhile, ownership of
the same building was transferred to Wilson Yao. La Navals lease agreement with the former owner expired. It wished to
extend its lease. A contract was executed between La Naval and Yao but they could not agree on the price. Yao convinced
La Naval to submit the matter for arbitration under RA 876 (Arbitration Law) in accordance with a provision in their
contract to the effect that if the parties cannot agree on the rental rate, the issue will be submitted to a group of 3
arbitrators. Both parties will be entitled to choose an arbitrator and the 2 arbitrators will elect the last.
The problem came after the 2 parties had elected their arbitrators. La Naval told its chosen arbitrator to defer the
confirmation of the appointment of the 3rd arbitrator until La Navals Board could meet and approve such appointment.
Yao saw this as a dilatory tactic and moved that after summary hearing under the Arbitration Law, the court order the
arbitrators to proceed. La Naval filed an answer with counterclaim and argued that Yao had no cause of action. Thereafter,
Yao filed an amended petition and sought to enforce the arbitration agreement with damages. La Naval contended, by way
of answer, that the filing fees were not paid. The RTC of Angeles City decided that the parties claims for damages may
be entertained by the court in a full hearing. La Naval moved for reconsideration and raised the issue of the courts
jurisdiction. The MR failed. On appeal, the CA held that while the court had limited jurisdiction under the Arbitration law,
La Naval was estopped as it had filed its own counterclaim.
Issue:
1. W/N the court had jurisdiction to entertain the claims for damages in a full hearing
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Arbitration Law limits the courts authority to the adjudication of the issue of whether there is an
agreement for arbitration. If there is, then the court shall order the parties to proceed. If there is not, the case will
be dismissed.
In its decision the Supreme Court discussed the difference between jurisdiction over subject matter and
jurisdiction over the person. On jurisdiction over subject matter, it said that this defense may be raised at any time
as it deals with jurisdiction conferred by law. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the nature of this case
necessitates its dismissal in view of the Arbitration Law. With regard to jurisdiction over the person, the voluntary
appearance of the defendant is tantamount to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. To protect himself from
the adverse effects of this rule, the defendant must timely contest the jurisdiction of the court. The submission of
other issues or affirmative defenses in a motion to dismiss does not operate as a waiver of the right to the defense
of the courts lack of jurisdiction.
197 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
11 - Cezar v. Ricafort-Bautista and Specified Materials Co. (2006)

Doctrines:
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff once the complaint is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways
through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired either through the service of
summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.
Facts:
On November 11, 1996, Specified Materials Corporation filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
Virgilio Cezar (Cezar) due to failure of the latter to pay construction materials it purportedly purchased under a credit line
extended by Specified Materials Corporation.
After the filing of the complaint, summons was issued to petitioner and this was served by Sheriff Juan C.
Marquez with the pertinent portion of the return stating that it summons was served through Mr. Arsenio Robles, an
employee of defendant who is authorized to transact business, as per his signature appearing below summons.
On 3 November 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Decision arguing that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person. This was denied by said court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
1. W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the substituted service of
summons effected by Sheriff Juan C. Marquez.
Held:
1. NO. Cezar claims that the person who allegedly received the summons on his behalf, and who was identified in
the sheriffs return as Arsenio Robles, was not his employee. He also maintains that had he been given the
opportunity to present his defense, he would have shown that his obligation to private respondent is less than the
amount as established by the trial court. Private respondent points out that the Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint and the Amended Complaint were personally served on petitioner himself as shown by his signatures
appearing thereon.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff once the complaint is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways
through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired either through the service of
summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and
the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. As the sheriffs return in
the present case does not contain any statement with regard to the impossibility of personal service the same is
patently defective and so the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions will not lie. Yet,
although the substituted service upon him of summons was defective, said defect was cured by his
voluntary appearance.
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12 - UCPB vs. Ongpin (2001) Special Appearance + Publication + Substituted Service

Doctrines:
If a defendant is a non-resident and his property in the Philippines had been attached, service may, by leave of
court, be effected outside the Philippines or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
In the same manner, if the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, likewise be effected by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. In this case, the plaintiff must show that the address of defendant is unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Facts:
(A lot of things happened. Basically, service through publication then substituted service were done. Sorry this has to be a
long digest for better understanding.)
Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) entered into a credit agreement with UCPB having Ongpin, the controlling
stockholder, as surety and bounded solidarily with PAI. After failure to pay its obligations, PAI was sued along with
Ongpin (now residing in Hongkong) as UCPB sought for attachment.
Ongpin made several special appearances questioning the jurisdiction of the court since the summons were not
served to him. UCPB then tried to serve the summons through publication but was held in abeyance.
Subsequently, the sheriff together with UCPBs lawyer went to the PILTEL office to serve summons on Ongpin,
who was then chairman of the board of PILTEL. After sometime, they encountered Anne Morallo (executive secretary of
the PILTEL President) who then told them that she was authorized to receive court processes on behalf of Ongpin
(found not to be holding his office there).
Ongpin assails the validity of the service of summons stating that PILTEL was not his place of business and
Morillo was not authorized to receive summons on his behalf.
Issues:
1. W/N Ongpins special appearances may be deemed voluntary appearances therefore giving jurisdiction to the
court.
2. W/N the substituted service of summons to Morillo was valid.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. A party making special appearances to challenge the jurisdiction of the court based on the ground of an
ineffective service of summons cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction.
In the present case, although respondent had indeed filed numerous pleadings, these pleadings were precisely for
the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the person of respondent on the ground that there
was no valid service of summons on him. It would be absurd to hold that respondent, by making such appearance,
thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
2. NO. The substituted service of summons to Morillo was not valid. Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if, for
justifiable causes, personal service cannot be effected on defendant, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
The word office or the phrase regular place of business refers to the office or place of business of the
defendant at the time of service
In the present case, PILTEL, where substituted summons was served and of which respondent was the chairman
of the board, was not even a party to the present suit. Respondent was sued in his personal capacity as surety for
PAI.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
As the PILTEL office is not respondents regular place of business, it cannot therefore be said that Anne V.
Morallo, the person who received the service of summons in behalf of respondent, was authorized to receive
service of process on behalf of respondent.
NOTE: It is clear that petitioner still has a remedy even Ongpin was residing in Hongkong with an address that cannot be
ascertained by UCPB:
Under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce the writ of attachment through a valid service of summons. if,
indeed, respondent is no longer a resident of the Philippines, petitioner still can, by leave of court, serve summons by
publication, as it in fact tried to do. The records show that petitioner attempted to serve summons by publication, but later
abandoned its effort and for some reason attempted personal service instead.
200 of 277
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13 - HSBC vs. Cecilia Catalan (2004) (bank did not release value of checks)
Doctrines:
It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g.,
invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court.
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity
which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law
to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Facts:
Fredrick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to Catalan in the total amount of HK $3.2 Million. Catalan
presented these checks to HSBC Bank. The Checks were dishonored for having insufficient funds. Catalan knowing that
Thomson had communicated with the Bnak, asked HSBC to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC did not
listen to her request. Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account was transferred to HSBC Trustee. Catalan
then requested Trustee to pay her but it refused and even asked her to submit back to them the original checks for
verification. Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong, at their own expense, to personally submit the checks but Trustee
despite receipt of the original checks, refused to pay Catalans claim. So Catalan is now suing HSBC to collect her HK
$3.2 Million dollars.
HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on the grounds that: (a) the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint since the action is a money claim for a debt contracted by Thomson before his
death which should have been filed in the estate or intestate proceedings of Thomson; (b) Catalan engages in forum
shopping ; (c) the amended complaint states no cause of action against HSBANK; (d) the RTC has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK for improper service of summons; and, (e) it did not submit to the jurisdiction of
the RTC by filing a motion for extension of time to file a motion to dismiss.10
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2001, summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House Counsel of
HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati. Without
submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, dated October 29, 2001, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it.11 HSBC TRUSTEE alleges
that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a
corporation separate and distinct from HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place
in the Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it has no resident agent
upon whom summons may be served because it does not transact business in the Philippines.
RTC denied the motions to dismiss. HSBC Bank and Trustee both filed for Petition for Certiorari in the CA which
was also denied. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the complaint state a cause of action
2. W/N Catalan engaged in non-forum shopping by filing the complaint for damages when she also filed a petition
for probate of the alleged last will of Thomson with another branch of the RTC
3. W/N the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC Trustee
Held/Ratio:
Note: Sorry mahaba, may ibang issues kase. But for summons, read number 3 only J
1. YES. Catalan anchors her complaint for damages on Article 19 of the Civil Code. It speaks of the fundamental
principle of law and human conduct that a person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It sets the standards which
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may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. We are
convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on tort under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. It is evident that Catalan is suing HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE for unjustified and willful refusal to pay
the value of the checks.
2. NO. there is forum-shopping when there exist: a) identity of parties, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.
There is no identity of parties. HSBANK is not a party in the probate proceeding. HSBC TRUSTEE is only a
party in the probate proceeding because it is the executor and trustee named in the Hongkong will of Thomson.
With respect to the second and third requisites, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for therein are different from
those pleaded in the probate proceeding, such that a judgment in one case would not bar the prosecution of the
other case.
3. YES for HSBank and NO for HSBC Trustee.
It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion to
Dismiss. HSBANK already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over it by praying that its motion for extension of time
to file answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking
affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance, entered precisely to question
the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.38 HSBC TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings in
assailing the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC over it.
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private
juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no such agent, on
the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within
the Philippines.
The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not sufficiently show the fact of HSBC
TRUSTEEs doing business in the Philippines. It does not appear at all that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any
act which would give the general public the impression that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its
ordinary and usual business undertakings in the country.
202 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 15 MOTIONS
1 - Cledera v. Sarmiento (2003) (Provincial Board)
Doctrine:
The directives in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory. Non-compliance
therewith is fatal to the cause of the movant, because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration, without the
requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for appeal. Unless the movant has the time and
place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to
determine whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear him on his objection,
since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which to file his reply or opposition.
Facts:
(This case is loaded with facts, please bear with me)
This case stemmed from a controversy between two groups of people. The first group consists of Cledera, the
Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur, together with other officials and members of the Provincial Board of the same
province. This group shall be referred to as the Provincial Board, for brevity. The second group consists of Camano and
other employees who were dismissed by the Provincial Board. This group shall be referred to as the Employees.
Sarmiento is the Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur who sided with the employees.
The Provincial Board passed a resolution that approved a certain road and bridge fund that abolished the positions
occupied by the employees. Thus, the employees filed two civil cases before the court of Judge Sarmiento in order to
claim damages and seek reinstatement. After the pre-trial, both groups agreed that the cases be decided jointly based on
the stipulation of facts entered into at the said pre-trial.
However, the employees reneged on their agreement and filed a motion to re-open both cases so that they could
be allowed to present additional evidence before decision is rendered. The Judge initially denied this motion. Persistent,
the employees filed a motion for reconsideration (Employees MR). This MR was defective for failure to contain a
notice of the time, date and place of hearing. The employees later on attempted to correct the mistake by requesting the
clerk of court to set the hearing of the motion and to serve notice to the camp of the Provincial Board. While the
Provincial Board was given 5 days to oppose the employees motion after being informed of its filing, the Board opted not
to. Thus, the Judge granted the employees motion and re-opened the two cases. Because of the additional evidence
presented by the employees, their prayer for reinstatement was granted.
Naturally, the camp of the Provincial Board, through Assistant Provincial fiscal Amador, filed a motion for
reconsideration (Provincial Boards MR) of the decision reinstating the employees. However, this MR was also
defective because it failed to comply with the requirements provided under Rule 15. First, the notice was not
addressed to all parties concerned, but only to the clerk of court. Second, the notice was not served to the
employees camp at least 3 days before hearing. Third, the motion was not accompanied by a proof of its service.
To counter the Provincial Boards MR, the employees filed a motion for execution of the decision, claiming that
since the MR was fatally defective as to form, it did not have any force and effect. The employees further argued that
because of the defects, the period to appeal was not tolled and thus, the period naturally lapsed. Therefore, the decision
must be treated as final and executory.
The Judge sided with the employees and granted the motion for execution, treating the defective motion as a mere
scrap of paper, which cannot be acted upon. Aggrieved, the Provincial Board elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. W/N the Provincial Board can still question the validity of the employees MR (Employees MR - filed by the
employees in order to submit additional evidence; now being questioned for failure to contain notice of hearing.)
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2. W/N Provincial Boards MR can be acted upon as a valid motion (Provincial Boards MR - filed by
Provincial Board to have the order of reinstatement reconsidered; validity now being insisted upon despite failure
to comply with the requirements under Rule 15)
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Provincial Board is now estopped from questioning the validity of the employees MR.
It must be remembered that the Judge gave ample time to the Provincial Board to oppose the MR, but it opted not
to. Thus, the failure to oppose the re-opening of the cases should be considered as a waiver of the right to
challenge its validity.
The SC enunciated that the raising of this particular issue was a tactic on the part of the Provincial Board. The
Board believed that they would have won the reinstatement case had the employees been prevented from
presenting additional evidence. Thus, as an afterthought, they questioned the validity of the employees MR with
the hopes that the Court would strike it down as invalid so that in turn, the re-opening of the cases and the
subsequent presentation of additional evidence would also be considered invalid. However, since they failed to
oppose the MR when they were given the chance to, they are now estopped from expressing their opposition so
late in the course of the proceedings.
2. NO. Without complying with the requisites set forth under Rule 15, the motion for reconsideration filed by
the Provincial Board is nothing but a mere scrap of paper.
According to Rule 15, notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned at least three
days before the hearing. The same rule requires that the notice be directed to all parties concerned and shall
indicate the time and place for the hearing of the motion. Moreover, it further requires that proof of service of
such motion be presented to the court before the motion can be acted upon, except in cases where the court is
satisfied that the rights of the parties are not affected. These requirements are mandatory in nature because
absent a hearing, the adverse party shall be left with no other occasion to oppose the motion directed
against his/her cause.
The Supreme Court attributed the mistake to Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador who still followed the old form
of notice provided in the Old Code of Civil Procedure that made it the Judges duty to serve notice of hearing
upon the adverse party. Be that as it may, the Court observed that the defective MR was submitted 3 days prior to
the expiration of the period to appeal. Thus, he still had 3 days to correct the defective notice of hearing. He
did not do so. As a consequence, the decision became final. Thus, the order of reinstatement can no longer be
challenged.
204 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2 - Vette Industrial Sales, Co., Inc. vs. Cheng (2006) (relaxing rules of procedure)
Doctrine:
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no
authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that
motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their
motions fatally defective.
Exceptions:
1. where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on
its face or from the recitals contained therein;
2. where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
3. where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and
4. where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate to the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed
Facts:
These are two consolidated cases. Vette Industrial Sales (VIS), petitioner corporation, along with members of the
Cheng family, are suing Sui Cheng for an alleged violation of a Memorandum Agreement entered into between the parties
on October 21, 2001. Sui, respondent, executed a Deed of Assignment wherein he transferred his 40,000 shares in VIS to
private petitioners Kenneth Tan, Vevette Cheng, Felesavette Cheng and Yvette Tan. VIS then acknowledged this with a
MOA stating the company owed Sui Cheng 6.8 million pesos, insurance proceeds amounting to 760,000.00 pesos and a
signing bonus of 300,000.00 pesos. Sui was issued 48 postdated checks, but from the 11th check onward, everything was
dishonored. Sui sued VIS and private petitioners for damages and breach of contract.
Pre-trial was originally set to July 3, 2003. Sui filed a Motion to Set Pre-Trial to December 16, 2003.
Petitioners received a copy of the motion but did not attend because there was no definite date assigned for pre-trial. On
December 29, 2003 petitioners received two orders from the trial court the first one allowed Sui to present
evidence ex-parte and the second one revoked the first order because December 16, 2003 was only a Motion to set a
pre-trial. (kumbaga, December 16 yung proposed date ni Sui, it is NOT the actual date the judge decided on.) Pre-trial
was then set on January 15, 2004, but postponed to May 21, 2004. On the said date, Atty Ferrer, Suis counsel, failed to
appear. The TC then issued a dismissal without prejudice to petitioners to present and prove their counterclaim.
Atty. Ferrer then filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, explaining that he did not fail to appear,
but was late. He explained that he was late because he had come from South Cotabato where he participated as
Chief Counsel for the Board of Canvassers, and he had to drop by his office to get the case folder. The motion was
granted by the TC.
Issues:
1. W/N the lower court erred in granting Suis Motion for Reconsideration.
2. W/N Atty. Ferrer could appear for his client
3. W/N Suis Motion for Reconsideration was fatally defective for failing to comply with Sections 4 and 6 of Rule
15.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The power to declare whether a party is non-suited rests with the discretion of the trial judge. The lower
court noted that Atty.Ferrer satisfactorily explained why he was late in coming to the pre-trial. The SC also
sustained the decision of the TC that procedural rules may be relaxed to further the interest of substantial justice.
205 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2. YES. Under Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules, the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial may be excused when
there is a valid cause shown or when a representative shall appear in his behalf, and is fully authorized in writing
to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. Although Sui was absent during the pre-trial, Atty.
Ferrer alleged that he was fully authorized to represent Sui. Moreover, it is not entirely accurate to state that
Atty. Ferrer was absent during the pre-trial because he was only late, the reasons for which he explained in his
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. The circumstances attendant in the instant case compel this Court
to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice.
3. NO. Petitioners admitted that they received a copy of Suis Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. In fact,
they had the opportunity to oppose the same. Under these circumstances, the court found that the demands of
substantial justice and due process were satisfied.
3 - Boiser v. Judge Aguirre (2005)

Doctrine:
The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except those motions which
the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be
addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
Facts:
Boiser was leasing a piece of land. He filed an ejectment case against Julleza over that piece of land in the MTC
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Boiser won, so Julleza elevated the case to the RTC of Negros Occidental.
Julleza then filed a motion to release bond because the writ of preliminary injunction filed with another MTC was
resolved without mentioning his liability. RTC judge Aguirre granted the motion.
Boiser then filed an administrative case against Judge Aguirre for Grave Abuse of Discretion and Gross
Ignorance of the Law because he was not furnished a copy of the motion, and the motion failed to state the time
and date of hearing, yet Judge Aguirre still granted it. In his comment, Judge Aguirre said there must have been a
miscommunication since if they exerted effort to find out the result of the case, they would have discovered that he
affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. [So Judge Aguirre actually sided with Boiser.]
Boiser realized this to be true, so he filed a motion to withdraw his complaint. However, it was too late, as the
Office of the Court Administrator already submitted its recommendation to fine Judge Aguirre. Upon referral of the case,
Boiser and his counsel reiterated that they were no longer interested in pursuing the case. Furthermore, Judge Aguirre had
already retired by that time, and appeared in the preliminary conference as a private citizen. Justice Zenarosa of the CA
recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
Issues:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed
2. W/N Judge Aguirre is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The withdrawal of complaints does not serve to divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to
determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline an erring judge. As regards the issue of Judge
Aguirres retirement, the Court is likewise not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere
fact that the public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the case.
2. YES. The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except those
motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of
hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
[see 4-6 of rule 15]
206 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
The Motion to Release Bond was defective as it did not have a proper notice of hearing. The date and time of the
hearing were not specified. Neither complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy. These were never
controverted by Judge Aguirre. [His comment focused on the ultimate decision of the case only, and not on the
defects of the motion he granted.]
A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court
could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind
the rule is clear: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. The objective of the rule
is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in
the trial. Proof of service is mandatory.
The law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. [The
decision goes on about how judges should be more discerning, as ignorance may erode the confidence of the
public in the courts, etc.]
Judge Aguirre is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is fined P5,000 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
207 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
4 - Andrada v. CA (1974)
Doctrine:
A notice addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting him to set the foregoing motion for the consideration and
approval of this Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof does not comply with the requirements of
Section 5 of Rule 15 and that subsequent action of the court thereon does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a
notice fatally defective is a useless piece of paper.
Facts:
The case concerns the reversal of the appellate courts ruling in an earlier case entitled Luzon Cement Corporation
et al. vs. Hon. Juan O. Reyes.
Hon. Juan O. Reyes was the lower courts judge who heard the case of plaintiff Andrada v. private respondent
Luzon Cement.
In Jose Andrada vs. Luzon Cement Corporation et als., the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Andrada.
Within the reglamentary period, Luzon Cement filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. Andrada
opposed the record on appeal on the ground that important pleadings and papers were omitted therefrom.
On Andradas opposition on March 31, 91969 the court ordered Luzon to re-draft their notice and include the
missing papers and documents to be complied with by April 15, 1969.
Luzon, on April 12, 1969 filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the requested documents to be
incorporated did not involve them and instead concerned the intervenor Zamora, thus he should be the one ordered to
include such documents on the record of notice.
The Manifestation and Motion however, DID NOT contain any notice of hearing. Instead, the notice simply
asked the clerk of court to submit the same to the court immediately upon receipt thereof. Moreover, a copy of said
Manifestation and Motion was received by Andrada only on April 23, 1969, on which date petitioner filed a motion
seeking the dismissal of the appeal submitted by Luzon.
On April 15, the court issued an order moving the last day for filing the re-drafted record on appeal on April 29,
1969.
During the hearing on April 29, Luzon insisted that they were under no obligation to re-draft their record on
appeal while petitioner pressed for the dismissal of the appeal.
The lower court decided in favor of petitioner Andrada for respondents failure to comply with the courts order
to re-draft their record on appeal. Respondent appealed but it was likewise denied.
The CA reversed the lower courts decision ratiocinating that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court to have dismissed the appeal, on the theory that inasmuch as no action, whether of approval or denial, appears
to have been taken by the trial court on respondents Manifestation and Motion of April 12, 1969, the above order of
May 27, 1969 had no legal basis.
It considered as inoffensive the defect in the notice of hearing in the Manifestation and Motion, claiming that
petitioners filing an opposition thereto may be considered as a waiver of the defect.
Issue:
1. W/N the lower court abused its discretion when it ordered a dismissal when it neither approved nor denied the
defendants Manifestation and Motion
2. W/N petitioners filing of an opposition to the Manifestation and Motion cured its defect with regard to notice
(relevant to the topic)
208 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The lower court was justified in dismissing Luzons appeal on the ground that it did not comply with its
order to re-draft its record on appeal. Section 7 of Rule 41 expressly provides that (i)f the trial judge orders the
amendments of the record, the appellant ... shall redraft the record by including therein ... such additional matters
as the court may have directed him to incorporate. These are not vain words. Much less do they give appellant
rather than the court last say on what should be included or not in the record on appeal. Unless the ground for
non-compliance with the courts order is clear and substantial, due regard for the trial courts authority to act in
the premises and to exercise its judgment demands that its action should not be disturbed.
2. NO. A notice addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting him to set the foregoing motion for the consideration
and approval of this Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof does not comply with the requirements of
Section 5 of Rule 15 and that subsequent action of the court thereon does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a
notice fatally defective is a useless piece of paper.
Indeed, considering that it is not disputed that petitioner was actually served copy of the Manifestation and
Motion only on April 23, 1969, it stands to reason that no proof of such service could have been presented to the
court on April 15, 1969, the day of the hearing of the record on appeal set by the court, hence, the court was
without authority to act thereon.
209 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
5 - Supreme Investment Corporation v. Engineering Equipment, Inc. (1972) (aircon case, motion to dismiss)
Doctrines:
It should be noted that the court for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice.
Facts:
Supreme Investment Corp. (SIC) and Engineering Equipment, Inc. (EEI) entered into a contract where EEI agreed
to furnish the materials, equipment, and labor necessary for the construction and installation of an air conditioning system
of the under-construction SIC building.
EEI contends that after it had fully complied with its obligations under the contract, SIC suddenly stopped
construction of the building and abandoned the same. Hence, the test-running or starting of the completed and installed
air-conditioning system were not done. This caused damages to EEI. EEI, in order to minimize further damages, decided
to remove the parts of equipment they had previously installed at the abandoned job site.
SIC, on the other hand, contends that it received a letter from EEI, demanding full payment for work already
completed, P203,476.89, as a condition for EEIs agreeing to a rescission of the contract or resumption of the work. SIC
refused to pay because an independent technician advised them that EEI had failed to perform its side of the contract. SIC,
in a letter, said that they would pay only if EEI fulfills its obligation or the contract is considered rescinded within 10 days
from receipt.
EEI filed with the CFI a complaint against SIC for specific performance and damages. SIC then filed a complaint
for rescission of the contract and damages. Upon being summoned, EEI moved to have the SIC-filed complaint dismissed,
claiming that there was already an existing action between the parties. The CFI granted EEIs motion and dismissed the
SIC-filed complaint.
SIC appealed. SIC claims that the motion to dismiss, dated December 31, 1965 and set for hearing on January 8,
1966, was mailed on January 3 and received by SIC on January 7 only. SIC claims that EEI failed to comply with the 3day requirement found in Section 4, Rule 15.
Issues:
1. W/N the CFI should have granted EEIs motion to dismiss
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that: Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties
concerned, at least three days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any
affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter
notice on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion.
It should be noted that the court for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice. SIC had admittedly
received previous notice of the motion and of the date of its hearing. Counsel for appellant, was, in fact,
present in court on the date of the hearing. It was clear to the trial judge that the two cases involved the same
parties and for the same cause. In considering that this was good cause to hear and act on the motion to dismiss
on shorter notice, no reversible error has been committed by the CFI.
210 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
7 - Gliceria Sarmiento v. Emerita Zaratan (2007) (ejectment case + notice of hearing)

Doctrine:
General Rule: Notice requirement in a motion is mandatory.
Exception (Grounds to suspend the requirements under the Rules):
existence of special or compelling circumstances
merits of the case
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
It has been consistently held that a motion to extend time is not a litigated motion where notice is needed but
an ex parte motion which can be granted even in the absence of knowledge of the other party.
Facts:
Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against Zaratan in the QC MeTC. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
Sarmiento. Zaratan filed a notice of appeal and the case was raffled and assigned to QC RTC. The RTC instructed Zaratan
to file her memorandum. Zaratans counsel received the order on May 19, 2003 and had until June 3, 2003 to submit
her memorandum. On June 3, 2003, Zaratans counsel filed a motion of extension of time of 5 days because he failed
to finish the memorandum due to illness and the lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood. Moreover, their
computer wires got immersed in the flood. The motion was not acted upon.
On June 9, 2003, Zaratan filed her memorandum. The RTC dismissed the appeal due to the failure of Zaratan to
file her memorandum on June 3. Zaratan moved to reconsider contending that they submitted a motion of extension of
time and that because no reply was given, they assumed that the same was granted. The RTC denied the MR stating that
the motion to extend was not given consideration because it did not contain a notice of hearing as required by
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. According to the RTC, a motion which does not meet the requisite requirements is no more
than a worthless piece of paper. Sarmiento then filed a motion for immediate execution of the MeTCs judgment, which
was subsequently granted.
Zaratan filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, the CA reversed the RTCs dismissal of the
appeal. The CA ordered that the memorandum be accepted and that the appeal be tried by the RTC. Sarmiento now assails
the order of the CA and seeks its reversal.
Issues:
1. (TOPIC) W/N the motion to extend time is defective because it lacks the required notice of hearing.
2. W/N the MeTC order shall be immediately executory despite the pendency of an appeal in the CA.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. As a general rule, a motion without notice is defective and is no more than a mere scrap of paper. The
notice is required where the opposite party has the right to resist the relief sought in the motion and that
justice demands that he be first given the opportunity to be heard. The test is the presence of the opportunity
to be heard. There are of course several grounds for the suspension of the requirements of the Rules
(please see doctrine). In the case at bar, the cause of delay cannot be attributed to the fault or negligence of
Zaratan (and counsel) because the failure was due to illness and the storm/flooding. Moreover, there are no
allegations that the extension was to cause delay and that Sarmiento will be prejudiced by such extension. No
substantive rights will be affected by the admittance of the motion.
211 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Furthermore, it has been consistently held that a motion to extend time is not a litigated motion where
notice is needed but an ex parte motion which can be granted even in the absence of knowledge of the other
party.
2. NO.
Sec. 21, Rule 70. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
A closer examination of the above-quoted provision reveals that said provision applies to decision of the RTC
rendered in its appellate jurisdiction, affirming the decision of the MeTC. In the case at bar, the RTC order was
an order dismissing respondents appeal based on technicality. It did not resolve substantive matters. Thus, the
case brought to the Court of Appeals was the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the required memorandum
within the period provided by law, and not on the merits of the ejectment case.
Side issues (Not important but just in case):
1. Typographical Errors in the Certificate of Forum Shopping: Doesnt matter as long as there is substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the errors are not material (Error: instead of putting
petitioner Zaratan put respondent.)
2. Sarmiento contends that an appeal to the CA, and not a petition for certiorari with the CA, is the proper remedy
from the RTC decision. SC said no because an order dismissing an appeal is not appealable but is subject to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
212 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
8 - Tuason v. Magdangal (1962) (Tatalon Estate)

Doctrine:
Where the opposing party is willing to have the motion heard on shorter notice, there is nothing that precludes the
court from hearing and disposing of it earlier than the regular motion day, or in less than three days from notice or
filing of the motion.
Facts:
The case originated from the lower court when J.M. Tuason & Company, Inc. charged Magdangal with obtaining
possession of the land in question through force, strategy, and stealth, and prayed for the surrender of its possession to
plaintiff, plus damages and costs. Magdangal, through counsel Atty. Manuel B. Ruiz, filed his answer. Issues having
been joined, the court issued a notice to the parties that the case would be heard on March 19, 1959.
2 days before the hearing, however, defendant Magdangal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there was another action pending filed by Alquiros against plaintiff. The motion was set for hearing on the following
motion day, Saturday, March 21. On March 19, however, it was called for hearing on said date. Defendant argued it was
not yet ready because the scheduled hearing was set on March 21. The plaintiff objected and the court dismissed the
defendants motion. Because of this, the defendant made it of record that he was not submitting to a trial by commissioner
and left the court room. The court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff.
Issue:
1. W/N the the lower Court erred (1) in ordering the trial of the case on the merits before hearing his motion to
dismiss; (2) in denying his motion to dismiss without any hearing.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO FOR BOTH. As early as March 6, appellant knew about the action filed by his vendor Alquiros against
plaintiff, for Alquiros and him had the same counsel. Between March 6 and March 19, therefore, appellant
had more than sufficient time to present his motion to dismiss and have it resolved before the hearing of
March 19, and there was no justifiable reason why the trial of the case on the merits on March 19 should be
postponed just because he had set his motion for hearing two days later. Actually, the three-day notice required by
law in the filing of motions is, as appellee correctly observes, intended not for the movants benefit but to avoid
surprises upon the opposite party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Thus,
where the opposing party himself is willing to have the motion heard on shorter notice, there is nothing that
precludes the court from hearing and disposing of it earlier than the regular motion day, or in less than
three days from notice or filing of the motion.
More so, when this case was called for hearing on March 19, plaintiff actually opened argument on the merits of
appellants motion when it objected thereto on the ground it was allegedly improper because defendant had
already filed an answer and that it was presented only for purposes of delay. Appellant should have then and there
argued in favor of his motion instead of insisting that the case was not ready for trial until his motion was heard
Appellant had thus been given ample opportunity to argue his motion to dismiss during the hearing of March 19,
and he should not now be heard to complain that he was not afforded a hearing thereon or that it was denied
without a hearing.
Just in case: Lastly, appellant argues that it was illegal for the court below to delegate the trial of this case to a
commissioner without his consent and over his vigorous objection. The error, if at all an error is, , only a
procedural irregularity that does make proceedings null if no substantial prejudice to the rights of the defendant is
shown.
213 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
9 - Azajar v. CA (1986)
Doctrines:
The purpose of notice of hearing to the adverse party of the date and time of the hearing is to give the
adverse party time to oppose the motion. Another purpose is also to determine the time of its submission for
resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether
and within what time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already
be resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the Court.
Facts:
Azajar purchased 100 kegs of nails (specified in printed order forms) from Cham Samco. He gave 18k for
payment. But in breach of contract, Cham Samco offered to deliver only a part of the quantity ordered. Cham Samco
filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action (not a perfected sale but
merely an offer) and (2) venue was improperly laid.
The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court:
The Clerk of Court
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
Naga City
Sir:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Court for its consideration and resolution
immediately upon receipt thereof.
Makati, Rizal for Naga City, February 4, 1974.
(SGD) Polo S. Pantaleon
Copy furnished:
Atty. Augusta Pardalias
It is this notice that has given rise to the controversy.
Azajar contends that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the Motion to Dismiss incapable of to the
period to answer. Azajar filed a motion to declare Cham Samco in default, which the court granted. Azajar presented
evidence ex parte. He won. The court said that the notice is NOT a motion because it is directed to the Clerk of
Court instead of to the party concerned (as required by sec. 5 of Rule 15) and is without the requisite notice of time
and place of hearing.
Cham Samco went to the CA. The CA set aside the trial courts order and judgment of default.
Cham Samcos belief that it was not necessary that its motion to dismiss be set for hearing was due to 2 factors:
(not really impt. But just in case Sir asks)
a. The Rules of court do not point out which written motions may be ex parte.
b. The 2 grounds for the motion to dismiss can be resolved exclusively on the basis of the documents annexed
to the motion.
Issues:
1. W/N the notice in the motion which was addressed to the clerk of court asking him to submit the motion for the
consideration of the court is a substantial compliance to Sec. 5, Rule 15
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a
specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to
214 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and
of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it and that the notice shall be directed to the parties
concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this Court has
been that a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to avoid surprises
upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion, as well as
to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for resolution.
Cham Samco quite frankly admits its error. The court concluded that The ends of justice would be better served
in this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court. ( The court took into
consideration the two reasons on why Cham Samco thought that notice to the adverse party was not neededso
pinagbigyan J)
215 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS

01 - De Dios v. Bristol Laboratories (1974) (med rep)
Doctrine:
A motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The admission,
however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint.
Facts:
De Dios was medical representative of Bristol Laboratories. De Dios was later fired, which prompted De Dios to
file a complaint in the CFI of La Union for recovery of damages the allegations of the complaint basically said the
following:
That De Dios was a med. rep. of Bristol, and he was dismissed with ulterior motives by means of a libelous letter,
that the letter was circulated to others which caused him to be put in a bad light in the community, and as a result sufferd
various injuries, and cannot find employment anymore.
The letter merly states that, he has not been working full time, he tampered with receipts, charged per dimes not
normally incurred, and that he did it more than once, and that he is dismissed.
Bristol filed a motion to dismiss said complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action against them. The
lower court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. W/N the dismissal was proper, because it did not state a cause of action?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. It is a rule, that in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the
insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The
admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. But
it does not admit the truth of mere words charging fraud; allegations of legal conclusions; an erroneous statement
of law.; mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; conclusions of law; matters of evidence; nor
surplusage and irrelevant matter.
A cause of action means an act or omission of one party of the legal right or rights of the other; its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
Since de Dios said that their claim for damages is based on the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 to 9, of the
complaint, the examination should be made only on the allegations in said paragraphs.
The allegation in paragraph 5 that Bristol, actuated ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of
their advantageous position as employers, in gross evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff de Dios his due,
willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner, are conclusions of law, inferences
from facts not alleged and expressions of opinion unsupported by factual premises. For nowhere the complaint
can be found any particular factual allegations as to the ulterior motives of Bristol; as to how they abused their
position as employer; as to how or why there was bad faith; and as to how de Dios was deprived of his due.
Likewise, the allegation characterizing the letter of dismissal as a libelous letter is a conclusion of law without
factual basis. And the allegations that the charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true, and that
defendants knowingly made the same, are legal conclusions or mere expressions of opinion, there being no
factual premises showing why the charges and statements in the letter are not true; nor is there stated any
particular fact or circumstance upon which Bristols knowledge of the falsity thereof can be predicated.
216 of 277
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Therefore, since conclusions of law, inferences or conclusions from facts not stated, and mere expressions of
opinion, are not deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss, what should be deemed admitted in paragraph 5 of the
complaint would be the bare allegation that de Dios was dismissed from employment, per letter of dismissal of
even date, a copy of which was attached to the complaint and made part thereof as Annex A.
There being no alleged and admitted fact showing that Bristol have committed acts constituting a delict or
wrong by which the Bristol violated the right of the de Dios causing them loss or injury. Or more specifically,
there is no alleged and admitted fact that Bristol fabricated a false ground to dismiss de Dios from employment,
the admitted fact being that his dismissal was for a just cause, as shown by the letter of dismissal. In this regard,
while the letter of dismissal is being attached to the complaint to show it existence and character, in the absence of
material fact well pleaded in the complaint and admitted, showing the nature of the dismissal, the complaint
should be read an interpreted with the letter, which on its face, shows that the dismissal was for a just cause.
Also, the court cannot render valid judgment upon the admitted facts in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint because the employer, in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific period, has the right to
dismiss his employees at any time with or without just cause. (labor issue not important)
02 - Dalandan v. Julio (1964) (salt beds and laches)

Doctrine:
One of the grounds for a motion to dismiss is prescription of actions, or laches.
Facts:
Sometime on September 24, 1932 during the lifetime of Clemente and Victorina Dalandan (spouses, both
deceased at the time of the case) they entered into a notarial agreement wherein Clemente ceded to Victorina 50 salt beds
in Las Pinas for a consideration of P 4,000. The agreement also stipulated that Clemente had the right to repurchase for
the same amount within 10 years of the pacto de retro sale. Before the 10-year period expired, the spouses executed a
second agreement dated May 14, 1940 wherein Victorina waived the 10-year period. However, Clemente failed to
exercise his right of repurchase. Both spouses passed away, and on December 12, 1960 the assigns of Clemente then
offered to the heirs of Victorina to pay the P 4,000. Defendants naturally refused payment, forcing plaintiffs to file
an action. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and laches, and also that the waiver of
the 10-year period was contrary to the provisions of the old Civil Code.
Issues:
1. W/N the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiffs complaint.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Under the provision of the Civil Code (old), the life of a pacto de retro or agreement could not exceed ten
years, and if the property subject of the contract was not redeemed within the period, the title then passed
irrevocably to the vendee. In line with this ruling, the aforementioned stipulation of May 14, 1940, insofar as it
gave the vendor right to repurchase beyond the ten-year period, is illicit and, therefore, null and void and cannot
be given force and effect. The vendor a retro Clemente Dalandan should have exercised his right to repurchase
the property in question at any time prior to the expiration of 10 years from September 24, 1932, the date of
execution of the sale a retro. Having failed to do so, title to said property had been consolidated, ipso facto, in the
vendee a retro Victorina Dalandan on September 24, 1942.
217 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Marcopper Mining v. Garcia (1986) (Reconveyance, All pleadings considered)

Doctrines:
General rule: when a motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, no
evidence may be allowed and the issue should be resolved based only on the allegations of the complaint.
Exception: when the court has access to other pleadings, these are to be considered also.
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense when they will cause injustice
Facts:
*Note the pleadings. They are in bold and underlined.
Marcopper Mining Corporation filed a complaint for quieting of title/reconveyance against Miguel Garcia.
Marcopper sought to have the free patent and OCT of Garcia over a parcel of land in Marinduque be declared null and
void. Marcopper alleges that it is the owner and present possessor of the land, having purchased it from Buenaventura
Paez who had O.C.E.A.N. possession (holla, land titles!) for more than 30 years. Marcopper further claims that Garcia
obtained his free patent through fraud by making the Director of Lands believe that the land was still part of the public
domain.
Garcia then filed his answer with counterclaim where he contends that he is the real owner by virtue of his
already indefeasible OCT (it was obtained in 1973) and that Paez, from whom Marcopper bought the land, was only
residing in a small portion of the land through his mere tolerance. Therefore, the sale from Paez to Marcopper had no
effect.
After Marcopper filed its answer to Garcias counterclaim, Garcia filed a request for admission. Pursuant to this
request, Marcopper filed its anwer to the request for admission. It admitted that it did not file an opposition against the
issuance of the free patent in favor of Garcia because it had no notice of such application. And also because of this lack of
knowledge, neither did it claim its other remedies such as annulment of the free patent/OCT within 1 year of their
issuance.
Garcia filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: a) that Marcopper had no cause of action
because the OCT was already indefeasible and b) that the action for reconveyance has prescribed because it should have
been filed within 4 years of the issuance of the OCT.
The Court of First Instance dismissed Marcoppers complaint for reconveyance. The court based its dismissal
on the complaint and subsequent pleadings of the parties where they found that indeed, Marcopper had no cause of
action because the OCT had already become indefeasible and that it did not take any steps to protect their rights over the
land before the free patent was issued to Garcia.
Issues:
1. W/N the Court of First Instance was correct in considering all the pleadings when it decided to dismiss the
complaint of Marcopper
2. W/N the land was already private land when the free patent was issued to Garcia
3. W/N the action for reconveyance has prescribed
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, the Court of First Instance was correct in considering not only the complaint of Marcopper, but also
the answer with counterclaim, the answer to the counterclaim , and the answer to the request for
admission.
Marcopper contends that it is a well-settled rule that when a motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the issue should be resolved based only on
the allegations of the complaint. Marcopper argues that the motion hypothetically admits the allegations in the
complaint and that the judge cannot inquire into the truth of the allegations anymore. In this vein, if only the
218 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
allegations in Marcoppers complaint were considered, this would lead to the conclusion that the land is private
and therefore, no free patent could have been issued over it in favor of Garcia. (Marcopper alleged that it bought
the land from Paez who had OCEAN possession for over 30 years.)
Sure, while this is a general rule, it is not without exceptions. In this case, before the trial court issued the order
of dismissal, it had the opportunity to examine the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the answer to
the counterclaim , and the answer to the request for admission. It was only logical for the court to consider
all these pleadings in determining whether Marcoppers complaint should be dismissed. Simply put, since
the court had all these pleadings anyway, it was not limited to basing its decision on the complaint only. (FYI:
The order of dismissal was in the nature of a summary judgement.)
Marcopper cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause
of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. The rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are
merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied
to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced.
2. NO. The land was not yet private when the free patent in favor of Garcia was issued.
The mere possession of the land for 30 years, assuming that Paez really possessed the land for this length of time,
did not automatically divest the land of its public character.
3. YES, the action of Marcopper has prescribed
Marcopper contends that since the title over the land was obtained by Garcia through fraud, then the law creates
what is called a constructive trust in its favor. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years. . The OCT was issued in 1973 and the case was filed in 1979. Marcopper contends that
since the prescription period for an implied trust is 10 years, its action has not yet prescribed. There is nothing in
the records to support the contention of the petitioner that an implied or constructive trust was created in its favor.
An implied or constructive trust presupposes the existence of a defrauded party who is the rightful owner of the
disputed property. In this case, Marcopper did not allege the existence of any relationship, fiduciary or otherwise,
with Garcia which may justify the creation of an implied trust. Since there is no implied trust, the prescription
period is 4 years. The action was filed 2 years beyond the prescription period.
219 of 277
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sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
04 - La Naval Drug Corporation v. CA (1994) (arbitration)

Doctrine:
Under Section 5 of Rule 16, any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss (See Rule 16, Section 1), except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may occur if a motion to
dismiss had been filed.
However, defenses and objections not pleaded in either a motion to dismiss or on an answer, except for the failure
to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. Failure to raise such defenses can result in waiver or estoppel.
Facts:
La Naval was leasing a portion of a commercial building owned by La Proveedora, Inc. Meanwhile, ownership of
the same building was transferred to Wilson Yao. La Navals lease agreement with the former owner expired. It wished to
extend its lease. A contract was executed between La Naval and Yao but they could not agree on the price.
Yao convinced La Naval to submit the matter for arbitration under RA 876 (Arbitration Law) in accordance with
a provision in their contract to the effect that if the parties cannot agree on the rental rate, the issue will be submitted to a
group of 3 arbitrators. Both parties will be entitled to choose an arbitrator and the 2 arbitrators will elect the last.
The problem came after the 2 parties had elected their arbitrators. La Naval told its chosen arbitrator to defer the
confirmation of the appointment of the 3rd arbitrator until La Navals Board could meet and approve such appointment.
Yao saw this as a dilatory tactic and moved that after summary hearing under the Arbitration Law, the court order the
arbitrators to proceed. La Naval filed an answer with counterclaim and argued that Yao had no cause of action.
Thereafter, Yao filed an amended petition and sought to enforce the arbitration agreement with damages. La Naval
contended, by way of answer, that the filing fees were not paid. La Naval invoked Sec. 5 of Rule 16 and presented a
Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing of its special and affirmative defenses.
The RTC of Angeles City ordered the parties to submit their position papers on the issue as to whether or not
respondent Yaos claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration
agreement. Also, it informed the parties that petitioners Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing of Special and
Affirmative Defenses would be resolved together with the question of damages. La Naval moved for reconsideration and
raised the issue of the courts jurisdiction. The MR failed. On appeal, the CA held that while the court had limited
jurisdiction under the Arbitration law, La Naval was estopped as it had filed its own counterclaim.
Issues:
1. W/N the submission of other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative defense in an answer, would result
to a waiver of the right of a defendant to set up the courts lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Under Section 5 of Rule 16, any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss (See Rule 16, Section 1), except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may occur if a motion to
dismiss had been filed.
According to Section 4, Rule 6, an answer contains negative and affirmative defenses. A negative defense denies
the material facts averred in the complaint essential to establish the plaintiffs cause of action, while an
affirmative defense in an allegation of a new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the
complaint, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff. Included in these defenses are those
mentioned in the grounds, which would permit the filing of a motion to dismiss.
However, defenses and objections not pleaded in either a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except for the failure
to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. This means that a defendant may feel enjoined to set up all possible
defenses, including his objection to the courts jurisdiction over his person. It is the failure to raise such defenses,
which can result in waiver or estoppel.
220 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
In its decision the Supreme Court discussed the difference between jurisdiction over subject matter and
jurisdiction over the person. On jurisdiction over subject matter, it said that this defense may be raised at any time
as it deals with jurisdiction conferred by law. The nature of this case necessitates its dismissal in view of the
Arbitration Law. With regard to jurisdiction over the person, the voluntary appearance of the defendant is
tantamount to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. To protect himself from the adverse effects of this rule,
the defendant must timely contest the jurisdiction of the court. The submission of other issues or affirmative
defenses in a motion to dismiss does not operate as a waiver of the right to the defense of the courts lack of
jurisdiction.
05 - Toyota Cubao v. CA (1990) (car repairs, substituted service, summons, not aware, ex-parte)
Doctrines:
Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If, however, this mode of
service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the
same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is
jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the courts ability to take cognizance
of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as
substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in
the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law.
*the case did not cite Rule 16 only Rule 14 regarding substituted service the motion is actually to declare
default and revolved around Substituted Service so baka Jurisdiction over person which is a ground of Motion to
Dismiss (not sure)
Facts:
Toyota Cubao, Inc. (Toyota) undertook repairs on the car owned by Danilo Guevarra (Guevarra). The cost
was paid by means of BPI Check (P76k++) drawn by Guevarra in favor of Toyota. The check was dishonored (DAIF).
Toyota requested that Guevarra should make good the check but still failed. Civil case for collection of the unpaid account
was filed.
The RTC issued the summons to Guevarra at his address in Lguna. PROCESS SERVER named Antonio Rimas
o RTC Calamba Laguna submitted to the Trial Court a RETURN ON THE SERVICE (..... it was duly served to the
defendant DANILO A. GUEVARRA, thru her sister-in-law, GLORIA CABALLES, by leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint but refused to sign). Toyota moved to declare Guevarra in default (failed to file an Answer). Trial court
GRANTED Toyotas Motion to Declare Defendant (Guevarra In Default) and ALLOWED an EX-PARTE presentation of
Toyotas evidence. The Trial Court rendered judgment IN FAVOR OF TOYOTA (Jan 6, 1994 decision).
Writ of execution was issued. Deputy Sheriff implemented the writ and levied on Guevarras Toyota Corolla. The
notice of levy was served on Guevarra personally BUT he REFUSED to sign the receipt thereof and was surprised. He
stated that he was NOT AWARE of any case instituted against him. The vehicle was sold at public auction to Christopher
Alex Sillano, the highest bidder for P150,000. L
Guevarra turned over, on demand the vehicle to the authorities L He asked through certiorari petition before the
CA for the nullification of the EX-PARTE Judgment of Jan 6, 1994. He claimed that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him. The CA, finding merit in the petition,
annulled and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy upon execution and the sale at public auction
of the vehicle. The CA held, in its now assailed decision of 28 June 1996, that the substituted service of summons effected
on private respondent was not valid and that, consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court were nugatory and
without legal effect.
Toyota argues that that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal
service cannot be conclusive proof that the substituted service resorted to is invalid (Mapa v. CA). Petitioner asserts that
the requirements of Substituted Service has been met and that the evidence for such compliance is the affidavit of the
221 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
process server on the substituted service annexed to its reply filed before the appellate court.
Issues:
1. W/N CA gravely erred in deciding that the substituted service of summons effected on Guevarra, was not valid,
thus, the proceedings were nugatory and without legal effect.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server, but
that, unfortunately, the servers return DID NOT state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the
substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process exacts the service of summons be such as my
reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Although it has been said that Irregularities of substituted
service might be cured by proof that the copies have actually been delivered to the defendant, however, in the case
at bar Guevarra appears to have been notified of the case for the FIRST TIME only at the time the levy on
execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff. The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been
unaware of the proceedings before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
Guevarra, upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that
court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its
discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the Affidavit of the PROCESS SERVER (declaring the
concomitant facts required to be incorporated in the return) which was presented to it for the first time only as an
annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its
face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the defendant (herein private respondent) of his
right to due process.
222 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Gabriel Duero vs. CA and Bernardo Eradel (2002) (farmer-tenant)

Doctrines:
The lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even by their express consent.
Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec 2, Rule 9)
Facts:
Sometime in 1988, Respondent Eradel entered and occupied Dueros Land in Surigao Del Sur with an assessed
value of P 5,240. Duero informed Eradel that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land. Eradel refused
and threatened Duero with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands from Duero, Eradel still refused to leave the land.
Duero filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorneys
fees against Duero, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena before the RTC Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The Ruenas entered into a
compromise agreement with Duero that they shall bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.
Eradel was not a party to this agreement and was declared in default for failure to file his answer. Duero presented
his evidence ex parte and judgment was rendered in his favor. Eradel was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the
land and to pay P 2,000 as annual rentals from 1988 until the time he vacated said land. He was also ordered to pay
attorneys fees. Eradel received the order on May 25, 1999. On June 10, 1996, Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial
alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned
over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had better right to the land and
was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Meanwhile, an administrative case between Duero and the Laurentes, remained pending with the the DENR
Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
On July 24, 1996, Eradel filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgement, reiterating the same
allegation for his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could
not be made to vacate the land. Also, he claims that judgement is void because the indispensible heirs of Laurente was not
impleaded. The trial court issued an order denying the Petition. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, Eradel
alleged that RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was
under the jurisdiction of the MTC. The RTC denied the MR. Duero filed a Motion for Execution which the RTC
granted. Entry of Judgement was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC. Eradel filed his petition
for certiorari before CA. CA granted Eradels petition. It declared that RTCs decision, Orders and Writs of execution null
and void.
Issues:
1. W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion when it held that the MTC had jurisdiction, and that private respondent
was not stopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it
223 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.13 Thus, CA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion because municipal court has jurisdiction based on RA 7491 amending BP 129. The jurisdiction is
not under the RTC anymore but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment.
Also, Eradel is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. Estoppel has become an equitable
defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely
its equitable enforcement. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Under the circumstances, CA was correct in overruling the RTC and in holding that Eradel was not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court
over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their
express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal. CA quoted Javier vs CA:
The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that
lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient
basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit,
thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum.
Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should
the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or
annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,), within ten (10) years from the finality
of the same
Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. A
farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could have
moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be
expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did
would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTCs
order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while the administrative case would
remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he
has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
Given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by the CA. Since the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the
fact that he believed the suit was properly his landlords concern.

13. SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.- Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
...
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs; Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
224 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
07 - Leviton Industries v. Salvador (1982)

Doctrine:
(the case did not mention any section from Rule 16, however, I think this is relevant for the said rule because it tackled the
issue on whether the motion to dismiss should be granted in this case.)
Legal capacity to sue of the plaintiff should not just be assumed but facts showing the capacity to sue or be sued
should be averred in the complaint itself. Failure to state these facts may be a ground for motion to dismiss.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the order of Judge Salvador wherein he denies the
motion to dismiss and sustains the legal capacity of a foreign corporation to maintain a suit for unfair competition under
the Trademark Law.
In this case, there are 2 companies in dispute: Leviton Manufacturing Co. and Leviton Industries:
Leviton Manufacturing Co. (foreign)
Foreign corporation which manufacture

high quality electrical wiring devices in
US. Its product is exported to Phil and
known to many as superior quality.
Leviton Industries (local)
A partnership organized under

that manufactures and sells
ballast, fuse, oval buzzer under
Leviton and tradename Leviton
CO.
Phil laws
electrical
trademark
Industries
It had registered trademarks Leviton Label

and Leviton wrt ballast and fuse.
Leviton Manufacturing, filed a complaint for unfair competition (trademark law) against Leviton Industries. The
former sought for an injuction to prohibit the latter from using tradename Leviton Industries, for local merely copied its
trademark and designs. Foreign alleges that it causes confusion in the minds of the consumers with regard to the
products of the 2 companies. Local filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because foreign failed to aver in its
complaint its capacity to sue under the Trademark Law (failure to state cause of action). It also alleged that the
foreign has no registered trademark/ trade name in the Phil. Patent office and it has no license to do business in the
Philippines. The judge denied the motion to dismiss and the Urgent Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that was
subsequently filed.
Issues:
1. W/N Leviton Manufacturing (foreign) has capacity to sue under the Trademark Law
2. W/N the motion to dismiss filed by Leviton Industries (local) should be granted
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Leviton Manufacturing (foreign) has no capacity to sue under the Trademark Law because it failed to
prove that it has all the requirements imposed by the said law. The Supreme Court held that for Leviton
Manufacturing to have the right to seek redress for unfair competition, it should have alleged in the complaint that
it has registered with the Philippine Patent Office and that it has been assigned with the trademark. To have the
capacity to sue, it must have complied with all the conditions set out by the law or provision upon which the
action was based. The fulfilment of these conditions must be expressly stated and averred in the complaint.
This was in accordance with Sec. 4 Rule 8 where it states that facts showing the party to sue or be sued must
be averred. This was not followed by Leviton Manufacturing for all it alleged in the complaint was that it was a
foreign corporation.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2. YES. SC ordered that the lower courts denial of motion to dismiss be set aside. The Court ordered the CFI of
Rizal (the original court) that the only action it may take is the dismissal of the original case. This is because
plaintiff in the original case failed to prove that it has legal capacity to sue under the Trademark Law.
08 - Valencia v. CA (1996) (lease of fishpond; requisites of litis pendentia)

Doctrines:
The requisites for the existence of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are as follows: 1) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the other case.
Facts:
Respondents (Bagtas and Bunye) - lessee of a 24-hectare fishpond in Paombong, Bulacan
Petitioner (Valencia; substituted by heirs) - lessor-owner
Complaint A. Rescission of the lease contract
Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission of the lease contract in the RTC of Malolos. The court issued a writ of
preliminary Mandatory Injunction ordering respondents to surrender to petitioner possession of the fishpond. In view
whereof, respondents filed a petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court.
At the hearing in the IAC, the parties agreed to maintain the status quo until the RTC of Malolos resolves the
case. However, petitioner failed to follow this order by subsequent acts:
a. sought the aid of the Phil. Constabulary to eject the respondents
b. dried up a portion of the pond
c. prevented the transfer of bigger fish to a more spacious portion resulting in the death of some
d. another person came and introduced himself as the new lessee
It was only when respondents appealed again to the IAC and the latter declared Valencia without right of
possession to the fishpond that respondents were able to take control of the fishpond.
B. Complaint for exemplary damages etc.
Respondents are now asking the RTC of Manila for exemplary damages, moral damages, attorneys fees, and
costs. (based on the noncompliance of petitioner with the order to maintain status quo)
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner which was denied (Hindi sinabi kung anong grounds ng MTD; it just
said that it was filed and was dismissed). Failing to file the necessary pleadings and to appear, he was declared in default
and the TC declared judgment awarding the damages and fees sought.
In his appeals (CA denied), petitioner asserts that under the rule on litis pendentia, the action for rescission
filed with the Bulacan court (Complaint A) bars the action for damages filed in Manila (Complaint B).
Issues:
1. W/N litis pendentia exists.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. There is no litis pendentia.
Requisites for the existence of litis pendentia:
a. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions;
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i. Identity of the parties - present

b. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
i. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed - none
ii. The Bulacan case was founded upon alleged violations of the lease contract and sought for
rescission of the lease contract while the Manila case stemmed from the prejudice suffered by
respondents due to the violation of the orders for the observance of status quo between the parties
and sought for damages.
c. identity with respect to (a) and (b) is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
i. Res judicata test
ii. Regardless of whoever will ultimately prevail in the Bulacan case, the final judgment therein,
whether granting or denying the rescission of contract, will not be conclusive between the parties
in the Manila case, and vice versa.
*Other rulings that the Court made:
1. Theres no forum shopping because of the failure to meet the res judicata test.
2. The claim for damages (Complaint B) is not a compulsory counterclaim in the complaint for rescission
(Complaint A). The court noted a test to determine the nature of the counterclaim:
a. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
b. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
c. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants
counterclaim?
d. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
In this instance, the answers to all four queries are in the negative.
227 of 277
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09 - Pacsports Phils., Inc. v. Niccolo Sports (2001) (Golf Products, litis pendentia, Later action dismissed)
Doctrines:
Requisites of litis pendentia if the following concur:

1. Identity of the parties, or at least such representing the same interest in both actions
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts
3. Judgment in one case would amount to res judicata on the other.
General Rule: When the elements of litis pendentia exist, the action filed later should be abated to avoid
multiplicity of suits.
Facts:
Pacsports Phils. Inc (PPI) and Niccolo Sports Inc. (NSI) entered into 2 separate Exclusive Retail Arrangements
where on a consignment basis, Bridgestone and Cross Creek golf products would be sold exclusively by NSI in its
Shangri-La Mall branch. Their contract14 provided that both parties had the right at anytime to terminate the agreement
after any material breach of the terms and conditions of the Agreement and the erring party failed to remedy such
breach within 60 days after being requested to do so. The effects of the termination are as follows:
PPI repossess unpaid stock and display materials
NSI entitled to reimbursement of all expenses during the operations of the Retail Outlet including construction
renovations
PPI pre-terminated the Agreement when NSIs obligations amounted to P 1.5 M and despite several demands,
failed to pay. Two cases arising from the same Agreement were filed:
Makati RTC by PPI - First to be Filed
A case for damages with application for a writ of replevin on January 28, 1999. PPI claimed that NSI, in the
absence of a material breach, unilaterally terminated their agreement and withheld the unsold inventory despite being on
consignment basis. The writ of replevin was granted but was not implemented as NSI concealed the goods. On February
26, 1999 PSI applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to compel NSI to turn over the goods and sales proceeds
amounting to P 1.2 M
QC RTC by NSI - Second to be Filed
A case for breach and confirmation of termination of contracts and damages against PPI on February 16, 1999.
NSI claimed that PPI was in bad faith for intercepting potential customers causing them undue damage and prejudice.
On January 29, 1999 NSI filed a Motion to Dismiss or suspend proceedings citing the pendency of the QC
RTC case in the Makati RTC. PPI also filed the same before the QC RTC citing the pendency of the Makati RTC case.
The Makati RTC denied NSIs motion to dismiss and granted the writ of prelim injunction. (The Motion to Dismiss
before the QC RTC was unresolved) After its motion for reconsideration was denied, NSI in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The CA reversed the order of the Makati RTC, hence this petition.

14. 8. a) Payments: NSI shall remit full payment, in cash or check, the outlets gross sales for the month less NSIs margin on or before 15 days of
the following month. Late payments shall have prior approval of PPI, b) The supply of all the products in the Retail Outlet is on a consignment
basis.
...
11. Term: This Agreement shall take effect from the Commencement Date and shall continue to be enforced for a period of 3 years and shall be
automatically renewed by mutual written agreement.
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Issues:
1. Major issue: Which of the two cases should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia the Makati City case
or the Quezon City case?
2. Not really impt: Whether the order of the Makati RTC granting Pacsports application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion?
Held/Ratio:
1. The QC RTC case.
The general rule is when the elements of litis pendentia exist, the action filed later should be abated to avoid
multiplicity of suits. This is based on the maxim Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure meaning, he who is before
in time is the better in right. The Makati RTC commenced proceedings by issuing a writ of replevin and later an
order granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as early as January 28, 1999.
In ordering the dismissal of the Makati Case filed earlier than the QC case, the CA deviated from the general
rule. Therefore the QC case must be reinstated.
The requirements of litis pendentia have been satisfied. Both cases are founded on the same facts, having been
based on the validity of the pre-termination of the Exclusive Retail Agreements. It involved the same parties,
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. The judgment on one case would amount to res judicata to the other.
2. NO. For the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
complainant has a clear legal right; 2.) That his right has been violated and the invasion is material and
substantial; and 3.) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. It is also a
rule that an injunction will be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it
into that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law.
PPI as the owner of the goods being withheld by NSI is entitled to possession. NSIs refusal to deliver them is a
breach of that right. NSIs claims are still to be resolved and given that PPI posted a bond posted, there is no basis
for withholding the goods and money as security.
229 of 277
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10 - Linzag v. CA (1998) (res judicata)

Doctrines:
An action is barred by a former judgment if (1) the former judgment is final; (2) the court which rendered it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; (4) there must be,
between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Facts:
Jose Linzag and the heirs of Cristobal Linzag are members of the Kalagan tribe, a non-Christian tribe, and claim
to have inherited from their deceased parents a parcel of land (Waniban Island).
At a cadastral proceeding, Linzag filed his claim over the land. Another person (Cunanan) likewise filed a claim.
Then another person (Salvador) filed a motion to award the the land in his favor since he acquired the rights from
Cunanan and Linzag withdrawn his answer/claim in favor of Cunanan and/or his successors-in-interest (His evidence: 1)
Deed of Absolute Sale of Hereditary Rights, and 2) verified Withdrawal of Claim/Answer).
The cadastral court awarded the land to Salvador because he has proven that he had been in peaceful, open,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession of the land. LRC was directed to issue the decree of registration.
After 6 years, Linzag filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages against Cunanan and
Salvador. Thereafter, they filed an amended complaint alleging that 1) they have been in OCEN possession of the land
since the Spanish regime, 2) the land was part of the public domain, and 3) that Atty. Sibala (Cunanans son-in-law) was
the one who notarized the withdrawal of claim and deed of absolute sale (so may fraud daw dito), and it was only after 3
years that theyve discovered the fraud.
CFI dismissed the case because the action was improper. They appealed that the decision with CA but it
dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription. Meanwhile, the OCT was cancelled and the Registry of Deeds issued a
TCT in the name of Blanco and Serrano.
Thereafter they filed a petition for the annulment of judgment of the CFI with the CA (impleaded as respondents
were Cunanan, Salvador, Blanco, Serrano). CA dismissed the petition on the ground of res judicata. (The requisites of res
judicata were present, 1) the judgment is already final because petitioners did not file any appeal within the reglementary
period and that the SC already issued a Resolution stating that the judgment is already final and executory, 2) the CFI
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, 3) that the judgment was rendered after a
determination of which part is right, and 4) that the parties and subject matter are the same in both cases)
Issues:
1. W/N there is an identity of in the causes of action between the two petitions
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The test to determine whether there is an identity of causes of action is to consider whether there is an
identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions or whether the same evidence will sustain
both.
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, to wit: (1) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; and (2) preclude relitigation of a particular fact or
issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. As CA enumerated, the
decision in the first case operates to bar, on the ground of res judicata, the case for annulment of judgment.
The claim of petitioners that the judgment in the RTC case does not bar the second case with CA because the
former was for annulment of title only, while the latter was for annulment of the judgment, is palpably
unmeritorious. It is settled that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the
form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. The Court said that the petitioners may
have resorted to the filing of the RTC case because they had lost the right to file a petition for review (napalampas
nila ung 1 year period from the entry of decree to file a petition for review).
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* Baka lang itanong

Another reason why the second CA case should be dismissed was that the remedy of annulment of judgment
allowed in Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 was no longer available to petitioners. Such is available only where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioners. Here, petitioners had, in fact, availed of an action for reconveyance where they litigated the grounds for
annulment of judgment.
11 - Hacienda Bigaa v. Chavez (2010)

Doctrines:
Res Judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39.15 This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res
judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment
Res judicata (First Concept) absolutely bars any subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (a) the
former judgment or order was final; (b) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it was
rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first
and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res judicata comes under the second
concept i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment
Only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment.
Sec. 5, Rule 16 [Di talaga siya binanggit sa case, but in case sir asks]: Effect of Dismissal Subject to the right
of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f) [RES JUDICATA], (h) and (i) of Section
1 [the one we memorized for the midterms] hereof shall bar the refilling of the same action or claim.
Facts:
Hacienda Bigaa filed with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas a complaint for ejectment (forcible entry) and
damages with application for writ of preliminary injunction against Chavez, who allegedly, entered by force, strategy,
and/or stealth Hacienda Bigaas premises (cut barbed wire, destroyed gate lock, built house on property).
According to Chavez, Hacienda Bigaa bought the lands in dispute from Ayala y Cia and the Zobels. Hence, Bigaa
is the successor-in-interest of the Ayala and Zobel-owned Hacienda Calatagan. Previously, the state, Ayalas and Zobels
claimed the lands. The Ayalas and Zobels had a TCT over the lands in their favor (it should be noted that the disputed
lands are those beyond the original TCT of the Ayalas and Zobels they expanded their TCT to include beach, foreshore
and bay areas, and navigable waters Ill call this excess areas). On the other hand, portions of the excess areas
(Foreshore Lands), were leased by the Republic, through the Bureau of Fisheries, to applicants in whose favor fishpond
permits were issued. This gave rise to ownership and/or possessory disputes between Hacienda Calatagan and the
Republic.
Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for the recovery of the areas. In Dizon v. Rodriguez (quieting of
title) and Republic v. Ayala y Cia (annulment of titles) , the excess areas of the TCT were declared unregistrable lands of
the public domain. The Ayalas and Zobels therefore were found to be mere usurpers. In Republic v. De los Angeles, the
same excess areas were under a reinvidicatory claim of the Republic aimed at recovering the lands. The court held that the

15.
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
...
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final
order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
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Republic has the right to place its lessees and fishpond permittees among them Zoila de Chavez, predecessor-ininterest and mother of respondent Chavez.
Chavez mainly argued that the current suit is barred by prior judgment in 2 prior cases a. unlawful detainer
case against Zoila de Chavez, filed by the Zobels; b. accion reinvidicatoria filed by Republic and Zoila de Chavez against
the Zobels (de los Angeles Case). Chavez asserts that the subject matter and the issues involved in these cases are squarely
similar and/or identical to the subject matter and issues involved in the present forcible entry suit; the rulings in these two
cases, therefore constitute res judicata with respect to the present case.
Issues:
1. Does Res Judicata apply?
2. Who has better right of possession?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, Res Judicata of the Second Kind applies. (medyo madugo yung discussion sa res judicata, sorry! Tingin ko
important e!)
Res Judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39. This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res
judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata
absolutely bars any subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (a) the former judgment or order
was final; (b) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it was rendered by a court that
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first and the second actions,
there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res judicata comes under the second
concept i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this concept, the rule bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under different claims or causes of
action. Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question
settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their
successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed
by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot
again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest,
in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action.
Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
The dictum laid down in an earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding
between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and
enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been
resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.
Obviously, in this case, there is an identity of parties (successors-in-interest lang yung mga current parties). Also,
there is an identity of subject matter (litigating the same properties). There is also identity of issues as all cases
involve the issue of ownership or better right of possession. Even if the present case is forcible entry while the
antecedent cases involve quieting, annulment of titles, and accion reinvidicatoria, Res Judicata, under the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment, operates even if no absolute identity of causes of action exists. Res
Judicata, in its conclusiveness of judgment concept, merely requires identity of issues.
2. Chavez has better right. The antecedent cases lay to rest the issues of ownership and of possession. In the previous
cases, the court ruled in favor of the Republic and its lessees and permittees.
232 of 277
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12 - Fels Energy, Inc. v. Prov. of Batangas (2007) (filed with provincial assessor, not with proper LBAA)
Doctrines:
The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but merely
substantial identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest or
privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in the second case even if the first case did not implead
the latter.
Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of
being vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would
subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the
litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Facts:
[The fact that this case was originally from two separate cases is important.] This is a consolidation of two cases,
one filed by FELS Energy, Inc (FELS) against the provincial assessor of Batangas, and the other by the National Power
Corporation (NPC), also against the provincial assessor of Batangas. The cases were dismissed by the Court of Appeals
on the ground of prescription, thus the instant cases for petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engine power barges
moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the
Agreement to FELS. The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement (Agreement) had a provision,
under its Article 10, that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of (a) all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and other
levies imposed by the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines or any agency or instrumentality thereof
...
On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from
Provincial Assessor for P 56,184,088 per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under
the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference
regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor.
[This paragraph pertains to the facts that lead to res judicata and forum shopping.] In September 7 1995, NPC
sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges. This was
denied. NPC thereafter filed with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). This was also denied, ordering FELS
to pay the tax. FELS appealed the decision to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The CBAA initially
granted it, but in a complete volte face [means turnaround] resolved against FELS and NPC. FELS and NPC filed separate
motions for reconsiderations with the CBAA, both of which were denied. FELS and NPC filed separate petitions for
review before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 for NPC and CA-G.R. SP No. 67491 for FELS). On January of 2002, NPC
filed for a motion for consolidation, to which the appellate court directed NPC to re-file its motion for consolidation
where the FELS case was filed, since it is the ponente of the latter petition who should resolve the request for
reconsideration. NPC failed to comply. The petition filed by NPC before the CA was denied. FELS filed a motion for
reconsideration for such case filed by the NPC which was denied. Meanwhile, NPC filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court, which was also denied. The subsequent motion for reconsideration by NPC before
the SC was also denied. Thereafter, the motion for reconsideration filed by FELS with the CA was denied. FELS then
filed a petition for review on certiorati before the SC. The SC ordered the consolidation for the two petitions for NPC and
FELS [despite the fact that the case filed by NPC has already been resolved by the SC].
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Issues:
1. W/N the instant petition is barred by prescription.
2. W/N the instant petition is barred by res judicata. [civpro-related]
3. W/N there is forum-shopping. [civpro-related]
4. W/N the properties were taxable.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provided that
appeal to the LBAA must be made within 60 days from the date of receipt of the assessment. Furthermore, the
letter of assessment from the provincial assessor contained a note that within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt hereof, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province by filing a petition under oath on the
form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of ARP/Tax Declaration and such affidavits or documents
submitted in support of the appeal. Nevertheless, NPC filed a motion with the provincial assessor, and not the
LBAA. Thus, the period to appeal to the LBAA prescribed.
2. YES. To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any proceeding regarding
real property assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
165113, it did so not only on its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the
earlier petition for review filed in this Court was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.
67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner
FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially identical parties
as to warrant the application of res judicata. FELSs argument that it is not bound by the erroneous
petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.
3. YES. NPC and FELS went from one court to another trying to get a favorable decision from one of the tribunals
which allowed them to pursue their cases. It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence
of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of
court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
4. YES. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that [d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are
intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast are considered immovable
property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of
machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
NPC and FELS maintain nevertheless that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c)
of R.A. No. 7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a governmentowned and controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power.
However, as stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement, POLAR shall own the Power Barges and
all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which
have been supplied by it at its own cost. Thus, ownership as between the parties, by virtue of the contract,
belongs to FELS, assignee of POLAR. Therefore, FELS and NPC cannot claim exemption under Section 234(c).
234 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
13 - Sempio v. CA (1998) (litis pendentia, foreclosure)

Doctrines:
Well-settled is the rule that only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties is required for litis
pendentia, or in any case, res judicata, to lie. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the
first case.
Facts:
The Sempio spouses owned a parcel of land in Bulacan. They mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) as a security for the loan they obtained. Because they failed to pay, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage. It emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. Then Aurelia Tuazon
purchased the land from DBP. 3 cases were filed thereafter:
Civil Case No. P-1787-89 (CASE 1)
DBP filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession Ex Parte in the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 15. Tuazon
filed a complaint-in-intervention and asserted that she is the new owner because she purchased the land from DBP.
Civil Case No. 181-M-90 (CASE 2)
The Sempios filed a Complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Reconveyance of Title and Damages in the RTC
of Bulacan Branch 19. They argued that the foreclosure should be null and void because they were not notified of the sale.
Civil Case No. 681-M-90 (CASE 3)
Tuazon filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages. She invoked her right as owner and asked the RTC of
Bulacan, Branch 6 to enjoin the Sempios from digging any portion of the land and to assess against the latter the damages
warranted
CASE 3 was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of litis pendentia because of the pendency of Cases 1 and 2.
Tuazon appealed to the CA. The CA set aside the dismissal order and ruled that CASE 3 should not be dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia since there was neither identity of parties nor identity of causes of action in the 3 cases.
Issue:
1. W/N the CA erred in ruling that there was no litis pendentia
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The requisites for litis pendentia are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (3) identity in both cases is such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. All the requisites of litis
pendentia concur in the 3 cases.
Identity of Parties:
Well-settled is the rule that only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties is required for litis
pendentia, or in any case, res judicata, to lie. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a
community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was
not impleaded in the first case.
Tuazon is the plainitiff in CASE 3, intervenor in CASE 1 and not a party in CASE 2 (the main party is DBP).
So it can be argued that technically there is no identity of parties because Tuazon was not a party in CASE 2.
But it cannot be denied that her interests are intertwined with those of DBP because the exercise of her rights as
purchaser of the land is conditioned on DBPs successful defense of the validity of its foreclosure procedures in
CASE 2. Even if she was not a party, she has an interest in that case, for the exercise of her right of ownership
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would depend on DBP. There is a community of interest between DBP and Tuazon. Thus, there is a
substantial identity of parties in all the 3 cases.
Identity of Causes of Action:
The cases were brought to court in 3 different forms (petition for issuance of writ of possession for CASE 1,
annulment of foreclosure in CASE 2, and complaint for damages in CASE 3). But even if there are differences
in terms of form, it is clear that there is only ONE cause of action in all these 3 cases: the continued
violation of what Tuazon believes to be her right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the land.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS (PART 2)

01 - De Los Reyes v. CA (1999) (Prescription + Fraudulently titled lands)
Doctrine:
Cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such
right is violated. Prescription runs from when the cause of action arises.
Facts:
Evarista De Los Reyes, mother of herein petitioners, owned a 13,405 sqm. parcel of land. They sold 10,000 sqm.
to the spouses Pea. In 1943, the spouses Pea were able to obtain a TCT not only for the 10,000 sqm. land but also to the
remaining 3,405 sqm. The lands went through subsequent purchases and eventually fell under the ownership of private
respondents Sps. Caia. In 1987 the De Los Reyes children filed an action for reconveyance of the 3,405 sqm portion of
the land held by the Caias. The RTC dismissed the action for being barred by laches. The CA affirmed the dismissal.
The heirs now contend that the period from which prescription shall be counted is not in 1943 when the TCTs were
fraudulently obtained by Spouses Pea but from the time their mother died (1962) or, if not, from the time the Spouses
Caia were issued their TCTs (1963).
Issue:
1. W/N prescription ran from the date the fraudulent TCTs were obtained by the Peas.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Prescription ran from the date the Peas fraudulently obtained the TCT over the 3,405 sqm. land. A cause
of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such
right is violated. In the instant case, petitioners cause of action accrued on 4 June 1943 when the Pena spouses
caused the registration in their name of the entire 13,405 square meters instead of only 10,000 square meters they
actually bought. It was on this date that the right of ownership of Evarista over the remaining 3,405 square
meters was transgressed and from that very moment sprung the right of the owner, and hence all her
successors in interest, to file a suit for reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them.
The heirs also contend that the Civil Code provisions on imprescriptibility of actions for nullification shall be
applied. The Court held that it is not applicable in the case at bar. Moreover, the claim is already barred by laches
because for 36 years the de los Reyeses slept on their rights. The rights of the subsequent innocent purchasers for
value shall not be trampled by their (the heirs) failure to file an action on time.
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02 - Aznar III v. Judge Bernad (1988)

Doctrine:
An amended answer is submitted to take the place of the original answer. Upon admittance of the amended
answer, the original answer passes into oblivion and ceases to exist with its former place entirely taken over by
the amended answer.
Facts:
The Spouses Kintar filed in the RTC of Cebu, a civil action against the Aznar Spouses praying for the annulment
of a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale and damages with preliminary Injunction. The Aznar spouses timely filed their answer
specifically denying the allegations in the complaint. 7 days later, the Aznar spouses submitted a Motion for Leave to
Amend Answer alleging that:
1. That this case has not yet been in the calendar
2. That no responsive pleading has yet been filed with respect to the answer
3. (Not Important 3,4,5) xxx
4. xxx
5. xxx
Attached to the motion was a copy of the amended answer which contained an additional paragraph
alleging, for the first time, the affirmative defense of prescription. It stated that the cause of action in the complaint
had already prescribed. And that the complaint for fraud based on the real estate mortgage was filed more than 8 years
after the date of registration. While under 1391 of the civil code, the action for annulment shall be brought within 4 years.
The trial court denied the motion of the Aznar spouses. The judgement was based on a strict/literal construction of
section 2,Rule9 of the revised rules of court which in essence, provides that defences or objections, except the failure to
state a cause of action, if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, are deemed waived.
Issue:
1. W/N the affirmative defense of prescription may be validly set up for the first time in an amended answer
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. The Spouses Aznar did not fail to allege the defense of prescription in their answer. The amended answer
was submitted to take the place of the original answer. Thus, upon admittance of the amended answer, the
original answer passes into oblivion and ceases to exist with its former place entirely taken over by the
amended answer. (Liberal interpretation was applied)
Moreover, at the time petitioners moved to have their original answer amended, they still had the right to do so.
The records do not show that a responsive pleading, like a reply, to the original answer, has already been served to
the petitioners by the private respondents. Neither is there any showing that the case has already been calendared
for hearing. Thus there is no procedural impediment for the petitioners to amend their original answer. This being
so, the affirmative defense of prescription has been validly pleaded for resolution in due course.
Obiter: Prescription if apparent on the face of the complaint may be favourably considered EVEN IF the affirmative
defense of prescription was not raised in the motion to dismiss, AND an amendment would no longer be feasible.
(Note: a supplemental pleading does not take the place of the original pleading unlike an amended pleading)
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03 - Maria Landayan et.al. v. Hon. Angel Bacani, et. al. (1982)

Doctrines:
The pleadings filed by petitioners do not seek the nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but
only insofar as the same deprived them of their share in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar.
Facts:
Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and a house in Manila covered by a
Torrens Title in his name. He died intestate in 1948.
In 1949, Maxima Andrada (surviving spouse) and Severino Abenojar (represented himself as the only forced
heir and descendant) executed an Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition, a public document which divided Teodoros
property.
Sometime in 1968 (more than 18 years later), petitioners filed a complaint before the CFI of Pangasinan seeking a
judicial declaration that they are the legal heirs of Teodoro and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the
ownership and possession of some properties acquired through the deed of extra-judicial settlement. They also seek to
have declared null and void a deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents Liberata Abenojar and Jose
Serrano.
The complaint filed by petitioners (Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio all surnamed LANDAYAN and their
spouses) alleged:
Petitioners pray that they be

declared as among the legal heirs
of the deceased entitled to his
estate.
On the other hand, respondents alleged in their pleadings that contrary to petitioners claim, Teodoro only married
once and that was with private respondent Maxima. They further claim that Severino is an acknowledged natural child
of Teodoro with Florencia. Guillerma (mother of petitioners) was allegedly Teodoros spurious child with Antera who
was married to another man.
As their affirmative and special defense, private respondents alleged that the action of petitioners had already
prescribed having been filed 18 years after the execution of the document they seek to annul. Respondent Judge
sustained respondents claim, taking into consideration the following:
1. If action for the annulment of the deed of extra-judicial partition and donation is based on fraud, prescriptive
period is at 4 years from discovery (assumed discovered upon the registration in the Office of Registry of Deeds)
2. Deed of extra-judicial partition not an inexistent and void contract which does not prescribe, it is at most voidable.
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Issues:
1. W/N the petitioners action was correctly dismissed
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the SC found the dismissal of the action precipitous and erroneous and ordered that the respondent Judge
to decide based on the merits of the case.
The principles relied on by the Judge were legally correct, but he unqualifiedly assumed that extra-judicial
partition is merely a voidable contract and not a void one. An inquiry on the legal status of Severino, whether he
may be considered a legal heir of Teodoro and as such may validly participate in the extra-judicial partition,
should have been inquired upon. The SC points that this is the most material point on which the parties may assert
conflicting claims. The question of whether or not document is void or merely voidable depends largely on this
determination.
If the petitioners claim was correct, Severino has no right to succession from Teodoro in view of Art 992 of the
Civil Code, which expressly provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Assuming that the petitioners are able to prove their
claim, Art 1105 of the Civil Code, which provides shall come into operation:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
void only with respect to such person.
The pleadings filed by petitioners do not seek the nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but
only insofar as the same deprived them of their share in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar.
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04 - Dulay v. CA (1995) (Big Bang, lack of cause of action)

Doctrines:
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
Facts:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela (Torzuela) and Atty. Dulay occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang,
Alabang Village. As a result, Benigno, the security guard on duty of the carnival shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Benita Dulay (Dulay), widow of Atty. Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela and SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD Security Corp., the alleged employers of Torzuela. Dulay prayed for actual, compensatory, moral,
and exemplary damages.
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of
action. SUPERGUARD claimed that the act of shooting Atty. Dulay was beyond the scope of Torzuelas duties. They are
contending that since the shooting was with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
In addition, SUPERGUARD claims the complaint for damages based on negligence applies only to quasi-offenses. Also,
the filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine
qua non for the employers subsidiary liability.
Respondent Judge Regino granted SUPERGUARDs motion to dismiss. He held that the complaint did not
state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of
Torzuela or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Mere allegations without stating the facts showing
such negligence are mere conclusions of law. udge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on
crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasidelict.
Issues:
1. W/N the judge erred in dismissing the case for lack of cause of action
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of Torzuela and SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay
resulting in the latters death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuelas employer and responsible for his acts.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne
in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
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09 - Yuvienco v. Judge Dacuycuy and Yao King Ong et al. (1981) (absolute acceptance absent)
Doctrine:
When a motion to dismiss invoking the Statute of Frauds is filed and all the documents available to movant are
before the court, and they are insufficient to comply with the Statute, it becomes incumbent upon the plaintiff
to bring out what note or memorandum still exists in his possession in order to enable the court to
expeditiously determine then and there the need for further proceedings.
Facts:
Yuvienco and his co-petitioners (the Sottos) owned a property in Tacloban City, which they intended to sell for
P6.5M to private respondents. The respondents appeared interested to purchase the Tacloban property. But because
their intent to purchase was never made absolute, Yuvienco was unsure as to whether respondents really wanted to
purchase the property. So to secure the deal, Yuvienco wrote a letter addressed to respondents offering to sell the property
with a condition that private respondents express their decision to purchase the property not later than July 31,
1978. Yuvienco hired Atty. Pedro Gamboa as their lawyer, and tasked him to bring the letter to Cebu to finalize the deal.
After several telegram exchanges, respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners and Atty. Gamboa. The
complaint alleged that the terms agreed upon regarding payment were changed without the knowledge of the
respondents (they claim that the P4.5M was to be paid 90 days from the execution of the contract, but was shortened to
30 days). Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action, and was purely a
conclusion of fact. Petitioners also argue that the letter sent through Atty. Gamboa was a mere expression of willingness
to sell the subject property and not a direct offer of sale to said respondents, thus there was still no perfected contract of
sale, and no party was prejudiced when Yuvienco altered the modes of payment.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale,
2. Whether or not the respondents complaint against petitioners stated a cause of action. (SEC 16 related)
3. Whether or not the respondents claim for specific performance is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds. (SEC 16 related)
4. Whether or not Judge Dacuycuys decision16 is sound and justifiable.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. There was never any perfected contract of sale because of the lack of absolute acceptance on the part of the
respondents. When they invited Atty. Gamboa to Tacloban to negotiate the details, this led the Court to believe
that the use of the word negotiate meant that the initial offer was rejected and required a negotiation to
come up with terms agreeable to both parties.
2. NO. Absolute acceptance of an offer is a major requirement in order that a party may file a complaint
against the offering party. But despite the fact that the contract of sale was never absolutely accepted by the
respondents, as required by Article 1319 of the Civil Code, the initial stipulation which provided for 90 days to
pay the P4.5M can be considered a cause of action. Apparently, petitioners first offer mentioned that respondents
would be given 90 days to pay the remaining P4.5M, after the P2M down payment. When the 90-day period was
shortened to just 30 days, it soured the interests of the respondents regarding the purchase of the. But since the

16. The complaint included Judge Dacuycuy because of his manifestly erroneous decision regarding the application of the Statute of Frauds.
He opined that respondents pleading abided by the conditions under Sec. 1 of Rule 8, which requires that every pleading contains a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts. He further claims that exhibits need not be attached, and that respondents promise to present additional
evidence to support a cause of action is sufficient to prove the existence of the cause of action (lol).

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respondents never expressed acceptance to the offer, they were never really prejudiced by such decision
and hence they have no cause of action against petitioners.
3. YES. It was never alleged in the complaint that any period was put into writing, except for the 30-day period
offered by Yuvienco. The 90-day term insisted by private respondents does not appear in any note,
memorandum, or writing signed by any of the parties. Hence, the oral contract alleged by the respondents falls
squarely under the prohibition in Art. 1403, paragraph 2(E) in regards to sale of real property.
4. NO. The SC disagreed with his decision, holding that to allow such a procedure is to tolerate and even
encourage undue delay in litigation, and to wait for a party to produce the additional evidence to prove a cause
of action would amount to unnecessarily postponing and prolonging the proceedings.
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RULE 17 DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
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02 - PCI Leasing Finance, Inc. v. Milan (2010) (loans, Sec. 3 Rule 17)
Doctrine:
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiffs fault if: (1) he fails to appear on the
date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) he fails to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; or (3) he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
The general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the
merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action. The only exception is when the order of dismissal
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.
The test for dismissing a case in the event the plaintiff fails to appear to prosecute a suit is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude.
Facts:
PCI Leasing Finance, Inc. (PCI) extended loans to Antonio and Laura Milan (Milans) on three separate dates.
The Milans duly executed Deeds of Assignments for the loans. Under its terms, they sold, assigned and transferred their
rights to various checks to PCI Leasing. In case of default or nonpayment of checks, the Milans must pay the face value
of the checks, interests and late payment charges.
PCI presented the checks for payment. However, they were dishonored for different reasons Payment Stopped,
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, and Account Closed. Despite repeated demands, the Milans failed to settle their
obligation (P2M). PCI filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the Milans before the RTC of Quezon City.
The RTC issued summons to the Milans to their place of residence. However, the process server returned the
summons and the copy of the complaint. In his Officers Return, he stated that he went to their residence on two different
occasions but he the people in the area told him that the Milans had already transferred to an unknown location. As a
result, PCI filed a Motion to Archive the Civil Case. It claimed that it was conducting an investigation to ascertain the
whereabouts of the Milans. The RTC denied the motion on account of the provision of an Administrative Circular. It
provided that the court may archive civil cases upon motion when the defendant, without fault or neglect of plaintiff,
cannot be served summons within 6 months from issuance of order of summons. The RTC directed PCI to take the
necessary steps to actively prosecute the instant case within 10 days from receipt. Otherwise, the case would be dismissed
for lack of interest.
PCI filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons. However, the RTC dismissed the case because counsels for
both parties failed to appear on the scheduled hearing. PCI sought for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of
merit.
PCI filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration, once more seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal of the
case. The RTC denied the motion because it was the second motion for reconsideration filed by PCI. It also cited Sec. 3 of
Rule 17.
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court,
the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
PCI filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the RTC dismissed it because it was filed beyond the reglementary
period (one day late). PCI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed for lack of merit. PCI filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but this was also denied. As a result, PCI elevated the case to the SC by way of instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
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Issues:
1. W/N the RTC erred in dismissing the civil case.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiffs fault if: (1) he fails to appear
on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) he fails to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; or (3) he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The general rule is
that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action. The only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a
qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.
The test for dismissing a case in the event the plaintiff fails to appear to prosecute a suit is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. When there is no showing that there is a scheme to delay the case or failure to observe the rules
on the part of the plaintiff, the court should decide on the case.
In this case, PCI explained that is counsel merely came late during the scheduled hearing. He arrived at the time
when the judge was already dictating the order of dismissal. Further, the hearing was merely for the issuance of
Alias Summons and not for presentation of evidence. A hearing for such is not necessary under the Rules of Court
because the RTC could have acted upon it without prejudicing the rights of the respondents. Despite this, the RTC
still dismissed the case. While trial courts have the discretion to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for
tardiness or absence at hearings, such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and should still conform to
the dictates of justice and fair play.
Moreover, the circumstances show that the delay in the RTC proceeding were not entirely the fault of PCI. PCI
failed to successfully prosecute the case for several months because it could not locate the Milans whereabouts.
They were constantly changing addresses and refusing to accept court processes.
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 18 PRE-TRIAL
01 - Martinez v. de la Merced (1989)
Doctrines:
The right to a preliminary conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure is deemed waived by a partys
failure to invoke the same before the trial court, this is not in the least to suggest that the trial courts may dispense
with such a preliminary conference.
Facts:
Martinez instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an unlawful detainer case against the herein private
respondents Bienvenido Juan and Sacred Heart School of Malabon, Inc., for the recovery of possession of the premises
being used by the latter as school building. Martinez claimed that the contract of lease has expired, and the terms and
conditions of the contract of lease were violated. The respondents claimed otherwise.
Eventually, the Municipal Trial Court ordered the case to be tried under the Rules on Summary Procedure
and, without setting the case for pre-trial conference, required the parties to submit the affidavits of their witnesses
with supporting documents and position papers within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Despite a motion for extension that was granted, private respondents failed to file their position paper on time.
The court ordered the position paper and the counter-affidavit writs to be stricken off. The lower court then made a
judgment in favor of the petitioners based on evidence presented ex parte.
On appeal to the RTC, Judge de la Merced declared the judgment of the inferior court null and void on the
ground that a preliminary conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure is a jurisdictional requirement, the nonobservance of which constitutes reversible error.
Issues:
1. Whether a preliminary conference under Summary Procedure is a jurisdictional requirement
Held/Ratio:
1. Proceedings undertaken without first conducting a pretrial or with a legally defective pre-trial are voided because
either of the parties thereto suffered substantial prejudice thereby or they were denied their right to due process.
However, the exception is when the issue of pre-trial did not affect the trial courts jurisdiction because no injury
was caused to any party therein. Another exception is when facts and circumstances dictate that to conduct
another pre-trial would only be a superfluity, its purpose of expediting the proceedings having been attained
otherwise.
Unless there is a showing of substantial prejudice caused to a party, the trial courts inadvertent failure to
calendar the case for a pre-trial or a preliminary conference cannot render the proceedings illegal or void
ab initio. A partys failure to object to the absence of a pre-trial is deemed a waiver of his right thereto.
Private respondents had at least three opportunities to raise the question of lack of preliminary conference:
when they filed an extension, when they actually filed the motion and when the filed a motion for reconsideration.
Nonetheless, none of these instances was the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised or even hinted at by
private respondents. In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings.
Private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file their position paper and a motion for
reconsideration of the order expunging from the record their position paper. These two pleadings are also
disallowed in summary proceedings. Obviously, the failure of private respondent to raise the issue was occasioned
by negligence on their part, if not a belief that it was not vital for their cause.
The right to a preliminary conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure is deemed waived by a partys
failure to invoke the same before the trial court, this is not in the least to suggest that the trial courts may dispense
with such a preliminary conference.
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02 - Andres Sarmiento v. Judge Juan, Belfast Surety (1983) (LBM, answer to compulsory counterclaim)
Doctrines:
A compulsory counterclaim need not be answered anymore before the court can schedule a pre-trial of the action.
By definition, a compulsory counterclaim is intimately related to the complaint such that to answer it would
merely result to a repetition of the allegations contained in the original claim / complaint.
Failure to answer a compulsory counterclaim is not a cause for a default declaration.
Facts:
1
No Date
Belfast Surety vs. Andres Sarmiento and his father Benjamin Sarmiento
Belfast Surety filed an action for indemnification against the Sarmientos under an
indemnification agreement between them for a bail bond.
The presiding judge was Judge Celestino Juan.
December 21 1979
The Sarmientos filed their answer with a (compulsory) counterclaim.
In response, original plaintiff Belfast Surety filed

c. a motion to dismiss as far as Benjamin Sarmiento is concerned
(for unknown reasons; unimportant detail)
d. a motion to schedule the case for pre-trial (now with only Andres Sarmiento as
defendant)
Judge Juan grants the motions and schedules the case for pre-trial on February 5 1980
(over a month and a half after December 21 1979)
Day of Pre Trial : February 5 1980

Only the counsel of Belfast appears in court. It was discovered that Andres Sarmiento could not
appear because he was suffering from a severe stomach pain and LBM that very day. He filed
for an urgent motion for postponement.
Judge Juan denies the urgent motion for postponement and instead, declares Andres in default.
Andres is now contending that pursuant to the OLD Rules of Court (Rule 20 Section 1), a pre-trial shall be
conducted only when the last pleading has been filed. Andres is saying that the last pleading in this case refers to none
other than what should be the reply or answer of Belfast Surety to Andres compulsory counterclaim filed on
December 21 1979 (event # 2). In other words, because Belfast Surety has not filed its answer to Andres compulsory
counterclaim, then Judge Juan could not proceed to pre-trial and eventually declare him in default.
Issue:
1. W/N an answer to the compulsory counterclaim is required
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
a. If no answer (to the counterclaim) is timely filed, the judge may proceed to the pre-trial. Otherwise, an
unscrupulous party litigant can hold court processes by the simple expedient of failing to answer. The
OLD Rule 20 Section 1 must be construed to mean that there is an element of time that must be
considered in waiting for the last pleading (i.e. answer to counterclaim).
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b. The last pleading referred to in the Rules is any pleading that a party will file as a reply to any other
pleading which asserts a claim. As long as a pleading is one that interposes a claim, then this pleading
must be answered, and this subsequent answer / reply in turn shall be considered the last pleading the
Rules requires and refers to. If any pleading asserting a claim is left unanswered, then the failure to
answer may be a ground for declaration of default of that party who failed to answer.
c. However, there is an exception to this general rule that failure to answer a pleading asserting a claim can
hold the failing party in default, such as the failure to answer a complaint in intervention or a
compulsory counterclaim so intimately related to the complaint such that to answer to same would
merely require a repetition of the allegations contained in the complaint.
In other words, Belfast Surety will not be declared in default simply because it failed to answer the
counterclaim interposed by Andres Sarmiento.
249 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
04 - Tria v. Lirag (1961) (compromise agreement, refuses to sign)

Doctrines:
Said compromise agreement is, however, more than a contract. It had been submitted to the court for approval
with request that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, and was accordingly approved by the court and
incorporation into its decision. In other words, it was part of the judgment and may, therefore, be enforced, as
such, by writ execution.
Facts:
Mariano Delgado, acting through his wife, and Lirag executed a deed wherein Delgado sold to Lirag a parcel of
land in CamSur. Alleging that Lirag had violated the terms of agreement, Delgado filed a complaint for recovery of 8k
plus attorneys fees and costs.
After the filing of Lirags answer, the parties submitted a compromise agreement which contained:
1. Parties agreed to rescind the deed of sale
2. That Delgado will pay Lirag the sum of 13.5K in full payment. Upon full payment, Lirag will deliver
the land.
3. That they mutually relinquish their claims for damages and attorneys fees
4. That Delgado may sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the land subject-matter of the sale or any part
thereof in order to raise such sum as may be necessary to pay the afore-mentioned amount of P13.5K to
Lirag, provided however, that no sale, mortgage or disposition made by Delgado shall be valid unless made
with the consent of Lirag; and that in case of disagreement the matter shall be settled by the Court.
Delgado then conveyed his rights to Tria who substituted Delgado as plaintiff. Lirag filed for a motion for
execution upon the ground that Tria had not paid the 13.5k in violation of the compromise agreement. The motion was
granted and a writ was issued but NOT enforced. An alias writ was issued. Tria filed a motion to lift alias writ of
execution which was denied. So Tria is appealing.
Tria is saying that the failure to pay 13.5K was imputable to Lirag because he refused to let him borrow the
OCT of the property, as well as to sign papers and pleadings necessary to enable Tria to raise funds.
Issues:
1. W/N Tria is correct
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Under the terms of the decision, should any controversy arise between the parties over the stipulation
allowing Delgado, Trias predecessor in interest, to mortgage the land in question, it should be submitted to this
Court for decision. Tria failed to call the attention of this Court to the alleged refusal of Delgado so that the
controversy could be resolved conformably to the decision.
Besides, notice of Liraos motion for execution of the decision was duly served upon Tria, who filed a written
opposition thereto. Yet, when the lower court issued its order overruling this opposition and granting said motion,
Tria did not appeal from said order and thus allowed it to become final executory. He did not question its
propriety until the issuance of an alias writ of execution more than a year and a half later. It is now too late.
Tria insists that the compromise agreement was merely a contract, which may be enforced by ordinary action
specific performance, not by writ of execution. Said compromise agreement is, however, more than a
contract. It had been submitted to the court for approval with request that judgment be rendered in
accordance therewith, and was accordingly approved by the court and incorporation into its decision,
which was rendered in conformity there with. In other words, it was part of the judgment and may,
therefore, be enforced, as such, by writ execution.
250 of 277
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05 - Pablo V. Zagala and Pablo V. Zagala and Co., v. Hon. Jose B. Jimenez (1987) (exchange rate)
Doctrine:
As per Sec 2, Rule 18, paragraph (a), the Court shall consider amicable settlement and other alternative modes of
dispute resolution. The parties are encouraged to compromise a case to avoid protracted litigation and costs of
suit.
Facts:
Petitioners are the assigns of a foreign company, Moller and Rothe, which now filed a suit to collect a sum of
money from private respondent Francisco Guballa. Guballa had previously entered into a contract with Moller and Rothe
regarding purchase and importation of book paper. Moller and Rothe exported two shipments of paper to Guballa. The
first shipment was worth $4,301 and the second shipment worth $6,106. The exchange rate at that time was about P3.92.
Now, these shipments were to be paid by two 90-day sight drafts drawn by Moller and Rothe against Guballa.
Guballa failed to answer to his obligations, and Moller and Rothe assigned the credit to Zagala and his company,
herein petitioners in this case. The action did not go to trial on the merits, because during the pre-trial the parties executed
a compromise agreement which was approved by respondent judge. Among others, the compromise agreement provided
that Guballa was willing to pay his obligation and this was manifested by his obtaining a loan with DBP which was to
issue letters of guaranty to PNB and PBCom. Guballa yet again failed to hold his end of the bargain. Petitioners were thus
constrained to file a motion with respondent judge to fix the peso value of the judgment in dollars. Respondent judge
refused and denied the motion, saying that the request was not embodied in the complaint, but only found in the
prayer. (In short, the judge is insisting na sa prayer lang nilagay yung request for fixing the exchange rate, at wala daw
sa main body ng complaint.) Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but was likewise met with denial.
Issue:
1. W/N the respondent CFI judge could fix the peso value of the judgment.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The trouble started with this sentence in the compromise agreement: That, the defendant is willing to pay
the claims of the plaintiffs as embodied in the complaint
The SC held that the judge read the sentence wrong: it is clear that in filing the complaint, the petitioners intended
to recover from the private respondent the amount of U.S.$9,404.14. This amount in U.S. dollars is the
petitioners claim embodied in the complaint which the private respondent bound himself to pay pursuant to the
judgment in Civil Case No. 69895. We agree with the petitioners explanation that the only reason why they
stated the peso equivalent of their claim was to facilitate and simplify the computation of the judicial costs. This
Court cannot sustain the narrow interpretation of the Compromise Agreement by the court a quo. The agreement
did not refer to the claim in the body of the complaint only but as embodied in the complaint. The complaint
should, therefore, be read in its totality including the prayer. And therein what is sought by the petitioners is the
recovery of the claim in U.S. dollars or its equivalent amount in peso based on the officially prevailing exchange
rate at the time of payment.
According to the case of Phoenix Assurance Company vs. Macondray & Co., Inc. a judgment awarding an
amount in U.S. dollars may be paid with its equivalent amount in local currency based on the conversion rate
prevailing at the time of payment. If the parties cannot agree on the same, the trial court should determine such
conversion rate. Needless to say, the judgment debtor may simply satisfy said award by paying in full the amount
in U.S. dollars.
Therefore, when the petitioners, in this case, filed their motion to fix the peso value of the judgment in dollars,
they only intended to exercise a right granted to them by the present jurisprudence that the trial court shall
determine or fix the conversion rate prevailing at the time of payment. The respondent judge erred in refusing to
grant said motion.
251 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 19 INTERVENTION
01 - Big Country Ranch Corporation v. CA (1993) (Barges)
Doctrines:
The right to intervene is not an absolute right. Under our rules on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Intervention will not be allowed when it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
principal parties, especially if intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Intervention is legally possible only before or during a trial, hence a motion for intervention filed after trial.
Facts:
The case stemmed from a case entitled Palarca v. Capt. Capada. Palarca petitioned for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against Capada of the Philippine Coast Guard for the release of two barges, Bangsi and Dangsol which were
allegedly with the Coast Guard. They found out that the barges in possession of the Coast Guard were different from the
descriptions of Bangsi and Dangsol. Golden Sawmill, private respondent in the case, filed a motion for intervention
claiming that they owned the two barges. According to them they got the barges from Big Country in a public auction, as
evidenced by a certificate of sale. Trial court allowed Golden Sawmills motion. Big Country also filed a motion for
leave to intervene alleging that they were the ones who owned the barges. They admitted that it was sold in a public
auction to Golden Sawmill but the auction was attended by irregularities. The RTC denied Big Countrys motion and
ordered that the barges be released to Golden Sawmill. CA affirmed.
Issue:
1. W/N Big Country should be allowed to intervene.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. As a general guide in determining whether a party may intervene, the court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original, parties, and whether or
not the intervenors rights may be, fully protected in a separate proceeding. Big Countrys claim that the public
sale was attended by some irregularities could evidently be better threshed out in an independent proceeding.
To allow Big Country to intervene in the replevin suit, which is primarily on the issue of possession, would
only make the proceedings therein unnecessarily complicated. New and unrelated issues on conflicting claims
of ownership, authenticity of documents of title and regularity in the mode of acquisition thereof could expectedly
be raised and inevitably cause delay in the adjudication of the rights claimed by the original parties.
Moreover, there is no pending principal action wherein petitioner may intervene. A decision was already
rendered therein by the trial court and no appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment in that main case is
now final and executory. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the
intervention may be based.
The proper remedy would have been to file a third-party claim over the barges under Rule 70.
252 of 277
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03 - Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila Branch 39 (1990)
Doctrines:
The fact that the trial court properly dismissed the original action does not require dismissal of the action in
intervention.
After the intervenor has appeared in the action, the plaintiff has no absolute right to put the intervenor out of court
by the dismissal of the action. The parties to the original suit have no power to waive or otherwise annul the
substantial rights of the intervenor
Facts:
Metrobank loaned Good Earth Emporium (GEE) P4,250,000 to finance the acquisition of airconditiong
equipment from Raycor Air Control System, Inc. GEE then executed a chattel mortgage over their air conditioning units
in favor of Metrobank. GEE failed to pay. Hence, Metrobank sued Uniwide (na hindi naman sinabi bakit Uniwide yung
kinasuhan K).
Raycor filed a motion for leave to intervene, alleging that it has a direct and immediate interest on the subject
matter of the litigation, that it will either gain or lose by the direct legal and effect of the judgment. There was no
opposition to the motion and the intervention complaint was admitted. But before trial started, Metrobank and Uniwide
were able to arrive at a compromise. The parties filed a joint moition to dismiss the complaint. The RTC dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
Raycor filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that it was not furnished a copy of the joint motion for
dismissal. The RTC granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Raycor, the intervenor. The RTC then admitted an
amended complaint in intervention.
Issues:
1. W/N the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing the intervention
suit to survive despite the dismissal of the main action and also in admitting the amended complaint in
intervention?
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is proper.
The joint motion to dismiss of the original parties, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has the effect
of putting to rest only the claims of the original parties. The dismissal cannot in any way affect the claim of
Raycor, which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original parties.
Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an
action, or against both, may intervene in such action, and when he has become a party thereto it is error for the
court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an agreement between the original
parties to the action. Any settlement made by the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the
intervenor is a party to it.
By the very definition of intervention, the intervenor is a party to the action as the original parties and to make his
right effectual, he must necessarily have the same power as the original parties, subject to the authority of the
court. Having been permitted to become a party, an intervenor is entitled to have the issues raised between him
and the original parties tried and determined. The fact that the trial court properly dismissed the original action
does not require dismissal of the action in intervention. An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the
original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. After the intervenor has appeared in the action, the plaintiff has
no absolute right to put the intervenor out of court by the dismissal of the action. The parties to the original
suit have no power to waive or otherwise annul the substantial rights of the intervenor.
If Raycor was made to refile another case, it will cause unnecessary delay and multiplicity of suits, defeating the
purpose of intervention. Regarding the amended complaint in intervention, it is well within the discretion of the
trial court to grant or deny the same.
253 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
04 - Batama Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association v. Judge Rosal (1971)

Doctrine:
While it is true that the motion for intervention is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, such discretion has
its limits: it should be denied when it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the right of the parties; or
when the claim of the intervenor can be properly decided in a separate proceeding like Teves claim.
Facts:
Antonio Villegas (private respondent 1) and Juan Teves (private respondent 2) were members of the Batama
Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association (association). Both had signed separately similar instruments denominated
as Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney- containing the same terms and conditions- in favor of the association
and had thereafter resigned as members. In light of his resignation, Villegas first filed a complaint for damages and
injunction against the association, seeking to enjoin the latter from continuing with the authority of the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney in the management, production, milling, and marketing of his sugar cane and sugar
cane products for the crop year.
A month after, Teves filed, thru the same course of Villegas, an urgent motion for intervention. He claims to have
a legal interest in Villegas complaint because he has a common cause of action with Villegas i.e. the lack of authority of
the association to act on strength of the already expired Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney.
The association filed its opposition to the said urgent motion for intervention, alleging that Teves Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney is entirely distinct and separate from the marketing agreement with Villegas; that their
enforcement cannot be joined in one action or complaint.
Judge Rosal granted the urgent motion and admitted Teves complaint-in-intervention thus, prompting Batama
Farmers to file this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Issue:
1. Whether Judge Rosal acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the complaint-in-intervention
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. Allowing the Teves intervention was improper; Teves should file a separate action against the Association,
which may be heard jointly with Villegas should the court and the parties find it feasible and convenient. The
Court ruled that while it is true that the motion for intervention is addressed to the discretion of the trial court,
such discretion has its limits: it should be denied when it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
right of the parties; or when the claim of the intervenor can be properly decided in a separate proceeding like
Teves claim.
The fact that their respective separate, distinct and independent contracts contain identical terms does not create in
favor of one a legal interest in the contract of the other. Any decision rendered in one will not affect the other.
254 of 277
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05 - Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA (1989)
Doctrine:
The interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties of the action could be allowed to intervene,
proceedings will become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable.
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the corporation, it does not
vest the owner thereof with any legal right or title to any of the property, his interest in the corporate property
being equitable or beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners of corporate property, which
is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal person.
Facts:
Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay, widow and special administratix of the estate of the late Senator Genaro
Magsaysay, filed an action against Artemio Panganiban, Subic Land Corporation (Subic), Filipinas Manufacturers Bank
(FILMANBANK) and the Register of Deeds of Zambales.
She alleged that in 1958, she and her husband acquired with their conjugal funds, a parcel of land with
improvements, known as Pequena Island. After the death of her husband, she discovered an annotation at the back of
the TCT that the land was acquired by her husband from his separate capital (not the conjugal) and that he registered a
Deed of Assignment in favor of Subic so that a new TCT was issued in favor of the corporation. The land was also
mortgaged by Subic to FILMANBANK. She argued there were done in an attempt to defraud the conjugal partnership
considering that the land is conjugal and her marital consent was not obtained. She further alleged that the change made
by the Register of Deeds was effected without the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration and that the late
Senator did not give his consent, unless, it vitiated.
The sisters of the late senator, filed a motion for intervention on the ground that their brother conveyed to them
half of his shareholdings in Subic and as assignees of around 41 % of the total outstanding shares of stocks of Subic, they
have a substantial and legal interest in the subject matter of litigation and that they have a legal interest in the success of
the suit with respect to SUBIC. They strongly argue that their ownership of stock in SUBIC entitles them to a significant
vote in the corporate affairs. Since the land is considered as the only tangible asset of Subic and that it that it appears that
they are more vitally interested in the outcome of the case than Subic, they are affected by the action of the widow.
The court denied the motion and ruled that the sisters have no legal interest whatsoever in the matter in litigation
and their being alleged assignees or transferees of certain shares in SUBIC cannot legally entitle them to intervene
because Subic has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders. The CA affirmed, stating that whatever claims
the sisters have against the late Senator or against Subic for that matter can be ventilated in a separate proceeding so that
they are not left without any remedy or judicial relief under existing law.
Issue:
1. W/N the Magsaysay sisters may intervene.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
otherwise qualified; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur.
The words an interest in the subject mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, and which would
put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which
plaintiff could not recover.
The interest, if it exists at all, of the Magsaysay sisters is indirect, contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential
and collateral. At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in the
255 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
management of the corporation and to share in the profits and assets on dissolution, after payment of the corporate
debts and obligations.
It is significant to note that as per records, there are 4 pending cases involving the parties. The sister-intervenors
interests are no doubt amply protected in these cases. Neither does the court lend credence to their argument that
they are more interested in the outcome of the case than Subic since the latter is willing to compromise with the
widow. Since a compromise involves the giving of reciprocal concessions, the only conceivable concession the
corporation may give is a total or partial relinquishment of the corporate assets.
The Magsaysay sisters cannot also claim the right to intervene on the strength of the transfer of shares allegedly
executed by the late Senator. The corporation did not keep books and records. No transfer was ever recorded,
much less effected as to prejudice third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to
affect third persons. The law on corporations is explicit. And even assuming arguendo that there was a valid
transfer, they are nonetheless barred from intervening as their rights can be ventilated and amply protected in
another proceeding.
256 of 277
ALS2014B
sof
ALS2014B

JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 37 NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

&
RULE 38 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS
01 - Domingo Neypes, et.al. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals (2005) (Fresh Period Rule)
Doctrines:
Fresh Period Rule allowance of a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration and may be availed of only when any of the two motions are filed.
Final Order adjudication on the merits. It is what ultimately ends the issues in the case.
Facts:
Neypes, et.al., filed an action for annulment of title of lands and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with the
issuance of preliminary injunction against Landbank, the Heirs of del Mundo, the Bureau of Lands, and the Bureau of
Forestry. Various motions were filed in court. Landbank and the Heirs filed motions to dismiss the case based on lack of
cause of action and prescription, respectively. These were denied. However, the Heirs filed a motion for reconsideration.
The trial court upheld the motion and dismissed the complaint of Neypes et. Al. based on prescription. The following
events thereafter followed:
Feb. 12, 1998
RTC dismissed the complaint based on prescription of

action.
Mar. 3, 1998
Neypes received the order of dismissal of complaint.
Mar. 18,
(15th day)
1998 Neypes filed a motion for reconsideration.
July 1, 1998
RTC dismissed Neypes MR
July 22, 1998
Neypes received order of dismissal of MR.
July 27, 1998
Neypes filed an order of appeal
Aug. 4, 1998
RTC denied notice of appeal for being filed beyond the

reglementary period. (8 Days late)
Aug 31, 1998
Neypes received denial of notice of appeal.
Neypes et. Al, assailed the denial via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the CA. They alleged that the period
to file a notice of appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 when they received the order of dismissal of their MR.
According to them, this order was to be considered the final order as contemplated under the Rules and BP 129.
Furthermore, they assail the ruling of the RTC (which is based on jurisprudence17) that the filing of an MR merely
suspended the reglementary period and should they file an appeal, they only have the remaining balance of the
period. According to Neypes, a fresh period of 15 days, counted from the final order, and not the remaining balance of the
reglementary period should be afforded them. CA denied their petition and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

17. Quelnan Doctrine and Apuyan Doctrine
257 of 277
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Issues:
1. What is the final order contemplated by the rules?
2. W/N a fresh period of 15 days to appeal shall be given to Neypes.
Held/Ratio:
1. THE ORDER DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS
THE FINAL ORDER. According to the SC, a final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is adjudication on the merits. In the case at bar, it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration (July 1, 1998) which constituted the final order as it was what ended
the issues raised there. The receipt of the order by Neypes (July 22, 1998) and not the order of dismissal of
complaint (Mar.3) triggered the running of the reglementary period.
2. YES. Under Rule 41, Section 3, Neypes had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. As mentioned above, on the 15th day from the notice of judgment Neypes opted to file
a Motion for Reconsideration, not a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court, using as basis its power to
promulgate rules of procedure in all courts of justice, deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The SC based this ruling on statutory construction that the use of or in the provision supposes that the notice
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final
order.
Notes:
Fresh Period rule does not run counter to the intent of BP 129 to hasten the disposition of cases by limiting the
period to appeal to 15 days, because the period to appeal still remains to be 15 days. The fresh period rule
becomes significant only if the parties opt to file an MR or a motion for new trial.
When Fresh Period Rule is applicable (as enumerated in the case):

o
Rule 40: MTC to RTC appeals.
Rule 42 RTC CA petitions for review
Rule 43: Quasi Judicial Agencies CA appeals
Rule 45: appeals by certiorari to SC
258 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Dacanay v. Alvendia (1969)

Doctrines:
Where the court had already thrice previously rejected the petitioner's self-same contentions and assertions, the
motion for reconsideration reiterating the same contentions and assertions for the fourth time was unquestionably
pro forma.
Mere citation and/or amplification of authorities not previously brought to the court's attention on the same
argument does not remove the pleading from the ambit of the pro forma doctrine.
Facts:
On September 28, 1957 Julian B. Dacanay lodged a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided
by the respondent judge, against the Consolidated Mines, Inc. (respondent corporation), praying that the latter be
condemned to pay to him a contingent fee due him in connection with auditing services supposedly rendered by him in the
gathering of evidence for the prosecution of civil case 18938 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Consolidated Mines, Inc. vs. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co."
The court then set the case for pre-trial on February 1, 1962. On this date the parties expressly agreed and
conceded that the sole issue is whether the respondent corporation had actually recovered and received from the
Benguet Consolidated Mines Co. any amount or amounts on account of shortages in chrome ore inventories,
anomalies in the payment of salaries and wages, and fictitious hauling of ore.
On February 4, 1963 Dacanay filed a motion to admit a first amended complaint and was subsequently admitted.
The court, through an order, (a) dismissed the alternative cause of action; (b) required the latter amend it again by
alleging ultimate and principal facts which would support his claim that the respondent corporation had recovered
from the Benguet Consolidated Company; and (c) warned the petitioner that "after the lapse of said period if
plaintiff has not filed his second amended complaint, the case shall be dismissed."
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a second amended complaint. The respondent corporation moved to strike out
and/or dismiss the second amended complaint on the grounds (1) that it absolutely failed to comply with the order; (2) that
it was but a reiteration of identical allegations contained in the first amended complaint already held "to be
baseless and totally unsubstantiated;" and (3) that it was "undisputably established that plaintiff's claim has been
absolutely released by him." The petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion of the respondent corporation.
On October 23, 1963 the court issued an order that the second amended complaint filed by the plaintiff dated
September 9, 1963 failed to comply with the orders of this Court dated July 15, and August 29, 1963.
On January 2, 1964 the petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the court's orders of October 23, 1963 and
December 14, 1963, manifesting therein that he had already filed the necessary appeal bond. 18 days from its receipt of
the petitioner's record on appeal, the respondent corporation filed its opposition thereto.
Thereafter, by order of January 23, 1964, the court dismissed the appeal, stating that
... the filing of the notice of appeal and the record on appeal was out of time as they were filed way
beyond the 30-day period within which plaintiff should have filed said notice of appeal. As pointed
out by counsel for the defendant, the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff was but a pro
forma motion. It did not suspend the running of the period within which to appeal.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted order was denied by the court on March 13, 1964.
Hence, an original petition for mandamus.
Issue:
1. W/N the petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated November 21, 1963 was pro forma
259 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The said motion was pro forma and consequently uphold the dismissal by the lower court of the petitioner's
proposed appeal. A motion for reconsideration which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro forma and
does not stop the period of appeal from slipping away
In filing his second amended complaint of September 10, 1963, which is not materially different from his first
amended complaint, the petitioner in effect persisted in urging the court to accept the fact of sufficiency of his
rejected first amended complaint.
In yet filing on November 21, 1963 his motion for reconsideration of the third order of October 23, 1963, again
insisting on the sufficiency of his second amended complaint notwithstanding the court's three previous adverse
rulings, the petitioner was completely aware of the court's precise position.
The court cannot sustain the petitioner's contention that the court was in error in ruling, in its order that
the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff was but a pro forma motion and therefore did not
suspend the running of the period within which to appeal. The petitioner's appeal was filed "out of time"
(by 36 days) since the reglementary 30-day period expired on November 27, 1963, whereas he posted his
appeal only on January 2, 1964.
Where the court had already thrice previously rejected the petitioner's self-same contentions and assertions, the
motion for reconsideration reiterating the same contentions and assertions for the fourth time was unquestionably
pro forma. Mere citation and/or amplification of authorities not previously brought to the court's attention on the
same argument does not remove the pleading from the ambit of the pro forma doctrine.
260 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
05 - Lucas v. Fabros (2000) (Summary Procedure, ejectment case, stomach pain, when Motion for Reconsideration
allowed)
Doctrines:
We have learned that a Motion for Reconsideration is prohibited motion on the Rules of Summary Procedure Sec.
19(c). The prohibited kind of motion mentioned in the said section is a Motion for Reconsideration of
Judgment rendered by the court after a trial upon the merits of the case.
At the case at bar, the respondent Judge granted the Motion for Reconsideration validly because the judgment of
the court was based on failure of a party to appear in the preliminary conference and NOT upon the merits of
the case. Thus, it is not the prohibited pleading contemplated in Sec 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure.
Facts:
Complainant Lucas charged Judge Fabros with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion
relative to an ejectment case where Lucas was the respondent.
In the said ejectment case (Castelo v. Lucas), the complaint of Castelo against Lucas was dismissed due to the
failure of Castelo and her counsel to appear in the Preliminary Conference. Immediately, after 4 days of the order
dismissing the complaint, Castelo filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that their failure to attend the Preliminary
Conference was due to an excruciating stomach pain suffered by his counsel (Atty. Suing). Judge Fabros granted such
motion.
Now, Lucas charges Judge Fabros Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion because it is
elementary that a Motion of Reconsideration is prohibited in ejectment cases, being Summary in nature. He claims
that Sec. 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure specifically prohibits this motion to be filed in Summary Proceedings.
Judge Fabros in her comment stated that she is well aware of the prohibitions of the Rules of Summary Procedure
and that Motion for Reconsiderations are thus prohibited. But she claims that denying this motion would lead to a
miscarriage of justice. She claims that the Rules of Summary Procedure is not a straight jacket that should be observed
even if it may lead to injustice. She also claims that the Order Dismissing the Complaint of Castelo has not yet reached
finality when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed.
Issues:
1. W/N Judge Fabros abused her discretion in granting the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Castelo in the said
summary proceeding (ejectment case)
Held/Ratio:
1. No. Sec 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure states:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed
in the cases covered by this Rule.
...
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered upon the
merits of the case.
Here, the order of dismissal rendered by Judge Fabros was due to the failure of a party to appear during a
preliminary conference, which is NOT OBVIOUSLY a judgment on the merits after trial of a case. Thus, Judge
Fabros did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of the ignorance of the law, in granting
Castelos Motion for Reconsideration.
261 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Cansino v. CA (2003)
Doctrine:
Rule 37 provides that a Motion for Reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence. If a
party wants to present further evidence, they should file a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.
Facts:
Sps. Francisco and Rosario Castro filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Danilo Cansino, Linda de Jesus
and Elena Mesa before the MeTC. Sps Castro alleged that Cansino et al, "by strategy and stealth unlawfully constructed
their respective houses inside Castros parcel of land." In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners Cansino and de Jesus
averred that their possession was "premised upon the honest belief that the lot they were and are still occupying was a
public land;" that they "had been in possession of the subject premises ever since 1977". The MeTC took cognizance of
the case and treated the complaint as one for ejectment under the Rules on Summary Procedure. MeTC dismissed the
complaint holding that in an ejectment case, the Castro has the burden of proving prior physical possession of the
property. Castro failed to discharge the burden. On appeal, RTC affirmed in toto MeTCs decision. Sps Castro were not
able to present evidence of their actual possession of the property prior to that of petitioners, while the latter were able to
prove their possession of the property since 1977. Sps Castro filed MFR where they appended more documentary
evidence.
RTC reversed its previous decision. It ruled that Castros were able to prove ownership and possession of their
predecessors-in-interest, which dated back to 1964, way before the 1977 possession of Cansino et al. Moreover, it rejected
the claim of petitioners that the subject land is public property since it has been proven that the lot is titled and the title has
been transferred to respondents on January 29, 1993. The title being incontrovertible after a year, petitioners can no longer
assail it. The court considered petitioners as intruders or squatters on the subject lot. Cansino filed a petition for review
with CA. CA affirmed RTC ruling. It held that Cansino et al were unable to substantiate their possession of the property.
With regard to the action taken by the RTC in considering the documentary evidence attached only in the MFR, the
appellate court ruled that under Sec. 5, Rule 135 of ROC, the RTC has the inherent power to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
Issues:
1. W/N the Sps Castro erred in their act of attaching new evidence with the Motion for Reconsideration
2. W/N Sps Castro have a clear right to posses land in question (not relevant to topic)
Held/Ratio:
1. Under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a party may file MFR on the ground, among others, that " the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or the decision or final order is contrary to law." It requires the
motion to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported
by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making specific reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence presented or to the provisions of law alleged to be violated. It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that MFR
cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence. Cansino et al correctly contend that if Castros wanted to
present further evidence, they should have filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
However, for newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have been discovered after trial, (b) it
could not have been discovered or produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence, (c) it must be material and
not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a witness, merely important evidence
being not enough, and (d) if presented, would probably alter the result of the action. In this case, the Castros
attached for the first time in their MFR, evidence to prove their ownership over the parcel of land subject matter
of this controversy. This is erroneous. For one, possession is the only issue in a case for unlawful detainer. More
importantly, there is no justification for the delay in presenting said evidence. We note that although it was Sps
Castro who filed an appeal to the RTC, they failed to submit their memo as required by the said court. It was only
after RTC rendered an unfavorable decision that Sps Castro filed MFR and appended their new evidence.
Piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.
262 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
2. No. It is fundamental that complainants in an ejectment case must allege and prove that they had prior physical
possession of the property before they were unlawfully deprived thereof by defendants. Sps Castro, being the
complainants before the lower court, had the burden of proving their claim of prior possession. They failed to
prove their claim, as can be gleaned from the totality of evidence: - The titles presented do not necessarily prove
their right to possession esp since theres a separate case for the investigation of the true status of the land. The
contract to sell and the location plan do not prove possession.
263 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
08 - Braulio Conde et.al., v. Intermediate Appelate Court (1986) (Intrinsic Fraud)

Doctrines:
Extrinsic Fraud fraud committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented
from presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
Intrinsic Fraud - acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of
the case
Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to attack a judgment.
Facts:
Marcelo Gutierrez filed an original complaint for recovery or possession of land against the Condes in the RTC.
RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and ordered that possession of the land be
delivered to Gutierrez. The Condes filed with the RTC a petition to annul the CA judgment based on fraud. The
Condes contend that Gutierrez was able to obtain a favorable decision on appeal because he presented false
evidence and testimony to prove his filiation to the original owners of the land and that, as a consequence, he was
the its lawful owner. The RTC dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
By way of a petition for certiorari, mandamus and injunction, the Condes elevated the annulment of judgment
case to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition holding that only the Supreme Court may annul judgments of the CA. The
case was elevated to the Supreme Court which remanded the case again to the CA ordering them to decide the case based
on the merits. The CA still insisted that it is absurd to annul their own judgments and dismissed the case but nevertheless
passed upon its merits, just for the sake of it.
Issue:
1. W/N the CA had jurisdiction
2. (TOPIC)W/N the judgment shall be annulled
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Because the SC said so (yan talaga yung reason nila, promise). According to the SC they could not
understand why the CA still refused to accept that they had jurisdiction over the case despite their earlier
pronouncement. According to the SC, because the Judiciary Act gave the CA exclusive jurisdiction over actions
for annulments of RTC judgments, they have jurisdiction over this case. Although it might appear that they are
annulling their own judgment, what they are annulling is an appellate judgment based on the review of an RTC
judgment.
2. NO. The fraud employed was merely intrinsic in nature. The introduction of false testimonies amounts to
fraud committed within the trial. Annulment of judgment is proper only when the fraud committed is an extrinsic
one wherein the defeated party was prevented from fully presenting his side, which is not apparent in the case at
bar.
264 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
09 - Victoriano Salazar v. Cayetana Salazar (1907) (Mistake or Excusable Error)

Doctrine:
Mistake / Error which is excusable is a ground for annulment of judgment.
Facts:
A subpoena to appear in court with witnesses was issued to Victoriano for an action for damages instituted by
Cayetana. The server, however, failed to serve the same to him because he apparently lived in Batangas already, and not
in Mindoro where it was issued. Victoriano and his witnesses failed to appear, he also failed to answer the complaint,
prompting the judge to issue the assailed judgment. It appears that despite Victoriano not being served the subpoena,
he was already served a copy of the complaint against him as evidenced by a motion filed by his attorney to permit him to
file an answer. The RTC rendered a judgment by default ordering Victoriano to pay P6,000 + costs of litigation.
Victoriano now seeks to annul the judgment because, according to him, he failed to present his case.
Victoriano admits to his knowledge of the complaint against him. However, he reasons that his failure to file an answer or
to appear in court was because he believed that the case was already terminated due to a compromise agreement
entered by him and Cayetana to settle the case. A certified copy of the agreement and the fact that Cayetanas attorney
filed a motion to dismiss the claim based on the compromise agreement proved this.
Issue:
1. W/N the RTC judgment shall be annulled.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The SC considered it natural and logical that Victoriano believed, and that such belief was well founded,
that the action brought against him by Cayetana had been ended in fact by virtue of the aforesaid compromise and
that he was, therefore, relieved from the duty of filing his answer. Perhaps technically such belief would be
erroneous, but it was, without doubt, excusable and the causes were reasonable why he did not answer. This
prevented him from making or utilizing a defense which would have been good and efficacious that is, the
aforesaid transaction or compromise, and therefore, annulment of judgment properly lies.
265 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
10 - In Re: Ayllon v. Sevilla (1987)

Doctrine:
A client is bound by the mistakes and omissions of his counsel, so that if an appeal is lost through the unjustified
neglect of counsel, that loss is binding upon the client. [Might be relevant to the topic in the sense that counsels
negligence cannot fall under excusable negligence for NT/MR/Relief]
Facts:
Mateo Ayllon died, and he left a holographic will. Erlinda is his second wife, who instituted the proceedings for
probate of the will. In this will, Mateo made dispositions of certain properties to Erlinda and to his sons/daughters from
his first marriage (2nd marriage bore no children).
In the probate of the will, the sons/daughters of the first marriage (herein respondents) opposed the proceedings.
To resolve this, Erlinda entered into a verbal agreement without the aid of counsel with Mateos children. Erlinda was
to receive 1/2 of a house in Samar in return for abandoning the case.
Pursuant to this agreement, Erlinda filed a motion to dismiss the case, which was granted. However, upon the
dismissal of the case, Mateos children did not comply with their verbal agreement, so Erlinda filed an affidavit with the
court asking for the withdrawal of her motion to dismiss and to reinstate the case. This was granted.
However, the court reversed itself later on and revived the order of dismissal, saying the case was amicably
settled and that Erlinda failed to produce 3 witnesses who could identify the handwriting of the testator as provided in the
Civil Code. After the MR was denied, Erlinda appealed to the CA.
On appeal, the CA required her to file a Record on Appeal within 60 days. However, what her counsel filed was
an Appeal Brief, and even when a motion to dismiss appeal was filed due to failure to file a Record on Appeal, counsel
still did not file the same. Thus, the CA dismissed the case.
Issue:
1. W/N the case should be reinstated
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the case should not be reinstated. It is a settled rule that a client is bound by the mistakes and omissions of his
counsel, so that if an appeal is lost through the unjustified neglect of counsel, that loss is binding upon the client.
Also, the Court took into consideration that Erlinda did not lose all of her hereditary rights, as the proceedings
could go on intestate. Thus, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings regarding intestate
succession.
266 of 277
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ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
11 - National Shipyards and Steel Co. v. Salvador Asuncion (1958) (TB + Newly Discovered Evidence)
Doctrine:
For there to be new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the evidence adduced must be of such nature that it
could not have been procured and presented during trial even with the exercise of due diligence.
Facts:
Asuncion worked as a rigger for National. One December morning, he vomited blood while working. Physicians
found out that he had Pulmonary Tuberculosis and that he should be confined. He was confined from December until July
11, when he was discharged as clinically and radiologically improved. He went back to work but he was informed that he
cannot be reinstated due to lack of funds. Referee Edrelito Luna of the Workmens Compensation Commission rendered a
decision, ordering National to pay Salvador Asuncion compensation, fees, and costs. National moved for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. According to National, they found evidence that even before Asuncion
worked for them he already had TB (the case didnt say how this evidence would work for National, they just assumed
it would). They also contend that they should not be required to pay medical costs after July 11 because Asuncion was
already free of TB.
Issue:
1. W/N the motion for new trial should be granted
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The respondent Commission did not err in declaring that the alleged newly discovered evidence could have
been produced at the trial if the petitioner had exercised due diligence, because the records referring to
respondent Asuncion had always been in petitioner's possession.
[Start palang ng employment asa National na yung medical records ni Asuncion plus may mga check ups din sila
so hindi talaga to newly discovered]
Moreover, the medical finding that respondent Asuncion on July 11, 1952 as clinically and radiologically
improved, was explained by the attending physician in Quezon Institute as merely meaning improvement in the
physical condition.
267 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
RULE 65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, AND MANDAMUS

01 - Balba v. Peak Development Inc. (2005)
Facts:
(brief history as to how case started)
The case started when Balba (then Financial Officer of Peak Devt) through a memorandum of the company was
suspended and later dismissed. She allegedly failed to abide by the requirements of the internal auditor and inefficiently
accounted and implemented financial policies. With this, Balba filed a case of illegal suspension and dismissal and nonpayment of service incentive leave before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision stated that the
reasons presented by the company were not sufficient grounds for dismissal. Upon the appeal of Peak Devt to the
NLRC, the latter modified the decision stating that Balba was illegally discharged but the rest of Labor Arbiters decision
stands.
PETITION BEFORE THE CA
Balba then instituted a petition before the CA for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 seeking the
nullification of the Decision of the NLRC. Balba seeks to have the CA review the evaluation of the evidence and
factual finds of the NLRC.
The Court of Appeals issued 2 decisions.
1st Decision - CA dismissed Balbas petition stating that the sole purpose of a writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not include correction of NLRCs evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings. Also, in certiorari proceedings, judicial review is limited to whether the Labor Arbiter or
NLRC had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion. CA finds that apart from
Balbas allegation nothing substantial was presented to indicate and show that NRLC indeed committed grave
abuse of discretion.
2nd Decision - Upon filing of motion for reconsideration, the CA set aside their 1st decision and reversed the
NLRCs decision. CA proceeded to review the factual findings of the NLRC and their conflicts with those
of LAs. CA then concluded that they are then convinced that the findings and conclusion of the LA were
supported by substantial evidence and should no longer be disturbed or challenged by the NLRC. The findings of
NLRC are clearly contrary to the evidence adduced.
PETITION BEFORE THE SC

Balba then filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court . This is with regard to the 2nd
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
1. W/N the CA erred in reversing the factual findings in the case instead of ruling only on errors of jurisdiction
as befits the judgment in special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (RULE 65)
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Court held that in this case, CA erred in concluding that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
The conflicting views of the LA and NLRC on the factual issues or insufficiencies of evidence supporting
the allegations of the parties warranted the review thereof by the CA. The Court advised that it is sometimes
necessary to delve in the factual issues to resolve allegations of grave abuse of discretion as ground for special
civil Action of Certiorari and prohibition.
In this case, it was found by the SC that the ground relied upon by the Labor Arbiter (clearly inefficient
accounting and financial policies, failure to come out with E-VAT study, charging overtime pay) were insufficient
grounds for dismissal. SC stated that not one of the 3 Grounds for dismissal amount to misconduct and there can
be no loss of confidence, thus BALBA was illegally dismissed.
268 of 277
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sof
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
SUMMARY: (WHEN PRESSED FOR TIME )

QUASI-JUDICIAL
BODY/COURT
PETITION
DECISION
Labor Arbiter
Balba filed complaint of illegal

dismissal
Complaint for illegal dismissal

was dismissed, but ordered
company to pay money claims
NLRC
Peaks Dev;t appealed decision
Finds that Balba was illegally

discharged
CA (1st decision)
Balba filed petition for certiorari

(Rule 65)
Upheld the decision of NLRC

and stated that it can no longer
heed to the request of Balba that
finding of facts of NLRC be
evaluated
CA (2nd decision)
Motion for reconsideration was

filed
Reversed first decision and

entered a new one where it
NLRCs decision is reversed.
SC
Petition for review (Rule 45)
Reversed 2nd decision of CA and

stated that 1st decision is one in
accord
with
law
and
jurisprudence
269 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
02 - New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. Iloilo City (2007)

Doctrine:
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and
independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of.
Facts:
New Frontier Sugar Corporation filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. The RTC issued a Stay Order appointing a rehabilitation receiver.
New Frontiers creditor, the Equitable PCI Bank, filed an Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging
that New Frontier is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no assets left.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the case. New Frontier filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied.
New Frontier then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was denied.
Issue:
1. W/N the petition for certiorari (under rule 65) to the CA is a proper remedy?
Held/Ratio:
1. No, Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and
independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed
against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing
of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
The order issued by the RTC is a final order since it terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case before the
trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus
Order.
Note: The RTC was correct for its summary dismissal, as it is tantamount to a finding that there is no merit to the petition.
This is in accord with the trial courts authority to give due course to the petition or not under Rule 4, Section 9 of the
Interim Rules.
270 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
03 - Camutin v. Sps. Potente (2009)

Facts:
Petitioners (Camutin et al) were the registered owners of parcels of land in Cavite issued in their names. They
reside abroad and discovered upon coming back to the Philippines in 1998 that the house and warehouse of respondents
(Spouses Norberto and Pascuala Potente) were erected on the subject lots. Thereupon, respondents agreed to pay
petitioners a P1,000.00 monthly rental starting 1 January 1998 for the use of the lots. They also agreed that should the
properties be sold, respondents would have the right of first refusal and should respondents be unable to purchase the
properties, they would peacefully vacate the premises.
However, respondents failed and refused to pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able to purchase the
lots. Consequently, petitioners sold a portion of the lots to a third party who had it fenced. After the fence was erected,
respondents in October 2006 filed a complaint for partition against petitioners and the buyer of the properties claiming
that they had a right over one-half of the property by virtue of the acknowledgment of rights allegedly executed by
petitioners deceased mother in 9 June 1970. (not so important)
Petitioners filed a complaint with the barangay to have respondents warehouse removed from the
properties. During the conference the parties agreed to wait for the outcome of the hearing on the case for partition before
the RTC. After the conference, the parties no longer appeared before the Barangay.
On 20 November 2006, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents. Respondents filed
an Answer with Motion to Enforce the Agreement entered into before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the Barangay The
Barangay Chairperson clarified that the agreement was only to wait for the result of the RTCs 17 October 2006 hearing
in the case for partition and not to wait for the termination of the case altogether.
Then, the MTC issued an Order/Writ of Execution where it noted the pendency of Civil Case before the RTC.
Apparently, the MTC treated the October 2006 agreement as an amicable settlement when the agreement was only to
defer the barangay case pending the hearing before the RTC. The MTC thus ordered that the proceedings in the
ejectment case to be indefinitely suspended and archived subject to its revival upon the final resolution of Civil Case
(partition case). The MTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss thereto,
alleging that the petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners thus come before this Court, arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari and that the MTC likewise erred in suspending the proceedings in the case for unlawful detainer until
the final resolution of Civil Case before the RTC.
Issue:
1. W/N the petitioners availed of the wrong remedy
Held/Ratio:
1. No. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against
any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case in the case at bar,
the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders dated 5 June 2007 and 16 August 2007
cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On the contrary, sustaining the MTCs
orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules
objective of speedy disposition of cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC
because these only ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case was not resolved
on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could have
validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited
pleading.
271 of 277
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JUDGE DELA ROSA
(not so important) However, the MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof
on the grounds aforestated have rendered the resolution of the present petition for review superfluous and
unnecessary. In their petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification of the RTCs orders and the subsequent
recall of the MTCs orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The
suspension of the unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus
no more need for the Court to decide the present petition on the merits.
04 - Bugarin, et al. v. Palisoc, et al. (2005)

Doctrines:
The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements of the latter is that there should be no appeal.
Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy was lost through fault or
negligence.
Facts:
Palisoc, et al. filed an ejectment complaint against Bugarin, et al. before the MeTC of Paraaque. The MeTC
ruled in favor of Palisoc, et al. Bugarin, et al. appealed to the RTC. The RTC affirmed the MeTCs decision. Bugarin, et
al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. This was denied in an
order dated March 3, 2003. The order came with the grant of Palisoc, et al.s motion for execution. Bugarin, et al. were
served the writ and notice to vacate. Then came a barrage of motions attacking the writ of execution from the Bugarin
party and motions to execute and demolish from the Palisoc side until the RTC made final the order denying Bugarin, et
al.s appeal and remanding the case records to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Bugarin, et al. filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. W/N the petition for certiorari may prosper
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Under Section 21, Rule 70, in cases of forcible entry and detainer, when the RTC decides on the appeal, such
decision is immediately executor without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In this case, the Bugarin party received the RTC decision denying their motion for reconsideration on March 12,
2003. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. This would have
kept their case alive. Instead, Bugarin, et al. filed a petition for certiorari.
Besides, by the time the case was decided by the Supreme Court, the demolition had already been executed and
the Bugarin, et al. had vacated the contested area.
NOTE: The petition for certiorari was hinged on alleged violation of RA 7279 providing for requirements as to notices in
cases of eviction or demolition. The SC found for Palisoc, et al., who argued that said law as Bugarin, et al. were not
eligible social housing program beneficiaries and that Bugarin and the others were properly notified.
272 of 277
ALS2014B
sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
06 - Dillena v. CA (1988)
Doctrine:
Certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal.
When the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator
cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate
of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily
included in its capacity as a probate court.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Eladio Dillena to nullify the orders of CFI sitting as a probate court.
The Carreon spouses died within 6 months of each other leaving an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon (Carreon).
Fausta Carreon Herrera (Herrera), sister of the Father Carreon was appointed as Special Administratrix only for the
purpose of receiving and collecting all sums of money due and payable to the estate. Carreon filed a motion to revoke the
letters of administration issued to Herrera. The court granted the motion.
Carreon sold 3 fishpond properties of her dead adoptive parents to Dillena, without the knowledge and approval
of the probate court. Prior to the sale, Dillena had leased the fishponds for several years. Transfer certificates of title were
issued. Aside from that sale, Dillena had also previously sold real properties of the estate to Luisa Rodriguez and to the
Starlight Industrial Co., Inc.. Both sales were also made without the approval of the probate court.
When the court found out, it issued an order requiring Dillena, Rodriguez and Starlight to appear and to explain
why the deeds of sale and the TCTs should not be cancelled for having been executed without court approval. Only
Starlight appeared and submitted an explanation, thus, the sale in its favor was approved and confirmed by the probate
court. The transfers in favor of Dillena and Rodriguez are declared null and void and without force and effect for having
been made without court authority and approval.
7 months after the order was received by Dillena, he filed a petition before the probate court, alleging it had
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, has no power to annul the sale of the fishponds in question; that the orders
annulling the sale are void because he is not a party to the probate proceedings and that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over the res, which are located in Bulacan province.
Issue:
1. W/N the court deprived him of his property without due process of law because he was not a proper party in the
court
2. W/N the nullification and revocation of the TCTs is discordant with law and jurisprudence.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. There is no denial of due process where the person was afforded an opportunity to present his case. Dillena
was afforded every opportunity to present his explanation but he repeatedly failed to appear on the two scheduled
hearings for the purpose. Moreover, he filed a petition before the probate court, by way of special appearance,
precisely questioning the power of the said court to declare null and void the sale of the fishponds involved
herein. As has been stated, the lower court after hearing the petition and the opposition thereto denied the same.
2. NO. It must be emphasized that the fishponds were included in the inventory of properties of the estate. The deed
of sale of the fishponds was executed between Carreon and Dillen without notice to and approval of the probate
court. But even after the sale, Carreon still included the three fishponds as among the real properties of the estate
in her inventory. In fact, Dillena, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in question, knew that the same were part
of the estate under administration, given that he had been leasing the fishponds for some years.
273 of 277
ALS2014B
sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
The evidence shows that when the fishponds were sold without court approval they were under administration.
The fishponds therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which according to settled jurisprudence
has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under administration.
Furthermore, it took Dillena about 7 months from receipt of the court order to file a petition before the probate
court questioning the power of the probate court to nullify the sale. The order nullifying the sale had long become
final and executory for failure of petitioner to appeal within the reglementary period. On that score alone, the
petition for certiorari which should have been dismissed outright because the remedy of certiorari does not lie
where appeal has been lost.
274 of 277
ALS2014B
sof

ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
08 - San Pedro v. Court of Appeals (1994) (requisites of staying of execution pending appeal)
Doctrine:
Judgments in favor of plaintiffs in ejectment cases are immediately executory. They can be stayed by the
defendant when the following all concur: (1) Perfecting an appeal, (2) Filing a supersedeas bond, and (3) Making
a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during
the pendency of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the
pendency of the appeal.
Facts:
Private Respondent Ledesma filed an unlawful detainer case against Petitioner spouses Loresto in the MeTC of
Kalookan City. The court ruled in favor of Ledesma and ordered the Loresto spouses to vacate the premises, pay P12,000
for compensation of the use and occupation they acquired from the property and attorneys fees. The spouses Loresto
appealed to the RTC.
After filing the appeal, the spouses Loresto along with San Pedro, initiated a case also in the RTC of Kalookan
seeking to annul the title of Ledesma over the property. They claim that a certain Mariano San Pedro, predecessor of
the petitioner San Pedro, had occupied such land since 1900.
Going back to the first case being appealed. Pending appeal, Ledesma filed a Motion for Execution because the
spouses failed to pay the P12,000 compensation for the use and occupation ordered by the MeTC. It was granted by the
RTC and a writ of execution was issued ordering the spouses to pay.
The Spouses Loresto and San Pedro filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of
Appeals. It was denied.
The Spouses and San Pedro claims that the writ of execution should not be issued because they still have a
pending case filed for the annulment of the title of Ledesma.
Issues:
1. W/N the decision of the Court of Appeals denying such motion is correct
2. W/N the court can rule on the validity of the title of Ledesma in this kind of appeal
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. Judgments in favor of plaintiffs in ejectment cases are immediately executory. They can be stayed by the
defendant when the following all concur: (1) Perfecting an appeal, (2) Filing a supersedeas bond, and (3)
Making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property during the pendency of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property during the pendency of the appeal.
The spouses admitted that they truly failed to pay the compensation and rentals. But their claim that they have a
pending case for the annulment of the title is untenable. It is a firmly settled rule that the pendency of an action
questioning the ownership of property will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein.
2. No. The instant petition being one for certiorari, this court is only confined to the issue of whther or not the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
order of the RTC authorizing the execution of the decision of the eviction case. Besides, the petitioners appeal is
still pending with the RTC. The question of whether or not the action for unlawful detainer was the proper remedy
of the private respondent should be addressed in that appeal, not in this certiorari proceeding.
275 of 277
ALS2014B
sof
ALS2014B

JUDGE DELA ROSA
09 - Equitable PCI Bank v. Ng Sheung Ngor (2007)

Doctrine:
There are two substantial requirements in a petition for certiorari. These are:
1. That the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of
his or its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
2. That there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioner must show that the public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that abuse
amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power was exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.
Facts:
Ng Sheung Ngor, Ken Appliance Division, Inc. and Benjamin E. Go (Ngor and company) filed an action for
annulment and/or reformation of documents and contracts against petitioner Equitable PCI Bank (Equitable) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. They claimed that Equitable induced them to avail of its peso and dollar credit
facilities by offering low interest rates so they accepted Equitable's proposal and signed the bank's pre-printed promissory
notes on various dates beginning 1996. They, however, were unaware that the documents contained identical escalation
clauses granting Equitable authority to increase interest rates without their consent. Equitable, in its answer, asserted that
Ngor and company knowingly accepted all the terms and conditions contained in the promissory notes. In fact, they
continuously availed of and benefited from Equitable's credit facilities for five years.
After trial, the RTC upheld the validity of the promissory notes invalidated the escalation clause contained therein
because it violated the principle of mutuality of contracts. Judgment was rendered against Equitable and they were made
to pay damages in favor of Ngor and company.
Date
Equitable
Ngor and company
Filed notice of appeal

March 1, 2004
Both notices were denied due course because Equitable and Ngor and
company failed to submit proof that they paid their respective appeal
fees.
Equitable
moved
for
the
reconsideration on the ground that
it did in fact pay the appeal fees
Ngor and company moved for

the issuance of a writ of
execution
March 24, 2004
Reconsideration was denied for

lack of merit. According to the RTC,
because Equitable did not move
for the reconsideration of the
previous order (denying due
course to the parties notices of
appeal), the February 5, 2004
decision
became
final
and
executory as to both parties and a
writ of execution against Equitable
was in order.
Ordered issuance of writ of

execution. 3 properties of
Equitable were levied upon.
March 26, 2004
Filed a petition for relief in the RTC

from the March 1, 2004 order.
276 of 277
ALS2014B
sof

March 30, 2004
ALS2014B
JUDGE DELA ROSA
Withdrew petition for relief, filed

petition for certiorari with an
application for injunction with the
CA. Injunction was granted.
July 1, 2004
Notwithstanding the writ of

injunction,
Equitables
properties were sold in a public
auction.
Moved to annul sale and cite in
contempt the sheriff
October 28, 2005
CA dismissed petition for certiorari.

Equitable moved for reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. W/N Equitables petition for certiorari is meritorious.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in its March 1 and 24 orders.
There are two substantial requirements in a petition for certiorari. These are:
a. That the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess
of his or its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
b. That there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion to prosper, petitioner must show that the public
respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power was
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
The March 1, 2004 order denied due course to the notices of appeal of both Equitable and Ngo and company.
However, it declared that the February 5, 2004 decision was final and executory only with respect to
Equitable. The March 1, 2004 and March 24, 2004 orders of the RTC were obviously intended to prevent
Equitable, et al. from appealing the February 5, 2004 decision. The execution of the decision was undertaken
with indecent haste, effectively obviating or defeating Equitable's right to avail of possible legal
remedies. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering those orders.
With regard to whether Equitable had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
Court held that there was none. The RTC denied due course to its notice of appeal in the March 1, 2004
order. It affirmed that denial in the March 24, 2004 omnibus order. Hence, there was no way Equitable
could have possibly appealed the February 5, 2004 decision.
Although Equitable filed a petition for relief from the March 24, 2004 order, that petition was not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for relief under Rule 38 is an
equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional circumstances or where there is no other available or
adequate remedy
Thus, the Court granted Equitable's petition for certiorari and consequently gave due course to its appeal.
277 of 277
ALS2014B
sof

SC upholds hierarchy of courts in dismissing directly filed certiorari petition

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CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

05 - Paloma v. Mora, et al (2005)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

06 - Quesada v. DOJ (2006)

The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

08 - Ella v. Judge Salanga (1970) (Jurisdiction)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

09 - Villamor v. Salas (1991) (recovery of ownership of land, administrative case)

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JUDGE DELA ROSA

10 - Dela Rosa v. Roldan (2006) (unlawful detainer, 500sqm portion of land)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

11 - Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (1968) (jurisdiction fifteen years after)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

12 - Calimlim v. Ramirez (1982) (Cancellation of TCT, court sitting as cadastral court)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

13 - Dela Cruz v. CA (2006) (fire / unlawful detainer)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

15 - Sun Insurance Office v. Asuncion (1989) (docket fees)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

16 - Ballatan v. CA (1999) (residential land, encroachment, good faith owners)

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

17 - Yuchengco v. Republic (2000) (wrong amount of docket fee, Marcoses)

b. More than P20,000 but less than P40,000

c. P40,000 or more but less than P60,000

d. P60,000 or more but less than P80,000

e. P80,000 or more but less than P100,000

P100,000 or more but less than P150,000

g. For each P1,000 in excess of P150,000

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

JUDGE DELA ROSA

Proceedings free of charge. - All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no