Professional Documents
Culture Documents
0022-006X/89/S00.75
Norman Epstein
University of Maryland, College Park
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Although there have recently been numerous investigations exploring the role of couples' cognitions
in an attempt to understand marital distress, at present there is little cohesion and direction in the
study of how couples think about their relationships. The current article asserts that this lack of
direction results from at least three factors: (a) a lack of delineation of the important cognitive
variables to be considered in marital functioning, (b) conceptual and methodological difficulties that
arise in attempts to operationalize cognitive variables, and (c) a dearth of models of marital functioning that incorporate cognitions in a detailed manner. These three factors are discussed, along with a
review of empirical investigations supporting the importance of cognitions in intimate relationships.
The role of cognitions in intimate relationships has gained increasing attention in recent years. Most work has focused on the
area of causal attributions, and numerous investigations have
demonstrated empirical relations between various types of attributions and level of marital maladjustment (see Baucom, 1987,
and Thompson & Snyder, 1986, for recent reviews of this work).
However, the study of cognitions in intimate relationships has
little coherent direction of movement, either from a research perspective or in terms of the treatment of marital distress.
This lack of focus and direction probably stems from at least
three factors: (a) insufficient delineation of important categories of marital cognitions other than attributions (with the work
on relationship beliefs by Eidelson & Epstein, 1982, being one
exception), (b) methodological and conceptual problems in operationalizing cognitive variables and comparing disparate
measures used in different studies, and (c) few descriptions of
explicit models to direct future research and to clarify the roles
that cognitions play in intimate relationships (with the models
proposed by Bradbury & Fincham, 1987, and Doherty, 198la,
198 Ib, being the exceptions). Consequently, this article focuses
on three related issues: (a) a proposed classification of cognitions that are potentially important in intimate relationships,
along with a review of the empirical status of these variables as
they are related to intimate relationships; (b) important methodological and conceptual issues to be considered in the operationalization of these variables; and (c) a discussion of what
should be included in cognitive models of intimate relationships and relationship maladjustment.
cognitive phenomena can be delineated that appear to play important roles in the development and maintenance of marital
maladjustment. The first of these involves the perceptual process of selective attention. The other four categories involve the
outcomes of cognitive processes: attributions (about why events
occur), expectancies (predictions of what events will occur in
the future), assumptions (about the nature of the world and correlations between events and characteristics), and standards
(about what "should" be). Although empirical investigations
are only beginning in most of these areas, much more is already
known about the outcomes of the cognitive processes than is
known about the cognitive processes themselves. For example,
as will be discussed, a fair amount is known about the content
of couples' attributions and their relation to marital discord.
Yet, little is known about the processes by which these attributions are made; that is, are couples lay scientists advancing
hypotheses and evaluating data? Are they cognitive opportunists who advance self-serving attributions, or are they simply
responding to classically conditioned associations between
emotion and thought?
Cognitions vary in how appropriate they are and, thus, in
how much they might contribute to marital distress. The appropriateness of a cognition can involve (a) its validity as a representation of reality or (b) its reasonableness as a standard or
explanation for relationship events when there are not objective
criteria available for determining reality. Individuals do not
commonly question their own moment-to-moment thoughts
about events in their lives (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979)
or their long-standing assumptions and standards about the nature of the world (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Consequently, a major
task of cognitively oriented marital therapy is to help spouses
become more active observers and to help them evaluate their
own cognitions so that their emotional and behavioral responses to one another will be minimally affected by distorted
cognitions (Epstein, 1982, 1986). The following are descrip-
31
32
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
husband's fairly unique script about how he and his wife behave
in order to respect each other's privacy). Accurate assumptions
allow individuals' past experiences to guide their current understanding and interaction with their spouses, but inaccurate assumptions may produce dysfunctional responses to marital
problems. Unfortunately, very little empirical research has investigated the importance of distorted assumptions in marital
discord, so their importance in marital distress has not yet been
demonstrated. However, Epstein and Eidelson (1981) found
that the more distressed spouses assumed that their partners
could not change a relationship and that overt disagreement was
destructive to a relationship, the more they preferred individual
therapy to marital therapy and the lower were their estimates
that therapy would benefit their own marital problems.
Standards. In contrast to the assumptions that a person
makes about the way relationships are, standards involve the
characteristics that the individual believes a partner or relationship should have. As emphasized by rational-emotive therapists
(Dryden, 1985; Ellis, 1962), an individual may hold an extreme
or irrational standard about intimate relationships that no reallife relationship could match. For example, one spouse might
cling to the standard that "\bu should be able to read my mind,
and I should not have to tell you what I want or need." In addition, he or she might also apply an extreme negative evaluation
when that standard is not met (e.g., "It is awful if you do not
know what I want intuitively; I can't stand it").
Standards per se are not dysfunctional; ethical and moral
standards are commonly quite functional guides for human relationships. They become problematic when they are extreme
or rigid or when they detract from other aspects of an individual's life (e.g., the person who strives to "do the best I can in
everything I do" may suffer exhaustion and may alienate neglected family members).
As in the area of assumptions, investigation into the role of
extreme standards in marital discord is only beginning. The few
existing studies have typically distinguished between extreme
standards for individuals and extreme standards for intimate
relationships. For example, Epstein and Eidelson (1981) found
that spouses' marital distress and low involvement in marital
therapy were more strongly correlated with a measure of unrealistic assumptions and standards about intimate relationships
(Eidelson & Epstein, 1982) than with Jones's (1968) measure
of irrational beliefs (extreme standards) about individual functioning described by Ellis (1962). Similarly, Jordan and McCormick (1987) found that unrealistic assumptions and standards
about relationships were more predictive of general marital distress than were extreme standards about sexual relationships.
These findings indicate the importance of assessing the content
of assumptions and standards focal to relationships in order to
understand marital adjustment.
Selective Attention, Attributions, and Expectancies
Spouses' perceptions and inferences about each other's behavior can contribute to marital distress independent of any
extreme standards and evaluations because they can serve as a
distorted and dissatisfying version of reality. That is, a spouse
might not violate standards about how a partner should behave,
Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and clinical writers (e.g., Beck et al.,
1979; Weiss, 1980) have described how perceptions are susceptible to selective attention because of factors such as emotional
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
33
1987; Fincham & O'Leary, 1983; Holtzworth-Munroe & JaKyle & Falbo, 1985). Distressed spouses tend to rate causes of
negative partner behaviors as more global and stable than do
nondistressed individuals, whereas nondistressed spouses rate
causes of positive behavior of the partner as more global and
stable. In addition, distressed spouses have a tendency to blame
their partners for negative marital events. These attributional
tendencies serve to accentuate the positive in nondistressed relationships and the negative in distressed relationships.
Recent studies have investigated other attributional dimensions that focus on the characteristics and motives of the part-
have relatively different perceptions of what behaviors have occurred in the marriage during a given 24-hr period; the kappas
calculated between husbands' and wives' reporting of behavior
not a certain event had occurred during the past day. In addi-
tion, all three of these investigations, as well as a study by Christensen and Wallace (1976), indicated that more satisfied cou-
spouses are offering distorted attributions or whether their partners actually do behave with negative motivations.
not all couples, couples who are more distressed seem to attend
selectively in different ways to a greater extent.
Other investigators have compared a spouse's report of marital events with a trained rater's report of the couple's behavior.
own homes. The couples also rated their own behaviors. A com-
parison of the raters' observations with the couples' observations revealed results consistent with the findings of differential
Bandura (1977) distinguished between an outcome expectancy (a prediction that a particular action will produce partic-
expec-
spouses than between raters and distressed spouses. In fact, distressed couples underestimated the frequency of pleasurable
events by 50%.
Attributions. As noted earlier, a rapidly growing body of literature has examined the attributions or causal explanations that
spouses provide for events in their relationships. The most common marital attribution dimensions investigated have been the
global-specific, stable-unstable, and internal-external dimen-
spouses tend to take an "if-then" form and can involve predictions of the self to the partner's behavior, and outcomes of a
joint event (e.g., "If we argue in front of the children, they will
be harmed psychologically").
As with some of the other cognitions described previously,
there is scant research on the role of expectancies in intimate
34
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
relationships. Crossing two dimensions of expectanciesgeneralized versus specific by outcome expectancy versus efficacy
expectancyresults in at least four different types of expectancies that can be explored. Pretzer et al. (1985) conducted one of
the only studies in this area, and it focused solely on generalized
efficacy expectancies. Their results supported Doherty's
(1981a, 1981b) hypotheses that spouses' low efficacy expectations regarding their ability to solve their marital problems are
associated with marital distress and depression and with attributions of causality for relationship problems to their partner's
behavior, stable personality, malicious intent, and lack of love.
Operationalizing Terms
To evaluate a model of marital functioning that primarily
considers cognitive factors, these cognitive variables must be operationalized. Although there has been considerable attention
given to the role of causal attributions in marital functioning,
few attempts have been made to operationalize the other cognitive variables previously discussed. Yet, even when attributions
have been considered alone, a number of unresolved conceptual
and methodological issues have surfaced. Several of these issues
will be considered because they will probably resurface when
attempts are made to assess the other categories of cognitions.
One general issue that has arisen in assessing attributions is
the extent to which the assessment strategies mirror the attributional processes that occur in the day-to-day lives of couples.
This rather broad concern incorporates several specific issues.
First, the extent to which the individual is asked explicitly to
make attributions is important. That is, individuals do not
make attributions about every event; to do so would result in
an extreme amount of cognitive processing that would severely
curtail the person's ability to proceed through even uncomplicated events. Consequently, although most self-report inventories of attributions concerning marital interaction explicitly ask
the respondent to explain why an event or behavior occurred,
it is unclear whether the person would have provided an attribution for the event in the natural environment (e.g., Pyszcynski
&Greenberg, 1981). Holtzworth-Munroeand Jacobson (1985)
both directly and indirectly probed for attributions regarding
marital events. They found that, although the two methodologies resulted in attributions that were statistically significantly
correlated, the correlations were all modest in magnitude.
Thus, the manner in which attributions are elicited probably
influences what is obtained, and at present the relative merits
of the various strategies are unclear. Similarly, the extent to
which the assessment strategy directs the respondent's thoughts
is pertinent when cognitions other than attributions are considered.
The representativeness of the cognitive assessment strategy
for understanding the couple's marital functioning is influenced
by a second factor whose relationship is focused on in the assessment. Some inventories ask respondents only about their
cognitions regarding their own marriages (Baucom & Sayers,
1987; Pretzer et al., 1985), yet other self-report measures ask
respondents about their cognitions regarding marriages in general as well as their own marriages (Eidelson & Epstein, 1982).
Asking about both types of relationships is appropriate, but
items have typically been combined into a single score, although the two foci may yield very different information. For
example, clinical experience suggests that many distressed couples hold different standards for their own marriage than for
marriages in general. To combine these two pieces of information into a single score could result in misleading or confusing
results.
The extent to which the assessment strategy mirrors cognitions in day-to-day living is also influenced by the specific stimuli, behaviors, or events with which the individual is presented.
Attributional assessment strategies can be divided according to
whether they ask couples to consider hypothetical or real events
in their relationships (e.g., Madden & Janoff-Bulman, 1981;
Orvis, Kelley, & Butler, 1976). Hypothetical events have the asset that all couples will be responding to the same set of stimuli,
which allows for easier comparison across couples; the liability
is that the events may not be representative of the couples' own
behavior. Using actual events from the couples' lives ensures
that the events have relevance to them; however, comparison
across couples becomes more complex. Findings to date have
been similar when attributions for both actual and hypothetical
marital events have been considered; yet, only one study has
compared the equivalence of hypothetical versus actual events,
and then only for wives (Fincham & Beach, in press). Their
findings revealed that similar attributions were provided for the
two types of stimuli. Whether to use real or hypothetical events
must also be addressed when the other classes of cognitions are
operationalized.
As stated previously, one major reason for using hypothetical
marital events is that all spouses are thus providing cognitions
about the same set of stimuli. To maximize the representativeness of the stimuli and yet provide a set of questions or statements to which all couples can respond, some investigators have
taken a different approach. They have constructed statements
that ask about the relationship in a very general way (e.g., Burns
& Volpicelli, 1987; Pretzer el al., 1985). Thus, in assessing expectancies, a respondent might be asked the extent to which he
or she agrees with the following statement, "No matter what I
do, my partner will not change." Such global expectancies
might be an important part of marital adjustment. However,
marital discord also seems to involve cognitions about very specific situations and aspects of the relationship, and the spouses'
thoughts about these specific components of the marriage also
need to be assessed.
In part, the relevance of obtaining cognitions about global
aspects or specific content areas of the relationship depends on
whether or not individuals have global cognitive styles that involve thinking about many aspects of the relationship in the
same way. For example, if a spouse makes similar attributions
for marital events regardless of the specific content under consideration (i.e., has a strong attributional style), then the content
provided is of less importance. Some marital investigators have
apparently assumed that spouses have an attributional style regarding their marriage (e.g., Doherty, 1982). However, Baucom,
Sayers, and Duhe (in press) found that, whereas some spouses
do provide consistent attributions across marital situations,
other spouses offer attributions that appear to be situation-specific.
the methodological and conceptual complexities inherent in assessing couples' cognitions relevant to their marriages are only
beginning. However, even as these issues become resolved, theo-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
35
ables relevant to marriage is whether to focus on the actual content of cognitions, on broader dimensions presumed to be important within certain categories of cognitions, or on some integration of the two. For example, in assessing attributions within
marriage, almost no investigators have focused on the actual
content of the attributions (see Pretzer et al., 1985, for an exception). Respondents are typically asked to offer attributions for
why some marital event occurred. Next, the respondent or outside raters evaluate the attribution on several dimensions such
as locus of control, globality, and stability. Almost invariably,
these dimensions become the foci of the investigation. Thus,
the content (e.g., whether the respondent believes that problems
result because the partner is stupid or lazy, etc.) is lost. Other
investigators have focused on content but have not been as careful in delineating the categories of cognitions under consider-
two variables such as environment (E) and person (P) are used
are relevant to marital distress (e.g., partner is unwilling or unable to change). Whereas some of these areas are assessed with
questions focusing on assumptions and expectancies, other content areas are assessed by asking about standards and assump-
statistical techniques have been used to test this model. (In con-
tions, can be substituted for E, P, and B.) This is generally regarded as a mechanistic model in that it embodies unidirectional causality from environment and person to behavior. The
model allows for investigating whether two or more variables
area. Such systematic exploration would allow for a determination of how these different types of cognitive variables, such as
a clear set of assumptions about a content area, make attributions about past behavior consistent with these assumptions,
and similarly provide expectancies about future behavior in
light of these assumptions and attributions but (b) have standards as to how the relationship should be that are in conflict
with these assumptions, attributions, and expectancies. As a result, this conflict between (a) how the relationship is perceived
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
36
Baucom, D. H., Bell, W. G., & Dune, A. (1982, August). The measurement of couples' attributions for positive and negative dyadic interac-
References
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned
helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory Englevraod Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Baucom, D. H. (1985, November). Enhancing behavioral marital therapy with cognitive restructuring and emotional expressiveness training. Paper presented at the 19th Annual Convention of the Association forthe Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Houston, TX.
Baucom, D. H. (1987). Attributions in distressed relations: How can we
explain them? In S. Duck & D. Perlman (Eds.), Heterosexual relations, marriage and divorce (pp. 177-206). London: Sage.
tions. Paper presented at the 16th Annual Convention of the Association forthe Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Los Angeles.
Baucom, D. H., & Hoffman, J. A. (1986). The effectiveness of marital
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
37
ples: Their relationship to expectations, goals and satisfaction. A mencan Journal of Family Therapy, 9, 13-22.
Epstein, N., Pretzer, !., & Fleming, B. (1982, November). Cognitive
therapy and communication training: Comparisons of effects with distressed couples. Paper presented at the 16th Annual Convention of
the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Los Angeles.
Epstein, N., Pretzer, J., & Fleming, B. (1987). The role of cognitive appraisal in self-reports of marital communication. Behavior Therapy,
18, 51-69.
Fincham, F. D., & Beach, S. (in press). Attribution processes in distressed and nondistressed couples: 5. Real versus hypothetical events.
Cognitive Therapy and Research.
Fincham, F. D., Beach, S., & Baucom, D. H. (1987). Attribution processing in distressed and nondistressed couples: 4. Self-partner attribution differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,
739-748.
Fincham, F. D., Beach, S., & Nelson, G. (1987). Attribution processes
in distressed and nondistressed couples: 3. Causal and responsibility
attributions for spouse behavior. Cognitive Therapy and Research,
11, 71-86.
Fincham, F. D., & Bradbury, T. N. (1987). The impact of attributions in
marriage: A longitudinal analysis. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 53, 510-517.
Fincham, F. D., & Bradbury, T. (1988). The impact of attributions in
marriage: Empirical and conceptual foundations. British Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 27, 77-90.
Fincham, F. D., &. O'Leary, K. D. (1983). Causal inferences for spouse
behavior in maritally distressed and nondistressed couples. Journal
of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1,42-57.
Holtzworth-Munroe, A., & Jacobson, N. S. (1985). Causal attributions
of married couples: When do they search for causes? What do they
conclude when they do? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology,
48, 1398-1412.
Huber, C. H., & Milstein, B. (1985). Cognitive restructuring and a collaborative set in couples' work. American Journal of Family Therapy,
13, 17-27.
Jacobson, N. S., McDonald, D. W., Follette, W. C., & Berley, R. A.
(1985). Attributional processes in distressed and nondistressed married couples. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 9, 35-50.
Jacobson, N. S., & Moore, D. (1981). Spouses as observers of the events
in their relationship. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,
49, 269-277.
Jones, R. G. (1968). A factored measure ofEllis' Irrational BeliefSystem, with personality and maladjustment correlates. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Texas Technological College. (University Microfilms No. 69-6443)
Jordan, T. J., & McCormick, N. B. (1987, April). The role of sex beliefs
in intimate relationships. Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the American Association of Sex Educators, Counselors, and Therapists, New York.
felly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York:
Norton.
Kyle, S. Q, & Falbo, T. (1985). Relationships between marital stress
and attributional preferences for own and spouse behavior. Journal of
Social and Clinical Psychology, 3, 339-351.
Madden, M. E., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (1981). Blame, control and marital satisfaction: Wives' attributions for conflict in marriage. Journal
of Marriage and the Family, 44, 663-674.
Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Clifis, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Orvis, B. R., Kelley, H. H., & Butler, D. (1976). Attributional conflict
in young couples. In J. H. Harvey, W. Ickes, & R. Kidd (Eds.), New
38
therapy. In N. Hoffmann (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive therapy: Theoretical methods and practical applications (pp. 11-49). New \fark:
Plenum Press.
Thompson, J. S., & Snyder, D. K. (1986). Attribution theory in intimate
relationships: A methodological review. American Journal of Family
Therapy, 14, 123-138.
Weiss, R. L. (1980). Strategic behavioral marital therapy: Toward a
model for assessment and intervention. In J. P. Vincent (Ed.), Advances infamily intervention, assessment, andtheory(VcA. 1, pp. 229271). Greenwich, CT: J AI Press.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.