Humanrights Part3cases

SORIAO vs PINEDA
CA GR SP NO 31546 August 10 1994

FACTS:
Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub
province of Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994).
Due to his reputation of talking back to school
authority during the past years, he was refused
readmission to complete his fourth and final year of
high school through a verbal notice not to readmit.
Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was
deprived of a hearing on the matter and thus the
verbal notice was a
denial of his right to due process. The administration
ignored the students plea to
reconsider its decision to deny him readmission
claiming that
it was their prerogative. Seeking further
remedies but to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for
certiorari to the CA.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petitioner was denied
his right to education.
HELD: 1. YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda,
Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara Memorial
High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after
he was meted out a disciplinary action without due
process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987
Constitution and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and
Article II, Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution
provide: Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall
protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. Section 2: The State shall: (1)
Establish, maintain, and support a complete,
adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the needs of the people and society; (2)
Establish and maintain, a system of free public
education in the elementary and high school levels.
Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear
their children, elementary education is compulsory
for all children of school age; (3) Establish and
maintain a system of scholarship grants, student
loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives
which shall be available to deserving students in
both public and private schools, especially to the
under-privileged;
(4)
Encourage
non-formal,
informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as
self-study programs particularly those that respond
to community needs; and (5) Provide adult citizens,
the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training
in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate
1|HUMANRIGHTS_PART3 CASES
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and

encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs. Section 17: The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.
(Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30,
1993)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE
ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all
surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R.
FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID
and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA
MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PASIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented
by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO,
MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE
CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented
by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and
DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and
REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL,

minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO,
JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge
of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A
BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED.
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's
constitutional
history,
is
solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." This right unites with the right to health
which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall protect
and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them." While the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced
and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative

duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NONIMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE
AT BAR. all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This
Court held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. 'A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . .
." We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: (190 SCRA 673 684 [1990]) ". . . Timber
licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.
L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since
timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed." In the second place, even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts, the instant
case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized

as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such a law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Court
stated: "The freedom of contract, under our system
of government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth
in Nebia vs. New York, (291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed.
940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135,
146-147 [1968]) to wit: "'Under our form of
government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the state. (Ongsiako vs.
Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, supra; Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 SCRA
172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National
Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. It
must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." Commenting on this provision in his

book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government. As worded, the
new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly
the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is
the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is
a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary." In
Daza vs. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See
also Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990];
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991];
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203
SCRA 767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for
this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the
jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION,
DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. the right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right. A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted. A cause of action is defined as: ". . . an act
or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of
the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao
Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947];
Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.

Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. vda. de
Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19
SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202
SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1
[1991].
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. It is
settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a
case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In
Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion
to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute." After a careful
examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find
the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under
the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI,
CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. The Court explicitly
states that petitioners have the locus standi
necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because
of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here
involved membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether
now or in the future it appears to me that
everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require
public respondents to take, is vested with the
necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen

therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as
against both the public administrative agency
directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such a beneficiaries' right of
action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in
the first instance, on the part of the governmental
agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not
discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A
BALANCE
AND
HEALTHFUL
ECOLOGY";
INTERPRETATION. The Court has also declared
that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p.
14). There is no question that "the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental"
and
that,
accordingly,
it
has
been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact
very
difficult
to
fashion
language
more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in
character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of
toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents,
garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and
coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines
and whole communities; of dumping of organic
and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after stripmining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of
certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section
3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6
June 1977 all appear to be formulations of
policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16
("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health"). As a matter of logic,
by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored

on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect
saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II
of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST
IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. Justice Feliciano
suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right a right
cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures
to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed
for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in
the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should
have given petitioners an effective opportunity so
to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF
ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS;
STANDARDS. the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is
that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable
to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to
this matter. The second is a broader-gauge
consideration where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality
of
the
Government."
When
substantive standards as general as "the right to a
balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as

broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the
result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel
courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the
vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and
professional qualifications. Where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments the
legislative and executive departments must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right
of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with
the
twin
concepts
of
"inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent
the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are
all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by
the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to

bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it
is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments
that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares
and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species
of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain
a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's
land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and fortysix per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion
and disturbance of this balance as a consequence
of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from the drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering
and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought
as is presently experienced by the entire country,

(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result
from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding
of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j)
the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multibillion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses,
irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process
carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing
and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental
consequences
of
continued
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege
that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had
some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's
land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's
predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding
areas covered is hereto attached as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about

200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if
not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences,
serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minors' generation and to generations yet unborn
are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and
their successors who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as the
parens patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is
hereto attached as Annex 'B'.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel
the existing TLA's, to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant
to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been
abundantly blessed with.
19.
Defendant's
refusal
to
cancel
the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth' and 'make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic).' (Section
1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2,
ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic).' (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.' (Section 16,
Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest
law of humankind the natural law and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital lifesupport systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July

1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable
question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order

granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim
that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
the concept of generational genocide in Criminal
Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to
self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied
in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation, per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available

involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of
the
Constitution's
non-impairment
clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply
in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that
they may still be revoked by the State when public
interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental
right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to
the "protection by the state in its capacity as
parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They
then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches
of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court,
but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a
bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done
by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period
of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after
due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of
due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on
some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein
are numerous and representative enough to ensure

the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in
the instant petition, the latter being but an incident
to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means
the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question
and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the
parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a

specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine,
plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the
matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be
taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of 'Separation of
Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot,
no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic)
by the fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion
that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of

Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than
any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology

carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on
this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired
between
Commissioner
Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
Conformably with the enunciated right to a

balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution
concerning
the
conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources,
including
the
protection
and
enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and use of the
country's natural resources, not only for the present
generation but for future generations as well. It is
also the policy of the state to recognize and apply
a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization; development and conservation of our
natural resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in
Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Without such forests, the
ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversibly disrupted.
10 | H U M A N R I G H T S _ P A R T 3 C A S E S
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall

ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality
of the environment and the objective of making
the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future

generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a
true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of
the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to
the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already
paid
special
attention
to
the
"environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The
former "declared a continuing policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of
the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee
and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate

and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who
has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to
dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this
Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its
failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot
on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners'
complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the subheading CAUSE
OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On
the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly
or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are

indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777
cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,

and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of
discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now
speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that

the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in
dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to 'impairment of contracts'
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We
are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke
in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If
he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read
Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705) which provides:
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . ."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn

whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the

general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28
this Court stated:
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what

otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54
O.G. 7576) . . ."
"The freedom of contract, under our system of

government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael,

Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that
the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless,
granting further that a law has actually been
passed mandating cancellations or modifications,
the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation
of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its
very nature and purpose, such a law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police
power of the state for the purpose of advancing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia

vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
" 'Under our form of government the use of property
and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental
with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.' "
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did,
how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for,
save in cases of renewal, no contract would have
as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to
it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,

Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur. Narvasa, C . J . , took
no part; related to one of the parties. Puno, J ., took no part in
the deliberations. Vitug, J ., took no part; I was not yet with the
Court when the case was deliberated upon.
(Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.]
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.
BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE
W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST.
FISCAL MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,
respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer,
Meer & Meer and Juan T . David for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D.
Quiason and Solicitor C . Padua for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
WHO MAY CONTEST LEGALITY THEREOF CASE AT BAR.
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby (Lewis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22)
and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda
vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d. 916; Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69; Ganci
vs. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d. 444).
Consequently, petitioner in the case at bar may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the document, papers, and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporation
adverted to, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity U.S., vs. Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997;
People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH
WARRANT. Two points must be stressed in
connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating

that the natural and juridical persons therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in the case at bar
do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code", as
alleged in aforementioned applications without
reference to any determine provision of said laws or
coders.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED
BY THE CONSTITUTION. To uphold the validity of
the warrants in question, would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy
of the victims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision Sec. 1, par. 3 Art. III,
Const.) to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means. Such is the seriousness of
the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it
fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court, by providing in its counterpart, under
the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The grave
violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of
the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, Financial records, vouchers,

journals,
correspondence,
receipts,
ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers, showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements." Thus, the warrants authorized the
search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions petitioners herein, regardless
of whether the transaction were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the
things to be seized be particularly described as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
5. ID.;
ID.; ID.; NON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE
CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not
only to the letter, but also to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant
is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements
of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause and only possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause and hence, no justification
for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of
crime. But when this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO
SECURE ILLEGAL SEARCH WARRANT OR MAKE
UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS NO EXCUSE.
The theory that the criminal prosecution of those
who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the
party in power, for certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which
the minority usually but understandably finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility of securing their

conviction, is watered down by the pardoning
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED.
The doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the warrants
for the search of 3 residences of petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null
and void; the searches and seizures therein made
are illegal.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C .J p:
Upon application of the officers of the government
named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred to as
Respondent-Prosecutors several judges 2
hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Judges
issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed
to any peace officer, to search the persons abovenamed and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property
to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence,
receipts,
ledgers,
journals,
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants
are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1)
they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash
money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original

action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining RespondentProsecutors, their agents and or representatives
from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same
null and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or
confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2)
that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured
by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event,
the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and
seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized
under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and (b) those found
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners
herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made
in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9
and that the objection to an unlawful search and

seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has
been held:
". . . that the Government's action in gaining
possession of papers belonging to the corporation
did not relate to nor did it affect the personal
defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized
and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the
corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one
whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property
had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the
rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)
291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based
on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not
extend to the personal defendants but embraces
only the corporation whose property was taken . . ."
(A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States,
[1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things
seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied
the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondent-Prosecutors from
using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and
things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made
under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2)
if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and
things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned

search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority thereof are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13
provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in
the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely

the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when
the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14
by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised
Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not
issue upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that "no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of
the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals,
correspondence,
receipts,
ledgers,
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the
things to be seized be particularly described as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil.
1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that
the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal
should not be allowed to go free merely "because
the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that
the
constitutional
prohibition
against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by
means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law
action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as
may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have
already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is
the only practical means of enforcing the
searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only
in case the prosecution which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will that wrong be repressed". 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal
Supreme Court had already declared:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized
and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land." 19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also,
broadened in subsequent decisions of the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's
constitutional documentation of the right of privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the
only courtroom door remaining open to evidence

secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We held that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State
court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth,
it is enforceable against them by the same sanction
of exclusion as it used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without
the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of
words', valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, 'without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard
as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' At the time that the Court held in Wolf that
the Amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment
included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered'
to that proposition. The right to privacy, when
conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection
and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches state or federal it was
logically and constitutionally necessary that the
exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to
privacy be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is
to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoinment. Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way by removing the incentive to

disregard it.' . . .
"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the
State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right
to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we
can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforceable
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoinment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him, to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled,
and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice."
(Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not
only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant
is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements
of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance
of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then,
this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution
of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures
would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact
that violations thereof are, in general, committed
by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse
a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents
of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact
that the psychological and moral effect of the

possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning, power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In
their
Motion
for
Reconsideration
and
Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81
and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street,
and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should
be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry
S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to
include personal belongings of said petitioners and
other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory,
regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and
effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,
has been advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution
of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would
appear to be a readjustment of that followed in
said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said
motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the
allegations of said petitions and motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners, to warrant application of the views
therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any
rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in
the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of

three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null
and void; that the searches and seizures therein
made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in
said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted,
insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P.,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ ., concur.
(United States v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 08,
1918)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12592. March 8, 1918.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE
BUSTOS ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Kincaid & Perkins for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; HISTORY.
Freedom of speech as cherished in democratic
countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands
before 1900. It was among the reforms sine quibus
non insisted upon by the Filipino People. The
Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary
Congress, in its bill of rights, zealously guarded these
basic rights. A reform so sacred to the people of
these Islands and won at so dear a cost should now
be protected and carried forward.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Constitution of the United
States and the State constitutions guarantee the
right of freedom of speech and press and the right
of assembly and petition. Beginning with the
President's Instructions to the Commission of April 7,
1900, these gruaranties were made effective in the
Philippines. They are now part and parcel of the
Organic Law of the Constitution of the
Philippines Islands.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. These
paragraphs in the Philippine Bill of Rights carry with
them all the applicable English and American

jurisprudence.
4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL PRINCIPLES. The interests of
society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
necessary for free speech. "The people are not
obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in
whispers or with bated breath in a free government,
but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906],
113 App. Div. N. Y., 510.) Of course, criticism does
not authorize defamation.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. The guaranties of a free speech
and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct.
6. ID.; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; GENERAL
PRINCIPLES. The right to assemble and petition is
a necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply without fear of penalty
to the appropriate branch or office of the
Government for a redness of grievances.
7. ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY
AND PETITION; PRIVILEGE. The doctrine of
privileged communications rests upon public policy,
"which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, through, as an incidental
result, it may, in some instances, afford an immunity
to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer."
(Abboth vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma
[1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. Qualified
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. "A
communication made bona fide upon any subject
matter in which the party communicating has an
interest or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contain
criminatory matter which without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison vs.
Rush, 5 E. & B. 344; 1 Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25;
3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Even when the statements are
found to be false, if there is probable cause for
belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in
good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover
the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not
necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the
mere fact that the communication is made in
intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the
wrong person through some natural and honest
mistake as to the respective functions of various
officials, such an unintentional error would not take
the case out of the privilege.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MALICE. In the usual libel case,
malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. the onus of
proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. A privileged communication
should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection
which
the
law
throws
over
privileged
communications.
12. ID.; ID.; ID. Previous decisions of this court
concerning libel reviewed and distinguished.
13. ID.; ID.; ID. A petition, prepared and signed at
an assembly of numerous citizens including
affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of
the peace with malfeasance in office and asking
for his removal, was presented through lawyers to
the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary
referred the papers to the judge of first instance of
the district. The judge of first instance, after
investigation, recommended to the GovernorGeneral that the justice of the peace filing a
motion for new trial, the judge of first instance
ordered the suppression of the charges and
acquitted the justice of the peace of the same.
Criminal action was then begun against the
petitioners, now become the defendants, charging
that portions of the petition presented to the
Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial court
found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and
sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. On
a review of the evidence, we find that express
malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good
faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their
ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and
the petition were transmitted through reputable
attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants
are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an
hones endeavor to improve the public service, they
should rather be commended for their good
citizenship.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
This appeal presents the specific question of
whether or not the defendants and appellants are
guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger
question of the attitude which the judiciary should
take in interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in
connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom
of speech and press, and of assembly and petition.
For a better understanding, the facts in the present
appeal are first narrated in the order of their
occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects
relative to the rights of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition are

interpolated, then the facts are tested by these
principles, and, finally, judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous
citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
the prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary through the law office of
Crossfield & O'Brien, and five individuals signed
affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga,
with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. Crossfield & O'Brien submitted this petition
and these affidavits with a complaint to the
Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by
these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens
apparently owners (now the defendants), and
contained the statements set out in the formation
as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges
against the justice of the peace were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make
complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the
justice of the peace, who first told her that he
would draw up the complaint for P5; afterwards he
said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her
in the house for four days as a servant and took
from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case
regarding land which was on trial before the justice
of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace
to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by
the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he
must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga
gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was
informed that he had lost the case. Returning again
to the office of the justice of the peace in order to
appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if
he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a
complaint for assault against four persons, on the
day of the trial the justice called him over to his
house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao)
P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the
judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial
District requesting investigation, proper action and
report. The justice of the peace was notified and
denied the charges. The judge of first instance
found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3
established. In view of this result, the judge, the
Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it
must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the
Governor-General that the respondent be removed
from his position as justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga,
and it is ordered that the proceedings had in it is
ordered that the proceedings had in this case be
transmitted to the Executive Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a

new trial; the judge of first instance granted the
motion and reopened the hearing; documents
were introduced, including a letter sent by the
municipal president and is councilors of Masantol,
Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace
was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin
Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had
instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the
judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the
charges against Punsalan and acquitted him of the
same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon
appealed to the Governor-General as requested
the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now
become the defendants, was instituted on October
12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in
the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P.I., the
said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminality
and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame
Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time
and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and
published a writing which was false, scandalous,
malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the
justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano,
in which writing appear among other things the
following:
" 'That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman
Punsalan Serrano, of this town of Macabebe, an
account of the conduct observed by him
heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office
which he holds, is found to be a public functionary
who is absolutely unfit, eminently immoral and
dangerous to the community, and consequently
unworthy of the office.
" 'That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced
in a clear and positive manner by facts so certain,
so serious, and so denigrating which appear in the
affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no
less serious, but which the undersigned refrain from
citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order not
to bother too much the attention of your Honor and
due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
" 'That should the higher authorities allow the said
justice of the peace of this town to continue in his
office, the protection of the rights and interest
solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Right,
and justice in this town will not be administered in
accordance with law.
" 'Than on account of the wrongful discharge of his
office and of his bad conduct as such justice of the
peace, previous to this time, some respectable
citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled
to present an administrative case against the said
Roman Punsalan Serrano before the judge of first

instance of Pampanga, in which case there were
made against him various charges which were true
and certain and of different characters.
" 'That after the said administrative case was over,
the said justice of the peace, far from changing his
bad and despicable conduct, which has roused
the indignation of this town of Macabebe,
subsequently
performed
the
acts
abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith
attached, as if intending to mock at the people
and to show his mistaken valor and heroism.'
"All of this has been written and published by the
accused with the deliberate purpose of attacking
the virtue, honor and reputation of the justice of the
peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus
exposing him to public hatred, contempt, and
ridicule. All contrary to law."
It should be noted that the information omits
paragraphs of the petition mentioning the
investigation before the judge of first instance, the
affidavits upon which based and the concluding
words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the
office of Crossfield & O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the
defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez,
Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel
Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay
a fine of P10 and one thirty-second part of the
costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. New attorneys for the defense, coming
into the case, after the handing down of the
decision, filed on December 16, 1916, a motion for
a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to
retire the objection interposed by then counsel for
the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A
consisting of the entire administrative proceedings.
The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and
Fortunato Macalino appealed making the following
assignments of error:
"1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the
convicted defendants for a new trial.
"2. The court erred in refusing to permit the
defendants to retire the objection inadvertently
interposed by their counsel to the admission in
evidence of the expediente administrativo out of
which the accusation in this case arose.
"3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the
prosecution to the introducing in evidence by the
accused of the affidavits upon which the petition
forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
"4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged
libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.
"5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly
holding that the burden was on the defendants to
show that the alleged libelous statements were true

and free from malice.
"6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
"7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of
the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. This is
especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe
Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes."
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the
proceedings, administrative and judicial, were
properly before this court. As a matter of fact
counsel for defendants in the lower court made an
improvident objection to the admission of the
administrative proceedings on the ground that the
signatures were not identified and that the same
was immaterial, which objection was partially
sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this
curious situation by reason of which the attorney for
the defense attempted to destroy through his
objection the very foundation for the justification of
his clients, we shall continue to consider all the
proceedings as before us. Not indicating
specifically the reason for this action, let the
following be stated: The administrative proceedings
were the basis of the accusation, the information,
the evidence, and the judgment rendered. The
prosecution cannot be understood without
knowledge of interior action. Nothing more unjust
could be imagined than to pick out certain words
which standing by themselves and unexplained are
libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of
facts which would justify these words, to convict the
accused. The records in question are attached to
the rollo, and either on the ground that the
attorneys for the defense retired the objection to
the introduction of the administrative proceedings
by the prosecution, or that a new trial should have
been had because under section 42 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure "a case may be reopened on
account of errors at law committed at the trial," or
because of the right of this court to call in such
records as are sufficiently incorporated into the
complaint and are essential to a determination of
the case, or finally, because of our conceded right
to take judicial proceedings supplemental to the
basis action, we examine the record as because us,
containing not alone the trial for libel, but the
proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to it. To
this action, the Government can not complain for it
was the prosecution which tried to incorporated
Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before
testing them by certain principles which make up
the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in
seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory
and general discussion of freedom of speech and
press and assembly and petition in the Philippine
Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to
clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject

and to place these basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing
new when we set down the freedom of speech as
cherished in democratic countries was unknown in
the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for
revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in
"Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos" (The Philippines a
Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the
reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist
upon, said:
"The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be
reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the
Philippines free and by instituting Filipino delegates."
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of
"La Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in
exposing the wants of the Filipino people
demanded." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.)
The Malolos Constitution, the work of the
Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously
guarded freedom of speech and press and
assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to
deduce the proposition that a reform so sacred to
the people of these Islands and won at so dear as
one would protect and preserve the covenant of
liberty itself.
Net comes the period of American-Filipino
cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United
States and the State constitutions guarantee the
right of freedom of speech and press and the right
of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not
surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna
Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instruction to the
Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900,
laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for
the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words
quoted are not unfamiliar to students of
Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of
the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which the American people
demanded before giving their approval to the
Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the
proposition never to be forgotten for an instant that
the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of
the Organic Law of the Constitution of the
Philippines Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of
Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language
carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of

great English and American Constitutional cases.
(Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs.
Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what are these
principles? Volumes would inadequately answer.
But included are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves
the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thinskinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of
the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does
not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the
individual is less than the State, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good. Rising
superior to any official, or set of officials, to the
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary
to any or all the agencies of Government
public opinion should be the constant source of
liberty and democracy. (See the well considered
cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L.R. 4 Q. B., 73;
Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen
vs. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of
the peace or a judge the same as any other public
officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the
part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest
sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge
does not hang suspended over the individual who
dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to
stand up bravely before any official. On the
contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
know of any official dereliction on the part of a
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer
to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty
it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of
Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to
the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to
speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or
with bated breath in a free government, but only in
a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App.
Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary

consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the right of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for
a redress of grievances. The persons assembling
and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development
and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests
upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and
unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
slanderer.'"
(Abbott
vs. National
Bank of
Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified.
With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified
privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The
rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any
subject-matter in which the party communicating
has an interest, or in reference to which he has a
duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
(Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25
L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified
privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or
conduct of a public official when addressed to an
officer or a board having some interest or duty in
the matter. Even when the statements are found to
be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith,
the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the individual. But the statements must be made
under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking
motive is destructive. Personal injury is not
necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure
and efficient administration of justice and of public
affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
person in good faith believe he is acting in
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken.
The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
the communication is made in intemperate terms.
A further element of the law of privilege concerns

the person to whom the complaint should be
made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as
to the respective functions of various officials such
unintentional error will not take the case out of the
privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory
words.
Privilege
destroy
that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the
defendant the existence of malice as the true
motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence
of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
(See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection which the law throws
over privileged communications. The ultimate test is
that of bona fides. (See white vs. Nicholls [1845],
How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.],
163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. L., 72; Street,
Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309;
Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc.
pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be
assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition,
having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as
a statute must be construed with reference to the
guaranties of our Organic Law, and having
sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a
position to test the facts of this case with these
principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the
information, if said of a private person, might well
be considered libelous per se. The charges might
also under certain conceivable conditions convict
one of a libel of a government official. As a general
rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the
peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are
actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we
do not have present a simple case of direct and
vicious accusations published in the press, but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the
proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged.
Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace,
they were believed to be true by the petitioners.
Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause
for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance
in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal
from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on
a frivolous matter but on instances which not only
seemed to them of a grave character, but which
were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first
instance to convince him of their seriousness. No
undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the
justice of the peace was proper. And finally the
charges and the petition were submitted through
reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient
to note that justices of the peace are appointed by
the Governor-General, that they may be removed
by
the
Governor-General
upon
the
recommendation of a judge of First Instance, or on
the Governor-General's own motion, and that at
the time this action took place the Executive
Bureau was the office through which the GovernorGeneral acted in such matters. (See Administrative
Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with
the cases of U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and
of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344, holding that
where defendant was subject to removal by the
sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of
State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different
from those established in other cases in which
private individuals have been convicted of libels of
public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood,
calumny, against the man and not the officer, have
been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S.
vs. Sedano [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs.
Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo
[1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation
for confirmation on the case of the United States vs.
Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos
case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with
the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that
there has been more publicity in the present
instance and that the person to whom the charge
was made had less jurisdiction than had the
Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
Publicity is immaterial if the charge against
Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication.
Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild
statements, with no basis in fact, made against
reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons
who could not furnish protection." Malicious and
untrue communications are not privileged. A later
case and one more directly in point to which we
invite special attention is United States vs. Galeza
([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey vs.
Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to

the protection of the rules concerning qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in
our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we
should rather commend them for their good
citizenship. The defendants and appellants are
acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher,
JJ., concur.
(Villavicencio v. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639, March 25,
1919)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 14639. March 25, 1919.]
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO ET AL., petitioners, vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF DOMICILE;
LIBERTY; HABEAS CORPUS; CONTEMPT. One
hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the
segregated district for women of ill repute in the city
of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of
Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated
from society and then at night, without their
consent and without any opportunity to consult
with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to
regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation
authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the
chief of the police of that city to force citizens of
the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of
habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the
Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily
responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of
court for his failure to comply with the order of the
court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The remedies of the unhappy
victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
A civil action was never intended effectively and
promptly to meet a situation in which there is
restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and
that the person may be proceeded against is also
no bar to the institution of habeas corpus
proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. These women, despite their
being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless
not chattles, but Philippine citizens protected by the
same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.
4. ID.; ID. The privilege of domicile is a principle

often protected by constitutions and deeply
imbedded in American jurisprudence.
5. HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
6. ID.; PARTIES. Where it is impossible for a party to
sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it
is proper for the writ to be submitted by some
person in his behalf.
7. ID.; JURISDICTION. It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should
be presented to the nearest judge of the Court of
First Instance.
8. ID.; ID. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands.
9. ID.; ID. Whether the writ shall be made
returnable before the Supreme Court or before an
inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme
Court and is dependent on the particular
circumstances.
10. ID.; RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential objects
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.
11. ID.; ID. The forcible taking of these women
from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in
a distant region, deprived these women of freedom
of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely
and truly waived this right.
12. ID.; ID. The true principle should be that if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court,
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted,
he should be compelled to do so.
13. ID.; ID. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ, is no
reason why the writ should not issue.
14. ID.; ID. The place of confinement is not
important to the relief if the guilty party is within the
reach of process so that by the power of the court
he can be compelled to release his grasp.
15. ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. For respondents

to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of
habeas corpus, three courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons
according to the command of the writ; (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity these persons could not safely
be brought before the Court; or (3) they could
have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be
present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.)
16. CONTEMPT OF COURT. The power to punish for
contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
Only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail.
17. ID. When one is commanded to produce a
certain person and does not do so, and does not
offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its
authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or
fined.
18. ID. An officer's failure to produce the body of
a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus,
when he has power to do so, is contempt
committed in the face of the court.
19. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A
GOVERNMENT OF LAWS. The Government of the
Philippine Islands is a government of laws. The court
will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and
not of men.
20. ID.; ID. No official, however high, is above the
law.
21. ID.; ID. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to
punish official transgressors.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case
quite as remarkable as the one which this
application for habeas corpus submits for decision.
While hardly to be expected to be met with in this
modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after
all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is
kept in the forefront of our minds the basic
principles of popular government, and if we give
expression to the paramount purpose for which the
courts, as an independent power of such a
government, were constituted. The primary
question is Shall the judiciary permit a
government of men instead of a government of
laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to
these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the
government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the

city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which
had been permitted for a number of years in the
city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and
October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined
to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities
quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of
Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao,
as laborers; with some government office for the
use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and
Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of
soldiers, At any rate, about midnight of October 25,
the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief
of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the
city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol
wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers
that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they
were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from that
region and had neither directly nor indirectly given
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary
guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on
October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales,
provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the
hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the
city of Manila. The further happenings to these
women and the serious charges growing out of
alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are
not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it
to say, generally, that some of the women married,
others assumed more or less clandestine relations
with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to
return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the
Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to
Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of
a considerable number of the deportees presented
an application for habeas corpus to a member of
the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,

through stipulation of the parties, was made to
include all of the women who were sent away from
Manila to Davao and, as the same questions
concerned them all, the application will be
considered as including them. The application set
forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated,
and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police
of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
parties. The writ was made returnable before the full
court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents,
Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts
relative to sequestration and deportation, and
prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties,
because the action should have been begun in the
Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of
Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did
not have any of the women under their custody or
control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of
Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the
answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined
to be laborers, at good salaries, on the hacienda of
Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to a question of a member of
the court, that these women had been sent out of
Manila without their consent. The court awarded
the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao,
and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to
bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on
December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women
had returned to Manila at their own expense. On
motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony
was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court
sitting as commissioner. On the day named in the
order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in
whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in
court by the respondents. It has since been shown
that three of those who had been able to come
back to Manila through their own efforts, were
notified by the police and the secret service to
appear before the court. The fiscal appeared,
repeated the facts more comprehensively,
reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to
the original petition copied a telegram from the
Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial
governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and
telegrams that had passed between the Director of
Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in

Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that
the women were contented with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila.
Respondent Sales answered alleging that it was not
possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court
because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the
Province of Davao, and because they had married
or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo
answered alleging that he did not have any of the
women under his control and that therefore it was
impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court,
after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918,
promulgated a second order, which related that
the respondents had not complied with the original
order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained
their failure to do so, and therefore directed that
those of the women not in Manila be brought
before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the
women should, in written statements voluntarily
made before the judge of first instance of Davao or
the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless
the respondents should demonstrate some other
legal motives that made compliance impossible. It
was further stated that the question of whether the
respondents were in contempt of court would
later be decided and the reasons for the order
announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including
that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial
governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of
the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting
in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the
respondents technically presented before the Court
the women who had returned to the city through
their own efforts and eight others who had been
brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for
the respondents, by their returns, once again
recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the
habeas corpus. In sub- stance, it was stated that
the respondents, through their representatives and
agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao
with their consent eight women; that eighty-one
women were found in Davao who, on notice that if
they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation free, renounced the right through
sworn statements; that fifty- nine had already
returned to Manila by other means, and that
despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not
be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the
city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton

Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila Jose
Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the
police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo,
an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto
Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of
court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al
memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25,
1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the
reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the
final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled
these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly
hustled
on
board
steamers
for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the
feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is
shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose
the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to
resolve the question By authority of what law did
the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act
in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to
another distant locality within the Philippine Islands
? We turn to the statutes and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine
Islands in conformity with an Act of Congress. The
Governor- General can order the eviction of
undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands.
Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and
Section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila provide for the conviction and punishment
by a court of justice of any person who is common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
citizen of the United States, who may have been
convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York
and other States have statutes providing for the
commitment to the House of Refuge of women
convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a
law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination. or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done
pursuant to some law or order. But one can search
in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even
hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila
or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of
the Philippine Islands and these women despite
their being in a sense lepers of society are

nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary,
Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public
officer who, not being expressly authorized by law
or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the
privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to
be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
Under the American constitutional system, liberty of
abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in
nature as not even to require a constitutional
sanction. Even the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands even the President of the United
States, who has often been said to exercise more
power than any king or potentate, has no such
arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.
Much less, therefore, has the executive of a
municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated
powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could,
at their mere behest or even for the most
praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the
citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of
police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials
can take to themselves such power, then any other
official can do the same. And if any official can
exercise the power, then all persons would have just
as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be
sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then
officialdom can hold the same club over the head
of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta
decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon
him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225,
Cap. 29; 1 Eng. Stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no
matter how high, is above the law. The courts are
the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors.
"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the
only supreme power in our system of government,
and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly
bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of
the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106

U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice
Matthews of the same high tribunal in another
case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S.,
356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the
writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we
said in the very beginning that the primary question
was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of
official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are
three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3)
habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by
which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest
to pursue such an action, but it was never intended
effectively and promptly to meet any such situation
as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal
Code in force in these Islands provides:
"Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law
or by regulations of a general character in force in
the Philippines who shall banish any person to a
place more than two hundred kilometers distant
from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than three hundred and twenty-five and
not more than three thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas.
"Any public officer not thereunto expressly
authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall
compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a
fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five
and not more than six thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas." (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due
investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of
law, these prosecutors will institute and press a
criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have
defended the same official in this action.
Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that
the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded
against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To
quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which
will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous
anomaly in the law if to an application by one
unlawfully confined, to be restored to his liberty, it

could be a sufficient answer that the confinement
was a crime, and therefore might be continued
indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and
punished therefor by the slow process of criminal
procedure. "(In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties
are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy,
respondents have raised three specific objections
to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued
(1) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2)
that the Supreme Court should not assume
jurisdiction, and (3) that the persons in question are
not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was
finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor
and the chief of police of the city of Manila only
extends to the city limits and that perforce they
could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not pressed with any vigor by
counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of
the deportees. The way the expulsion was
conducted by the city officials made it impossible
for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus.
It was consequently proper for the writ to be
submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, Sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard
for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a
court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if
there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction
a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty, though no application be made therefor.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 93.) Petitioners
had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have
been asked for in the Court of First Instance of
Davao or should have been made returnable
before that court. It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should
be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The
writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, Sec. 79; Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be
made returnable before the Supreme Court or
before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the
Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that
the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session,

or that the women had any means by which to
advance their plea before that court. On the other
hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with
their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the
case involved parties situated in different parts of
the Islands; it was shown that the women might still
be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it
was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its
purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and
decided immediately by the appellate court. The
failure of the superior court to consider the
application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and
more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed
for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was
asked were under no restraint; the women, it is
claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of
the mayor and the chief of police did not extend
beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable
position. On closer examination, acceptance of
such dictum is found to be perversive of the first
principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from
Manila by officials of that city, who handed them
over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom
of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money
or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they
pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely
and truly waived this right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with
such a defense would mean. The chief executive of
any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly
and illegally take a private citizen and place him
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that
the person was under no restraint and that he, the
official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality. We believe the true principle should
be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the court and has it in his power to obey the order
of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.

Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before
the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of
police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to
Davao, these same officials must necessarily have
the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright
of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of
liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore
been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close
examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable
courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the
State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or
not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the
Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of
the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and
continues to be detained in another State. The
membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this
time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief
justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy,
justices. On the question presented the court was
equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom
concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished
American judges and law-writers, with whom
concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should
issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was
predicated to a large extent on his conception of
the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter
appear, the English courts have taken a contrary
view, only the following eloquent passages from the
opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
"I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the
power of this court to issue the present writ on the
petition which was laid before us. . . .
"It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after
the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been
expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of
blood shed for its establishment; after its many
confirmations, until Coke could declare in his
speech on the petition of right that 'Magna Charta
was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign,'
and after the extension of its benefits and securities
by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that
evasion of that great clause for the protection of

personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the
whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is
so, it is important that it be determined without
delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the
subject being brought to their notice. . . .
"The second proposition that the statutory
provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment
within the state seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It
was never the case in England that the court of
king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not
passed to give the right, but to compel the
observance of rights which existed. . . .
"The important fact to be observed in regard to the
mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is
directed to and served upon, not the person
confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former
except through the latter. The officer or person who
serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set
the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
compelling the oppressor to release his constraint.
The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to
be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are
fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of
affording relief, and if any other means are resorted
to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual.
The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to. the relief, if the guilty party is within
reach of process, so that by the power of the court
he can be compelled to release his grasp. The
difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the
confinement being beyond the limits of the state,
except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where is the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy." (In
the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been
accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers
vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People
[1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young
[1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration
to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of
England by the respondent. A writ of habeas
corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division
upon the application of the mother and her
husband directing the defendant to produce the
child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until
a certain date to produce the child, but he did not
do so. His return stated that the child before the
issuance of the writ had been handed over by him
to another; that it was no longer in his custody or
control, and that it was impossible for him to obey

the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On
appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
"A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and
was issued on January 22. That writ commanded
the defendant to have the body of the child before
a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice
immediately after the receipt of the writ, together
with the cause of her being taken and detained.
That is a command to bring the child before the
judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful
reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction
of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of
his having lawfully parted with the possession of the
child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant
had no longer power to produce the child, that
might be an answer; but in the absence of any
lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court
for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse.
Many efforts have been made in argument to shift
the question of contempt to some anterior period
for the purpose of showing that what was done at
some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt.
But the question is not as to what was done before
the issue of the writ. The question is whether there
has been a contempt in disobeying the writ after it
was issued by not producing the child in obedience
to its commands." (The Queen vs. Barnardo [1889],
23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish
case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.S.],
233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case
[1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of
interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the
defendant to have before the circuit court of the
District of Columbia three colored persons, with the
cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the
writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the
negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as
he believed, they were removed beyond the
District of Columbia before the service of the writ of
habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond
his control and out of his custody. The evidence
tended to show that Davis had removed the
negroes because he suspected they would apply
for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the
return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis
was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis
being present in court, and refusing to produce
them, ordered that he be committed to the
custody of the marshall until he should produce the
negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course
of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be
released upon the production of two of the
negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and
been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced
the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United

States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C. C., 622, Fed.
Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883],
111 U. S., 624; Church on Habeas Corpus, 2nd ed.,
p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority,
that no one of the defenses offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the
respondents complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus,
and if it be found that they did not, whether the
contempt should be punished or be taken as
purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo
Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the
writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The
order was dated November 4, 1918. The
respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As
far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of
Manila waited until the 21st of November before
sending a telegram to the provincial governor of
Davao. According to the response of the attorney
for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief,
there were then in Davao women who desired to
return to Manila, but who should not be permitted
to do so because of having contracted debts. The
half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court
on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's
order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons
according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely
be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show ,that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be
present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.)
They did not produce the bodies of the persons in
whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not
show impossibility of performance; and they did not
present writings that waived the right to be present
by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were
contented with their life in Davao, some of which
have since been repudiated by the signers, were
appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at
least sixty, could have been brought back to
Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this
time they were easily to be found in the
municipality of Davao, and that about this number
either returned at their own expense or were

produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was
made, would have been warranted summarily in
finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court,
and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the
order. Their excuses for the non-production of the
persons were far from sufficient. The authorities
cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all
tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas
corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in
Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to
an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought
that, having brought about that state of things by
his own illegal act, he must take the consequences;
and we said that he was bound to use every effort
to get the child back; that he must do much more
than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself
go after the child, and do everything that mortal
man could do in the matter; and that the court
would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to
produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to
take drastic action was because it did not wish to
see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of
a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the
respondents appear to have become more zealous
and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were
dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted,
the constabulary and the municipal police joined in
rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a
critical reading of the record might reveal a failure
of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to
conclude that there is a substantial compliance
with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced
somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy
incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an
executive investigation. If any particular individual is
still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the
object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since
we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing
further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in

contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city
of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of
Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should
be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain
that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is
commanded to produce a certain person and
does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse,
a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the
respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's
failure to produce the body of a person in
obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has
power to do so, is a contempt committed in the
face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal.,
156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and
with judicial regard for human imperfections, we
cannot say that any of the respondents, with the
possible exception of the first named, has flatly
disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez,
Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of
their chiefs, and while, under the law of public
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is
nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance.
The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn
into the case through a misconstruction by counsel
of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal,
Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more
than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of
the city government. Finding him innocent of any
disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for
the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is
said and done, as far as this record discloses, the
official who was primarily responsible for the
unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for
the steamers and the constabulary, who
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of
Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the
return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was
Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His
intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the

court
was
only
tardily
and
reluctantly
acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of
Section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in
pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to
forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400
each, which would reach to many thousands of
pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a
contempt. Some members of the court are inclined
to this stern view. It would also be possible to find
that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he
has purged his contempt of the first order. Some
members of the court are inclined to this merciful
view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the
correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to
obey the first mandate of the court tended to
belittle and embarrass the administration of justice
to such an extent that his later activity may be
considered only as extenuating his conduct. A
nominal fine will at once command such respect
without being unduly oppressive such an amount
is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on
the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin,
Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of
court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of
the city of Manila to strike from the record the
Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed
against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task,
may we not be permitted to express the hope that
this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications
of an orderly government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C. J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

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SORIAO vs PINEDA

CA GR SP NO 31546 August 10 1994

in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and

ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL,

and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative

modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized

Government." Commenting on this provision in his

Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.

necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen

by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored

health" are combined with remedial standards as

but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to

as is presently experienced by the entire country,

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about

executive branches of Government. In their 12 July

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order

more areas for logging than what is available

are numerous and representative enough to ensure

fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a

Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology

Conformably with the enunciated right to a

"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall

different segments of the present as well as future

as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate

party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,

The reason is that, even if we were to assume that

license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn

ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the

'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what

"The freedom of contract, under our system of

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael,

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,

(Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967)

the same were issued upon applications stating

"Books of accounts, Financial records, vouchers,

moral effect of the possibility of securing their

petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original

and that the objection to an unlawful search and

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned

caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely

only courtroom door remaining open to evidence

available way by removing the incentive to

that the psychological and moral effect of the

abandoned; that the warrants for the search of

them all the applicable English and American

press and of assembly and petition are

Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a

Roman Punsalan Serrano before the judge of first

show that the alleged libelous statements were true

clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject

carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary

A further element of the law of privilege concerns

justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

We find the defendants and appellants entitled to

4. ID.; ID. The privilege of domicile is a principle

15. ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. For respondents

government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the

the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,

Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in