Wirecard

(TecDAX, Financial Services)

Value Indicators:

Buy
EUR

60.00

Price

EUR 34.82

Upside

72.3 %

EUR

Share data:

DCF:
FCF-Value Potential 17e:

60.00
33.00

Bloomberg:
Reuters:
ISIN:

Market Snapshot:

EUR m

Shareholders:

Market cap:
No. of shares (m):
EV:
Freefloat MC:
Trad. Vol. (30d):

4,238
122
3,930
3,942
58.42 m

Description:
WDI GR
WDIG
DE0007472060

Provider of risk management,

banking, electronic
transaction/payment/processing
services

Risk Profile (WRe):

Freefloat
MB Beteiligungs mbH

93.0 % Beta:
6.4 % Price / Book:
6.3 % Equity Ratio:

Jupiter Asset Management

T. Rowe Price

5.0 %

Alken Luxembourg S.A.

5.0 %

2015e

1.1
3.5 x
55 %

Attempt to verify facts and separate them from questions

How we are dealing with the first Zatarra report: In a first step, we made the theoretical assumption that everything in the report is not true.
We did that because in 2010, there was a manipulated letter which showed it is a letter from Mastercard. In a second step, we have done quite
a lot of work trying to verify to some extent the data used in Zatarras report. Thirdly, we said that it is not possible for an analyst to cross-check
all data included in the 100 hundred pages.
What we have done: We worked through the commercial registers of Switzerland, the UK, U.S. and Ireland. The German commercial register
is the only one demanding a written application to the register (you cannot do it online) before a download of data reports is possible. Hence,
up to now, we havent checked the relevant set of data (e.g. inatec) in the German commercial register.
Furthermore, we tried to find old press articles and we spoke with a Swiss attorney. In addition to that, we called the insolvency service in the
UK to verify a set of different data. In a last step, we contacted Zatarra and spoke to them.
Summary of our impressions: Firstly, many allegations were made between 2003 and 2011. Secondly, some information can easily be
identified as rather (partially) incorrect. Thirdly, some information in the report, especially when it comes to the incorporation of companies (and
the persons behind them), is obviously true and can be verified with some research work. However, these findings say nothing about their
relevance.
Moreover, what makes it complicated: Zatarra takes several different facts, throws them together and tries to connect those facts in a way to
make it look as if everything was operated by Wirecard. This approach makes it quite complicated (for us) to verify the evidence of Zatarras
allegations. Wirecard gave an e-mail statement to the report. We are getting back to that later.
The way the report is written, how it was published, and the chosen time of publication seem more than unusual or could even potentially be
qualified as market and share price manipulation even if some of the information is true.
For analysts it is an extremely difficult situation, too. Compliance might recommend changing the rating to suspended. This would clearly play
into the hands of the authors of the report. Just saying we believe that all allegations are untrue might be too simple. Therefore, as stated
above, we have spent quite a lot of time trying to verify parts of the report. On the next pages, we describe our findings.
Strangely enough, Zatarra is the alias for Edmond Dants from the character Jacopo in the 2002 film The Count of Monte Cristo. Again,
maybe it doesnt mean anything, but having read the report several times, one could potentially get the impression that to some extent it seems
to be a personal vendetta against Wirecard.

FY End: 31.12.
in EUR m

Rel. Performance vs TecDAX:

1 month:
6 months:

-19.2 %
1.3 %

Year to date:

-12.5 %

Trailing 12 months:

-12.6 %

Company events:
07.04.16
19.05.16
16.06.16
11.08.16

FY 2015
Q1
AGM
Q2

CAGR
(14-17e)

Sales
Change Sales yoy
Gross profit margin
EBITDA
Margin
EBIT
Margin
Net income

24.5 %

EPS
EPS adj.
DPS
Dividend Yield
FCFPS
FCF / Market cap

30.8 %
29.9 %
0.0 %

EV / Sales
EV / EBITDA
EV / EBIT
P/E
P / E adj.
FCF Yield Potential
ROE
ROCE (NOPAT)

0.7 %
28.6 %
31.5 %
31.0 %

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

325
19.6 %
44.1 %
85
26.0 %
76
23.4 %
61

394
21.3 %
44.3 %
109
27.8 %
93
23.6 %
73

482
22.3 %
44.5 %
126
26.1 %
99
20.5 %
83

601
24.8 %
47.5 %
173
28.8 %
133
22.1 %
108

749
24.6 %
49.4 %
230
30.7 %
186
24.8 %
150

968
29.2 %
48.8 %
296
30.5 %
239
24.7 %
190

1,159
19.8 %
48.5 %
368
31.8 %
303
26.1 %
243

0.60
0.60
0.10
0.8 %
0.76
3.0 %

0.65
0.72
0.10
0.6 %
0.89
4.0 %

0.74
0.83
0.12
0.5 %
0.94
3.4 %

0.89
0.99
0.13
0.4 %
1.22
2.3 %

1.23
1.43
0.13
0.4 %
1.68
3.7 %

1.56
1.82
0.13
0.4 %
2.20
5.2 %

1.99
2.17
0.13
0.4 %
2.78
6.4 %

3.3 x
12.8 x
14.3 x
19.8 x
19.8 x
5.8 %

4.0 x
14.3 x
16.9 x
24.3 x
21.9 x
4.9 %

5.0 x
19.0 x
24.3 x
30.6 x
27.3 x
3.1 %

5.6 x
19.3 x
25.1 x
34.7 x
31.2 x
3.4 %

5.2 x
16.9 x
20.8 x
28.3 x
24.3 x
3.8 %

4.1 x
13.3 x
16.4 x
22.3 x
19.1 x
5.1 %

3.2 x
10.1 x
12.2 x
17.5 x
16.0 x
7.1 %

19.5 %
23.1 %

16.5 %
20.0 %

14.4 %
17.5 %

12.8 %
17.4 %

13.2 %
19.6 %

14.7 %
20.7 %

16.2 %
23.4 %

Guidance

Analyst

J o che n Re ic hert
jreichert@warburg-research.com
+49 40 309537-130

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Wirecard
Sales development

FCF adjusted (WRe)

EBIT development

in EUR m

in EUR m

in EUR m

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

Company Background
Wirecard is one of the leading independent suppliers of electronic payment and risk management solutions and card-based B2C
products. Furthermore, Wirecard is a provider of POS payment/transaction services and systems.
The company serves more than 20,000 commercial customers worldwide and generates a transaction volume of >EUR 30bn, which
corresponds to about >670m individual transactions. The key elements of the strategy are:
An IP-based platform which can be simply linked to dealers' websites. The platform integrates risk management systems, payment,
processing and transaction solutions, currencies and banking/credit card services.
Wirecard combines technology, risk management & banking and follows a so-called omni-channel strategy which provides payment
technologies for all kinds of payment channels at the POS or online
Business model is based on transaction value and percentage-based fees.

Competitive Quality
Structural growth underpins Wirecard's positioning: internet-based consumption and the number of electronic-based payments are
increasing worldwide. E-payment methods are gaining in popularity in emerging markets.
In South-East Asia and India, Wirecard is positoned as an enabler of electronic payment and transaction solutions at the POS.
Wirecard combines typical payment gateway services, with risk management tools and banking solutions (e.g. acquiring).

EBT development

ROCE adjusted (WRe)

Net income development

in EUR m

in%

in EUR m

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

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Wirecard
Some of Zatarras allegations

Jochen Hochrein
4
Mr Burkhard Ley and the insolvency of the Kirch Group
4
Mr Schuett and rumours that he received his orders from Markus Braun 4
Trautmanns indicated potential connection to Mr Suter in Switzerland
5
Trautmanns indicated connection to some Irish companies
6
Bluetool, Wire Card, Krores, Oval 2123
6
Schuett and his potential connection to EZV which is a business partner
of Wirecard
9
Bluemay Enterprises
10
Conclusion
11

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Wirecard
Some of Zatarras allegations
Jochen Hochrein
In some parts of the report (e.g. page 1) it is written that Jochen Hochrein, a former
Wirecard board member, is involved in money laundering and is still connected to
Wirecard.
To put this into perspective: Jochen Hochrein was CEO of Infogenie AG until 2003.
Infogenie was used for a reverse IPO of Wirecards payment gateway assets and of the
payment business in 2003/2004.
Mr Hochrein left Infogenie in 2004. Infogenie had a different business (call centre
activities) compared to the Wirecard business model. Furthermore, Wirecard
restructured the call centre business, and Mr Hochrein presumably had a consultant
contract with Wirecard.

Mr Burkhard Ley and the insolvency of the Kirch Group

The report questions his responsibility in the collapse of the Kirch Media Group in 2002.
First, Mr Ley was the CFO of Kirch New Media, which was a smaller entity within the
Kirch Group. Second, he was the CFO between 2000 and 2001. Third and most
important, the insolvency of the Kirch Media Group was mainly caused by high
investments in pay TV in the German market. In the early 2000s, the German TV market
was simply not ready for pay TV offerings. Concluding and implicitly saying that Mr. Ley
was responsible for several severe corporate governance issues of Kirch Media (and not
Kirch New Media!) at the time of the insolvency seems difficult to follow, in our view,
considering the facts about the Kirch Media collapse.

Mr Schuett and rumours that he received his orders from

Markus Braun
In 2010, the U.S. Secret Service found out and investigated that Schuett had received
roughly USD 70m by international wire transfer. The money transfer was said to be
related to illegal transactions. Bluetool was among the companies which transferred the
money to Schuett. Furthermore, Bluetool had a bank account at Wirecard Bank. Based
on our findings in publicly available data, this information is true.
The report now indicates that there had been rumours in 2010 that Schuett said he
received his orders directly from Markus Braun.
Based on FBI findings, Wirecard Bank had transferred roughly USD 6m from the real
estate firm Bluetool to Michael Schuett in Florida. The FBI assumed that Schuett
operated a network of more than 700 firms to pay out online poker players and gamblers
in the U.S. Schuett was released from prison after 40 days already because he made a
comprehensive confession. Based on our findings, there is no public document which
provides evidence of the rumours described above.
Furthermore, Bluetool had bank accounts at many other banks beside Wirecard Bank. In
addition to that, Wirecard Bank was not convicted for money laundering in the Schuett
case. Obviously, prosecutors didnt see and find any relation between Schuetts money
laundering network and Wirecard Bank. If the FBI or German prosecutors had found any
evidence for money laundering in 2010 and 2011, why didnt we see any action against
Wirecard between 2011 and 2016?
According to Zatarra, new information is now available, which investigators did not have
access to in 2010. Zatarra says that some important filings regarding Wire Card and
other companies was not available during the time of the investigation because the

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Wirecard
information was published afterwards.
In an email statement, Wirecard wrote: With regards to the Schtt case, in 2010 the
online portal Goldman, Morgenstern & Partners (Gomopa) published a report falsely
claiming that Mr Michael Schtt, in his testimony to US authorities, named Wirecard as
an ally in his money laundering scheme for gambling companies. Several investigations
by journalists have entirely cleared both Wirecard and Mr Trautmann in relation to
Gomopas false claims. Gomopas claims were entirely fraudulent and made solely to
manipulatively drive down Wirecards stock price. For an example of this, please see the
Handelsblatt
article
available
via
the
link:
http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/maerkte/boerseinside/marktgeruechtefinanzaufsic
ht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-beiwirecard/3406252.html. Gomopas reputation for
questionable business practices is well known.

Trautmanns indicated potential connection to Mr Suter in

Switzerland
Page 10 and page 11 of the report show a list of different companies.
Due to the report a company named P.E.R.T. AG was incorporated in 2007. The
owners were Mr Trautmann (at that time he was in Wirecards board) and Jrg Paul
Suter. Furthermore, Michael Brinkmann (a Managing Director at Wirecard) was involved
in a Swiss company (incorporated in 2007) named PERM AG.
We checked the information about P.E.R.T. and PERM in the commercial register in
Switzerland. We found that Mr Suter was an owner of both companies, that a person
named Ruediger Trautmann was an owner of P.E.R.T. and that a person named
Michael Brinkmann had owned PERM. We think it is likely that both persons are the
ones who worked (or are working) for Wirecard.
P.E.R.T. AG was closed in 2010 and PERM currently is in a liquidation process.
The report indicates that Mr Trautmann (former board member of Wirecard) and Mr
Brinkmann are related and/or incorporated companies of Mr. Suter, who is undergoing
an investigation in Switzerland. This includes aiding and abetting multiple instances of
money laundering, illegal cross border transactions, embezzlement and commercial
fraud.
We did some research on this topic. First, we read several articles published in the NZZ
(Neue Zuricher Zeitung). In a second step, we had a phone call with a prosecutor in
Switzerland.
Our findings: In 2012, Suter was investigated within the so-called Behring case. Mr
Behring was an investment manager in Switzerland and lost hundreds of millions of
Swiss Francs for investors. Swiss attorneys are prosecuting Mr. Behring for investment
fraud while allegations against other suspects (e.g. Mr Suter) are discontinued.
What do our findings mean? First, the report tries to implicitly say that potentially a
person named Trautmann (Wirecard board member?) incorporated a company
together with a person (Suter) who was prosecuted for money laundering because of
illegal transactions and money wire transfer. However, the allegations were related to
investment fraud and not to illegal payment processing.
Second the report gives the impression that Mr Suter is still prosecuted which is not the
case regarding the allegations against Behring.
Third, what remains is the question why Trautmann and Brinkmann incorporated two
Swiss companies together with Mr Suter while they were working for Wirecard?
Furthermore, we found another Swiss company (Istart GmbH) which is owned by
Ruediger Trautmann. Furthermore, we have no real feeling for that are the activities of
Wirecard employees really unusual compared to other listed companies? We havent
checked that.

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Wirecard
We spoke with Wirecard about the issue. If we understood Wirecard correctly, Wircard
would deal with its employees like that:
Wirecard ensures that employees use their work-time completely for Wirecard.
Wirecard assures that there are no conflicts of interests, mainly in two ways.
Employees are not allowed to invest in competitive businesses. Moreover, employees
should not invest or should not have business relations to existing and potential
customers.

Trautmanns indicated connection to some Irish companies

The report mentions three Irish companies (FX Currency Services, Forex Trading
Platform Limited, Roteral limited) in which at least one of the persons, Ruediger
Trautmann (board member of Wirecard AG between 2005-2010), Dietmar
Knoechelmann (Wirecard Payment Solutions) or Andy Quinn (Wirecard Payment
Solutions), had been officers while they were working for Wirecard. Based on our
research in the commercial register of Ireland, this information is correct. We think that
those companies are rather related to private matters.
In our view, these single facts seem to be no real evidence for any activities in money
laundering.
At most, however, they again raise the question, why Mr Trautmann, partially together
with other Wirecard employees, was involved in a couple of other companies while he
was member of the Wirecard board. Wirecards respond to our question (if we
understood it correctly) we described above.

Bluetool, Wire Card, Krores, Oval 2123

Based on our research, there was a company named Wire Card Ltd., incorporated in
2006 and dissolved in 2010. It was owned by Fermoya, a company registered in the
British Virgin Islands, and B.M.I.E., a UK-based company. Furthermore, there is an
officer listed by the name of Ruediger Trautmann, the former Wirecard board member,
and the company secretarys name is Bournewood, another company registered in the
British Virgin Island.
It should be mentioned that the share capital was GBP 2. Furthermore, Wirecard said it
incorporated Wire Card as a shell which was never used. Furthermore, the commercial
register showed Wire Card UK limited as dormant.
The information provided above is shown in the report.
Furthermore, as written at the beginning of our note, Bluetool Ltd had obviously a bank
account at Wirecard Bank in 2010. In 2010, based on our findings, Bluetool made a wire
transfer of roughly EUR 6m to Mr Schuett, the person who was prosecuted in the U.S.
for money laundering related to illegal gambling transactions. The commercial register
shows that Bluetool had the same professional service companies, Fermoya (owner)
and Bournewood (company secretary, professional registrar). These findings are correct,
based on our verifications by searching in publicly available data.

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Wirecard
Zatarras logic for the connection between Wirecard and Bluetool
Wirecard AG
Company
Secretary
corporate
shell

Wire Card UK ltd

Bournewood

Bluetool ltd

Officer

Owner

Owner

Ruediger
Trautmann

Fermoya
B.M.E.I

Fermoya

Source: Warburg Research

Zatarra indicates (if we understood them correctly) from the connection between Wire
Card (the Wirecard shelf) and Bluetool (involved in money laundering in the Schuett case
via Fermoya and Bournewould) that Wirecard and the board of Wirecard were involved
in establishing a network of shadow and shelf companies to settle illegal transactions in
gambling, adult entertainment and pharmaceuticals.
Furthermore, searching for Bournewood in the Companies House data base results in
738 matches in which Bournewood is the company secretary and registrar. Not
surprisingly, when searching for Fermoya one finds many results in which Fermoya is
either an owner or a company secretary.
Zatarra questions: Shouldnt it dangerous and shouldnt it provide evidence that Wirecard
has used the same professional services as many (or hundreds) of other potentially
doubtful incorporated companies.
Wirecard said that Wire Card UK was incorporated on behalf of Wirecard for the purpose
of establishing a subsidiary for Wirecard in the UK, but other decisions were made. It
was a dormant company during its entire life and never was operational.
Should we really conclude from Bluetool and Wire Card having had the similar corporate
structure that Wirecard is involved in operating a network of shadow and shell
companies to process illegal transactions?
What we cannot really evaluate: Is it rather usual to take a nominee as an owner,
especially a firm which is registered on the British Virgin IslandsT
Tbecause if Bournewood and Fermoya are just used by professional service or
consultancy companies to provide company formation services, the indicated connection
between Wirecard-Bluetool and Wirecard-Bluemay could potentially easily be explained,
in our view.
Zatarra has listed other UK or Ireland-based companies in the report: Krores
UK/Fantazzle, Krores Ireland, Oval (2123).
Krores UK was founded in 2009 and dissolved in 2010. Again, Trautmann and Quinn
had been officers. It looks as if Krores was a shell, too. We point out that there are no
details about the potential connections between Wirecard, Trautmann and Krores
Limited UK.
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Wirecard
There is something, however, which could potentially make it complicated: Based on our
findings, a person named Vineet Katial was an officer, too. He is also listed as an officer
at two other dormant UK companies, Vistamoney Ltd and Vista Money Ltd.
Furthermore, Zatarra has written that Katial incorporated a couple of other companies,
e.g. Krores Cards Private Ltd in India and Krores LCC, U.S. The LinkedIn profile of Katial
reveals that he sold a company named Krores to a German listed bank. We havent
checked whether the profile is real or not.
Zatarra concludes that all information listed in its reportT
T(1) the incorporation of Krores UK,
T(2) other companies around the world which have Krores in the company name
T(3) Trautmann and Katial being officers at Krores UK at the same time
T(4) Katials LinkedIn profile
Tshould be evidence to conclude that Wirecard acquired Krores.

The facts and the logic which are used to conclude that Wirecard potentially bought a
company which was potentially incorporated by employees of Wirecard seem
questionable, in our view.
First, we have only indications about the person named Katial. Second, Wirecard said in
an email statement that it had never acquired Krores from Mr Knoechelmann, Mr
Trautmann or any other party. Furthermore, Wirecard wrote that it also does not have
any business relationship with Krores.
In our view it would be very helpful, if Wirecard could shed some light on the question,
why Trautmann was an officer at Krores UK together with a person (Katial) who seems
potentially to be involved in competitive payment businesses (while he was a board
member of Wirecard AG).

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Wirecard
Zatarras logic for the connection between Wirecard and Krores UK
Wirecard AG

Krores UK

Trautmann

Knoechelmann

incorporated: 2009
deleted: 2010

Officers

Katial

Potentially involved
in competitive
payment businesses

Source: Warburg Research

Oval 2123 was incorporated in 2006 and dissolved in 2011. It seems that Wirecard
acquired 51% in Oval 2123 in 2006 via its Gibraltar unit. Mr Trautmann and Mr Hartmann
(employees from Wirecard) had been officers at that time. Later on, according to our
findings in the commercial registers, Oval 2123 was completely taken over by Wirecard.
Until now, everything seems to be quite clear. Zatarra points out that Alexander Herbst
who left Wirecard in 2003, was appointed as an officer at Oval 2123 in 2006.
Again, we really do not comprehend how this or the Oval 2123 case are related to
criminal actions. Furthermore, it is not unusual, after a board member leaves a company,
that he or she is still involved in one or another project for a certain period of time.
Zatarra raises the question why Trautmann still signed Wirecard related filings ten
months after he had officially left the company? Mr Trautmann signed the filings for
striking off Oval 2123 at the end of 2010.

Schuett and his potential connection to EZV which is a

business partner of Wirecard
According to a complaint from 2010 (which we have already referred to earlier in this
note), Mr Schuett appears to have operated an unlicensed money transmitting business
through his various corporations for one or more internet gambling organisations and
received and disbursed gambling winnings to persons in the United States and Canada
(e.g. operating shadow and shell companies for money laundering).
USA AG Inc. was one of the major companies which operated the network of shadow
companies. As written in the Zatarra report, this company was incorporated by Michael
Schuett (we checked this information in the commercial registers in Florida). Another
U.S. based company was involved in the money laundering system, International
Payment Systems, in which Mr Schuett (via USA AG Inc.) and a person named Freddy
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Wirecard
Kalder (Wiesbaden, Germany) had been officers, based on our findings in the company
registers of Florida. Then, Freddy Kalder was involved in the incorporation of a company
in the UK, Deutsche Zahlungsverkehrsgesellschaft Ltd. This information, as written in the
Zatarra report, again is correct.
However, when reading the Zatarra report one might get the impression that Kalder, who
was involved in money laundering together with Schuett in the U.S., incorporated the
German company EZV, Gesellschaft fr Zahlungssysteme mbH, which is a cooperation
partner of Wirecard. Based on our findings here, the Zatarra report could easily be
misinterpreted in our view.
Zatarra writes that USA AG Inc. had an address in Germany which seemingly had the
same address as EZV. Based on our research, this seems to be correct.
In the same complaint, Bluetool plays a key role. Apparently, Bluetool Ltd appears to
have been used as a money intermediary for gambling sites.
Again, it is a combination of different individual correct information which is used to
provide potential evidence of systematic money laundering.

Zatarras logic for the connection between Wirecard and US AG Inc.

UK Bluetool ltd

(1) used as an Intermediary from

Gambling sites
(2) Illegal money Transfer

EZV

Money Laundry U.S.A

Germany
US AG Inc

Wirecard
Bank
Account

International
Payment Systems

Schuett

Kalder

Business
partner of
Wirecard

ZATARRA
Conclusion

Zatarra: Connection via a potential Bank account

of Bluetool at Wirecard Bank and the relation of
Bluetool to US AG Inc

Zatarra: Connection via same

address in Germany / Berlin (US AG
Inc and EZV)

Source: Warburg Research

Bluemay Enterprises
Based on our findings, Bluemay Enterprises was incorporated in the UK in 2010. As
written in the report, owner of Bluemay enterprises was for a certain period of time again
Fermoya and the company Bournewoold was an officer for one year in 2010. The
company went insolvent.
Zatarra writes, (1) the potential connection to Wirecard is again via Bluetool (same
owners and offices), (2) Bluemay was a front page for gambling sites, and (3) Bluemay
had a bank account at Wirecard Bank in 2013.
Based on our findings, the provided document from the Insolvency Service from 2014
(Manchester District) shows:
Among the initial shareholders was Fermoya.
Company accounts show profits of GBP 478 in 2011 and GBP 833 in 2012.

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10

Wirecard
A company account at Wirecard Bank AG had total credits EUR 36.3m between June
30, 2011 and June 30, 2012. It was not possible to reconcile the apparent minimal
activity declared in the published accounts with the volume of transactions passing
through the companys Euro account.

Zatarras logic for the connection Wirecard, Bluetool, Bluemay

Wirecard AG
Zatarra: Bluemay had a bank account
at Wirecard in 2011 and 2012, total
credits of EUR 36m
corporate
shell

Zatarra:
Related to Gambling

Wire Card UK ltd

Bluetool ltd

Bluemay ltd

Officer

Owner

Owner

Owner

Ruediger
Trautmann

Fermoya
B.M.E.I

Fermoya

Fermoya

Source: Warburg Research

Again, it comes back to the question: Is it rather usual to take a nominee as an owner,
especially a firm which is registered at the British Virgin IslandsT
Tbecause if Fermoya is used from professional service or consultancy companies to
provide company formation services, the indicated connection between WirecardBluetool and Wirecard-Bluemay could potentially easily be explained.

Conclusion
Firstly the conclusion cannot be just yes or no, true or false. Secondly until now, we
havent checked all the data. For example, we havent done a closer look on the
allegations about Asia until now.
Thirdly - our findings show that a lot of information and data which is written in the
Zatarra report can be verified by some research work. However, and this is the key
question: Should the connections and conclusions made by Zatarra just be ignored?
A high part of concerns and insecurity would potentially disappear if Wirecard could
provide some more colour why Wirecard used Fermoya (even that Wire Card hadnt any
economic relevance) and why we observed quite a lot of incorporations by Mr Trautmann
while he was a board member of Wirecard.

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11

Wirecard
DCF model
Detailed forecast period

Transitional period

Term. Value

2015e

2016e

2017e

2018e

2019e

2020e

2021e

2022e

2023e

2024e

2025e

2026e

2027e

Sales
Sales change

749
24.6 %

968
29.2 %

1,159
19.8 %

1,367
18.0 %

1,600
17.0 %

1,840
15.0 %

2,060
12.0 %

2,266
10.0 %

2,470
9.0 %

2,668
8.0 %

2,828
6.0 %

2,913
3.0 %

2,956
1.5 %

EBIT
EBIT-margin

186
24.8 %

239
24.7 %

303
26.1 %

362
26.5 %

432
27.0 %

497
27.0 %

556
27.0 %

612
27.0 %

667
27.0 %

720
27.0 %

764
27.0 %

816
28.0 %

828
28.0 %

Tax rate (EBT)

16.0 %

17.0 %

17.0 %

20.0 %

20.0 %

20.0 %

20.0 %

25.0 %

25.0 %

30.0 %

30.0 %

30.0 %

30.0 %

156

198

251

290

346

397

445

459

500

504

534

571

579

44
5.9 %

57
5.8 %

66
5.7 %

78
5.7 %

90
5.6 %

101
5.5 %

124
6.0 %

136
6.0 %

148
6.0 %

160
6.0 %

170
6.0 %

175
6.0 %

177
6.0 %

0
56
7.5 %

0
64
6.6 %

0
73
6.3 %

0
75
5.5 %

0
88
5.5 %

0
105
5.7 %

0
124
6.0 %

0
136
6.0 %

0
148
6.0 %

0
160
6.0 %

0
170
6.0 %

0
175
6.0 %

0
177
6.0 %

Free Cash Flow (WACC

Model)

144

191

244

293

347

394

445

459

500

504

534

571

579

PV of FCF

146

180

214

239

264

278

293

281

285

267

264

262

248

Figures in EUR m

NOPAT
Depreciation
in % of Sales
Changes in provisions
Change in Liquidity from
- Working Capital
- Capex
Capex in % of Sales
Other

7.24 %

share of PVs

35.98 %

Model parameter

1.5 %

588
4,229
56.78 %

Valuation (m)

Derivation of WACC:

Derivation of Beta:

Debt ratio
Cost of debt (after tax)
Market return
Risk free rate

0.00 %
2.1 %
7.00 %
1.50 %

Financial Strength
Liquidity (share)
Cyclicality
Transparency
Others

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.18

WACC

7.45 %

Beta

1.08

Present values 2027e

Terminal Value
Financial liabilities
Pension liabilities
Hybrid capital
Minority interest
Market val. of investments
Liquidity
Equity Value

3,220
4,229
0
0
0
0
0
0
7,449

No. of shares (m)

Value per share (EUR)

121.7
61.18

Sensitivity Value per Share (EUR)

Beta
1.26
1.17
1.13
1.08
1.04
0.99
0.90

WACC
8.4 %
7.9 %
7.7 %
7.4 %
7.2 %
6.9 %
6.4 %

Terminal Growth
0.75 % 1.00 %
49.02
49.83
52.86
53.84
55.00
56.08
57.29
58.49
59.77
61.10
62.46
63.94
68.56
70.42

1.25 %
50.69
54.89
57.24
59.78
62.54
65.55
72.46

1.50 %
51.62
56.02
58.50
61.18
64.11
67.31
74.70

1.75 %
52.61
57.25
59.86
62.71
65.82
69.24
77.19

2.00 %
53.69
58.57
61.34
64.37
67.70
71.36
79.95

2.25 %
54.85
60.02
62.96
66.20
69.76
73.71
83.04

Beta
1.26
1.17
1.13
1.08
1.04
0.99
0.90

WACC
8.4 %
7.9 %
7.7 %
7.4 %
7.2 %
6.9 %
6.4 %

Delta EBIT-margin
-1.5 pp -1.0 pp -0.5 pp +0.0 pp +0.5 pp +1.0 pp +1.5 pp
48.78
49.73
50.67
51.62
52.57
53.51
54.46
52.95
53.97
55.00
56.02
57.05
58.07
59.10
55.29
56.36
57.43
58.50
59.57
60.64
61.71
61.18
57.83
58.95
60.07
62.30
63.42
64.54
60.60
61.77
62.94
64.11
65.28
66.45
67.62
69.77
71.00
63.63
64.86
66.09
67.31
68.54
70.62
71.98
73.34
74.70
76.06
77.42
78.78

Trend towards internet-based payment drives growth

Banking-related working capital effects are eliminated

NOTE

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12

Wirecard
Free Cash Flow Value Potential
Warburg Research's valuation tool "FCF Value Potential" reflects the ability of the company to generate sustainable free cash flows. It is based on the
"FCF potential" - a FCF "ex growth" figure - which assumes unchanged working capital and pure maintenance capex. A value indication is derived via
the perpetuity of a given years FCF potential with consideration of the weighted costs of capital. The fluctuating value indications over time add a
timing element to the DCF model (our preferred valuation tool).
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

61
8
-2
9
0

72
16
-2
14
0

83
27
-4
40
0

117
40
-7
50
0

150
44
-7
55
0

190
57
-10
55
0

243
66
-10
55
0

63
5.8 %
7.45 %

77
4.9 %
7.45 %

74
3.1 %
7.45 %

114
3.4 %
7.45 %

146
3.8 %
7.45 %

202
5.1 %
7.45 %

263
7.1 %
7.45 %

= Enterprise Value (EV)

1,085

1,569

2,394

3,342

3,876

3,930

3,705

= Fair Enterprise Value

842

1,031

994

1,526

1,966

2,707

3,536

Net Debt (Cash)

Pension Liabilities
Other
Market value of minorities
Market value of investments

-323
0
-90
0
0

-323
0
-90
0
0

-323
0
-90
0
0

-323
0
-90
0
0

-362
0
0
0
0

-309
0
0
0
0

-533
0
0
0
0

= Fair Market Capitalisation

1,255

1,444

1,407

1,938

2,329

3,016

4,069

122

122

122

122

122

122

122

10.31

11.86

11.56

15.92

19.13

24.77

33.43

-45.1 %

-28.8 %

-4.0 %

14.49
15.71
17.21
19.13
21.63
25.06
30.03

18.39
20.07
22.14
24.77
28.22
32.94
39.78

25.08
27.28
29.99
33.43
37.93
44.09
53.03

in EUR m

+
+

Net Income before minorities

Depreciation + Amortisation
Net Interest Income
Maintenance Capex
Other

= Free Cash Flow Potential

Free Cash Flow Yield Potential
WACC

No. of shares (total) (m)

= Fair value per share (EUR)
premium (-) / discount (+) in %
Sensitivity Fair value per Share (EUR)

WACC

10.45 %
9.45 %
8.45 %
7.45 %
6.45 %
5.45 %
4.45 %

8.32
8.84
9.49
10.31
11.38
12.84
14.97

9.43
10.07
10.86
11.86
13.17
14.97
17.57

9.21
9.83
10.59
11.56
12.82
14.55
17.07

12.32
13.27
14.44
15.92
17.87
20.53
24.38

FCF-Value does not reflect growth potential

NOTE

P u bl i s h e d 1 0 . 0 3 . 2 0 1 6

13

Wirecard
Valuation
Price / Book
Book value per share ex intangibles
EV / Sales
EV / EBITDA
EV / EBIT
EV / EBIT adj.*
P / FCF
P/E
P / E adj.*
Dividend Yield
Free Cash Flow Yield Potential

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

3.5 x
0.74
3.3 x
12.8 x
14.3 x
14.3 x
32.9 x
19.8 x
19.8 x
0.8 %
5.8 %

3.3 x
1.73
4.0 x
14.3 x
16.9 x
15.3 x
25.1 x
24.3 x
21.9 x
0.6 %
4.9 %

4.2 x
1.47
5.0 x
19.0 x
24.3 x
21.6 x
29.6 x
30.6 x
27.3 x
0.5 %
3.1 %

3.5 x
3.30
5.6 x
19.3 x
25.1 x
25.1 x
43.6 x
34.7 x
31.2 x
0.4 %
3.4 %

3.5 x
4.27
5.2 x
16.9 x
20.8 x
20.8 x
27.3 x
28.3 x
24.3 x
0.4 %
3.8 %

3.1 x
3.71
4.1 x
13.3 x
16.4 x
16.4 x
19.1 x
22.3 x
19.1 x
0.4 %
5.1 %

2.6 x
5.56
3.2 x
10.1 x
12.2 x
12.2 x
15.7 x
17.5 x
16.0 x
0.4 %
7.1 %

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

51
24.4 %

73
22.7 %

80
17.4 %

121
24.7 %

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

*Adjustments made for: -

Company Specific Items

FCF adjusted (WRe)
ROCE adjusted (WRe)

NOTE

P u bl i s h e d 1 0 . 0 3 . 2 0 1 6

14

Wirecard
Consolidated profit & loss
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

Sales
Change Sales yoy

325
19.6 %

394
21.3 %

482
22.3 %

601
24.8 %

749
24.6 %

968
29.2 %

1,159
19.8 %

Increase / decrease in inventory

Own work capitalised
Total Sales
Material Expenses
Gross profit
Gross profit margin

0
7
332
189
325
44.1 %

0
10
404
230
394
44.3 %

0
21
502
288
482
44.5 %

0
25
626
341
601
47.5 %

0
26
775
405
749
49.4 %

0
28
996
523
968
48.8 %

0
30
1,189
627
1,159
48.5 %

Personnel expenses
Other operating income
Other operating expenses
Unfrequent items
EBITDA
Margin

28
1
32
0
85
26.0 %

37
4
33
0
109
27.8 %

48
7
47
0
126
26.1 %

66
7
53
0
173
28.8 %

88
5
57
0
230
30.7 %

110
7
74
0
296
30.5 %

118
9
84
0
368
31.8 %

Depreciation of fixed assets

EBITA
Amortisation of intangible assets
Goodwill amortization
EBIT
Margin
EBIT adj.

1
84
8
0
76
23.4 %
76

3
106
13
0
93
23.6 %
103

4
122
23
0
99
20.5 %
111

8
165
32
0
133
22.1 %
133

8
222
36
0
186
24.8 %
186

10
286
47
0
239
24.7 %
239

11
358
55
0
303
26.1 %
303

Interest income
Interest expenses
Other financial income (loss)
EBT
Margin

0
2
0
74
22.8 %

3
5
0
91
23.0 %

2
6
0
94
19.6 %

1
8
0
126
21.0 %

1
8
0
179
23.9 %

0
10
0
229
23.7 %

0
10
0
293
25.2 %

Total taxes
Net income from continuing operations
Income from discontinued operations (net of tax)
Net income before minorities
Minority interest
Net income
Margin

13
61
0
61
0
61
18.9 %

18
73
0
72
0
73
18.4 %

12
83
0
83
0
83
17.2 %

18
108
0
117
0
108
18.0 %

29
150
0
150
0
150
20.0 %

39
190
0
190
0
190
19.6 %

50
243
0
243
0
243
21.0 %

102
0.60
0.60

112
0.65
0.72

112
0.74
0.83

122
0.89
0.99

122
1.23
1.43

122
1.56
1.82

122
1.99
2.17

In EUR m

Number of shares, average

EPS
EPS adj.
*Adjustments made for:

Guidance: EBITDA 2015e: EUR 210m - EUR 230m; 2016e: EUR 280m - EUR 300m

Financial Ratios
Total Operating Costs / Sales
Operating Leverage
EBITDA / Interest expenses
Tax rate (EBT)
Dividend Payout Ratio
Sales per Employee

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

76.3 %
0.7 x
35.6 x
17.2 %
16.6 %
698,488

75.0 %
1.0 x
21.5 x
19.7 %
15.4 %
847,312

78.2 %
0.3 x
21.7 x
12.3 %
16.2 %
1,036,009

75.4 %
1.4 x
22.4 x
14.4 %
14.7 %
1,292,542

72.8 %
1.6 x
28.8 x
16.0 %
10.5 %
1,610,753

72.4 %
1.0 x
29.6 x
17.0 %
8.3 %
2,080,645

70.8 %
1.3 x
36.8 x
17.0 %
6.5 %
2,491,640

Sales, EBITDA

Operating Performance

in EUR m

in %

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

NOTE

P u bl i s h e d 1 0 . 0 3 . 2 0 1 6

Performance per Share

Source: Warburg Research

15

Wirecard
Consolidated balance sheet
In EUR m

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

265
116
128
3
27
0
295
1
182
222
7
412
707

348
177
142
12
99
0
459
2
215
443
9
669
1,128

444
254
146
14
127
0
586
5
279
547
14
845
1,431

671
391
218
16
124
0
811
3
355
818
8
1,184
1,995

687
400
225
26
148
0
861
5
376
902
37
1,320
2,181

930
643
225
31
148
0
1,109
5
430
919
54
1,408
2,516

932
645
225
36
148
0
1,116
5
455
1,173
54
1,687
2,803

102
11
228
0
341
0
341
2
0
191
1
135
37
366
707

112
140
290
-1
542
0
542
8
0
337
15
187
55
586
1,128

112
142
354
0
608
0
608
8
0
493
16
259
62
822
1,431

123
493
453
3
1,073
0
1,073
11
0
495
9
298
118
922
1,995

123
493
440
150
1,207
0
1,207
12
0
540
10
312
110
974
2,181

123
493
575
190
1,381
0
1,381
13
0
610
10
400
112
1,135
2,516

123
493
749
243
1,608
0
1,608
15
0
640
10
430
110
1,195
2,803

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

6.4 x
1.0 x
20.8 %

9.5 x
0.9 x
15.8 %

12.5 x
0.9 x
14.1 %

7.9 x
0.8 x
13.3 %

7.9 x
0.9 x
17.4 %

14.7 x
0.9 x
17.1 %

17.5 x
1.1 x
21.8 %

23.1 %
19.5 %
19.5 %

20.0 %
16.5 %
18.2 %

17.5 %
14.4 %
16.1 %

17.4 %
12.8 %
14.3 %

19.6 %
13.2 %
15.3 %

20.7 %
14.7 %
17.2 %

23.4 %
16.2 %
17.7 %

-31
-31
-9.2 %
n.a.
3.3
0.7

-106
-106
-19.5 %
n.a.
4.8
1.7

-54
-54
-8.9 %
n.a.
5.4
1.5

-323
-323
-30.1 %
n.a.
8.8
3.3

-362
-362
-30.0 %
n.a.
9.9
4.3

-309
-309
-22.4 %
n.a.
11.3
3.7

-533
-533
-33.2 %
n.a.
13.2
5.6

Assets
Goodwill and other intangible assets
thereof other intangible assets
thereof Goodwill
Property, plant and equipment
Financial assets
Other long-term assets
Fixed assets
Inventories
Accounts receivable
Liquid assets
Other short-term assets
Current assets
Total Assets
Liabilities and shareholders' equity
Subscribed capital
Capital reserve
Retained earnings
Other equity components
Shareholders' equity
Minority interest
Total equity
Provisions
thereof provisions for pensions and similar obligations
Financial liabilities (total)
thereof short-term financial liabilities
Accounts payable
Other liabilities
Liabilities
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity

Financial Ratios
Efficiency of Capital Employment
Operating Assets Turnover
Capital Employed Turnover
ROA
Return on Capital
ROCE (NOPAT)
ROE
Adj. ROE
Balance sheet quality
Net Debt
Net Financial Debt
Net Gearing
Net Fin. Debt / EBITDA
Book Value / Share
Book value per share ex intangibles

ROCE Development

Source: Warburg Research

Net debt

Book Value per Share

in EUR m

in EUR

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

NOTE

P u bl i s h e d 1 0 . 0 3 . 2 0 1 6

16

Wirecard
Consolidated cash flow statement
In EUR m

Net income
Depreciation of fixed assets
Amortisation of goodwill
Amortisation of intangible assets
Increase/decrease in long-term provisions
Other non-cash income and expenses
Cash Flow
Increase / decrease in inventory
Increase / decrease in accounts receivable
Increase / decrease in accounts payable
Increase / decrease in other working capital positions
Increase / decrease in working capital (total)
Net cash provided by operating activities
Investments in intangible assets
Investments in property, plant and equipment
Payments for acquisitions
Financial investments
Income from asset disposals
Net cash provided by investing activities
Change in financial liabilities
Dividends paid
Purchase of own shares
Capital measures
Other
Net cash provided by financing activities
Change in liquid funds
Effects of exchange-rate changes on cash
Cash and cash equivalent at end of period

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

61
1
0
8
0
0
70
0
-63
37
3
-24
46
-7
-2
-21
0
0
-58
53
-10
0
0
0
42
30
0
142

72
3
0
13
0
0
88
-1
-33
52
-10
8
96
-22
-3
-106
0
0
-131
9
-11
0
141
-5
134
98
-1
240

83
4
0
23
0
11
122
-3
-63
72
0
6
127
-35
-6
-28
-83
0
-162
130
-12
0
0
-10
107
72
-1
311

117
8
0
32
0
3
159
1
-76
39
5
-30
129
-35
-8
-83
-12
0
-170
-153
-15
0
367
-15
184
143
2
501

150
8
0
36
0
0
194
-2
-21
14
27
17
211
-45
-11
-7
-24
0
-87
12
-16
0
0
-36
-40
84
0
656

190
10
0
47
0
0
247
0
-54
88
6
40
286
-50
-14
0
0
0
-64
50
-16
0
0
-240
-206
17
0
673

243
11
0
55
0
0
308
0
-25
30
30
35
343
-57
-16
0
0
0
-73
0
-16
0
0
0
-16
255
0
928

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015e

2016e

2017e

77
11.3 %
63
59.8 %
0.2 %
1.4 %

99
17.8 %
77
96.7 %
0.8 %
1.9 %

105
17.8 %
74
103.8 %
0.3 %
1.4 %

148
14.3 %
114
79.7 %
0.1 %
1.6 %

204
20.7 %
146
103.5 %
0.1 %
1.5 %

268
23.0 %
202
117.0 %
0.0 %
1.7 %

338
23.3 %
263
111.4 %
0.0 %
1.6 %

2.7 %
2.8 %
104.9 %
10.5 %
134.5 %
242.8 x
205
261
-259

6.4 %
3.6 %
162.0 %
9.8 %
115.1 %
141.3 x
200
297
-293

8.6 %
8.3 %
150.5 %
5.6 %
107.6 %
61.9 x
211
329
-319

7.2 %
8.3 %
107.3 %
7.0 %
118.8 %
102.9 x
215
320
-314

7.5 %
7.3 %
127.3 %
8.6 %
120.5 %
81.0 x
183
281
-274

6.6 %
5.7 %
113.3 %
5.4 %
107.5 %
104.6 x
162
279
-274

6.3 %
4.7 %
111.5 %
2.8 %
105.8 %
125.4 x
143
250
-246

Financial Ratios
Cash Flow
FCF
Free Cash Flow / Sales
Free Cash Flow Potential
Free Cash Flow / Net Profit
Interest Received / Avg. Cash
Interest Paid / Avg. Debt
Management of Funds
Investment ratio
Maint. Capex / Sales
Capex / Dep
Avg. Working Capital / Sales
Trade Debtors / Trade Creditors
Inventory Turnover
Receivables collection period (days)
Payables payment period (days)
Cash conversion cycle (Days)

CAPEX and Cash Flow

Free Cash Flow Generation

Working Capital

Source: Warburg Research

Source: Warburg Research

in EUR m

Source: Warburg Research

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DISCLOSURE ACCORDING TO 34B (1) OF THE GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT (WHPG) AND THE ORDINANCE ON
THE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (FINANV)
The valuation underlying the investment recommendation for the company analysed here is based on generally accepted and widely used methods of
fundamental analysis, such as e.g. DCF Model, Free Cash Flow Potential, Peer Group Comparison or Sum of the Parts Model. The result of this
fundamental valuation is modified to take into consideration the analysts assessment as regards the expected development of investor sentiment and
its impact on the share price.
Independent of the applied valuation methods, there is the risk that the price target will not be met, for instance because of unforeseen changes in
demand for the companys products, changes in management, technology, economic development, interest rate development, operating and/or
material costs, competitive pressure, supervisory law, exchange rate, tax rate etc. For investments in foreign markets and instruments there are further
risks, generally based on exchange rate changes or changes in political and social conditions.
This commentary reflects the opinion of the relevant author at the point in time of its compilation. A change in the fundamental factors underlying the
valuation can mean that the valuation is subsequently no longer accurate. Whether, or in what time frame, an update of this commentary follows is not
determined in advance.
In accordance with 5 (4) of the Ordinance on the Analysis of Financial Instruments (FinAnV) Warburg Research GmbH has implemented additional
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GmbH from M.M.Warburg & CO (AG & Co.) KGaA and the creation of areas of confidentiality. This prevents the exchange of information, which could
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The analysts of Warburg Research GmbH do not receive a gratuity directly or indirectly from the investment banking activities of M.M.Warburg &
CO (AG & Co.) KGaA or of any company within the Warburg Group.
All prices of financial instruments given in this financial analysis are the closing prices on the last stock-market trading day before the publication date
stated, unless another point in time is explicitly stated.
M.M.Warburg & CO (AG & Co.) KGaA and Warburg Research GmbH are subject to the supervision of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority,
BaFin.

SOURCES
All data and consensus estimates have been obtained from FactSet except where stated otherwise.

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Additional information for clients in the United States
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2. The Report is provided in the United States for distribution solely to "major U.S. institutional investors" under Rule 15a-6 of the U.S. Securities
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Reference in accordance with section 34b of the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG) and the Ordinance on the Analysis
of Financial Instruments (FinAnV) regarding possible conflicts of interest with the analysed company:

-1-

Warburg Research, or an affiliated company, or an employee of one of these companies responsible for the compilation of the
research, hold a share of more than 5% of the equity capital of the analysed company.
Warburg Research, or an affiliated company, within the last twelve months participated in the management of a consortium

-2-

for an issue in the course of a public offering of such financial instruments, which are, or the issuer of which is, the subject of the
financial analysis.

-3-

Companies affiliated with Warburg Research manage financial instruments, which are, or the issuers of which are, subject of
the financial analysis, in a market based on the provision of buy or sell contracts

-4-

Warburg Research, or an affiliated company, were in the last twelve months bound by a service agreement with the issuers,
who are themselves or their financial instruments are, subject of the financial analysis, in connection with investment banking
business for which a service or a promise of a service emanated.

-5-

The company compiling the analysis or an affiliated company had reached an agreement on the compilation of the financial
analysis with the analysed company.

-6-

Companies affiliated with Warburg Research regularly trade financial instruments of the analysed company or derivatives of
these.

-7-

The company preparing the analysis as well as its affiliated companies and employees have other important interests in
relation to the analysed company, such as, for example, the exercising of mandates at analysed companies.

Company

Disclosure

Link to the historical price targets and rating changes (last 12 months)

Wirecard

6, 7

http://www.mmwarburg.com/disclaimer/disclaimer_en/DE0007472060.htm

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INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION
Investment recommendation: expected direction of the share price development of the financial instrument up to the given price target in the opinion of
the analyst who covers this financial instrument.
-B-

Buy:

The price of the analysed financial instrument is expected to rise over the next 12 months.

-H-

Hold:

The price of the analysed financial instrument is expected to remain mostly flat over the next 12
months.

-S-

Sell:

The price of the analysed financial instrument is expected to fall over the next 12 months.

Rating suspended:

The available information currently does not permit an evaluation of the company.

WARBURG RESEARCH GMBH RESEARCH UNIVERSE BY RATING

Rating

Number of stocks

% of Universe

Buy

127

66

Hold

56

29

Sell

Rating suspended

191

100

Total

WARBURG RESEARCH GMBH ANALYSED RESEARCH UNIVERSE BY RATING P

P taking into account only those companies which were provided with major investment banking services in the last twelve
months.
Rating

Number of stocks

% of Universe

Buy

26

81

Hold

13

Sell

Rating suspended

32

100

Total

PRICE AND RATING HISTORY WIRECARD AS OF 10.03.2016

The chart has markings if Warburg Research GmbH changed its
rating in the last 12 months. Every marking represents the date
and closing price on the day of the rating change.

NOTE

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21