A crack in the line

The discovery of a fuel leak leads to a hostile reaction.

WAS FLYING THREE FRIENDS IN A PA28 181

Warrior on a trip from Bankstown down

to the NSW South Coast for a weekend
camping trip.
On start-up for the trip home, I switched
on the fuel pump, prepared to prime and start
up when I noticed that there was no fuel pressure. I tried again - still nothing. I kept the
pump on, primed the carby anyway, and started the motor. The motor kicked over. Slowly
the fuel pressure rose. I then switched the
pump off, waited, then switched the pump on
again with no real difference.
I elected to continue, and taxied to begin
the flight home. The flight was uneventful.
Back at Bankstown, I wrote up the problem
in the release sheet, and notified the flying
school.
A few days later I contacted the school to
find out about the fault. They couldn't tell me
but gave me the number of the workshop.
When I asked the workshop, I was met with a
hostile reply. They asked whether I was working
with CASA, or as an investigator. I explained that I
was the last pilot, and I wanted to know what was
wrong with the aircraft. It took some time to convince the LAME to tell me. He told me man abrupt
manner that there was a crack in the fuel line
between the electric pump and the carby.
You can imagine how that horrified me. The
thought of raw fuel spraying into the engine
bay conjured up some disturbing images. A
streaking ball of flame in the sunset?
The attitude of the LAME surprised me. Perhaps this problem was not as dangerous as I had
imagined, but unless someone explains these
thing, you just don't know.

HE MAJOR

ause of
This mcident was probably
a lack of understanding of aircraft systems, and the specific
purpose of each system. When the pilot
switched on the auxiliary (electric) fuel pump,
and found no fuel pressure, he should have

ANALYS

investigated the problem. Since a cracked fuel

line usually cannot be detected during the preflight inspection, the proper functioning of the
auxiliary fuel pump is doubly important
because it is the only indication that the system is operating.
If there is no fuel pressure when the auxiliary fuel pump is switched on, it means either
that the electric fuel pump has failed, or that
there is an electrical fault.
Because the auxiliary fuel pump is an electrical accessory, the pilot should have looked
for the circuit breaker or the fuse labelled "aux
pump" to check the cause of the problem.
If the pilot could not ascertain whether the
auxiliary fuel pump was functioning, he
should not have taken off. According to the
PA28 Pilot Operating Handbook, the auxiliary fuel pump must be "on" for all take-offs,
landings and when switching tanks in case the
engine driven pump fails. With a cracked fuel
line, the pilot exposed himself and his passengers to the risk of an engine fire in flight.
The pilot was also probably suffering from
"get-home-itis' which made him accept lower
standards. With this subtle pressure, it is
tempting to disregard the consequences.
If you are in doubt about the serviceability of
an aircraft, you should always seek advice from
a LAME. This pilot did the right thing in "writing up" the defect and advising the flying school.
Instead of being reluctant to provide information to the pilot, the school and the LAME
could have used the incident as a learning
opportunity. The pilot was keen to know and
will not forget this lesson.
In many cases, student pilots are told what
to do but not why certain actions or procedures are required. If a pilot understands the
functioning and the purpose of aircraft systems, and therefore the consequences, he or
she is less likely to take unnecessary risks.
Instructors need to clearly explain to students that the auxiliary (electric) fuel pump
must be switched on during take-off and
landing as a safety measure in case the engine
driven pump fails. The auxiliary fuel pump is
there to restore fuel flow to the engine if the
engine-driven pump is unable to provide adequate fuel flow to sustain combustion. In aviation, redundancy is a key element of the safety
margin.
Prue Anderson and Irene Henley, department of
aviation studies, University of Western Sydney,
Macarthur.
FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA AUTUMN 1997 13

Send entries by 16 June 1997 to:

The editor, Flight Safet
GPO Box 2005,
Canberra ACT 2601