1.

EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, et.al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. STEWART EDDIE

TAIT, defendant-appellee.

Rule: Jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must

be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.

No, the foreign judgment is not enforceable against the defendant. The defendant is not liable
for the amount to which he was sentenced for he was not duly tried or even summoned in
conformity with the law.

According to the French law regarding summons, it must be served in the place of residence if the
person to be served summons has no known residence in France, or, if the place is unknown, the
writ shall be posted at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint has been filed.

FACTS:
The appellant Emilie Elmira Renee Boudard, in her capacity as widow of Marie Theodore Jerome
Boudard and as guardian of her co-appellants, her children born during her marriage with the
deceased, obtained a judgment in their favor from the civil division of the Court of Hanoi, Frendch
Indo-China on June 27, 1934. The judgment was rendered against the defendant who had been
declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before said court. The civil action from which
the judgment was rendered was based on the fact that Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard, who was
an employee of Stewart Eddie Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of said Tait, although
outside of the fulfillment of a duty.

The dismissal of appellants' complaint by the lower court was based on the lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of Hanoi to render the judgment in question considering that the defendant was not a
resident of, nor had a known domicile in, that country. Further, the evidence adduced at the trial
conclusively proves that neither the defendant nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi and
that the deceased had never, at any time, been his employee. The defendant s first intimation of
his having been sued and sentenced to pay a huge sum by the civil division of the Court of First
Instance of Hanoi was when he was served with summons in the present case.

ISSUE:

In the case at bar, it was shown that the summons alleged to have been addressed to the
defendant, was delivered in Manila to J. M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill & Tait
Inc., which is an entity entirely different from the defendant. Moreover, the evidence of record
shows that the defendant was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint, nor were his
employees or representatives.

The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding
payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such
foreign country before the proceedings. The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over
nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the
state which renders the judgment.

The process of a court of one state cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled to
respond to proceedings against him. Notice sent outside the state to a nonresident is unavailing to
give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. There must be actual
service within the State of notice upon him or upon some one authorized to accept service for him.
Thus, a personal judgment rendered against a nonresident, who has neither been served with
process nor appeared in the suit, is without validity.

WON the foreign judgment can be enforced in the Philippines against the defendant.

RULING:

Hence, it cannot be said that the decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should be conclusive to
such an extent that it cannot be contested, for it merely constitutes, from the viewpoint of our
laws, prima facie evidence of the justness of plaintiff' claim, and, as such, naturally admits proof to
the contrary. This is precisely the provision of Sec. 311 of Act No. 190, to wit:

The effect of a judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment, is as follows:
1.

In case of a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

2.

In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as

between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

2.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. CA and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY
INC., respondents.

Rules:

A judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having

jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.

A court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.

Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon
a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.

The record of a foreign judgment may be evidenced by an official publication or by a

duly attested or authenticated copy thereof.

FACTS:
Petitioner, a foreign corporation, seeks to enforce, in the Philippines, a judgment rendered in its
favor by a Japanese court against private respondent., a Philippine corporation doing business in
Japan. The judgment stemmed from a civil action filed by the petitioner against the private
respondent collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages. Based
on the evidence on record, sometime in May 1974, petitioner and private respondent, through its

Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. However, the private respondent
failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales; thus, petitioner filed the suit sometime in May 1980.

On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the Japanese court against private respondent
at its Japan office; however, the attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the
bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to
receive court processes, was in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980. On such date, the
bailiff returned to the office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming
that he was no longer an employee of the defendant.

Thereafter, the Japanese court judge decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons
served at the head office of the respondent in Manila through diplomatic channels. It requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to send the summons together with the other legal documents to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in
Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now DFA)
of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on private respondent at its principal office in Manila. On
August 28, 1980, private respondent received the writ of summons. Despite receipt of the same,
private respondent failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Japanese Court proceeded
to hear the petitioners complaint and subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On
March 24, 1981, private respondent received a copy of the judgment. Private respondent not
having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.

Since the petitioner was unable to execute the decision in Japan, it sough to enforce the judgment
here in the Philippines; however, the RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that the foreign
judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction, which was subsequently
sustained by the CA.

Private respondent, in this petition, alleges that the foreign judgment cannot be enforced against it
since the foreign judgment is null and void as the Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
it. It contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the
Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore
acquire jurisdiction over it.

ISSUE:
WON the Japanese court acquired jurisdiction over the private respondent, making the foreign
judgment valid and enforceable against the private respondent.

RULING:
Yes, the Japanese court has acquired jurisdiction over the private respondent. As a rule, a
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the
contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of
due notice therein.

Under Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal
of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may,
however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Sec. 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity. Thus, being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, the private respondent had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such
judgment.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process
upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum . In this case, it is the
procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law; thus, it may not be
taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon the private respondent to present evidence
as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid; however, such was not done by the private respondent. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called doctrine processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 12 of Rule 14
provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service
may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3)
on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

Under the above provision, if the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons,
the designation is exclusive and service of summons is without force and gives the court no
jurisdiction unless made upon him. But where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be
made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the
case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign
banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so
made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or
other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.

In this case, private respondent did not allege having a resident agent authorized to receive court
processes in Japan; thus, it can only mean that there is no such agent. Consequently, the service
on the designated government official or on any of the private respondents officers or agents in
Japan could be availed of. And while it may be true that service could have been made upon any
of the officers or agents of the private respondent at its three other branches in Japan, the
availability of such a recourse would not preclude service upon the proper government official, as
stated above. Thus, the service made upon the private respondents principal office through the
DFA is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code.

In as much as private respondent was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
doctrine of processual presumption, it may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said
courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it
by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the doctrine of processual presumption but also
because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

3.

SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

COMPANY, INC., defendant-appellant.

BINALBAGAN-ISABELA

SUGAR

Rule: A judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
however, said judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The matter was brought by the petitioner to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of
Arbitration in Calcutta, India, which subsequently rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The
award was then referred to the Calcutta High Court, which issued a decree affirming the award.

As petitioner was unable to enforce said judgment, it sought enforcement with the RTC, which
issued the assailed decision in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

FACTS:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation with an office in Calcutta, India; while, petitioner is a domestic
corporation with an office in Manila. Sometime in May 1949, the two corporations entered into a
contract whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter 1.7M pieces of Hessian bags. The shipment
of the bags was agreed to be made in equal installments of 425K pieces or 425 bales during each
of the months of July, August, September and October.

Sometime in September 1949, petitioner informed the respondent that out of the 850 bales to be
delivered for the month of July and August, only 310 bales were shipped by the former, leaving a
balance of 540 bales. Further, from the 425 bales to be delivered for the month of September, 54
bales were defaulted. Thereafter, respondent requested from the petitioner delivery of 100 bales of
the 540 bales defaulted for the months of July and August as well as the 54 bales defaulted for the
September shipment totaling to 154 bales. Respondent also demanded payment of 5% of the value
of the 154 bales defaulted as penalty, to which the petitioner did.

On October 1, 1949, the Government of India increased the export duty of jute bags from 80 to 350
rupees per ton. As a result, petitioner requested from the respondent to increase its letter of credit
to cover the increased export duties imposed upon the goods that were to be shipped for the month
of October, to which the respondent did. Petitioner also demanded from the respondent, in a
separate letter, a further increase of its letter of credit to cover the increased export duties for the
delivery of the 154 bales defaulted; however, this was opposed to by the respondent alleging that
should the shipment have been made as agreed, the 154 bales would not have been subjected to
the increased export duties as the increase took effect only on October 1.

WON the decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed
by the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta, is enforceable in the Philippines.

RULING:
No, the decision of the tribunal is not enforceable in the Philippines. Under Sec. 48 of Rule
39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
however, said judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Upon the facts of record, the Court held that the decision sought to be enforced was rendered upon
a clear mistake of law and it wrongly makes respondent, an innocent party, suffer the
consequences of the default or breach of contract committed by petitioner.

There is no question that petitioner was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed to deliver 154
bales which should have been delivered to the latter in the months of July, August and September,
all of the year 1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these 154 bales been delivered in
accordance with the contract, the increase in the export tax due upon them would not have been
imposed as said increased export tax became effective only on October 1, 1949.

To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase in the export tax, petitioner claims that respondent
should be held liable therefor on the strength of its letter of September 29, 1949 asking petitioner to
ship the shortage. This argument is unavailing because it is not only illogical but contrary to known
principles of fairness and justice. When respondent demanded that petitioner deliver the shortage
of 154 bales it did nothing more than to demand that to which it was entitled as a matter of right.
The breach of contract committed by petitioner gave respondent, under the law and even under
general principles of fairness, the right to rescind the contract or to ask for its specific performance,
in either case with right to demand damages. Part of the damages appellant was clearly entitled to
recover from petitioner growing out of the latter's breach of the contract consists precisely of the
amount of the increase decreed in the export tax due on the shortage which, because of
petitioners fault, had to be delivered after the effectivity of the increased export tax.

To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce and of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to the facts of this case
fundamental principles of contract, the same may be impeached, as they have been sufficiently
impeached by respondent, on the ground of clear mistake of law.

4.

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM
INC., respondent.

WHEELS,

INC., petitioner, vs.

FASGI

ENTERPRISES,

Thereafter, respondent instituted an action against petitioner and FPS for breach of contract and
recovery of damages in the amount of US$2M before the US District Court for the Central District of
California. During the pendency of the case, the parties entered into a settlement wherein the
petitioner and FPS would accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to
respondent the purchase price of US$268K via four irrevocable letters of credit (L/C).

Subsequently, the president of petitioner company expressed, through a telex message, its inability
to comply with the agreement and proposed a revised schedule of payment wherein it undertakes
to issue the first L/C on or before April 1980, payable 90 days thereafter. However, d espite its
assurances, petitioner failed to open the first L/C in April 1980 allegedly due to Central Bank
inquiries and restrictions. This prompted respondent to pursue its complaint for damages against
petitioner before the California district court. In the interim, the parties resolved to enter into another
arrangement which provides that respondent would deliver to petitioner a container of wheels for
every L/C opened and paid by petitioner. The agreement also allowed respondent to enter before
the California court the stipulations of the agreement in the event of failure of petitioner to make
good on the scheduled payments provided in the agreement. This means that should petitioner fail
to make the scheduled payments, judgment may be rendered in favor of the respondent and
against petitioner.

However, the petitioner, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the new agreement.
While it opened the first L/C on 19 June 1980, it, however, only paid on March 20, 1981, when the
letters of credit by then were supposed to have all been already posted. This lapse,
notwithstanding, respondent promptly shipped to petitioner the first container of wheels. Again,
despite the delay incurred by petitioner on the second L/C, respondent readily delivered the second
container. Later, petitioner totally defaulted in opening and paying the third and the fourth L/Cs.

Rule: Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must
be extrinsic.

FACTS:
Respondent, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of USA, entered into a distributorship
agreement with petitioner, a domestic corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo (FPS), an Italian
corporation, whereby the respondent agrees to purchase, import and distribute aluminum wheels
manufactured by petitioner. Pursuant to the contract, petitioner shipped to respondent a total of
8,594 wheels, the value of which was paid by respondent upon arrival; however, it was later found
out that the shipment were defective and in non-compliance with the agreed requirements.

Due to the petitioners persistent default, respondent filed with the US District Court of the Central
District of California a stipulation for judgment against petitioner. On August 24, 1982, resdpondent
filed a notice of entry of judgment. A certificate of finality of judgment was issued, on September 7,
1982 by the US District Judge of the District Court for the Central District of California. Unable to
obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, respondent ffiled a complaint for
enforcement of foreign judgment before the RTC in Makati. However, this was dismissed on the
ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud and clear mistake of law and fact. Upon
appeal, the RTC decision was reversed and set aside by the CA, which ordered the full
enforcement of the foreign judgment.

ISSUE:

WON the foreign judgment is enforceable in the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes, the foreign judgment is enforceable. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may
be recognized, insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned,
so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
procuring the judgment.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum. Under Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order, in case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. However, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Petitioner contends that its counsel has acted without its authority in entering into a settlement with
respondent; however, this claim is belied by the fact that the president of petitioner company could
have signified to respondent a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead, more than a year after the
execution of the settlement agreement, the president of the petitioner company sent a
communication to the respondent that failed to mention its counsels supposed lack of authority. On
the contrary, the letter confirmed the terms of the agreement when he sought forbearance for the
impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in the
agreement.

Nor could petitioner claim any prejudice by the settlement as it was, under the agreement, was
afforded time to reimburse the price it had paid for the defective wheels. It should not, after its
opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement
when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.

Further, petitioners contention that its counsel did not have authority to sign on its behalf the
supplemental agreement is without merit since, from the time the stipulation for judgment was
entered into until the certificate of finality of judgment was issued, no notification was issued by
petitioner regarding its termination of its counsel services.

Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic,
i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or
that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom
judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense.
In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action, such as
fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract, is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot
militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.

5.

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased, RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary

administrator-appellee, vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.

Rule: A court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.

FACTS:
A certain Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others,
two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant corporation, the certificates being in the
possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which is the domiciliary administrator of the
estate of the deceased. Sometime in August 1960, a certain Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Afterwards, Lazaro A.
Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, but was later on substituted by the appellee Renato
D. Tayag.

A dispute arose between the domiciliary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in
the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question. On January 27, 1964, the CFI ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust, to
produce and deposit them with Tayag or with the Clerk of Court; however, such order was not
complied by County Trust; thus, on February 11, 1964, Tayag petitioned the court to issue an order
declaring the certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares in question to be lost.

The CFI then rendered a decision in favor of Tayag, the tenor of which is as follows: (1) that the
certificates in question are considered as lost for all purposes in connection with the administration
and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins; (2) that the said certificates be
cancelled, and (3) that Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Is directed to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator
or to the Probate Division of the Court.

From such order, an appeal was taken by the oppositor-appelant, stating that, as far as it is
concerned, it is immaterial as to who is in possession of the said certificates of stock; however, it
opposed the petition of Tayag since the certificates are in existence and are in the possession of
County Trust; thus, it should not be declared or considered as lost. Further, it alleges that there was
a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be
issued. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON the erred in issuing the assailed order.

RULING:
No, the decision of the CFI should be upheld. It is often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his
domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is
granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration; while,
any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because
a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country
in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the
Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's
right to the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares be respected is equally beyond question,
for the appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and is subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as
immune from lawful court orders.

There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court when it ordered that the
certificates in question be considered lost when in fact it is in the possession of County Trust
Company; however, that certainly does not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order.
Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to
deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as
lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent
under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled. Any
other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the
uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which thus far has
shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be
heard to contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a mere scrap of paper,
the court issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.

Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. seeks to invoke one of the provisions of its by-laws which
states that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such
certificate or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new
certificate or certificates would await the final decision by a court regarding the ownership thereof.
However, such reliance is misplaced as there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It is
admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in question.
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the
command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.

6.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Rule: Matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum (i.e. the foreign court that rendered the judgment).

15 that was applied and not Clause 16. Clause 15 provides that: All questions, disputes and
differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the
place from which this supply order is situated.

FACTS:
GAS COMMISSION is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
while PACIFIC CEMENT is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.

GAS COM and PACIFIC entered into a contract whereby the PACIFIC undertook to supply the
former 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement in consideration of$477,300.00. The oil well cement was
loaded on board a ship at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery in India. But the cargo
was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination because of a dispute between the
shipowner and PACIFIC CEMENT. Despite the fact that the private respondent had already
received payment and several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to
deliver the oil well cement.

PACIFIC CEMENT agreed to replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class "G"
cement cost free at the petitioner's designated port. The cement, however, did not conform to the
petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then referred its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause
16 of their contract, to wit:

Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes, relating
to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and
as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing
whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution
or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period. xxxx xxx xxx The venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra Dun.

The chosen arbitrator resolved the dispute in GAS COMS favor. To execute the award in its favor,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India, praying that the
decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. Because of the refusal of PACIFIC
CEMENT to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to GAS COM, GAS COM filed
a complaint with the RTC of Surigao City for the enforcement of the judgment of the foreign court.

The RTC upheld the petitioner's legal capacity to sue, but dismissed the complaint for lack of a
valid cause of action. The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to the
arbitrator as a "mistake of law or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction." It should have been Clause

Thus, the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had
therefore adopted no legal award which could be the source of an enforceable right. The petitioner
appealed to the respondent CA which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that since the
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, the foreign court could not
validly adopt the arbitrator's award. A motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision
was denied. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the foreign court judgment, which was based solely on the arbitrators decision, is valid and
enforceable in the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes, the foreign judgment is valid and enforceable. As specified in the order of the Civil Judge
of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree." This is a categorical
declaration that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained
in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive discussion of the
respective claims and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same.
Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment
the appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision containing
literally, only the dispositive portion."

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the
fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that
matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.
Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be
rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the
same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final
and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

7.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

Rules:

Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or
court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a
defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum.

Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be
extrinsic.

FACTS:
Petitioner, in this case, is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia; while, private
respondent is a domestic corporation. Sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection
against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP), before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, seeking to recover the
indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the
completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP for
the completion of certain projects.

On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and
against the private respondent. However, attempts to secure payment from the private respondent
proved unsuccessful; thus, petitioner initiated a complaint before the RTC to enforce the foreign
judgment. This was opposed to by the private respondent, contending that the alleged judgment
should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or
fact. Private respondents motion to dismiss based on such grounds was denied by the trial court
considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and therein
raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. Petitioner countered and alleged that the
High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the private respondent by its voluntary submission
to the court's jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee. Furthermore, private
respondent's counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court's jurisdiction in a pleading
filed before the court.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the petitioners complaint. This was
subsequently affirmed by the CA upon appeal. In this present appeal, petitioner assails the ruling of
the CA in holding that the Malaysian Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the private respondent.
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that the foreign judgment is invalid based on the
following grounds:
(a)

that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of private
respondent due to alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent,
considering that the person who received the summons was not authorized to do so for
and in behalf of the private respondent, and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to
appear and represent private respondent in the suit, considering that there was no board
resolution authorizing them to admit all the claims of the petitioner;

(b)

the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of
fact or law; and

(c)

that the Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that
the every decision must state the facts and law on which it is based.

ISSUE:
WON the judgment rendered by the Malaysian Court is valid and enforceable against the private
respondent..

RULING:
A judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the
same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, a court,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party
attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the
High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. The testimony of the petitioners sole witness was
to the effect that: (a) the writ of summons were served at the registered office of private respondent
and to a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; (b) that upon
the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill entered their conditional appearance for private
respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently
withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; (c) that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two weeks, petitioner filed an application for
summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; (d)

that the matter was heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur iwhere private respondent was
represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to
be enforced. In addition, it also presented several documentary evidence, one of which is a certified
and authenticated copy of the judgment promulgated by the Malaysian court. Thus, having proven
the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, such judgment enjoys presumptive validity
and the burden then fell upon the private respondent to prove otherwise.

Unfortunately, in this case, private respondent failed to sufficiently prove by clear and convincing
evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court
judgment.
The reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and
recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by
the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress,
the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant,
the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a
decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this
case.

conditional appearance was in fact subsequently withdrawn when counsel realized that the writ was
properly served.

On the ground that collusion, fraud and, clear mistake of fact and law tainted the judgment of the
High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the same was adduced or shown. Fraud to hinder the
enforcement within the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be extrinsic, evidence of which is
wanting in this case.

Lastly, anent the third ground, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of
remedy and procedure. Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a
valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon
which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in the
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.

8.
In this case, anent the first ground, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well
as other matters raised by it. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence
as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of
summons upon a financial officer of a corporation is invalid. Since, the private respondent failed to
do so, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.

On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the counsels to represent private respondent, petitioner
was able to offer in evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudence to the effect that: (a) it is not
necessary under Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court to submit a
special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a client before said court; (b) that counsel
appearing before the Malaysian High Court has full authority to compromise the suit; and (c) that
counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as
required under Philippine law to appear and compromise judgments on behalf of their clients before
said court. Furthermore, it is incorrect to hold that conditional appearance of private respondent's
counsel, who was allegedly not authorized to appear and represent, cannot be considered as
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said conditional
appearance was not premised on the alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the conditional
appearance was entered to question the regularity of the service of the writ of summons. Such

WANG LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAFAEL T. MENDOZA,

et. al., respondents.

Rule: Service of summons can be validly made to a private foreign corporation through its
designated resident agent (e.g. its exclusive distributor).

FACTS:
Petitioner Wang Laboratories, which is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the United
States, is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling computers worldwide. In the
Philippines, it sells its products to its exclusive distributor, Exxbyte Technologies Corporation, which
is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling computer products to the public in its
own name and for its own acount.

Private respondent ACCRALAW entered into a contract with Exxbyte for acquisition and installment
of an Integrated Information System. Thereafter, private respondent opened a letter of credit in

favor of petitioner. The hardware was then delivered and installed by Exxbyte in private
respondents office.

Petitioner and private respondent again entered into another contract for the development of a date
processing software program needed to computerize the office of the private respondent; however,
subsequent thereto, the contract was not implemented. Private respondent then filed a complaint
for breach of contract with damages, replevin and attachment against petitioner.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was imporper service of
summons. Then, petitioner filed a Motion for Deposition by Oral Examination for the purpose of
presenting testimonial evidence in support of its motion to dismiss. Respondent court later ordered
the taking of the deposition by way of oral examination. Thereafter, petitioner filed its reply to the
opposition to motion to dismiss.

Private respondent filed an Ex-Abundante Cautela Motion for leave to effect Extraterritorial service
of Summons on Petitioner, to which the respondent Judge Mendoza granted. He also denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground that it had voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, and thus declined to consider the legal and factual issues raised in the Motion to
Dismiss. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the extrajudicial summons or any kind
thereof cannot bind the petitioner inasmuch as it is not doing business in the Philippines nor is it
licensed to do business in the country.

Under the circumstances in this case, petitioner cannot unilaterally declare that it is not doing
business in the Philippines. In fact, it has installed at least 26 different products in several
corporations in the Philippines since 1976. It has registered its trade name with the Philippine
Patents Office and Mr. Yeoh who is petitioners controller in Asia have visited the office of its
distributor for at least four times where he conducted training programs in the Philippines. Wang
has allowed its registered logo and trademark to be used by Exxbyte and made it known that there
exists a designated distributor in the Philippines as published in its advertisements. The various
public advertisements of Wang and Exxbyte clearly show that Wang has appointed Exxbyte, which
is domiciled in the Philippines, as its authorized exclusive representative in this country. In fact,
Wang represents that its office in the Philippines is Exxbyte; while, the letterhead of Exxbyte and its
invoices show that it is Wang's representative.

Moreover, in its Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Wang itself admitted that it deals
exclusively with Exxbyte in the sale of its products in the Philippines. Indeed it has been held that
where a single act or transaction of a foreign corporation is not merely incidental or casual but is of
such character as distinctly to indicate a purpose to do other business in the State, such act
constitutes doing business within the meaning of statutes prescribing the conditions under which a
foreign corporation may be served with summons.

Be that as it may, the Court has categorically stated that although a foreign corporation is not doing
business in the Philippines, it may be sued for acts done against persons in the Philippines.
Jurisprudence provides that if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is
not barred from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that same corporation
cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or
persons in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is considered as doing business in the Philippines so as to allow extrajudicial
service of summons.

RULING:
Yes, petitioner is doing business in the Philippines through its exclusive distributor,
Exxbyte. The Court held that there is no general rule or governing principle that can be laid down
as to what constitutes doing or engaging or trading in business. Indeed each case must be
judged in the light of its peculiar environmental circumstances, i.e. upon peculiar facts and upon the
language of the statute applicable.

In any event, Wang has waived lack of jurisdiction of the court. As noted by the trial court, Wang, in
its Motion to Dismiss, sought affirmative reliefs requiring the exercise of jurisdiction, by praying: (1)
for authority to take testimony by way of deposition upon oral examination; (2) for extension of time
to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion to effect Extraterritorial Service of Summons; (3) to hold in
abeyance any and all proceedings relative to plaintiffs' foregoing motion and (4) to consider as a
mere scrap of paper plaintiff's motion to strike out Deposition. In addition, the records show that
petitioner also prayed for: (1) authority to reset date of taking of deposition; (2) admission of the
formal stenographic notes and (3) suspension of time to file responsive pleadings, not to mention
its various participation in the proceedings in the court other than for the purpose of objecting to
lack of jurisdiction.

TN: Sec. 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, as amended by SC Resolution A.M. No. 11 3-6-SC
(March 15, 2001) -

Rule: Service upon any agent of a foreign corporation, whether or not engaged in business
in the Philippines, constitutes personal service upon that corporation, and accordingly,
judgment may be rendered against said foreign corporation.

When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which was transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made:
a.

On its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose; or

FACTS:

b.

If there be no such agent -

i.

On the government official designated by law to that effect; or

Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the nullification of a resolution of the NLRC which
affirmed a decision of the POEA holding it solidarily liable with foreign corporation ZAMEL to pay
private respondent Virgilio Nacionales' salary and vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired
portion of his employment contract with ZAMEL.

ii.

On any of the foreign corporations officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent,
service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following
means:
a.

By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the DFA;

b.

By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant
may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at
the last know address of the defendant;

c.

By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service;
orservice upon any agent of a foreign corporation, whether or not engaged in business in the
Philippines, constitutes personal service upon that corporation, and accordingly, judgment
may be rendered against said foreign corporation

d.

By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.

9.

ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSI0N and VIRGILIO P. NACIONALES, respondents.

In 1983, ROYAL, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed VIRGILIO for
employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. On May 25, 1983, a
service agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the former was to
receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year
commencing from the date of his arrival in Saudi Arabia.

Private respondent departed for Saudi Arabia on June 28,1983. However, sometime on February
1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of VIRGILIO on the ground that his performance was
below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not
allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to
board a plane bound for the Philippines. Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a complaint
for illegal termination against petitioner and ZAMEL with the POEA.

POEA decided in favor of VIRGILIO, holding ZAMEL AND ROYAL solidarliy liable. Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal to the NLRC by the POEA.
Petitioner alleged that the POEA erred in holding it solidarily liable for ZAMEL's violation of private
respondent's service agreement even if it was not a party to the agreement. However, the appeal
was denied by the NLRC and the POEA decision was affirmed by the NLRC.

In a resolution promulgated on December 11, 1986, the NLRC affirmed the POEA decision, holding
that, as a duly licensed private employment agency, petitioner is jointly and severally liable with its

foreign principal ZAMEL for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the employment contract or service agreement. On March 30, 1987, the NLRC
denied for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

In this petition for review, petitioner argues that it should not be held solidarily liable with ZAMEL
since no jurisdiction was acquired over ZAMEL through extra-territorial service of summons.

DEUTCHE MILCHWERKE DR. A. SAUER (DMW for brevity) was a firm in West Germany
manufacturing PRODUCTS (probably chemicals) under the trademarks FISSAN, etc. Private
respondent Philippine Chemical Laboratories, Inc. (PHILCHEM, for brevity) is a local company
which apparently also manufactures and sells chemicals.

ISSUE:
WON there was proper service of summons on the foreign private corporation.

On February 28, 1963, DMW and PHILCHEM executed a so-called Agency AGREEMENT the
basic provision of which was that PHILCHEM would be the exclusive importer of the PRODUCTS
into the Philippines. The benefit to PHILCHEM would be the profits realized from re-sale in this
country of imported PRODUCTS. Other relevant provisions, generally stated, were that:
a.

The term of the AGREEMENT was five years renewable automatically for five years each time
unless one party gives due notice of termination to the other.

b.

PHILCHEM could manufacture the PRODUCTS locally with raw materials from sources other
than LINGNER, but in such case DMW will have to be paid 5% of 80% of PHILCHEM's
wholesale prices.

c.

After termination of the AGREEMENT, PHILCHEM will be entitled, for five years, to 10%
royalty on sales of PRODUCTS in the Philippines (hereinafter to be referred to as the
ROYALTY CLAUSE).

d.

"All legal settlements within the compass of this AGREEMENT shall fall under the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts."

RULING:
Yes, there was proper service of summons. It is well-settled that . In the case at bar, it cannot be
denied that petitioner is an agent of ZAMEL. The service agreement was executed in the
Philippines between VIRGILIO and the petitioner, for and in behalf of ZAMEL.

Moreover, one of the documents presented by petitioner as evidence, i.e., the counter-affidavit of
its General Manager Ms. Fausto, contains an admission that it is the representative and agent of
ZAMEL.

It appears that, subsequently, the DMW interests were acquired by LINGNER & FISHER GMBH
LINGNER for brevity). On other hand, LINGNER was a subsidiary of BEECHAM GROUP LTD.
which, through BEECHAM PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL (BEECHAM, for brevity), had opened an
office in Pasig, Metro Manila, under the supervision or managership of one named TANNER.
10. LINGNER & FISHER GMBH, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
RICARDO L. PRONOVE JR. and PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES,
INC., respondents.
(Note: LINGNER and BEECHAM can be deemed to constitute a single personality. Subsequent
reference to LINGNER will include reference to DMW and BEECHAM.)
Rule: If a local plaintiff and a foreign corporation have agreed on Philippine venue,
summons by publication can be made on the foreign corporation under the principle of
liberal construction of the rules.

The AGREEMENT was automatically renewed once, or up to February 28, 1973, and finally
terminated on August 31, 1977. The events relative to the termination were as follows:

ISSUES:
WON petitioner is doing business in the Philippines.

Before February 28, 1973, the parties agreed to extend the AGREEMENT up to February 28,
1975. If it is not terminated by prior notice six months before February 28, 1975, as it was not,
it would be extended for a further two years up to February 28, 1977.
By letter dated February 25, 1977, through the law firm of Ozaeta Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta,
Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles (the Law Firm, for brevity) PHILCHEM was advised
that LINGNER was interested in continuing business relationship with PHILCHEM and will be
interested in negotiating a new contract and that, prior to the signing of a new contract,
LINGNER was proposing that the old contract be extended by mutual agreement for a period
of six (6) calendar months beginning March 1, 1977 to expire automatically on August 31,
1977 if no contract is entered into.

The proposal was accepted by PHILCHEM, and no new contract having been signed by
August 31, 1977, the AGREEMENT terminated on that date.

On July 20, 1979, PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER for P1,055,000.00 under the
ROYALTY CLAUSE. The claim was discussed between PHILCHEM and TANNER of
BEECHAM with the intervention of the Law Firm. No settlement having been arrived at,
PHILCHEM, on August 6, 1980, filed a complaint against BEECHAM alone in Civil Case No.
38086 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. The summons issued could not be served
on BEECHAM, the Sheriff having reported that BEECHAM was neither a company registered
in the Philippines, nor resident at the given address of Unit A, Padilla Building, Emerald
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila.

PHILCHEM then filed an amended complaint, this time making LINGNER and BEECHAM as
the defendants, and pleading that summons could be served on the Law Firm as an agent of
the defendants.

The Law Firm submitted a special appearance in the case on behalf of LINGNER, and, also
on behalf of LINGNER, moved for dismissal on the grounds (a) that LINGNER was not a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines and hence could not be sued locally,
and, (b) that LINGNER could not be served with summons through the Law Firm.

WON petitioner could be validly served summons through the law firm as its agent.

RULING:
As to the first issue, the Court did not rule on whether or not petitioner is doing business in
the Philippines and held that evidence as to whether LINGNER was doing business in the
Philippines, even before the Trial Court, is no longer necessary in view of the fact that PHILCHEM
and LINGNER were contractees in the AGREEMENT and the claim of PHILCHEM is based on the
ROYALTY CLAUSE of that AGREEMENT. Whether LINGNER is or is not doing business in the
Philippines will not matter because the parties had expressly stipulated in the AGREEMENT that all
controversies based on the AGREEMENT "shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts". In
other words, there was a covenant on venue to the effect that LINGNER can be sued by
PHILCHEM before Philippine Courts in regards to a controversy related to the AGREEMENT.

As to the second issue, the Court held that summons can be made through publication. For the
expeditious determination of this controversy, therefore, in view of the insufficiency of evidence that
LINGNER is doing business in the Philippines, which is a sine qua non requirement under the
provision of Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules before service of process can be effected upon a
foreign corporation and jurisdiction over the same may be acquired, it is best that alias summons
on LINGNER be issued, in this case under the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14, in relation to Rule
4 of the Rules of Court, which recognizes the principle that venue can be agreed upon by the
parties. If a local plaintiff and a foreign corporation have agreed on Philippine venue, summons by
publication can be made on the foreign corporation under the principle of liberal construction of the
rules.

TN: An alias summons is a second summons served when the first attempt at serving a summons
is unsuccessful.
At the RTC level, the lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss assuming that LINGNER could be
sued in this jurisdiction, and holding that LINGNER can be served with summons through the Law
Firm. On appeal, the CA held that summons served through the Law Firm was valid.

11.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA

and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Rule: Under the most significant relationship rule, the following contacts are to be taken
into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered

FACTS:
Private respondent Morada was hired by petitioner, sometime in 1988, as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
Morada went to a disco dance with two fellow crew members, both Saudi nationals. Because it was
almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the
room of her male companion. When they were in the room, the other male companion left on some
pretext. Shortly after he did, the other male companion attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. The two Saudi
nationals were later on arrested by the Indonesian police.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several of petitioners officials interrogated her
about the incident; then, they then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release
of the two accused. In Jakarta, Morada was asked to sign a blank paper and a document written in
the local dialect but she decline. Eventually, she was allowed to return to Jeddah but was barred
from the Jakarta flights and was subsequently transferred to Manila.

interrogation; however, she was barred from boarding the plane. She was later told that she is
forbidden to take the flight. On July 3, 1993, Morada was again escorted to the Saudi court where
the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision sentencing her to 5 months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. It was only then that she realized that she was tried together with
her male companions for the following crimes: (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, Morada sought the help of her employer; however, petitioner denied her any
assistance.But because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, shortly before her return to
Manila, she was terminated from the service by petitioner, without her being informed of the cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against petitioner and its country
manager; however, this was opposed to by petitioner when it filed its motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, which was later on denied by the lower court. Upon appeal, the CA
held a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the basis for recovery
of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of trial court.

Petitioner contends that the case is a conflict of laws case which must call for the application of the
doctrine of lex loci delicti commissi or the law of the country where the act was committed; thus, the
Philippine law is not the proper law to be applied.

ISSUES:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction.
WON the Philippine law should be applied.

Sometime in January 1992, Morada was brought to Jeddah where she was questioned about the
incident. Her passport was taken by the police and was not returned to her until she made a
statement dropping the case against the two accused. Subsequently, on June 16, 1993, she was
brought to a Saudi Court by a certain Khalid, from the petitioners office, where she was asked to
sign a written document in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case; however, it
later turned out that the document was a notice to her to appear before the court. Morada later
returned to Manila. Shortly afterwards, petitioner summoned Morada to report to Jeddah for further
investigation. She was brought again to the Saudi Court, where she was interrogated by a Saudi
judge through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. She was allowed to leave after the

RULING:
Yes, the trial court has jurisdiction. The trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit as provided for under Sect. 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit: RTC shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P100K or
P200K, in Metro Manila.

The Court held that the following considerations weigh heavily in favor of the RTC assuming
jurisdiction over the case: the convenience of the parties, the private interest of the litigant, and the
enforceability of a judgment, if one is obtained.Further, had the lower court refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing Moradato seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of
forum of the private respondent should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing
her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. On the other hand, petitioner in filing several
motions and in praying for other reliefs under the premises, petitioner has effectively submitted to
the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.

As to the second issue, the Court held that the Philippine law is the more applicable law. After a
careful study of the pleadings on record, the Court is convinced that there is reasonable basis for
private respondent's assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought
her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she
made; however, as it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. There is likewise logical basis on
record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent to
Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Further, petitioner's such
acts done were done in the guise of petitioner's authority as employer.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or
"point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the Court held that the Philippines could be said
as a situs of the tort or the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place. This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and
working here.

Further, the Court applied the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which is more
appropriate to apply, given the factual context of this case. In applying said principle to determine

the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a)
the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

In this case, it can be said that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in
this dispute considering that the over-all dispute occurred in the Philippines and that the private
respondent is a Filipino resident. Thus, prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", the more
applicable law is the Philippine law on tort liability.

12. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WONG CHENG (alias
WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Rules:

Under the French rule, crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they
were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory.

Under the English rule, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within the territory they were committed unless it
relates to internal discipline among the crew or members of the vessel.

FACTS:
Respondent Cheng was charged for illegally smoking opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa,
which is of English nationality, while the vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city. He filed a demurrer to the information, which was sustained by the trial
court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in
our jurisdiction waters.

RULING:
Yes, the trial court has jurisdiction. When a tort is committed on board a foreign vessel, we
consider either the French rule or the English rule in determining jurisdiction.

Under the French rule, crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory. On the other hand, the
English rule, which is based on the territorial principle and which is being followed in the United
States, provides that crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within the territory they were committed. Of these two rules, it is the English
Rule that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in
the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the
United States.

The Court held that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit does not bring
about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding; thus, such is not
considered a disturbance of the public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established,
because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. Moreover, the
idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila
in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive
of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may
come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

13. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Rule: The Objective Territoriality Principle provides that the court has jurisdiction over
crimes completed within its territory even if it started outside its territory. Thus, when the
forbidden conditions existed during the time the ship was within territorial, regardless of
the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship sailed from the foreign port and
while it was on the high seas.

FACTS:
In December 1908, defendant Bull was then the master of a steam sailing vessel, known as the
steamship Standard, which was engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos and other
animals from a foreign port to Manila. According to the information filed against the defendant, on
December 2 of the same year, he transported 677 head of cattle and carabaos from Formosa to
Manila without providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit to avoid cruelty
and unnecessary suffering to such animals. Thus, it was alleged that, by reason of such neglect on
the part of the defendant, the animals were badly wounded and bruised and some were killed,
contrary to the provisions of Act Nos. 55 and 275 of the Philippine Commission.

After trial, the court convicted the defendant for the crime charged. However, defendant contends
that the information is insufficient as it does not indicate any fact that would confer jurisdiction to the
trial court.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction.

RULING:
Yes, the trial court has jurisdiction. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created
thereby on Courts of First Instance in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such
ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission
thereof. However, there is a question as to this jurisdiction applies when the crime is committed
aboard a foreign vessel, as in this case.

As a rule, no court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles
of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency.

This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters
the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of
her voyage the violation of the statute continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the
high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.

14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.

LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and
JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

Afterwards, a series of arrests were effected in different places which led to the arrest of the
accused in this case. An information charging the accused with qualified piracy or violation of the
PD 532, Piracy in the Philippine Waters, was filed.

As for the accused Hiong, it turned out that he was employed by Navi Marine Services, which is a
foreign company. Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first time
with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the
transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to supervise the transfer from a ship called
Galilee to Navi Pride. However, for such transfer, it was Paul Gen who received the payment. An
entrapment was then made by the Philippine police which led to the arrest of Hiong.

After the trial, the court rendered a decision finding all of the accused guilty of the crime charged.
All of the accused appealed the decision. One of the accused, Hiong, contends in his appeal that
the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.

ISSUE:
WON Hiong can be convicted as an accomplice for acts allegedly committed outside the Philippine
waters and territory.

Rule: Under the Subjective Territoriality Principle, the court of the country where the crime
was commenced acquires jurisdiction even if such crime was completed outside the
jurisdiction or territory of that country.

FACTS:
MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded
with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was
suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed pirates, which are the accused Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante,
and others unknown, in this case. They detained and took control of the vessel. Later on, the name
MT Tabangao and the PNOC logo were painted over with black and was painted with the name
Galilee. The ship crew was then forced to sail to Singapore, where the it awaited another vessel,
which later on did not arrive. Thus, the ship was sent back to Batangas, Philippines and
remained at sea. After several days, it was sent back to Singapore. This time, another vessel,
called the Navi Pride, anchored beside it. Accused San Hiong then supervised the Navis crew and
received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods from MT Tabangao
to Navi Pride was completed, the former was sent back to the Philippines and the original crew
members were released by the pirates in batches. The crew was ordered not to tell authorities of
what happened; however, the chief engineer reported the incident to the coast guard.

RULING:
Yes, accused Chiong is liable for the crime charged. As regards the contention that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where
its cargo was offloaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accusedappellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack
and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need
not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely

to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.

arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

ISSUE:
15. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

WON petitioner is immune from suit.

Rule: Acts constituting a crime is not covered by immunity from suit since it is not done in
official capacity.

RULING:

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged with
two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.

Petitioner was then arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail
at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of
ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country.

Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City.

The RTC ordered the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review

No, the petitioner is not immune from suit. Under Section 45 of the Agreement, officers and staff
of the Bank including experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy
immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.

The Court held that the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's
case falls within the ambit of such provision. Thus, the prosecution should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Further, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty .
The imputation that it is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle
of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does
not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner as such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.

16. THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant, vs. WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendantsappellees.

Rule: The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability
of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.

Rule: The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high
seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines.

FACTS:

FACTS:
On August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth $20
while on board the vessel Lawton. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First
Instance that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged since it happened in the high
seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends;
thus, they asked that the case be dismissed.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the high seas on board
of transport not registered in the Philippines.

Sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S Asiatica, a vessel operated by petitioner Eastern
Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan for transportation to Manila loaded 5,000 pieces of
calorized pipes valued at P256,039.00 which was consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co, Inc.
and 7 cases of spare parts valued at P92, 361.75 consigned to Central Textile Mills. Both sets of
goods were insured against marine risk for their stated value with respondent Development
Insurance and Surety Corp.

In the same vessel, 2 containers of garment fabrics were also loaded which was consigned to
Mariveles Apparel Corp worth $46,583. The said cargoes were consigned to Nisshin Fire and
Marine Insurance. Another cargo loaded to the vessel was the surveying instruments consigned to
Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise and insured against respondent Dowa Fire & Marine
Insurance for $1,385.00.

On the way to Manila, M/S Asiatica caught fire and sank. This resulted to the loss of the ship and its
cargoes. The respective Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values and were thus
subrogated to the rights of the insured.

RULING:
No, the Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas
on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The transport Lawton not
being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime
committed on board the same.

17. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION,respondents.

The insurers filed a suit against the petitioner carrier for recovery of the amounts paid to the
Insured. However, petitioner contends that it is not liable on the ground that the loss was due to an
extraordinary fortuitous event.

On June 16, 1978, respondents Nisshin Fire & Marine Insurance Co. NISSHIN for short), and
Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (DOWA, for brevity), as subrogees of the insured, filed suit
against Petitioner Carrier for the recovery of the insured value of the cargo lost with the then Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch 11 (Civil Case No. 116151), imputing unseaworthiness of the
ship and nonobservance of extraordinary diligence by petitioner Carrier. Petitioner Carrier denied
liability on the principal grounds that the fire which caused the sinking of the ship is an exempting
circumstance under Section 4(2) (b) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA); and that when

the loss of fire is established, the burden of proving negligence of the vessel is shifted to the cargo
shipper.

by law.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners contention that COGSA should apply is correct.

18. MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

RULING:

Rules:

The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common
carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the cargoes in question were
transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed
primarily by the Civil Code. However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and
obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.
Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil
Code.

In an action for nullity of marriage based on bigamy, the spouse who has the legal
personality to file an action is the aggrieved spouse in the first marriage and not the
husband of the second marriage which is alleged to be bigamous.

In an action for recognition of foreign judgment, such as the foreign court judgment
declaring the marriage void by reason of bigamy, the only requirement is to prove the
genuineness and due execution of the foreign court judgment. Proof of validity of the
foreign court judgment is not required and the Philippine courts are not supposed to
review the merits of the foreign court judgment.

Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods, according to all the
circumstances of each case. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to, among others, flood, storm, earthquake,
lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. However, the Court held that fire may not be
considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some
act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused
by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or
privity of the carrier.

As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception under the Civil Code provides that
all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary
deligence required by law. In this case, the respective insurers, as subrogees of the cargo shippers,
have proven that the transported goods have been lost.
Petitioner Carrier has also proved that the loss was caused by fire. The burden then is upon
Petitioner Carrier to proved that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required

FACTS:
Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marina in the Philippines on
January 23, 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008,
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on May 15, 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. The two then met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship.

In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On January 14, 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage) and prayed that: the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio; and for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the NSO.

Recognition of Foreign Judgment

The RTC dismissed the petition of Fujiki and applied A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provided that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. Thus, in this case, only Marinay or Maekara can file the petition and not Fujiki. However, Fujiki
moved for the reconsideration of the decision, contending that since a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, then A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC will not apply. He further
argues that it is not difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage; thus, he had material
interest and the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

He also contends that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the procedural implementation of the Civil Register Law
(Act No. 3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code, which imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the
local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC sought, among others, to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. However, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
a.

WON the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. NO.

b.

WON a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy. YES.

c.

WON the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. YES.

RULING:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
or A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan,
the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.

Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

Recognition of Foreign Judgment does not Require Relitigation under Philippine Court
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against
a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds

external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

Recognition made in a Special Proceeding for Cancellation or Correction of Entries under

Rule 108
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

Party in Interest in Bigamy

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.

Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry

Recognition of Foreign Judgment not a Circumvention of the Law requiring a Direct Action
in declaring a marriage null and Void
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country.

There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Philippine Court of Limited Jurisdiction in Recognition of Foreign Judgments to those

External to its Merits.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is

able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties."

Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves
as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.

19. GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

Rules:

The alien spouse cannot claim a right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse;
however, the unavailability of such provision to aliens does not necessarily strip them
of legal interest to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.

The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous
of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the
marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant
to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she
be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under the Philippine law.

ISSUE:
WON the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.

RULING:
No, the alien spouse cannot claim a right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse ;
however, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does

not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. The Court held that the direct involvement
or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest
to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms.

Recording in the Civil Register

Recognition of Foreign Divorce Judgment
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person's legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play.

This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer
having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.

Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Rule: It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment,
in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

FACTS:
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late
Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for
tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

Proper Remedy that includes Both: Rule 108

The Estate of Marcos however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of
pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of
a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As
such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability
of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the
Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of
the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC was correct in dismissing the complaint.

RULING:
20. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, et. al., Petitioners, vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives
in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R.
Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Respondents.

No, the RTC judge was not correct in dismissing the complaint not because the case is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, but because such order will amount to a preclusion.

Clearly, the case is capable of pecuniary estimation, because even though it was an enforcement
of a foreign judgment, it was capable of pecuniary estimation as the foreign amount can be
converted into Philippine peso to its last cent.

However, the assessment of the huge amount of docket fee is incorrect and improper because it
would amount to a preclusion, as supported by customary international law on principles of comity,
utility and convenience of nations. It has been held that, even though international communities are
not unanimous in the view as to what theory is to be applied in recognizing the judgments laid down
by foreign tribunals, they are unanimous in the essentiality of the viability of such a recognition,
stating that the notion of unconnected bodies of laws is not one conducive to the growth of a
transnational community.

Although there is no treaty or agreement which obligates the Philippines to recognize and not
preclude the recognition of a foreign judgment by the Philippine Court, the Philippines is bound by
the principles of customary international law which includes the principle of comity and against
preclusion, that is, foreign judgments must be recognized by the courts. However, balancing this
with the inherent independence of the judiciary to appreciate facts and laws applicable, the Court is
given the opportunity to review the judgment only in limited matters: only if there is want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law and fact. Thus,
unless these grounds exist, the Philippine courts, must seek to enforce the judgments laid down by
the foreign courts.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign
judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for
the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. The rules are silent as to
what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for
such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, nd clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right
prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the "presumptive evidence of a right."
Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of
judgment must be brought before the regular courts.

An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a
foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the
provision indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for
enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction over
such complaint:

In this case, moreover, the assessment of Php 472,000,000 amounts to a preclusion, because the
judgment may not be reviewed or enforced without the litigants, who are relatively incapable of
raising such amount.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
Verbatim Ruling
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the
thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both
cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of
want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the
party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action
based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141.

For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),
involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not
involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave

abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and
dismissed the complaint.

It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive
yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the
Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the
question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final
Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other
issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated
before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48,
Rule 39.