Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2008-2009
Impact Superfile
1 /413
**TERMINAL IMPACTS**....................................................5
AIDS.........................................................................................6
Aids turns military readiness....................................................7
Air Pollution.............................................................................8
Anthrax.....................................................................................9
Biodiversity............................................................................10
Bioterror..................................................................................11
Bioterror.................................................................................12
Bird Flu...................................................................................13
Constitution............................................................................14
Democracy..............................................................................15
Democracy Good- Democide.................................................16
Dehumanization......................................................................17
Disease....................................................................................18
Disease turns military readiness.............................................19
Disease turns military readiness.............................................20
Economy.................................................................................21
Econ- US Key.........................................................................22
Econ- developing countries....................................................23
Economy- U.S. civil war and dissolution...............................24
Econ Collapse Bad.................................................................25
Econ interdependence prevents war.......................................26
Impacts Economic Decline Nuclear War........................27
Impacts U.S. Key to Global Economy................................28
Impacts Econ Turns Heg.....................................................34
Impacts Econ Turns Prolif...................................................36
Impacts Econ Turns Disease................................................37
Impacts Econ Turns Warming/Environment.......................38
Impacts Econ Turns Famine................................................40
Impacts Econ Turns Racism................................................41
Impacts Econ Turns Russia War..........................................42
Impacts Econ Solves War....................................................43
Impacts Econ Solves Poverty..............................................44
Impacts War Turns Gender Violence...................................45
Impacts Econ Turns Terrorism............................................46
Economic decline turns TB, Malaria, AIDS...........................47
Economic Decline Turns Soft Power.....................................48
Econ turns heg........................................................................49
Econ turns heg........................................................................51
US Econ Collapse global...................................................52
Econ growth good- environment............................................53
Growth in the economic is beneficial to the environment......53
Econ Growth good- environment...........................................54
Econ growth good- environment............................................55
Econ growth good- Poverty....................................................56
Countries with higher economic growth rates will face poverty
alleviation...............................................................................56
Econ growth good- poverty/environment...............................57
Economic growth is key to reducing poverty and helping the
environment............................................................................57
Econ growth good- social services.........................................58
Econ growth good- poverty....................................................59
AT: Dedev-No mindshift........................................................60
Econ growth good-violence....................................................61
Econ growth good- social services.........................................62
Nelson
<tournament>
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
Impact Superfile
2 /413
Kagan....................................................................................118
Decline Inev..........................................................................121
Econ T/.................................................................................122
**WAR IMPACTS**...........................................................123
War causes dehumanization..................................................124
War Turns Disease................................................................125
War turns Gender violence...................................................126
War turns Human Right Violations.......................................127
War turns human rights/ disease...........................................128
War Turns Racism................................................................129
War Turns Everything...........................................................130
War Turns Mental Health.....................................................131
War turns Health...................................................................132
War turns domestic violence.................................................133
War turns the environment...................................................134
War outweighs disease..........................................................135
AIDS.....................................................................................137
Animal Rights T/..................................................................138
Biodiversity..........................................................................139
Cap........................................................................................140
Civil Liberties T/..................................................................141
Dehumanization T/...............................................................142
Democracy T/.......................................................................143
Disease T/.............................................................................144
Disease T/.............................................................................145
Domestic Violence T/...........................................................146
Econ T/.................................................................................147
Edelman................................................................................148
Environment.........................................................................149
Environment.........................................................................150
Fascism.................................................................................151
Gendered Violence T/...........................................................152
Health T/...............................................................................153
Heg T/...................................................................................154
Homelessness.......................................................................155
Homophobia.........................................................................157
Inequality..............................................................................158
Mental Health T/...................................................................160
Poverty..................................................................................161
Poverty..................................................................................162
Woman Rights T/..................................................................163
Racism..................................................................................164
Rape......................................................................................165
Rights T/...............................................................................166
Rights T/...............................................................................167
Social Service T/...................................................................168
Starvation..............................................................................169
Terror....................................................................................170
**X TURNS CASE**..........................................................171
AIDS T/ Readiness...............................................................172
AIDS T/ Readiness...............................................................173
Disesase T/ Readiness..........................................................174
Disease T/ Readiness............................................................175
Disease T/ War......................................................................176
Ecodestruction T/ Disease....................................................177
Nelson
<tournament>
Ecodestruction T/ Disease....................................................178
Ecodestruction T/ War..........................................................179
Ecodestruction T/ Agriculture..............................................180
**NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIOS**..................................181
Central Asian Conflict..........................................................182
China-US..............................................................................183
Economic Collapse...............................................................184
India/Pakistan War................................................................185
Iraq Pullout...........................................................................186
Iran........................................................................................187
Japanese Relations (Spratly Islands)....................................188
Japanese Relations (Middle Eastern Conflict).....................189
Japanese Relations (China/Taiwan Conflict)........................190
Japanese Relations (Korea)..................................................191
Japanese Relations (Sino-Russian Ties)...............................192
North Korea..........................................................................193
Pakistan Collapse..................................................................194
Sino-Russian Conflict...........................................................195
Sunni/Shiite Conflict............................................................196
Russia-US.............................................................................197
Taiwan/China War................................................................198
Taiwan..................................................................................199
Terrorism Nuclear Escalation..........................................200
Terror = Extinction...............................................................201
**NUKE WAR IMPACTS**...............................................202
Nuclear War Disease........................................................203
Nuclear War Extinction...................................................204
Nuclear War Pollution.....................................................206
Nuclear War Phytoplankton Scenario..............................207
Nuclear War Ozone Scenario...........................................208
Nuke War Oceans............................................................209
Nuclear War Biodiversity Scenario (1/2)........................210
Nuclear War Biodiversity Scenario (2/2).........................211
**NUKE WAR PROBABILITY**......................................212
Nuclear War Evaluated First.................................................213
Schell....................................................................................215
Nuclear War Likely...............................................................216
Nuclear War Likely Escalation..........................................217
Nuclear War Likely Middle East Prolif.............................218
Great Power War Likely.......................................................219
Nuke War Not Likely............................................................220
Nuke War Not Likely US Russia.......................................221
Nuke War Not Likely Rising Costs...................................222
Nuke War Not Likely Deterrence......................................223
Nuke War Not Likely International System......................224
Nuke War Not Likely North Korea...................................226
Nuke War Not Likely Pakistan..........................................227
No Nuclear Terror.................................................................228
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (1/6).......229
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (2/6).......231
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (3/6).......232
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (4/6).......233
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (5/6).......234
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (6/6).......235
AT: Schell.............................................................................236
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
Impact Superfile
3 /413
AT: Schell.............................................................................237
AT: Schell.............................................................................238
**IMPACT TAKEOUTS**..................................................239
AT: Giligan...........................................................................240
Extinction Impossible...........................................................242
Nuclear War..........................................................................243
Biological Attack Not Probable............................................244
Indo-Pak...............................................................................245
Iran........................................................................................246
**IMPACT CALCULUS**.................................................247
Impacts Exaggerated (1/2)....................................................248
Impacts Exaggerated (2/2)....................................................249
Prob. Evaluated First (1/2)...................................................250
Prob. Evaluated First (2/2)...................................................251
Prob Before Mag Ext............................................................252
Systemic Impacts First.........................................................253
Probability Evaluation Key..................................................254
AT: Rescher..........................................................................255
Predictions Bad - Policymaking...........................................256
Predictions Bad Background Beliefs.................................258
Predictions Bad Irresponsibility........................................259
Predictions Bad - Monkeys..................................................261
Predictions Bad Decisionmaking Spillover.......................262
AT: Monkeys........................................................................263
Predictions Good (1/3).........................................................264
Predictions Good (2/3).........................................................265
Predictions Good (3/3).........................................................266
Mag. Evaluated First (1/3)....................................................267
Mag. Evaluated First (2/3)....................................................268
Mag. Evaluated First (3/3)....................................................269
Role of Ballot = Magnitude..................................................270
Extinction Evaluated First....................................................272
**PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**...............................273
Precautionary Principle Good- Risk Avoidance...................274
Precautionary Principle Good- Risk Fails............................275
Precautionary Principle Good Risk Fails..........................276
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Innovation Stultification277
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Zero Risk.......................278
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Cost...............................279
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Bad Science...................280
**AT PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**..........................281
Precautionary Principle Bad- Paralysis (1/3).......................282
Precautionary Principle Bad- Paralysis (2/3).......................283
Precautionary Principle Bad- Paralysis (3/3).......................284
Precautionary Principle Bad- Innovation (1/3).....................285
Precautionary Principle Bad- Innovation (2/3).....................286
Precautionary Principle Bad- Innovation (3/3).....................287
Precautionary Principle Bad- Pandemic...............................288
Precautionary Principle Bad- Militarism..............................289
**UTIL**.............................................................................290
Util O/W Rights....................................................................291
Util Good K2 Policymaking..............................................292
Util Good - K2 Determine Rights........................................293
Util Good Best Interest......................................................294
Util Good Concrete Decisionmaking................................295
Nelson
<tournament>
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
Impact Superfile
4 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
5 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**TERMINAL IMPACTS**
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
6 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AIDS
The spread of AIDS causes mutations that risk extinction
Ehrlich and Erlich 90
Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, Professors of Population studies at Stanford University, THE
POPULATION EXPLOSION, 1990, p. 147-8
Whether or not AIDS can be contained will depend primarily on how rapidly the spread of HIV can be slowed through public
education and other measures, on when and if the medical community can find satisfactory preventatives or treatments, and
to a large extent on luck. The virus has already shown itself to be highly mutable, and laboratory strains
resistant to the one drug, AZT, that seems to slow its lethal course have already been reported." A virus that infects
many millions of novel hosts, in this case people, might evolve new transmission characteristics. To do so,
however, would almost certainly involve changes in its lethality. If, for instance, the virus became more common in the
blood (permitting insects to transmit it readily), the very process would almost certainly make it more lethal. Unlike the
current version of AIDS, which can take ten years or more to kill its victims , the new strain might cause death in
days or weeks. Infected individuals then would have less time to spread the virus to others, and there would be strong
selection in favor of less lethal strains (as happened in the case of myxopatomis). What this would mean epidemiologically is
not clear, but it could temporarily increase the transmission rate and reduce life expectancy of infected
persons until the system once again equilibrated. If the ability of the AIDS virus to grow in the cells of
the skin or the membranes of the mouth, the lungs, or the intestines were increased, the virus might be
spread by casual contact or through eating contaminated food . But it is likely, as Temin points out, that acquiring
those abilities would so change the virus that it no longer efficiently infected the kinds of cells it now does and so would no
longer cause AIDS. In effect it would produce an entirely different disease . We hope Temin is correct but another
Nobel laureate, Joshua Lederberg, is worried that a relatively minor mutation could lead to the virus infecting a type of white
blood cell commonly present in the lungs. If so, it might be transmissible through coughs.
proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an
analogue to the emergence of pneumonic plague.
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
7 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
8 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Air Pollution
Air pollution will lead to extinction
Driesen 03
(David, Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School, 1989,
Fall/Spring, 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 25, p. 26-8)
Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and
harming the health of both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that
are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs that is
worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. Between them, they aid
understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the center of concerns for sustainable
development." While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects a
concern about the natural environment. Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air
quality implicates both of these concerns. Lead, carbon monoxide, particulate, tropospheric ozone, sulfur dioxide, and
nitrogen oxides have historically threatened urban air quality in the United States. This review will focus upon tropospheric
ozone, particulate, and carbon monoxide, because these pollutants present the most widespread of the remaining urban air
problems, and did so at the time of the earth summit. 6 Tropospheric ozone refers to ozone fairly near to the ground, as
opposed to stratospheric ozone high in the atmosphere. The stratospheric ozone layer protects human health and the
environment from ultraviolet radiation, and its depletion causes problems. By contrast, tropospheric ozone damages human
health and the environment. 8 In the United States, the pollutants causing "urban" air quality problems also affect human
health and the environment well beyond urban boundaries. Yet, the health problems these pollutants present remain most
acute in urban and suburban areas. Ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate cause very serious public health
problems that have been well recognized for a long time. Ozone forms in the atmosphere from a reaction between volatile
organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, and sunlight. Volatile organic compounds include a large number of hazardous air
pollutants. Nitrogen oxides, as discussed below, also play a role in acidifying ecosystems. Ozone damages lung tissue. It
plays a role in triggering asthma attacks, sending thousands to the hospital every summer. It effects young children and
people engaged in heavy exercise especially severely. Particulate pollution, or soot, consists of combinations of a wide
variety of pollutants. Nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide contribute to formation of fine particulate, which is associated with
the most serious health problems. 13 Studies link particulate to tens of thousands of annual premature deaths in the United
States. Like ozone it contributes to respiratory illness, but it also seems to play a [*29] role in triggering heart attacks among
the elderly. The data suggest that fine particulate, which EPA did not regulate explicitly until recently, plays a major role in
these problems. 16 Health researchers have associated carbon monoxide with various types of neurological symptoms, such
as visual impairment, reduced work capacity, reduced manual dexterity, poor learning ability, and difficulty in performing
complex tasks. The same pollution problems causing current urban health problems also contribute to long lasting
ecological problems. Ozone harms crops and trees. These harms affect ecosystems and future generations. Similarly,
particulate precursors, including nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide, contribute to acid rain, which is not easily reversible. To
address these problems, Agenda 21 recommends the adoption of national programs to reduce health risks from air pollution,
including urban air pollution. These programs are to include development of "appropriate pollution control technology . . . for
the introduction of environmentally sound production processes." It calls for this development "on the basis of risk
assessment and epidemiological research." It also recommends development of "air pollution control capacities in large cities
emphasizing enforcement programs using monitoring networks as appropriate." A second principle, the precautionary
principle, provides support for the first. As stated in the Rio Declaration, the precautionary principle means that "lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation" when "there are threats of serious or irreversible damage." Thus, lack of complete certainty about the adverse
environmental and human health effects of air pollutants does not, by itself, provide a reason for tolerating them. Put
differently, governments need to address air pollution on a precautionary basis to ensure that humans can
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
9 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Anthrax
A small amount of anthrax could be effective in killing millions of people
Wake, 01
Ben Wake The Ottawa Citizen October 13, 2001 Saturday Final EDITION
http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?
docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7030650745&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=26&resultsUrlKey=29_T703
0641352&cisb=22_T7030650748&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8363&docNo=4
.The potential impact on a city can be estimated by looking at the effectiveness of an aerosol in producing downwind
casualties. The World Health Organization in 1970 modeled the results of a hypothetical dissemination of 50 kg of agent
along a 2-km line upwind of a large population center. Anthrax and tularemia are predicted to cause the highest number
of dead and incapacitated, as well as the greatest downwind spread. A government study estimated that about 200
pounds of anthrax released upwind of Washington, D.C., could kill up to 3 million people. Here is a list of all of the
recognized Biological Weapons.
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
10 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Biodiversity
Biodiversity is key to preventing extinction
Madgoluis 96
(Richard
Margoluis,
Biodiversity
Support
Program,
1996,
http://www.bsponline.org/publications/showhtml.php3?10)
Biodiversity not only provides direct benefits like food, medicine, and energy; it also affords us a "life
support system." Biodiversity is required for the recycling of essential elements, such as carbon, oxygen, and
nitrogen. It is also responsible for mitigating pollution, protecting watersheds, and combating soil erosion.
Because biodiversity acts as a buffer against excessive variations in weather and climate, it protects us from catastrophic
events beyond human control. The importance of biodiversity to a healthy environment has become
increasingly clear. We have learned that the future well-being of all humanity depends on our stewardship
of the Earth. When we overexploit living resources, we threaten our own survival.
millions of years to correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by destruction of natural habitats.
10
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
11 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Bioterror
Bioterror will cause extinction
Steinbrenner 97, Brookings Senior Fellow, 1997 [John D. , Foreign Policy, "Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses," Winter, InfoTrac]
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential
weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive,
weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently
engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense
implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay
rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the
extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning .
The
use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For
most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few
pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the
other direction.
A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable
of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population .
The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit. Nobody really knows how
serious a possibility this might be, since there is no way to measure it reliably.
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)
deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a
nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they
are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent
anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can
massive exchange of
be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in
comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill
millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical
weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical
extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of
11
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
12 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Bioterror
Biological terrorism caused extinction
Richard Ochs, Chemical Weapons Working Group Member, 2002
[Biological
Weapons
must
be
Abolished
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
Immediately,
June
9,
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or
vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence
pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter,"
resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely
compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get
out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of
these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown
to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage
bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of
people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized.
Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment.
Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the
killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually
forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even
greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example
of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN
EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.
12
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
13 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Bird Flu
Bird Flu goes global, killing billions
[Ethne Barnes, Research Assistant in Paleopathology, Wichita State, 2005, Diseases and human evolution, p. 427-8]
Human history is riddled with accounts of epidemics wreaking similar havoc among human populations around the world,
though not as severe as the rabbit myxomatosis introduced into Australia. Even the great influenza pandemic in the early
twentieth century did not come close to killing off a significant portion of the global population. However, a more deadly
influenza pandemic is all too likely. Influenza virus exemplifies the ideal predator for reducing human
populations. It is airborne and travels the globe easily and quickly , capable of infecting all age groups in
repeated waves within a short time span. Influenza type A viruses are unstable and continuously evolving. Global
movements of people and viruses at a rapid pace make gene swapping possible among previously
isolated strains. Hybrid virus produced by such gene swapping could result in a deadly strain that targets the lower
branches of the bronchial tubes and the lungs. Severe viral pneumonia and death within twenty-four hours would follow.
The new influenza virus could easily move around the globe within days and kill over half the human
population (Ryan, 1997). Crowded cities, especially megacities, could suffer up to 90 percent fatalities within days or
weeks.
13
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
14 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Constitution
The Constitution is the most important thing to preserve
Eidmoe 92 (John A. Eidsmoe is a Constitutional Attorney, Professor of Law at Thomas Goode Jones School of Law and Colonel with the USAF, 1992
3 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 35, p. 57-9)
Other misfortunes may be borne, or their effects overcome. If disastrous war should sweep our
commerce from the ocean, another generation may renew it; if it exhaust our treasury, future industry may
replenish it; if it desolate and lay waste our fields, still under a new cultivation, they will grow green again, and ripen to future harvests. It were
but a trifle even if the walls of yonder Capitol were to crumble , if its lofty pillars should fall, and its gorgeous decorations be
all covered by the dust of the valley. All these might be rebuilt. But who shall reconstruct the fabric of demolished
government? Who shall rear again the wellproportioned columns of constitutional liberty ? Who shall frame
together the skilful architecture which united national sovereignty with State rights, individual security, and public prosperity? No, if these columns
fall, they will be raised not again. Like the Coliseum and the Parthenon, they will be destined to a mournful, a melancholy immortality.
Bitterer tears, however, will flow over them, than were ever shed over the remnants of a more glorious edifice than Greece or Rome ever saw, the edifice of
14
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
15 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Democracy
Democracy preserves human life
15
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
16 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
16
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
17 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Dehumanization
Dehumanization outweighs all other impacts
Berube, 1997
(Berube,
David.
Professor.
English.
University
of
Nanotechnological
Prolongevity:
The
Down
http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm.)
South
Side.
Carolina.
1997.
Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire
resultant worldview smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial science. This would involve
valuing people as means. Moreover, there would always be a superhuman more
super than the current ones, humans would never be able to escape their
treatment as means to an always further and distant end. This means-ends
dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of
humanity. They warn: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague,
famine, or natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of
civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well
be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the
holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and
dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man...
(Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact
dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of
humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate
the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value
greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is
nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they
become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once
justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is
evil's most powerful weapon.
17
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
18 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Disease
Disease causes extinction
South China Morning Post 96
(Avi Mensa, 1-4-1996, Leading the way to a cure for AIDS, P. Lexis)
Despite the importance of the discovery of the "facilitating" cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There
is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a
virus deadlier than HIV. If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it.
AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now
affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg". Two
decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and
man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV. "An
airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from
anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and
it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen."That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film,
but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted
the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the
deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was killed before it had a
chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong.
It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow.The shock of the AIDS epidemic has
prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of a deadly viral outbreak
is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent conference. He added that the
problem was "very serious and is getting worse". Dr Ben-Abraham said: "Nature isn't benign. The survival of the human
species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of genetic variation exist for viruses
to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system." He cites the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak as an example of how
viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new "mega-cities" are being developed in the Third World and
rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into areas of human habitation. "This raises
the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for the first time, infect humanity at a
large scale and imperil the survival of the human race," he said.
against the current of a raging river." The grimmest possibility would be the emergence of a strain that
spreads so fast we are caught off guard or that resists all chemical means of control perhaps as a result of our
,
stirring of the ecological pot. About 12,000 years ago, a sudden wave of mammal extinctions swept through the Americas.
Ross MacPhee of the American Museum of Natural History argues the culprit was extremely virulent disease, which humans
helped transport as they migrated into the New World.
18
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
19 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
19
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
20 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
1532 Francisco Pizarro and his army of 168 Spaniards defeated the Incan army of 80,000. A
devastating smallpox epidemic had killed the Incan emperor and his heir, producing a civil
war that split the empire and allowed a handful of Europeans to defeat a large, but divided
enemy.144 In modern times, too, pandemic infections have affected the ability of military
forces to prosecute and win a war. The German Army chief of staff in the First World War ,
General Erick Von Ludendorf, blamed Germany.s loss of that war at least partly on the
negative effects of the 1918 influenza epidemic on the morale of German troops. 145 In the
Second World War, similarly, malaria caused more U.S. casualties in certain areas than did
military action.146 Throughout history, then, IDs have had a significant potential to decimate
armies and alter military history.
20
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
21 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Economy
Economic collapse causes a global nuclear exchange
Mead 92
(Walter Russell, Mead, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations, NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY,
Summer, 1992, p. 30)
The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes
to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the
international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the Westbecause they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates,
or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North,
rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear
weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.
Economic slowdown will cause WWIII
Bearden 2k
(Liutenant Colonel Bearden, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big-Medicine/message/642
Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in
about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the
160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat
Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions . Prior to the final economic collapse, the
stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts , to the point where the
arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an
example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea,
including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear
missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such
scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for
decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries
are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD
concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed . Without effective defense, the only chance a
nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its
perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange
occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great Armageddon
will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
21
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
22 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Econ- US Key
U.S. economic collapse leads to an economic depression globally.
(Walter Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 04 04, Americas Sticky
Power, Foreign Policy, Proquest, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_
id=2504&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/ cms.php?story_id=2504&page=2)
Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private
bonds, direct and portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the
strength of the U.S.-led system. A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the
prosperity of the United States. Without their best customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into
depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely shaken should the United States collapse.
Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United
States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can turn
from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by
maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines,
a collapsing U.S. economy would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world.
22
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
23 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
23
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
24 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Economic and financial problems in the U.S will cause a civil war and the
breakup of the U.S.
(Andrew Osborn, former KGB analyst, dean of Russian Foreign Ministrys academy for future diplomats, expert on
U.S.- Russia relations, 12 29 08, As if Things werent bad enough, Russian Professor Predicts End of U.S.,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123051100709638419.html)
He based the forecast on classified data supplied to him by FAPSI analysts, he says. Mr. Panarin predicts that
economic, financial and demographic trends will provoke a political and social crisis in the U.S. When the going gets
tough, he says, wealthier states will withhold funds from the federal government and effectively secede from the
union. Social unrest up to and including a civil war will follow. The U.S. will then split along ethnic lines, and foreign
powers will move in. California will form the nucleus of what he calls "The Californian Republic," and will be part of
China or under Chinese influence. Texas will be the heart of "The Texas Republic," a cluster of states that will go to
Mexico or fall under Mexican influence. Washington, D.C., and New York will be part of an "Atlantic America" that
may join the European Union. Canada will grab a group of Northern states Prof. Panarin calls "The Central North
American Republic." Hawaii, he suggests, will be a protectorate of Japan or China, and Alaska will be subsumed into
Russia. "It would be reasonable for Russia to lay claim to Alaska; it was part of the Russian Empire for a long time."
A framed satellite image of the Bering Strait that separates Alaska from Russia like a thread hangs from his office
wall. "It's not there for no reason," he says with a sly grin. Interest in his forecast revived this fall when he published
an article in Izvestia, one of Russia's biggest national dailies. In it, he reiterated his theory, called U.S. foreign debt "a
pyramid scheme," and predicted China and Russia would usurp Washington's role as a global financial regulator.
24
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
25 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
25
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
26 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
26
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
27 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
27
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
28 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
lead. The world is awash in conflicting bilateral trade agreements, varying degrees of capital
mobility, and wildly inconsistent access within nations to the fruits of global development. If there is a
time for the United States to demonstrate sober global leadership while responsibly advancing its own
interests and ideals, it is now. With the Doha round stagnating and the Bank and Fund deep into an identity
crisis, but with the memories of the economic turbulence of the 1980s and 90s still fresh in the mind, an
uncertain world continues to look toward the United States to show a willingness to step up to engage the
recalcitrant global economy. The process of reengagement is difficult and will undoubtedly prove frustrating for the next
administration. The G-8 is no longer a useful forum for building global economic consensus unless it
moves more quickly to include emerging economic powers. The IMF must continue in its reform
mission as well as embrace the need to become the explicit lender of last resort to sovereign nations. The
next administration should develop clear and thoughtful goals for engagement with each global region, and build ties,
embrace, and nurture mutually beneficial relationships with emerging regional leaders. The days of proxy wars for spheres of
influence are long gone, while the flood of economic support in exchange for political-security cooperation is showing no
faster diminishing returns than in Pakistan and Iraq. The authors in the preceding pages of this volume have debated the
costs, effectiveness, and opportunities for multilateral engagement across a wide range of specific issues. Where the United
States continues to hold absolute supremacy, such as military power, and where ideological objectives are concerned, such as
the continuing War on Terror, the U.S. enjoys the luxury to choose whether or not to engage the rest of the
world in a multilateral discussion and debate. On economic development, there is no such choice. The
future prosperity of billions of low and middle income citizens around the world, and the continued success
of todays leading economies depends on a sound and stable global economic architecture, and the deferential
respect afforded the U.S. in the global economy begs for its reengagement.
American consumption key to global economic growth other nations cant replace the US spot
Sull, President and Chief Investment Officer at Pacific Partners-Capital Management, 7-2
Ajbinder Sull, President and Chief Investment Officer at Pacific Partners Capital Management, 7-2-09, The Financial Post,
The US Consumer: Engine of the Global Economy Gears Down
Over the years, the world the world has looked to the US consumer to lead the way out of economic
downturns. Currently, the US consumer accounts for almost 70% of the American economy and about 15 17% of the global economy. Economists had long derided the Spend! Spend! Spend! ways of Americans. Credit was
a means to an end. The rising real estate prices that had lasted for much of this decade allowed consumers to cash out some of
the equity from their homes to continue the odyssey of lifestyle improvement. This gave way to the notion that US consumers
were using their homes as ATM machines. But a funny thing has happened during the current economic slowdown.
US consumers have retrenched from vigorous consumption in order to save more. As the chart below shows,
savings rates in the US have gone from a negative rate (consumers adding debt to consume) to positive. Current statistics
show that the savings rate in the US is on track to approach a level of about 7% later this year. This change in behavior is
both positive and negative. The negative case for this change is that it means that other countries will have to
bolster their own consumption and investment as an offset. This will not be easy as Asian nations have a
higher rate of savings. Europes economy will likely take much longer to get moving as is usually the
28
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
29 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
case after economic slowdowns. For the financial markets this means that any excessive optimism should be tempered
with this realization that the coming economic recovery will be different than any we have seen in quite some time. The
positive side to this change is that it will mean less reliance by the US on foreign capital to help fund the budget deficit.
These rising savings rates are ending up in the US banking system and will provide more fuel for the US banking system to
lend a helping hand to the US economy. Not to mention - helpful to the US dollar. The irony is that just as the world
would welcome the US consumer going back to old habits of spending and consuming, Americans have
realized that a little savings can go a long way. The price of this change in behavior is that global
economic growth will not rebound as fast and as much as the markets might be hoping for.
29
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
30 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
countries both by unsettling global financial markets, thus curbing access to capital, and by
depressing trade. "The U.S. and Asian economies are not decoupled, and a slowdown here is likely to
produce ripple effects lowering growth there," says Janet Yellen, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco. Whether the rest of the world can, in fact, shrug off slower U.S. growth remains to be demonstrated. But the
remedies central banks are choosing to fight the credit crunch are putting strains on other parts of the
global financial system, which could ultimately damage growth in some emerging markets. Central banks in
the USA, United Kingdom and Canada have cut interest rates in recent weeks, trying to counteract banks' reluctance to make
new loans. On Tuesday, the Federal Reserve, which already has trimmed the target for its benchmark rate by three-quarters of
a percentage point since September, is widely expected to cut rates again. The Fed's actions ricochet from Beijing to Dubai.
Countries such as China and the oil producers of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council, which link their
currencies to the level of the U.S. dollar to varying degrees, face a choice between setting interest rates according to
the needs of their domestic economies or tailoring rates to maintain stable exchange rates. That means keeping their
exchange rates stable against the dollar and importing inflation or raising their interest rates to head off
inflation at the cost of seeing their currencies appreciate. So far, the quasi-dollar-linked countries are swallowing
higher prices and the potential for overheating. In Qatar, for example, inflation runs at an annual rate of almost 13%. Current
monetary policies and exchange rates are "completely out of kilter with what these countries need and might actually
encourage the bubble in emerging markets to get bigger. It is really only a question of time before we have this regime
change in the global monetary system," says George Magnus, senior economic adviser of UBS (UBS) in London. That said,
most economists expect the global economy to pull through unless another unexpected shock hits. "We're in this window
of vulnerability. If something else comes along, we don't have a lot of padding," says Harvard's Rogoff. " We're very
vulnerable."
30
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
31 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
We have weathered hurricanes fury and record-high energy prices while continuing to grow and keep inflation under
control. The statement the Federal Open Market Committee released Tuesday quite summed up our current situation succinctly: Although recent
economic data have been uneven, the expansion in economic activity appears solid. This is especially true in what I call the growth riman arc of
population centers with favorable demographics that begins in Virginia, runs down the southeastern seaboard through Georgia to Florida, then through the
megastate of Texas and on to the uberstate of California and up to Seattle. I use mega and uber to describe the two largest states for a reason: to illustrate
the depth and breadth of our economy. In dollar terms , Texas produces 20 percent more than India, and California produces
roughly the same output as China. To the extent there is weakness in the U.S. economy, it is in the Northeast and North Central states. Netting all
this out, the consensus of most economic forecasters is that growth in the first quarter will rebound to a rate well above 4 percent. To understand what this
kind of growth means, we need only follow Margaret Thatchers wise hectoring to do the math. The United States produces $12.6 trillion a year in goods
and services. Be conservativeonce again, Lady Thatcher would like itand assume that in 2006 we grow at last years preliminary rate of 3.5 percent. The
math tells us we would add $440 billion in incremental activityin a single year. That is a big number. What we add in new economic activity
in a given year exceeds the entire output of all but 15 other countries. Every year, we create the economic equivalent of a
Swedenor two Irelands or three Argentinas. In dollar terms, a growth rate of 3.5 percent in the U.S. is equivalent to
surges of 16 percent in Germany, 20 percent in the U.K., 26 percent in China and 70 percent in India. Of course, our
growth is driven by consumption, a significant portion of which is fed by imports, which totaled $2 trillion last year. Again,
do the math: Our annual import volumewhat we buy in a single year from abroadexceeds the GDP of all but four
other countriesJapan, Germany, Britain and France. So, yes, the United States is the growth engine for the world
economy. And it is important that it remain so because no other country appears poised to pick up the torch if the U.S.
economy stumbles or tires
growth dynamic especially difficult.'' As the US economy faltered in early 2001, many Wall Street
gurus predicted that Europe would outpace the US. European Vulnerability ''It didn't happen _ a
lesson investors should bear in mind today ,'' says Joseph Quinlan, chief market strategist at Bank of America Capital
31
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
32 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
plunged 64% in 2001, according to Mr Quinlan. Those declines in the biggest and most-profitable market for many German,
UK, French and Dutch enterprises resulted in reduced orders, lower profit, slower job growth and weak business confidence.
After expanding 3.9% in 2000, euro-area growth shrank to 1.9% in 2001, 0.9% in 2002 and 0.8% in 2003. ''As the US
economy decelerates and as the dollar continues its slide, Europe will sink or swim with the US in 2007,''
Mr Quinlan says
32
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
33 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
33
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
34 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
than that of other major trading partners. For example, the impact of EU growth on the rest of the world is significant but
smaller than the impact of U.S. growth.
34
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
35 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
35
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
36 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
36
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
37 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
37
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
38 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
38
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
39 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
climate of economic stagnation, individual nations will be little able and even less inclined to end their destabilizing
environmental practices. Thus the groundwork will be laid for a chain reaction of conflicts across a spectrum of relations,
with one nation after another forced into escalating confrontation along several fronts.
39
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
40 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
back on planting, which means even less food for a continent where the supply has already been
weakened by drought, political unrest and rising prices. While the world's attention has been focused on rescuing
investment banks and stock markets from collapse, the global food crisis has worsened, a casualty of the growing
financial tumult. Oxfam, the Britain-based aid group, estimates that economic chaos this year has pulled the incomes of an
additional 119 million people below the poverty line. Richer countries from the United States to the Persian Gulf are busy
helping themselves and have been slow to lend a hand. The contrast between the rapid-fire reaction by Western authorities to
the financial crisis and their comparatively modest response to soaring food prices earlier this year has triggered anger among
aid and farming groups. "The amount of money used for the bailouts in the U.S. and Europe -- people here are
saying that money is enough to feed the poor in Africa for the next three years ," said Muchiri, head of the Eastern
Africa Farmers Federation. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that 923 million people were seriously
undernourished in 2007. Its director-general, Jacques Diouf, said in a recent speech that he worries about cuts in aid to
agriculture in developing countries. He said he is also concerned by protectionist trade measures intended to counteract the
financial turmoil. Although the price of commodities has come down in the past few months, Diouf said, 36 countries still
need emergency assistance for food, and he warned of a looming disaster next year if countries do not make food security a
top priority. "The global financial crisis should not make us forget the food crisis," Diouf said. Commodity
prices have plummeted in recent weeks as investors have shown increasing concern about a global recession and a drop in the
demand for goods. Wheat futures for December delivery closed at $5.1625 on Friday -- down 62 percent from a record set in
February. Corn futures are down 53 percent from their all-time high, and soybean futures are 47 percent lower. Such declines,
while initially welcomed by consumers, could eventually increase deflationary pressures -- lower prices could mean
less incentive for farmers to cultivate crops. That, in turn, could exacerbate the global food shortage . In
June, governments, donors and agencies gathered in Rome to pledge $12.3 billion to address the world's worst food crisis in a
generation. But only $1 billion has been disbursed. An additional $1.3 billion, which had been earmarked by the European
Commission for helping African farmers, is tied up in bureaucracy, with some governments now arguing that they can no
longer afford to give up that money. "The financial crisis is providing an excuse for people across the spectrum
-- governments, multilateral organizations, companies -- to not do the right thing," said Oxfam spokeswoman
Amy Barry. The precarious aid situation is compounded by export taxes and bans imposed this year by a number of grainand fertilizer-producing nations, including China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine and Argentina. E.U. Trade Commissioner Peter
Mandelson has criticized export restrictions because they "drive up world prices and cut off supplies of raw materials." Such
restrictions, he said, "invite a cycle of retaliation that is as economically counterproductive as it is politically hard to resist,"
Mandelson said last month. China -- the world's biggest grain and rice producer and the biggest exporter of certain types of
fertilizer -- could see its moves having ripple effects on vulnerable countries. "
40
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
41 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
41
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
42 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause . From 1989 to the present, the
GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in
1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the
official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the
revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without
well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an
American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis
show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will
soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the
powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an
exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile,
the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and
medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the
military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of
soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities
pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve
closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a
regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is
crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue
to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them
together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to
the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow
when they receive so little in return . Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which
make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians
to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for
autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is
likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be
severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone . An embattled
Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees
would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors .
Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of
Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil
war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most
alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its
nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim
consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of
thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the
loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will
slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such
dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think
of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war
42
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
43 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
43
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
44 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
44
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
45 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
war toward human beings, but toward women. Let's begin with rape. The rate of violence toward
women escalates in war," said the playwright and activist who has traveled to war-torn regions in Bosnia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Middle East. "War is really about taking what you want when you want it without
consent. It really perpetuates a rape mentality. Take Iraq as an example. Saddam Hussein was as evil as they come.
Under his regime, 1 million died, women were raped, people were tortured. That existed for 30 years and we never
intervened on behalf of the people being tortured and raped. If this were a war about stopping human rights violations, that
was a war that should have been called 20 years ago."
45
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
46 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
46
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
47 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
47
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
48 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
48
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
49 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
49
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
50 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The erosion of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth
between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the
Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from
the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences
of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest.
As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably,
from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At
the same time, China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year a truly
stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of
losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000.
Worse, Americas decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only
further weaken U.S. power. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make
clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to
continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States.
50
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
51 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
51
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
52 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
52
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
53 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
53
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
54 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
54
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
55 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
55
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
56 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
government support for the social sectors are helpful in reducing poverty.
56
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
57 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Economic growth is an important factor in reducing poverty and generating the resources
necessary for human development and environmental protection. There is a strong
correlation between gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and indicators of development
such as life expectancy, infant mortality, adult literacy, political and civil rights, and some
indicators of environmental quality. However, economic growth alone does not guarantee human
development. Well-functioning civil institutions, secure individual and property rights, and broad-based health and
educational services are also vital to raising overall living standards. Despite its shortcomings, though, GDP remains a
useful proxy measure of human well-being.
The world economy has grown approximately fivefold since 1950, an unprecedented rate of
increase. The industrialized economies still dominate economic activity, accounting for
US$22.5 trillion of the US$27.7 trillion global GDP in 1993 [1]. Yet a remarkable trend over
the past 25 years has been the burgeoning role played by developing countries, in particular
the populous economies of east and south Asia.
57
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
58 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
58
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
59 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
59
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
60 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
60
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
61 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
61
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
62 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
62
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
63 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Trainer
Ted Trainers ideas are flawed overconsumption is unavoidable and
necessary
(Margo Condoleon, Document of the DSP, national executive, 09,
"Environment, Capitalism and Socialism,"
http://books.google.com/books?id=kP4xrhGDoywC&pg=PA97&dq=ted+trainer&lr=&ei=LBYSsujHpbyzQTLzJw1)
Ted Trainer's main ideas have been expressed in two books Abandon Affluence and Developed to Death. They
contain very detailed presentation of trends in resource depletion and energy supply, population growth, the
wastefulness of consumer societies, and the exploitation of the Third World by wealthier nations. Trainer argues
strongly against those who believe that these problems can be addressed adequately through existing political and
social institutions.
However, as the title indicates, Abandon Affluence argues that all have to accept a lower level of consumption -the root cause of the ecological crisis is "overconsumption" by individual consumers in the industrially
developed countries. This argument undervalues the great disparities in income that exist within the developed
countries. It also fails to grasp that wasteful consumption is overwhelmingly created by the needs of capital for
ever expanding markets: if profits need to be maintained planned obsolescence, the permanent stimulation of
new "needs" through advertising, multiple versions of the same product and unnecessary packaging are all
unavoidable. Thus Trainer's tendency to blame individual consumption levels for the ecological crisis stems from his
equating affluence (a plentiful supply of products meeting rational needs) with consumerism and wasteful
consumption created by capitalism
63
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
64 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Econ defense
Economic problems dont increase the likelihood of war
Bennet and Nordstrom, 2k (D. Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, dept of political science @ the
University of Penn, 2000,Foreign Policy)
Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries, Journal of Conflict resolution, vol.44 no.1 p.
33-61, jstor
Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when
faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals
require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important
resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a "guns versus butter" world of economic trade-offs,
when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for
leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a
rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to bemost important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad
and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is
more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a
worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state
leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument
also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer
compete economically with the United States. Hypothesis 2: Poor economic conditions increase the probability of
rivalry termination. Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to a single cause (internal economic
problems). As such, they demand are search design that can account for substitutability between them.
64
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
65 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Econ Defense
The economy is resilient
Sehgal, 4-17 (Rohit- chief investment strategist for Dynamic Funds, The Globe and Mail, Optimism
reigns,
even after
the humble
pie
Lexis-Nexis Academic, April
17, 2009,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do)
We follow two economies very closely, China and the U.S. In China, the numbers look very encouraging. They also
have a fairly aggressive stimulus plan that seems to be sticking. Car sales in China, for instance, in March were more
than 12 million [at an annual pace] so they are already exceeding U.S. car sales.
In the U.S., we are still in a crisis mode. You have to look very closely at housing because that's where the whole
trouble started. If you're looking at affordability, it's improving pretty dramatically. You're seeing mortgage
applications, the numbers are beginning to improve. The retail data in the U.S. are not as bad, durables numbers are
not as bad. Not as bad to me is a good sign.
And if you look at inventories, they're scraping the bottom right now so you could have a pretty fast recovery there,
because industrial production came to a screeching halt. When you look at all this anecdotal evidence, you can make a
case that maybe things are improving a bit.
The bears say that things may get better, but not for long and then they will get worse. What do you say to that?
But maybe it will not get worse again. Look at the amount of stimulus, and look at the valuations in equity markets.
They're at historically low levels. If you look at the last 10 years, equity returns are zero. That's a very rare occurrence.
It doesn't mean we won't have setbacks. I think we will have setbacks. I don't believe we are in a great depression. I
think we have a problem that started in the housing sector with subprime, and it's going to take a long time to clean it
up.
The U.S. economy is very resilient. This is one area where the bears don't want to give too much credit. Unlike Japan
and Europe, it's adaptive. They go and blow their brains out once every five or six years because of excesses, but they
learn their lessons and they do adapt very well and it's still a very productive economy. It will take time, certainly.
"America is one of the only free markets in the world, where intellectual property and people can be
developed. Its industrial and technology companies are the hot houses of the world for producing
innovation. The low dollar means that there is a huge wind at the back for companies who can serve the
world with exports, services and goods that help build their economies and enable infrastructure
development."
65
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
66 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
66
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
67 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
67
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
68 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
68
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
69 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
For developing countries during the 1980s, cropland grew at just 0.26 percent a year, less than half the
rate of the 1970s. More importantly, in these countries arable land per capita dropped by 1.9 percent a
year.52 In the absence of a major increase in arable land in developing countries, experts expect that the
world average of 0.28 hectares of cropland per capita will decline to 0.17 hectares by the year 2025,
given the current rate of world population growth.53 Large tracts are being lost each year to urban
encroachment, erosion, nutrient depletion, salinization, waterlogging, acidification, and compacting. The
geographer Vaclav Smil, who is generally very conservative in his assessments of environmental
damage, estimates that two to three million hectares of cropland are lost annually to erosion; perhaps
twice as much land goes to urbanization, and at least one million hectares are abandoned because of
excessive salinity. In addition, about one-fifth of the world's cropland is suffering from some degree of
desertification.54 Taken together, he concludes, the planet will lose about 100 million hectares of arable
land between 1985 and 2000.55
69
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
70 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Freedom
Violation of freedom negates the value of human existence and represents the greatest threat to
human survival
Rand 89
(Ayn Rand, Philosopher, July 1989, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, p. 145)
A society that robs and individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of his mind, or
compels him to act against his own rational judgment, a society that sets up a conflict between its ethics and the
requirements of mans nature is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule.
Such a society destroys all values of human coexistence, has no possible justification, and represents , not
a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to mans survival. Life on desert island is safer than and
70
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
71 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Genocide
Genocide threatens extinction
Diamond 92
(Diamond, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, 1992, p. 277)
While our first association to the world genocide is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those were not
even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were modern targets of
successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world are potential
targets in the near future. Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either wed rather not think about it
at all, or else wed like to believe that nice people dont commit genocide only Nazis do. But our refusal to think about
it has consequences weve done little to halt the numerous episodes of genocide since World War II, and
were not alert to where it may happen next . Together with our destruction of our own environmental
resources, our genocidal tendencies coupled to nuclear weapons now constitute the two most likely
means by which the human species may reverse all its progress virtually overnight.
Genocide should always be weighed before other impacts
Rice 05
(Susan Rice, Brookings Institute, WHY DARFUR CANT BE LEFT TO AFRICA, August 7, 2005,
http://www.brookings.org/views/articles/rice/20050807.htm)
Never is the international responsibility to protect more compelling than in cases of genocide. Genocide
is not a regional issue. A government that commits or condones it is not on a par with one that, say, jails dissidents,
squanders economic resources or suppresses free speech, as dreadful as such policies may be. Genocide makes a claim
on the entire world and it should be a call to action whatever diplomatic feathers it ruffles.
71
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
72 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Heg
Heg prevents global nuclear wars
Khalilzad 95
(Zalmay
Khalilzad,
Rand
Corporation,
The
Washington
Quarterly
1995)
What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward ? Without the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of EastCentral Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either
in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely
to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given
the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear
exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's
security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security
and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S.
protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant
Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological
prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear
dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides,
with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would
face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last.
In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both
sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their
independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran
controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that
gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United
States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East
under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace
process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.
<continued> The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the
United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard
of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and
jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of
The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as
North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles . That danger would only increase if the United
States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many
states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly . If this
necessary adjustments might be high.
happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.<continued> Under the third option,
the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the
indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but
because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would
be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a
better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by
renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers,
including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a
multipolar balance of power system.
72
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
73 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Homophobia War
Heterosexual dominance justifies genocide homophobia isolates
homosexuals as citizens undeserving of equal protection of law
Cohen, 2K [More censorship or less discrimination? Sexual orientation hate
propaganda in multiple perspectives, McGill law review]
The above phenomena--closetry, deviance, sexism, and supremacy--form the context of homophobia against which hate
propaganda works its harms. These harms are not just those of individual libel writ large; they are, seen contextually, the
implements of heterosexual domination. (24) First among them is a range of physiological and psychological traumas
experienced by members of the targeted group, all of which exacerbate existing feelings of vulnerability and
isolation. (25) Second, these effects extend beyond the targeted group, causing particular detriment to freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and democracy. (26) Third, sexual orientation hate propaganda reinforces
(and is reinforced by) the other tools of homophobia, which include harassment, gay bashing, overt and covert
discrimination, extortion, stigmatization, murder, and genocide. (27) Finally, the absence of protection from hate
propaganda--particularly in jurisdictions such as Canada, where other target groups receive protection--signals to members
of sexual minorities that they are second class citizens not entitled to equal protection of the law. (28) It is
the individual and combined effect of these interconnected tools of homophobia, and not the mere pluralization of individual
defamation
or
libel,
that
ultimately
justifies
state
sanction
of
anti-gay
hate
propaganda.
73
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
74 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is
being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the
Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of
individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights,
encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of
accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include human-centered sustainable
development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United
States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear
on both domestic and foreign policy.
74
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
75 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Having an effective and principled American strategy to promote democratic freedoms around the world has never
been more important to Americas national security. Indeed, I strongly believe that promoting human rights is central
to Americas central national security imperative of defeating terror, for three reasons. First, the aims of Al Qaeda
and its allies are advanced by the actions of repressive regimes in the Muslim world, which stretches from Africa to
the Middle East to Central, South and Southeast Asia. The terrorists primary aim, we should remember, is to turn the
hearts and minds of the people of this region against their governments and against the West, and to seize upon that
anger to transform the region politically. When governments in countries like Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Uzbekistan shut down political dissent, lock up non-violent dissidents, torture opponents, abuse the rule of law, and
deny their people fair justice, they are contributing to the radicalization of their people, thus playing right into the
hands of terrorist movements. And when ordinary people in the region associate the United States with their
repressive governments, Al Qaedas aim of painting the United States as the enemy is also advanced. Second, in the
long run, the only viable alternative to the rise of violent, extremist movements in this region is the development of
moderate, non-violent political movements that represent their peoples aspirations, speaking out for economic
progress and better schools and against corruption and arbitrary rule. But such movements can only exist under
democratic conditions, when people are free to think, speak, write and worship without fear, when they can form
political organizations, and when their rights are protected by independent courts. Without a doubt, more radical
organizations can also exploit democratic freedoms to express their views, and they will be part of the political
landscape as societies in the Middle East become more open. But as for terrorists, they do not need human rights to do
what they do. They have thrived in the most repressive societies in the world. It is the people who dont use violence
who need democratic freedoms to survive. Third, promoting human rights and democracy is important because
Americas moral authority partly depends on it. American power in the world is more likely to be respected
when it is harnessed to goals that are universally shared. People around the world are more likely to aid the
United States in the fight against terrorism and other important goals if they believe the United States is also
interested in defending their rights and aspirations. When America is seen to be compromising the values it has
long preached, its credibility and influence are diminished.
75
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
76 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the
Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear
option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists
and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world.
Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the
bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and
so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think youve got
to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East,
what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had
hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents
training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively
easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United
States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi
Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had
attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely
certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise
missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in
the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. More Terror Were familiar with the horror scenario of a
Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same
scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the
bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very
difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states like Pakistans
intelligence services or Irans Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source
of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear
terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis enjoy an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels
of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and
Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based
understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out,
however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic,
Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race .
76
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
77 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the worlds
non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like
Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially
in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be
tempted to take control of Kuwaits oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare
risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once
the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand,
to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely
tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the
Cold War, but there were also many hot proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized
Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear confrontations.
77
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
78 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
B. Extinction
Diamond95.(Larry,Snr.researchfellow@HooverInstitute,PromotingDemocracyinthe1990's,p6
7)
This hardly exhausts the list of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades.
In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread.
The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that
have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of
tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical. and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very
source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and
unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
78
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
79 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
few potential allies in a zone where other states are not so amenable to U.S. activity. Regional countries need
American moral and material support to maintain independence in the face of increasing pressures, and its guidance in
dealing with presidential transition crises and addressing human rights abuses. Even with limited political and
financial resources, U.S. leadership can do a great deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate problems. However,
this will only be possible if a policy is defined early and communicated clearly, if there is a particular focus on
partnership with European allies in addressing regional challenges, and if Russia is encouraged to become a force for
stability rather than a factor for instability in the regions.
The Caucasus and Central Asia at a Crossroads
This is a critical time for the Caucasus and Central Asian states because a number of negative trends could converge to
bring about a crisis. Responding to that crisis requires the United States to build a long-term strategy based on a frank
assessment of regional needs and of U.S. capabilities and resources. The Clinton administration's approach to the regions was ad hoc. It tackled a laundry list
of initiatives in response to crises and shifting policy priorities. Issues such as oil and gas pipelines, conflict resolution, and human rights were targeted at
different junctures, but an overall strategywhich was essential given limited government resources for the regionswas never fully articulated. As a result,
American priorities were not communicated clearly to local leaders, resulting in frequent misinterpretations of intentions. Domestic constituencies in the
United States undermined leverage in regional conflicts. Incompatible government structures and conflicting legislation fostered competition among agencies
and encouraged a proliferation of parallel initiatives, while congressional mandates limited areas in which scarce funds could be applied and thus reduced
flexibility. The new administration must get ahead of this negative trend in setting policy and priorities, while tackling U.S. government deficiencies directly.
In crafting policy, several developments need to be considered: The civil war in Afghanistan will likely regain momentum this summer. Already, the
incursion of refugees and fighters from Afghanistan into Central Asia and the activities of Central Asian militant groups have strained fragile political
situations in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Governments in Central Asia are violating human rights as they clamp down on Islamic groups in
response to acts of terrorism and militant activities. In Uzbekistan, the closing of mosques, a ban on political opposition movements, and arrests of practicing
Muslims have forced groups underground and increased support for insurgencies and extremists. In Chechnya, the war shows little sign of resolution
through political negotiation. Refugees and fighters have been pushed across borders into the South Caucasus by Russian troops, as well as into neighboring
Russian regions. As in Afghanistan, an intensification of the war in Chechnya is likely this summer. Other Caucasus civil wars are in a state of "no peace,
no war." Recent international efforts to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, led by the United States, France, and Russia, have raised expectations for
a peace settlement. But, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, opposition figures openly discuss the resumption of war if leaders are perceived to have sold out.
Georgia is teetering on the verge of collapse, overwhelmed by internal difficulties and burdened by the inability to combat corruption and tackle economic
reform. The dual secessions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have split the country and spillover from Chechnya has soured relations with Russia. In winter
2000, Russia imposed new, stringent visa requirements on Georgia and temporarily suspended energy supplies over payments and a contract dispute,
increasing pressure on the beleaguered country. In both Georgia and Azerbaijan, political succession has become a critical issue. Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan will soon face the same crisis. No provisions have been made for a presidential transition, and emerging leaders have often been
suppressed or forced into exile. All of these issues are exacerbated by the continued downturn of regional economies. The Asian and Russian financial crises
of 1998 were a major setback, leading to the devaluation of currencies, untenable debt burdens, and the withdrawal of foreign investment. Deep-rooted
corruption feeds into the economic crisis and hinders the emergence of small and medium-sized businesses that could spur market development and economic
growth. For both regions, Russia is the only source of reliable employment, a significant market for local products, and, in the short-term, the principal energy
supplier. In Georgia alone, approximately 10 percent of the population currently works in Russia and sends home an amount equivalent to nearly a quarter of
Georgia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This influx of economic migrants has exacerbated ethnic tensions within Russia. Because regional governments
cannot pay their energy bills, clashes over energy with Russia will continue, increasing tensions and instability. In Central Asia, high unemployment fosters
the smuggling of raw materials and consumer goods, and trafficking in arms and drugs. Eighty percent of heroin sold in Europe originates in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and about half of this production flows through Central Asia. The heroin trade in Central Asia has created a burgeoning intravenous drug problem
and an HIV/AIDS outbreak that mimics the early epidemic in Africa. Health workers fear an escalation in a matter of months that will overwhelm local
medical systems and the region's miniscule international programs. A major HIV/AIDS crisis would be the final straw for states like Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. U.S.-Russian Tensions in the Caspian Basin Converging with this regional crisis is a sharp difference of opinion between the United States and
Russia over U.S. involvement in Caspian energy development and engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Moscow, the United States is portrayed
as purposefully weakening Russia's strategic position and bent on establishing Central Asia and the Caucasus as U.S. outposts. Where American policymakers
speak of intervention in a positive sense to promote regional cooperation and stability, Russian political commentators speak of American "vmeshatel'stvo"
literally, negative interventionto constrain Russia. The United States and Russia are at odds politically and semantically in the Caspian. Because
79
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
80 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
approximately 50 percent of Russia's foreign currency revenues are generated by oil and gas sales, the Putin administration has made increasing Russian
energy exports to Europe a priority. Caspian energy resources play a major role in Russian calculations. Gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan flows into
the Russian pipeline system, where it supplies the Russian domestic market and supplements Russia's European exports. Russia is the largest supplier of gas
to Turkey, and has begun constructing a new Black Sea pipeline ("Blue Stream") to increase supplies. But gas flowing to Turkey from Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijanand bypassing Russiacould pose direct competition. Over the last five years, U.S. policy in the Caspian Basin has
promoted multiple gas and oil pipelines to world markets to increase export options for regional states, persuading Moscow that the United States seeks to
squeeze Russia out of regional energy development. Beyond energy issues, Russia sees itself caught between NATO to the west and chaos to the south. In the
Caucasus, Russia has lost its strategic defensive structures against NATO's southern flank in Turkey. Moscow perceives this loss as significant, given NATO
expansion east and the alliance's willingness to use force in the extended European arena. Explicit statements of intent to join NATO by Georgia and
Azerbaijan have angered Russian policymakers, along with the active involvement of regional states in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, and the
formation of a regional alliance among states that have opted out of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States security structures (the so-called
GUUAM group of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). Although Central Asia is less a zone of competition because of shared concern
about Afghanistan, which resulted in unprecedented U.S.-Russian collaboration on UN sanctions against the Taliban in December 2000, U.S. bilateral military
relations with regional states still alarm Moscow. The fact that an energetic Pentagon moved faster than the State Department to engage Central Asian
counterparts has led Moscow to view U.S. actions in both regions with deepening suspicion. Crafting U.S. Policy. To address these issues, the Bush
administration will first have to recognize that the Caucasus and Central Asia are a major factor in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations. Russia does not only view
its dealings with the U.S. through the prism of NATO, missile defense, and non-proliferation issues, although these are currently the United States' top
security priorities in the relationship. Russia's southern tier is now its most sensitive frontier and the Caucasus and Central Asia are its number one security
priority. Having recognized this fact, the Bush administration must present a unified front when dealing with Moscow and the region, and prevent the various
agencies from acting in conflict with each other. The administration needs to articulate a message that is positive and inclusive for Russia as well as regional
states and stick to it. It should emphasize regional stability, cooperative relations, political solutions to conflicts, border security, human rights, institutional
development, orderly successions of political power, anti-corruption efforts, and opportunities for citizen participation in political and economic
decisionmaking. Although this framework would not be considerably different from the general themes of the Clinton administration, the notion of explicitly
recognizing the importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian regions in the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationshipand staying focusedwould be a departure.
The primary goal should be to encourage Russia to adopt a positive approach to relations with its neighbors that eschews commercial and political bullying.
To this end, the administration will have to maintain a direct dialogue with its Russian counterparts in working out a practical approach for the Caucasus and
Central Asia. With its message clear, the administration needs to bring its bureaucratic mechanisms in line to focus on key issues and countries. Even if
responsibility for the Caucasus and Central Asian states is divided within government departments, effective structures will have to be created to preserve
links between the regions, and conflicting legislation will have to be streamlined to resolve interagency conflicts over responsibilities. This will require the
executive branch to work closely with Congress to reconcile appropriations with a comprehensive program for the regions and to articulate U.S. interests
through public hearings and testimony. If the administration has appropriate mechanisms in place, some policy innovations should be considered to
80
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
81 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Oceans
Oceans key to survival
Craig '03
(Robin Kundis Craig -- Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law McGeorge Law Rev Winter
elipses in original)
The world's oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable .
"Occupy[ing] more than [seventy percent] of the earth's surface and [ninety-five percent] of the biosphere," 17 oceans
provide food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes,
including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life , both aesthetic
and economic, for millions of people worldwide . 18 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the
ocean to humanity's well-being: "The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of
existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles
that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate." 19 Ocean and coastal ecosystem services have been
calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per year, worldwide. 20 In addition, many people assign heritage and
existence value to the ocean and its creatures, viewing the world's seas as a common legacy to be passed on relatively intact
to future generations.
81
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
82 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ozone
Ozone depletion causes extinction
Greenpeace, 1995
(Full of Homes: The Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer,
http://archive.greenpeace.org/ozone/holes/holebg.html .)
When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer
depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible
scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful
ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to
increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system suppression
in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems. This is why Rowland's and Molina's theory
was taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.
Ozone destruction causes mass extinction
Palenotological Research Insitute, No Date
(Paleontological
Research
Institute,
PERMIAN
http://www.priweb.org/ed/ICTHOL/ICTHOLrp/82rp.htm)
EXTINCTION,
no
date,
Lastly, a new theory has been proposed- the Supernova explosion. A supernova occurring 30 light years
away from earth would release enough gamma radiation to destroy the ozone layer for several years.
Subsequent exposure to direct ultra-violet radiation would weaken or kill nearly all existing species.
Only those living deep in the ocean will be secured. Sediments contain records or short-term ozone
destruction- large amounts of NOx gasses and C14 plus global and atmospheric cooling. With
sufficient destruction of the ozone layer, these problems could cause widespread destruction of life.This
was the biggest extinction event in the last 500 million years, and researchers want a theory that is
scientifically rigorous. Therefore, all these theories are possible but also have many faults and create
much controversy in determining if it is the one exact theory which will explain this historic mass
extinction.
82
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
83 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Patriarchy
Patriarchy is the root cause of wars
Reardon 93
(Betty A. Reardon, Director of the Peace Education Program at Teachers College Columbia University, 1993, Women and
Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-2 (PDNSS6401))
In an article entitled Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War (1983), Charlene Spretnak focused on some of
the fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy
encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost
unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race limited
to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is badly needed . . . A clearly visible element in
the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of
dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to strut their stuff as
we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically
inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance ones character from that of
women, to survive the toughest violent initiation , to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in
order to hold it at bay all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in
ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear
power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles
because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend,
instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water . If we believe that war is a
necessary evil, that patriarchal assumptions are simply human nature, then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The
ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological.
Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically
have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983)
Citizens in this nation fear challenging patriarchy even as they lack overt awareness that they are fearful,
so deeply embedded in our collective unconscious are the rules of patriarchy . I often tell audiences that if we
were to go door-todoor asking if we should end male violence against women, most people would give their unequivocal
support. Then if you told them we can only stop male violence against women by ending male domination, by eradicating
patriarchy, they would begin to hesitate, to change their position. Despite the many gains of contemporary feminist
movement-greater equality for women in the workforce, more tolerance for the relinquishing of rigid
gender roles- patriarchy as a system remains intact, and many people continue to believe that it is needed
if humans are to survive as a species. This belief seems ironic, given that patriarchal methods of organizing
nations, especially the insistence on violence as a means of social control , has actually led to the slaughter of
millions of people on the planet.
83
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
84 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Patriarchy War
Patriarchy is the root cause of war The unequal value of women and
threat of violence mirror the coercive order of the war system
Runyan 92 (Anne, Department of PoliSci at Potsdam College of State U of NY,
Criticizing the Gender of International Relations, International Relations:
Critical concepts in Political Science, pg. 1693-1724)
Betty Reardon takes this thesis even further by equating war with patriarchy, military with sexism, and peace and
world order with feminism. According to Reardon, the war system is a pervasive, competitive social order, which
is based in authoritarian principles, assumes unequal value among and between human beings, and is
held in place by coercion. In addition, it is controlled by a few elites in industrialized countries, implemented
by subelites throughout the world, and directed against nonelites to ensure their submission. Similarly, patriarchy is
a set of beliefs and values supported by institutions and backed up by the threat of violence. It lays down the
supposedly proper relations between men and women, between women and women and between men
and men. Thus, patriarchal relations constitute the paradigm on which the war system is
based, and the war system, in turn, consolidates patriarchal relations.
84
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
85 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Patriarchy War
Manifestation of Evil - Discourse of male dominance for survival affirms
the same type of coercion and violence it defends against
Johnson 97 The Gender Knot
To support male aggression and therefore male dominance as society's only defense against evil, we have to believe
that evil forces exist out there, in villains, governments, and armies. In this, we have to assume that the bad guys
actually see themselves as evil and not as heroes defending loved ones and principles against bad guys like us. The
alternative to this kind of thinking is to realize that the same patriarchal ethos that creates our masculine heroes
also creates the violent villains they battle and prove themselves against, and that both sides often see themselves
as heroic and self-sacrificing for a worthy cause. For all the wartime propaganda, good and bad guys play similar
games and salute a core of common values, not to mention one another on occasion. At a deep level, war and many
other forms of male aggression are manifestations of the same evil they supposedly defend against. The
evil is the patriarchal religion of control and domination that encourages men to use coercion and
violence to settle disputes, manage human relations, and affirm masculine identity.
85
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
86 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Patriarchy War
Patriarchy is the root cause of war The unequal value of women and
threat of violence mirror the coercive order of the war system
Runyan 92 (Anne, Department of PoliSci at Potsdam College of State U of NY,
Criticizing the Gender of International Relations, International Relations:
Critical concepts in Political Science, pg. 1693-1724)
Betty Reardon takes this thesis even further by equating war with patriarchy, military with sexism, and peace and
world order with feminism. According to Reardon, the war system is a pervasive, competitive social order, which
is based in authoritarian principles, assumes unequal value among and between human beings, and is
held in place by coercion. In addition, it is controlled by a few elites in industrialized countries, implemented
by subelites throughout the world, and directed against nonelites to ensure their submission. Similarly, patriarchy is
a set of beliefs and values supported by institutions and backed up by the threat of violence. It lays down the
supposedly proper relations between men and women, between women and women and between men
and men. Thus, patriarchal relations constitute the paradigm on which the war system is
based, and the war system, in turn, consolidates patriarchal relations.
86
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
87 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Patriarchy War
Manifestation of Evil - Discourse of male dominance for survival affirms
the same type of coercion and violence it defends against
Johnson 97 The Gender Knot
To support male aggression and therefore male dominance as society's only defense against evil, we have to believe that
evil forces exist out there, in villains, governments, and armies. In this, we have to assume that the bad guys actually see
themselves as evil and not as heroes defending loved ones and principles against bad guys like us. The alternative to this
kind of thinking is to realize that the same patriarchal ethos that creates our masculine heroes also creates the violent
villains they battle and prove themselves against, and that both sides often see themselves as heroic and self-sacrificing
for a worthy cause. For all the wartime propaganda, good and bad guys play similar games and salute a core of common
values, not to mention one another on occasion. At a deep level, war and many other forms of male aggression are
manifestations of the same evil they supposedly defend against. The evil is the patriarchal religion of control
and domination that encourages men to use coercion and violence to settle disputes, manage human
relations, and affirm masculine identity.
87
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
88 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Poverty
Ongoing global poverty outweighs nuclear war- only our ev is comparative
Spina 2k
(Stephanie Urso, Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at the Graduate School of the City
University of New York, Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society, p.
201)
This sad fact is not limited to the United States. Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural
violence, compared to 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. That is , approximately every five years, as
many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million
deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as
were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an
ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and the
poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.
Poverty poses the greatest threat to the worldwe have a moral obligation to eradicate it
Vear 04
(Jesse Leah, Co-coordinates POWER--Portland Organizing to Win Economic Rights, "Abolishing
Poverty:
A
Declaration
of
Economic
Human
Rights,"
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0407/040704.htm)
Locked in the cross-hairs of domestic and foreign policies which intentionally put our bodies in harm's
way, our terror is the terror of poverty - a terror boldly and callously proliferated by our own government. Surely one
doesn't need the surveillance powers of high-definition weapons-grade satellites to see the faces of the some 80 million poor
people struggling just to survive in America; to see the worried faces of homeless mothers waiting to be added to the waiting
list for non-existent public housing; to find the unemployment lines filled with parents who aren't eligible to see a doctor and
who can't afford to get sick; to see the children stricken with preventable diseases in the midst of the world's best-equipped
hospitals; to hear the rumble in the bellies of millions of hungry Americans whose only security is a bread line once a week;
or to detect the crumbling of our nation's under-funded, under-staffed schools. Meanwhile, billions are spent waging wars and
occupying countries that our school children can't even find on a map. Surely it doesn't take a rocket scientist to
detect the moral bankruptcy of a nation - by far the world's richest and most powerful - which disregards
the basic human needs of its own despairing people in favor of misguided military adventures that
protect no one, whether in nations half-way across the globe, or in the outer reaches of our atmosphere. To see these things
one needs neither a high-powered satellite nor a specialized degree. One needs only to open one's eyes and dare to see the
reality before them. Yet even as you look you still might not see the millions of poor people in America. My
face is only one of 80 million Americans who never get asked for in-depth television interviews or for our expert commentary
regarding the state of the economy or the impact of our nation's policies. In addition to all the indignities suffered by poor
people in America, we must suffer the further indignation of being disappeared - kept discretely hidden away from the eyes,
ears, and conscience of the rest of society and the world. The existence of poverty in the richest country on earth cannot
remain a secret for long. Americans, like the majority of the world's peoples, are compassionate, fair-minded people . When
exposed, the moral hypocrisy of poverty in America cannot withstand the light of day any more than the
moral hypocrisy of slavery or race or sex discrimination could . That's where the Poor People's Economic Human
Rights Campaign comes in. With this campaign, we are reaching out to the international community as well as the rest of US
society to help us secure what are our most basic human rights, as outlined in International Law. According to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, an International Treaty signed in 1948 by all UN member nations, including the United States,
all nations have a moral and legal obligation to ensure the basic needs and well-being of all their
citizens. Among the rights outlined in the Declaration are the rights to food, housing, health care, jobs at living wages, and
education. Over half a century after signing this document, despite huge economic gains and a vast productive capacity, the
United States has sorely neglected its promise. In a land whose founding documents proclaim life, liberty, and
justice for all, we must hold this nation to its promises.
88
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
89 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Racism
Racism is the root cause of violence
Foucault '76
[Michel, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, p. 254-257 Trans. David Macey]
What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is
under
power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of
the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are
described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a
population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to
treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known,
precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also
has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will
cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must
be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But
racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die" - function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible
with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand ,
89
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
90 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
SARS
A SARS bioweapon would kill at least 50 million people
Conant, 06
Paul, House Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack,July 2006
http://www.angelfire.com/ult/znewz1/bioterror.html
Concerned about this point, subcommittee Chairman John Linder, R-Ga., asked whether someone
with a "modicum of talent in this business" might genetically alter the SARS virus and "make it
more virulent, spread faster and make it more difficult to treat? The "short answer is yes," replied
Brent, though the recombinant virus might actually be weaker than the original Still,
resynthesized SARS spread by suicidal coughers is a real concern, said Brent.Anthrax,
though not contagious in humans, is the more serious threat, said witnesses, Callahan noting that
"you don't have to store it, it lives forever, and you don't have to feed it." The pathogen
is also easy to obtain because the disease afflicts animals in many places, he
said.However, Callahan put avian influenza -- bird flu -- as a top concern because of its extreme
mortality in humans. If a mutated bird flu pathogen becomes contagious among humans
and remains extremely deadly, it could kill some 50 million people worldwide, experts
have said. http://www.angelfire.com/ult/znewz1/bioterror.html
90
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
91 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
. There is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be
alerted to:
If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it. AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed
more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg". Two decades of intensive study
and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV. "An
airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain
reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen." That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could
have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it
was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could
happen tomorrow. The shock of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of a deadly viral outbreak is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the
91
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
92 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
92
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
93 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
powers may concede hegemony but will continue to seek asymmetric counters.4 The result will be a space strategy
that better aligns with what evolved out of the nuclear dilemma: mutual assured destruction (MAD). As a common MAD
logic developed across the globe (but primarily between the two players in the gamethe United States and Soviet Union), nontraditional foreign-policy
traits became apparent. Any move toward developing weapons or practices that increased the viability of the idea that one could win a nuclear exchange
was perceived as destabilizing. Deterrence in the form of MAD had to overcome the notion of winningone that could come in several forms: 1. A nation
could survive nuclear attacks and prevail. Conceding offensive dominance was critical if MAD were to deter nuclear holocaust. One had to avoid an odd
array of destabilizing practices and systems, including missile-defense systems and civil-defense programs. 2. A nation could use nuclear weapons on a
small scale and prevail in a predominantly conventional conflict. The term theater nuclear weapons was an oxymoronevery nuclear weapon was strategic
because it posed the threat of escalation. Limited use of nuclear weapons was destabilizing; hence, one had to avoid any such strategy. Prohibiting the
development of the neutron bomb, in spite of the immediate tactical benefits it offered to outnumbered NATO forces in Europe, was a direct result of this
logic. 3. A nation could launch a successful first strike. Stabilizing approaches that reduced the viability of surprise via first strike were pursued. More than
its name implies, if MAD were to prohibit a nuclear exchange, it had to be paired either with a reliable early warning capability allowing a reactive nuclear
response or with a survivable second-strike capability. The United States pursued both: the former via space- and land-based early warning networks and the
latter via submarine-launched ballistic missiles. From this experience, one can draw and apply lessons as the possibility of space
weapons emerges. Clearly, these weapons offer the potential for instantaneous and indefensible attack. Although the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967 (outlawing weapons of mass destruction [WMD] in space) prohibits complete annihilation, the threat of annihilation would
still existit is difficult to distinguish space-based WMD from space-based non-WMD. In simple terms, space weaponization could
Although MAD successfully deterred a nuclear exchange over the past 40 years, it was a very costly means of
overcoming the lack of trust between superpowers. The dissolution of that distrust and the corresponding reduction of nuclear arms lie at the very heart of
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). Comparing the emergence of nuclear-tipped ICBMs with the accession of space weapons does yield some
stark differences, however. There is no single threat to focus diplomatic efforts aimed at building trust, and there does seem to be some international support
for the idea of coalescing a strategy supporting space sanctuary and deterring third world space upstarts. Aside from these differences, though , one could
assume the existence of proliferated space weapons and proceed with the thought experiment that a space-MAD strategy would emerge
Again, one would have to eliminate the notion of winning a space-weapons exchange, and on at least the first two
counts, one could do so: 1. It is logical to concede the offensive dominance of space-based weapons in low-earth orbit (LEO). Any point on earth
could have a weapon pointed at it with clear line of sight; the potential of directed-energy weapons takes the notion of instantaneous to the
extreme; and defense of every national asset from such an attack would prove next to impossible . 2. The same argument against
the logic of tactical nuclear weapons would also apply to the tactical use of space-based weapons. Once they were used, any conflict could
automatically escalate to a higher level. 3. The failing of a space-MAD strategy comes on the third count: early warning or survivable secondstrike capability. Should space be weaponized and two space-capable foes emerge, there will be no 30-minute early
warning window from which one actor could launch a counterattack prior to the impact of the preemptive first strike.
Furthermore, space basing is equivalent to exposureno strike capability can be reliably hidden or protected in
space in order to allow a surviving, credible second strike. Space-MAD weapons without early warning or reliable
survivability logically instigate a first strike. This creates an incredibly unstable situation in which the viability of
winning a space war exists and is predicated upon striking first (with plausible deniability exacerbating the problem ),
eliminating the mutual from MAD and only assuring the destruction of the less aggressive state. Obviously, this is
not a good situation. Putting weapons in space could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy: we put them there because we
anticipate well need them, and because theyre there, well be compelled to use them; hence, we needed them. The
conclusion, then, of a nuclear weaponsspace weapons analogy can only be that while the threats from each type of weapon are similar, the most successful
strategy (MAD) for dealing with the former cannot work for the latter. Unlike the strategy for nuclear weapons, there exists no obvious
strategy for employing space weapons that will enhance global stability. If the precedent of evading destabilizing situations is to
continueand that is compatible with a long history of US foreign policyone ought to avoid space-based weapons. Further, even if one could construct a
workable space-MAD strategy, the nuclear-MAD approach teaches that this is an intensely expensive means of dealing with mutual distrust between nations.
93
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
94 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
economic perspective, the PRC views the exploitation of space as an integral part of its modernization
drive, a top priority on Beijing's national agenda . 8 The rapid growth of China's economy in the past two decades
has fueled investments in civilian space capabilities for several reasons. First, the explosive growth of the Chinese
telecommunications market has spurred China to put both indigenous and foreign-made networks of communications
satellites into orbit to keep pace with demand. Second, China's relatively inexpensive and increasingly reliable launchers have
enabled Beijing to provide satellite-launching services to major international customers. Third, China recognizes that
space research at the frontier of scientific knowledge promises innovative breakthroughs that are likely
to strengthen its economic power and technological capabilities in the long term. [End Page 21] As a result
of these economic imperatives, the Chinese government has invested substantial resources in a robust
space program. The PRC has developed a comprehensive scientific and industrial base capable of producing commercial
space launchers and satellites. Chinese launch vehicles, which have become increasingly reliable and competitive in the
international market, can place a variety of satellitesincluding those used for communications, remote sensing, photo
reconnaissance, meteorology, and scientific researchinto earth orbit. Furthermore, since 1999, China's involvement in
preparations for manned space flight has attracted substantial international attention. In the case of national security, China's
space program is shrouded in extreme secrecy, effectively shielding Chinese intentions and capabilities from outside
observers. The PRC's official policy is to support the exploitation of space for economic, scientific, and
cultural benefits while firmly opposing any militarization of space. 9 China has consistently warned that
any testing, deployment, and use of space-based weapons will undermine global security and lead to a
destabilizing arms race in space. 10 These public pronouncements have been primarily directed at the
United States, especially after President George W. Bush declared in December 2001 that the United States was officially
withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treatyand accelerating U.S. efforts to develop a missile defense system. Some
Chinese observers point to U.S. efforts to militarize space as evidence of the U.S. ambition to establish
unilateral hegemony. For example, in 2001, Ye Zhenzhen, a correspondent for a major daily newspaper of the Chinese
Communist Party, stated that, "[a]fter the Cold War, even though the United States already possessed the sole
strategic advantage over the entire planet, and held most advanced space technology and the most satellites, they still want
to bring outer space totally under their own armed control to facilitate their smooth ascension as the
world hegemon of the 21st century." 11 Diplomatically, China has urged the use of multilateral and bilateral legal
instruments to regulate space activities, and Beijing and Moscow jointly oppose the development of space weapons or the
94
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
95 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
ensure unrivaled superiority in space, as exemplified by the Rumsfeld Commission report, increasingly defines China's
interests in space. Chinese anxieties about U.S. space power began with the 1991 Gulf War, when the PRC leadership
watched with awe [End Page 22] and dismay as the United States defeated Iraq with astonishing speed. Beijing recognized
that the lopsided U.S. victory was based on superior command and control, intelligence, and communications systems, which
relied heavily on satellite networks. Demonstrations of the United States' undisputed conventional military power in Bosnia;
Kosovo; Afghanistan; and, most recently, Iraq further highlighted for Chinese officials the value of information superiority
and space dominance in modern warfare.
95
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
96 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in
the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that
have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble . Moreover, the United States could
find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of
Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to
play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India
and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear
arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after
extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian
nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others
are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions
throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian
nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and
intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could
cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global
economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
96
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
97 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
97
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
98 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
NASA ACTIVITIES IN SPACE ARE NOT FOR WEAPONIZATION THEY ARE KEY TO
EXPLORATION
National
Space
Society,
2005.
Nuclear
Power:
http://www.nss.org/adastra/volume17/david.html 7/7/09 RFF
Now
More
Than
Ever,
Or
Never?
Having a far different outlook is Bruce Behrhorst, president of Nuclear Space Technology Institute, Inc. He runs the NuclearSpace.com website. Its short and
sweet mission: "To promote the use of nuclear power in space to further enhance the manned exploration of our Solar
System." "There is no other technology in the near term that can be manipulated to service human beings in outer
space other than nuclear energy, if at least to insure the survival of our species in the heavens ," Behrhorst believes. "Our
technological prowess and space exploration requires the use of dynamic, high density energy systems to realistically
transport humans and robotica in a safe and efficient mode ." Behrhost sees space nuclear power as opening the window to other realistic
methods to affect the space and time frame metric, thus "providing insight into the micro universe for the practicality of bridging much of the ultimate macro
universe." Similar in view is James Dewar, a former nuclear affairs expert in the Department of Energy. In his book, To the End of the Solar System: The
Story of the Nuclear Rocket [University Press of Kentucky, 2003], he stresses that chemically propelled rockets can lift less than five
percent of their takeoff weight into orbit. That fact is a prescription for a stay-at-home, highly limited space program .
Dewar sees nuclear-powered rockets, however, as offering far superior thrusting power and speed. To date, the nuclear rocket story has been scarred by
political battles over the space program's future, involving U.S. presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. He
maintains that only by reestablishing a nuclear rocket project can the nation have a space program worthy of the 21st century, one that makes reality of the
hopes and dreams of science fiction. Just like those projects of the past, NASA's newest nuclear initiative offers the promise of
an untethered exploration of the Solar System. Risk management, as well as public and political support tied to the building of safe, reliable
and affordable nuclear power space systems are essential if humanity is to break the stranglehold of Earth's gravity and travel deep into the Solar System and
well beyond into the surrounding cosmos. If past is prologue, NASA's latest nuclear power play will be as challenging as the technology it hopes to harness.
98
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
99 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Russia is
particularly vulnerable to such manipulation, from the major defensive weapons systems it fielded to counter U.S. armaments that appeared only on the
pages of Aviation Week, to scary space hardware it actually built to combat what it saw as "soldier-astronauts" aboard militarized Gemini, Apollo and space
shuttle vehicles. In recent years, historians have revealed that Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev bankrupted his country's space program by demanding that
his engineers build a copy of NASA's space shuttle because his advisers persuaded him that the United States wanted to use it for bombing Moscow. Aside
from the waste, building such hardware created new hazards to everyone involved.
Now come the newest stories that echo down the
interconnected corridors of the American mainstream media, about "killer satellites" and "death stars" and "Rods
from God" bombardment systems as if the Hollywoodized terminology wasn't a clue that most of the subject matter was equally imaginary.
Take the opening paragraph of a recent Christian Science Monitor editorial that denounced what it portrayed as "the possible first-ever overt deployment of
weapons where heretofore only satellites and astronauts have gone." But history reveals an entirely different reality .
Dawn
of
New
Era
Space.com.
For those that think space weaponization is impossible, Dolman said such belief falls into the same camp that "man will never fly". The fact that space
weaponization is technically feasible is indisputable , he said, and nowhere challenged by a credible authority. "Space
weaponization can work," Dolman said. "It will be very expensive. But the rewards for the state that weaponizes first--and establishes itself at the top of the
Earth's gravity well, garnering all the many advantages that the high ground has always provided in war--will find the benefits worth the costs." What if
America weaponizes space? One would think such an action would kick-start a procession of other nations to follow
suit. Dolman said he takes issues with that notion. " This argument comes from the mirror-image analogy that if another state
were to weaponize space, well then, the U.S. would have to react. Of course it would! But this is an entirely different
situation," Dolman responded. "The U.S. is the world's most powerful state. The international system looks to it for order.
If the U.S. were to weaponize space, it would be perceived as an attempt to maintain or extend its position, in effect,
the status quo," Dolman suggested. It is likely that most states--recognizing the vast expense and effort needed to hone their
space skills to where America is today--would opt not to bother competing, he said.
99
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
100 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
TB (1/4)
TB collapses the economy
Fonkwo, International Consultant on Public Health, 2008 (Peter Ndeboc, International Consultant on
Public
Health,
EMBO
reports
9,
S1,
S13S17
(2008),
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v9/n1s/full/embor2008110.html)
During the past couple of decades, however, microbes have shown a tenacious ability to adapt, re-adapt, survive and
challenge human ingenuity (Table 1). The impact of these diseases is immense and is felt across the world. In addition to
affecting the health of individuals directly, infectious diseases are also having an impact on whole societies, economies and
political systems. In the developing world in particular, crucial sectors for sustained development such as health and
education, have seen a marked loss of qualified personnel, most notably to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), tuberculosis (TB) and malaria. These and other infectious agents not only take
an enormous physical toll on humanity, but also cause significant economic losses both directly in the
developing world and less directly in the developed world. It is therefore a matter not only of public health, but
also of economic interest, to invest in and organize an internationally coordinated strategy to fight the
major infectious diseases, or at least to bring them under control Of course, one could simply think the solution
.
would be to try to eliminate the pathogens and/or their vectors from their natural reservoirs or hosts. After all, this was
successfully done with smallpox, for example. Cholera and malaria were similarly brought under control in the USA and
southern Europe. Unfortunately, it is not easy to predict where and when most infectious agents will strike or which new
diseases will emerge. The reasons for their persistence are manifold and include biological, social and political causes.
Pathogens constantly change their genetic make-up, which challenges the development of vaccines against infectious
diseases. This genetic flexibility allows many infectious agents to mutate or evolve into more deadly strains against which
humans have little or no resistance: the HIV and influenza viruses, for example, constantly mutate and recombine to find their
way through the host defence mechanisms. "From the evolutionary perspective, they [viruses and bacteria] are 'the fittest' and
the chances are slim that human ingenuity will ever get the better of them" (Stefansson, 2003). Mass migrations, trade and
travel are notoriously effective at spreading infectious diseases to even the most remote parts of the globe (Table 2). Mass
migrations are often the result of emergency situations such as floods, wars, famines or earthquakes, and can create
precarious conditionssuch as poor hygiene and nutrition or risky sexual behaviourswhich hasten the spread of infectious
diseases. Global trade and travel introduce new pathogens into previously virgin regions , where the diseases find a
more vulnerable population and can develop into epidemics; this was the case
when West
Nile virus arrived in New York City, from where it quickly spread throughout North America. In the
, for example, in the late 1990s,
present-day global village, the next rabies or Ebola epidemic could occur anywhere in the world. Increasing urbanization and
the growth of urban slums that lack sanitation and clean water, provide fertile ground for infections. Many cities and
townships in the developing world expands at the expense of pristine land, thereby disturbing natural habitats and bringing
humans into more intimate contact with unknown and possibly dangerous microorganisms. Human forays into virgin areas of
the African equatorial forests have brought us into contact with the Ebola virus, although its real origin has not yet been
identified. When humans live in close contact with animals, pathogens are sometimes able to change hosts and infect humans
(Parish et al, 2005). The new hostin this case, a humanis often not as adapted to these zoonotic diseases as the original
host. The past outbreaks of avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), hantavirus, Nipah virus and the HIV
epidemic were all due to pathogens that were normally found in animals, but which subsequently found a new, susceptible
host in humans. Moreover, the misuse and overuse of antibiotics is eroding our ability to control even common infections.
Many bacteria have become resistant to even the most powerful antibiotics or combinations of antibiotics; similarly, the once
first-line drugs against malaria are now almost useless. Promiscuous sexual behaviour and substance abuse remain the main
means of transmission of blood-borne infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis. In areas of extreme poverty, given the
increased resort to the sex trade for survival, sexual transmission of these diseases is accelerated. In many developing
countries, commercial sex workers and long-distance truck drivers have contributed greatly to the spread of such infectious
diseases from one community to another. In addition, institutional settingssuch as child-care centres, hospitals and homes
for the elderlyprovide an ideal environment for the transmission of infectious diseases because they bring susceptible
individuals into close contact with one another. Wars, natural disasters, economic collapse and other catastrophes, either
individually or in combination, often cause a breakdown in healthcare systems, which contributes further to the emergence,
re-emergence and persistence of otherwise easily controllable diseases. Yet these diseases do not necessarily require an
emergency situation to be able to thrive.
100
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
101 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
TB (2/4)
Complacency within the population or health-service providers could be equally dangerous under
otherwise normal conditions. Cutbacks in prevention programmes
and a lack of early-detection
systems allow infectious diseases to gain a foothold in otherwise healthy populations. It is often not the
lack of tools, but the lack of an appropriate healthcare infrastructure and personnel that handicaps the
response to infectious diseases. More generally, there is not yet enough commitment to control infectious diseases at
, a lack of trained staff
the political level. The absence of a direct and obvious link between disease control and the benefits for public health makes
it difficult to sustain public-health policies. Programmes to prevent and treat infectious diseases in developing countries
depend largely on indigenous health workers, most of whom are unfortunately not motivated enough to deliver the goods.
Given the multiplicity and complexity of the reasons behind this general demotivation, only a strong political will can
improve the situation. Finally, public-health experts also worry that global climate change could contribute further to the
spread of both pathogens and their vectors such as mosquitoes or birds, as their migratory patterns and normal habitats are
likely to change. The burden of infectious disease is therefore likely to aggravate, and in some cases even
provoke
economic decay,
and political destabilization, especially in the developing world and
former communist countries. As of the year 2001, one billion people lived on less than US$1 per day. Countries with a per
capita income of less than US$500 per year spend, on average, US$12 per person per year on health. According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), infectious diseases caused 32% of deaths worldwide, 68% of deaths in Africa and 37% of
deaths in Southeast Asia (WHO, 1999). These diseases account for 90% of the health problems worldwide and kill about 14
million people annually, 90% of whom are from the developing world. They have killed more people than famine, war,
accidents and crimes together. AIDS, TB and malaria are increasingly being acknowledged as important factors in the
political and economic destabilization of the developing world. However, the developed world is not spared either. As of the
year 2000, the number of annual deaths owing to infectious diseases was estimated at roughly 170,000 in the USA (Gordon,
2000). HIV and pneumonia/influenza are among the 10 leading causes of death in the USA. At present, approximately one
million Americans are infected with HIV. The WHO estimates that 33.4 million people have contracted HIV worldwide since
the beginning of the epidemic in 1983 and about 2.3 million of these died in the year 1998 alone. In the USA and many other
countries, AIDS is now the leading cause of death among young adults (Fauci et al, 1996). The United Nations Joint
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS; Geneva Switzerland) estimates that another 115 million people will die by 2015 in the
60 countries most affected by AIDS (UNAIDS, 2006). The economic costs of infectious diseases especially
HIV/AIDS and malariaare significant. Their increasing toll on productivity owing to deaths and chronic
debilitating illnesses, reduced profitability and decreased foreign investment has had a serious effect on the
economic growth of some poor countries. According to the WHO, the economic value of the loss-of-life owing to HIV/AIDS
in 1999 was estimated at about 12% of the gross national product (GNP) in sub-Saharan African countries, and the virus
could reduce the gross domestic product of some by 20% or more by 2010. Some of the hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan
Africaand possibly in South and Southeast Asiawill face severe demographic changes as HIV/AIDS and associated
diseases reduce human life-expectancy by as much as 30 years and kill as many as 23% of their populations, thereby creating
a huge orphan cohort. Nearly 42 million children in 27 countries will lose one or both parents to AIDS by 2010, and 19 of the
hardest-hit countries will be in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2003). These demographic changes also affect economic growth,
as endemic diseases deplete a country of its work force. A 10% increase in life expectancy at birth (LEB) is associated with a
rise in economic growth of 0.30.4% per year. The difference in annual growth owing to LEB between a typical high-income
country with a LEB of 77 years and a typical less-developed country with a LEB of 49 years is roughly 1.6% per year, and is
cumulative over time The relationship between disease and political instability is indirect but real. A wideranging study on the causes of instability indicates that TB prevalence a good indicator of overall quality of
lifecorrelates strongly with political instability, even in countries that have already achieved a measure of
democracy (Van Helden, 2003). The severe social and economic impact of infectious diseases is likely to
intensify the struggle for the political power to control scarce resources. Health must therefore be regarded as a
major economic factor and investments in health as a profitable business. According to the WHO, TB affects working
hours in formal and informal economies, as well as within households (WHO, 2008). Country studies document that each
TB patient loses, on average, 34 months of work time annually due to the disease, and lost earnings amount to 2030% of
household income. Families of people who die from the disease lose approximately 15 years of income.
The global burden
, further
social fragmentation
101
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
102 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
TB (3/4)
of TB in economic terms can therefore be easily calculated: given 8.4 million patients yearly according to the most
recent WHO estimates (Kim et al, 2008), the majority of whom are potential wage-earners, and assuming a 30% decline in
average productivity, the toll amounts to approximately US$1 billion each year. Annual deaths are estimated at two million
and, with an average loss of 15 years of income per death, there is an additional deficit of US$11 billion. Every 12 months
TB therefore causes roughly US$12 billion to disappear from the global economy. The social cost of the lost
productivity further increases the burden on society. By contrast, a 50% reduction in TB-related deaths would cost US$900
million per year, but the return on investment by 2010 would be 22 million people cured, 16 million deaths averted and US$6
billion saved. Each year there are between 400 and 900 million febrile infections owing to malaria (0.72.7 million deaths),
more than 75% of which are among African children, and less than 20% of these malaria cases ever see a doctor for
treatment. Pregnant women have a higher risk of dying from the infection or of having children with low birth weight.
Children suffer cognitive damage and anaemia, and families spend up to 25% of their income on treatment. A study by
Gallup & Sachs (2000) showed that countries with endemic malaria had income levels in 1995 that were only 33% of those
in countries that do not suffer from malaria. Countries with a severe malaria burden grew 1.3% less per year, compared with
those without. Gallup & Sachs estimated the aggregate loss owing to the disease in some 25 countries at approximately
US$73 billion in 1987, which represented more than 15% of the GDP. AIDS/HIV also creates an enormous burden for the
global economy. In the year 2000, 36.1 million people were living with AIDS (25 million of whom were in sub-Saharan
Africa), 5.3 million people were infected (3.8 million in sub-Saharan Africa) and three million people died (2.4 million in
sub-Saharan Africa), and AIDS has caused 21.8 million deaths to date. This has a heavy economic impact on society.
According to the WHO Macroeconomics Report, the economic burden of AIDS on sub-Saharan Africa is approximately 72
million disability-adjusted life years (DALY), and each AIDS death is estimated to have resulted in 34.6 DALYs lost, on
average, in 1999 (WHO, 2003). Assuming that each DALY is valued at the per capita income, the economic value of lost life
years in 1999 caused by AIDS represents 11.7% of the GNP. If each DALY is valued at three times the per capita income, the
losses represent 35.1% of the GNP. In addition, infectious diseases n general, especially those that can cause an
epidemic continue to make costly disruptions to trade and commerce in every region of the world (Table 3).
Emerging and re-emerging diseases, many of which are likely to appear in poorer countries first, can easily spread to richer
parts of the world. The burden of infectious disease already weakens the military capabilities of various countries and
international peace-keeping efforts. This will contribute further to political destabilization in the hardest-hit parts of the
world. In slowing down social and economic development, diseases challenge democratic developments and transitions, and
contribute to civil conflicts. Finally, trade embargoes or restrictions on travel and immigration owing to
outbreaks of infectious disease will cause more friction between developing and developed countries,
and hinder global commerce to the greater detriment of poor countries. The effects of infectious diseases over the next
decades depend on three variables: the relationship between increasing microbial resistance and scientific efforts to develop
new antibiotics and vaccines; the future of developing and transitional economies, especially with regard to improving the
basic quality of life for the poorest people; and the success of global and national efforts to create effective systems of
surveillance and response. Depending on these variables, the relationship between humans and infectious diseases, and their
impact on the human race, could take one of the following pathways. The optimistic scenario foresees steady improvement
whereby ageing populations and declining fertility, socioeconomic advances, and improvements in health care and medical
research will lead to a 'health transition' in which infectious diseases will be replaced by non-infectious diseases such as
diabetes, heart disease and cancer, as major health challenges. By contrast, the pessimist scenario of steady deterioration
foresees little or no progress in countering infectious diseases in the future. According to this scenario, a vicious spiral
will develop between infectious diseases and poverty. Major diseases such as HIV/AIDSwill reach
catastrophic proportions as the viruses spread throughout populations as a result of increased resistance
to multi-drug treatments and the unavailability of expensive treatments in developing countries, which face the majority
of the problem. The third and most likely scenario foresees an initial deterioration followed by limited improvement.
Persistent poverty in the least-developed countries will create conditions that sustain reservoirs of infectious diseases.
Microbial resistance will continue to increase faster than the pace of drug and vaccine development. The threat, in
particular from HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria, will cause such massive socio-economic and cultural upheaval that
it will eventually affect a critical mass of humanity This will create the necessary pressure for a movement towards
better prevention and control efforts, with new and effective drugs and vaccines made affordable. This will only later result in
demographic changes such as reduced fertility and ageing populations, and a gradual socioeconomic improvement in most
countries. The good news is that infectious
.
102
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
103 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
TB (4/4)
diseases can be easily prevented through simple and inexpensive methods (Sidebar A). This requires correct education and
the spread of knowledge; however, even these simple measures will not be enough to bring infectious diseases under control
if there is no political and international commitment. Governments must be made to understand the stakes
involved in fighting infectious diseasesthis is the only way to guarantee that the necessary resources
will be allocated in sufficient quantities and on time . We need a global commitment to address the most prominent
infectious diseases and to complement local initiatives with special attention to the least-developed countries ( Alilio, 2001;
Stop TB Partnership, 2006). This will require analytical and advisory services in order to help countries generate and act on
information about the status and dynamics of most infectious diseases, and to estimate their social and economic impact.
Such information is essential for advocacy, and for making appropriate and timely decisions. In the face of limited resources,
joint efforts will have to focus on the main killer diseasesincluding HIV/AIDS, TB and malariain order to have the
greatest impact. Medical treatment, psychosocial supportincluding palliative care for debilitating diseasesand highly
active anti-microbial therapy will be essential. In addition, the prevailing problem of the physical and financial inaccessibility
of most of these drugs will have to be addressed. Last, best practices will have to be identified and scaled up. This will
require special efforts to identify and overcome legal barriers, and to analyse, country-by-country, financial and non-financial
resources with a view to mobilizing support internationally. In conclusion, infectious diseases constitute a major problem for
the world, but even more so for the developing world. No country can afford to remain aloof in the battle against these
diseases, especially given the potentially far-reaching and devastating effects that they could have on the human race at large.
Increasing globalization means that the big questions in relation to epidemics will be those of where and whenand not
whetherthe next epidemic emerges, as historical examples have shown. Therefore, all stakeholdersresearchers,
politicians, health professionals, the financial sector and the community at largemust take the necessary bold steps forward
Even from the purely economic point of view, the investment in the fight against infectious diseases is
evidently good business: the world economyand, subsequently, individual family economiesstands to benefit
from such investments. We already know a lot of what we must do; we just need to do it. The future of the human
race depends on our actions today.
103
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
104 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
TB
TB collapses the economy
Thomas, Writer for the WHO, 4/8/05 (Chris, Writer for the World Health Organization (WHO), 4/8/05
http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_apr05/pillars.htm )
TB tends to threaten the poorest and most marginalized groups of people. It disrupts the social fabric of
society and slows or undermines gains in economic development. An overwhelming 98 percent of the 2
million annual TB deathsand some 95 percent of all new casesoccur in developing countries. On
average, TB causes three to four months of lost work time and lost earnings for a household. USAID has
been a key player in the Stop TB Partnership, an effort of more than 350 partner governments and organizations. Aside from
funding, the Agency invests in the Stop TB Partnership and GDF by providing technical support. This helps poor countries
improve their drug management systems, trains local TB experts, and helps health ministries draw up comprehensive TB
strategies. USAID has been particularly involved in administering DOTS, a system of observing people while they take the
full course of medicine to prevent drug-resistant strains from developing.
today, according to the Associated Press. "Any way you look at it, this is a potentially explosive
situation."
104
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
105 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Terror
A terrorist attack escalates to a global nuclear exchange
Speice 06
)Speice 06 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile
material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear
security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods , including
"steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438]
such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40
Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on
their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear
devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not
significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States
makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly,
supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most
effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for
maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least
35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized
somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young
to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear
material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked
spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly
horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human
and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the
perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a
full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from
Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear
weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or
its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the
United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53
A nuclear terrorist attack will trigger every single impact scenario
Zedillo 06
(Ernesto Zedillo, Former President of Mexico Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, FORBES, January
9, 2006, p. 25)
Even if you agree with what's being done in the war on terror, you still could be upset about what's not happening: doing the
utmost to prevent a terrorist nuclear attack. We all should have a pretty clear idea of what would follow a
nuclear weapon's detonation in any of the world's major cities. Depending on the potency of the device the loss
of life could be in the hundreds of thousands (if not millions), the destruction of property in the trillions
of dollars, the escalation in conflicts and violence uncontrollable, the erosion of authority and
government unstoppable and the disruption of global trade and finance unprecedented. In short, we
could practically count on the beginning of another dark age.
105
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
106 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
106
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
107 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Terrorism Defense
Nuclear weapons are too expensive
RAND,
5
(RAND
research
brief,
Combating
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/ RB165/index1.html)
Nuclear
Terrorism
. A bomb planted in a
piece of checked luggage was responsible for the explosion that caused a PanAm jet to crash into
Lockerbie Scotland in 1988. Since that time, hundreds of billions of pieces of luggage have been
transported on American carriers and none has exploded to down an aircraft. This does not mean that
one should cease worrying about luggage on airlines, but it does suggest that extreme events do not
necessarily assure repetitionany more than Timothy McVeigh's Oklahoma City bombing of 1995
has.
destruction on September 11 was also unprecedented, of course. However, extreme events often remain exactly thataberrations, rather than harbingers
107
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
108 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Terrorism Defense
The costs of fighting terrorism outweigh the small risk of another attack
Fidas, 7 (George- Professor of Practice of International Affair @ Elliot school of international affairs,
"Terrorism: Existensial Threat or Exaggerated Threat: Challenging the Dominant Paradigm" Feb 28,
2007 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181269_index.html)
But terrorism is not likely to pose the kind of sustained existential threat that strong states, especially nuclear-armed
ones, posed against other strong states in the 20th century. Treating terrorism as such in an endless war is likely to
lead to endless fear and the slighting of other, perhaps more salient new and existing security threats, ever larger
budget expenditures that weaken our overall economy, and growing restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of
movement at home and loss of soft power abroad. It will also produce a self-fulfilling sense of fear and terror that will
accomplish the goals of our terrorist adversaries at little risk to themselves.
No Impact to terrorism
Fidas, 7 (George- Professor of Practice of International Affair @ Elliot school of international affairs,
"Terrorism: Existensial Threat or Exaggerated Threat: Challenging the Dominant Paradigm" Feb 28,
2007 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181269_index.html)
The overwhelmingly dominant-indeed only-paradigm concerning terrorism is that it is pervasive, highly lethal, and
poses a clear and present danger to the United States, in particular, and tothe world in general. Yet, group think is
rarely correct and this is evident from the facts. There has been no terrorist act in the United States since 9/11 and less
than 10 major terrorist attacks around the world resulting in fewer than 1000 casualties. The riposte is that this is due
to strong countermeasures, especially in the U.S., but this is belied by the fact that borders remain porous and
thousands of people cross them illegally on a daily basis, many counterterrorism measures have failed official and
unofficial tests, and key facilities remain unprotected. Meanwhile, huge funds are being allocated to conduct the socalled war on terror, the balance between liberty and security is tilting toward security, and both law enforcement
officials and publics are "terrorized" by a pervasive uneasiness about impending terrrorist attacks. There is no doubt
that the 9/11 attacks were horrific, but they have become an anchoring event in a psychological sense through which
all subsequent events and perceptions are being filtered, and thereby may be skewing our perceptions about the
continued seriousness of the terrorist threat. It is time to at least question the dominant paradigm and that is the topic
of this paper.
108
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
109 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
109
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
110 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
110
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
111 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Warming
Warming leads to nuclear war and famine that kills hundreds of millions
of people
Pfeiffer 2004
[Dale Allen, Geologist, Global Climate Change & Peak Oil, The Wilderness Publications, Online]
But the real importance of the report lies in the statement of probability and in the authors' recommendations to the President
and the National Security Council. While no statistical analysis of probability is given in the report as it has been released
(any such statistical analysis would most likely be classified), the authors state that the plausibility of severe and
rapid climate change is higher than most of the scientific community and perhaps all of the political
community is prepared for.6 They say that instead of asking whether this could happen, we should be
asking when this will happen. They conclude: It is quite plausible that within a decade the evidence of an imminent
abrupt climate shift may become clear and reliable.7 From such a shift , the report claims, utterly appalling
ecological consequences would follow. Europe and Eastern North America would plunge into a mini-ice
age, with weather patterns resembling present day Siberia. Violent storms could wreak havoc around the
globe. Coastal areas such as The Netherlands, New York, and the West coast of North America could become
uninhabitable, while most island nations could be completely submerged . Lowlands like Bangladesh could
be permanently swamped. While flooding would become the rule along coastlines, mega-droughts could destroy the world's
breadbaskets. The dust bowl could return to America's Midwest . Famine and drought would result in a major drop
in the planet's ability to sustain the present human population. Access to water could become a major
battleground hundreds of millions could die as a result of famine and resource wars . More than 400
million people in subtropical regions will be put at grave risk. There would be mass migrations of climate refugees,
particularly to southern Europe and North America. Nuclear arms proliferation in conjunction with resource
wars could very well lead to nuclear wars.8 And none of this takes into account the effects of global peak oil and the
North American natural gas cliff. Not pretty.
Environmental Minister Michael Meacher is also worried about the survival of the human race due to
global warming.
111
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
112 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**HEG**
112
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
113 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers. A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to
balance a states economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America,
a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies
that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-
term declinewe should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend
more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like
Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond
defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great
powers, the allure of preventive waror lesser measures to merely firmly contain a rising powerhas
a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have
famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that
hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the
deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that the first and most attractive response to a societys
decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war. Yet, waging war just to
keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic
Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and
German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use
war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly
defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked . As China rises, America must avoid this great-power
trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of Chinas increasing
power and possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when Chinas
economic star began to rise in the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China
would overtake the United States as the worlds leading economic power by 2050. 8 Now, as that date draws nearerindeed,
current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for
continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the stronger. Absent provocative
military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the rising power are most likely
doomed to failure. Chinas growth turns mainly on domestic issuessuch as shifting the workforce
113
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
114 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
from rural to urban areasthat are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence .
Although Chinas growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of
obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling
the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines
would likely backfireand only exacerbate Americas problems, increasing the risk of
counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This self-reinforcing spiral escalates
current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive
investment for future growth. Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the
Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down
in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted
its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s.
Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate
the hollowness of the Bush administrations plan for expanding NATO to Russias borders by scoring a quick and
decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war
between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and
naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United
States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a
protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between Americas productive resources and global
commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of Americas overstretched
grand strategy? Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a
significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major
regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an
ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the worlds product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope.
Nearing 20 percent, it cannot. Yet, just withdrawing American troops from Iraq is not enough to put Americas grand strategy
into balance. Even assuming a fairly quick and problem-free drawdown, the risks of instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere in the region are likely to remain for many years to come. Further, even under the most optimistic
scenarios, America is likely to remain dependent on imported oil for decades . Together, these factors point
toward the Persian Gulf remaining the most important region in American grand strategy. So, as Europe and Asia continue to
be low-order priorities, Washington must think creatively and look for opportunities to make strategic trades . America
needs to share the burden of regional security with its allies and continue to draw down our troop levels
in Europe and Asia, even considering the attendant risks. The days when the United States could
effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an
end. True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks.
However, this is simply part of the price of Americas declining relative power. The key principle is for America to
gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security
objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Irans
nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders. And of course America needs to develop a
plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvards Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to
renew Americas environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in
science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment
over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to Americas new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to
assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the
world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand
strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several
years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a
declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the
state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma. This approach has done little for great powers in the past,
and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy
making.The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising to
114
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
115 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must
adopt more realistic foreign commitments.
115
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
116 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the
stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the
rising power are most likely doomed to failure. Chinas growth turns mainly on domestic issuessuch
as shifting the workforce from rural to urban areasthat are beyond the ability of outside powers to
significantly influence. Although Chinas growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit
this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and
clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that
together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines would likely backfireand only
exacerbate Americas problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing.
116
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
117 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
117
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
118 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Kagan
US hegemony key to check multiple scenarios for nuclear war.
Kagan 7 Senior Associate @ the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(End
of
Dreams,
Return
of
History,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html)
Policy
Review,
Hoover
Institution,
Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations,
Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East
Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal
after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing
through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the
Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is
also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East
and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a
traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global
place as No. 1 and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic
reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their
own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape
the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious
nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system.
Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition
for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from
intensifying its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in
the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser
powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation
and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that
most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons . That could make wars between them less likely, or it could
simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States
plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the
United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home
waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international
waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when
the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more
genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their
own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land.
Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that
is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation
provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American
power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany.
Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europes stability depends on the guarantee, however
distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on
the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of
world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American
predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists
independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the
aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But
118
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
119 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
thats not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by
configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the
world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar
world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of
order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it.
Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would
suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from
perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the worlds great powers. Even under the umbrella of
unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in
both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European
allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan
remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other
great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the U nited
States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its
positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable
American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of Chinas
neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region,
faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.
In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene even if it remained the worlds most powerful
nation could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful
approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of
the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a
permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible
even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe if it adopted what some call a
strategy of offshore balancing this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia
and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable
end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among
powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism
doesnt change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The
alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The
region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be
followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China
and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region,
particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take
actions that could shift the balance of power in the
Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasnt changed that much. An American withdrawal from
Iraq will not return things to normal or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new
instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional
119
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
120 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning
nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist
movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a
reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
120
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
121 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Decline Inev
Rising asymmetric balancing, diplomatic countermovements, and
overstretch coupled with massive expenditure has rendered the decline of
hegemony imminent
Khanna 08
_r=1&oref=slogin)
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the
independent
state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has
absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The
European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as
121
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
122 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Econ T/
US withdrawal would result in a new dark age and collapse the global
economy
Ferguson, 4 (Niall. Prof of history @ Harvard. Hoover Digest, A World without Power July/August 4.
http://www.hooverdigest.org/044/ferguson.html)
So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are
the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of
course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the
world is much more populousroughly 20 times moremeaning that friction between the worlds disparate tribes
is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on
fresh water and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded
destruction, too; it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it.
For more than two decades, globalizationthe integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capitalhas
raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process
through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalizationwhich a new Dark Age would producewould certainly
lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second
September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for
foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europes Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists
infiltration of the E.U. would become irreversible, increasing transatlantic tensions over the Middle East to the
breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the communist system into crisis, unleashing the
centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that
lower returns at home were preferable to the risks of default abroad.
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of
the global economyfrom New York to Rotterdam to Shanghaiwould become the targets of plunderers and pirates.
With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners,
while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could
devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the
Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in evangelical Christianity imported by
U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few
remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave
their privately guarded safe havens to go there?
122
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
123 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**WAR IMPACTS**
123
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
124 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
124
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
125 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
125
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
126 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
126
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
127 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
127
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
128 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
128
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
129 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
129
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
130 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
130
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
131 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
131
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
132 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
132
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
133 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
133
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
134 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
134
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
135 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
135
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
136 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Turns Everything
War causes destroys health, human rights, the environment, and causes
domestic violence
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys families, communities,
and sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from protection and promotion of health, medical care,
and other human services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It limits human rights and contributes to
social injustice. It leads many people to think that violence is the only way to resolve conflictsa mindset that
contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and other kinds of violence. And it contributes to the destruction of the
environment and overuse of nonrenewable resources. In sum. war threatens much of the fabric of our civilization.
136
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
137 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AIDS
War helps transmit HIV/AIDS
Unicef 96
(Unicef, 1996, Sexual violence as a weapon of war http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/sexviol.htm)
In addition to rape, girls and women are also subject to forced prostitution and trafficking during times
of war, sometimes with the complicity of governments and military authorities. During World War II, women
were abducted, imprisoned and forced to satisfy the sexual needs of occupying forces, and many Asian women were also
involved in prostitution during the Viet Nam war. The trend continues in today's conflicts. The State of the World's
Children 1996 report notes that the disintegration of families in times of war leaves women and girls especially vulnerable to
violence. Nearly 80 per cent of the 53 million people uprooted by wars today are women and children. When fathers,
husbands, brothers and sons are drawn away to fight, they leave women, the very young and the elderly to fend for
themselves. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Myanmar and Somalia, refugee families frequently cite rape or the fear of rape as a
key factor in their decisions to seek refuge. During Mozambique's conflict, young boys, who themselves had been
traumatized by violence, were reported to threaten to kill or starve girls if they resisted the boys' sexual advances. Sexual
assault presents a major problem in camps for refugees and the displaced, according to the report. The incidence of rape was
reported to be alarmingly high at camps for Somali refugees in Kenya in 1993. The camps were located in isolated areas, and
hundreds of women were raped in night raids or while foraging for firewood. UNHCR (the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees) has had to organize security patrols, fence camps with thorn bushes and relocate the most
vulnerable women to safer areas. Some rape victims who were ostracized were moved to other camps or given priority for
resettlement abroad. UNHCR has formal guidelines for preventing and responding to sexual violence in the camps, and it
trains field workers to be more sensitive to victims' needs. Refugee women are encouraged to form committees and become
involved in camp administration to make them less vulnerable to men who would steal their supplies or force them to provide
sex in return for provisions. The high risk of infection with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including
HIV/AIDS, accompanies all sexual violence against women and girls. The movement of refugees and
marauding military units and the breakdown of health services and public education worsens the impact
of diseases and chances for treatment. For example, one study has suggested that the exchange of sex for
protection during the civil war in Uganda in the 1980s was a contributing factor to the country's high
rate of AIDS.
137
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
138 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Animal Rights T/
War hurts animal rights
Ernst 09
(Stephanie Ernst, 5-29-09, Animals in War: You Don't Have to Be Human to Die by the Millions
http://animalrights.change.org/blog/view/animals_in_war_you_dont_have_to_be_human_to_die_by_the_millions)
The Animals in War Memorial in London, unveiled in 2004, bears the following as part of its inscription:
"They
had no choice." "They" refers to the literally millions of animals killed in twentieth-century wars- -horses,
mules, donkeys, pigeons, elephants, glow worms, and camels among them. Indeed, " eight million horses and countless
mules and donkeys died in the First World War . They were used to transport ammunition and supplies to the front
and many died, not only from the horrors of shellfire but also in terrible weather and appalling
conditions" (emphasis mine), a brief history on the monument's Web site explains--and that was only one war and only one
set of animals among many different animals.
A BBC article further explains, "The monument pays special tribute to the 60 animals awarded the PDSA Dickin Medal - the
animals' equivalent of the Victoria Cross - since 1943." Fifty-four of the 60, including 32 pigeons, were used in World War II.
And before anyone is inclined to say or think "just pigeons" or "just messages," consider what the birds were forced to endure
to get the messages back and forth. Examples: " Winkie, a pigeon that flew 129 miles with her wings clogged
with oil to save a downed bomber crew," and "Mary of Exeter, another pigeon, which flew back with her neck and
right breast ripped open, savaged by hawks kept by the Germans at Calais." (Note the BBC's irritating use of "which" and
"that" here instead of "who.") Sometimes people make remarks about such animals "giving" their lives. But they didn't give
their lives. They didn't choose to enlist. Their fate was decided for them . It was the ultimate, no-recourse draft.
For that reason, I am glad for that so-true inscription: "They had no choice." And animals certainly don't have to be dragged
to active battlefields to suffer and die because of humans' wars. The U.S. military shoots, injures, and kills animals on our
soil regularly, as part of training.
138
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
139 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Biodiversity
War destroys Forests and Biodiversity
Sierra Club, 2003
(No publish date, references 2003 in the past tense, http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/postings/war-and-environment.html)
Throughout history, war has invariably resulted in environmental destruction. However, advancements in military technology
used by combatants have resulted in increasingly severe environmental impacts. This is well illustrated by the devastation to
forests and biodiversity caused by modern warfare. Military machinery and explosives have caused unprecedented levels of
deforestation and habitat destruction. This has resulted in a serious disruption of ecosystem services, including erosion
control, water quality, and food production. A telling example is the destruction of 35% of Cambodias intact forests due to
two decades of civil conflict. In Vietnam, bombs alone destroyed over 2 million acres of land.[13] These environmental
catastrophes are aggravated by the fact that ecological protection and restoration become a low priority during and after war.
The threat to biodiversity from combat can also be illustrated by the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The risk to the already
endangered population of mountain gorillas from the violence was of minimal concern to combatants and victims during the
90-day massacre.[14] The threat to the gorillas increased after the war as thousands of refugees, some displaced for decades,
returned to the already overpopulated country. Faced with no space to live, they had little option but to inhabit the forest
reserves, home to the gorilla population. As a result of this human crisis, conservation attempts were impeded. Currently, the
International Gorilla Programme Group is working with authorities to protect the gorillas and their habitats. This has proven
to be a challenging task, given the complexities Rwandan leaders face, including security, education, disease, epidemics, and
famine.[15]
139
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
140 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Cap
War has become privatized, fueling a stronger capitalism
Ferguson 08
Francis Ferguson, PhD Economist , 3-22-08, The Privatization of War
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_francis__080320_the_privatization_of.htm
Since 2000, there has been a huge increase in private contracts let by the US government. Spending on private
contractors has risen from $174.4 billion to $377.5 billion, an increase of 86%. Over this same period, private
contractors' collections for the Department of Defense increased from $133 billion to $279 billion annually, an
increase of 102.3%. These expenditures represent a unique new source of revenue and profit for American
business, because much of what it being purchased are services which would previously have been done by
military personnel. (source http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1071) With these tasks shifting to private
contractors, workers can be hired in low wage nations such and put to work doing menial labor for the troops.
This is not to say these services come cheap. They do not. Contractors such as Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR)
charge handsomely for the meals, laundry and logistics provided. They just don't pay the workers who perform
these tasks much. The difference, of course, is profit. What was once a relatively minor expense to taxpayers in
the form of Army pay for soldiers performing kitchen duties, now becomes a major source of bottom line
revenue for private companies who previously got nothing from these services. In addition to new opportunities
for profit in a war theater, there are new opportunities for corruption. Third World contract workers have
reported their employers withholding their passports, effectively making them indentured servants. KBR and
it's subsidiaries have been discovered charging premium prices for meals they never served and with supplying
contaminated drinking water to the troops. Government investigators report literally billions of dollars have
gone missing with no accounting for who received them or what was done with the money. The Center for
Public Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&fil=IQ) has a listing of contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan and the value of the contracts they hold. Many of the contracts are awarded without
competitive bidding, and billions of dollars have literally gone missing. The Chicago Tribune reports ongoing
investigations of Kellogg Brown and Root and various of their sub-contractors for gross violations and fraud.
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-kbr-war-profiteers-feb21,1,5231766.story. All of this is
symptomatic of deeper problems. We have privatized war, an in so doing, we have reduced the populace's
natural resistance to war and increased its profitability. With contracting, our military can be smaller. This
means the conflicts can be more easily handled with a voluntary, professional military. Conscription can more
easily be avoided along, as can the political backlash from potential draftees and their relatives. With
privatization, a greater portion of military spending flows as profit to American businesses. Spending on
contractor services can expand massively within the context of war. Wartime allows emergency measures and
expenditures which can proceed without customary bidding or oversight. The result is a river of profit with
little economic gain for the nation.
140
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
141 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Civil Liberties T/
In times of war nations ignore civil liberties to deal with threats Britain proves
Posner 92
HeinOnline -- 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1679 1993-1994, EXECUTIVE DETENTION IN TIME OF WAR , IN
THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN. By
A. W. Brian Simpson. Oxford: Clarendon, Press. 1992. Pp. x, 453. $62.
The absence of a comparative dimension is a closely related source of Simpson's disparagement of his
country's response to national emergency. Peacetime civil liberties are a luxury that nations engaged in
wars of survival do not believe they can afford. The question for the realistic civil libertarian is not
whether Britain curtailed civil liberties more than either seemed at the time or was in retrospect
necessary, but whether it reacted more or less temperately than other nations in comparable
circumstances would do or have done. So far as I can judge, the answer to this question is more
temperately - than the United States, for example, which was far less endangered.8 Of course there are
perils in using a purely relative standard. The administration of Regulation 18B caused hardships and, in
hindsight at least, seems not to have contributed materially to Britain's survival or to have shortened the
war. If there are lessons here that might enable Britain or the United States to deal more effectively with
the problem of internal security in wartime the next time the problem arises, they ought to be drawn. But
the only lesson Simpson draws is that Britain should not have destroyed "about 99 per cent of public
records dealing with detention, which is in line with general practice" (p. 422) and should not be
refusing access, half a century later, to most of the rest. I am sure this observation is right, but it makes
for rather a tepid ending to the book; the ending reads as if the British government's greatest sin with
respect to the wartime detention program was to make it difficult for academics to write the program's
history.
141
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
142 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Dehumanization T/
Dehumanization is used as propaganda during wars
Vinulan-Arellano 03. [Katharine, March 22 yonip.com Stop Dehumanization of People to Stop Wars
http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/nomorewars.html ]
In war time, dehumanization is a key element in propaganda and brainwashing. By portraying the enemy as less than
human, it is much easier to motivate your troops to rape, torture or kill. Ethnic cleansing or genocide would always be
perceived as a crime against humanity if human beings belonging to another race or religion are not dehumanized.
Throughout history, groups or races of human beings have been dehumanized. Slaves, Negroes, Jews, and now,
Muslims. Up to now, women are dehumanized in many societies -- they are made sexual objects, treated as secondclass human beings. The proliferation of the sex trade are indications of the prevailing, successful dehumanization of
women, worldwide. During wars, mass rape of women is common.
142
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
143 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Democracy T/
Administrations use wartime to consolidate power and destroy democratic institutions
Forward Newspaper, 2008
L.L.C. Apr 11, 2008, The President in Wartime. (2008, April 11). Retrieved July 23, 2009, from Ethnic NewsWatch (ENW).
(Document ID: 1478699201). New York, N.Y.: Apr 11, 2008. Vol. 111, Iss. 31700; pg. 12, 1 pgs
The Bush administration recently declassified a secret Justice Department memo from 2003 that shows just how serious a
threat our democracy faces in the current war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the threat revealed in the memo is not from Al
Qaeda, but from us. The memo was addressed to the legal department of the Pentagon. It was meant to advise the military on
how far it may lawfully go in roughing up captured terrorism suspects during interrogation. The answer was, pretty far
indeed. It was the considered legal opinion of the chief legal office of the United States, the Department of Justice, that the
president of the United States is - well, above the law. "In wartime, it is for the President alone to decide what methods to
use to best prevail against the enemy," wrote the memo's author, John Yoo, then a Justice Department lawyer. In fact, Yoo
wrote, "Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate a criminal statute, the Justice Department could not bring a
prosecution because the statute would be unconstitutional as applied in this context." That is, the law would conflict with the
Constitution's designation of the president as commander in chief, charged with doing whatever necessary to protect the
nation during wartime. There's "original intent" for you. And who decides what constitutes "wartime"? According to the
Constitution, the Senate does. But that's old stuff. Nowadays, we're at war whenever the president says we are. All he has to
do is decide we're under attack - or threatened with attack - and order our troops to open fire. And when does the war end?
When the president says so. Right now, for example, we face an enemy so shadowy and ubiquitous - terrorism - that the war
could last, we're told, for a generation. Until then, according to the Bush Justice Department, the president may do whatever
he thinks necessary to protect us. In other words, anything he wants. The Yoo memo was withdrawn a year after its drafting,
following a revolt by government lawyers. But a similar Yoo memo, issued to the CIA, remains.in force. Congress passed a
law overriding it a few years ago, but the president vetoed the bill. It's hard to imagine what terrorists could do that would
threaten our democracy more than this president's notion of his power. Next time we choose a president, we ought to find out
how the contenders define the job.
143
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
144 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Disease T/
War increases the spread of fatal disease.
Boston Globe 07. [05-07, Spread of disease tied to U.S. combat deployments
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/05/07/spread_of_disease_tied_to_us_combat_deploy
ments/]
A parasitic disease rarely seen in United States but common in the Middle East has infected an estimated
2,500 US troops in the last four years because of massive deployments to remote combat zones in Iraq
and Afghanistan, military officials said. Leishmaniasis , which is transmitted through the bite of the tiny
sand fly, usually shows up in the form of reddish skin ulcers on the face, hands, arms, or legs. But a
more virulent form of the disease also attacks organs and can be fatal if left untreated. In some US
hospitals in Iraq, the disease has become so commonplace that troops call it the "Baghdad boil." But in
the United States, the appearance of it among civilian contractors who went to Iraq or among tourists
who were infected in other parts of the world has caused great fear because family doctors have had
difficulty figuring out the cause. The spread of leishmaniasis (pronounced LEASH-ma-NYE-a-sis) is
part of a trend of emerging infectious diseases in the United States in recent years as a result of military
deployments, as well as the pursuit of adventure travel and far-flung business opportunities in the
developing world, health officials say. Among those diseases appearing more frequently in the United
States are three transmitted by mosquitoes: malaria, which was contracted by 122 troops last year in
Afghanistan; dengue fever; and chikungunya fever.
War would increase immune system deficiency and create dangers of new
and deadly diseases
Sagan, former professor at Stanford and Harvard, 84
(Carl Sagan, former professor at Stanford and Harvard, Pulitzer prize winning author, 1984, Foreign Affairs, Nuclear War
and Climatic Catastrophe p. Lexis)
Each of these factors, taken separately, may carry serious consequences for the global ecosystem: their interactions may be
much more dire still. Extremely worrisome is the possibility of poorly underatood or as yet entirely uncontemplated
synergisms (where the net consequences of two or more assaults on the environment are much more than the sum of the
component parts). For example, more than 100 rads (and possibly more than 200 rads) of external and ingested
ionizing radiation is likely to be delivered in a very large nuclear war to all plants, animals and unprotected
humans in densely populated regions of northern mid-latitudes. After the soot and dust clear, there can, for such wars, be a
200 to 400 percent increment in the solar ultraviolet flux that reaches the ground, with an increase of many orders of
magnitude in the more dangerous shorter-wavelength radiation. Together, these radiation assaults are likely to
suppress the immune systems of humans and other species, making them more vulnerable to disease. At
the same time, the high ambient-radiation fluxes are likely to produce, through mutation, new varieties of
microorganisms, some of which might become pathogenic. The preferential radiation sensitivity of
birds and other insect predators would enhance the proliferation of herbivorous and pathogen-carrying
insects. Carried by vectors with high radiation tolerance, it seems possible that epidemics and global pandemics
would propagate with no hope of effective mitigation by medical care, even with reduced population sizes and
greatly restricted human mobility. Plants, weakened by low temperatures and low light levels, and other animals would
likewise be vulnerable to preexisting and newly arisen pathogens.
144
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
145 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Disease T/
War helps the spread of disease
VOA News, 05
(Voice of America News, 8-31-05, Poverty and Conflict Contribute the Spread of
Infectious Diseases, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-08/2005-08-31-voa23.cfm)
Dr. Garcia says
war also spreads disease because it often creates large populations of refugees . And they're
moving from one town to another, or one country to another (and) they may bring with them some
prevalence of disease that may not be a disease that is present in that other country.
Mr. Parkinson adds, It's also probably no coincidence that the great Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 was
associated with troop movements in Europe and especially afflicted the United States because that was the time of
the U.S. involvement in the war, and the troop movements back and forth created a great vector for infection.
The epidemic itself killed more people than died in the entire war -- an estimated 20 to 40 million people died from the
epidemic.
Where there are soldiers and conflict, there are also prostitutes and rape. This has led to a rapid spread of
AIDS in many war-torn African countries, say public health officials.
Conflict impacts disease in other ways, too, said Dr. Joseph Malone, director of the U.S. Navy's program to track emerging
global infections. Basic services such as clean water, availability of food, are threatened when there's
substantial conflict and generally the health care infrastructure and availability of medicines is generally
reduced whenever there's conflict and even any supplies that might be available can be diverted to nonhelpful uses.
Military conflicts spread fatal diseases globally
Boston Globe 07
[Boston Globe 05-07, Spread of disease tied to U.S. combat deployments
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/05/07/spread_of_disease_tied_to_us_combat_deploy
ments/]
A parasitic disease rarely seen in United States but common in the Middle East has infected an estimated 2,500 US
troops in the last four years because of massive deployments to remote combat zones in Iraq and
Afghanistan, military officials said. Leishmaniasis , which is transmitted through the bite of the tiny sand fly , usually
shows up in the form of reddish skin ulcers on the face, hands, arms, or legs. But a more virulent form of the
disease also attacks organs and can be fatal if left untreate d. In some US hospitals in Iraq, the disease has become
so commonplace that troops call it the "Baghdad boil." But in the United States, the appearance of it among
civilian contractors who went to Iraq or among tourists who were infected in other parts of the world has caused
great fear because family doctors have had difficulty figuring out the cause . The spread of leishmaniasis
(pronounced LEASH-ma-NYE-a-sis) is part of a trend of emerging infectious diseases in the United States in
recent years as a result of military deployments , as well as the pursuit of adventure travel and far-flung business
opportunities in the developing world, health officials say.
145
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
146 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Domestic Violence T/
War creates a cycle of violence that spills over to domestic violence
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
War often creates a cycle of violence, increasing domestic and community violence in the countries engaged in war.
War teaches people that violence is an acceptable method for settling conflicts. Children growing up in environments
in which violence is an established way of settling conflicts may choose violence to settle conflicts in their own lives.
Teenage gangs may mirror the activity of military forces Men, sometimes former military servicemen who have been
trained to use violence, commit acts of violence against women; there have been instances of men murdering their
wives on return from battlefield.
War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys
families, communities, and sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from protection and
promotion of health, medical care, and other human services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It
limits human rights and contributes to social injustice. It leads many people to think that violence is the
only way to resolve conflictsa mindset that contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and
other kinds of violence. And it contributes to the destruction of the environment and overuse of nonrenewable
resources. In sum. war threatens much of the fabric of our civilization.
146
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
147 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Econ T/
War leads to economic recession
Baumann, 08
(Nick Baumann, assistant editor, 2-29-08, Is the Economy a Casualty of War?
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/economy-casualty-war)
Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has blamed the Iraq war for sending the United States
into a recession. On Wednesday, he told a London think tank that t he war caused the credit crunch and the
housing crisis that are propelling the current economic downturn. Testifying before the Senate's Joint Economic
Committee the following day, he said our involvement in Iraq has long been "weakening the American economy" and "a day
of reckoning" has finally arrived. Stiglitz's contention that the war is causing the nation's economic woes has
become an increasingly popular meme in Democratic circles. (And a source of indignation in Republican ones.
Before Stiglitz's testimony, White House spokesman Tony Fratto said, "People like Joe Stiglitz lack the courage to consider
the cost of doing nothing and the cost of failure.") Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.), a leading anti-war voice and cochair of the
Congressional Progressive Caucus, is among leading Democrats who echo Stiglitz's view. " The war is the primary
reason for this recession and we have to drum that home ," she told me. Meanwhile, a coalition of progressive and
anti-war groupsincluding MoveOn.org and Americans United for Changeannounced a $20 million campaign to convince
voters that the war is related to the nation's ongoing economic troubles, an effort that is headlined by former Senator John
Edwards and his wife Elizabeth. Polls show that voters trust the Democrats over the Republicans to manage both the Iraq War
and the economy, so pitching these two issues as interconnected could make political sense. The war and the economy are
undoubtedly linked, but there's a potential problem for anyone who claims the war led to a recession: Many economists say
this isn't so.
squeezed, relatively more of their income has to go to energy, and that expense is just getting exported.
It's not stimulating the U.S. economy. The war is [also] a part of America' current account deficit. It
contributes to that and [that] is what's driving down the dollar.
Media and politicians rarely distinguish between government spending and government investments . War costs are
spending... When spent unnecessarily, that is without contributing to national security (i.e., Iraq), war costs are, in
effect, money down a rat hole. All spending over and above revenues creates deficits that must be
financed with borrowing, either from foreigners or future generations. So money spent on an
unnecessary war requires borrowing which drives down the value of the dollar and hurts our economy.
147
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
148 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Edelman
Wars sacrifice soldiers to protect future generations, making the queer expendable to protect
conceptions of family norms
Donna Miles, Writer, Jan. 18, 2005
(Staff Writer for American Forces Press Service, Bush Begins Inaugural Celebration With Military 'Salute',
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24328)
The president credited the men and women in uniform for helping extend that same power to more than 50 million
people in Afghanistan and Iraq during the past four years. He called the first free elections in Afghanistan's 5,000-year history
and the upcoming elections in Iraq "landmark events in the history of liberty." "And none of it would have been possible
without the courage and the determination of the United States armed forces," he said. Bush told the troops their service and
sacrifice in the war on terror is making America safer for today and the future. " Your sacrifice has made it possible for
our children and grandchildren to grow up in a safer world," he said. But this success has come at a great
cost and through tremendous sacrifice, the president noted. He acknowledged the long separations families
must endure, the wounds many service members will carry with them for the rest of their lives, the
heroes who gave their lives, and the families who grieve them . "We hold them in our hearts," Bush said. "We lift
them up in our prayers."
In times of war the life of the child is elevated above sacrificial adults, sacrificing the queer
Deen, @ Ipsnews.net, Jan 9 2004
(POLITICS: U.N. Must Protect Children in War NGOs, http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=21855)
18 are still directly involved in armed conflicts worldwide, was released ahead of a Security Council meeting on child
soldiers scheduled for Jan. 20. It says many countries do not adequately protect children, a situation exacerbated by
impeded access of civilians to much-needed humanitarian assistance in times of conflict. As a result, says the study,
''more children die from malnutrition, diarrhoea and other preventable diseases in conflict situations than die as a direct
result of fighting.'' It wants Annan to expand existing lists of violators beyond those countries and
groups that use child soldiers, to include nations that do not adequately protect children.
148
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
149 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Environment
Modern warfare devastates the environment- it destroys ecosystems
Worldwatch Institute, 2008
(January/February
issue,
Modern
Warfare
Causes
Unprecedented
Environmental
Damage,
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5544)
Washington, D.C. Modern warfare tactics, as seen in the American war in Vietnam, the Rwandan and Congolese civil wars,
and the current war in Iraq, have greatly increased our capacity to destroy the natural landscape and produce devastating
environmental effects on the planet, according to Sarah DeWeerdt, author of War and the Environment, featured in the
January/February 2008 issue of World Watch. Wartime destruction of the natural landscape is nothing new, but the scope of
destruction seen in more recent conflicts is unprecedented. For one thing, there is the sheer firepower of current weapons
technology, especially its shock-and-awe deployment by modern superpowers. The involvement of guerrilla groups in many
recent wars draws that firepower toward the natural ecosystemsoften circumscribed and endangered oneswhere those
groups take cover, writes DeWeerdt. The deliberate destruction of the environment as a military strategy, known as
ecocide, is exemplified by the U.S. response to guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. In an effort to deprive the communist Viet
Cong guerrillas of the dense cover they found in the hardwood forests and mangroves that fringed the Mekong Delta, the
U.S. military sprayed 79 million liters of herbicides and defoliants (including Agent Orange) over about one-seventh of the
land area of southern Vietnam. By some estimates, half of the mangroves and 14 percent of hardwood forests in southern
Vietnam were destroyed during Operation Trail Dust, threatening biodiversity and severely altering vegetation . Less
deliberate, but still devastating, were the environmental effects that stemmed from the mass migration of refugees during the
Rwandan genocide in 1994. Nearly 2 million Hutus fled Rwanda over the course of just a few weeks to refugee camps in
Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, making it the most massive population movement in history.
Approximately 720,000 of these refugees settled in refugee camps on the fringes of Virunga National Park, the first United
Nations World Heritage site declared endangered due to an armed conflict. The refugees stripped an estimated 35 square
kilometers of forest for firewood and shelter-building materials. The dense forests also suffered as a result of the wide paths
clear-cut by the Rwandan and Congolese armies traveling through the park to reduce the threat of ambush by rebel groups.
The longterm ecological effects of the current war in Iraq remain to be seen. Looking to the effects of the recent Gulf War as
a guide, scientists point to the physical damage of the desert, particularly the millimeter-thin layer of microorganisms that
forms a crust on the topsoil, protecting it from erosion. Analysis of the area affected by the Gulf War has already shown an
increase in sandstorms and dune formation in the region, and one study suggests that desert crusts might take thousands of
years to fully recover from the movement of heavy vehicles. Warfare is likely to have the most severe, longest-lasting
effects on protected areas that harbor endangered species, and slow-to-recover ecosystems such as deserts . Even in the most
fragile environments, sometimes natureand peoplecan surprise us, writes DeWeerdt. But turn and look in another
direction and you are likely to see warfares enduring scars.
149
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
150 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Environment
War destroys the environment- both during and preparing for war
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
Finally, war and the preparation for war have profound impacts on the physical environment (see Chapter 5). The
disastrous consequences of war for the environment are often clear. Examples include bomb craters in Vietnam that
have filled with water and provide breeding sites for mosquitoes that spread malaria and other diseases; destruction of
urban environments by aerial carpet bombing of major cities in Europe and Japan during World War II; and the more
than 600 oil-well fires in Kuwait that were ignited by retreating Iraqi troops in 1991, which had a devastating effect on
the ecology of the affected areas and caused acute respiratory symptoms among those exposed. Less obvious are the
environmental impacts of the preparation for war, such as the huge amounts of nonrenewable fossil fuels used by the
military before (and during and after) wars and the environmental hazards of toxic and radioactive wastes, which can
contaminate air, soil, and both surface water and groundwater. For example, much of the area in and around
Chelyabinsk, Russia, site of a major nuclear weapons production facility, has been determined to be highly
radioactive, leading to evacuation of local residents (see chapter 10).
150
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
151 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Fascism
War desensitizes culture and politics to fascist authoritarian structures
Kallis, 04
(Aristotle, DOI: 10.1177/0265691404040007 2004; 34; 9 European History Quarterly Aristotle A. Kallis
Consensus Ideological Production, Political Experience and the Quest for Studying Inter-War Fascism in
Epochal and Diachronic Terms)
A further revision of the early spirit of fascism came in the form of its idiosyncratic coexistence with traditional right-wing
authoritarian structures. In intellectual terms, fascism had very little to do with conservative notions of authoritarianism, in
spite of its oppositional convergence with radical forms of conservatism.67It advocated instead a more direct, transcendental
type of communication between nation and charismatic leader, as well as a collective representation and negotiation of
sectional interests within the framework of the party and its various societal extensions. However, the coopting of the fascist
leaderships by powerful traditional lite groups sealed the fate of fascisms relations to the mainstream Right by forcing the
former to operate in a system which perpetuated central elements of the conventional Rightist authoritarian tradition.
Compared to this (more conventional) type of rule, fascism offered a populist solution to the problem of generating social
support and ensuring active societal unity through the ritualization of controlled mass participation. Yet, this combination of
novelty with an essentially traditional framework of politics was hardly conducive to the pursuit of the mythical core of
fascist nationalist utopianism. The result was a tension inside the regimes with at least a fascist variant between fascism and
authoritarianism a tension that was never fully resolved, but which affected the evolution of inter-war fascism in two
ways. First, it completed the ideologicalpolitical expropriation of fascism by the Right, in contrast to its initially mixed (or
at least not exclusively right-wing) intellectual roots and active revolutionary anti-system spirit. Second, it compelled fascism
to wage a constant struggle to defend its own political contours from the restrictive grip of its conservative sponsors/partners
and the authoritarian legacies of its political framework. In analytical terms, this means that a categorical distinction between
the regime-variant of fascism and conservative authoritarianism is meaningless, in so far as fascism accepted an institutional,
not violently revolutionary, approach to its own political emancipation from the mainstream Right and thus could never
fully eliminate continuities between new and old Right.68 By the time that even the most advanced fascist systems of
Germany and Italy had accelerated their rhythm of consolidation with their newfound self-confidence, they had absorbed
already crucial features of conventional authoritarianism (not least the leaders monopoly of power) into their general
worldview. Kallis, Studying Inter-war Fascism 31
151
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
152 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Gendered Violence T/
War causes sexual violence and reifies the subjugation of women.
Eaton 04. [Shana JD Georgetown University Law Center 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 873 Summer lexis]
While sexual violence against women has always been considered a negative side effect of war, it is
only in recent years that it has been taken seriously as a violation of humanitarian law. In the "evolution"
of war, women themselves have become a battlefield on which conflicts are fought. Realizing that rape
is often more effective at achieving their aims than plain killing, aggressors have used shocking sexual
violence against women as a tool of conflict, allowing battling forces to flaunt their power, dominance,
and masculinity over the other side. The stigma of rape is used to effectuate genocide, destroy
communities, and demoralize opponents-decimating a woman's will to survive is often only a secondary
side effect.
Sexual violence against women during wartime had to reach horrifying levels before the international
community was shocked enough to finally take these atrocities seriously. It took the extremely brutal
victimization of vast numbers of women, played out against a backdrop of genocide, to prove that rape
is not simply a natural side effect of war to be lightly brushed aside.
The conflicts in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia put women's rights directly in the spotlight, and
the international community could no longer avoid the glare. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ethnic
cleansing was central to the conflict. Raping women helped to achieve this aim in a number of ways,
from forced impregnation, where offspring would have different ethnicities than their mothers, to the use
of sexual violence to prevent women from wanting to have sex again (thus limiting their likelihood of
bearing children in the future). Additionally, rape was used as a means of destroying families and
communities. Raping a woman stigmatized her, making it unlikely that she would ever want to return
home, and in many cases, ensuring that if she did return home that she would be rejected. Civilians,
particularly women, came to be used as tools to achieve military ends, putting the human rights of these
women at the heart of the conflict.
War conditions cause sexual violence
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
Women are especially vulnerable during war (see Chapter 12). Rape has been used as a weapon in many
wars- in Korea, Bangladesh, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda, the former Yugslavia,
and elsewhere. As acts of humiliation and revenge, soldiers have raped the female family members of
their enemies. For example, at least 10,000 women were raped by military personnel during the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The social chaos brought about by war also creates situations and conditions
conductive to sexual violence.
152
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
153 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Health T/
Funds are prioritized for war over health services
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
Many countries spend large amounts of money per capita for military purposes. The countries with the highest
military expenditures are shown in Table I -1. War and the preparation for war divert huge amounts of resources
from health and human services and other productive societal endeavors. This diversion of resources occurs in
many countries. In some less developed countries, national governments spend S10 to $20 per capita on military
expenditures but only SI per capita on all health-related expenditures. The same type of distorted priorities also exist
in more developed countries. For example, the United States ranks first among nations in military expenditures and
arms exports, but 38th among nations in infant mortality rate and 45th in life expectancy at birth. Since 2003. during a
period when federal, state, and local governments in the United States have been experiencing budgetary shortfalls
and finding it difficult to maintain adequate health and human services, the U.S. government has spent almost $500
b i l l i o n for the Iraq War, and is spending (in 2007) more than $2 billion a week on the war.
153
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
154 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Heg T/
One more military engagement would deplete US ground forces and utterly destroy US hegemony
Perry 06
(The U.S. Military: Under Strain and at Risk, The National Security Advisory Group, January 2006, William J. Perry,
Chair)
In the meantime, the United States has only limited ground force capability ready to respond to other contingencies. The
absence of a credible strategic reserve in our ground forces increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to
challenge the United States Since the end of World War II, a core element of U.S. strategy has been maintaining a military
capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression in more than one theater at a time. As a global power with global
interests, the United States must be able to deal with challenges to its interests in multiple regions of the world
simultaneously. Today, however, the United States has only limited ground force capability ready to respond outside the
Afghan and Iraqi theaters of operations. If the Army were ordered to send significant forces to another crisis today, its only
option would be to deploy units at readiness levels far below what operational plans would require increasing the risk to the
men and women being sent into harms way and to the success of the mission. As stated rather blandly in one DoD
presentation, the Army continues to accept risk in its ability to respond to crises on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere.
Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialized assets to deter or respond to aggression, the
visible overextension of our ground forces has the potential to significantly weaken our ability to deter and respond to some
contingencies.
154
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
155 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Homelessness
Wars create homelessness
Markee 03
(Markee, Patrick,Senior Policy Analyst for Coalition for the Homeless, 3-27-03
http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/FileLib/PDFs/war_and_homelessness.pdf)
It is axiomatic that wars create homelessness in the territories where combat occurs. Every war that the
United States has been involved in, from the Revolutionary War to Desert Storm, has at least temporarily
displaced populations and destroyed the homes of civilians. Even the undeclared wars that the United
States has sponsored and supported, in Latin America and elsewhere , produced hundreds of thousands of
refugees and uprooted rural and urban populations. However, since the Civil War there have been no sustained
military battles fought on United States territory, so most Americans have no first-hand contact with the immediate impact of
homelessness resulting from war. In contrast, our armed forces veterans do have first-hand experience with
homelessness that is a direct consequence of American military and domestic policies . This briefing paper
provides an overview of the impact of homelessness on armed forces veterans, both historically and currently. Throughout
American history there has been high incidence of homelessness among veterans, primarily as a result of combat related
disabilities and trauma and the failure of government benefits to provide adequate housing assistance for low-income and
disabled veterans. The paper concludes that, absent a dramatic change in Federal policies, the war on Iraq will
The post-Civil War era witnessed a much more significant growth in homelessness nationwide . Indeed,
asKusmer notes, even the words tramp and bum, as applied to the homeless, can be traced to the Civil War era.3 One
reason was the enormous economic dislocation generated by the war and the succeeding economic
recession, and by the 1870s vagrancy was recognized as a national issue . Many of the new nomads riding
the rails and congregating in cities were Civil War veterans, and many had suffered physical injuries and trauma during the
war. As the early 1870s recession deepened, many cities responded by creating new antivagrancy legislation. In 1874 the
number of reported vagrants in Boston was 98,263, more than three times the number just two years earlier. From 1874 to
1878 the number of vagrancy arrests in New York City rose by half.4 The homelessness crisis of the Great Depression, which
affected many World War I veterans, was dramatically abated in the early 1940s by the enlistment of tens of thousands of
Americans in the armed forces and by the wartime economic upswing. In New York City, according to Kusmer, In one twomonth period in 1943, 100 Bowery residents joined the armed forces, while another 200 acquired jobs in hospitals,
restaurants, or on the railroads.5 With the end of World War II, however, homelessness re-emerged as a
significant problem in many cities. In New York City, demand for emergency shelter rose in the late 1940s, with as
many as 900 men bedding down in the Lodging House Annex (later the Municipal Shelter) on East 3rd Street in the 1948-49
winter.6 Homelessness would have continued to affect many thousands of World War II veterans were it
not for the national economic upturn and the benefits provided by the G.I. Bill. With the advent of the Vietnam
War, however, the link between homelessness and military veterans finally came to the attention of the
general public. As Kusmer writes, Only a few years after the end of the waranew wave of homeless persons, mostly in
their 20s and 30s and disproportionately black or Hispanic, began to appear on city street corners. Many were Vietnam
veterans, unable to find work after being discharged.7 By the late 1970s, when modern homelessness fully emerged, a
significant portion of the homeless men seen sleeping outdoors in vast numbers in New York City and other large cities were
armed forces veterans. Many veterans suffered from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse disorders, and
physical disabilities caused by their experiences in combat. The 1991 Gulf War, the last major conventional war involving the
United States military, also left many veterans recovering from physical and mental disabilities and confronting
homelessness. A 1997 survey of 1,200 homeless veterans nationwide who resided at mission shelters found that 10 percent of
155
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
156 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
156
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
157 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Homophobia
Wartime consensus favors inherently homophobic military culture
Dennis Sewell, 1993
(January 27, THE GUARDIAN FEATURES PAGE; Pg. 17, lexis)
If the public reasons why the armed forces are so set against admitting homosexuals bear such little scrutiny, is there an
unspoken reason? A homophobia that dare not speak its name? Certainly there is a profoundly ingrained distaste for
homosexuals prevalent among private soldiers and NCOs. This stems partly from a fear of becoming the object of unwanted
homosexual attentions. Also there is a knee-jerk association of the homosexual with the effeminate or effete. To men brought
up in an exaggeratedly macho culture, one of the most effective taunts within the group is that of being "queer" . OFFICERS,
of course, are keen to distance themselves from this way of thinking or behaving. Such attitudes are, they say, part of
ordinary working-class culture and not specific to the military. They themselves, being middle class and having, doubtless,
seen homosexual behaviour at their public schools, affect a personal insoucience about the whole issue. But they insist "the
lads won't have it". This, too, we have heard before. The slow progress made by blacks in becoming senior NCOs or officers
in the British Army owed much to the same kind of argument. Working-class culture was inherently racist, officers would
say. Once the lads were told they were jolly well going to have to lump it, of course they accepted black officers. But in the
case of homosexual servicemen, there is a complicating factor. Whereas officers did not, on the whole, condone racist
attitudes, they are often complicit in fostering homophobic attitudes. They make and enjoy the jokes just as much as the men.
Indeed, for the more insecure, a little queer baiting has been one way of proving their own masculinity. They will find it hard
now to tell the lads that they were wrong all along.
157
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
158 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Inequality
Wars are fought by the poor who are sacrificed for the upper classes turning case
Tyson, Wash Post, 05
(Ann Scott Youths in Rural U.S. Are Drawn To Military, Recruits' Job Worries Outweigh War Fears, Ann Scott Tyson,
Washington Post Staff Writer, Friday, November 4, 2005; Page A01)
As sustained combat in Iraq makes it harder than ever to fill the ranks of the all-volunteer force, newly released Pentagon
demographic data show that the military is leaning heavily for recruits on economically depressed, rural areas where youths'
need for jobs may outweigh the risks of going to war. More than 44 percent of U.S. military recruits come from rural areas,
Pentagon figures show. In contrast, 14 percent come from major cities. Youths living in the most sparsely populated Zip
codes are 22 percent more likely to join the Army, with an opposite trend in cities. Regionally, most enlistees come from the
South (40 percent) and West (24 percent). Many of today's recruits are financially strapped, with nearly half coming from
lower-middle-class to poor households, according to new Pentagon data based on Zip codes and census estimates of mean
household income. Nearly two-thirds of Army recruits in 2004 came from counties in which median household income is
below the U.S. median. Such patterns are pronounced in such counties as Martinsville, Va., that supply the greatest number of
enlistees in proportion to their youth populations. All of the Army's top 20 counties for recruiting had lower-than-national
median incomes, 12 had higher poverty rates, and 16 were non-metropolitan, according to the National Priorities Project, a
nonpartisan research group that analyzed 2004 recruiting data by Zip code.
158
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
159 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
159
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
160 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Mental Health T/
War creates many mental health issues
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
Given the brutality of war. many people survive wars only to be physically or mentally scarred for life (see Box 1-1).
Millions of survivors are chronically disabled from injuries sustained during war or the immediate aftermath of war.
Approximately one-third of Ihe soldiers who survived ihe civil war in Ethiopia, for example, were injured or disabled, and at
least 40,000 individuals lost one or more limbs during the war.' Antipersonnel landmines represent a serious threat to
many people'' (see Chapter 7). For example, in Cambodia, I in 236 people is an amputee as a result of a landmine
explosion.'0
Millions more people are psychologically impaired from wars, during which they have been physically or sexually assaulted or have
physically or sexually assaulted others; have been tortured or have participated in the torture of others; have been forced to serve
as soldiers against their will; have witnessed the death of family members; or have experienced the destruction of their communities or entire nations (sec Chapter4). Psychological trauma may be demonstrated in disturbed and antisocial behaviors,
such as aggression toward family members and others. Many soldiers, on returning from military action, suffer from
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). which also affects many civilian survivors of war.
160
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
161 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Poverty
Wartime spending causes poverty
Henderson, 98
(Errol Anthony Henderson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, The Journal of Politics, Vol.
60, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 503-520, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647920)
Thisanalysisattemptedtoascertaintowhatextentarelationshipobtainedbetweenmilitaryspendingandpovertyinthe
UnitedStates.Withthedecliningsignificanceofmacroeconomicforces,typesofgovernmentspendinghavebecomesalient
ininfluencingpovertyratechanges.Partialsupportwasfoundfortheviewthatincreasedmilitaryspending,intheaggregate,
is associated with increased poverty though these effects are different for peacetime and wartime. Peacetime military
spendingincreasespoverty,morethanlikelythroughitsimpactonincreasinginequalityandunemployment,whilewartime
spendinghasthereverseeffect.Whendisaggregated,militarypersonnelspendingisshowntodecreasepovertywhileother
componentsareassociatedwithincreasingpoverty.Althoughmilitarypersonnelspendingreducespoverty,militarybuildups
sincetheKoreanWarhaveincreasedtheshareofprocurementspendingattheexpenseofpersonnelexpenditures(Chan
1995).Inaddition,totheextentthatincreaseddefensespendingisfinancedthroughdeficitspending,theinflationaryimpact
alsodisproportionatelyharmsthepoor.Whileincreasedaggregatemilitaryspendingfailsasanantipovertypolicy,focused
spendingonmilitarypersonnelmaydecreasepoverty,suggestingitspotentialasacountercyclicalinstrument.However,
argumentsinfavorofsuchmilitaryspendingincreasesaremostpersuasivelyputforthonthebasisofnationalsecurity
concernswithinahostileinternationalenvironmentorinthepresenceofanarmsracewithamajorpowerrival.Neither
conditionobtainsinthepostColdWar climate. Thefindingscomport withthe present discourse onmilitary spending
dominated by discussions of the"peace dividend" resulting from decreased defense budgets (Chan 1995). While these
findingssuggestthatreducedaggregatedefensespendingisassociatedwithdecreasedpoverty,defensereductionswillhave
different impactsacrossregions,occupations,andethnicgroups.Defensecutbackswillprobablyhavemoredeleterious
impactsonstatesthatareheavilyreliantupondirectandindirectmilitaryspending,suchasCalifornia,Texas,Virginia,New
York,Florida,Pennsylvania,andOhio.Inaddition,economicconversioninitiativesaredominatedbyconcernsforrelieffor
defense contractors and their usually highskilled workforce. To be sure, skilled workers in affected regions will face
difficultiesasoccupationssuchasaeronautics,industrialandmechanicalengineering,andmetalworkingdecline;however,
lowskilledlaborersaremorelikelycandidatesforpoverty.
161
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
162 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Poverty
Conflict causes chronic poverty
Goodhand 03
(Johnathan Goodhand, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2003 http://www.pikpotsdam.de/research/research-domains/transdisciplinary-concepts-and-methods/favaia/workspace/documents/worlddevelopment-volume-31-issue-3-special-issue-on-chronic-poverty-and-development-policy/pages629-646.pdf)
Research studies on the costs of conflict show that although the effects of war vary according to the nature,
duration and phase of the conflict, the background economic and social conditions and the level of compensatory action by
national governments or the international community protracted conflicts are likely to produce chronic poverty.
This particularly applies to collapsed state, warlord type conflicts characterized by the systematic and
deliberate violation of individual and group rights. In such conflicts the deliberate impoverishment of
the population may be used as a weapon of war. 9 Violent conflict is therefore likely to be both a
driver and maintainer of intergenerationally transmitted (IGT) poverty: Poor societies are at risk of
falling into no-exit cycles of conflict in which ineffective governance, societal warfare, humanitarian crises, and the lack of
development perpetually chase one another (Gurr et al., 2001, p. 13). (b) Macro effects of conflict
Conflict has direct and indirect costs. The direct impacts including battlefield deaths, disablement and
displacement have long-term costs for societies. Chronic poverty is likely to increase due to higher
dependency ratios caused by an increased proportion of the old, women and disabled in the population .
But the indirect costs are likely to have a more significant impact on IGT poverty. Many more people die from
wars as a result of lack of basic medical services, the destruction of rural life and transport and collapse of the state, than
from direct battlefield deaths. 10
162
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
163 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Woman Rights T/
War destroys womens rights
Marshall, founder of the feminist peace network, 04
(Lucinda Marshall Founder of the Feminist Peace Network, Feminist Writer and Activist, 12-18-04
Unacceptable: The Impact of War on Women and Children http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1219-26.htm)
Women and children account for almost 80% of the casualties of conflict and war as well as 80% of the 40
million people in world who are now refugees from their homes. It is one of the unspoken facts of militarism that women
often become the spoils of war, their deaths are considered collateral damage and their bodies are
frequently used as battlegrounds and as commodities that can be traded.
"Women and girls are not just killed, they are raped, sexually attacked, mutilated and humiliated. Custom,
culture and religion have built an image of women as bearing the 'honour' of their communities.
Disparaging a woman's sexuality and destroying her physical integrity have become a means by which
to terrorize, demean and 'defeat' entire communities , as well as to punish, intimidate and humiliate
women," according to Irene Khan of Amnesty International.
Sexual violence as a tool of war has left hundreds of thousands of women raped, brutalized, impregnated and infected with
HIV/AIDS. And hundreds of thousands of women are trafficked annually for forced labor and sexual slavery. Much of this
trafficking is to service western troops in brothels near military bases. Even women serving in the military are subjected to
sexual violence. U.S. servicewomen have reported hundreds of assaults in military academies and while serving on active
duty. The perpetrators of these assaults have rarely been prosecuted or punished.
The impact of war on children is also profound. In the last decade, two million of our children have been
killed in wars and conflicts. 4.5 million children have been disabled and 12 million have been left homeless.
Today there are 300,000 child soldiers, including many girls who are forced to 'service' the troops.
War restricts womens freedom and suppresses their basic human rights
Abeyesekera, director of a humans rights organization, 03
(Sunila Abeyesekera, director of Inform, a Sri Lankan human rights organization 02-03
http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/A-Women-s-Human-Rights-Perspective-on-War-and-Conflict)
At the same time, wars and conflicts have led to a host of negative consequences for unarmed women
civilians and dependent family members, children, the old and the infirm. Figures worldwide point to the fact that the
majority of refugees and internally displaced persons are female . The erosion of democratic space that often
accompanies conflict and war also propel women into a more active role in political and social life. In moments when men
and male-dominated traditional political and social formations, such as political parties and trade unions, are reluctant or
unable to come forward in defense of human rights and democratic principles, groups of women have had the courage to
stand up to the armed might of both state and non-state actors. War and conflict also push women into decision-making
positions in their families and communities, in particular in the role of head of household.
Most conflicts and wars emerge out of processes of identity formation in which competing identity groups and communities
resort to violence to affirm their equal status in society. Given this dynamic, conflict and war situations result in the
heightening of all forms of conservatism and extremism including religious fundamentalism, ultranationalism and ethnic and linguistic chauvinism. The hardening of identity-based roles ascribed to men
and women within the community that happen as a part of this process often has disastrous
consequences for women. It restricts their mobility and freedom, imposes dress codes, confines them to
the domestic sphere, brings them under the rigid control of male members of the family and the
community and, most critically, places them in the role of 'bearers of the community's honour' and
traditions. Thus, the rape and violation of the women of the 'enemy' community becomes a critical
military strategy in all identity-based wars and conflict.
163
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
164 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Racism
Wartime culture results in racism
Dieckmann et al., 97
(Bernhard Dieckmann, Christoph Wulf, Michael Wimmer, Violence--racism, nationalism, xenophobia,
134
War is as important as any other medium-term socio-economic or political factor in leading to a rise in
racism. In fact, anyone studying the history of race during the twentieth century cannot avoid the
conclusiuon that the worst persecution of minorities has occurred during wartime. Apart from genocide,
illustrated by the Annenian genocide in World War I and the Nazi Holocaust in World War Two, states
such as Britain and Brazil experienced some of their worst twentieth century outbreaks of violence
during the First World War. The explanations as to why war leads to an increase in intolerance are many,
but revolve around the increase in ostracisation of out groups, facilitated by the seizure of control,
directly or indirectly, by the military, as members of the dominant society fell closer together to fight the
external enemy.
164
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
165 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Rape
War facilitates the rape of women to force unwanted pregnancies and to further ethnic
cleansing
Robson 93
(Robson, has a Master's degree in African Literature and is an award winning writer, 06-93
http://www.newint.org/issue244/rape.htm)
No-one will ever know the exact number of women and girls raped during the conflict in former
Yugoslavia. But Heraks accounts of his forced participation in rapes of Bosnian Muslim women his commander had
told him it was good for morale accord with evidence recounted to human-rights observers and journalists
throughout the region. Though all figures must be treated with caution in a war so plagued by propaganda, these witnesses
tell of the organized and systematic rape of at least 20,000 women and girls by the Serbian military and the murder of many
of the victims. Muslim and Croatian as well as some Serbian women are being raped in their homes, in schools,
police stations and camps all over the country. The sexual abuse of women in war is nothing new. Rape
has long been tolerated as one of the spoils of war, an inevitable feature of military conflict like pillage
and looting. What is new about the situation in Bosnia is the attention it is receiving and the recognition that it is being
used as a deliberate military tactic to speed up the process of ethnic cleansing. According to a recent report
by European Community investigators, rapes are being committed in particularly sadistic ways to inflict
maximum humiliation on victims , their families, and on the whole community. 1 In many cases the intention is
deliberately to make women pregnant and to detain them until pregnancy is far enough advanced to
make termination impossible. Women and girls aged anything between 6 and 70 are being held in camps throughout
the country and raped repeatedly by gangs of soldiers. Often brothers or fathers of these women are forced to rape them as
well. If they refuse, they are killed.
165
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
166 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Rights T/
Wars undermine human rights
Ganesan and Vines 04. [Arvind, Business and Human Rights Program Director @ HRW Alex, Senior
Researcher @ HRW, Head of Africa Programme Chatham House, Royal Institue of Intl Affairs,
Engine of War: Resources, Greed, and the Predatory State, Human Rights Watch World Report 2004
http://hrw.org/wr2k4/download/14.pdf]
Internal armed conflict in resource-rich countries is a major cause of human rights violations around the
world. An influential World Bank thesis states that the availability of portable, high-value resources is an
important reason that rebel groups form and civil wars break out, and that to end the abuses one needs to
target rebel group financing. The focus is on rebel groups, and the thesis is that greed, rather than
grievance alone, impels peoples toward internal armed conflict.
Although examination of the nexus between resources, revenues, and civil war is critically important,
the picture as presented in the just-described greed vs. grievance theory is distorted by an
overemphasis on the impact of resources on rebel group behavior and insufficient attention to how
government mismanagement of resources and revenues fuels conflict and human rights abuses. As
argued here, if the international community is serious about curbing conflict and related rights abuses in
resource-rich countries, it should insist on greater transparency in government revenues and
expenditures and more rigorous enforcement of punitive measures against governments that seek to
profit from conflict.
Civil wars and conflict have taken a horrific toll on civilians throughout the world. Killings, maiming,
forced conscription, the use of child soldiers, sexual abuse, and other atrocities characterize numerous
past and ongoing conflicts. The level of violence has prompted increased scrutiny of the causes of such
wars. In this context, the financing of conflict through natural resource exploitation has received
increased scrutiny over the last few years.
When unaccountable, resource-rich governments go to war with rebels who often seek control over the
same resources, pervasive rights abuse is all but inevitable. Such abuse, in turn, can further destabilize
conditions, fueling continued conflict. Factoring the greed of governments and systemic rights abuse
into the greed vs. grievance equation does not minimize the need to hold rebel groups accountable, but
it does highlight the need to ensure that governments too are transparent and accountable.
Fundamentally, proper management of revenues is an economic problem, and that is why the role of IFIs
is so important. But it is an economic problem that also has political dimensions and requires political
solutions. Political will and pressure, including targeted U.N. sanctions where appropriate, can motivate
opaque, corrupt governments to be more open and transparent. Where such pressure is lacking, as in
Liberia prior to enforcement of sanctions, continued conflict, rights abuse, and extreme deprivation of
civilians all too commonly are the result.
166
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
167 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Rights T/
Modern warfare involves crippling civilian infrastructure and violating
human rights
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and
Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
Modern military technology, especially the use of high-precision bombs, rockets, and missile warheads, has now
made it possible to attack civilian populations in industrialized societies indirectlybut with devastating resultsby
targeting the facilities on which life depends, while avoiding the stigma of direct attack on the bodies and habitats of
noncombatants. The technique has been termed "bomb now, die later."
U.S. military action against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Iraq War has included the specific and
selective destruction of key aspects of the infrastructure necessary to maintain ci vi l i an life and health (see Chapter
15). During the bombing phase of the Persian Gulf War this deliberate effort almost totally destroyed Iraq's electricalpower generation and transmission capacity and its civilian communications networks. In combination with the
prolonged application of economic sanctions and the disruption of highways, bridges, and facilities for refining and
distributing fuel by conventional bombing, these actions had severely damaging effects on the health and survival of
the civilian population, especially infants and children. Without electrical power, water purification and pumping
ceased immediately in all major urban areas, as did sewage pumping and treatment. The appearance and epidemic
spread of infectious diarrheal disease in infants and of waterborne diseases, such as typhoid fever and cholera, were
rapid. At the same lime, medical care and public health measures were totally disrupted. Modern multistory hospitals
were left without clean water, sewage disposal, or any electricity beyond what could he supplied by emergency
generators designed to operate only a few hours per day. Operating rooms, x-ray equipment, and other vital facilities
were crippled. Supplies of anesthetics, antibiotics, and other essential medications were rapidly depleted. Vaccines and
medications requiring refrigeration were destroyed, and all immunization programs increased. Because almost no
civilian telephones, computers, or transmission lines were operable, the Ministry of Health was effectively
immobilized. Fuel shortages and the disruption of transportation limited civilian access to medical care.
Many reports provide clear and quantitative evidence of violations of the requirements of immunity for civilian
populations, proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering. They mock the concept of life integrity
rights. In contrast to the chaos and social disruption that routinely accompany armed conflicts, these deaths have
been the consequence of and explicit military policy, with clearly foreseeable consequences to human rights of
civilians. The U.S. military has never conceded that its policies violated human rights under the Geneva Conventions
or the guidelines under which U.S. military personnel operate. Yet the ongoing development of military technology
suggests thatabsent the use of weapons of mass destructionviolations of civilians human rights will be the
preferred method of warfare in the future.
167
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
168 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Social Service T/
Increased military spending from war would tradeoff with health care and other social services
Tasini , executive director of labor research association ran for senate in NY, 8-13 -7 (Jonathan , Guns Versus
Butter -- Our Real Economic Challenge , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-tasini/guns-versus-butterour_b_60150.html)
Guns versus butter. It's the classic debate that really tells us a lot about our priorities that we set for the
kind of society we can expect to live in -- how much money a country spends on the military versus how
much money is expended on non-military, domestic needs. To perhaps explain the obvious, buying a gun (or
missile defense or a sophisticated bomber) means you don't have those dollars for butter (or a national
health care plan or free college education ). At some basic level, we all know that those tradeoffs exist but,
sometimes, numbers bring home the meaning of this equation in stunning fashion. What made me think of this is a set of
revealing numbers that jumped out at me the other day -- numbers that underscore why there is, in my opinion, something
lacking in the message of most of the Democratic presidential candidates and our party's leadership.
War spending trades off with Medicaid Bush and the Iraq war proves
Star Tribune 5 ("Social programs would bear brunt of deficit reduction", February 8, @Lexis)
President Bush sent Congress a $2.57 trillion budget Monday that would drastically cut or shut down 150
government programs and slash spending on Medicaid, farming and low-income housing, while boosting
money for defense and homeland security. In what Bush described as the most austere budget of his presidency,
discretionary spending would grow by 2.1 percent - less than the projected rate of inflation. Meanwhile, non-defense
spending would be cut by nearly 1 percent - the first such proposed cut since the Reagan administration . Hardest
hit is Medicaid, which could cost Minnesota as much as $712 million over the next decade.
168
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
169 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Starvation
War causes starvation
Messer 96
(Ellen Messer, University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1996, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu22we/uu22we0j.htm)
After the wars, communities decimated and depopulated by physical and human losses can remain
underproductive and hungry for years, as food wars and the conditions leading up to them remain a
legacy of armed conflict that is not easily remedied without outside assistance. Individuals, households, and
communities must regain access to land, water, and other sources of livelihood, and human resources and social infrastructure
must somehow recover. Communities in many cases must be re-formed, especially where areas have experienced complete or
selective depopulation. Production and markets must be re-established, so that goods can flow and livelihoods rebound.
During prolonged warfare, whole generations may be conscripted into the military; with no other
schooling, they must later be socialized into peacetime occupations if they are not to revert to violence
and brigandage as a source of entitlements. In the African conflicts of Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone,
destruction of kinship units was a deliberate military strategy to remove intergenerational ties and community bonds and
create new loyalties to the military. These grown youths now need sustenance, and basic and specialty education, if they are
to contribute to a peacetime economy and society, and to general food security. After decades of civil war, these
countries also lack skilled agricultural, social, and health professionals to speed recovery. They require
agricultural, health, educational, and economic services to rebuild societies, as well as physical infrastructure
such as agricultural works, transport and communication lines, and market-places destroyed in the wars.
169
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
170 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Terror
Wars, like the Iraq war, have increased a chance of a terror attack
People Press 05
(Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 7-21-05, http://people-press.org/report/251/more-say-iraq-warhurts-fight-against-terrorism)
The public is growing more skeptical that the war in Iraq is helping in the effort to fight terrorism. A
plurality (47%) believes that the war in Iraq has hurt the war on terrorism , up from 41% in February of this year.
Further, a plurality (45%) now says that the war in Iraq has increased the chances of terrorist attacks at
home, up from 36% in October 2004, while fewer say that the war in Iraq has lessened the chances of terrorist attacks in the
U.S. (22% now and 32% in October). Another three-in-ten believe that the war in Iraq has no effect on the chances of a
terrorist attack in the U.S. Older Americans are more skeptical than younger people that the war in Iraq is helping the effort to
fight terrorism. A 56% majority of those age 50 and over say the war in Iraq has hurt the war on terrori sm, up
from 39% in February. Those younger than age 50 are divided on this issue, with 45% saying the war in Iraq has helped and
41% saying it hurt the war on terrorism; that pattern has remained stable since February.
170
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
171 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
171
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
172 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AIDS T/ Readiness
AIDS kills readiness- it decreases troops and erodes govt control
Peterson, 3 (Susan- associate professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, Security
Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3), Epidemic Disease and National Security
http://people.wm.edu/~smpete/files/epidemic.pdf)
Still, IDs. impact in the contemporary international system may be somewhat different. Unlike other diseases, AIDS has
an incubation period of ten years or more, making it unlikely that it will produce significant casualties on the front
lines of a war. It will still, however, deplete force strength in many states. On average, 20.40 percent of armed forces
in sub-Saharan countries are HIV-positive, and in a few countries the rate is 60 percent or more. In Zimbabwe, it may
be as high as 80 percent.147 In high incidence countries, AIDS significantly erodes military readiness, directly
threatening national security. Lyndy Heinecken chillingly describes the problem in sub-Saharan Africa: AIDS-related
illnesses are now the leading cause of death in the army and police forces of these countries, accounting for more than
50% of inservice and post-service mortalities. In badly infected countries, AIDS patients occupy 75% of military
hospital beds and the disease is responsible for more admissions than battlefield injuries. The high rate of HIV infection
has meant that some African armies have been unable to deploy a full contingent, or even half of their troops, at short
notice.. [In South Africa, because] participation in peace-support operations outside the country is voluntary, the
S[outh] A[frican] N[ational] D[efence] F[orce] is grappling with the problem of how to ensure the availability of
sufficiently suitable candidates for deployment at short notice. Even the use of members for internal crime prevention
and border control, which subjects them to adverse conditions or stationing in areas where local in- frastructure is
limited, presents certain problems. Ordinary ailments, such as diarrhoea and the common cold, can be serious enough
to require the hospitalization of an immune-compromised person, and, in some cases, can prove fatal if they are not
treated immediately.148 Armed forces in severely affected states will be unable to recruit and train soldiers quickly
enough to replace their sick and dying colleagues, the potential recruitment pool itself will dwindle, and officers corps
will be decimated. Military budgets will be sapped, military blood supplies tainted, and organizational structures
strained to accommodate unproductive soldiers. HIV-infected armed forces also threaten civilians at home and abroad.
Increased levels of sexual activity among military forces in wartime means that the military risk of becoming infected
with HIV is as much as 100 times that of the civilian risk. It also means that members of the armed forces comprise a
key means of transmitting the virus to the general population; with sex and transport workers, the military is
considered one of the three core transmission groups in Africa.149 For this reason, conflict-ridden states may become
reluctant to accept peacekeepers from countries with high HIV rates. Rather than contributing directly to military
defeat in many countries, however, AIDS in the military is more likely to have longer term implications for national
security. First, IDs theoretically could deter military action and impede access to strategic resources or areas. Tropical
diseases erected a formidable, although obviously not insurmountable, obstacle to colonization in Africa, India, and
Southeast Asia. French and later American efforts to open the Panama Canal, similarly, were stymied until U.S.
mosquito control efforts effectively checked yellow fever and malaria. Second, in many countries AIDS already strains
military medical systems and their budgets, and it only promises to divert further spending away from defense toward
both military and civilian health. Third, AIDS in the military promises to have its greatest impact by eroding a
government.s control over its armed forces and further destabilizing the state. Terminally ill soldiers may have little
incentive to defend their government, and their government may be in more need of defending as AIDS siphons funds
from housing, education, police, and administration. Finally, high military HIV/AIDS rates could alter regional balances
of power. Perhaps 40.50 percent of South Africa.s soldiers are HIV-infected. Despite the disease.s negative impact on
South Africa.s absolute power, Price-Smith notes, AIDS may increase that nation.s power relative to its neighbors,
Zimbabwe and Botswana, with potentially important regional consequences. 150 AIDS poses obvious threats to the
military forces of many countries, particularly in sub- Saharan Africa, but it does not present the same immediate
security problems for the United States. The authors of a Reagan-era report on the effects of economic and
demographic trends on security worried about the effects of the costs of AIDS research, education, and funding on the
defense budget,151 but a decade of relative prosperity generated budget surpluses instead. These surpluses have
evaporated, but concerns about AIDS spending have not reappeared and are unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future,
given the relatively low levels of HIV-infection in the United States. AIDS presents other challenges, including
prevention education and measures to limit infection of U.S. soldiers and peacekeepers stationed abroad, particularly in
high risk settings, and HIV transmission by these forces to the general population. These concerns could limit U.S.
actions where American interests are at stake.152
172
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
173 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AIDS T/ Readiness
Aids kills military readiness
Upton, 4 ( Maureen- member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow of the 21st Century
Trust, World Policy Journal, Global Public Health Trumps the Nation-State Volume XXI, No 3, Fall
2004, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj04-3/Upton.html)
The political economist Nicholas Eberstadt has demonstrated that the coming Eurasian AIDS pandemic has the
potential to derail the economic prospects of billions of peopleparticularly in Russia, China, and Indiaand to
thereby alter the global military balance.5 Eurasia (defined as Russia, plus Asia), is home to five-eighths of the worlds
population, and its combined GNP is larger than that of either the United States or Europe. Perhaps more importantly,
the region includes four of the worlds five militaries with over one million members and four declared nuclear states.
Since HIV has a relatively long incubation period, its effects on military readiness are unusually harsh. Officers who
contract the disease early in their military careers do not typically die until they have amassed significant training and
expertise, so armed forces are faced with the loss of their most senior, hardest-to-replace officers.
173
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
174 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Disesase T/ Readiness
Diseases kill military readiness- empirically proven
Peterson, 3 (Susan- associate professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, Security
Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3), Epidemic Disease and National Security
http://people.wm.edu/~smpete/files/epidemic.pdf)
Military readiness. Even when disease is not deliberately used, it can alter the evolution and outcome of military
conflict by eroding military readiness and morale. As Jared Diamond notes, .All those military histories glorifying
great generals oversimplify the ego-deflating truth: the winners of past wars were not always the armies with the best
generals and weapons, but were often merely those bearing the nastiest germs to transmit to their enemies..142 During
the European conquest of the Americas, the conquistadors shared numerous lethal microbes with their native
American foes, who had few or no deadly diseases to pass on to their conquerors. When Hernando Cortez and his men
first attacked the Aztecs in Mexico in 1520, they left behind smallpox that wiped out half the Aztec population.
Surviving Aztecs were further demoralized by their vulnerability to a disease that appeared harmless to the Europeans,
and on their next attempt the Spanish succeeded in conquering the Aztec nation.143 Spanish conquest of the Incan
empire in South America followed a similar pattern: In 1532 Francisco Pizarro and his army of 168
Spaniards defeated the Incan army of 80,000. A devastating smallpox epidemic had
killed the Incan emperor and his heir, producing a civil war that split the empire and
allowed a handful of Europeans to defeat a large, but divided enemy. 144 In modern times,
too, pandemic infections have affected the ability of military forces to prosecute and win
a war. The German Army chief of staff in the First World War, General Erick Von
Ludendorf, blamed Germany.s loss of that war at least partly on the negative effects of
the 1918 influenza epidemic on the morale of German troops. 145 In the Second World
War, similarly, malaria caused more U.S. casualties in certain areas than did military
action.146 Throughout history, then, IDs have had a significant potential to decimate
armies and alter military history.
174
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
175 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Disease T/ Readiness
Disease turns military readiness
Suburban Emergency Management Project, 7 (Disease Outbreak Readiness Update, U.S. Department
of Defense
Biot Report #449: July 25, 2007, http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=449)
An infectious disease pandemic could impair the militarys readiness, jeopardize ongoing military operations abroad,
and threaten the day-to-day functioning of the Department of Defense (DOD) because of up to 40% of personnel
reporting sick or being absent during a pandemic, according to a recent GAO report (June 2007).
Congressman Tom Davis, ranking member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in the U.S. House
of Representatives, requested the GAO investigation. (1) The 40% number (above) comes from the Homeland
Security Councils estimate that 40% of the U.S. workforce might not be at work due to illness, the need to care for
family members who are sick, or fear of becoming infected. (2) DOD military and civilian personnel and contractors
would face a similar absentee rate, according to the GAO writers.
175
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
176 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Disease T/ War
Disease increases the likelihood of war and genocide
Peterson, 3 (Susan- associate professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, Security
Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3), Epidemic Disease and National Security
http://people.wm.edu/~smpete/files/epidemic.pdf)
How might these political and economic effects produce violent conflict? Price-Smith offers two possible answers:
Disease .magnif[ies].both relative and absolute deprivation and.hasten[s] the erosion of state capacity in seriously
affected societies. Thus, infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic lowintensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure..83 Disease
heightens competition among social groups and elites for scarce resources. When the debilitating and deadly effects of
IDs like AIDS are concentrated among a particular socio-economic, ethnic, racial, or geographic group, the potential
for conflict escalates. In many parts of Africa today, AIDS strikes rural areas at higher rates than urban areas, or it hits
certain provinces harder than others. If these trends persist in states where tribes or ethnic groups are heavily
concentrated in particular regions or in rural rather than urban areas, AIDS almost certainly will interact with tribal,
ethnic, or national differences and make political and military conflict more likely. Price-Smith argues, moreover, that
.the potential for intra-elite violence is also increasingly probable and may carry grave political consequences, such as
coups, the collapse of governance, and planned genocides..84
176
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
177 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ecodestruction T/ Disease
Worldwatch Institute, 96 (Infectious Diseases Surge: Environmental Destruction, Poverty To Blame
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1593)
Rates of infectious disease have risen rapidly in many countries during the past decade, according to a new study
released by the Worldwatch Institute. Illness and death from tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, and AIDS are up
sharply; infectious diseases killed 16.5 million people in 1993, one-third of all deaths worldwide, and slightly more
than cancer and heart disease combined.
The resurgence of diseases once thought to have been conquered stems from a deadly mix of exploding populations,
rampant poverty, inadequate health care, misuse of antibiotics, and severe environmental degradation, says the new
report, Infecting Ourselves: How Environmental and Social Disruptions Trigger Disease. Infectious diseases take their
greatest toll in developing countries, where cases of malaria and tuberculosis are soaring, but even in the United
States, infectious disease deaths rose 58 percent between 1980 and 1992.
Research Associate Anne Platt, author of the report, says, "Infectious diseases are a basic barometer of the
environmental sustainability of human activity. Recent outbreaks result from a sharp imbalance between a human
population growing by 88 million each year and a natural resource base that is under increasing stress."
"Water pollution, shrinking forests, and rising temperatures are driving the upward surge in infections in many
countries," the report says. "Only by adopting a more sustainable path to economic development can we control
them."
"Beyond the number of people who die, the social and economic cost of infectious diseases is hard to overestimate,"
Platt says. "It can be a crushing burden for families, communities, and governments. Some 400 million people suffer
from debilitating malaria, about 200 million have schistosomiasis, and nine million have tuberculosis."
By the year 2000, AIDS will cost Asian countries over $50 billion a year just in lost productivity. "Such suffering and
economic loss is doubly tragic," says Platt, "because the cost of these diseases is astronomical, yet preventing them is
not only simple, but inexpensive."
The author notes, "The dramatic resurgence of infectious diseases is telling us that we are approaching disease and
medicine, as well as economic development, in the wrong way. Governments focus narrowly on individual cures and
not on mass prevention; and we fail to understand that lifestyle can promote infectious disease just as it can contribute
to heart disease. It is imperative that we bring health considerations into the equation when we plan for international
development, global trade, and population increases, to prevent disease from spreading and further undermining
economic development."
The report notes that this global resurgence of infectious disease involves old, familiar diseases like tuberculosis and
the plague as well as new ones like Ebola and Lyme disease. Yet all show the often tragic consequences of human
actions:
Population increases, leading to human crowding, poverty, and the growth of mega-cities, are prompting dramatic
increases in dengue fever, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS.
Lack of clean water is spreading diseases like cholera, typhoid, and dysentery. Eighty percent of all disease in
developing countries is related to unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation.
Poorly planned development disrupts ecosystems and provides breeding grounds for mosquitoes, rodents, and snails
that spread debilitating diseases.
Inadequate vaccinations have led to resurgences in measles and diphtheria.
Misuse of antibiotics has created drug-resistant strains of pneumonia and malaria.
177
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
178 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ecodestruction T/ Disease
Environmental collapse threatens health and civilization collapse
WHO, 5 (Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Health Synthesis http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosys
tems/ecosysq1.pdf)
In a fundamental sense, ecosystems are the planet's life-support systems - for the human species and all other forms of
life (see Figure 1.1). The needs of the human organism for food, water, clean air, shelter and relative climatic
constancy are basic and unalterable. That is, ecosystems are essential to human well-being and especially to human
health defined by the World Health Organization as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being.
Those who live in materially comfortable, urban environments commonly take for granted ecosystem services to
health. They assume that good health derives from prudent consumer choices and behaviours, with access to good
health care services. But this ignores the role of the natural environment: of the array of ecosystems that allow people
to enjoy good health, social organization, economic activity, a built environment and life itself. Historically,
overexploitation of ecosystem services has led to the collapse of some societies (SG3). There is an observable
tendency for powerful and wealthy societies eventually to overexploit, damage and even destroy their natural
environmental support base. The agricultural-based civilizations of Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, the Mayans, and
(on a micro-scale) Easter Island all provide well documented examples. Industrial societies, although in many cases
more distant from the source of the ecosystem services on which they depend, may reach similar limits. Resource
consumption in one location can lead to degradation of ecosystem services and associated health effects in other parts
of the world (SG3). At its most fundamental level of analysis, the pressure on ecosystems can be conceptualized as a
function of population, technology and lifestyle. In turn, these factors depend on many social and cultural elements.
For example, fertilizer use in agricultural production increasingly is dependent on resources extracted from other
regions and has led to eutrophication of rivers, lakes and coastal ecosystems. Notwithstanding ecosystems'
fundamental role as determinants of human health, sociocultural factors play a similarly important role. These include
infrastructural assets; income and wealth distribution; technologies used; and level of knowledge. In many
industrialized countries, changes in these social factors over the last few centuries have both enhanced some
ecosystem services (through more productive agriculture, for instance) and improved health services and education,
contributing to increases in life expectancy. The complex multifactorial causation of states of health and disease
complicates the attribution of human health impacts to ecosystem changes. A precautionary approach to ecosystem
management is appropriate.
178
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
179 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ecodestruction T/ War
Environmental degradation increases war, instability, and hurts the
economy
UN, 4 (United Nations News Center, Environmental destruction during war exacerbates instability
November
5,
2004,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=12460&Cr=conflict&Cr1=environment,
"These scars, threatening water supplies, the fertility of the land and the cleanliness of the air are recipes for instability
between communities and neighbouring countries," he added.
Citing a new UNEP report produced in collaboration with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Mr. Toepfer stressed that environmental degradation
could undermine local and international security by "reinforcing and increasing grievances within and between
societies."
The study finds that a decrepit and declining environment can depress economic activity and diminish the authority of
the state in the eyes of its citizens. It also points out that the addressing environmental problems can foster trust
among communities and neighbouring countries.
179
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
180 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ecodestruction T/ Agriculture
Environmental degradation destroys cropland
Homer-Dixon, 91 (Thomas- Professor of Political Science and Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the
University of Toronto, International Security On The Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict
199, http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/thresh/thresh2.htm)
Decreased agricultural production is often mentioned as potentially the most worrisome consequence of
environmental change,47 and Figure 2 presents some of the causal scenarios frequently proposed by researchers. This
illustration is not intended to be exhaustive: the systemic interaction of environmental and agricultural variables is far
more complex than the figure suggests.48 Moreover, no one region or country will exhibit all the indicated processes:
while some are already clearly evident in certain areas, others are not yet visible anywhere.
The Philippines provides a good illustration of deforestation's impact, which can be traced out in the figure. Since the
Second World War, logging and the encroachment of farms have reduced the virgin and second-growth forest from
about sixteen million hectares to 6.8-7.6 million hectares. 49 Across the archipelago, logging and land-clearing have
accelerated erosion, changed regional hydrological cycles and precipitation patterns, and decreased the land's ability to
retain water during rainy periods. The resulting flash floods have damaged irrigation works while plugging reservoirs
and irrigation channels with silt. These factors may seriously affect crop production. For example, when the
government of the Philippines and the European Economic Community commissioned an Integrated Environmental
Plan for the still relatively unspoiled island of Palawan, the authors of the study found that only about half of the
36,000 hectares of irrigated farmland projected within the Plan for 2007 will actually be irrigable because of the
hydrological effects of decreases in forest cover.50
Figure 2 also highlights the importance of the degradation and decreasing availability of good agricultural land,
problems that deserve much closer attention than they usually receive. Currently, total global cropland amounts to
about 1.5 billion hectares. Optimistic estimates of total arable land on the planet, which includes both current and
potential cropland, range from 3.2 to 3.4 billion hectares, but nearly all the best land has already been exploited. What
is left is either less fertile, not sufficiently rainfed or easily irrigable, infested with pests, or harder to clear and work. 51
For developing countries during the 1980s, cropland grew at just 0.26 percent a year, less than half the rate of the 1970s.
More importantly, in these countries arable land per capita dropped by 1.9 percent a year. 52 In the absence of a major increase
in arable land in developing countries, experts expect that the world average of 0.28 hectares of cropland per capita will
decline to 0.17 hectares by the year 2025, given the current rate of world population growth. 53 Large tracts are being lost each
year to urban encroachment, erosion, nutrient depletion, salinization, waterlogging, acidification, and compacting. The
geographer Vaclav Smil, who is generally very conservative in his assessments of environmental damage, estimates that two
to three million hectares of cropland are lost annually to erosion; perhaps twice as much land goes to urbanization, and at
least one million hectares are abandoned because of excessive salinity. In addition, about one-fifth of the world's cropland is
suffering from some degree of desertification. 54 Taken together, he concludes, the planet will lose about 100 million hectares
of arable land between 1985 and 2000.55
180
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
181 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
181
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
182 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Central Asias physical infrastructure might charitably be called Third World and the region is highly diverse
ethnically and politically. Thus we might quickly end up on the wrong side of a Central Asian ethnic
conflict. In such a case we would also quite likely be opposed by one or more of the key neighboring
states, China, Iran, or Russia, all of whom might find it easier to project and sustain power into the area
(or use proxies for that purpose) than we could.
Central Asia is the most likely scenario for a global nuclear war
Stephen Blank,, Director of Strategic Studies Institute at US Army War College, 1999 Central Asian
Survey (18; 2), [Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the
Transcaspian Energy Wars]
many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene
now exist in the Transcaucasus. And similarly many conditions exist for internal domestic strife if the leadership of any
of these governments changes or if one of the many disaffected minority groups revolts. Many Third World conflicts
generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often
feel obliged to rescue their proxies and protgs . One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other
side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or
perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in
1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a
nuclear war in that case. This episode tends to confirm the notion that `future wars involving Europe and America as allies
Thus
will be fought either over resources in chaotic Third World locations or in ethnic upheavals on the southern fringe of Europe
and Russia . 95 Sadly, many such causes for conflict prevail across the Transcaspian . Precisely because Turkey
is a Nato members but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia or if it could, would
conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia s
declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost every-where else in the
CIS or the so-called arc of crisis from the Balkans to China.
182
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
183 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
China-US
US China war goes nuclear
Hadar, adjunct scholar at Cato, 96
(Louis Hadar , The Sweet and Sour Sino-American Relationship, 1/23/96, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-248.html)
Some analysts, including Nicholas D. Kristof, former Beijing chief of the New York Times, have drawn a historical
parallel between the rise of Germany as a world economic and military power at the end of the 19th century
and China's rise in the last decade of the 20th century. They suggest that, given the similar authoritarian and
insecure nature of the regimes in post-Bismarck Germany the post-Deng China, China could emerge as a
leading anti-status quo player, challenging the dominant position of the United States, which like Great Britain
in the 19th century occupies the leading economic and military position in the world. "The risk is that Deng's successor will
be less talented and more aggressive--a Chinese version of Wilhelm II," writes Kristof. "Such a ruler unfortunately may be
tempted to promote Chinese nationalism as a unifying force and ideology, to replace the carcass of communism." For all the
differences between China and Wilhelmine Germany, "the latter's experience should remind us of the difficulty that the world
has had accommodating newly powerful nations," warns Kristof, recalling that Germany's jockeying for a place in the front
rank of nations resulted in World War I.(66) Charles Krauthammer echoes that point, contending that China is "like late
19th-century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for the continent it finds itself on."( 67)
Since Krauthammer and other analysts use the term "containment" to describe the policy they urge Washington to adopt
toward China, it is the Cold War with the Soviet Union that is apparently seen as the model for the future Sino- American
relationship. Strategist Graham Fuller predicts, for example, that China is "predisposed to a role as leader of the
dispossessed states" in a new cold war that would pit an American-led West against an anti-status quo
Third World bloc.(68) Although Krauthammer admits that China lacks the ideological appeal that the Soviet
Union possessed (at least in the early stages of the Cold War), he assumes that, like the confrontation with the
Soviet Union but unlike the British-German rivalry, the contest between America and China will remain
"cold" and not escalate into a "hot" war. That optimism is crucial. Advocates of containment may be able
to persuade a large number of Americans to adopt an anti-China strategy if the model is the tense but
manageable Soviet-American rivalry. However, not many Americans are likely to embrace containment
if the probable outcome is a bloody rerun of World War I--only this time possibly with nuclear weapons.
183
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
184 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Economic Collapse
Economic decline leads to global nuclear war and totalitarian regimes
Cook, former analyst for the US Treasury Department, 2007
Richard Cook, Writer, Consultant, and Retired Federal Analyst U.S. Treasury Department, 6/14/2k7 "It's Official: The
Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5964
Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face
the economic music. The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War
II. Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if the U.S.
decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they dont want
our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes? Maybe well finally have a revolution either
from the right or the center involving martial law, suspension of the Bill of Rights, etc., combined with
some kind of military or forced-labor dictatorship. Were halfway there anyway. Forget about a revolution
from the left. They wouldnt want to make anyone mad at them for being too radical.
184
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
185 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
India/Pakistan War
India Pakistan War leads to extinction
Gertz, Staff Writer at the Washington Times, 2001
(Bill Gertz, Staff writer at the Washington Times 12/31/2001, India, Pakistan prepare nukes, troops for war, Lexis)
Pakistan and India are readying their military forces - including their ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons - for war, The Washington Times has learned. U.S. intelligence officials say Pakistani military moves include
large-scale troop movements, the dispersal of fighter aircraft and preparations for the transportation of nuclear weapons from
storage sites. India also is moving thousands of its troops near the border with Pakistan and has dispersed some aircraft to
safer sites away from border airfields, say officials familiar with intelligence reports of the war moves. Pakistan is moving the
equivalent of two armored brigades - several thousand troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles - near the northern
part of its border with India. Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged heavy mortar fire over their border in southern Kashmir
today, Agence France-Presse reported. Five Indian soldiers were seriously injured in the heaviest shelling in four months, a
senior Indian army official said. More than 1,000 villagers were evacuated from their homes overnight for the operation,
according to the report. Officials say the most alarming signs are preparations in both states for the use of nuclear-tipped
missiles. Intelligence agencies have learned of indications that India is getting its short-range Prithvi ballistic missiles ready
for use. The missiles are within range of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. Meanwhile, Pakistan is mobilizing its Chinesemade mobile M-11 missiles, also known as the Shaheen, which have been readied for movement from a base near Sargodha,
Pakistan. Intelligence reports indicate that India will have all its forces ready to launch an attack as early as this week, with
Thursday or Friday as possible dates. Pakistan could launch its forces before those dates in a pre-emptive strike. Disclosure
of the war preparations comes as President Bush on Saturday telephoned leaders of both nations, urging them to calm
tensions, a sign of administration concern over the military moves in the region. The administration also fears that a conflict
between India and Pakistan would undermine U.S. efforts to find terrorists in Afghanistan. U.S. military
forces are heavily reliant on Pakistani government permission to conduct overflights for bombing and
other aircraft operations into Afghanistan, primarily from aircraft carriers located in the Arabian Sea.
With tensions growing between the states, U.S. intelligence officials are divided over the ultimate meaning of the indicators
of an impending conflict. The Pentagon's Joint Staff intelligence division, known as J-2, late last week had assessed the
danger of conflict at "critical" levels. Other joint intelligence centers outside the Pentagon, including those supporting the
U.S. military forces responsible for the Asia-Pacific region and for Southwest Asia, assess the danger of an India-Pakistan
war as less than critical but still "serious." Intelligence officials are especially worried about Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal because control over the weapons is decentralized. Even before the latest moves, regional
commanders could order the use of the weapons, which are based on missiles or fighter-bombers.
185
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
186 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Iraq Pullout
Iraq pullout causes Middle-Eastern nuclear war
Gerecht, resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007
(Reuel,
The
Consequences
of
Failure
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25407,filter.all/pub_detail.asp)
in
Iraq,
Jan
15,
If we leave Iraq any time soon, the battle for Baghdad will probably lead to a conflagration that
consumes all of Arab Iraq, and quite possibly Kurdistan, too. Once the Shia become both badly bloodied
and victorious, raw nationalist and religious passions will grow. A horrific fight with the Sunni Arabs
will inevitably draw in support from the ferociously anti-Shiite Sunni religious establishments in Jordan
and Saudi Arabia, and on the Shiite side from Iran. It will probably destroy most of central Iraq and whet
the appetite of Shiite Arab warlords, who will by then dominate their community, for a conflict with the
Kurds. If the Americans stabilize Arab Iraq, which means occupying the Sunni triangle, this won't happen. A strong,
aggressive American military presence in Iraq can probably halt the radicalization of the Shiite community. Imagine an Iraq
modeled on the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. The worst elements in the Iranian regime are
heavily concentrated in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence, the two organizations most
active inside Iraq. The Lebanese Hezbollah is also present giving tutorials. These forces need increasing strife to prosper.
Imagine Iraqi Shiites, battle-hardened in a vicious war with Iraq's Arab Sunnis, spiritually and operationally linking up with a
revitalized and aggressive clerical dictatorship in Iran. Imagine the Iraqi Sunni Islamic militants, driven from Iraq, joining up
with groups like al Qaeda, living to die killing Americans. Imagine the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan overwhelmed with
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arab refugees. The Hashemites have been lucky and clever since World War II. They've
escaped extinction several times. Does anyone want to take bets that the monarchy can survive the implantation of an army of
militant, angry Iraqi Sunni Arabs? For those who believe that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the
epicenter of the Middle East, the mass migration of Iraq's Sunni Arabs into Jordan will bury what small
chances remain that the Israelis and Palestinians will find an accommodation. With Jordan in trouble,
overflowing with viciously anti-American and anti-Israeli Iraqis, peaceful Palestinian evolution on the
West Bank of the Jordan river is about as likely as the discovery of the Holy Grail. The repercussions
throughout the Middle East of the Sunni-Shiite clash in Iraq are potentially so large it's difficult to
digest. Sunni Arabs in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will certainly view a hard-won and bloody Shiite
triumph in Iraq as an enormous Iranian victory. The Egyptians or the Saudis or both will go for their
own nukes. What little chance remains for the Americans and the Europeans to corral peacefully the
clerical regime's nuclear-weapons aspirations will end with a Shiite-Sunni death struggle in
Mesopotamia, which the Shia will inevitably win. The Israelis, who are increasingly likely to strike
preemptively the major Iranian nuclear sites before the end of George Bush's presidency, will feel even
more threatened, especially when the Iranian regime underscores its struggle against the Zionist enemy
as a means of compensating for its support to the bloody Shiite conquest in Iraq . With America in full retreat
from Iraq, the clerical regime, which has often viewed terrorism as a tool of statecraft, could well revert to the mentality and
tactics that produced the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996. If the Americans are retreating, hit them. That would not be just
a radical Shiite view; it was the learned estimation of Osama bin Laden and his kind before 9/11 . It's questionable to
argue that the war in Iraq has advanced the radical Sunni holy war against the United States. There
should be no question, however, that an American defeat in Mesopotamia would be the greatest
psychological triumph ever for anti-American jihadists. Al Qaeda and its militant Iraqi allies could
dominate western Iraq for years--it could take awhile for the Shiites to drive them out.
186
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
187 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Iran
Iran attack will cause a global nuclear war that leads to human extinction
Hirch Professor at the University og Califorina at San Diego 2008
(Seymour Hirsch, Professor of physics @ the University of California @ San Diego, 4/10/2k8
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=HIR20060422&articleId=2317)
Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in Iraq
and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, it is not clear whether Iran
would target Israel in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes nuclear
weapons use against Iranian facilities, as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring Iran it will cause a much
more violent response. Iranian military forces and militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq and the
US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and inflaming the
Muslim world. There could be popular uprisings in other countries in the region like Pakistan, and of
course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers . Finally I would like to discuss the grave
consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the likelihood of terrorist
attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously enhanced after these
events. And terrorist's attempts to get hold of "loose nukes" and use them against Americans will be
enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran. , it will destroy America's
position as the leader of the free world. The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear weapons are
qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction between small and
large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those targeting armies or
civilians. It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression against a non-nuclear
country, and the US will become a pariah state. Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist,
and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a
deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons,
any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are millionfold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity
many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global
conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed.
187
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
188 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The Japan-U.S. alliance also probably serves as a deterrent against any one nation seizing control of the
Spratly Islands and, by extension, the sea lanes and resources of the South China Sea . Formally, the area is
outside the Far East region that the United States and Japan agree is covered by Article 6 of the security treaty. For the
countries vying for control of the sea, however, the proximity of two of the worlds great maritime forces must
case scenario, Asian countries would go to war against each other, possibly over disputes such as their
conflicting claims on the Spratly Islands. China might then declare war on the U.S., leading to full-scale,
even nuclear, war.
188
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
189 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States and Islamic
countries, which, with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested that Japan can become a potential
intermediary between the United States and the Muslim world because of Japans close relations with
Arab governments, Muslim oil-producing states, and the nations of Central Asia ; its relatively more flexible
stance on human rights policies; and the absence of a strong tie to Israel . Japan can contribute to a U.S.Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and an inconsistent U.S.
commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of stemming the rise of terrorism in the
Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the
industrialized world that extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States also needs
to explain its reluctance to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights standards as
those applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia.
189
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
190 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Regardless of whether Chinas development takes the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason for
concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life
have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. The U.S.Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem . Both Japan
and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force . When China conducted
provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby
waters as a sign of its disapproval of Chinas belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the
possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities . Even though
intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests
guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked
attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs up Japans basic stance that the two sides need to come to a
negotiated solution.
190
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
191 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
the
the
people, the North Korean military maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of
artillerysome of which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheadsawaiting the
signal to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRKs immense stock of weapons includes large numbers of Nodong missiles
Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its choking, inhumane society,
DPRK government still refuses to retreat to its place on the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of
capable of striking Japans western coastal regions and probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major
Japanese city. The United States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some 30,000
U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul . Most military experts admit that the army troops serve a largely
symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment could
pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces at the incipient stage. The firepower the USFJ
can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance the
Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and
manipulation, but they know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a
strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan.
191
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
192 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
take strategic steps to counter these efforts, it will lose influence to Russia and China in an increasingly
important part of the world. Unimaginable just a few years ago, the weeklong military exercises dubbed "Peace
Mission 2005" will involve 10,000 troops on China and Russia's eastern coasts and in adjacent seas. This unmistakable
example of Sino-Russian military muscle-flexing will also include Russia's advanced SU-27 fighters, strategic TU-95 and
TU-22 bombers, submarines, amphibious and anti-submarine ships. The exercise's putative purpose is to "strengthen the
capability of the two armed forces in jointly striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism," says China's
Defense Ministry. But the Chinese defense minister was more frank in comments earlier this year. Gen. Cao Gangchuan said:
"The exercise will exert both immediate and far-reaching impacts." This raised lots of eyebrows especially in the United
States, Taiwan and Japan. For instance, although Russia nixed the idea, the Chinese demanded the exercises be held
500 miles to the south a move plainly aimed at intimidating Taiwan. Beijing clearly wanted to send a
warning to Washington (and, perhaps, Tokyo) about its support for Taipei, and hint at the possibility that if
there were a Taiwan Strait dust-up, Russia might stand with China. The exercise also gives Russia an
opportunity to strut its military wares before its best customers Chinese generals. Moscow is Beijing's largest arms
supplier, to the tune of more than $2 billion a year for purchases that include subs, ships, missiles and fighters. Rumors
abound that Moscow may finally be ready to sell strategic, cruise-missile-capable bombers such as the long-range TU-95 and
supersonic TU-22 to Beijing strengthening China's military hand against America and U.S. friends and allies in Asia.
Russia and China are working together to oppose American influence all around their periphery. Both
are upset by U.S. support for freedom in the region notably in the recent Orange (Ukraine), Rose (Georgia) and
Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) revolutions all of which fell in what Moscow or Beijing deems its sphere of influence. In fact, at a
recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (i.e., Russia, China and the four 'Stans'), Moscow and Beijing
conspired to get Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close U.S. airbases. As a result, Uzbekistan gave America 180 days to get out,
despite the base's continued use in Afghanistan operations. (Quick diplomacy by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saved
the Kyrgyz base, but it remains on the ropes.) Moreover, it shouldn't be overlooked that the "Shanghai Six" have invited Iran,
India and Pakistan to join the group as observers, expanding China and Russia's influence into South Asia and parts of the
Middle East. What to do? First, the Pentagon must make sure the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review balances U.S.
forces to address both the unconventional terrorist threat and the big-power challenge represented by a Russia-China strategic
partnership. Second, the United States must continue to strengthen its relationship with its ally Japan to
ensure a balance of power in Northeast Asia and also encourage Tokyo to improve relations with
Moscow in an effort to loosen Sino-Russian ties. Third, Washington must persevere in advancing its new
relationship with (New) Delhi in order to balance Beijing's growing power in Asia and take advantage of India's
longstanding, positive relationship with Russia. And be ready to deal. Russia has historically been wary of China. America
must not ignore the possibilities of developing a long-term, favorable relationship with Russia despite the challenges
posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's heavy-handed rule. These unprecedented military exercises don't make a
formal Beijing-Moscow alliance inevitable. But they represent a new, more intimate phase in the Sino-Russian
relationship. And China's growing political/economic clout mated with Russia's military would make for
a potentially potent anti-American bloc. For the moment, Beijing and Moscow are committed to
building a political order in Asia that doesn't include America atop the power pyramid. With issues from
Islamic terrorism to North Korean nukes to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the stakes in Asia are huge.
Washington and its friends must not waste any time in addressing the burgeoning Sino-Russian entente.
192
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
193 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
North Korea
North Korean War goes nuclear
CNN 2003
[CNN, N K. Warns of nuclear conflict, 2/26/2003 ,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/25/nkorea.missile/index.html]
Pyongyang cites upcoming U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises scheduled to begin on March 4, as "reckless war
moves" designed to "unleash a total war on the Korean peninsula with a pre-emptive nuclear strike". " The situation of the
Korean Peninsula is reaching the brink of a nuclear war," the statement, issued by the official Korean
Central News Agency, says. The North also called on South Koreans to "wage a nationwide anti-U.S. and anti-war
struggle to frustrate the U.S. moves for a nuclear war." The United States denies it has any plans to attack North Korea,
consistently saying it is seeking a diplomatic and political solution to the increasing tensions sparked by Pyongyang's
decision to reactivate its nuclear program. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on Tuesday wrapped up a four-day tour of
Japan, China and South Korea during which he lobbied Asian leaders to support a multi-lateral approach to pressure North
Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Powell repeated the U.S. position that it had no intention of invading North Korea
and had no plans to impose fresh economic sanctions on the impoverished communist nation. While Japan and South Korea
indicated they might support a regional initiative to sway Pyongyang, China -- a key ally and aid donor to the North -appeared to remain unconvinced. China says the United States must deal with Pyongyang equally on a one-to-one basis. "We
believe diplomatic, political pressure still has a role to play. And there are countries who have considerable influence with the
North Koreans who will continue to apply pressure," Powell said Tuesday. "We also made it clear that if they begin
reprocessing (nuclear material), it changes the entire political landscape. And we're making sure that is communicated to
them in a number of channels." Powell would not be drawn on how would Washington react if Pyongyang did begin
reprocessing but did say that the U.S. had "no intention of invading" North Korea. Tensions on the peninsula have
been ratcheting up over the past few weeks with North Korea becoming increasingly provocative. On Monday,
the North fired a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan, or East Sea, an act many believe was designed to upstage the
inauguration of new South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. (Roh sworn in) Last week, a North Korean MiG-19 fighter
briefly flew into South Korean air space. (MiG incursion) The North has also threatened to abandon the 1953
armistice that ended the fighting of the Korean War.
193
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
194 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Pakistan Collapse
Pakistan Collapse leads to nuclear war and nuclear terrorism
Brooks, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 2007
Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 7/2/2007 (Peter, BARACK'S BLUNDER
INVADE A NUCLEAR POWER?
http://www.nypost.com/seven/08022007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/baracks_blunder_opedcolumnists_peter_brookes.htm?
page=2)
The fall of Musharraf's government might well lead to a takeover by pro-U.S. elements of the Pakistani military but other possible outcomes are extremely unpleasant, including the ascendance of Islamist factions. The last thing
we need is for Islamabad to fall to the extremists. That would exacerbate the problem of those terrorist
safe havens that Obama apparently thinks he could invade. And it would also put Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal into the wrong hands. That could lead to a number of nightmarish scenarios - a nuclear war with
India over Kashmir, say, or the use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group against any number of targets,
including the United States.
194
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
195 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Sino-Russian Conflict
Sino Russian War leads to Extinction
Sharavin Head of the Institute for Political and military analysis 2001,
(Alexander Sharavin, head of the institute for political and military analysis, 10/1/2001 The Third Threat
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5470.html)
Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called,
is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical
weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses
(even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible
than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and
complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction
(we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive
nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what
would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long
run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country
would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against
the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.
195
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
196 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Sunni/Shiite Conflict
A war between Sunnis and Shiites would spill over resulting in extinction
Hutson Correspondent for Renew America 2007
(Warner Todd Huston, Correspondent for Renew America, recently appeared 1/24/2007, Media: Bushs flawed portrayal of
the enemy in the State of the Union http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/huston/070124)
Once again, a National U.S. paper "arguably" chooses sides with Europe's interests over that of America.
Under Bush's rubric, a country such as Iran which enjoys diplomatic representation and billions of
dollars in trade wit major European countries is lumped together with al-Qaeda, the terrorist group
responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. "The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the
same totalitarian threat," Bush said, referring to the different branches of the Muslim religion. Trade? How is trade an
assurance of the benevolence of any nation? Nations didn't stop trading with Nazi Germany even as Hitler was Blitzkrieging
through Europe, for instance. Even the USA was still trading with the Confederacy after the Civil War had already begun.
The fact that Europe is still trading with Iran as if everything is hunkeydorie does NOT say one word as to the Iranian
regime's status as a bunch of nice guys. Trade is one of the last things that is affected by war. Business is
business, after all. Further Bush did not "lump together" al-Qaeda and Iran as if they were
indistinguishable, as the Post seems to be claiming. Here is what Bush actually said: In recent times, it has also become
clear that we face an escalating danger from Shia extremists who are just as hostile to America, and are also determined to
dominate the Middle East. Many are known to take direction from the regime in Iran, which is funding and arming terrorists
like Hezbollah a group second only to al Qaeda in the American lives it has taken. The president said that the Shia
extremists in Iran are "second only to al Qaeda" among the enemies we face. He did not, however, say they were one and the
same. The Post's simple-minded efforts to make Bush himself look simple minded only makes the Post out to be practicing
partisan political demagogy. Bush's saying that Shia and Sunni extremism are only "different faces of the same totalitarian
threat" is not to say they are wholly the same, only that they share a similar end game: total domination over the Middle East
in the near term and the world in the long term. Using WWII as an example again, it would like saying that the
Nazis and the Japanese were indistinguishable merely because they both wanted to rule the world. No
one would make such an absurd claim. Yet both threatened our extinction. Just as both Shia and Sunni
extremism today threatens our interests and our way of life. Unfortunately, the Post seems to see no threat from
Iran in particular and Shia extremism in general. Perhaps no one let the Washington Post in on the badly kept secret that Iran
has been sending weapons, manpower, advisors and thousands of IEDs into Iraq to attack us since the
first day Saddam's hold over the country ended. Not to mention the constant threat and rhetoric against
us emanating from the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
196
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
197 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Russia-US
Russia-US conflict guarantees nuclear Armageddon nuclear stockpiles
Bostrom Professor of philosophy at Yale, 2002
(Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Yale. Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,
2002, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR.
An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that
might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal . There was a real worry among those best
acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might
annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization .[4] Russia and the US retain large
nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation , either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a
risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however tha t a smaller nuclear exchange,
between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankinds potential permanently.
197
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
198 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Taiwan/China War
China Taiwan War would draw in the US and lead to extinction
Straits Times 2000
[The Straits Times, No One Gains in War over Taiwan, 6/25/00, Lexis]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US
and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests,
then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far
and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US
and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces
attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan,
the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And
the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing
world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The
balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities
between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous
phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander
of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using
nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the
military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was
confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the
US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little
hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that
China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems
prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was
considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan
Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson
International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong
pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons
mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said
that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in
such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it
cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
198
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
199 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Taiwan
Taiwan is the most probable scenario for nuclear war
Johnson President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, 2001
(Chalmers Johnson, President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, The Nation, 5/14/2k1
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010514&c=1&s=Johnson)
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US
militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the
overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads).
Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most
dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no
one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that
neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a
Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself
against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. Since any
Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally would be viewed as a challenge to China's sovereignty, forwarddeployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect. The United States uses satellites to observe changes
in China's basic military capabilities. But the coastal surveillance flights by our twelve (now eleven) EP-3E Aries II spy
planes, like the one that was forced down off Hainan Island, seek information that is useful only in an imminent battle. They
are inherently provocative and inappropriate when used to monitor a country with which we are at peace. The United States
itself maintains a 200-mile area off its coasts in which it intercepts any aircraft attempting similar reconnaissance.
America's provocative military posture in East Asia makes war with China more likely because it
legitimizes military strategies in both Beijing and Taipei as well as in Washington and Tokyo .
199
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
200 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The horrible truth is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real , in light of the potential existence of a black
market in fissile material. Nuclear terrorists might issue demands, but then again, they might not. Their target could be
anything: a U.S. military base in a foreign land, a crowded U.S. city, or an empty stretch of desert
highway. In one fell swoop, nuclear terrorists could decapitate the U.S. government or destroy its
financial system. The human suffering resulting from a detonation would be beyond calculation, and in
the aftermath, the remains of the nation would demand both revenge and protection. Constitutional
liberties and values might never recover. When terrorists strike against societies already separated by fundamental
social fault lines, such as in Northern Ireland or Israel, conventional weapons can exploit those fault lines to achieve
significant gains. n1 In societies that lack such pre-existing fundamental divisions, however, conventional weapon attacks do
not pose a top priority threat to national security, even though the pain and suffering inflicted can be substantial. The bedrock
institutions of the United States will survive despite the destruction of federal offices; the vast majority of people will
continue to support the Constitution despite the mass murder of innocent persons. The consequences of terrorists
employing weapons of mass destruction, however, would be several orders of magnitude worse than a
conventional weapons attack. Although this threat includes chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapon's
devastating [*32] potential is in a class by itself. n2 Nuclear terrorism thus poses a unique danger to the
United States: through its sheer power to slay, destroy, and terrorize, a nuclear weapon would give
terrorists the otherwise-unavailable ability to bring the United States to its knees. Therefore, preventing
terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons should be considered an unparalleled national security priority
dominating other policy considerations.
Nuclear terrorism will cause global nuclear war, leading to extinction
Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian political analyst for the Al-Ahram newspaper, 2004:
(Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian political analyst for the Al-Ahram newspaper, Al-Ahram online, August 26,
2004,http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from
certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear
technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs
dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This
completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of
events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a
sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD,
proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would
further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living.
Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human
rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It
would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is
imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This
could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war
which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When
nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
200
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
201 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Terror = Extinction
Terrorist attack risks extinction.
Alexander Prof and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies 3
(Yonah, Terrorism Myths and Realities, Washington Times, Prof and Director of Inter-University
For Terrorism Studies)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that
the
international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the
terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended
to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security
concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy
of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise,
Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the
second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic
efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United
States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by
new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute
to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of
morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.
Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in
terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization
of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological,
chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and
global security concerns.
201
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
202 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
202
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
203 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
In addition, the amount of radioactive fallout is much more than expected . Many previous calculations simply
ignored the intermediate time-scale fallout. That is, calculations were made for the prompt fallout -- the plumes of
radioactive debris blown downwind from each target-and for the long-term fallout, the fine radioactive particles lofted into
the stratosphere that would descend about a year later, after most of the radioactivity had decayed. However, the radioactivity
carried into the upper atmosphere (but not as high as the stratosphere) seems to have been largely forgotten. We found for the
baseline case that roughly 30 percent of the land at northern midlatitudes could receive a radioactive dose greater than 250
rads, and that about 50 percent of northern midlatitudes could receive a dose greater than 100 rads. A 100-rad dose is the
equivalent of about 1000 medical X-rays. A 400-rad dose will, more likely than not, kill you. The cold, the dark and the
intense radioactivity, together lasting for months, represent a severe assault on our civilization and our species.
Civil and sanitary services would be wiped out. Medical facilities, drugs, the most rudimentary means for
relieving the vast human suffering, would be unavailable. Any but the most elaborate shelters would be
useless, quite apart from the question of what good it might be to emerge a few months later. Synthetics burned in the
destruction of the cities would produce a wide variety of toxic gases, including carbon monoxide, cyanides,
dioxins and furans. After the dust and soot settled out , the solar ultraviolet flux would be much larger than its
present value. Immunity to disease would decline. Epidemics and pandemics would be rampant,
especially after the billion or so unburied bodies began to thaw . Moreover, the combined influence of
these severe and simultaneous stresses on life are likely to produce even more adverse consequences -biologists call them synergisms -- that we are not yet wise enough to foresee.
203
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
204 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous, an acknowledgment hat
the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how
seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and
certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the
"matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility -a genuine possibility- as a certainty. Humanity is
not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction . The doctrine of no-use is based on the
possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and
asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear
world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctiveness. It is of no moral account that extinction may
be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that
by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural
extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all
calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the
connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several . Most
obviously, a sizable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to the earth's
uninhabitability, to "nuclear winter," or to Schell's "republic of insects and grass." But the consideration of extinction
cannot rest with the possibility of a sizable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizable
exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or "theater" use, or a so-called limited use, is also
prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizable exchange or
because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent
for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other
consequences: the contagious effect on nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear
and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the
number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on
immediately in the form of escalation, can be counted on to seek expression later. Other than full strategic uses are not
confined, no matter how small the explosive power: each would be a cancerous transformation of the world. All
nuclear roads lead to the possibility of extinction. It is true by definition, but let us make it explicit: the doctrine of
no-use excludes any first or retaliatory or later use, whether sizable or not. No-use is the imperative derived from the
possibility of extinction. By containing the possibility of extinction, any use is tantamount to a declaration of war
against humanity. It is not merely a war crime or a single crime against humanity. Such a war is waged
by the user of nuclear weapons against every human individual as individual (present and future), not as
citizen of this or that country. It is not only a war against the country that is the target. To respond with nuclear weapons,
where possible, only increases the chances of extinction and can never, therefore, be allowed. The use of nuclear weapons
establishes the right of any person or group, acting officially or not, violently or not, to try to punish those responsible for the
use. The aim of the punishment is to deter later uses and thus to try to reduce the possibility of extinction, if, by chance, the
particular use in question did not directly lead to extinction. The form of the punishment cannot be specified. Of course the
chaos ensuing from a sizable exchange could make punishment irrelevant. The important point, however, is to see that those
who use nuclear weapons are qualitatively worse than criminals , and at the least forfeit their offices. John
Locke, a principal individualist political theorist, says that in a state of nature every individual retains the right to punish
transgressors or assist in the effort to punish them, whether or not one is a direct victim. Transgressors convert an otherwise
tolerable condition into a state of nature which is a state of war in which all are threatened. Analogously, the use of
nuclear weapons, by containing in an immediate or delayed manner
204
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
205 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
"a trespass against the whole species" and places the users in a
state of war with all people. And people , the accumulation of individuals , must be understood as of course
always indefeasibly retaining the right of selfpreservation , and hence as morally allowed, perhaps enjoined, to
take the appropriate preserving steps.
205
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
206 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
206
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
207 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
If the production of aerosol by fires is large enough to cause reductions in the penetration of sunlight to
ground level by a factor of a hundred, which would be quite possible in the event of an all-out nuclear war, most of
the phytoplankton and herbivorous zooplankton in more than half of the Northern Hemisphere oceans would die
(36). This effect is due to the fast consumption rate of phytoplankton by zooplankton in the oceans. The effects
of a darkening of such a magnitude have been discussed recently in connection with the probable occurrence of such
an event as a result of the impact of a large extraterrestrial body with the earth (37). This event is believed by
many to have caused the widespread and massive extinctions which took place at the Cretacious-Tertiary boundary
about 65 million years ago.
B.) Phytoplankton depletion collapses the global carbon cycle causing extinction
Bryant 03
(Donald, Professor of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at Penn State, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, The beauty in small things
revealed, Volume 100, Number 17, August 19, http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/100/17/9647)
Oxygenic photosynthesis accounts for nearly all the primary biochemical production of organic matter on
Earth. The byproduct of this process, oxygen, facilitated the evolution of complex eukaryotes and supports
their/our continuing existence. Because macroscopic plants are responsible for most terrestrial photosynthesis, it is
relatively easy to appreciate the importance of photosynthesis on land when one views the lush green diversity of grasslands
or forests. However, Earth is the "blue planet," and oceans cover nearly 75% of its surface. All life on Earth
equally depends on the photosynthesis that occurs in Earth's oceans. A rich diversity of marine
phytoplankton, found in the upper 100 m of oceans, accounts only for 1% of the total photosynthetic biomass, but
this virtually invisible forest accounts for nearly 50% of the net primary productivity of the biosphere (1).
Moreover, the importance of these organisms in the biological pump, which traps CO2 from the atmosphere and
stores it in the deep sea, is increasingly recognized as a major component of the global geochemical carbon
cycle (2). It seems obvious that it is as important to understand marine photosynthesis as terrestrial photosynthesis, but the
contribution of marine photosynthesis to the global carbon cycle was grossly underestimated until
recently. Satellite-based remote sensing (e.g., NASA sea-wide field sensor) has allowed more reliable determinations of
oceanic photosynthetic productivity to be made (refs. 1 and 2; see Fig. 1).
207
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
208 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
But in a nuclear war, the atmosphere would be so perturbed that our normal way of thinking about the ozone layer
needs to be modified. To help refocus our understanding, several research groups have constructed models that
describe the ozone layer following nuclear war. The principal work has been carried out by research teams at the
National Center for Atmospheric Research and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (ref. 4.9). Both find that there is an
additional mechanism by which nuclear war threatens the ozone layer. With massive quantities of smoke injected into
the lower atmosphere by the fires of nuclear war, nuclear winter would grip not only the Earth's surface, but the high
ozone layer as well. The severely disturbed wind currents caused by solar heating of smoke would, in a matter
of weeks, sweep most of the ozone layer from the northern midlatitudes deep into the Southern Hemisphere. The
reduction in the ozone layer content in the North could reach a devastating 50% or more during this phase. As time
progressed, the ozone depletion would be made still worse by several effects: injection of large quantities of
nitrogen oxides and chlorine-bearing molecules along with the smoke clouds; heating of the ozone layer
caused by intermingling of hot smoky air (as air is heated, the amount of ozone declines); and decomposition of
ozone directly on smoke particles (carbon particles are sometimes used down here near the ground to cleanse air of
ozone).
When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer
depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible
scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful
ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to
increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system suppression in
humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems . This is why Rowland's and Molina's theory was
taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.
208
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
209 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
be irreversible.
209
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
210 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Obviously, when a nuclear bomb hits a target, it causes a massive amount of devastation, with the heat, blast and
radiation killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people instantly and causing huge damage to infrastructure.
But in addition to this, a nuclear explosion throws up massive amounts of dust and smoke. For example, a large
nuclear bomb bursting at ground level would throw up about a million tonnes of dust. As a consequence of a nuclear war,
then, the dust and the smoke produced would block out a large fraction of the sunlight and the sun's heat from the
earth's surface, so it would quickly become be dark and cold - temperatures would drop by something in the
region of 10-20C - many places would feel like they were in an arctic winter. It would take months for the sunlight to get
back to near normal. The drop in light and temperature would quickly kill crops and other plant and animal life while
humans, already suffering from the direct effects of the war, would be vulnerable to malnutrition and
disease on a massive scale.
B). We have high probability degree changes devastate entire ecosystems risking extinction
Sagan and Turco, 1990
(Carl and Richard, astrophysicist and astronomer at Cornell University, and founding director of UCLA's Institute of the Environment, A Path Where No
Man Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race, pg 22)
Life on Earth is exquisitely dependent on the climate (see Appendix A). The average surface temperature of the
Earth averaged, that is, over day and night, over the seasons, over latitude, over land and ocean, over coastline and
continental interior, over mountain range and desertis about 13C, 13 Centigrade degrees above the temperature at which
fresh water freezes. (The corresponding temperature on the Fahrenheit scale is 55F.) It's harder to change the temperature of
the oceans than of the continents, which is why ocean temperatures are much more steadfast over the diurnal and seasonal
cycles than are the temperatures in the middle of large continents. Any global temperature change implies much
larger local temperature changes, if you don't live near the ocean. A prolonged global temperature drop of a few
degrees C would be a disaster for agriculture; by 10C, whole ecosystems would be imperiled; and by
20C, almost all life on Earth would be at risk. The margin of safety is thin.
C) Nuclear war collapses ecosystems and kills all biodiversity
Ehrlich et al, 1983
(Paul R. Ehrlich, Stanford University; Mark A. Harwell, Cornell University; Carl Sagan, Cornell University; Anne H. Ehrlich, Stanford University; Stephen
J. Gould, Harvard University; biologists on the Long-Term Worldwide Biological Consequences of Nuclear War (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 25 and 26
April 1983)., Science, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 4630, Dec. 23, 1983, pg 1293-1300, jstor)
The 2 billion to 3 billion survivors of the immediate effects of the war would be forced to turn to natural ecosystems as
organized agriculture failed. Just at the time when these natural ecosystems would be asked to support a human population
well beyond their carrying capacities, the normal functioning of the ecosystems themselves would be severely
curtailed by the effects of nuclear war. Subjecting these ecosystems to low temperature, fire, radiation, storm, and other
physical stresses (many occurring simultaneously) would result in their increased vulnerability to disease and pest outbreaks,
which might be prolonged. Primary productivity would be dramatically reduced at the prevailing low light levels; and,
because of UV-B, smog, insects, radiation, and other damage to plants, it is unlikely that it would recover quickly to normal
levels, even after light and temperature values had recovered. At the same time that their plant foods were being limited
severely, most, if not all, of the vertebrates not killed outright by blast and ionizing radiation would either freeze or face a
dark world where they would starve or die of thirst because surface waters would be frozen and thus unavailable. Many of the
survivors would be widely scattered and often sick, leading to the slightly delayed extinction of many additional species.
210
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
211 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Natural ecosystems provide civilization with a variety of crucial services in addition to food and shelter. These include
regulation of atmospheric composition, moderation of climate and weather, regulation of the
211
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
212 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
212
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
213 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
213
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
214 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
214
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
215 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Schell
Extinction from nuclear war dwarfs all other impact calculus you must treat the RISK of
extinction as morally equivalent to its certainty
Schell, 82
Jonathan Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96 1982
To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation just as it would be a misrepresentation
to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the
adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may
be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them
without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished
in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our
sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use
all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere
may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced
to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite
of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the
peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When
the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great
powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also
realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the
path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass of "the basic power of the
universe" and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of
his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that
sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was
detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it.
At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to
destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is
clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being
added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere
risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any
other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been
contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some
purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the
possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs
in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although
the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still
infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if
we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although,
scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring
about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of
nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate
of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery.
We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility
should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the
threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.
215
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
216 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
countries that precisely fit the Iran profile: the "Nuclear Posture Review" and the "Doctrine for Joint
Nuclear Operations." The doctrine of preemptive attack adopted by the Bush administration and already
put into practice in Iraq, and the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" (NSPD
17), which promises to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons. 150,000 American soldiers in
Iraq, whose lives are at risk if a military confrontation with Iran erupts, and who thus provide the
administration with a strong argument for the use of nuclear weapons to defend them. Americans'
heightened state of fear of terrorist attacks and their apparent willingness to support any course of action
that could potentially protect them from real or imagined terrorist threats. The allegations of involvement of
Iran in terrorist activities around the world [1], [2], including acts against America [1], [2], and its alleged possession of
weapons of mass destruction. The determination of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission that Iran has connections
with al-Qaeda. Senate Joint Resolution 23, "Authorization for Use of Military Force," which allows the
president "to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States" without
consulting Congress, and the War Powers Resolution [.pdf], which "allows" the president to attack
anybody in the "global war on terror." The Bush administration's willingness to use military power based on
unconfirmed intelligence and defectors' fairy tales. The fact that Iran has been declared in noncompliance [.pdf] with the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which makes it "legal" for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against Iran. The course of
action followed by the Bush administration with respect to Iran's drive for nuclear technology, which can only lead to a
diplomatic impasse. The Israel factor [1], [2] .
216
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
217 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
When the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United States, the Cold War had entered a new phase. The cold war
became a conflict more dangerous and unmanageable than anything Americans had faced before. In the old cold war
Americans had enjoyed superior nuclear force, an unchallenged economy, strong alliances, and a trusted Imperial President to
direct his incredible power against the Soviets. In the new cold war, however, Russian forces achieved nuclear equality. Each
side could destroy the other many times. This fact was officially accepted in a military doctrine known as
Mutual Assured Destruction, a.k.a. MAD. Mutual Assured Destruction began to emerge at the end of the
Kennedy administration. MAD reflects the idea that one's population could best be protected by leaving
it vulnerable so long as the other side faced comparable vulnerabilities. In short: Whoever shoots first,
dies second.
217
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
218 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Iran is still probably five to 10 years away from gaining the ability to make nuclear fuel or nuclear bombs. But
its program is already sending nuclear ripples through the Middle East. The race to match Iran's capabilities has
begun. Almost a dozen Muslim nations have declared their interest in nuclear energy programs in the past
year. This unprecedented demand for nuclear programs is all the more disturbing paired with the unseemly rush of nuclear
salesman eager to supply the coveted technology. While U.S. officials were reaching a new nuclear agreement with India last
month, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Libya and agreed to help
the United Arab Emirates launch its own civilian nuclear program. Indicating that this could be just the
beginning of a major sale and supply effort, Sarkozy declared that the West should trust Arab states with
nuclear technology. Sarkozy has a point: No one can deny Arab states access to nuclear technology, especially as they are
acquiring it under existing international rules and agreeing to the inspection of International Atomic Energy Agency officials.
But is this really about meeting demands for electric power and desalinization plants? There is only one nuclear power
reactor in the entire Middle Eastthe one under construction in Busher, Iran. In all of Africa there are only two, both in
South Africa. (Israel has a research reactor near Dimona, as do several other states.) Suddenly, after multiple energy
crises over the 60 years of the nuclear age, these countries that control over one-fourth of the world's oil
supplies are investing in nuclear power programs. This is not about energy; it is a nuclear hedge against
Iran. King Adbdullah of Jordan admitted as much in a January 2007 interview when he said: "The rules have changed on the
nuclear subject throughout the whole region. . . . After this summer everybody's going for nuclear programs." He
was referring to the war in Lebanon last year between Israel and Hezbollah, perceived in the region as
evidence of Iran's growing clout. Other leaders are not as frank in public, but confide similar sentiments in private
conversations. Here is where the nuclear surge currently stands. Egypt and Turkey, two of Iran's main
rivals, are in the lead. Both have flirted with nuclear weapons programs in the past and both have
announced ambitious plans for the construction of new power reactors. Gamal Mubarak, son of the
current Egyptian president and his likely successor, says the country will build four power reactors, with
the first to be completed within the next 10 years. Turkey will build three new reactors, with the first beginning
later this year. Not to be outdone, Saudi Arabia and the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) at the end of 2006 "commissioned a joint study on the use of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes." Algeria and Russia quickly signed an agreement on nuclear development in January 2007,
with France, South Korea, China, and the United States also jockeying for nuclear sales to this oil state. Jordan announced
that it, too, wants nuclear power. King Abdullah met Canada's prime minister in July and discussed the purchase of heavy
water Candu reactors. Morocco wants assistance from the atomic energy agency to acquire nuclear
technology and in March sponsored an international conference on Physics and Technology of Nuclear
Reactors. Finally, the Arab League has provided an overall umbrella for these initiatives when, at the
end of its summit meeting in March, it "called on the Arab states to expand the use of peaceful nuclear
technology in all domains serving continuous development." Perhaps these states are truly motivated to
join the "nuclear renaissance" promoted by the nuclear power industry and a desire to counter global
warming. But the main message to the West from these moderate Arab and Muslim leaders is political, not industrial. "We
can't trust you," they are saying, "You are failing to contain Iran and we need to prepare." It is not too late to prove them
wrong. Instead of seeing this nuclear surge as a new market, the countries with nuclear technology to sell have a moral and
strategic obligation to ensure that their business does not result in the Middle East going from a region with one nuclear
weapon state - Israel - to one with three, four, or five nuclear nations. If the existing territorial, ethnic, and political
disputes continue unresolved, this is a recipe for nuclear war.
218
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
219 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Mandlebaum flows neg he concedes that great power war is still likely
with Russia and China
Michael Mandelbaum, American foreign policy professor at the Nitze School of Advanced
International
Studies
at
Johns
Hopkins
University,
1999 Is
Major
War
Obsolete?, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/
Now having made the case for the obsolescence of modern war, I must note that there are two major question marks
hanging over it: Russia and China. These are great powers capable of initiating and waging major wars, and in these
two countries, the forces of warlessness that I have identified are far less powerful and pervasive than they are in the
industrial West and in Japan. These are countries, in political terms, in transition, and the political forms and political
culture they eventually will have is unclear. Moreover, each harbors within its politics a potential cause of war that
goes with the grain of the post-Cold War period-with it, not against it-a cause of war that enjoys a certain legitimacy even
now; namely, irredentism.
War to reclaim lost or stolen territory has not been rendered obsolete in the way that the more traditional causes have.
China believes that Taiwan properly belongs to it. Russia could come to believe this about Ukraine, which means that the
Taiwan Strait and the Russian-Ukrainian border are the most dangerous spots on the planet, the places where World War III
could begin.
219
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
220 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
For nearly half a century, the worlds most powerful nuclear-armed countries have been locked in a
military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet
Union possessed such large, welldispersed nuclear arsenals that neither state could entirely destroy the others nuclear forces
in a rst strike. Whether the scenario was a preemptive strike during a crisis, or a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack, the victim
would always be able to retaliate and destroy the aggressor. Nuclear war was therefore tantamount to mutual suicide. Many
scholars believe that the nuclear stalemate helped prevent conict between the superpowers during the Cold War, and that it
remains a powerful force for great power peace today. 1 The age of MAD, however, is waning. Today the United
States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy vis--vis its plausible great power adversaries.
For the frst time in decades, it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or
China with a nuclear first strike. A preemptive strike on an alerted Russian arsenal would still likely fail, but a
surprise attack at peacetime alert levels would have a reasonable chance of success. Furthermore, the
Chinese nuclear force is so vulnerable that it could be destroyed even if it were alerted during a crisis.
220
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
221 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
A critical issue for the outcome of a U.S. attack is the ability of Russia to launch on warning (i.e., quickly
launch a retaliatory strike before its forces are destroyed ). It is unlikely that Russia could do this. Russian
commanders would need 713 minutes to carry out the technical steps involved in identifying a U.S.
attack and launching their retaliatory forces. They would have to (1) confirm the sensor indications that an attack
was under way; (2) convey the news to political leaders; (3) communicate launch authorization and launch codes to the
nuclear forces; (4) execute launch sequences; and (5) allow the missiles to fly a safe distance from the silos. 38 This timeline
does not include the time required by Russian leaders to absorb the news that a nuclear attack is The End of MAD? 21
under way and decide to authorize retaliation. Given that both Russian and U.S. early warning systems have had
false alarms in the past, even a minimally prudent leader would need to think hard and ask tough
questions before authorizing a catastrophic nuclear response.39 Because the technical steps require 713
minutes, it is hard to imagine that Russia could detect an attack, decide to retaliate, and launch missiles
in less than 1015 minutes. The Russian early warning system would probably not give Russias leaders
the time they need to retaliate; in fact it is questionable whether it would give them any warning at all .
Stealthy B-2 bombers could likely penetrate Russian air defenses without detection . Furthermore, low-flying
B-52 bombers could fire stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles from outside Russian airspace; these
missilessmall, radar-absorbing, and flying at very low altitude would likely provide no warning
before detonation. Finally, Russias vulnerability is compounded by the poor state of its early warning
system. Russian satellites cannot reliably detect the launch of SLBM s; Russia relies on groundbased radar to
detect those warheads.40 But there is a large east-facing hole in Russias radar network; Russian leaders might
have no warning of an SLBM attack from the Pacific.41 Even if Russia plugged the east-facing hole in its
radar network, its leaders would still have less than 10 minutes warning of a U.S. submarine attack from
the Atlantic, and perhaps no time if the U.S. attack began with hundreds of stealthy cruise missiles and
stealth bombers.
221
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
222 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Major war is obsolete nuclear weapons and rising cost check aggression
Michael Mandelbaum, American foreign policy professor at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University, 1999 Is Major War Obsolete?, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there
are reasons to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I mean war
waged by the most powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time
with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French
Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been,their consequences have been
monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a
series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last
two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, this kind of war, is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than
unlikely. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which
you received when coming in, Major war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress are obsolete . It is something that is out
of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery,
dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that
now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once
regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made
ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst. Why is this so? Most simply, the costs have risen and the benefits of major
war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this
century of nuclear weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the
benefits, these now seem, at least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional
motives for warfare are in retreat, if not extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein
after his unhappy experience, as a paying proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged
in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was
inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But the ideology that
is now in the ascendant, our own, liberalism, tends to be pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War
developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of these is the rise of democracy, for
democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument
made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldnt go that far. I dont
believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe
there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now its true that one important cause
of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And
realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most
leading exponents in this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for
it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue,
however, that a post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The
Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms limits that reduce
the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state
has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations
of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where
common security is concerned. Its not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I
should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of the major forces that have made
war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for other reasons, decided
that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend
itself to warlessness is the novel distinction between the periphery and the core, between the powerful states and the less
powerful ones. This was previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article again, While
for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War, with the
industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict
into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed.
222
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
223 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
223
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
224 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
224
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
225 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
progress that has brought a change in attitudes about international war among the great powers of the world ,37
creating for the first time, an almost universal sense that the deliberate launching of a war can no longer be
justified.38 At times leaders of the past were compelled by the masses to defend the national honor, but today popular
pressures push for peaceful resolutions to disputes between industrialized states. This normative shift has rendered war
between great powers subrationally unthinkable, removed from the set of options for policy makers, just as dueling is
no longer a part of the set of options for the same classes for which it was once central to the concept of masculinity and
honor. As Mueller explained, Dueling, a form of violence famed and fabled for centuries, is avoided not merely because it has
ceased to seem necessary, but because it has sunk from thought as a viable, conscious possibility. You cant fight a duel if
the idea of doing so never occurs to you or your opponent.39 By extension, states cannot fight wars if doing so does not
occur to them or to their opponent. As Angell discovered, the fact that major war was futile was not enough to bring about its
endpeople had to believe that it was futile. Angells successors suggest that such a belief now exists in the industrial (and
postindustrial) states of the world, and this autonomous power of ideas, to borrow Francis Fukuyamas term, has brought
about the end of major, great power war.40
225
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
226 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
undeterrable as the suicidal pilots of 11 September 2001 but given to rational calculations that are often very difficult to
sort out. This use could come in the form of a North Korean nuclear attack against Japan, South Korea, or even the United
States.3 The nearest targets for a North Korean nuclearweaponwould be South Korea and Japan, but
therewould be many complications should Pyongyang use such weapons against either.
226
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
227 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Pakistan has established a robust set of measures to assure the security of its nuclear weapons. These
have been based on copying U.S. practices, procedures and technologies, and comprise : a) physical
security; b) personnel reliability programs; c) technical and procedural safeguards; and d) deception and
secrecy. These measures provide the Pakistan Armys Strategic Plans Division (SPD)which oversees nuclear weapons
operationsa high degree of confidence in the safety and security of the countrys nuclear weapons .2 In
terms of physical security, Pakistan operates a layered concept of concentric tiers of armed forces
personnel to guard nuclear weapons facilities, the use of physical barriers and intrusion detectors to
secure nuclear weapons facilities, the physical separation of warhead cores from their detonation
components, and the storage of the components in protected underground sites. With respect to personnel
reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers
from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which
groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support. Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) that
screens individuals for Islamist sympathies, personality problems, drug use, inappropriate external affiliations, and sexual deviancy. 3 The
army
uses staff rotation and also operates a two-person rule under which no action, decision, or activity
involving a nuclear weapon can be undertaken by fewer than two persons .4 The purpose of this policy is
to reduce the risk of collusion with terrorists and to prevent nuclear weapons technology getting
transferred to the black market. In total, between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from the SPDs security division and from Pakistans
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence and Intelligence Bureau agencies are involved in the security clearance and
monitoring of those with nuclear weapons duties. 5 Despite formal command authority structures that cede a role to Pakistans civilian leadership, in
controlled identification system to assure the identity of those involved in the nuclear chain of command, and it also uses a rudimentary Permissive
reliability programs, the reasons for their removal, and how often authenticating and enabling (PAL-type) codes are changed). In addition, Pakistan
uses deceptionsuch as dummy missilesto complicate the calculus of adversaries and is likely to have extended this practice to its nuclear
Taken together, these measures provide confidence that the Pakistan Army can fully
protect its nuclear weapons against the internal terrorist threat, against its main adversary India, and
against the suggestion that its nuclear weapons could be either spirited out of the country by a third party
(posited to be the United States) or destroyed in the event of a deteriorating situation or a state collapse in
Pakistan.
weapons infrastructure.
227
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
228 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
No Nuclear Terror
Nuclear Power plants have excellent security
Heaberlin Head of the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, managed by Battelle 2004,
(Scott W. Heaberlin Head of the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, managed by Battelle, A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity,, Battelle Press, 2004)
But, of course, airline crashes are not the only way for a terrorist to attack a nuclear power plant. Truck
bombs and armed attacks are certainly something to consider. It turns out that nuclear power plants are one
of the few facilities in our national infrastructure that does consider these things. Every U.S. nuclear
power plant has a trained armed security force who is authorized to use deadly force to protect the plant. Not
wanting to give any terrorists alternative ideas, but if I had a choice of going after a facility either totally unprotected or
protected with only a night watchman versus a facility with a team of military capable troopers armed with automatic
weapons, it would not be a tough choice. That is not to say these wackos are afraid to die. Clearly, they have demonstrated
that they are not. However, one would assume that they do want to have a reasonable chance of successfully
completing their vile mission. In that regard, a nuclear power plant would be a tough nut to crack.
228
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
229 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
One often hears references to a taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, but people usually have
difficulty putting their finger on exactly what that means. A taboo surely is more than simply something
we want to avoid, something we disapprove of, for we do not hear of taboos on bank robberies or on
murder. A taboo, then, refers to something that we are not willing even to think about doing, something
about which we do not weigh benefits and costs but that we simply reject. The best example in ordinary life is
the taboo on incest. If a six-year-old girl asks whether she could marry her brother when they grow up, her parents typically
do not reason with her, perhaps suggesting, Your brother and you are always squabbling about your toys; surely you can find
someone else more compatible to marry.We instead respond simply,No one marries their brother or sister! The child
quickly enough picks up the signal that this is something that is simply not done. Another such taboo is, of course,
cannibalism. Air Force crews are briefed on hundreds of measures they can take to survive after a crash, but one subject
never touched upon is that of avoiding starvation by consuming the body of a dead comrade. The entire question is just not
thinkable. The taboo on nuclear weapons use that seems to have settled into place over the nearly sixty
years sinceNagasaki may indeed have taken this form.We do not hear many discussions of the costs and
benefits of a nuclear escalation, but a somewhat unthinking and unchallenged conclusion that such
escalation is simply out of the question . Related, though hardly identical, is speculation as to whether a customary
international law on the use of nuclear weapons may be said to have emerged, by which the battlefield application of such
weapons has become illegal without any international treaties being signed or ratified, simply because they have gone so long
unused.16 How such a custom or taboo is developed and what happens to it when violated will play an
important part in our assessment of what the world would be like after a new nuclear attack. The fact
that the nuclear taboo is not violated decade after decade, that nuclear weapons are not used again in
anger, arguably strengthens the taboo, but there are also a few ways in which that state of affairs may endanger it. The
reinforcement comes simply from the general sense that such an act must be unthinkable because no one has initiated one for
so long; it is in this sense that customary international lawis held to be settling into place by which the abstinence of other
states presses our own state to abstain. People did not begin speaking about a nuclear taboo for a number of years after
Nagasaki. It was only in the late 1950s, after more than a decade had passed without repetition of the experiences of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the feeling arose that a barrier now existed to treating nuclear weapons as just another
weapon.17 But in time there will be hardly anyone alive who was a victim of the 1945 attacks, hardly anyone who
remembers seeing the first photographs of their victims or who recalls the nuclear testing programs of the 1950s and 1960s.
Further, an unwelcome result of the bans on nuclear testing, intended to shield the environment and discourage horizontal and
vertical nuclear proliferation, is that some of the perceived horror of such weapons may be fading, so that ordinary human
beings will be a little less primed to reject automatically the idea of such weapons being used again . The only fair test of
the long-term viability of the nuclear taboo would, of course, be for the world to manage to keep that
taboo observed and intact. The net trend, the net result, of a prolongation of non-use is most probably
that such non-use will be strengthened and renewed thereby, just as it seems to have been over the
decades of the Cold War and its aftermath. There have been parallel taboos in other areas of warfare,
taboos that have indeed been violated in the last several decades. The world for many years sensed the
development of such a taboo on chemical warfare; the effective prohibition was reinforced by the Geneva Protocol but
observed even by states that had not yet ratified the protocol (the best example being the United States at its entry intoWorld
War II). A similar taboolike aversion was thought to apply to biological warfare.18 The long period since naval forces have
confronted each other on the high seas (broken only by the Argentine-British war over the Falklands) may have had some
similar characteristics. The longer one goes without engaging in some form of warfare, the stranger and less
manageable that kind of conflict will seem, and the more the public and others will regard it as simply
not to be contemplated.
229
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
230 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
230
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
231 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
If a nuclear weapon was use countries would rally against the nation preventing retaliation
Quester, Professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, 2005
(George Quester, Professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, Spring 2005, Naval War College
Review, If the Nuclear Taboo gets broken, https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%20War%20College
%20Review/2005/Article%20by%20Quester%20Spring%202005.pdf)
This entire question might seem the more interesting at first to those who are pessimistic about future
risks and who might thus regard speculation about an end to the nuclear taboo as overdue . Yet, to repeat,
pessimism may not be necessary, since analysis of the likely consequences of nuclear escalation might
stimulate governments and publics to head it off. The chances are as good as three out of five that no
nuclear event will occur in the period up to the year 2045 that there is a better than even chance that the
world will be commemorating a full century, since Nagasaki, of the non-use of such weapons. But analysts
and ordinary citizens around the world to whom the author has put these odds typically dismiss themas too optimistic.
Indeed, the response has often been a bit bizarre, essentially that we have not been thinking at all about
the next use of nuclear weapons, but we think that you are too optimistic about such use being avoided. Such
responses in Israel, Sweden, Japan, or the United States might support the worry that people around the world have simply
been repressing an unpleasant reality, refusing to think about a very real danger. Yet the possibility remains that the relative
inattention is not simply a repression of reality but rather a manifestation of the unthinkableness of nuclear weapons use One
could also introduce another wedge of hope, that any such use of nuclear weapons between now and 2045 would
be followed by reactions and consequences that reinforced rather than eroded the taboo. That would be
the case if the world did not retreat in the face of such use but rallied to punish it, and as a result the
perpetrator did not advance its interests by such an escalation but actually lost the battles and territories
that were at issue.
231
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
232 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The nuclear taboo, however, also has an intersubjective or a phenomenological aspect: it is a taboo
because people believe it to be. Political and military leaders themselves began using the term to refer to
this normative perception starting in the early 1950s, even when, objectively, a tradition of nonuse hardly existed. If actors
see the use of nuclear weapons as if it were a taboo, as their rhetoric suggests, then this could affect their
choices and behavior. In the words of sociologists William and Dorothy Thomas, "If men define situations as real,
they are real in their consequences ."18 This subjective (and intersubjective) sense of "taboo-ness" is one of
the factors that makes the tradition of nuclear nonuse a taboo rather than simply a norm . Although one
might be skeptical that this is just empty rhetoric, this belief is not entirely detached from reality .
Evidence for the taboo lies in discourse, institutions, and behavior. The most obvious evidence lies in discoursethe
way people talk and think about nuclear weaponsand how this has changed since 1945. This includes public opinion,
the diplomatic statements of governments and leaders, the resolutions of international organizations, and
the private moral concerns of individual decisionmakers. The discourse evidence is supplemented both
by international law and agreements that restrict freedomof action with respect to nuclear weapons, and
by the changing policies of states that downgrade the role of nuclear weapons (e.g., shifts in NATO policy, he
denuclearization of the army and marines, and the buildup of conventional alternatives). As the inhibition on use has
developed over time, it has taken on more taboo-like qualitiesunthinkingness and taken-for-grantedness. As a systemic
phenomenon, the taboo exists at the collective level of the international community (represented especially
by the United Nations), but this need not mean that all countries have internalized it to the same degree. As
noted earlier, the taboo is a de facto, not a legal, norm. There is no explicit international legal prohibition
on the use of nuclear weapons such as exists for, say, chemical weapons. Although resolutions passed in
the UN General Assembly and other international forums have repeatedly proclaimed the use of nuclear
weapons as illegal, the United States and other nuclear powers have consistently voted against these . U.S.
legal analyses have repeatedly defended the legality of use of nuclear weapons as long as it was for defensive and not
aggressive purposes, as required by the UN charter. 19 As the 1996 World Court advisory opinion on the issue confirmed,
although increasing agreement exists that many, if not most, uses of nuclear weapons are illegal under the traditional laws of
armed conflict, there is by no means agreement that all uses of nuclear weapons are illegal. 20 Nevertheless, legal use has
been gradually chipped away through incremental restrictionsan array of treaties and regimes that
together circumscribe the realm of legitimate nuclear use and restrict freedom of action with respect to
nuclear weapons. These agreements include nuclear weapons-free zones, bilateral and multilateral arms
control agreements, and negative security assurances (i.e., political declarations by the nuclear powers that they
will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are members of the NPT). Together, these agreements
enhance the normative presumption against nuclear use. By multiplying the number of forums where a
decision to use nuclear weapons would have to be defended, they substantially increase the burden of
proof for any such decision.21 Many of these legal constraints have been incorporated into U.S. domestic practice, where
they are reflected in constraints on deployments and targeting, proliferation, arms control, and use. 22 Thus, while the
legality of nuclear weapons remains in dispute, the trend line of decreasing legitimacy and
circumscribed legality is clear.
232
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
233 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
based on the fear of consequences of a given course of action. The latter arose as a response to a
realization of the danger or the unforeseeable consequences involved in nuclear war. The analysis in this
article elaborates on the moral, normative, legal, and rational constraints involved in the use of nuclear weapons and their
possible role in the formation and evolution of the taboo U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially used the term
taboo to describe the prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons. On October 7, 1953, he was reported to have said:
"Somehow or other we must manage to remove the taboo from the use of these weapons" (quoted in Bundy 1988, 249).
Dulles was in favor of developing usable nuclear weapons to obtain the battlefield military objectives of the United States.
Schelling popularized the concept of a tradition of nonuse in his writings in the 1960s. In his words,
what makes atomic weapons different is a powerful tradition for their nonuse, "a jointly recognized
expectation that they may not be used in spite of declarations of readiness to use them, even in spite of
tactical advantages in their use" (Schelling 1980, 260). A tradition in this respect is based on a habit or
disposition that prevents the use of nuclear weapons as a serious option for consideration by decision
makers.3 As Schelling (1994, 110) argued, the main reason for the uniqueness of nuclear weapons is the
perception that they are unique and that once introduced into combat, they could not be "contained,
restrained, confined, or limited." Although prolonged conventional war can also cause somewhat similar
levels of destruction, the difference is in the perception of the impact. The swiftness with which destruction can
take place is the distinguishing point in this respect.4 Clearly, the nuclear taboo has developed largely as a
function of the awesome destructive power of atomic weapons. The potential for total destruction gives
nuclear weapons an all-or-nothing characteristic unlike any other weapon invented so far, which, in turn,
makes it imperative that the possessor will not use them against another state except as a last-resort
weapon. This means a nuclear state may not use its ultimate capability unless a threshold is crossed (e.g., unless the survival
of the state itself is threatened). Decision makers and the public at large in most nuclear-weapon states believe that great
danger is involved in the use of nuclear weapons with respect to casualties and aftereffects, in both psychological and
physical terms. Breaking the taboo could bring the revulsion of generations to come unless it were for an issue of extremely
vital importance-a situation that thus far has failed to materialize . Not surprisingly, nuclear states, even when they
could have received major tactical and strategic gains by using nuclear weapons, have desisted from
their use.
233
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
234 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The taboo has been observed by all nuclear and opaque-nuclear states thus far. Nations with different
ideological and political systems and military traditions-the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, China, India, and Israel-have found no occasion to use them, pointing toward the emergence of a
global "recognition that nuclear weapons are unusable across much of the range of traditional military
and political interests" (Russett 1989, 185). The American unwillingness to use them in Korea and Vietnam
to obtain military victory and the Soviet refrain from using them to avert defeat in Afghanistan suggest
the entrenchment of the taboo among the superpowers even during the peak of the cold war period .5 The
Chinese aversion to using them against the Vietnamese to obtain victory in the 1979 war also point out that
other nuclear powers have observed the taboo. In the United States, the taboo or the tradition of nonuse
became well entrenched despite many urgings by military and political leaders to break it during times
of intense crises. It was observed in the 1950s and 1960s when the United States could have gained
major tactical and strategic objectives against its adversaries. Possibly, it began with the revulsion and the fear
that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks engendered in the consciousness of the public and political leadership. Although
the fear of nuclear weapons had been somewhat removed by the end of the 1940s, with the Soviet
attainment of nuclear and missile capability in the early 1960s, a sense of renewed vulnerability began to
creep into the American public perception (Malcolm- son 1990, 8, 35; Weart 1988). This sense of vulnerability,
arising from the awareness that effective defenses against a nuclear attack do not exist, may have
contributed to the development of the nuclear taboo. The Vietnam War saw the entrenchment of the
tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons. In 1969, President Nixon "could not make the nuclear threat in Vietnam that
he believed he had seen Eisenhower use successfully in Korea" (Bundy 1988, 587-8). Since then, each passing decade
saw the strengthening of this tradition, and the experience of over four decades "has more firmly
established a de facto norm of non-use" (Russett 1989, 185). The Cuban missile crisis further showed the perils of a
crisis spilling over to a possible nuclear war. The crisis underlined the dangers of atomic posturing to the point of permanently discrediting this kind of atomic diplomacy (Bundy 1984, 50).6
234
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
235 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The taboo was also likely to have been strengthened by a rational calculation that military victory
following a nuclear attack may not be materially, politically, or psychologically worth obtaining if it
involves the destruction of all or a sizable segment of an enemy's population and results in the
contamination of a large portion of the territory with radio-active debris . Thus the tradition must have
emerged largely from the realization by nuclear states that there are severe limits to what a state can
accomplish by actually using a nuclear weapon (Gaddis 1992, 21). It also implies that after a certain point, the
capacity to destroy may not be useful, as the relation between the power to harm and the power to
modify the behavior of others is not linear (Jervis 1984, 23). Additionally, the effects of nuclear attack may be
beyond the local area of attack but could have wider effects, spatially and temporally (Lee 1993, 18). There
exists no guarantee that aftereffects such as the spread of radioactive debris could be confined to the
target state's territory. Neighboring states that may be neutral or aligned with the nuclear state could be
the victims of a nuclear attack as well. The fear that, once unleashed, nuclear terror could escape
meaningful political and military control and physical limitation may have influenced decision makers'
choices in this regard.
235
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
236 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Schell
Schells views on policy are flawed and impossible to achieve
Review: Freeze: The Literature of the Nuclear Weapons Debate
Author(s): Peter deLeon he Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 181-189
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/173847.pdf
Lastly, one turns to Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, probably the most pretentious (witness its
title) and flawed of these books. But it is also the most important, for in many ways, it has served as the catalyst of the
antinuclear movement. His examples of a thermonuclear holocaust are no more graphic- although better written-than are
those of other authors, nor is his litany of secondary effects (e.g., the effects on the food chain and the possible depletion of
the earth's ozone layer) any more convincing. But these are just preliminary groundwork to Schell's main thesis-that
mankind's major obligation is to its future and the "fact" that nuclear war literally destroys whatever future may exist. No
cause, he argues, can relieve us of that burden. Some (e.g., Kinsley, 1982) have claimed that Schell has no right to impose
his set of values on the body politic. Perhaps, but few should contest Schell's sincerity in explicitly raising the profoundly
moral issues that have too long been neglected in the ethically sterile discussions that have characterized mainstream nuclear
doctrine. Whether Schell is right or wrong in assuming his high moral ground is the normative prerogative and judgment of
the individual reader; at the very worst, however, Schell forces the reader to confront these issues directly. And this,
in spite of his grandiose style of writing, is why this book warrants careful attention. Schell probably does not expect to have
his thesis accepted uncritically; he admits his data are open to wide variation and interpretation. But, given his "evidence" and
logic, Schell has the courage of his conviction to realize where his positions will take him. He admits that the nuclear
weapons demon cannot be put back in the bottle, that even with a nuclear disarmament treaty, the extant scientific knowledge
would always allow a nation to reconstruct this ultimate weapon. Similarly, to rely on conventional weapons to preserve
national sovereignty is to invite a nation to cheat, to build clandestine nuclear weapons and thus begin the nuclear arms race
towards extinction once again. The fundamental culprit to Schell's way of thinking is not Zuckerman's dedicated
nuclear engineer nor Ivan the Targeteer, but the nation-state itself. He openly acknowledges that "the task we
face is to find a means of political action that will permit human beings to pursue any end for the rest of
time. We are asked to replace the mechanism by which the political decisions, whatever they may be, are
reached. In sum, the task is nothing less than to reinvent politics" (p. 226). Schell's proposal, past an
immediate nuclear freeze, is some form of functioning world government, that is, the abandonment of
national sovereignty and perhaps individual liberties as a means of retreating from the nuclear precipice,
for any life, he avers, is better than no life. Schell does not actually say "better red than dead," but he
surely could not disavow such a position.
236
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
237 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Schell
Schells rationality argument contradicts with human nature
Nevin, University of New Hampshire, 82
JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR ON RESISTING EXTINCTION: A REVIEW
OF
JONATHAN SCHELL'S THE FATE OF THE EARTH' JOHN A. NEVIN
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE1982, 38, 349-353 NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER)
Schell relies primarily on rational argument. A rational calculus suggests that although the probability of nuclear
extinction may be small, its value-the termination of life -is minus infinity, and the product of any non- zero probability and
minus infinity is minus infinity. In terms of relative expected utility, then, the choice is clear (Schell, p. 95). The choice
correctly posed and evaluated by Schell is structurally identical to Pascal's wager on the existence of God, which has an
expected utility of plus infinity despite the possibly infinitesimal probability that belief in God is necessary and
sufficient for eternal life. But Pascal's rational argument never made converts-faith appears to derive from certain
immediate experiences, even in his own case. Likewise, I fear that Schell's calculus will not make converts
to disarmament-choice behavior depends not on rational calculation but on experienced events.One
significant event that can be experienced by any reader is exposure to Schell's book itself. As a warning of imminent
disaster and a motivator of action, it is supremely effective in arousing concern and activating behavior. The
problem now is to identify events and contingencies that will foster sustained commitment, by the
species, to the second alternative-survival. Laboratory work on commitment and self-control suggests
that humans and animals will usually choose the smaller but more immediate of two rewards, or the
larger but more delayed of two punishers, to their own long-term detriment . Our current choice, as a
species, of the first alternative-continuation of the arms race-is therefore entirely consistent with
laboratory data. Can knowledge from the laboratory help us switch over to the second alternative? One way in which
animals can be trained to choose the larger, more delayed reward (or the lesser but more immediate punisher) is to adjust
the delay values gradually, while giving repeated exposure to both outcomes; but of course this method is ruled out by the
nature of the nuclear dilemma. Another method is to train the subjects to make an early "commitment" response that
precludes access to one of the choices later. However, as Schell points out, we can never really preclude access to nuclear
weapons, because the methods for making them are well known and cannot be unlearned; the commitment response must
be continuous.
Perhaps the problem is best approached by invoking more immediate, smaller-scale, molecular events. For example, we can
try to get a large audience for Schell's book, which (as noted above) is a strikingly potent stimulus.
We can also expose all people, everywhere, to stimuli correlated with nuclear warfare such as pictures of
the burned and dying and dead at Hiroshima, and films showing the awesome power of nuclear test
explosions, which bring at least some of the future aspects of the first alternative into the present. But
this is not sufficient, because it might merely serve to generate numb passivity or avoidance of the entire
issue. We need, in addition, to instigate and maintain behavior that is compatible with the second alternative, including
open discussion, nonviolent protest, and political action that opposes the momentum of the arms race and leads to
disarmament. Clearly, we have witnessed some of the requisite behavior during this year, as hundreds of thousands of
people in many countries have rallied to demonstrate their opposition to the threat of nuclear war. Political support for
disarmament is on the rise. However, such behavior must be rein- forced if it is to be maintained through the protracted
negotiations and rearrangements of international politics that will be required; and it cannot be reinforced by the
nonoccurrence of a nuclear holocaust, because that nonevent will always be equally well correlated
with pursuit of the arms race until the holocaust occurs. Much more immediate and local reinforcers such as
societal approval, access to political office, and economic well-being will be necessary. of humankind is
thereby placed in doubt. The entire system of sovereign nation-states is therefore a dangerous relic of
pre-nuclear times and must be abandoned.
237
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
238 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Schell
Society wont react to warning about nuclear war, disproving Schells argument
Nevin 82
JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR ON RESISTING EXTINCTION: A REVIEW
OF
JONATHAN SCHELL'S THE FATE OF THE EARTH' JOHN A. NEVIN
UNIVERSITY OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE1982, 38, 349-353 NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER)
It is impossible not to acknowledge the power of Schell's presentation, but its very power may lead to two further
problems. First, his account of Armageddon generates strong aversive emotional reactions, and we
know from the study of negative reinforcement that such stimuli strengthen behavior that removes them.
The orienting-response literature also suggests that organisms will orient away from cues that signal
aversive events. We are, therefore, likely to turn away from warnings of nuclear warfare and engage in
other activities. Second, the ultimate horror that Schell portrays is widely regarded as inevitable. The
arms race is often said to possess a sort of impersonal momentum, like a massive object that rolls on
inexorably, regardless of our actions; and certainly the recent history of negotiations to control the arms
race, conducted by people who are well aware of its potential ultimate outcome, does nothing to reassure
us. In the laboratory, uncontrollable aversive events have been shown to produce a state of inactivity termed helplessness.
Taken together, the history of uncontrollability of the arms race, the aversiveness of our reactions to
warnings of nuclear warfare, and the lack of correlation of such warnings with experienced events would
seem to explain the absence of effective privateaction (thinking) to analyze the problem or overt
behavior to effect disarmament. This combination of factors may be responsible for what Robert Jay Lifton has
termed "psychic numbing," a refusal to confront the threat of universal death that hangs over our heads like an
executioner's sword.
How can we approach the absence of relevant action-the refusal to look up at the sword and do something to blunt it or
prevent it from falling-from a behavioral perspective? Consider an analogy. If we saw a person afflicted with a potentially
fatal disease, taking daily doses of an addictive drug that gave temporary relief from distress but in addition exacerbated
the disease, we would diagnose the behavior as maladaptive. Appealing to this person to exercise "self-control" would
not be likely to have much effect. If this person became our client, we would immediately regulate access to the drug
and take steps to eliminate its use, while at the same time arranging a program of behavioral therapy to maintain
abstinence when treatment ended. Schell suggests that human society, living as it does under the constant
threat of self-imposed termination while using its economic resources to build more instruments of
universal death in the name of security, is like this client-"insane," in Schell's words. Immediate therapy
is essential. However, our society is both client and therapist. Consequently, we are enmeshed in a
problem, at the level of society and species, that parallels the problem of "self-control" at the level of the
individual. Schell poses the choice facing humanity in terms very close to the laboratory study of selfcontrol:
238
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
239 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**IMPACT TAKEOUTS**
239
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
240 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Giligan
Violence is too deeply entrenched into our society to end poverty, even Gilligan concedes
Alvarez, Professor in the department of criminal justice at Northern Arizona University and
Bachman, Professor and Chair of the Sociology and Criminal Justice Department at the
University of Delware 2007
(Alex Alvarez, Professor in the department of criminal justice at Northern Arizona University and Ronet Bachman,
Professor and Chair of the Sociology and Criminal Justice Department at the University of Delware, 2007 Violence:
the enduring problem Chapter 1 ,Pg. 19-20, http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/17422_Chapter_1.pdf
We also worry about violence constantly, and change our behavior in response to perceived threats of
violence. We avoid certain parts of town, add security features to our homes, and vote for get tough
laws in order to protect ourselves from violent offenders . At the time this chapter was written, Americans were
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and news reports were full of fallen soldiers, car bombings, torture of prisoners, and
beheadings of hostages. In short, whether domestically or internationally, violence is part and parcel of
American life. In fact, the sociologists Peter Iadicola and Anson Shupe assert that violence is the overarching
problem of our age and suggest that every social problem is influenced by the problem of violence .47
James Gilligan, a medical doctor who directed the Center for the Study of Violence at Harvard Medical School, put it this
way: The more I learn about other peoples lives, the more I realize that I have yet to hear the history of
any family in which there has not been at least one family member who has been overtaken by fatal or
life threatening violence, as the perpetrator or the victimwhether the violence takes the form of suicide or
homicide, death in combat, death from a drunken or reckless driver, or any other of the many nonnatural forms of
death.48 So its safe to say that violence is not foreign to us, but rather is something with which we rub
shoulders constantly.We know violence through our own lived experiences and the experiences of our
family, friends, and neighbors, as well as through the media images we view. At a deeper level, this
means that our identities as citizens, parents, children, spouses, lovers, friends, teammates, and
colleagues are often shaped by violence, at least in part. Who we are as individuals and as human beings
is shaped by the culture within which we live.How we define ourselves, the ways in which we relate to
others, and our notions of what we stand for and what we believe in, are all determined in large part by
the influences and experiences of our lives or, as the great English Poet Alfred Lord Tennyson once wrote, I am a
part of all that I have met.49 In a similar vein, although a bit less poetically, the sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann suggest, Identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society.50 In short,
our life experiences shape who we are. Therefore, if violence is a part of our reality, then it plays a role
in shaping us as human beings and influences how we understand the world around us. To acknowledge
this is to understand that violence is part of who we are and central to knowing ourselves and the lives
we lead. Because of this prevalence and its impact on our lives, some have suggested that Americans
have created and embraced a culture of violence . Culture is a nebulous concept that includes values, beliefs, and
rules for behavior. These qualities detail what is expected, what is valued, and what is prohibited.51 Essentially, then, this
argument contends that our history and experiences have resulted in a system of values and beliefs that, to a greater extent
than in some other cultures, condones, tolerates, and even expects a violent response to various and specific situations.52
Other scholars have further developed this theme by arguing that, instead of a culture of violence in the United States, there
are subcultures of violence specific to particular regions or groups. First articulated by the criminologists Wolfgang
and Ferracuti, this viewpoint suggests that members of some groups are more likely to rely on violence. As they suggest
Quick resort to physical combat as a measure of daring, courage, or defense of status appears to be a cultural expectation . . .
When such a cultural response is elicited from an individual engaged in social interplay with others who harbor the same
response mechanism, physical assaults, altercations, and violent domestic quarrels that result in homicide are likely to be
relatively common.53 This argument has been applied to various subcultural groups such as Southerners, young African
American males, and others.54 The South historically has had much higher rates of violence than other regions of the country
and many have suggested that it is a consequence of Southern notions of honor that demand a violent response to certain
240
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
241 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
provocations. The argument suggests that Southern culture, in other words, is more violence prone than other regional
cultures. Violence, then, is something that appears to be embedded in our values and attitudes, which is why some have
suggested that violence is as American as apple pie.55
241
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
242 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Extinction Impossible
It is impossible to kill all humans.
Schilling 00
But others have pointed out that the human animal (as opposed to human civilization) would be almost
impossible to kill off at this point. People have become too widespread and too capable, a few pockets of
individuals would find ways to survive almost any conceivable nuclear war or ecological collapse. These
survivors would be enough to fully repopulate the Earth in a few thousand years and another
technological civilization would be a precedent. Maybe this will happen many times
A nuclear war would only kill hundreds of thousands of people. It is defiantly survivable and the
impact is not huge.
Brian Martin Formal training in physics, with a PhD from Sydney University, 2002
(Activism
after
nuclear
war,
http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2002/Martin_ActivismNuclearWar.html)
In the event of nuclear war, as well as death and destruction there will be serious political consequences.
Social activists should be prepared. The confrontation between Indian and Pakistani governments earlier
this year showed that military use of nuclear weapons is quite possible. There are other plausible
scenarios. A US military attack against Iraq could lead Saddam Hussein to release chemical or biological
weapons, providing a trigger for a US nuclear strike. Israeli nuclear weapons might also be unleashed.
Another possibility is accidental nuclear war. Paul Rogers in his book Losing Control says that the risk
of nuclear war has increased due to proliferation, increased emphasis on nuclear war-fighting, reduced
commitment to arms control (especially by the US government) and Russian reliance on nuclear arms as
its conventional forces disintegrate. A major nuclear war could kill hundreds of millions of people. But
less catastrophic outcomes are possible. A limited exchange might kill "only" tens or hundreds of
thousands of people. Use of nuclear "bunker-busters" might lead to an immediate death toll in the
thousands or less.
242
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
243 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Nuclear War
The chance of a nuclear war is just as likely as it was a half century ago.
Daily Newscaster November 15, 2008
(World
conflict
brewing
but
nuclear
war
unlikely,
http://74.125.47.132/search?
q=cache:SLntzFWp_iEJ:www.dailynewscaster.com/2008/11/15/world-conflict-brewing-but-nuclear-war-unlikely/
+"World+conflict+brewing+but+nuclear+war+unlikely"&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
In August, oilgeopolitical expert F.W. Engdahl wrote, The signing on August 14th of an agreement between the governments
of the United States and Poland to deploy on Polish soil US interceptor missiles is the most dangerous move towards
nuclear war the world has seen since the 1962 Cuba Missile crisis. Now, I dont like being in a position where I
have to contradict the leading analyst of the New World Order, but there is no chance we are any closer
to a nuclear war than we were in the 1950s, 1962, or any time in the last 58 years . I cant speak for Mr.
Engdahl but most NWO conspiracy theorists expect a depopulation event to rid the planet of 5 billion useless eaters. The
Illuminati, they say, need only 500 million of us for slaves when they take over the world. Dont get me wrong, I am not
saying there couldnt be a depopulation event before 2012 but a nuclear war is not in the cards. Nuclear World War III
would make too much of the planet uninhabitable and that would include the One World governors as
well as the 500 million humans they need for slaves. Think about it: why havent we had a nuclear
accident since the 50s? Where is Dr. Strangelove or some insane Air Force General Jack D. Ripper who orders a first
strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or how about just a plain f up? If things can go wrong, they will go
wrong and the U.S. government or any nuclear power are not exactly the sharpest tools in the shed.
243
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
244 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
244
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
245 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Indo-Pak
Indo-Pak nuclear conflict unlikely.
The Michigan Daily 02
(Experts say nuclear war still unlikely, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely)
University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war
between India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his
office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the
U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and
Pakistan than would be warranted." The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking
fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. " The decision makers are aware of what nuclear
weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have
vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said. Varshney added that
there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is committed to a nofirst-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation
would be gravely dangerous." Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President
Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan
is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s
considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. " If
anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The
trigger is in very safe hands." But the low probability of nuclear war does not mean tensions between the
two countries who have fought three wars since they were created in 1947 will not erupt . "The possibility of
conventional war between the two is higher. Both sides are looking for ways out of the current tension," Lieberthal said.
245
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
246 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Iran
The US wont have a have a nuclear war with Iran, too risky.
Defense experts say a military strike on Iran would be risky and complicated . U.S. forces already are
preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, and an attack against Iran could inflame U.S. problems in the Muslim
world. The U.N. Security Council has demanded Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. But Iran
has so far refused to halt its nuclear activity, saying the small-scale enrichment project was strictly for
research and not for development of nuclear weapons. Bush has said Iran may pose the greatest challenge to the
United States of any other country in the world. And while he has stressed that diplomacy is always preferable, he has
defended his administration's strike-first policy against terrorists and other enemies. "The threat from Iran is, of course,
their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel," the president said last month in Cleveland.
"That's a threat, a serious threat. It's a threat to world peace; it's a threat, in essence, to a strong alliance . I
made it clear, I'll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally.'' Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Mark
Ballesteros would not comment Sunday on reports of military planning for Iran. "The U.S. military never comments on
contingency planning," he said. Stephen Cimbala, a Pennsylvania State University professor who studies U.S. foreign policy,
said it would be no surprise that the Pentagon has contingency plans for a strike on Iran. But he suggested the hint of military
strikes is more of a public show to Iran and the public than a feasible option. "If you look at the military options, all of them
are unattractive," Cimbala said. "Either because they won't work or because they have side effects where the cure is worse
than the disease.''
246
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
247 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**IMPACT CALCULUS**
247
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
248 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
248
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
249 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
249
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
250 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
250
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
251 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
251
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
252 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
possibilities as having a probability of effectively zero -- and thus not counting as real possibilities at all -- we shall
find our actions systematically stultified to a degree which we are unwilling to accept in ''real life situations . It is thus
clear that rule (III) takes priority over (I). Finally, it is clear that rules (II) and (III) can also conflict. For consider the situation
of Figure 2. Note that a refusal to see the situation in terms of a = 0 keeps the catastrophe in the picture, so As these
deliberations indicate, the three cardinal principles of risk management stand in a relation of preferential rank-order so
that: (Ill) takes precedence over (II), which in turn takes precedence over (I). We have here a sequential priority-ordering of
the several principles, which fixes an automatic process for one's overriding another in those cases where their rulings
conflict. This precedence ordering entails certain limitations to the reach of classical decision theory, which proceeds on the
basis of the unmodified and unadulterated use of expected-value appraisals. A deployment of the concepts of catastropheavoidance and of effectively zero'' probabilities modifies this policy in two directions. First, catastrophe is seen to
represent an unacceptable risk, when ''the game's not worth the candle'' because the potential negative outcomes, unlikely
though their realization may be, are simply too massive for the stakes otherwise at issue. But, secondly, this principle itself
needs to be curtailed, when it becomes too conservative in its operation and leads to a stultification of action. Just this
rationale motivates the recourse to ''effectively zero'' probabilities.
252
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
253 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
some recent empirical data that have no staying power (according to their very own theoretical terms). Finally, you will ask, isn't this being dogmatic? Haven't we learned not to bank too much on
what we've learned so far, when we also know that learning can always be improved, modified, even revised? Isn't progress in the sciences and technology proof that past knowledge always gets
defending consequentialism, like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, have argued the opposite thesis: Unless one can prove, beyond a doubt, that violating rights in a particular instance is necessarily
wrong in the eyes of a "rational and fair man," the state may go ahead and "accept the natural outcome of dominant opinion" and violate those rights.1 Such is now the leading jurisprudence
253
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
254 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
http://gunston.gmu.edu/healthscience/riskanalysis/ProbabilityRareEvent.asp
The concept of fault trees and reliability trees has a long history in space and nuclear industry. Several books (Krouwer,
2004) and papers describe this tool (Marx and Slonim, 2003). The first step in conducting fault trees is to identify the
sentinel adverse event that should be analyzed. Then all possible ways in which the sentinel event may occur is listed.
It is possible that several events must co-occur before the sentinel event may occur. For example, in assessing the
probability of an employee providing information to outsiders, several events must co-occur. First the employee must be
disgruntled. Second, information must be available to the employee. Third, outsiders must have contact with the employee.
Fourth, the employee must have a method of transferring the data. All of these events must co-occur before hospital data is
sold to an outside party. None of these events are sufficient to cause the sentinel event. In a fault tree, when several
events must co-occur, we use an "And" gate to show it. Each of these events can, in part, depend on other factors. For
example, there may be several ways to transfer the data: on paper, electronically by email, or electronically on disk. Any one
of these events can lead to transfer of data. In fault tree when any one of a series of events may be sufficient by themselves to
cause the next event to occur, we show this by an "Or" gate. Fault tree is a collection of events connected to each other by
"and" and "Or" gates. Each event depends on a series of other related events, providing for a complex web of
relationships. A fault tree suggests a robust work process when several events must co-occur before the catastrophic failure
occurs. The more "And" gates are in the tree structure, the more robust the work process modeled. In contrast, it is also
possible for several events by themselves to lead to catastrophic failure. The more "Or" gates in the path to failure, the less
robust the work process. The second step is to estimate probabilities for the fault tree. Since the catastrophic failure is
rare, it is difficult to asses this probability directly. Instead, the probability of various events leading to this failure are
assessed. For example, the probability of a finding a disgruntled employee can be assessed. The probability of an employee
having access to large data sets can be assessed by counting employees who have such access during the course of their
work. The probability of an employee being approached by someone to sell data can be assessed by providing an expert data
on frequency of reported crimes and asking him/her to estimate the additional unreported rate. In short, through objective
data or subjective opinions of experts various probabilities in the fault tree can be assessed. The fault tree can then be used
to assess the probability of the catastrophic and rare event using the following formula:
254
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
255 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Rescher
Reschers theories are flawed- using predictions for data is key
Eggleston 02
Ben Eggleston January 12, 2002 Department of Philosophy University of Kansa
Practical Equilibrium: A New Approach to Moral Theory Selection
http://web.ku.edu/~utile/unpub/pe.pdf
The language of data to be accounted for recurs even more frequently in papers published in the wake of Rawlss book.
Singer writes that The reflective equilibrium conception of moral philosophy . . . lead[s] us to think of our particular moral
judgmentsas data against which moral theories are to be tested (1974, p. 517; cf. 1998, p. vi), and Nicholas Rescher writes
that our intuitions are the data . . . which the theoretician must weave into a smooth fabric and that The process is
closely analogous with the systematization of the data of various levels in natural science (1979, p. 155). Others
have offered similar characterizations.13 So the notion of accounting for the data is often regarded as providing support for
reflective equilibrium. I wish to argue, though, that the notion of accounting for the data can be seen to provide such
support only when clouded by a pair of misunderstandings, and that when these two misunderstandings are removed,
the notion of accounting for the data actually lends support to practical equilibrium. The two misunderstandings
concern what the data to be accounted for actually are, and how a moral theory accounts for whatever data it accounts
for.
First, consider what the data actually are. When it comes to our moral intuitions, we might think that our data are that acts of
certain kinds, such as acts of punishing the innocent, are never justified. But actually this overstates our data: in fact our
data are just our observations of our own intuitions, such as our observation that it seems to us that punishing the
innocent is never justified. It is a further claim, not among the data to be accounted for, that these intuitions that we are
aware of having are correct. The data do not include that certain acts are wrong; the data include only our regarding certain
acts as wrongfor this latter phenomenon, our own judgment of the matter, is all that we can really detect in any instance of
moral appraisal.14 So the first error in reflective equilibriums use of the notion of accounting for the data lies in its holding
theories responsible for accounting for things that are not actually among the data. It says that a moral theory must explain
the truth of the intuitions that we have, when actually the only data there are are that we have those intuitions.
Now at this point it may appear that I am arguing that what the notion of accounting for the data means in the case of a moral
theory is not that the theory explains the truth of the intuitions that we have, but that the theory explains the fact that we have
those intuitions. For this interpretation of accounting for the data would accommodate the interpretation of what the data
actually are that I have just been arguing for. But Imaintain that we need to make a second adjustment in order to arrive at a
sound interpretation of the notion of accounting for the data in the case of a moral theory.
Whereas the first adjustment had to do with what the data are, this one has to do with
what it means for a moral theory to account for data. What I have in mind is that we need
to say that what a moral theory is supposed to do, as far as its accounting for anything is concerned, is not to explain
our having certain intuitions, but to endorse our having those intuitions.
The reason for this adjustment is simple: moral theories differ from scientific ones in that they are not in the business
of predicting or explaining anything: they are in the
business of prescribing, or giving instructions. Normally, the instructions were interested in are those that concern specific
situations in which we might engage in some conduct or regard to the intuitions we should have
255
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
256 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
In a sense, any
decision may have catastrophic unforeseen consequences. If far-reaching indirect effects are taken into
account, then given the unpredictable nature of actual causation almost any decision may lead to a disaster.
In order to be able to decide and act, we therefore have to disregard many of the more remote possibilities .
Cases can also easily be found in which it was an advantage that far-fetched dangers were not taken seriously. One case in
point is the false alarm on so-called polywater, an alleged polymeric form of water. In 1969, the prestigious scientific journal
Nature printed a letter that warned against producing polywater. The substance might "grow at the expense of normal water
under any conditions found in the environment," thus replacing all natural water on earth and destroying all life on this
planet. (Donahoe 1969 ) Soon afterwards, it was shown that polywater is a non-existent entity. If the warning had been
heeded, then no attempts would had been made to replicate the polywater experiments, and we might still not have known
that polywater does not exist. In cases like this, appeals to the possibility of unknown dangers may stop investigations and
thus prevent scientific and technological progress. We therefore need criteria to determine when the possibility of
unknown dangers should be taken seriously and when it can be neglected. This problem cannot be
solved with probability calculus or other exact mathematical methods. The best that we can hope for is a
set of informal criteria that can be used to support intuitive judgement . The following list of four criteria has
been proposed for this purpose. (Hansson 1996) Asymmetry of uncertainty: Possibly, a decision to build a second bridge
between Sweden and Denmark will lead through some unforeseeable causal chain to a nuclear war. Possibly, it is the other
way around so that a decision not to build such a bridge will lead to a nuclear war. We have no reason why one or the other of
these two causal chains should be more probable, or otherwise more worthy of our attention, than the other. On the other
hand, the introduction of a new species of earthworm is connected with much more uncertainty than the option not to
introduce the new species. Such asymmetry is a necessary but insufficient condition for taking the issue of unknown dangers
into serious consideration. 2. Novelty: Unknown dangers come mainly from new and untested phenomena. The emission of a
new substance into the stratosphere constitutes a qualitative novelty, whereas the construction of a new bridge does not. An
interesting example of the novelty factor can be found in particle physics. Before new and more powerful particle
accelerators have been built, physicists have sometimes feared that the new levels of energy might generate a new phase of
matter that accretes every atom of the earth. The decision to regard these and similar fears as groundless has been based on
observations showing that the earth is already under constant bombardment from outer space of particles with the same or
higher energies. (Ruthen 1993) 3. Spatial and temporal limitations: If the effects of a proposed measure are known to be
limited in space or time, then these limitations reduce the urgency of the possible unknown effects associated with the
measure. The absence of such limitations contributes to the severity of many ecological problems, such as global emissions
and the spread of chemically stable pesticides. 4. Interference with complex systems in balance: Complex systems such as
ecosystems and the atmospheric system are known to have reached some type of balance, which may be impossible to restore
after a major disturbance. Due to this irreversibility, uncontrolled interference with such systems is connected with a high
degree of uncertainty. (Arguably, the same can be said of uncontrolled interference with economic systems; this is an
argument for piecemeal rather than drastic economic reforms.) It might be argued that we do not know that these systems can
resist even minor perturbations. If causation is chaotic, then for all that we know, a minor modification of the
liturgy of the Church of England may trigger a major ecological disaster in Africa. If we assume that all
cause-effect relationships are chaotic, then the very idea of planning and taking precautions seems to
lose its meaning. However, such a world-view would leave us entirely without guidance, even in
situations when we consider ourselves well-informed. Fortunately, experience does not bear out this
256
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
257 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
pessimistic worldview. Accumulated experience and theoretical reflection strongly indicate that certain
types of influences on ecological systems can be withstood, whereas others cannot. The same applies to
technological, economic, social, and political systems, although our knowledge about their resilience
towards various disturbances has not been sufficiently systematized.
257
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
258 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Even if the practical difficulties of obtaining people's consent could be overcome, it is widely reported
that people are notoriously poor judges of risks. People's perceptions frequently fail to match up with the
actual dangers risks pose and few people have a "feel" for what a chance of dying, say a chance of one in a
million, really means. Research by psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman has shown that we are regularly led
astray in our assessments of probabilities by rules of thumb. Faced with a judgment that requires even a minimal
familiarity with statistics, we frequently avoid the statistical information and rely instead on a
description or heuristic which feels less strange. 8 We tend to overemphasize low probabilities and underestimate
large ones. We have to struggle to resist the gambler's fallacy: the belief that after a series of losses the odds must favor a win.
We are also poor judges of outcomes. We appear to be more concerned to avoid a loss than to receive an
equivalent gain, and this asymmetry can be exploited in the way choices are presented.9 Retailers, for
example, know enough about our suceptibility to the way options are framed to represent a surcharge for credit card
customers as a discount to those who are willing to pay cash.10 The influence of framing on judgments about risk is
systematic and pervasive, and shows up at all levels of education. Health care professionals are no less susceptible to the
effects of framing than their patients who have less experience and lack their expertise. The following hypothetical case was
put to a group of physicians: Imagine that you have operable lung cancer and must choose between two treatments: surgery
and radiation therapy. Of 100 people having surgery, 10 die during the operation, 32 are dead after one year, and 66 after five
years. Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during treatment, 23 are deadafter one year, and 78 after five years.
Which treatment do you prefer?11 Given these options, fifty percent of the physicians said they preferred radiation treatment.
However when the same options were presented in terms of survival rates rather than mortality rates, 84% said they would
prefer surgery. It is perhaps not completely surprising to learn that people are poor judges of probabilities, but "we want to
give [people] credit for at least knowing their own minds," as one report puts it, "when it comes to assigning values to the
outcomes of their choices."12 Apparently, very little credit is due, as experiment after experiment reveals: Imagine that the
United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual flu epidemic which is expected to kill 600 people, unless action is
taken. Two alternative programs to combat the disease are proposed If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If
program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved When
the alternatives were posed in these terms in a test survey, 72 percent of the respondents opted for program A, only 28 percent
for program B. A second group was given the same options, but re-described (re-framed) in this way: If program A is
adopted, 400 people will die; if program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability
that 600 people will die This time only 22 percent opted for the first program, while 78 percent opted for the second.13 It is
generally believed that consistency in judgments is a minimal condition of rationality. Since our
judgments about risk are apparently inconsistent, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that our attitudes
towards risk are also irrational. These findings have disturbing implications for public policy, especially
in a society like our own which relies on a democratic process. If we are irrational in our judgments
about risk, the policies we enact will reflect a similar bias. Given our untrustworthy attitudes, a consentbased approach to legitimating risk-imposing activities can only lead to irrational public policies.
258
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
259 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
arresting the dark sides of industrial progress and advanced modernization through reexivity are
routinely short-circuited, according to Beck, by the insidious inuence of organized irresponsibility.
Irresponsibility, as Beck uses the term, refers to a political contradiction of the self-jeopardization and
self-endangerment of risk society. This is a contradiction between an emerging public awareness of risks produced by
and within the
social-institutional system on the one hand, and the lack of attribution of systemic risks to this system on the other. There
is,
in Becks reckoning, a constant denial of the suicidal tendency of risk society the system of organized
irresponsibility which manifests itself in, say, technically orientated legal procedures designed to
satisfy rigorous causal proof of individual liability and guilt.
This self-created dead end, in which culpability is passed off on to individuals and thus collectively
denied, is maintained through political ideologies of industrial fatalism: faith in progress, dependence on
rationality and the rule of expert
opinion.
259
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
260 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
260
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
261 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
261
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
262 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
risk analysis in debate can inform our understanding of the crisis rhetoric which we confront on an
almost daily basis. The best check on such preposterous claims, it seems to us, is an appreciation of
nature of risk analysis and how it functions in argumentation. If we understand this tool, we will be wellarmed in our battle with the bogeyman of our age
262
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
263 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Monkeys
Menand bases his claims off flawed principals in Expert Political Judgement
Davies, staff for STMI Consulting, 07
Adrian Davies, 15 July 2007. St Andrews Management Institute, Book Review:
Expert Politial Judgement. http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk/4bookrev26.html
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt in your philosophy. This was Hamlets admission that
he was confused by complexity and had difficulty in coming to judgment. Hamlets solution was inexpert and created a new
set of political problems.
Expert Political Judgment is an attempt to identify the characteristics of individuals who have the
ability to analyse situations in depth and with accurate foresight so that their decisions are informed by
expert political judgment. The author is a psychologist but has worked for many years with a range of specialists in
different disciplines in order to distil the quintessence of expert political judgment, not only for the immediate need but
sustainable into the longer term. The main focus of the book is on forecasting outcomes of particular situations and on
identifying the specific techniques and mental attitudes which do so most successfully. Luck is recognised as a factor but is
set aside as exogenous. The quest is for the mindset and toolkit which will optimise forecasting by quantifying the
unquantifiable. For the mindset contrasts are drawn between radical sceptics, who expect nothing and meliorists who
are open to seeking improved outcomes. Another facet of mindset is Isiah Berlins contrast between hedgehogs who know
one big thing and foxes who know many little things. In the context of the book hedgehogs emerge as having fixed
views, seeing issues as black or white and supremely self-confident. By contrast foxes are open-minded, flexible and
self-critical. One key finding of the book is that foxes emerge as winners of most of the tests, yet hedgehogs are more
focussed and willing to make tough decisions. In times of increasing uncertainty it would seem that fox-like characteristics
are at a premium over those of hedgehogs in evaluation, though hedgehog confidence is needed to take action.
The book draws to a conclusion with a challenge: Are we open-minded enough to acknowledge the limits of openmindedness? This chapter is a critique of scenario planning which the author sees as advising only that
anything is possible. Too often those involved are over absorbed in inward looking details to build
their stories, while an outside view is needed to provide a reality check. Tetlock fails to realise that
scenario planning should be used as a means of guiding action not engendering endless debate.
Judgment seems to involve a metacognitive trade off between theory driven and imagination driven
modes of thinking. Theory offers certainty and imagination helps to cope with uncertainty. The author
sees the best long term predictor of good judgment to be a Socratic commitment by protagonists to
thinking about how they think.
263
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
264 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises
already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that
we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected
consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical
contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations.
The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes,
instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources
of harm to our successors.
264
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
265 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
265
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
266 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
2005
Expert
Political
Judgement,
Chapters 2 and 3 explore correspondence indicators. Drawing on the literature on judgmental accuracy, I divide the guiding hypotheses into two categories:
those rooted in radical skepticism, which equates good political judgment with good luck, and those rooted in meliorism, which maintains that the quest for
predictors of good judgment, and ways to improve ourselves, is not quixotic and there are better and worse ways of thinking that translate into better and
worse judgments. Chapter 2 introduces us to the radical skeptics and their varied reasons for embracing their counterintuitive creed. Their guiding precept
is that, although we often talk ourselves into believing we live in a predictable world, we delude ourselves: history is ultimately one damned thing after
another, a random walk with upward and downward blips but devoid of thematic continuity. Politics is no more predictable than other games of chance. On
any given spin of the roulette wheel of history, crackpots will claim vindication for superstitious schemes that posit patterns in randomness. But these
schemes will fail in cross-validation. What works today will disappoint tomorrow.34 Here is a doctrine that runs against the grain of human nature, our
shared need to believe that we live in a comprehensible world that we can master if we apply ourselves.35 Undiluted radical skepticism requires us
to believe, really believe, that when the time comes to choose among controversial policy options--to support Chinese entry
into the World Trade Organization or to bomb Baghdad or Belgrade or to build a ballistic missile defense--we could do as
well by tossing coins as by consulting experts.36 Chapter 2 presents evidence from regional forecasting exercises consistent with this debunking
perspective. It tracks the accuracy of hundreds of experts for dozens of countries on topics as disparate as transitions to democracy and capitalism, economic
growth, interstate violence, and nuclear proliferation. When we pit experts against minimalist performance benchmarks--dilettantes, dart-throwing chimps,
and assorted extrapolation algorithms--we find few signs that expertise translates into greater ability to make either "well-calibrated" or "discriminating"
forecasts. Radical skeptics welcomed these results, but they start squirming when we start finding patterns of consistency in
who got what right. Radical skepticism tells us to expect nothing (with the caveat that if we toss enough coins, expect some streakiness). But the data
revealed more consistency in forecasters' track records than could be ascribed to chance. Meliorists seize on these findings to argue that crude humanversus-chimp comparisons mask systematic individual differences in good judgment. Although meliorists agree that skeptics go too far
in portraying good judgment as illusory, they agree on little else. Cognitive-content meliorists identify good judgment with a particular outlook but squabble
over which points of view represent movement toward or away from the truth. Cognitive-style meliorists identify good judgment not with what one thinks,
but with how one thinks. But they squabble over which styles of reasoning--quick and decisive versus balanced and thoughtful--enhance or degrade
judgment. Chapter 3 tests a multitude of meliorist hypotheses--most of which bite the dust. Who experts were--professional background, status, and so on-made scarcely an iota of difference to accuracy. Nor did what experts thought--whether they were liberals or conservatives, realists or institutionalists,
optimists or pessimists. But the search bore fruit. How experts thought--their style of reasoning--did matter. Chapter 3 demonstrates the
usefulness of classifying experts along a rough cognitive-style continuum anchored at one end by Isaiah Berlin's prototypical
hedgehog and at the other by his prototypical fox.37 The intellectually aggressive hedgehogs knew one big thing and sought,
under the banner of parsimony, to expand the explanatory power of that big thing to "cover" new cases ; the more eclectic foxes
knew many little things and were content to improvise ad hoc solutions to keep pace with a rapidly changing world. Treating the regional forecasting
studies as a decathlon between rival strategies of making sense of the world, the foxes consistently edge out the hedgehogs but enjoy their
most decisive victories in long-term exercises inside their domains of expertise. Analysis of explanations for their predictions sheds light
on how foxes pulled off this cognitive-stylistic coup. The foxes' self-critical, point-counterpoint style of thinking prevented them from
building up the sorts of excessive enthusiasm for their predictions that hedgehogs, especially well-informed ones, displayed for
theirs. Foxes were more sensitive to how contradictory forces can yield stable equilibria and, as a result, "overpredicted" fewer departures, good or bad,
from the status quo. But foxes did not mindlessly predict the past. They recognized the precariousness of many equilibria and hedged their bets by rarely
ruling out anything as "impossible." These results favor meliorism over skepticism--and they favor the pro-complexity branch of meliorism, which
proclaims the adaptive superiority of the tentative, balanced modes of thinking favored by foxes,38 over the pro-simplicity branch, which proclaims the
superiority of the confident, decisive modes of thinking favored by hedgehogs.39 These results also domesticate radical skepticism, with its wild-eyed
implication that experts have nothing useful to tell us about the future beyond what we could have learned from tossing coins or inspecting goat entrails .
This tamer brand of skepticism--skeptical meliorism--still warns of the dangers of hubris, but it allows for how a self-critical,
dialectical style of reasoning can spare experts the big mistakes that hammer down the accuracy of their more intellectually
exuberant colleagues.
266
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
267 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
267
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
268 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
268
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
269 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
1983
Risk: A Philosophical
juggling probabilities such outcomes as the loss of one hair and the loss of his health or his freedom. The imbalance or disparity between risks is just too
great to be restored by probablistic readjustments. They are (probablistically) incommersuable: confronted with such incomparable hazards,
we do not bother to weigh this balance of probabilities at all, but simply dismiss one alternative as involving risks that are,
in the circumstances, unacceptable.
269
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
270 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Previous sections have argued that the combined probability of the existential risks is very substantial .
Although there is still a fairly broad range of differing estimates that responsible thinkers could make, it is nonetheless
arguable that because the negative utility of an existential disaster is so enormous, the objective of
reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration when acting out of concern for humankind
as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for moral action; we can call it Maxipok: Maximize the
probability of an okay outcome, where an okay outcome is any outcome that avoids existential disaster. At best, this is a
rule of thumb, a prima facie suggestion, rather than a principle of absolute validity, since there clearly are other moral
objectives than preventing terminal global disaster. Its usefulness consists in helping us to get our priorities
straight. Moral action is always at risk to diffuse its efficacy on feel-good projects[24] rather on serious
work that has the best chance of fixing the worst ills. The cleft between the feel-good projects and what
really has the greatest potential for good is likely to be especially great in regard to existential risk. Since
the goal is somewhat abstract and since existential risks dont currently cause suffering in any living creature[25], there is
less of a feel-good dividend to be derived from efforts that seek to reduce them. This suggests an offshoot moral
project, namely to reshape the popular moral perception so as to give more credit and social approbation
to those who devote their time and resources to benefiting humankind via global safety compared to
other philanthropies. Maxipok, a kind of satisficing rule, is different from Maximin (Choose the action that has the best
worst-case outcome.)[26]. Since we cannot completely eliminate existential risks (at any moment we could be sent into the
dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum phase transition triggered in a remote galaxy a billion years
ago) using maximin in the present context has the consequence that we should choose the act that has the greatest benefits
under the assumption of impending extinction. In other words, maximin implies that we should all start partying as if there
were no tomorrow. While that option is indisputably attractive, it seems best to acknowledge that there just might be a
tomorrow, especially if we play our cards right.
270
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
271 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
271
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
272 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Asia would decay about 40 percent of the ozone layer in the middle latitudes and 70 percent in the high latitudes of the
northern hemisphere.
"The models show this magnitude of ozone loss would persist for five years, and we would see substantial losses continuing
for at least another five years," says Mills.
Mills extracted his results from computer models. Previous models were created during the 1980s, however those investigations revealed
that impact of the nuclear detonations would be much more moderate. This might be because the old models do not take into consideration
the columns of soot rising at altitudes of 80 kilometers into Earth's atmosphere, as Mills considers.
Once the soot is released into the upper atmosphere, it would block and absorb most of the solar energy, thus determining a heating of the
surrounding atmosphere, process that facilitates the reaction between nitrogen oxides and ozone. Ultraviolet rays influx, caused by the
decay of the ozone layer, would increase by 213 percent, causing DNA damage, skin cancers and cataract in most - if not all living beings. Alternatively, plants would suffer damage twice, as the current due to ultraviolet light.
"By adopting the Montreal Protocol in 1987, society demonstrated it was unwilling to tolerate a small percentage of ozone
loss because of serious health risks. But ozone loss from a limited nuclear exchange would be more than an order of
magnitude larger than ozone loss from the release of gases like CFCs," says co-author of the study Brian Toon. "This study is
very conservative in its estimates. It should ring alarm bells to remind us all that nuclear war can destroy our world far faster
than carbon dioxide emissions," says Dan Plesch, of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at theSchool of
Oriental and African Studies, UK, although he notes that no one knows how likely a nuclear exchange is.
272
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
273 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**
273
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
274 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
274
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
275 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
275
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
276 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
276
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
277 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Greater vigilance about possible harmful side effects of all innovations. Alternatives to harmful technologies
(such as genetic modification to reduce pesticide use) must be scrutinized as carefully as the technologies they
replace. It does not make sense to replace one set of harms with another. Brand-new technologies must receive
much greater scrutiny than they have in the past.
Redirection of research and ingenuity toward inherently safer, more harmonious, more sustainable
technologies, products, and processes.
277
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
278 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
278
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
279 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
279
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
280 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
280
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
281 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
281
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
282 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
282
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
283 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
damage done to the relation be-tween farmer and herd has further adverse effects on the landscape. Unable to take full
responsibility for the life and the death of his animals, a farmer ceases to see the pointof his unprofitable trade. The small
pasture farms that created the landscape of England are now rapidly disappearing, to be replaced by faceless agrobusinesses or equestrian leisure centers. This damages our landscape, and in doing so damages our sense of
nationhood, of which the landscape has been the most potent symbol. As if those long-term costs were not bad enough, we have also had to endure the
short-term cost of hoof-and-mouth disease, which in the past would usually be contained in the locality where it broke out. In its latest occurrence, the
disease was immediately carried all over the country by animals on their way to some distant abattoir. The result was the temporary, but total, ruination of
our livestock farming. Now, a responsible politician would have taken into account, not only the small risk addressed by
the directive, but also the huge risks posed to the farming community by the destruction of local abattoirs, the risks
posed to animals by long journeys, the benefits of localized food production and local markets for meat, and so on. And he
would have a motive for considering all those things, namely, his desire to be re-elected, when the consequences of his
decision had been felt. As a rational being, he [or she] would recognize that risks do not come in atomic particles, but
are parts of complex organisms, shaped by the flow of events. And he would know in his heart that there is no more risky practice than
that of disaggregating risks, so as one by one to forbid them. Even bureaucrats, in their own private lives, will take the same line. They too are rational
beings and know that risks must constantly be taken and constantly weighed against each other. However, when a bureaucrat legislates for others and
suffers no cost should he get things wrong, he will inevitably look for a single and specific problem and seize on a single and absolute principle in order to
solve it. The result is the Precautionary Principle and all the follies that are now issuing from the unconscionable use of it. This suggests another
and deeper irrationality in the principle. It is right that legislators should take risks into account, but not that they should
automatically forbid them, even when they can make a show of isolating them from all other relevant factors. For there is an
even greater risk attached to the habit of avoiding risks-namely, that we will produce a society that has no ability to
survive a real emergency when risk-taking is the only recourse. It is not absurd to think that this is a real danger. How
283
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
284 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
many a soporific Empire, secure in its long-standing abundance, has been swept away by barbarian hordes, simply because
the basileus or caliph had spent his life in risk-free palaces? History is replete with warnings against the habit of heeding
every warning. Yet this is the habit that the Precautionary Principle furthers. By laying an absolute edict against risk, it
is courting the greatest risk of all, namely, that we shall face our next collective emergency without the only thing
that would enable us to survive it.
principleAn
Impossible
burden
of
proof
for
new
The zero-risk impetus of the precautionary principle fails to recognize that although science can provide a high level
of confidence, it can never provide certainty. Absolute proof of safety is not achievable because it would require the
proof of a negative, a proof that something (risk) does not exist. The precautionary principle always tells us not to
proceed because there is some threat of harm that cannot be conclusively ruled out. Thus, "the precautionary
principle will block the development of any technology if there is the slightest theoretical possibility of harm." (Holm &
Harris, 1999, p. 398). With a separate precautionary principle as a component of risk management, such an assertion by
regulatory decision-makers could completely negate the role of science in food safety decisions.
284
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
285 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
285
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
286 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
286
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
287 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
principleAn
Impossible
burden
of
proof
for
new
The problem with the precautionary principle is two-fold, one logical and the other perceptual. First, the logical fault
the precautionary principle was originally developed to provide risk managers with a tool for decision-making on
environmental threats from processes or substances that had not undergone safety evaluation or regulatory approval. The
precautionary principle was not defined or developed for application to the intentional components of foods that require or
depend on a conclusion of safety. Application of this principle could create an impossible burden of proof for new food
products or ingredients. Second, the perceptual faultthe term "precautionary principle" is seductively attractive
because it sounds like something that everyone should want and no one could oppose.
Upon initial consideration, it might seem that the only alternative to precaution is recklessness but, in fact, excessive
precaution leads to paralysis of actions resulting from unjustified fear. In many cases, the slight but non-zero risk
associated with a product or process is far safer than the alternative of doing nothing. Excellent examples include the
outbreak of cholera resulting from fear of chlorinated water (Anderson, 1991) and the reluctance to permit food
fortification with folic acid to reduce the incidence of specific birth defects for fear of masking vitamin B-12 deficiency
(United States Food and Drug Administration [US FDA], 1996).
287
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
288 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
288
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
289 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
289
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
290 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**UTIL**
290
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
291 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Utilitarianism is the only calculus that takes into account human response
Ratner, professor of law at USC, 1984 (Leonard G. Ratner p.735, professor of law at USC, 1984 Hofstra Law
Journal. The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution HeinOnline)
Because evolutionary utilitarianism is concerned with human survival and depends on human response,
its goal is necessarily fulfillment of human needs and wants. Utilitarian choices are made by existing
humans. The decisions of every human are derived from the experience, and reflect the desires, of that
human. Humans may be concerned with the needs and wants of animals or of future generations, but
that concern is inescapably a product of existing human needs and wants.
291
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
292 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
known to them, resource allocations and behavior constraints that significantly reflect their in- put best
implement those preferences. The need/want fulfillment of such members expands with their approval of
community decision-making institutions. Such approval lowers the costs of dissenter disruption while
increasing psychological security and productive efficiency. The utilitarian enhanced-fulfillment goal is
most effectively implemented by communities that optimize (not maximize) individual participation in
policy formulation. Optimal participation involves the selection of capable officials who make independent community
fulfillment decisions but remain subject to effective community supervision. Self-constrained majoritarianism thus appears to
be the evolving political counterpart of utilitarianism, a continuity suggested by the progression of western nations from
autocracy toward representative democracy, the enhanced need/want fulfillment that has accompanied the progression, and
the inability of totalitarian governments to match that fulfillment.
292
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
293 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
293
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
294 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
character, a utilitarian approach to public policy requires officials to base their actions, procedures, and
programs on the most accurate and detailed understanding they can obtain of the circum- stances in
which they are operating and the likely results of the alternatives open to them . Realism and empiricism are
the hallmarks of a utilitarian orientation, not customary practice, unverified abstractions, or wishful Promotion of the well
being of all seems to be the appropriate, indeed the only sensible, touchstone for assessing public policies and institutions,
and the standard objections to utilitarianism as a personal morality carry little or no weight against it when
viewed as a public philosophy. Consider, for instance, the criticisms that utilitarianism is too impersonal and ignores
one's individual attachments and personal commitments, that it is coldly calculating and concerned only with maximizing,
that it demands too much of moral agents and that it permits one to violate certain basic moral restraints on the treatment of
others. The previous two chapters addressed sorne of these criticisms; others will be dealt with in Chapter 8. The point here,
though, is that far from undermining utilitarianism as a public philosophy , these criticisms highlight its
strengths. We want public officials to be neutral, impersonal. and detached and to proceed with their eyes
firmly on the effects of the policies they pursue and the institutions that their decisions shape. Policy
making requires public officials to address general issues, typical conditions. and common circumstances. Inevitably, they must do this through general rules, not on a case by case basis. As explained later in this chapter,
this fact precludes public officials from violating the rights of individuals as a matter of policy. Moreover,
by organizing the efforts of countless individuals and compelling each of us to play our part in collective endeavors to
enhance welfare, public officials can make it less likely that utilitarianism will demand too much of any one individual
because others are doing too little. Utilitarians will seek to direct and coordinate people's actions through
effective public policy and to reshape, in utility-enhancing ways, the institutions that structure the
choices people face. By doing so, utilitarians can usually accomplish more good than they can through
isolated individual action, however dedicated and well intentioned . For this reason, they will strive to Easter
institutions that false over from individuals much of the task of promoting the general welfare of society. General welfare
is a broad goal, of course, and sensible policies and institutions will typically focus on more specific
desiderata - such as promoting productivity, increasing individual freedom and opportunity, improving
peoples physical health, guaranteeing their personal security, and so on that contribute significantly
to people's well-being. Implementing even there goals can prove difficult. Furthermore, many of the problems facing
society have no simple answers because they are tangled up with contested issues of fact and controversial questions of
psychology, sociology, and economics. To the extent that utilitarians disagree among themselves over these matters, their
policy recommendations will diverge. Nevertheless, by clarifying what is at stake and continually orienting discussion toward
the promotion of well-being, a. utilitarian approach provides the necessary framework for addressing questions of
institutional design and for fashioning effective public policy. The present chapter explicates the utilitarian approach to three
matters that have long engaged social and political philosophers and that concern.
294
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
295 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
disparagement of other such rights or standards as crypto-nti1itarian. A priori rights divorced from
need/want fulfillment depend on the magic power of language. When not determined by social
consequences, the morality of behavior tends to be resolved by definition of the words used to
characterize the behavior. Necessarily ambiguous generalizations, evolved to describe and correlate
heterogeneous events, acquire a controlling normative role . Definition, of course, reflects human experience. But
the equivocal significance of that experience may be replaced with the illusory security of fixed meaning. Ethical
connotations are then drawn not from the underlying empirical lessons that provide a context for meaning, but from inflexible
linguistic "principles and their emotional overtones. Derivation of meaning from the social purposes that engender the
terminology leads to a utilitarian appraisal of need] want fulfillment. The preexisting rights of nonutilitarian
morality are usually identified as components of "liberty," "equality, and autonomy,"' labels that
suggest a concern with individual need/want fulfillment and its social constraints. Liberty is perceived as
freedom for behavior that improves the quality of existence, such as speech, religion, and other "civil
rights activity; equality as rejection of disparate individual worth and "discriminatory" treatment;
autonomy as the individual choice implied by liberty and equality.
295
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
296 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
re- mains the survival remedy pending a reciprocity solution. The survival costs of nonnuclear warfare
of course continue to be high, but when the survival costs of capitulation are perceived as exceeding
them, compensation for combatants commensurate with risk would provide a kind of market
accommodation for those induced thereby to volunteer and would reduce the disproportionate wartimecon-scription assessment.
296
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
297 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Util Inevitable
Utilitarianism inevitable
Ratner, professor of law at USC, 1984 (Leonard G. Ratner p.727, professor of law at USC, 1984 Hofstra Law
Journal. The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution HeinOnline)
utilitarianism reconciles autonomy and reciprocity, surmounts the strident intuitionist attack, and exposes the utilitarian
underpinning of a priori rights." In the context of the information provided by biology, anthropology, economics, and other
disciplines, a functional description of evolutionary utilitarianism identities enhanced per capita need/want
fulfillment as the long-term utilitarian-majoritarian goal, illuminates the critical relationship of self interest to that
goal, and discloses the trial-and-error process of accommodation and priority assignment that implements it . The
description confirms that process as arbiter of the tension between individual welfare and group welfare
(i.e., between autonomy and reciprocity)* and suggests a utilitarian imperative: that utilitarianism is
unavoidable, that morality rests ultimately on utilitarian self interest, that in the final analysis all of us
are personal utilitarians and most of us are social utilitarians.
Utilitarianism is inevitable - people are inherently utilitarians
Gino et al 2008 [Francesca Gino Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, Don Moore Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University, Max H.
Bozman Harvard Business School, Harvard University No harm, no foul: The outcome
bias in ethical judgments http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-080.pdf]
A home seller neglects to inform the buyer about the homes occasional problems with
flooding in the basement: The seller intentionally omits it from the houses legally required
disclosure document, and fails to reveal it in the negotiation. A few months after the closing, the
basement is flooded and destroyed, and the buyer spends $20,000 in repairs. Most people would
agree that the sellers unethical behavior deserves to be punished. Now consider the same
behavior on the part of a second seller, except that it is followed by a long drought, so the buyer
never faces a flooded basement. Both sellers were similarly unethical, yet their behavior
produced different results. In this paper, we seek to answer the question: Do people judge the
ethicality of the two sellers differently, despite the fact that their behavior was the same? And if
so, under what conditions are peoples judgments of ethicality influenced by outcome
information? Past research has shown some of the ways that people tend to take outcome
account in a manner that is not logically justified (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Allison, Mackie,
& Messick, 1996). Baron and Hershey (1988) labeled this tendency as the outcome bias.
Extending prior work on the effect of outcome severity on judgments (Berg-Cross, 1975;
Lipshitz, 1989; Mitchell & Kalb, 1981; Stokes & Leary, 1984), their research found that people
information into
judge the wisdom and competence of decision makers based on the nature of the outcomes they
obtain. For instance, in one study participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario of a
surgeon deciding whether or not to perform a risky operation (Baron & Hershey, 1988). The
surgeon knew the probability of success. After reading about identical decision processes,
participants learned either that the patient lived or died, and were asked to rate the quality of the
No Foul 4 surgeons decision to operate. When the patient died, participants decided it was a mistake to
have operated in the first place.
297
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
298 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
298
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
299 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
299
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
300 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Consequentialism Good
Consequentialism is best, short term impacts are key even when the longterm impacts are
uncertain.
Cowen 2004 [Tyler Cowen, Department of Economics George Mason University The epistemic Problem does not
refute
consequentialismNovember2,2004
http://docs.google.com/gview?
a=v&q=cache:JYKgDUM8xOcJ:www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf+%22nuclear+attack+on+Manhattan
%22+cowen&hl=en&gl=us]
Let us start with a simple example, namely a suicide bomber who seeks to detonate a nuclear device in midtown Manhattan.
Obviously we would seek to stop the bomber, or If we stop the bomber, we know that in the short run we will save millions
of lives, avoid a massive tragedy, and protect the long-term strength, prosperity, and freedom of the United States.
Reasonable moral people, regardless of the details of their meta-ethical stances, should not argue against stopping the
bomber. No matter how hard we try to stop the bomber, we are not, a priori, committed to a very definite view of how
effective prevention will turn out in the long run. After all, stopping the bomber will reshuffle future genetic identities, and
may imply the birth of a future Hitler. Even trying to stop the bomber, with no guarantee of success, will remix the future in
similar fashion.Still, we can see a significant net welfare improvement in the short run, while facing radical generic
uncertainty about the future in any case. Furthermore, if we can stop the bomber, our long-run welfare estimates will likely
show some improvement. The bomb going off could lead to subsequent attacks on other major cities, the emboldening of
terrorists, or perhaps broader panics. There would be a new and very real doorway toward general collapse of the world.
While the more distant future is remixed radically, we should not rationally believe that some new positive option has been
created to counterbalance the current destruction and the new possible negatives. To put it simply, it is difficult to see the
violent destruction of Manhattan as on net, in ex ante terms, favoring either the short-term or long-term prospects of the
world. We can of course imagine possible scenarios where such destruction works out for the better ex post; perhaps, for
instance, the explosion leads to a subsequent disarmament or anti-proliferation advances. But we would not breathe a sigh of
relief on hearing the news of the destruction for the first time. Even if the long-run expected value is impossible to estimate,
we need only some probability that the relevant time horizon is indeed short (perhaps a destructive asteroid will strike the
earth). This will tip the consequentialist balance against a nuclear attack on Manhattan.
300
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
301 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Consequentialism Fails
Consequentialism, by very nature, will fail in public policy to improve the well-being of others
Scheffler, prof philosophy, Princeton, 94
(Samuel Scheffler, prof philosophy, Princeton, 11/24/94, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 14-16,
http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=M95w6e9pzZsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA14&dq=reject+consequentialism&ots=hbQFBohbTL&sig=VgDh7pP6sAhJ
1IKGaBA3BW7hi1Y)
I will maintain shortly that a hybrid theory which departed from consequentialism only to the extent of incorporating an
agent-centred prerogative could accommodate the objection dealing with personal integrity. But first it is necessary to give
fuller characterization of a plausible prerogative of this kind. To avoid confusion, it is important to make a sharp distinction
at the outset between an agent-centred prerogative and a consequentialist dispensation to devote more attention to
ones own happiness and well-being than to the happiness and well-being of others. Consequentialists
often argue that a differential attention to ones own concerns will in most actual circumstances have the
best overall results, and that such differential treatment of oneself is therefore required on consequentialist
grounds. Two sorts of considerations are typically appealed to in support of this view. First, it is said that one is in a better
position to promote ones own welfare and the welfare of those one is closest to than to promote the welfare of other people.
So an agent produces maximum good per unit of activity by focusing his efforts on those he is closest to,
including himself. Second, it is said that human nature being what it is, people cannot function effectively at all unless
they devote somewhat more energy to promoting their own well-being than to promoting the well-being of other people.
Here the appeal is no longer to the immediate consequantialist advantages of promoting ones own well-being, but rather to
the long-term advantages of having psychologically healthy agents who are efficient producers of the good. We find an
example of the first type of argument in Sidgwicks remark that each man is better able to provide for his own happiness
than for that of other persons, from his more intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs, and his greater opportunities
of gratifying them. Mill, in the same vein, writes that the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it
in his powerto be a public benefactor are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public
utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Sidgwick
suggests an argument of the second type when he says that because it is under the stimulus of self-interest that the active
energies of most men are most easily and thoroughly drawn out, it would not under actual circumstances promote the
universal happiness if each man were to concern himself with the happiness of others as much as with his own.
permitted to favor their own interests at the expense of the greater good.
301
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
302 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Consequentialism Fails
There is a limit to what morality can require for us, which consequentialism fails to incorporate
Kagan, prof social thoughts and ethics, Yale, 84
(Philosophy and Public Affairs, Kagan, prof social thoughts and ethics, Yale, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1984), pp. 239-254
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2265413.pdf)
Our ordinary moral intuitions rebel at this picture. We want to claim that there is a limit to what morality can require
of us. Some sacrifices for the sake of others are meritorious, but not required; they are super- erogatory .
Common morality grants the agent some room to pursue his own projects, even though other actions might have better
consequences: we are permitted to promote the good, but we are not required to do so. The objection that consequentialism
demands too much is accepted uncritically by almost all of us; most moral philosophers introduce per- mission to perform
nonoptimal acts without even a word in its defense. But the mere fact that our intuitions support some moral feature hardly
constitutes in itself adequate philosophical justification. If we are to go beyond mere intuition mongering, we
must search for deeper foundations. We must display the reasons for limiting the requirement to pursue
the good.
permitting sacrifices to be imposed on some for the sake of others. Some theories include deontological
restrictions, forbidding certain kinds of acts even when the consequences would be good. I will not consider
here the merits of such restrictions. It is important to note, however, that even a theory which included such restrictions might
still lack more general permission to act nonoptimally-requiring agents to promote the good within the pennissible means. It
is only the grounds for rejecting such a general requirement to promote the overall good that we will examine here.
302
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
303 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**AT UTIL**
303
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
304 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
For almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of benefits and costs. Some people win, while
others lose. The Pareto optimality would is almost nonexistent. A policys outcome is Pareto optimal if nobody loses and at
least one person gains.
utilitarian disregards the distributive justice issue altogether and espouses the current mode of
production and consumption and the political-economic structure, without any attention to the inequity
and inequality in the current system. Even worse and more subtly, it delivers the philosophy of it exists,
therefore its good. However, just because it sells, doesnt mean we have to worship it (Peirce 1991).
304
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
305 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
of the individual interests. The result is a legislative and economic dilemma. Indeed, individuals prone to
political action, and held under the sway of utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor of
the supposed collective interest over and against that of the individual. But then, what happens to
individual human rights? Are they not sacrificed and set aside as unimportant? In fact, this is precisely
what has happened. In democratic countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred
years has occurred primarily for this reason. In addition, such thinking largely served as the justification for the
mass murders of millions of innocent people in communist countries where the leaders sought to
establish the workers paradise. To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to
discern between the various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails to
provide an adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is extremely
important for a whole host of policy issues. Among them, the issue of the governments provision of public goods is worth
our consideration.
the utilitarian principle will tend to lead to the collective use of government power
so as to redistribute income in order to gain the greatest happiness in society. Regrettably, the rent
seeking behavior that is spawned as a result of this mind set will prove detrimental to the economy .
is the first labor saving device ,
Nevertheless, this kind of action will be justified as that which is most socially expedient in order to reach the assumed
ethical end. Utilitarianism, in short, has no logical stopping place short of collectivism.[3] If morality is
ultimately had by making the individuals happiness subservient to the organic whole of society , which is
what Benthams utilitarianism asserts, then the human rights of the individual may be violated . That means
property rights may be violated if it is assumed to promote the utilitarian end. However, property rights are essential in
securing a free market order. As a result , utilitarianism can then be used to justify some heinous government
actions. For instance, the murder of millions of human beings can be justified in the minds of reformers
if it is thought to move us closer to paradise on earth. This is precisely the view that was taken by
communist revolutionaries as they implemented their grand schemes of remaking society. All of this is not
to say that matters of utility are unimportant in policy decisions, but merely to assert that utilitarian ethics will have the
tendency of promoting collectivist policies.
305
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
306 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
the means." If a means provides a solution to a practical problem, it is morally justifiable.{86} The
Holocaust, in which Nazi Germany saw a problem in the existence of Jews, Gypsies, and mentally and
physically handicapped people, was founded on Hegels pragmatic philosophy .{87} C.G. Campbell,{88}
President of the American Eugenics Society Inc. in 1931{89} has written:
"Adolf Hitler ... guided by the nation's
anthropologists, eugenicists and social philosophers, has been able to construct a comprehensive racial policy of population
development and improvement ... it sets a pattern ... these ideas have met stout opposition in the Rousseauian social
philosophy ... which bases ... its whole social and political theory upon the patent fallacy of human equality ... racial
consanguinity occurs only through endogamous mating or interbreeding within racial stock ... conditions under which racial
groups of distinctly superior hereditary qualities ... have emerged." (Emphasis added).{90} Mr. Campbell, a leader in the
eugenics movement,{91} has clearly rejected the idea of human equality. This rejection helped pave the
way toward intellectual acceptance of Nazi Germanys "Final Solution. " and has helped pave the way toward
Americas final solution to problem pregnancy. "Nazi Germany used the findings of eugenicists as the basis for the killing of
people of inferior genetic stock."{92} Another leader in the eugenics movement, Madison Grant,{93} connected the
purported inequality of the unborn to the goals of the eugenics movement. "...Indiscriminate efforts to preserve babies among
the lower classes often results in serious injury to the race ... Mistaken regard for what are believed to be divine laws and
sentimental belief in the sanctity of human life tend to prevent both the elimination of defective infants and the sterilization of
such adults as are themselves of no value to the community" (Emphasis added).{94} As recently as six years ago, two
medical ethicists, Kuhse and Singer, have argued that no human being has any right to life.{95} Using a utilitarian
approach, they have concluded that "mentally defective" people, unborn people, and even children
before their first birthday, have no right to life because these people are not in full possession of their
faculties.{96} These utilitarian authors are fully consistent with other utilitarians in that they first reject
the principle that are humans have equal moral status, then, using subjective criteria that appeals to
themselves personally, they identify certain humans they find expendable. While Kuhse and Singer may be
personally comfortable with their conclusions, this approach leaves all of us less than secure from being dehumanized. If
newborn infants can be found to lack equal moral status, then surely there are other innocent and vulnerable member of
society who can be similarly found to lack equal moral status. The Nazis left few people in Germany safe from the gas
chambers, and any other society that uses utilitarianism in medical ethics also leaves great portions of society at risk of death
at the convenience of society at large. Clearly, the equal moral status of all humans must be recognized by the law.
306
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
307 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point of being meaningless.[6]
307
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
308 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Util ignores fundamental rights and creates a slippery slope until rights lose all significance
Bentley 2k [ Kristina A. Bentley graduate of the Department of government at the University of
Manchester. Suggesting A Separate Approach To Utility and Rights: Deontological Specification and
Teleogical
Enforcement
of
Human
Rights,
September.
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/postgrad/vol1_issue3/issue3_article1.pdf]
Utilitarian theories usually present the view that they are capable of accommodating the idea of legal rights, as well as
providing a normative theory about such rights, which Lyons calls the legal rights inclusion thesis (Lyons, 1994: 150). On
the other hand however, utilitarian theorists are sceptical of the idea of moral rights unsupported by legal institutions, as such
rights would then in certain circumstances preclude the pursuit of the most utile course of action owing to their moral force,
or normative force (Lyons, 1994: 150). Conversely, legal rights are seen as being compatible with utilitarian goals as they
are normatively neutral, being morally defensible (which entails the idea of a moral presumption in favour of respecting
them) only in so a far as they contribute to overall utility (Lyons, 1994: 150). The problem then, as conceived by Lyons, is
whether or not utilitarians can account for the moral force of legal rights (which people are commonly regarded as having by
rights theorists and utilitarians alike), as: although there are often utilitarian reasons for respecting justified legal rights, these
reasons are not equivalent to the moral force of such rights, because they do not exclude direct utilitarian arguments against
exercising such rights or for interfering with them (Lyons, 1994: 150). This being the case, the utilitarian finds herself in the
uncomfortable position of having to explain why rights ought to be bothered with at all, as if they may be violated on an ad
hoc basis to satisfy the demands of maximal utility, then they seem as confusing on this scheme as natural or moral rights are
claimed to be. This then raises the question as to whether or not utilitarianism can accommodate any rights at all, even legal
rights as its exponents claim it is able to do, in its rule formulation at least. However, leaving this debate aside as it exceeds
the scope of this paper, an alternative approach, that of government house utilitarianism (see Goodin, 1995: 27) is worth
considering as a possible means to a solution.
308
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
309 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
309
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
310 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**RIGHTS/DEONTOLOGY**
310
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
311 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The contagion is unknown to science and unrecognized by medicine (psychiatry aside); yet its wasting symptoms are plain for
all to see and its lethal effects are everywhere on display . It neither kills outright nor inflicts apparent physical harm, yet the
extent of its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natual calamity on record -- and its
potential damage to the quality of human life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason, this
sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Hourseman of the Apocalypse. Its more conventional name, of course, is
dehumanization.
311
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
312 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
312
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
313 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Nagel effectively accepts the consequentialist view that a system of moral rules can only be defended by
showing that their adoption brings about some good that could not otherwise be realized, and then seeks
to show that deontology is such a system. The claim is not, of course, that agent-relative reasons rest directly on
considerations of value in a manner obviously susceptible to the CVC; rather, the grounding is indirect the notion is that
worlds in which there are agent-relative reasons are better than worlds in which there are not. Nagel argues that an agent
relative morality, qua moral system, is intrinsically valuable. Thus we concur with Hooker (1994), then, pace
Howard-Snyder (1993), that rule consequentialism is not a 'rubber duck'. Thus rights (the obverse of constraints)
have value, and are, therefore, part of the basic structure of moral theory. A right is an agent-relative, not an
agent-neutral, value, says Nagel (1995, p.88). This is precisely because it is supposed to resist the CVC (one is
forbidden to violate a right even to minimize the total number of such violations). So Nagel faces the
Scheffler problem: How could it be wrong to harm one person to prevent greater harm to others? How
are we to understand the value that rights assign to certain kinds of human inviolability, which makes this consequence
morally intelligible? (p.89, our emphasis note the presumption inherent in the question). The answer focuses on
the
status conferred on all human beings by the design of a morality which includes agent-relative
constraints (p.89). That status is one of being inviolable (which is not, of course, to say that one will not be
violated, but that one may not be violated even to minimize the total number of such violations). A
system of morality that includes inviolability encapsulates a good that its rivals cannot capture. For, not
only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the
person in those ways is an additional and independent evil (p.91). So there is a sense in which we are better off if
there are rights (they are a kind of generally disseminated intrinsic good (p.93)). Hence there are rights. In short, we are
inviolable because
313
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
314 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
One problem with utilitarianism is that it leads to an "end justifies the means" mentality. If any
worthwhile end can justify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that the
end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to
purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a
communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. A particular act
cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some
objective and consistent standard of morality. Second, utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of minorities
if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century could justify
slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans. Certainly the majority
benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third problem with utilitarianism
is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on results, then we would have to have omniscience in
order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only guess at the future,
and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences
themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results.
Utilitarianism provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the
mechanism used to judge the action itself.inviolability is intrinsically valuable.
314
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
315 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Nagel effectively accepts the consequentialist view that a system of moral rules can only be defended by
showing that their adoption brings about some good that could not otherwise be realized, and then seeks
to show that deontology is such a system. The claim is not, of course, that agent-relative reasons rest directly on
considerations of value in a manner obviously susceptible to the CVC; rather, the grounding is indirect the notion is that
worlds in which there are agent-relative reasons are better than worlds in which there are not. Nagel argues that an agent
relative morality, qua moral system, is intrinsically valuable. Thus we concur with Hooker (1994), then, pace
Howard-Snyder (1993), that rule consequentialism is not a 'rubber duck'. Thus rights (the obverse of constraints)
have value, and are, therefore, part of the basic structure of moral theory. A right is an agent-relative, not an
agent-neutral, value, says Nagel (1995, p.88). This is precisely because it is supposed to resist the CVC (one is
forbidden to violate a right even to minimize the total number of such violations). So Nagel faces the
Scheffler problem: How could it be wrong to harm one person to prevent greater harm to others? How
are we to understand the value that rights assign to certain kinds of human inviolability, which makes this consequence
morally intelligible? (p.89, our emphasis note the presumption inherent in the question). The answer focuses on
the
status conferred on all human beings by the design of a morality which includes agent-relative
constraints (p.89). That status is one of being inviolable (which is not, of course, to say that one will not be
violated, but that one may not be violated even to minimize the total number of such violations). A
system of morality that includes inviolability encapsulates a good that its rivals cannot capture. For, not
only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the
person in those ways is an additional and independent evil (p.91). So there is a sense in which we are better off if
there are rights (they are a kind of generally disseminated intrinsic good (p.93)). Hence there are rights. In short, we are
inviolable because
315
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
316 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what
theory of rights leave alone. When may rights be overridden by the government? I have two sorts of cases in mind:
overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right
of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call civilization values. An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps
must countenance, the states overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step
of the way. For the state to override-that is, sacrifice- a right of some so theat others may keep it, the
situations must be desperate. I havein mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a
right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some or allow
them to be killed), if the only alternative is letting everyone die. It is the right to life which most prominently
figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that numbers count. Just as
one may prefer saving ones own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third party-let us say, the
state- can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is
otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being
sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the
lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they
resist being sacrificed. To accept utilitarianism (in some loose sense) as a necessary supplement. It thus
should function innocently, or when all hope of innocence is gone . I emphasize, above all, however, that every
care must be taken to ensure that the precept that numbers of lives count does not become a license for
vaguely conjectural decisions about inflicting death and saving life and that desperation be as strictly
and narrowly understood as possible. (But total numbers killed do not count if members of one group
have to kill members of another group to save themselves from threatened massacre of enslavement or
utter degradation or misery; they may kill their attackers in an attempt to end the threat.)
316
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
317 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
317
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
318 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Principle has made us less relevant to policy makers, whose main concerns are who gains, who
loses, by how much, and can or should the losers be compensated. By focusing on the
distribution of gains and losses and replacing the Pareto Principle with estimates of whether a big
enough economic surplus could be generated so that gainers could compensate losers, the socalled
new welfare economics (which is no longer new) was a step toward more relevancy for policy
makers (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz). Another major step toward relevancy was made by the more recent
emphasis on political economy and institutional economics. But are we trading off scientific validity for
relevancy? Robbins (p. 9) seems to think so, when he states that "claims of welfare economics to be
scientific are highly dubious." But if Aristotle saw economics as a branch of ethics and Adam Smith was a moral philosopher,
when did we, as implied by Stigler, replace ethics with precision and objectivity? Or, when did we as economists move away
from philosophy toward statistics and engineering and are we on our way back to a more
comprehensive political economy approach, in which both quantitative and qualitative variables are taken
into account? I believe we are. Does that make us less scientific, as argued by Robbins?
I am not questioning whether the quantification of economic relationships is important. It is. In the case
of food policy analysis, it is critically important that the causal relationship between policy options and
expected impact on the population groups of interest is quantitatively estimated . But not at the expense of
reality, context, and ethical considerations, much of which can be described only in qualitative terms.
Economic analyses that ignore everything that cannot be quantified and included in our models are not
likely to advance our understanding of economic and policy relationships. Neither
will they be relevant for solving real world problems. The predictive ability is likely to be low and,
if the results are used by policy makers, the outcome may be different from what was expecte.
318
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
319 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Deontology does not dismiss consequences, categorical imperative means deont still maximizes
happiness
Donaldson 95 (Thomas Donaldson is Professor of Business Ethics at Georgetown U, Ethics and International
Affairs,International Deontology Defended: A Response to Russell Hardin, pg. 147-154)
When discussing nuclear deterrence or intervention it is common to exaggerate the nonconsequential nature
of Kantianism. It is a false but all-too common myth that Kant believed that consequences were
irrelevant to the evaluation of moral action. In his practical writings Kant explicitly states that each of us
has a duty to maximize the happiness of other individuals, a statement that echoes Mills famous principle of
utility. But Kants duty to promote beneficial consequences is understood to be derived from an even
higher order principle, namely, the categorical imperative that requires all of us to act in a way that
respects the intrinsic value of other rational beings. Kant does not dismiss
consequences. He simply wants them in their proper place.
319
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
320 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Callahan (1/2)
Callahan embraces reason and says it must be used in combination with a moral obligation to
make decisions
Callahan, fmr. Director of the Hastings Institute, 75
DANIEL CALLAHAN, Fmr. Director of the Hastings Institute, author of The Tyranny of Survival & Senior Fellow at
Yale, February 1975,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3560956
A RECENT correspondent,
after praising the position I took in opposition to Garrett Hardin's "Life-boat Ethic" ("Doing Good
by Doing Well," Dec. 1974), ended her letter with a complaint. I had, she implied, fallen into a fatal trap by trying to argue
with Hardins thesis on "rationalistic rounds. The issue at stake is "humanitarianism" and the future of altruism, neither of
which will be saved if they must be defended on the narrow base of reason and logic. Indeed, she seemed to be saying, there
is an inherent conflict between humanitarianism and rationalism. As an unreconstructed rationalist, I balk at admitting
such a dualism, just as I rebel at the general black-balling of reason and logic which seems to many to offer the only
antidote to the generally insane, depressing state of the world. One can well understand how rationality has come to have a
bad name. We have in the twentieth century been subjected to endless wars, ills and disasters carried out in the name of
somebody or other's impeccable logic and assertedly rational deliberations. One can also understand the sense of distaste any
feel in the face of articulate proponents of "triage" in our dealings with poor countries and a "lifeboat ethic" in deter-mining
our own moral responsibilities toward the starving, particularly when such positions are advanced in the name of no-nonsense
rational calculation. For all that, I am far more fearful of a deliberate abandonment of reason than of the evils which can
be done in its name. The fault with the latter form of attacking "reason" is that it takes those arguing in its name too
much at their own word. Poke around a bit under the facade of carefully-honed rationality and precise logical moves
and what does one usually discover? Pure mush. Those vast, intricate edifices rest on a bowl of porridge, made up of
irrational self-interest, the worst forms of sentimentality (or pure cruelty), utterly unanalyzed assumptions about
politics, or ethics, or human nature, tribalism, and god knows what else. None of that has much if anything to do with
reason. A recent article by Robert L. Heilbroner, author of the much-acclaimed book, An Inquiry Into the Human
Prospect, is indicative of the muddle created when one calls for an abandonment of rationality in favor of something
more Illuminating. In "What has Posterity Ever Done for Me?" (New York Times Magazine, January 19, 1975), Prof.
Heilbroner tries to make the case that contemporary human beings will never learn to take responsibility for the future of
mankind until they give up trying to find a compelling reason why they should. Only some fundamental revelatory
experience-to wit, famine, war and the like-will bring people back to what is an essentially "religious" insight, that of "the
transcendent importance of posterity for them." It is intriguing to see the way Heilbroner develops his case. "Why," he asks,
"should I lift a finger to affect events that will have no more meaning for me 75 years after my death than those that happened
75 years before I was born? There is no rational answer to that terrible question. No argument based on reason will lead me to
care for posterity or to lift a finger in its behalf. Indeed, by every rational consideration, precisely the opposite answer is
thrust upon us with irresistible force." Going on, Heilbroner quotes an anonymous "Distinguished Younger Economist" who
has concluded that he really doesn't "care" whether mankind survives or not. "Is this," Heilbroner queries, "an outrageous
position? I must confess it outrages me. But this is not because the economist's arguments are 'wrong'-indeed, within their
rational framework they are indisputably right. It is because their position reveals the limitations-worse, the suicidal dangersof what we call 'rational argument' when we con-front questions that can only be decided by an appeal to an entirely different
faculty from that of cool reason." I find Heilbroner's despair at finding a rational basis to care about posterity, or the
distant past, simply startling. Surely, to begin with the past, he can hardly believe (to stick to his own field of economics)
that Adam Smith and the other "worldly philosophers" have no significance whatever any more, despite the fact that they had
a critical place in shaping the world in which we live today. And surely, as an American, he must find some slight trace of
present and personal meaning in the historical fact that some distant people once upon a time signed a "declaration of
independence." My beginning with the past is no accident. If a case is to be made for caring about the fate of posterity, it will
arise out of the highly rational recognition that (for better or worse) we are where we are because it seemed to our ancestors
only sensible to worry about the fate of their descendants, just as (also for better or worse) still earlier generations had
worried about their descendants. More deeply, unless one has decided that human life is, regardless of its condition,
meaningless and terrible-in which case, what the hell-one will also recognize the moral interdependence of generations as one
of the conditions for extracting whatever possibilities there are for human happiness. To love and believe in life at all is not
just to love one's own life; it is to love both the fact and idea of life itself, including the life of those yet to be born. My point
here, however, is not to make the rational case for obligations
320
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
321 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Callahan (2/2)
toward posterity. It is only to indicate there are rational ways of going about it (and if you don't like the reasons I've given, I
can think of still others), just as there are rational ways of establishing a variety of other moral duties. The truly
hazardous part of despairing of reason, and longing for a return to something more primitive, can readily be seen in
the texture of some of Heilbroner's other arguments. He is looking for what he calls the " survivalist" principle, by which he
seems to mean some deep sense of obligation toward the future, powerful enough to give us the courage and the toughness to
take those immediate steps necessary to discharge our obligation. "Of course," he writes, "there are moral dilemmas to be
faced even if one takes one's stand on the 'survivalist' principle.... [But] this essential commitment to life's continuance gives
us the moral authority to take measures, per-haps very harsh measures, whose justification cannot be found in the precepts of
rationality, but must be sought in the unbearable anguish we feel if we imagine ourselves as the executioner of mankind." Of
course we may have to act harshly. But, to bring the circle full turn, how are we to act harshly, to whom and under what
circumstances? Are we also meant to abandon reason in trying to answer that question? Are we supposed to solve the
evident "moral dilemmas" to which Heilbroner refers by a dependence, not on reason, but on a sense of "unbearable
anguish"?I see no reason to hope that even a fully shared sense of anguish would tell us how to resolve moral dilemmas.
Moreover, Heilbroner himself cites at least one person who does not share his feelings, and unless we are to suppose that
person to represent a class of one, the pillar to the center of the earth Heilbroner offers us begins to look like a piece of balsa
wood. The amusing side of all this is that the two principal "survivalists" of our day, Garrett Hardin and Robert Heilbroner,
seem to come out at opposite poles in the place they give to reason. Hardin appears the very paradigm of that cool rationality
which Heilbroner believes to be our greatest threat to survival. And Heilbroner's quest for some deeper affective, "religious"
motivation for survival seems the very model of that soft-hearted and woolly-headed humanitarianism which Hardin
identifies as the villain. Neither is likely to carry the day, and for very healthy reasons. Heilbroner is correct when he
discerns that the appeal to reason has its limitations. It takes more than mere logic to move people deeply, especially to
move them to act. More than that, the frequently indignant reaction which greeted Hardin's "lifeboat ethic" indicates that
many are not about to adopt a policy of calculating callousness, "logical" though that may seem. Hardin is correct when he
says that we must think very hard about the question of survival, however much such thought may end by posing hard, even
revolting, choices. But he seems not to have realized that, unless the drive for survival has a moral basis and a saving
reference to some-thing deeper than rational calculation, some and perhaps many people will decide that survival at any price
is not a moral good. Nothing I have said here solves the vexing problem of the right relationship between reason and
feeling in the moral life. But it seems to me at least clear that the worst possible solution is to choose one at the expense
of the other, or to think that we can make a flat choice between them. There is enough evidence from recent
psychological research to indicate that our feelings and emotions are vigorously tutored by our perceptions and
cognition; reason has its say even in the way we feel. A no less important insight is that there is all the difference in the world
between being "rational and being "logical."Almost anyone can work through a simple syllogism, presuming he is spared
the ordeal of worrying about whether the premises are correct. It is a far more difficult matter to be rational, particularly
where ethics is concerned
321
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
322 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Callahan Ext
We replace survival as the sole aspect of decision making
Moore, Cambridge University Press, 75
Harold Moore, The Review of Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1975), Cambridge University Press,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406214
If the solution does not lie in the development of more efficient technology, then contemporary society needs a new basis
for analyzing the moral problems precipitated by recent technological developments. Callahan claims that two extremes
are to be avoided in forging a responsible perspective: the "tyranny of survival" on the one hand and the "tyranny of
individualism" on the other. He very effectively points out that there is almost nothing people won't do once they are
convinced that survival (of a group, life or kind of life) is at stake. The moral difficulty is obvious: the social concern
with survival as the only or as the decisive variable in making decisions on technological utilization is decision-making at
a level well below any acceptable moral minimum. If survival is the only value, then indeed just about anything is
permitted. The "survival only" thesis fails by overemphasizing one value. The thesis of "individualism" errs in another
way: in making the satisfaction of individual needs and desires the locus of morality it offers no real hope of coping with
either man's communal life or the moral problems that ineluctably follow from man's social nature. Given the failure of the
extreme positions, Callahan argues for the development of a public morality, one that is capable of integrating values
other than mere survival.
322
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
323 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
323
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
324 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Reasonableness, or the capacity for a sense of justice, is the ability to limit the pursuit of ones conception of the good out of
a respect for the rights and interests of other people and out of a desire to cooperate with them on fair terms. A person who
acts reasonably acts according to a principle of reciprocity: he seeks to give justice to those who can give justice in return
(p. 447). The tight connection between reasonableness and autonomy is explained by Rawls in sec. 86 of Theory: the sense
of justice . . . reveals what the person is, and to compromise it is not to achieve for the self free reign but to give way to the
contingencies and accidents of the world (p. 503). When we act reasonably, says Rawls, we demonstrate an ability to
subordinate the pursuit of our own good, which may be unduly influenced by the contingencies and accidents of the world,
to those principles we would choose as members of the intelligible realmour reasonableness, in other words, is emblematic
of our autonomy, our independence from natural and social contingencies. This explains our sense of shame when we fail to
act reasonably: we behave then as if we were members of a lower order of animal , whose actions are determined by
the laws of nature rather than the moral law (p. 225).
The Priority of Right over the Good and the Priority of Justice over Welfare and Efficiency are both expressions of our nature
as reasonable beings, i.e., beings able to act in conformity with, and out of respect for, the moral law. In Kants terms, to
sacrifice justice for the sake of welfare or excellence of character would be to sacrifice what is of absolute value (the good
will) for what is of merely relative value (its complements). Rawls himself makes the same strong connection between
reasonableness and these two kinds of priority: But the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational being can be
fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first priority. . . . Therefore in order to realize our
nature we have no alternative but to plan to preserve our sense of justice as governing our other aims. This sentiment cannot
be fulfilled if it is compromised and balanced against other ends as but one desire among the rest (TJ, p. 503, emphasis
added). Just as reasonableness is a key facet of our autonomy, so the priorities of right and justice are expressions of our
reasonableness: we best indicate our commitment to guide our actions by the principles of justice by refusing to compromise
those principles for the sake of our other ends.
324
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
325 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Rationality is our capacity for a conception of the good, which we pursue through a plan of life. We schedule, prioritize,
temper, and prune our desires in accordance with this plan; rather than living from impulse to impulse, as other animals do,
we arrange the pursuit of our interests and ends according to a coherent scheme (secs. 6364). Now, given what was said in
the previous subsection, one may find it difficult to see the connection between rationality, so defined, and autonomy: if our
desires are largely the product of natural and social contingencies, then how can acting in accordance with a plan to advance
them be an aspect of our autonomy? In other words, if rationality is merely the slave of the passions, 11 and these passions
are the result of such contingencies, then how can rationality possibly express our nature as free and equal beings? According
to Rawls, however, rationality is much more than a slave of the passions. The exercise of rationality involves a clear
distancing from ones immediate desires, as Rawls indicates in the following passage: The aim of deliberation is to find
that plan which best organizes our activities and influences the formation of our subsequent wants so that our aims and
interests can be fruitfully combined into one scheme of conduct . Desires that tend to interfere with other ends, or which
undermine the capacity for other activities, are weeded out; whereas those that are enjoyable in themselves and support
other aims as well are encouraged. 12 The image of rationality here is active, not passive. Rather than being haplessly driven
on by the dominant desires, rationality exercises authority over them: rationality elevates some desires and lays low others; it
integrates retained desires into one scheme of conduct; and it even shapes the development of future desires. Far from
being a slave of desire, rationality is its master. This conception of rationality is consistent with at least one reading of Kants
idea of practical reason as applied to the pursuit of happiness: H. J. Paton notes that prudential reasoning in Kants moral
theory involves a choice of ends as well as means and a subsequent maximum integration of ends. 13
325
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
326 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Rights Absolute
Rights absolute cant infringe on one persons rights to increase well-being of others.
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U Chicago. 1994.
Alan. Are There Any Absolute Rights? Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics. Joram Graf Haber. Pgs 137-138
Ought Abrams to torture his mother to death in order to prevent the threatened nuclear catastrophe? Might he not merely
pretend to torture his mother, so that she could then be safely hidden while the hunt for the gang members continued?
Entirely apart from the fact that the gang could easily pierce this deception, the main objection to the very raising of such
question s is the moral one that they seem to hold open the possibility of acquiescing and participating in an unspeakably evil
project. To inflict such extreme harm on one' s mother would be an ultimate act of betrayal; in performing or even
contemplating the performance of such an action the son would lose all self-respect and would regard his life as no longer
worth living.' A mother' s right not to be tortured to death by her own son is beyond any compromise. It is absolute . This
absoluteness may be analyzed in several different interrelated dimensions. all stemming from the supreme principle of
morality. The principle requires respect for the rights of all persons to the necessary conditions of human action, and this
includes respect for the persons themselves as having the rational capacity to reflect on their purposes and to control their
behaviour in the light of such reflection. The principle hence prohibits using any person merely as a means to the well-being
of other persons. For a son to torture his mother to death even 10 protect the lives of others would be an extreme violation of
this principle and hence of these rights, as would any attempt by others to force such an action . For this reason , the concept
appropriate to it is not merely 'wrong' but such others as 'despicable', 'dishonorable", 'base', 'monstrous'. In the scale of moral
modalities , such concepts function as the contrary extremes of concepts like the supererogatory , What is supererogatory is
not merely good or right but goes beyond these in various ways; it includes saintly and heroic actions whose moral merit
surpasses what is strictly required of agents, In parallel fashion, what is base, dishonourabte. or despicable is not merely bad
or wrong but goes beyond these in moral demerit since it subverts even the minimal worth or dignity both of its agent and of
its recipient and hence, the basic presupposition s of morality itself, Just as the supererogatory is superlatively good, so the
despicable is superlatively evil and diabolic, and its moral wrongness is so rotten that a morally decent person will not even
consider doing it. This is but another way of saying that the rights it would violate must remain absolute.
326
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
327 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
327
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
328 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Rights/Liberty K2 Rationality
Rights and basic liberties are a prerequisite of rational decisionmaking.
Taylor, professor of philosophy @ Princeton. 2003.
Robert. Rawls Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, No. 3, Pg 16. Project MUSE.
In order to advance the reconstruction of the Hierarchy Argument, we must now answer the following question: How does
this highest-order interest in rationality and its preconditions justify the lexical priority of the basic liberties over other
primary goods, as called for by the Priority of Liberty? In short, it justifies such priority because the basic liberties are
necessary conditions for the exercise of rationality, which is why parties in the Original Position give first priority to
preserving their liberty in these matters (pp. 13132). If the parties were to sacrifice the basic liberties for the sake of other
primary goods (the means that enable them to advance their other desires and ends [p. 476]), they would be sacrificing their
highest-order interest in rationality and its preconditions, and thereby failing to express their nature as autonomous beings (p.
493). A brief examination of the basic liberties enumerated by Rawls will indicate why they are necessary conditions for the
exercise of rationality (p. 53). The freedoms of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom of thought are
essential to the creation and revision of plans of life: without secure rights to explore ideas and beliefs with others (whether in
person or through various media) and consider these at our leisure, we would be unable to make informed decisions about our
conception of the good. Freedom of the person (including psychological and bodily integrity), as well as the right to personal
property and immunity from arbitrary arrest and seizure, are necessary to create a stable and safe personal space for purposes
of reflection and communication, without which rationality would be compromised if not crippled. Even small restrictions
on these basic liberties would threaten our highest order interest , however slightly, and such a threat is disallowed given
the absolute priority of this interest over other concerns. Note also that lexical priority can be justified here for all of the basic
liberties, not merely a subset of them (as was the case with the strains-of-commitment interpretation of the Equal Liberty of
Conscience Argument).14
328
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
329 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
329
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
330 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
happiness, will do something more than just try to motivate people to aim directly at it. It will occur to him that a legal
system, with its sanctions and implicit directives, will both guide people what to do, and at the same time provide motivation
to conform to the legal standards. He will want, with Bentham, a legal system which as a whole will maximize happiness by
producing pro-social conduct at the least cost. Moreover, the one thing should be clear: If the moral system has been carefully
devised, there will not be gross disparity between what it requires and conduct that promises to maximize benefit. To avoid
such disparity, an optimal rule-utilitarian moral code will contain " escape clauses." For instance, it will permit a driver to
obstruct a driveway illegally when there is an emergency situation. But suppose there is a minor disparity between the
requirements of the moral code and what will do most good: suppose Mary will have to walk to work tomorrow, but the gain
in convenience to the person who obstructs her driveway will be: greater than the loss to her. Will the consistent utilitarian
then advise the driver to park illegally? Let us suppose the utilitarian has decided that a utility maximizing moral code will
not direct a person to do what he thinks will maximize expectable utility in a particular situation, but to follow certain rules roughly, to follow his conscientious principles, as amended where long-range utility requires. If he has decided this, then it is
inconsistent of him to turn around and advise individuals just to follow their discretion about what will maximize utility in a
particular case. Of course, the utilitarian will want everyone to be sensitive to the utility of giving aid to others and avoiding
injury; requirements or encouragement to do so are pan of our actual moral cede, and it is optimal for the code to be $0. But
once it is decided that the optimal code is not that of act-utilitarianism, the utilitarian will say it is desirable for a person to
follow the optimal moral code, that is, follow conscience except where utility demands amendment of the principles of the
code, So it seems the consistent utilitarian will conclude that there is a moral obligation not to obstruct Mary' s driveway
illegally, in accordance with the optimal code.
330
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
331 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
331
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
332 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
332
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
333 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
333
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
334 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
world to which action relates us descriptively is not the utilitarians world of natural causes and effects.
The claim that youre really something is a not a claim about a persons empirical or psychological
state; rather it is a claim about his status.19 Similarly, the examples Wollaston invokes to illustrate his theory of
action all involve claims about the status of an agent in relation to others. Thus Wollastons view, echoed by Kamm, seems to
be that action tracks certain practical factsfacts about where we stand in relation to one another as
members of a social world. Wollastons conception of action seems to presuppose a moral psychology which is different
from Cumberlands. While Wollaston would not deny that every action involves an exercise of efficient
causality, his view suggests that our ultimate practical concern is not for the effects we can
produce. Indeed his conception implies that in addition to a causal element, action contains a reflexive element.
The exercise of human agency, according to Wollaston, involves a reflective awareness of ourselves in relation to
others.20 Action expresses a conception of where we stand in relation to the other constituents of the
world, conceived as a realm of status relations. Moreover, this awareness determines an ultimate end of
action which is not an effect to be brought about. That end is the faithful representation of the
interpersonal order of which we are members.
334
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
335 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**AT DEONTOLOGY/RIGHTS**
335
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
336 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
The trouble with this response is pointed out by Richard Rorty, who offers the rejoinder, made by an agent who wants to
infringe upon the rights of another, that philosophers like Gewirth "seem ,oblivious to blatantly obvious moral
distinctions, distinctions any decent person would draw . ''8~ For Rorty, the problem cannot be solved by
sitting down with a chalkboard and diagramming how the agent and his potential victim are both PPAs.
It is, he argues, a problem that will not be solved by demonstrating that the agent violates his victim on
pain of self-contradiction because, for this agent, the victim is not properly a PPA, despite looking and acting very much
like one. The old adage about looking, swimming, and quacking like a duck comes to mind here; no
amount of quacking will convince the agent that his victim is, in fact, a duck. As Rorty points out,
This rejoinder is not just a rhetorical device, nor is it in any way irrational. It is heartfelt. The identity of these people, the
people whom we should like to convince to join our Eurocentric human rights culture, is bound up with their sense of who
they are not . . . . What is crucial for their sense of who they are is that they are not an infidel, not a queer, not a woman, not
an untouchable .... Since the days when the term "human being" was synonymous with "member of our tribe," we have
always thought of human beings in terms of paradigm members of the species. We have contrasted us, the real humans, with
rudimentary or perverted or deformed examples of humanity. 82
There are, I believe, two problems for Gewirth's theory here. The first is that an agent can quite clearly
sidestep rational inconsistency by believing that his victim is somehow less of an agent (and, in the case presented by
Rorty, less of a human being) than he is himself. The agent, here, might recognize that his victim is a PPA, but
other factors (being an infidel, a queer, a woman, or an untouchable) have far greater resonance and preclude her
having the same rights as the agent. He might also recognize his victim as a potential PPA, but not one in the fullest
sense of that term or one who has actually achieved that status; as Gewirth himself notes, "there are degrees of approach to
being prospective purposive agents. ''83 It seems to me that the Nazis knew quite well that their Jewish victims
could be PPAs in some sense; the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 confirm their awareness that Jews could plan and execute
the same sorts of actions they could (voting and working, for example). The rights of the Jews could be restricted, however,
because Jews were quite different from Germans; rather than PPAs in the fullest sense, they were, in the eyes of the Nazis,
what Rorty calls "pseudohumans. ''~4 On this point, Rorty's point is both clear and compelling: " Resentful young Nazi
toughs were quite aware that many Jews were clever and learned, but this only added to the pleasure
they took in beating such Jews. Nor does it do much good to get such people to read Kant and agree that one should not
treat rational agents simply as means. For everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being, as a rational agent in the
only relevant sense--the sense in which rational agency is synonymous with membership in our moral community. ''s5 The
second problem for the PGC pointed out by Rorty is that it is overly academic and insufficiently pragmatic . In
other words, its fifteen steps might be logically compelling to those in a philosophy department, but not to
those who are actually making these decisions on inclusion and exclusion. "This is not," Rorty tells us,
"because they are insufficiently rational. It is, typically, because they live in a world in which it would be just too risky-indeed, would often be insanely dangerous--to let one's sense of moral community stretch beyond one's family, clan, or tribe.
''86 This second point leads to the final critique of Gewirth's argument for the PGC.
336
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
337 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
337
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
338 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
338
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
339 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT Rawls
Rawls conception of rights flawed fails to explain why small incursions on liberty would
threaten citizenship.
Taylor, professor of philosophy @ Princeton. 2003.
Robert. Rawls Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, No. 3, Pg 5. Project MUSE.
Up to this point, Rawls has said nothing about the priority of the basic liberties; rather, he has focused exclusively on their
equal provision. Only at the end of his main presentation of the Self-Respect Argument does he briefly discuss the Priority of
Liberty: When it is the position of equal citizenship that answers to the need for status, the precedence of the equal liberties
becomes all the more necessary. Having chosen a conception of justice that seeks to eliminate the significance of relative
economic and social advantages as supports for mens self-confidence, it is essential that the priority of liberty be firmly
maintained (p. 478).These two sentences provide a good illustration of what I earlier called the Inference Fallacy: Rawls tries
to derive the lexical priority of the basic liberties from the central importance of an interest they supportin this case, an
interest in securing self-respect for all citizens. Without question, the Self-Respect Argument makes a strong case for
assigning the basic liberties a high priority: otherwise, economic and social inequalities might reemerge as the primary
determinants of status and therefore of self-respect. It does not explain, however, why lexical priority is needed. Why, for
example, would very small restrictions on the basic liberties threaten the social basis of self-respect, so long as they were
equally applied to all citizens? Such restrictions would involve no subordination and, being very small, would be unlikely to
jeopardize the central importance of equal citizenship as a determinant of status.
339
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
340 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT Rawls
Rawls fails to provide warrants for the absolute preservation of basic liberties over other ends.
Taylor, professor of philosophy @ Princeton. 2003.
Robert. Rawls Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, No. 3, Pgs 20-21. Project MUSE.
Although Rawls briefly discusses and defends the Priority of Liberty early in Political Liberalism (PL, pp. 41, 74, 76), his
most sustained arguments for it are to be found late in the book, in the lecture entitled The Basic Liberties and Their
Priority. All of these arguments are framed in terms of Justice as Fairness rather than liberal political conceptions of justice
more generally, a point to which we will return below. The three arguments for the Priority of Liberty that we identified in
Theory can also be found in Political Liberalism, and both their strengths and weaknesses carry over into the new context.18
At least two new arguments can be found, however, arguments that I will refer to as the Stability Argument and the WellOrdered Society Argument, respectively. As I will now show, both of these arguments are further illustrations of the Inference
Fallacy. The Stability Argument has a structure similar to that of the Self- Respect Argument. In it, Rawls notes the great
advantage to everyones conception of the good of a . . . stable scheme of cooperation, and he goes on to assert that Justice
as Fairness is the most stable conception of justice . . . and this is the case importantly because of the basic liberties and the
priority assigned to them.Taking the second point first, Rawls never makes clear why the Priority of Liberty is necessary for
stability, as opposed to strongly contributory to it. Very small restrictions on the basic liberties would seem unlikely to
threaten it, and some types of restrictions (e.g., imposing fines for the advocacy of violent revolution or race hatred) might
actually enhance it. Even if we assume, however, that the Priority of Liberty is necessary for stability, this fact is not enough
to justify it: as highly valued as stability is, sacrificing the basic liberties that make it possible may be worthwhile if such a
sacrifice is necessary to advance other highly valued ends. Pointing out the high priority of stability, in other words, is
insufficient to justify the lexical priority of the basic liberties that support itonly the lexical priority of stability would do
so, yet Rawls provides no argument for why stability should be so highly valued.
340
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
341 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT Rawls
Rawls conception of personal freedom cannot resolve utilitarian democratic ideals.
Taylor, professor of philosophy @ Princeton. 2003.
Robert. Rawls Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, No. 3, Pgs 22-23. Project MUSE.
Rawls speculates that the narrower the differences between the liberal conceptions when correctly based on fundamental
ideas in a democratic public culture . . . the narrower the range of liberal conceptions defining the focus of the consensus.25
By correctly based, Rawls appears to mean at least two things: first, that the conceptions should be built on the more
central of these fundamental ideas; second, that these ideas should be interpreted in the right way (PL, pp. 16768). For
example, Rawls asserts that his conception of the person as free and equal is central to the democratic ideal (PL, p. 167).
This idea is in competition with other democratic ideas, however (e.g., the idea of the common good as it is understood by
classical republicans), as well as with other interpretations of the same idea (e.g., the utilitarian understanding of equality
as the equal consideration of each persons welfare). A necessary condition, then, for Justice as Fairness to be the focus of an
overlapping consensus would be for adherents of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines to endorse this idea, along with the
interpretation Rawls gives it, as more central to the democratic ideal than other fundamental ideas. If they were to accept
not only this idea but also its companion idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, then the procedures of political
constructivism (including the Original Position) would presumably lead them to select Justice as Fairness as their political
conception of justice.
341
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
342 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Is such acceptance likely? Consider the important example of the adherents of utilitarian reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
Would a utilitarian be able to endorse a Kantian conception of free persons, with its elevation of rationality over the
satisfaction of desire and its consequent implications for agent motivation in the Original Position? It seems unlikely that any
utilitarian (with the possible exception of John Stuart Mill in his most syncretic mood) would countenance this variety of
asceticism. Thus, utilitarians would be likely to focus on another interpretation of the idea of free persons or perhaps on an
entirely different fundamental idea or set of ideas; doing so would lead them to structure the Original Position differently and
would presumably produce a political conception of justice that did not include the Priority of Liberty. Rawls argues in
Political Liberalism that classical utilitarians (such as Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick) would be likely to endorse a
political conception of justice liberal in content, but he never suggests that they would choose the Priority of Liberty, or
Justice as Fairness more generally (PL, p. 170). We can conclude from this finding that the class of liberal political
conceptions of justice constituting the focus of a realistic overlapping consensus would include conceptions that did not
endorse the Priority of Liberty (although they would all give the basic liberties special priority). Moreover, Justice as
Fairness might not be alone among the liberal conceptions in endorsing the Priority of Liberty: a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine might, for example, support a Kantian conception of free persons but not Rawlss particular interpretation of society
as a fair system of cooperation, leading through the procedures of political constructivism to a liberal conception of justice
that endorsed the Priority of Liberty but rejected, say, the Difference Principle. Thus, the Priority of Liberty would be one
competitor idea among many in an overlapping consensus, endorsed by both adherents of Kantian comprehensive doctrines
and their fellow travelers, but rejected by others.
No justification for violation of rights to prevent external loss - principle of intervening actions
means that government is not held responsible for death of others.
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U Chicago. 1994.
Alan. Are There Any Absolute Rights? Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics. Joram Graf Haber. Pgs 143.
He may be said to intend the many deaths obliquely, in that they are a foreseen but unwanted side-effect of his refusal . But
he is not responsible for that side-effect because of the terrorist s' intervening action. It would be unjustified to violate the
mother's right to life in order to protect the rights to life of the many other residents of the city. For rights cannot be
justifiably protected by violating another right which, according to the criterion of degrees of necessity for action, is at
least equally important. Hence, the many other residents do not have a right that the mother' s right to life be violated for their
sakes . To be sure , the mother also does not have a right that their equally important rights be violated in order to protect
hers. But here too it must be emphasized that in protecting his mother's right the son does not violate the rights of the others;
for by the principle of the intervening action, it is not he who is causally or morally responsible for their deaths . Hence
too he is not treating them as mere means to his or his mother's ends.
342
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
343 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
343
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
344 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Gewirth
Gewirths theories fail to leave the theoretical realm
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer
Reviewed Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
Despite his best efforts to demonstrate the way in which the PGC applies to real agents, Beyleveld has
simply restated Gewirth's argument and, in my estimation, added additional jargon that seems to encourage
rather than refute Held's objection. The biggest difficulty with this defense--apart from the way it is worded,
which lends credence to our belief that there is something not quite human about these PPAs --is that Beyleveld seems to
have conflated characteristics and purposes. It is correct that a PPA must accept the PGC regardless of the nature of
his purposes, for having any purposes at all entails that he is a PPA and being a PPA necessitates his acceptance of the PGC.
However, it does not follow that he must accept the PGC regardless of the nature of his (or others')
characteristics, for these characteristics might invalidate some aspect of the PGC. He might be, for
example, one of the unfortunate marginal agents discussed above; alternately, he might be acting upon one of
those marginal agents, in which case he need not worry about granting the generic rights that he claims for himself.
Beyleveld's response to this concern seems lackluster : "a PPA, regardless of its particular occurrent characteristics,
is logically required to concentrate attention on the generic features as the basis of its rights-claims, and must restrict its
categorically binding rights-claims to these features, because it is not logically required to attend to any other features. "94
Leaving aside the fact that Beyleveld refers to PPAs as neither "him" nor "her," but rather "it," at the same
time that he is attempting to humanize them, the argument he makes here does not stand up to scrutiny.
All he claims is that PPAs are required to base their rights-claims on the generic features of action (which
everyone, except for marginal agents, must possess)b because they are not required to base those claims on other features.
This does not mean that a PPA cannot base his claim on characteristics other than the generic features of
action; it simply means he must also include the generic features of action in his claim , as they--like the
other characteristics--are necessarily connected with agency. By and large, then, it seems that Gewirth has
not gone a great distance toward refuting this critique nor has Beyleveld offered much assistance. In fact,
Gewirth seems to recognize his shortcoming even as he attempts to offer his response to Engels: "Hence,
while not entirely exempt from Engels's criticism, the present approach in terms of the generic features of action has an
important justification. For it sets up a morally neutral starting point that does not accept persons' actual power relations and
other differences as a moral datum. ''95 This, though, seems to be the point of Engels' critique and of more recent critiques of
analytical theories that attempt to abstract from the world in order to discuss it. Indeed, Michael Sandel's objections to Rawls'
well-known ideas of the original position and veil of ignorance are equally apt in looking at the greatest weakness of
Gewirth's theory. Although Sandel stands quite close to Rawls on the question of what a liberal society's principles of justice
ought to be, he contends that Rawls' assumptions about the populace of that society provide a poor foundation for his
principles.
344
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
345 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Gewirth
Gewirths study of contradiction fails, he never isolates where negative consequences come from
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer
Reviewed Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
To begin, then,
necessarily rational actors who behave as Gewirth outlines or, instead, a bundle of desires engaged in
continual struggle, especially after looking at the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan.
345
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
346 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Gewirth
Gewirth ignores the fundamental differences between peoples
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer
Reviewed Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
While this Lacanian critique is an interesting one, it is not the strongest argument against Gewirth on the question of
contradiction. Though it might be the case that people are unable to rationally order their preferences, as Lacan argues, or that
some people do not have the sort of meta-desire for rational consistency that Gewirth assumes for the purposes of his theory,
it certainly seems to be more often the ease that people can and do. What Gewirth fails to consider properly, however,
is the ability that people have to rationalize their actions in an effort to avoid the cognitive dissonance
that comes with self-contradiction. He clearly recognizes the problem , pointing out that "some person may
without inconsistency claim the right to inflict various harms on other persons on the ground that he possesses qualities that
are had only by himself or by some group he favors. ''72 By way of a response, as noted above, he puts forward the ASA:
that being a PPA is both the necessary and sufficient justificatory reason for having the generic rights. This
answer seems not to have placated Gewirth's detractors, nor has it gone far enough to suit me . Of course,
Beyleveld deals with multiple versions of this objection in the fortieth through forty-fifth objections to the PGC. One such
objection is that of Donald E. Geels, who "alleges that '[i]t is trivial to claim that whatever is right for one person
must be right for any relevantly similar person in any relevantly similar circumstances ,' because there is no
determinate criterion of relevant similarity. ''73 This sounds remarkably similar to Gewirth's own objection to the formal
principle, described above. As Beyleveld points out, however, Gewirth has quite clearly specified the criterion of relevant
similarities: "a PPA must claim that it has the generic rights (according to the argument for the sufficiency of agency [ASA])
for the sufficient reason that it is a PPA. Because a PPA logically must claim the generic rights, it is the property of be/ng a
PPA that is logically required to be the criterion of relevant similarities. ''74 More interesting, in my estimation, are
arguments like the one made by N. Fotion, that "a 'fanatic' (read 'elitist') can grant itself rights on the grounds
that it is a superior PPA, yet refuse to grant these rights to other PPAs, who are not superior PPAs,
without contradiction. ''75
346
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
347 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Gewirth
Gewirths theories fail to answer how different people treat each other equally
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer
Reviewed Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
More challenging for Gewirth is the claim not that a PPA is in some way special and thereby deserving of rights, but
instead that some other PPA is somehow damaged and thereby not worthy of them. Such an argument,
however, seems neither to have been made directly against Gewirth nor is it carefully considered by him
or by Beyleveld. Gewirth seems to recognize the existence of this problem --indeed, he seems to put it forward
himself--but fails really to grapple with it in any meaningful way.
He says, To be P, that is, a prospective purposive agent, requires having the practical abilities the generic features of action:
the abilities to control one's behavior by one's unforced choice, to have knowledge of relevant circumstances, and to reflect
on one's purposes. These abilities are gradually developed in children, who will eventually have them in full; the abilities are
had in varying impaired ways by mentally deficient persons; and they are largely lacking among animals...Since the quality
that determines whether one has the generic rights is that of being P, it follows from these variations in degree, according to
the Principle of Proportionality, that although children, mentally deficient persons, and animals do not have the generic rights
in the full-fledged way normal human adults have them, members of these groups approach having the generic rights in
varying degrees, depending on the degree to which they have the requisite abilities. 77 Of course, in reading these remarks,
one must wonder whether it is acceptable to infringe upon the rights of those who fall within the
categories Gewirth lays out. If one is like a child, then perhaps it is acceptable for society to take away
one's rights to freedom and well-being. Surely that must be the case if one is like an animal for, as Gewirth says,
"the lesser the abilities, the less one is able to fulfill one's purposes without endangering oneself and
other persons. ''78 There is something rather troubling about making these sorts of statements, but
Gewirth seems not to see it. For him, it is sufficient to argue that one ought to have the generic rights to the degree to
which one approaches being a PPA. Beyleveld's response to this objection, unlike his many others, is
surprisingly lacking and is confined to a footnote. By doing so, he seems to have made things worse for
Gewirth, as he points out that five theorists have taken issue with the PGC on this important point but
then offers no substantive rejoinder.
He says, It seems to me that Gewirth's theory is essentially a theory of the rights of PPAs, and not a theory of human rights
as such...From this ft follows that there are some human beings (those who are not even marginal agents) who do not have the
generic rights, and that nonhuman beings might have the generic rights...The question of the rights of "marginal agents" is,
however, a more complex one. I do not discuss this, because I view its importance as being for the argument from the PGC,
rather than the argument to the PGC, with which this book is solely concerned; so I shall not discuss any of the above claims
in detail. 79
347
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
348 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Gewirth
Human beings are infinitely more complex than Gewirths theories assume
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer
Reviewed Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
In order to offer a truly compelling secular foundation for the idea of human rights , one must do more
than Gewirth has done in demonstrating the logical necessity of accepting a principle that entails the universalization of
the generic rights of freedom and well-being. As we have seen. Gewirth crafts an interesting argument for human
rights in theory, but runs into considerable trouble when his theory is put into practice. As critics like Rorty
and Sandel point out, there is something about the Principle of Generic Consistency that rings a bit hollow .
For Rorty, the problem lies in Gewirth's failure to appreciate the fierce partiality that often drives human
rights violations; it is a confusion to point out contradictions to those who either refuse to recognize them or are not
terribly troubled by them. For Sandel, the PGC must fail for the same reason that Rawls' original position fails;
there is simply no getting around the fact that human beings are more complex than abstract possessors
of goods or prospective purjoiiooposive agents. Any examination of human life that abstracts in these ways removes the
discussion too far from the real world in which human rights are actually violated. These violations cannot be said to
be the same thing as the simple removal of freedom and well-being from a PPA, for this sort of language
is hopelessly sterile. Human rights violations happen, instead, to men like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Primo
Levi, who struggle desperately to survive and, if successful, carry the scars of their experiences with
them for the rest of their lives. This is a mistake of the highest order, one that insults the victims and
survivors of some of humanity's most terrible tragedies. It is one that Gewirth and Beyleveld cannot
possibly intend to make, but one that creeps up on them as the abstractions with which they deal
multiply.
348
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
349 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
AT: Gewirth
Gewirths academic discussion of human rights ignores the actual human cost and suffering of
torture and death
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer
Reviewed Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
In abstracting away so many characteristics from human beings in order to create the prospective purposive agent,
something has clearly been lost from Gewirth's account of the justification for human inviolability . It
might be philosophically interesting to consider whether the generic features of action can logically provide a secular
grounding for the idea of human fights, but what is at stake for Gewirth seems overly academic. Human rights,
however, are not simply academic and their justification is far more than a philosophical puzzle; they are
deadly serious, often a matter of life and death. For this reason, human fights cannot be considered in a
vacuum, and any attempt at their justification must be firmly entrenched in the real world. While I have
quibbled with the PGC on its own terms and argued that (15) does not necessarily follow from (1), and while I have noted
that a great many other theorists have done likewise, my deepest critique is that the PGC's assumptions cause a
great deal of trouble whether or not Gewirth's theory ultimately makes logical sense. As Rorty argues,
Gewirth's theory removes the discussion of human rights from the realm of the actual and concentrates
on the purely theoretical. In doing so, it calls to mind Arthur Koestler's point that "Statistics don't bleed; it is
the detail which counts. ''98 Neither, it seems to me, do PPAs. And the terrible reality is that human beings
do, often at the hands of others. This grim reality is not surprising to anyone, but it is not often expressed
in the way that Samantha Power does, for example. In writing about the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Power offers a quotation
from a UN official on the ground during the worst of the violence: When we arrived, I looked at the school across the street,
and there were children, I don't know how many, forty, sixty, eighty children stacked up outside who had all been
chopped up with machetes. Some of their mothers had heard them screaming and had come running, and the militia had
killed them, too. We got out of the vehicle and entered the church. There we found 150 people, dead mostly, though some
were still groaning, who had been attacked the night before .... The Rwandan army had cleared out the area, the gendarmerie
had rounded up all the Tutsi, and the militia had hacked them to death. 99 This sort of thick description stands in
marked contrast to the kind of language that Gewirth employs in his discussion of the PGC's
applications. Consider the following example, one of the few in which Gewirth departs from talking about
PPAs and assigns names: Suppose Ames physically assaults Blake, who defends himself by physically assaulting Ames.
In a purely formal view, Ames and Blake are each disobeying the moral principle
they are not real and no attempt has been made to make them real for us, we do not--we cannot--become
emotional'ly attached to Ames and Blake, and we do not care, therefore, what happens to either of them. Our
eyes trip lightly over the words "physically assaults" in Gewirth's example in a way that they cannot
move past the words "who had all been chopped up with machetes" in Power's.
349
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
350 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ethics Bad
Ethics is structurally flawed, in that it implies a transgression
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 9596)
This is why we propose to maintain the concept of the act developed by Kant, and to link it to the
thematic of overstepping of boundaries, of transgression, to the question of evil. It is a matter of
acknowledging the fact that any (ethical) act precisely in so far as it is an act, is necessarily evil. We
must specify, however, what is meant here by evil. This is the evil that belongs to the very structure of
the act, to the fact that the latter always implies a transgression, a change in what is. It is not a matter
of some empirical evil, it is the very logic of the act which is denounced as radically evil in every
ideology. The fundamental ideological gesture consists in providing an image for this structural evil.
The gap opened by an act (i.e. the unfamiliar, out-of-place effect of an act) is immediately linked in
this ideological gesture to an image. As a rule this is an image of suffering, which is then displayed to
the public alongside this question: Is this what you want? And this question already implies the answer:
It would be impossible, inhuman, for you to want this! Here we have to insist on theoretical rigour, and
separate this (usually fascinating) image exhibited by ideology from the source of uneasiness from the
evil which is not an undesired, secondary effect of the good but belongs, on the contrary, to its
essence. We could even say that the ethical ideology struggles against evil because this ideology is
hostile to the good, to the logic of the act as such. We could go even further here: the current
saturation of the social field by ethical dilemmas (bioethics, environmental ethics, cultural ethics,
medical ethics) is strictly correlative to the repression of ethics, that is, to an incapacity to think
ethics in its dimension of the Real, an incapacity to conceive of ethics other than simply as a set of
restrictions to yet another aspect of modern society: to the depression which seems to have became
the social illness of our time and to set the tone of the resigned attitude of the (post)modern man of
the end of history. In relation to this, it would be interesting to reaffirm Lacans thesis according to
which depression isnt a state of the soul, it is simply a moral failing, as Dante, and even Spinoza, said:
a sin, which means a moral weakness. It is against this moral weakness or cowardice [ lachete morale]
that we must affirm the ethical dimension proper.
The ideology of good and evil is inherently flawed
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 9091)
The first difficulty with this concept of diabolical evil lies in its very definition: that diabolical evil
would occur if we elevated opposition to the moral law to the level of a maxim (a principle or law).
What is wrong with this definition? Given the Kantian concept of the moral law which is not a law
that says do this or do that, but an enigmatic law which only commands us to do our duty, without
ever naming it the following objection arises: if the opposition to the moral law were elevated to a
maxim or principle, it would no longer be an opposition to the moral law, it would be the moral law
itself. At this level no opposition is possible. It is not possible to oppose oneself to the moral law at the
level of the (moral) law. Nothing can oppose itself to the moral law on principle that is, for nonpathological reasons without itself becoming a moral law. To act without allowing pathological
incentives to influence our actions is to do good. In relation to this definition of the good, (diabolical)
evil would then have to be defined as follows: it is evil to oppose oneself, without allowing pathological
350
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
351 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
incentives to influence ones actions, to actions which do not allow any pathological incentives to
influence ones actions. And this is simply absurd.
351
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
352 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ethics Bad
The real drive behind ethics is desire, not the will to do good
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 3-4)
Kants second break with the tradition, related to the first, was his rejection of the view that ethics is concerned
with the distribution of the good (the service of goods in Lacans terms). Kant rejected an ethics based on my
wanting what is good for others, provided of course that their good reflects my own.
It is true that Lacans position concerning the status of the ethics of desire continued to develop. Hence his position in
Seminar XI (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis) differs on several points from the one he adopted in
Seminar VII (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis). That the moral law, looked at more closely, is simply desire in its
pure state is a judgment which, had it been pronounced in Seminar VII, would have had the value of a compliment; clearly
this is no longer the case when it is pronounced in Seminar XI. Yet even though the later Lacan claims that the analysts
desire is not a pure desire, this does not mean that the analysts desire is pathological (in the Kantian sense of the word), nor
that the question of desire has lost its pertinence. To put the matter simply, the question of desire does not so much lose its
central place as cease to be considered the endpoint of analysis. In the later view analysis ends in another
dimension, that of the drive. Hence as the concluding remarks of Seminar XI have it before this dimension opens up
to the subject, he must first reach and then traverse the limit within which, as desire, he is bound.
is not concerned with what might or might not be done, Kant discovered the essential dimension of
ethics: the dimension of desire, which circles around the real qua impossible. This dimension was excluded from the
purview of traditional ethics, and could therefore appear to it only as an excess. So Kants crucial first step involves taking
the very thing excluded from the traditional field of ethics, and turning it into the only legitimate territory for ethics.
If critics often criticize Kant for demanding the impossible, Lacan attributes an incontestable theoretical value to this Kantian
demand.
Ethics is merely a tool by which personal morals are imposed on others, which is the root of
discontent in society
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 1)
The Freudian blow to philosophical ethics can be summarized as follows: what philosophy calls the moral law and,
more precisely, what Kant calls the categorical imperative is in fact nothing other than the superego. This judgment
provokes an effect of disenchantment that calls into question any attempt to base ethics on foundations other than the
pathological. At the same time, it places ethics at the core of what Freud called das Unbehagen in der Kultur. the
discontent or malaise at the heart of civilization. In so far as it has its origins in the constitution of the superego,
ethics becomes nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology which may try to pass off its own
commandments as the truly authentic, spontaneous and honourable inclinations of the subject. This
thesis, according to which the moral law is nothing but the superego, calls, of course, for careful examination, which I shall
undertake in Chapter 7 below.
352
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
353 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Ethics Bad
It is impossible to determine whether an action is truly ethical or not
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 1617)
By spelling things out in this way we can see clearly that the ethical is, in fact, essentially a supplement. Let us, then, begin
with the first level (the legal). The content of action (its matter), as well as the form this content, are
exhausted in the notion of in conformity with duty. As long as I do my duty nothing remains to be
said. The fact that the act that fulfils my duty may have been done exclusively for the sake of this duty
would change nothing at level of analysis. Such an act would be entirely indistinguishable from an act
done simply in accord with duty, since their results would be exactly the same. The significance of acting
(exclusively) for the sake of duty will be visible only on the second level analysis, which we will simply call the level form.
Here we come across a form which is no longer the form of anything, of some content of other, yet it is not so much an empty
form as form outside content, a form that provides form only for itself. In other words, we confronted here with a supply
which at the same time seems to be pure waste, something that serves absolutely no purpose.
Ethics in terms of attempts to do something good only re-entrenches the presence of the
omnipresent evil
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 86)
The theme of radical evil is currently something of a hot topic, and Kant, as a theoretician of radical evil, is subject to very
diverse and sometimes contradictory readings. In his book, LEthique Alain Badiou points out that the topic of
radical evil has become a spectre raised by ethical ideologists every time a will to do something (good)
appears. Every positive project is capable of being undermined in advance on the grounds that it might
bring about an even greater evil. Ethics would thus be reduced to only one function: preventing evil, or
at least lessening it. It seems that such an ethics of the lesser evil is justified in its reference to Kant. The criticism of
Kant according to which he defined the criteria of the (ethical) act in such a way that one can never satisfy them goes as far
back as Hegel. From this point it follows that all our actions are necessarily bad, and that one can remain
pure only if one chooses not to act at all. In this perspective, good does not exist, whereas evil is
omnipresent.
353
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
354 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Discussion among philosophers often stops at the point of fundamental disagreement over moral
principles, just as discussion among strategists often stops at the point of disagreement over hypothetical assertions about
deterrence. But most moral theorists -- and all utilitarians -- also require consideration of hypothetical
assertions to reach their conclusions, although they are typically even less adept at objective, causal argument
than are strategists, who are themselves often quite casual with their social scientific claims. Even if one
wishes to argue principally from deontological principles, one must have some confidence in one's
social scientific expectations to decide whether consequences might not in this instance be overriding .
Only a deontologist who held the extraordinary position that consequences never matter could easily
reach a conclusion on nuclear weapons without considering the quality of various outcomes . Alas, on this
dreadful issue good causal arguments are desperately needed.
354
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
355 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
of values
typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above
all, thescope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so
conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only
one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a democracy,
policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the
problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do
something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of
utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient,
though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.
.
355
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
356 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
356
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
357 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Regarding the policymaking role of deontological philosophy in a democracy, I am concerned about the
same issue that concerned scholars such as Herman Finer and Victor Thompson--the specter of
policymakers (whether elected or unelected) imposing their own perceptions of higher-order moral
principles on an unwilling or uninformed society. History has shown that the imposition of higher-order
moral principles from above all too often degenerates into instrumental oppression. Thus as Finer has--I
believe correctly--pointed out, the crucial difference between democracy and totalitarianism is the people's
power to exact obedience to the public will. In a democracy, values are not "discovered" by policy
activists; instead, yhey emerge out of the democratic process. For this reason I find very troubling the suggestion
by Joel Kassiola that environmental ethics requires that such long-standing and powerful values as national sovereignty and
property rights will have to be ethically assessed and, perhaps, redefined or subordinated to a
more morally-weighty, environmentally-based values and policies. I cannot help but wonder just who will
be doing the refining and subordinating of these values and how this is to be done. As Kurt Baier reminds us, in a
democracy the moral rules and convictions of any group can and should be subjected to certain tests
(1958, p. 12). That test is the submission of those moral rules and convictions
to the sovereign public. While policymakers are expected to sort out the value conflicts that arise in light
of their duty to serve the public interest, they are seldom entitled to act solely according to some
perceived a priori moral imperative. (Those who would act this way in the case of environmental policy are aptly
described by Bob Taylor as environmental ethicists who discover 'truth' even though this truth can't or won't be seen by their
fellow citizens.) Herein lies one of the important moral dilemmas of democratic government. Individuals
are free, within the constraints of law, to act on perceived moral imperatives; democratic governments
are not. It is, for example, one thing for individuals to donate their property for environmental
preservation, but it is quite another thing for the government
to seize private lands (i.e., redefine property rights) for the same purpose.
357
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
358 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
late, how is he supposed to drive? Is the deontologist supposed to speed, breaking his duty to society to
uphold the law, or is the deontologist supposed to arrive at his meeting late, breaking his duty to be on
time? This scenario of conflicting obligations does not lead us to a clear ethically correct resolution
nor does it protect the welfare of others from the deontologist's decision. Since deontology is not based
on the context of each situation, it does not provide any guidance when one enters a complex situation in
which there are conflicting obligations (1,2).
358
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
359 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
In the rights ethical theory the rights set forth by a society are protected and given the highest priority.
Rights are considered to be ethically correct and valid since a large or ruling population endorses them.
Individuals may also bestow rights upon others if they have the ability and resources to do so (1). For
example, a person may say that her friend may borrow the car for the afternoon. The friend who was
given the ability to borrow the car now has a right to the car in the afternoon. A major complication of
this theory on a larger scale, however, is that one must decipher what the characteristics of a right are in
a society. The society has to determine what rights it wants to uphold and give to its citizens. In order for
a society to determine what rights it wants to enact, it must decide what the society's goals and ethical
priorities are. Therefore, in order for the rights theory to be useful, it must be used in conjunction with
another ethical theory that will consistently explain the goals of the society (1). For example in America
people have the right to choose their religion because this right is upheld in the Constitution. One of the
goals of the founding fathers' of America was to uphold this right to freedom of religion. However,
under Hitler's reign in Germany, the Jews were persecuted for their religion because Hitler decided that
Jews were detrimental to Germany's future success. The American government upholds freedom of
religion while the Nazi government did not uphold it and, instead, chose to eradicate the Jewish religion
and those who practiced it.
359
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
360 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would
be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the
same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment
of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be
fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other
words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we
lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore,
although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a
holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no
choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use
would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery,
and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to
wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence
and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to
ourselves.
360
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
361 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
of
people who will sanction such killing of the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking
of
the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and
far
greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery
but
merely forbore to prevent it? Insuchacontext,suchreasoningandsuchforbearingtopreventseemstome
toconstituteamoralevasion.Isayitisevasivebecauseratherthansteelinghimselftodowhatinnormal
circumstanceswouldbeahorribleandvileactbutinthiscircumstanceisaharshmoralnecessityhe
allows.whenhehasthepowertopreventit,asituationwhichisstillmanytimesworse.Hetriestokeep
his'moralpurity'and[to]avoid'dirtyhands'atthepriceofuttermoralfailureandwhatKierkegaard
called'doublemindedness.'Itisunderstandablethatpeopleshouldactinthismorallyevasivewaybutthis
doesnotmakeitright.
361
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
362 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
flexible. Therefore, deontology should be rejected, and by rejecting deontology we are left with
consequentialism as a viable theory.Nielsen relied heavily on examples to support his first premise that deontology
makes mistakes. He discussed warfare to show how it is not the case that one is necessarily morally corrupt if he or she
knowingly kills the innocent while making moves to kill combatants, but this point would not have been salient without
having seen the movie he referred to, The Battle of Algiers. Nielsen did present an effective example, though, with the case
of the innocent fat man. In this thought experiment, a fat man is leading a group of people out of a cave when he
gets hopelessly stuck in the opening. There is a rising tide that will cause everyone inside the cave to
drown unless they can get out. The only option for removing the fat man is to blast him out with
dynamite that someone happens to have. Nielsen explains that the deontologist would hold that the fat
man must not be blasted and killed because this would violate the prohibition against killing and it is
only nature responsible for everyone else drowning. Nielsen challenges this principle by declaring that
anyone in such a situation, including the fat man, should understand that the right thing to do is blast the
fat man out in order to save the many live s in the cave. Furthermore, the deontologist exhibits moral
evasion whenever he stands idly by and allows a greater tragedy than is necessary to occur. Nielsen
explains that this is the kind of example that highlights the corrupt nature of deontology.
362
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
363 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
We might say that the ethical dimension of an action is supernumerary to the conceptual pair
legal/illegal. This in turn suggests a structural connection with the Lacanian notion of the Real. As
Alain Badiou has noticed, Lacan conceives of the Real in a way that removes it from the logic of the
apparently mutually exclusive alternatives of the knowable and the unknowable. The unknowable is just
a type of the knowable; it is the limit or degenerate case of the knowable; where the Real belongs to
another register entirely. Analogously, for Kant the illegal still falls within the category of legality
they both belong to the same register, that of things conforming or failing to conform with duty. Ethics
to continue the analogy escapes this register. Even though an ethical act will conform with duty, this
by itself is not and cannot be what makes it ethical. So the ethical cannot be situated within the
framework of the law and violations of the law. Again, in relation to legality, the ethical always presents
a surplus or excess.
363
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
364 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
always and only dealing with a form and a content. So, in this view, if we are to decide whether an act is
ethical or not, we simply have to know which in fact determines our will: if it is the form, our actions are
pathological; if it is the form, they are ethical. This indeed, would rightly be called formalism but it not what Kant
is aiming at this his use of the concept of pure form.
First of all we should immediately note that the label formalism is more appropriate for what Kant calls legality. In terms
of legality, all that matters is whether or not an action conform with duty the content of such an action, the
real motivated for this conformity, is ignored; it simply does not matter. But the ethical, unlike the legal,
does in fact present a certain claim concerning the content of the will. Ethics demands not only that an
action conform with duty, but also that this conformity be the only content or motive of that action.
Thus Kants emphasis on form is in an attempt to disclose a possible drive for ethical action. Kant is saying that form has to
come to occupy the position formerly occupied by matter, that form itself has to function as a drive. Form itself must be
appropriated as a material surplus, in order for it to be capable of the will. Kants point, I repeat, is not that all traces
materiality have to be purged from the determining ground of the moral will but, rather, that the form of the moral law has
itself become material, in order for it to function as a motive force of action.
As result of this we can see that there are actually two different problems to be resolved, mysteries to be cleared up,
concerning the possibility of a pure ethical act. The first is the one we commonly associate with Kantian ethics. How is it
possible to reduce or eliminate all the pathological motives or incentives of our actions? How can a subject disregard
all self-interest, ignore the pleasure principle, all concerns with her own well-being and the well-being
of those close to her? What kind of a monstrous, inhuman subject does Kantian ethics presuppose? This line of
questioning is related to the issue of the infinite purification of the subjects will, with its logic of no matter how far you
have come one more effort will always be required. The second question that must be dealt with concerns what we might
call the ethical transubstantiation required by Kants view: the question of the possibility of converting a mere form into a
materially efficacious drive. This second question is, in my view, the more pressing of the two, because answering it would
automatically provide an answer to the first question as well. So how can something which is not in itself
pathological (i.e. which has nothing to do with the representation of pleasure or pain, the usual mode of subjects
casuality) nevertheless become the cause or drive of a subjects actions? The question here is no longer that
of a purification of motives and incentives. It is much more radical : how can form become matter, how
can something which, in the subjects universe, does not qualify as a cause, suddenly become a cause?
This is the real miracle involved in ethics. The crucial question of Kantian ethics is thus not how can we eliminate all the
pathological elements of will, so that only the pure form of duty remains? but rather, how can the pure form of duty
itself function as a pathological element, that is, as an element capable of assuming the role of the driving
force or incentive of our actions?. If the latter were actually to take place if the pure form of duty were actually to
operate as a motive (incentive or drive) for the subject we would no longer need to worry about the problems of the
purification of the will and the elimination of all pathological motives. This, however, seems to suggest that for such
a subject, ethics simply becomes second nature, and thus ceases to be ethics altogether. If acting ethically is a
matter of drive, if it is as effortless as that, if neither sacrifice, suffering, nor renunciation is required, then it also seems
utterly lacking in merit and devoid of virtue. This, in fact, was Kants contention: he called such a condition the holiness of
the will, which he also thought was an unattainable ideal for human agent. It could equally be identified with utter banality
the banality of the radical good to paraphrase Hannah Arendts famous expression. Nevertheless and it is one of the
fundamental aims of this study to show this this analysis moves too quickly, and therefore leaves something out. Our
364
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
365 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
theoretical premiss here is that it will actually be possible to found an ethics on the concept of the drive, without this ethics
collapsing into either the holiness or banality of human actions.
365
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
366 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**AT EGAL**
366
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
367 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
without the intervention of foreign powers.18 Thisis,then,a thoroughly nationalist conception of justice:
social justice applies only within a state or nation. Rawlssradicalprinciplesofdistributivejustice,suchasthedierence
principle,wouldonlyholdtransdomesticallywhere,improbably,stateshadsigned treatiestothiseect. Given that such wide ranging
internationally redistributive treaties have never been signed, A Theory of Justice provided a rationale for the
Western general publics impression that their duties to the global poor are, at most, those of charity . Rawls
fullexpressionofhisviewsinthisareacamenearlythreedecadeslaterin TheLawofPeoples.19 HereRawls againusesthenotionofa
transdomesticoriginal position,arguingthatitisan appropriate instrument for selecting laws to govern relations
betweenbothliberalsocietiesanddecentnonliberalsocieties,especially thosewhicharedecenthierarchicalsocieties,beingnonaggressive,
recognisingtheir citizenshumanrights,assigningwidelyacknowledgedadditionalrightsandduties, andbeingbackedbygenuineandnot
unreasonablebeliefsamongjudgesandother officialsthatthelawembodiesacommongoodideaofjustice.20 ThisSocietyof Peopleswould
agreetobeguidedbyeightprinciplesconstitutingthebasiccharterof theLawofPeoples.21
the receiving end of welfare may create the very divisions in society that the relational egalitarian seeks to
avoid. If government programs designed to help the poor stand in the way of citizens relating to each other
non-hierarchically, maybe we should abolish such programs in the interest of a society in which citizens stand as
equals.
367
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
368 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
rational social theory must appeal to commonvalues. By definition, those have not been respected when a
measure is forced upon certain people against their own values.
368
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
369 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
5. Inequality inevitablecapitalism
Stuart White 2k, ReviewArticle: Social Rights and the Social Contract Political Theory and the
New Welfare Politics Cambridge University Press, B.J.Pol.S. 30, 50753
How Much Equality of Opportunity Does Fair Reciprocity Require? I have presented only a very intuitive account of
the conditions of fair reciprocity; I have not formally presented a full conception of distributive justice and
demonstrated how each condition follows from this conception, something one might attempt in a lengthier analysis.
However, I do wish to examine one general philosophical issue that arises when we come to think about the
conditions of fair reciprocity. Assume that distributive justice is centrally about some form of equal opportunity.
The notion of equality of opportunity can, of course, be understood in a number of different ways. But assume, for the
moment, that we understand it in the radical form defended in contemporary egalitarian theories of distributive
justice.40 Equal opportunity in this sense requires, inter alia, that we seek to prevent or correct for inequalities in
income attributable to differences in natural ability and for inequalities in capability due to handicaps that people
suffer through no fault of their own. The question I wish to consider can then be put like this: How far must society
satisfy the demands of equal opportunity before we can plausibly say that all of its members have obligations
under the reciprocity principle? One view, which I shall call the full compliance view, is that the demands of equal
opportunity must be satised in full for it to be true that all citizens have obligations to make productive
contributions to the community under the reciprocity principle. The intuition is that people can have no obligation to
contribute in a signicant way to a community that is not (in all other relevant respects) fully just at least if they are
amongst those who are disadvantaged by their societys residual injustices. Reciprocity kicks in, as it were, only when
the terms of social co-operation are fair, where fairness requires (inter alia) full satisfaction of the demands of
equal opportunity. If equal opportunity is understood in our assumed sense, however, then this full compliance view
effectively removes the ideal of fair reciprocity from the domain of real-world politics. For there is no chance
that any advanced capitalist (or, for that matter, post-capitalist) society will in the near future satisfy equal
opportunity, in our assumed sense, in full. And so, following the full compliance view, we should, if we are
egalitarians in the assumed sense, simply abandon the idea that there can be anything like a universal civic
obligation to make a productive contribution to the community.
369
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
370 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
370
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
371 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Hierarchies Inevitable
Hierarchies are inevitable even after the redistribution of wealth
JanNarveson P.hD @ Harvard University 1997 Egalitarianism: Partial, Counterproductive
and BaselessBlackwell
Egalitarians can only defend their view by reference to values that manyormost people do not have. People
below the mid-point of the proposed redistributional scale will,ofcourse,havesome reason to rejoice at their
unearned egalitarian windfalls temporarily. Meanwhile, people from whom they are wrested have the
opposite motivation, so common good is out the window fromthestart. Nor can equality relevantly be held to
be an objectiveoranabsolutevalueavalueinitself,thatdoesntneedto beheldbyanybody(except
thetheoristhimself,ofcourse).That isintuitionaltalk,whichhasalreadybeendismissed.Do real people
(asopposedtotheorists)care about equality as such? No. They want betterandmorereliablefoodonthe
table, nicertablestoputiton,TVs, theatres, motorcars,books,medical services,churches,coursesin
Chinesehistory,andsoon,indefi nitely.Equality is irrelevant to these values: how much of any or all of
them anyone has is logically independent of how much anyone else has. People are rarely free of envy,tobe
sure.Most people would like to be better than others in some wayand somewillpayotherstoletthemlook
downonthem. But few will make themselves worse off in order to make some other people equally badly off.
Valuesthatcanbeimprovedbyhumanactivityarenotindependentinanyotherway,though,for
productioniscooperative, requiringarrangementsagreedtobyagreatmanypeoplework ers,financiers,
engineers,customers.Nobody can attain to wealth,insofarasthefreemarketobtains,without others likewise
benefiting.These are truisms,thoughIamawarethattheywillbe seenbymanyreadersasideological
even atthepresenttime, whentheabsurditiesofalternative views of economics have been socompletely
exposed.13
Equality is impossibleenvy
Jon Mandle 2k Reviwed: Liberalism, Justice, and Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality by
Colin M. Macleod The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 601-604 Duke
University Press. Jstor
Here, I can only illustrate one of Macleod's many distinct criticisms of Dworkin's use of idealized markets. Dworkin
argues that the initial division of resources (prior to adjustments made in light of differences in individual ambition)
should satisfy an "envy test": "No division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any
[person] would prefer someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle" (Dworkin 1981b, 285). And the
mechanism he proposes to satisfy this test is a hypothetical auction in which individuals bid on resources using some
counter (itself without value and equally distributed). This market-based solution values resources entirely in
terms of the preferences that individuals express in the auction. Macleod recognizes that a great strength of
Dworkin's auction is that it is sensitive to the opportunity costs to others of giving some re- source to a particular
individual. As Macleod helpfully points out, "The resources a person can acquire are a function not only of the
importance she attaches to them but also of the importance attached by others to them .... Phrased in the
language of opportunity costs, the auction ensures that aggregate opportunity costs are equal" (26).
371
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
372 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Egal = Envy
Distribution of benefits to equalize the impoverished is indefensible encourages envy and moral
disorientation.
Page 2007
Edward. Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach. Journal of
Global Ethics. Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2007, pgs 3-20.
Suppose, again, that the sufficiency level for all was 50. Whereas intrinsic egalitarianism seems, other things being equal, to
favour outcome (3) and prioritarianism would favour allocation (1), sufficientarianism would favour outcome (2) since this
would be the only outcome in which at least some people had enough. For the sufficientarian, the distribution of benefits
and burdens to achieve equality or priority in such circumstances is indefensible. It would be analogous to the tragedy
involved in a famine situation of giving food to those who cannot possibly survive at the cost of those that could survive if
they received extra rations. In this sense, the ideal of sufficiency is related to the medical concept of triage according to
which, when faced with more people requiring care than can be treated, resources are rationed so that the most needy receive
attention first. However, because the category of most needy is defined in terms of the overarching aim that as many people
as possible should survive a given emergency, triage protocols often lead to the very worst off being denied treatment for the
sake of benefitting those who can be helped to survive. Frankfurts view is that all distributive claims arise in some way from
an analysis of where people stand relative to the threshold of sufficiency, or as he puts it the threshold that separates lives
that are good from lives that are not good (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). Egalitarianism, by contrast, posits a relationship between
the urgency of a persons claims and their comparative well-being without reference to the level at which they would have
enough. Since allocating people enough to lead decent lives exhausts our duties of distribution, sufficientarians argue that
egalitarianism recognizes duties that do not exist. In fact, in linking ethical duties to the comparative fortunes of people ,
egalitarianism encourages envy and thereby contributes to the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time
(Frankfurt 1987, pp. 2223; Anderson 1999, pp. 287ff.).
372
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
373 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
fetishizes comparative wellbeing but rather that it fetishizes absolute well-being with the result that it mandates constant
interference in peoples lives to benefit the worst off. By doing so, prioritarianism is inclined to generate just as much envy
and pity as its egalitarian rival and to mandate a range of redistributions that do not help their recipients to lead decent lives.
Consider the following example. There are two groups in society, where one enjoys a considerably lower level of well-being
than the other, where both groups enjoy a far better than decent life, and where the inequalities are undeserved. We can call
these groups the very happy and the extremely happy. Egalitarians claim that, if we could do something about it, the very
happy group should be compensated for their relative well-being deficit. This is because this theory regards undeserved
inequality as bad even if everyone is at least very happy; that is, it makes no ethical difference that the inequality is between
groups, or persons, who are very well off. Prioritarians, by contrast, regard the very happy in isolation of their relative
happiness as they are only interested in absolute levels of well-being. Nonetheless, the very happy, as the worst off, deserve
our attention even if their lives are so good they want for nothing. According to sufficientarians, however, the egalitarian
and prioritarian claims are absurd. How can there be a duty to help the worst off, they ask, when they already lead
lives of such a high standard?
373
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
374 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Egal Biased
Egalitarian claims are biased
JanNarveson P.hD @ Harvard University 1997 Egalitarianism: Partial, Counterproductive
and BaselessBlackwell
Further reflectiononthis leads to an important further point against egalitarianism :that it is essentiallycertaintobe
counterproductive aswellto defeat the very values whose equalization is required by the theory. Forced transfers
from rich to poor,from capitaliststoproletarians,willworsenthe lot of the poor even as it decreases the wealth of
the rich. Not only is egalitarianism biased, but the particular people against whom it is biased are the
productivethe source of what the people it is biased in favour of hope to receive in consequenc e. It is not too
much to say, even, that egalitarianism is a conspiracy against those it claims to be trying to help.
374
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
375 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
375
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
376 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
consequences,andtheaverageelectedrepresentativeisprobably innobetterposition.Inspeculatingabout
longtermconsequences theymaybeinordinatelyswayedbyanynumberofprejudicesorpre conceived
ideas.When the truth does not present itself clearly, it is easy to seize on the evidence that supports one's
ideological presuppositions. The consequence of applying equality of fortune to the welfare debate is not
usefully neutral in the sense that it avoids blind ideological presuppositions or commitments. It is tragically
neutral inthe sensethat it providesdemocraticvotersandtheirrepresentativeswith no reason to challenge
theirblind ideological commitments.For equality of fortune would focus the debate on the empirical question
thatdid,infact,commandthelion'sshareofattention:Whichpolicy isbestforthepoor?Answerstothis
questionwillbedetermined by prejudice and mood more than reasoned deliberation or real debate. If this
consequence is inevitable, then the implications for the ideal of equality are dismal :it would appear impotent as
a political ideal,forit requiresdemocraticbodiestomakedecisionsbasedonspeculation abouteconomic
effectsoverthecourseofdecadesorevengenerations.
376
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
377 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
basic set of directives to which everyone ought to adhere,andby reference to which the conduct of anyone may
be called to account, could be wildly inegalitarian(as withslavemoralities.)Universality sameness of rules
for all is a defining feature of morals; egalitarianism is not.
377
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
378 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
378
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
379 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
whomitisbiasedaretheproductivethesourceofwhatthepeopleitisbiasedinfavourofhopeto receive
inconsequence.Itisnottoomuchtosay,even,thategalitarianismisaconspiracyagainstthoseitclaimsto
betryingtohelp. Thereisareasonforthis,whoseincomprehensionbyphilosopherseventothisday
shouldbeamatterofastonishment.Afree economyisoneinwhichnooneforciblyintervenesagainstthe
propertyrightsofanyotherallarefreetousetheirresourcesas theyjudgebest,includingengagingin
commercialexchanges.In suchasystem,theonlywaystoachievewealtharebymeanswhich improvethe
situationsofothers.Successfulbusinesspeoplebecome sobyorganizingorfinanciallysupportingthe
productionof thingsthatotherpeoplewant,andwantmorethantheexisting alternativessincethose
people,havingnoobligationtobuy, wouldnototherwisebuythem.Theonlyotherpossibilitiesare fairly
uninteresting:gift,andthediscoveryororiginalacquisitionofvaluablethings.Butgift,assuch,ispure
transferanddoes notcreatewealth,exceptintheformofgoodwill . We may praise occasional acts of
charity, but if everyone were only charitable and unproductive, all,including the poorandsick,would quickly
die. Andastoacquisition,if we would attain to wealth, those items must be harnessed to human usenature
does not afford a free lunchanymorethanourfellows.Evensomeonewho acquiredanaturalbeautyspot,
say,andkeepsitnatural,willbe abletomakeadecentlivingtherebyonlyifheisabletocharge othersfor
therighttoenjoythatspot.Andsoon.
379
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
380 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Utilitarian calculus not egalitarian doesnt act on the principle of intrinsic equality.
Page 2007
Edward. Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach. Journal of
Global Ethics. Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2007, pgs 3-20.
Perhaps the simplest theory of the pattern of justice is that benefits and burdens should be distributed across some population
so that inequality is minimized. We might call this view intrinsic egalitarianism as it holds that inequality is bad or unjust (I
use these terms interchangeably) in itself and not because of its consequences. As Temkin has put it, the essence of intrinsic
equality is that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own (Temkin 2003, p. 62). It is worth
contrasting intrinsic equality with some closely associated views. Utilitarians hold that acts and social policies should be
evaluated only in terms of their consequences and that these consequences ought to promote the maximum amount of welfare
possible. Depending on the circumstances the utilitarian may prefer an equal distribution of well-being because this coincides
with the desire to maximize welfare. The reason for this is that it is generally easier to help the worse off than othersone
only has to give them a little for their welfare level to improve a lot. In this sense, utilitarians are accidental, rather than
intrinsic, egalitarians.
380
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
381 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Inegal Solves
In-egalitarianism solves benefits trickle down
preferencesofthose people.11
381
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
382 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
382
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
383 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Sufficientarianism Good
The goal of the judge should not be to make sure each person is equal
rather ensure each person is sufficient
Yuko Hashimoto --ph.d. Japanese. Associate Professor of Economics. June 2005 What Matters is
Absolute Poverty, Not Relative Poverty http://www.cdams.kobe-u.ac.jp/archive/dp05-10.pdf
Therefore, sufficientarianism is an alternative to economic egalitarianism. Sufficientarianism presents the idea of
sufficiency as an alternative to the idea of economic equality. The essence of sufficientarianism is to show that the
idea of economic equality has no intrinsic value. According to sufficientarianism, when people consider what is
important for their own lives, the amount of goods owned by other people becomes irrelevant. Instead, comparison
with the amount of goods owned by others prevents people from seeking what they consider valuable for themselves.
It is unnecessary to attach moral significance to economic egalitarianism. While Frankfurt enumerates some
reasons for the failure of economic egalitarianism, he indicates that egalitarians do not actually defend the idea of
equality, as indicated by the priority view. In other words, egalitarians objections are not based on their moral
aversion to a person holding a smaller amount of goods as compared to other people. In reality, their objection
is to the fact that the person owns only a remarkably small amount of goods. This naturally gives rise to the
following questions. What does sufficiency imply? What is the standard of sufficiency? Although Frankfurt does not
define the meaning of sufficiency in concrete terms, it does not imply that sufficientarianism is pointless. Indeed, the
meaning of sufficiency can be defined in various ways. However, the essence of sufficientarianism is to seek what
one finds valuable in his/her life and not compare the amount of goods one owns with that of others; this is
crucial to judge sufficiency.
383
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
384 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Sufficientarianism Good
Egalitarianism fosters never-ending comparison and obligation a sufficientarian framework
should take precedence.
Page 2007
Edward. Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach. Journal of
Global Ethics. Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2007, pgs 3-20.
In contrast to egalitarians and prioritarians, some theorists, such as Harry Frankfurt, hold that benefits and burdens should be
distributed in line with the doctrine of sufficiency. This states that as many people as possible should have enough (of the
currency of justice adopted) to pursue the aims and aspirations they care about over a whole life; and that this aim has
lexical priority over other ideals of justice (Frankfurt 1987, pp. 2143; 1997, pp. 314). Attaining what we really care
about, for Frankfurt, requires a certain level of well-being, but once this level is reached there is no further relationship
between how well-off a person is and whether they discover and fulfil what it is that they really care about. Frankfurt holds
that, above the level of sufficiency, it is neither reasonable to seek a higher standard of living nor expect, as amatter of justice,
any additional allocation of some currency of justice to further improve their prospects. It is important to add that having
enough is not the same as living a tolerable life in the sense that one does not regret ones existence. Rather it means a
person leads a life that contains no substantial dissatisfaction. According to Frankfurt, the flaw in intrinsic egalitarianism
lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either
of them has (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34). What matters, Frankfurt argues, is not that everyone should have the same but that
each should have enough. If everyone had enough it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than
others (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21; original emphasis). This does not mean, however, that egalitarian and prioritarian concerns
will always frustrate sufficiency since each and every person should be helped to the threshold of sufficiency if possible, and
those who can be helped to lead a decent life are often among the worst off in a population. But the aim of reducing
inequality, or of improving the position of the worst off, has no intrinsic value for sufficientarians.
384
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
385 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Sufficientarian Perm
Moderate sufficentarianism offers a pluralist approach to justice which maximizes contextual
equality.
Page 2007
Edward. Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach. Journal of
Global Ethics. Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2007, pgs 3-20.
One way of responding to the problems raised by these two examples would be to construct a pluralist approach to
distributive justice. Pluralism, in this context, means that we would appeal to contrasting ideals in different contexts (Daniels
1996, p. 208). There are three possibilities, which I can only sketch here. First, the ideals could apply in different distributive
circumstances. For example, we might give lexical priority to sufficiency when at least some can be brought up to the
threshold, but appeal to equality or priority when all are above, or all below, the threshold (Crisp 2003, pp. 758ff.). Second,
sufficiency might be allocated non-lexical priority over other values so that large gains in these values will sometimes
outweigh lesser gains in sufficiency. Arneson has usefully labeled this moderate sufficientarianism (Arneson 2006, p. 28).
The strength of this view is that it can explain why we should opt for (2) over (1) since it offers tremendous gains in both
equality and priority with no adverse impact on sufficiency. Similarly, though more controversially, moderate
sufficientarians have at least some reason to opt for (4) over (3) since great benefits arise, in terms of equality and priority, if
we ignore the sufficiency of the few for the prize of giving major benefits to the many. Third, we might subsume one ideal
under another while attributing some degree of intrinsic value to the subsumed ideal. Sufficientarians generally view
inequality as regrettable because of its consequences, such as the way in which it inhibits economic growth, undermines
political processes, or is a malign influence on cultural life. Yet, there is a more subtle way that inequality matters. This is that
some people might fail to reach the standards of a decent life if they are continually faced with the discomfiture that many
others are far better off. Similarly, some people might fall below the threshold of sufficiency if they begin to enjoy life less as
a result of identifying with the resentment of others who are worse off (Marmor 2003, pp. 127ff).
385
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
386 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**AGENCIES**
386
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
387 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
387
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
388 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
388
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
389 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
children
seeking
asylum
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/127345_juv19.html.
Responsibility of care for unaccompanied immigrant children was transferred in March from the INS to the Office of
Refugee Relocation a division of the Administration of Children and Families in the Department of Health and Human
Services.
389
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
390 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Agriculture Department
Agriculture department has internal problems and performance gaps
GAO-09-650T 6/29/09 U.S. Department of Agriculture: Recommendations and Options Available to the New
Administration and Congress to Address Long-Standing Civil Rights Issues Summary
ASCR's difficulties in resolving discrimination complaints persist--ASCR has not achieved its goal of preventing
future backlogs of complaints. At a basic level, the credibility of USDA's efforts has been and continues to be
undermined by ASCR's faulty reporting of data on discrimination complaints and disparities in ASCR's data. Even such
basic information as the number of complaints is subject to wide variation in ASCR's reports to the public and the Congress.
Moreover, ASCR's public claim in July 2007 that it had successfully reduced a backlog of about 690 discrimination
complaints in fiscal year 2004 and held its caseload to manageable levels, drew a questionable portrait of progress. By July
2007, ASCR officials were well aware they had not succeeded in preventing future backlogs--they had another backlog on
hand, and this time the backlog had surged to an even higher level of 885 complaints. In fact, ASCR officials were in the
midst of planning to hire additional attorneys to address that backlog of complaints including some ASCR was holding dating
from the early 2000s that it had not resolved. In addition, some steps ASCR had taken may have actually been counterproductive and affected the quality of its work. For example, an ASCR official stated that some employees' complaints had
been addressed without resolving basic questions of fact, raising concerns about the integrity of the practice. Importantly,
ASCR does not have a plan to correct these many problems. USDA has published three annual reports--for fiscal years 2003,
2004, and 2005--on the participation of minority farmers and ranchers in USDA programs, as required by law. USDA's
reports are intended to reveal the gains or losses that these farmers have experienced in their participation in USDA
programs. However, USDA considers the data it has reported to be unreliable because they are based on USDA employees'
visual observations about participant's race and ethnicity, which may or may not be correct, especially for ethnicity. USDA
needs the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to collect more reliable data. ASCR started to seek
OMB's approval in 2004, but as of May 2008 had not followed through to obtain approval. ASCR staff will meet again on
this matter in May 2008. GAO found that ASCR's strategic planning is limited and does not address key steps needed to
achieve the Office's mission of ensuring USDA provides fair and equitable services to all customers and upholds the civil
rights of its employees. For example, a key step in strategic planning is to discuss the perspectives of stakeholders. ASCR's
strategic planning does not address the diversity of USDA's field staff even though ASCR's stakeholders told GAO that such
diversity would facilitate interaction with minority and underserved farmers. Also, ASCR could better measure performance
to gauge its progress in achieving its mission. For example, it counts the number of participants in training workshops as part
of its outreach efforts rather than access to farm program benefits and services. Finally, ASCR's strategic planning does not
link levels of funding with anticipated results or discuss the potential for using performance information for
identifying USDA's performance gaps.
390
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
391 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
abortions. But federal laws also protec[t] the rights of patients to legal health care." It continues that the
new rule would "choose the former over the latter, and also remove protections for the 584,294 federally
funded medical entities -- hospitals, doctors' offices and pharmacies -- that might find it an 'undue
burden' to pay employees who refuse to do the work for which they were hired." According to the
editorial, it will cost about $44 million annually for medical entities to certify compliance with the rule,
which "doesn't include the cost in pain and confusion, and maybe litigation, that would come with
allowing health care workers to decide who is worthy of receiving what care." The editorial continues
that the rule demonstrates that the Bush administration "doesn't care about the objections of doctors or
hospitals or patients -- but what about the approximately 70 million Americans who voted Nov. 4 to let
Barack Obama lead the nation? Apparently, they don't matter either." To undo the regulation, Congress could
"resort" to using the Congressional Review Act, "which has been used only once," the editorial says. The other
option would be for incoming HHS Secretary Tom Daschle to "restart the rule-making process," which
would "take months ," according to the editorial. It adds, "The Obama team has signaled that it is ready to
go this route, with the inevitable political divisiveness -- and who knows how many individuals who
won't get the health care or information they need?" The editorial concludes that the HHS rule provides
"[m]ore proof that George W. Bush's historic unpopularity is the only thing he's ever earned"
(Philadelphia Daily News, 12/18).
HHS is to large to be effective
GAO, March 18, 1997 Department of Health and Human Services: Management Challenges and Opportunities
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97098t.pdf
In summary, the first challenge HHS faces is its ability to define its mission, objectives, and measures of success and
increase its accountability to taxpayers. Because of the size and scope of its mission and the resulting organizational
complexity, managing and coordinating HHS programs so that the public gets the best possible results are especially
difficult. The Department has eleven operating divisions responsible for more than 300 diverse programs. HHS has
not always succeeded in managing the wide range of activities its agencies carry out or fixing accountability for
meeting the goals of its mission. Another complicating factor is that HHS needs to work with the governments of the
50 states and the District of Columbia to implement its programs, in addition to thousands of private- sector
grantees. Developing better ways of managing is essential if HHS is to meet its goals.
391
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
392 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Department of Education
The DOE is a total failure
Cato Cato Handbook for Congress 2003 http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/index.html
The inevitable pattern of bureaucracy is to grow bigger and bigger. The Department of Education should be
eliminated now, before it evolves into an even larger entity consuming more and more resources that could be better
spent by parents themselves. 7. The $47.6 billion spent each year by the Department of Education could be much better
spent if it were simply returned to the American people in the form of a tax cut. Parents themselves could then decide how
best to spend that money. 8. The Department of Education has a record of waste and abuse. For example, the
department reported losing track of $450 million during three consecutive General Accounting Office audits. 9. The
Department of Education is an expensive failure that has added paperwork and bureaucracy but little value to the
nations classrooms.
392
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
393 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
393
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
394 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Department of Interior
Infrastructure problems prevent DOI productivity
GAO Department of Interior Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Interior also faces a challenge in adequately maintaining its facilities and infrastructure. The department owns, builds,
purchases, and contracts services for assets such as visitor centers, schools, office buildings, roads, bridges, dams, irrigation
systems, and reservoirs; however, repairs and maintenance on these facilities have not been adequately funded. The
deterioration of facilities can impair public health and safety, reduce employees morale and productivity, and increase
the need for costly major repairs or early replacement of structures and equipment. In November 2008, the department
estimated that the deferred maintenance backlog for fiscal year 2008 was between $13.2 billion and $19.4 billion (see
table 1). Interior is not alone in facing daunting maintenance challenges. In fact, we have identified the management of
federal real property, including deferred maintenance issues, as a government wide high-risk area since 2003.23
394
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
395 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
395
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
396 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
B. Not only is federal aid insufficient, but it creates dependency and ruins local economies
GAO Department of Interior Tuesday, March 3, 2009
In December 2006, we reported on serious economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges facing American
Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.16 The economic
challenges stem from dependence on a few key industries, scarce natural resources, small domestic markets, limited
infrastructure, shortages of skilled labor, and reliance on federal grants to fund basic services. In addition, efforts to meet
formidable fiscal challenges and build strong economies are hindered by financial reporting that does not provide
timely and complete information to management and oversight officials for decision making. As a result of these
problems, numerous federal agencies have designated these governments as high- risk grantee s. To increase the
effectiveness of the federal governments assistance to these island communities, we recommended, among other things,
that the department increase coordination activities with other federal grant-making agencies on issues of common concern
relating to the insular area governments. The department agreed with our recommendations, stating that they were
consistent with OIAs top priorities and ongoing activities. We will continue to monitor OIAs actions on our
recommendations.
396
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
397 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
397
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
398 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Department of labor
Falls under the department of labor
Department of Labor July 6, 2009
III.
DOL
Mission
and
Agency
Functions
http://www.dol.gov/osbp/pubs/dolbuys/mission.htm
The Department's many activities affect virtually every man, woman, and child in our country. Such activities include
protecting the wages, health and safety, employment, and pension rights of working people; promoting equal
employment opportunity; providing job training, unemployment insurance and workers' compensation; strengthening
free collective bargaining; and collecting, analyzing, and publishing labor statistics. Although created to help working people,
the Department's services and information benefit many other groups such as employers, business organizations, civil rights
groups, government agencies at all levels, and the academic community. Its enforcement activities and job training services,
in particular, affect large numbers of people who are not currently working. As the Department seeks to assist all
Americans who need and want work, special efforts are made to meet the unique job market requirements of older workers,
youths minority group members, women, the disabled, and other groups.
398
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
399 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Department of Justice
Lack of data sharing hampers effectiveness
Office of the Inspector General , March 2009 The Department of Justices litigation case management system
Audit Report 09-22 http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0922/final.pdf.
Each of the Departments litigating divisions currently maintains its own case management system, which is not able
to share information with other systems in the Department. As a result, these divisions cannot efficiently share
information or produce comprehensive reports among the divisions. separate systems also hamper the ability of the
litigating divisions to collaborate and limit the timeliness and quality of case information available to Department
leadership.
399
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
400 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Performance problems
GAOMarch2009 Environmental Protection Agency http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09434.pdf
While EPA has made some progress in improving its operations, many of the same issues still remain. EPAs mission is,
without question, a difficult one: its policies and programs affect virtually all segments of the economy, society, and
government, and it is in the unenviable position of enforcing myriad inherently controversial environmental laws and
maintaining a delicate balance between the benefits to public health and the environment with the cost to industry and
others. Nevertheless, the repetitive and persistent nature of the shortcomings we have observed over the years points
to serious challenges for EPA to effectively implement its programs. Until it addresses these long-standing challenges,
EPA is unlikely to be able to respond effectively to much larger emerging challenge s, such as climate change. Facing
these challenges head-on will require a sustained commitment by agency leadership. As a new administration takes office
and begins to chart the agencys course, it will be important for Congress and EPA to continue to focus on the issues we
have identified.
400
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
401 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Epidemic
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/21/3/57
In
Africa:
Implications
For
U.S.
Policy
In response, the focus of U.S. government activities toward HIV/AIDS has shifted away from a domestic orientation
toward an increasingly international focus. The Office of National AIDS Policy now has an explicit international
focus. Although the African epidemic is now the worst, the potential exists for an epidemic of similar magnitude in Asia over
the next decade. Emerging epidemics in the Caribbean and Latin America are smaller in scale but closer to home.
401
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
402 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
402
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
403 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
ICE
Immigration courts are brutally unfair and clog the system
Brad Heath 3/29/2009 Immigration courts face huge backlog USA TODAY
WASHINGTON The nation's immigration courts are now so clogged that nearly 90,000 people accused of being in
the United States illegally waited at least two years for a judge to decide whether they must leave, one of the last
bottlenecks in a push to more strictly enforce immigration laws. Their cases identified by a USA TODAY review of the
courts' dockets since 2003 are emblematic of delays in the little-known court system that lawyers, lawmakers and others
say is on the verge of being overwhelmed. Among them were 14,000 immigrants whose cases took more than five years to
decide and a few that took more than a decade. "It's an indication that they just don't have enough resources," says Kerri
Sherlock Talbot of the American Immigration Lawyers Association. Some immigration courts are now so backlogged that
just putting a case on a judge's calendar can take more than a year, says Dana Marks, an immigration judge in San
Francisco and president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. "You could have a case that would take an hour
(to hear). But I can't give you that hour of time for 14 months," Marks says. In the most extreme cases, immigrants can
remain locked up while their cases are delayed. More often, the backlogs leave them struggling to exist until they learn
their fate, Marks and others say. The immigration courts, run by the Justice Department, have weathered years of
criticism that their 224 judges are unable to handle a flood of increasingly-complicated cases. Justice Department
spokeswoman Susan Eastwood acknowledges some long delays, but says that's often the result of unusual circumstances. She
says the department has enough judges.
403
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
404 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
404
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
405 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
405
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
406 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
**INTERNATIONAL LAW**
406
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
407 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Charney03 [10/03JonathanI.Charney,OftheBoardofEditors.Supportforthispaperwas
providedbytheVanderbiltUniversitySchoolofLaw.Researchassistancewasprovidedby
JenniferMcGinty,J.D.VanderbiltUniversity,1993.UniversalInternationalLaw,Lexis]
Toresolvesuchproblems,itmaybenecessarytoestablishnewrulesthatarebindingonallsubjectsof
internationallawregardlessoftheattitudeofanyparticularstate.For unlessallstatesarebound,an
exemptedrecalcitrantstatecouldactasaspoilerfortheentireinternationalcommunity .Thus,statesthat
arenotboundbyinternationallawsdesignedtocombatuniversalenvironmentalthreatscouldbecome
havensfortheharmfulactivitiesconcerned.Suchstatesmighthaveaneconomicadvantageoverstates
thatareboundbecausetheywouldnothavetobearthecostsoftherequisiteenvironmentalprotection.
They would be free riders on the system and would benefit from the environmentally protective
measures introduced by others at some cost. Furthermore, the example of such free riders might
underminethesystembyencouragingotherstatesnottoparticipate,andcouldthusderailtheentire
effort.Similarly,inthecaseofinternationalterrorism,onestatethatservesasasafehavenforterrorists
canthreatenall.Warcrimes,apartheidorgenocidecommittedinonestatemight threateninternational
peaceandsecurityworldwide. Consequently,forcertaincircumstancesitmaybeincumbentontheinternationalcommunityto
establish international law that is binding on all states regardless of any one state's disposition. Unfortunately, the traditions of the
internationallegalsystemappeartoworkagainsttheabilitytolegislateuniversalnorms.Statesaresaidtobesovereign,thusableto
determineforthemselveswhattheymustormaydo.Stateautonomycontinuestoservetheinternationalsystemwellintraditionalspheres
ofinternationalrelations.Thefreedomofstatestocontroltheirowndestiniesandpolicieshassubstantialvalue:itpermitsdiversityandthe
choicebyeachstateofitsownsocialpriorities.Few,ifany,statesfavoraworldgovernmentthatwoulddictateuniformbehaviorforall.
Consequently,manywritersusethelanguageofautonomywhentheydeclarethatinternationallawrequirestheconsentofthestatesthat
aregovernedbyit.Manytakethepositionthatastatethatdoesnotwishtobeboundbyanewruleofinternationallawmayobjecttoitand
beexemptedfromitsapplication.Ifsovereigntyandautonomyprevailedinallareasofinternationallaw,however,onecouldhardlyhope
todeveloprulestobindallstates.Inacommunityofnearlytwohundreddiversestates,itisvirtuallyimpossibletoobtaintheacceptanceof
alltoanynorm,particularlyonethatrequiressignificantexpensesorchangesinbehavior.Completeautonomymayhavebeenacceptable
inthepastwhennostatecouldtakeactionsthatwouldthreatentheinternationalcommunityasawhole.Today,theenormousdestructive
potentialofsomeactivitiesandtheprecariousconditionofsomeobjectsofinternationalconcernmakefullautonomyundesirable,ifnot
potentiallycatastrophic.InthisarticleIexplorethelimitsofstateautonomytodeterminewhethersomeorallofinternationallawmaybe
madeuniversallybindingregardlessofthepositionofoneorasmallnumberofunwillingstates.Toaccomplishthisobjective,Ibeginby
analyzingthesecondaryrulesofrecognition(thedoctrineofsources)usedtoestablishprimaryrulesofinternationallaw.Whiletreaties
mayrequiretheconsentofindividualstatestobebindingonthem,suchconsentisnotrequiredforcustomarynorms.Finally,Iexplorein
greaterdepththeactualprocessesbywhichmanycustomarylawnormshavecomeintobeinginthelasthalfofthetwentiethcentury.The
contemporaryprocessthatisoftenusedissignificantlydifferentfromthatdescribedintheclassictreatisesontheformationofcustomary
law. Contemporary procedural developments place the international legal system closer to the more formal notions of positive law,
facilitatingthedevelopmentofuniversalinternationallaw.Theseproceduraldevelopmentsstrengthentheargumentthatthesystemmay
establishgeneralinternationallawbindingonallstates,regardlessoftheobjectionofasmallnumberofstates.Likemanyothers,Itakethe
positionthatthereexistsaninternationallegalsystemwithstandardsandproceduresformaking,applyingandenforcinginternationallaw.
n6Asajurisprudentialmatter,thesourceoftheobligationtoabidebyinternationallawisamatterofdebate.Perhapsthemostpopular
theoryisthatstatesbecomeboundtotheinternationallegalsystemonthebasisofasocialcontract,actualconsentortacitconsent. n7
Othertheoriesdispensewithconsentasthesourceofastate'sobligationtoabidebyinternationallaw.Theprincipalonesmaintain(1)that
naturallawimposesadutyonthoselocatedwithintheterritorialscopeofthelegalsystemtoabidebyit,especiallywhenitislegitimate
andjust;n8(2)thatprinciplesoffairplayorgratitudebindthosewhobenefitfromthelegalsystemtoabidebyitsrules; n9and(3)that
utilitarianconsiderationsbasedonthevalueoftheruleorofthesystemtoindividualsobligatethemtoabidebythelaw.n10Depending
uponthetheory,theconsentofstatesmayormaynotbefoundattherootofallinternationallaw.Bethatasitmay,thesystemof
internationallawservesthepracticalinterestsofstates. Asistrueofallsocieties,theinternationalcommunityhasa
needforrulestoimpartadegreeoforder,predictabilityandstabilitytorelationsamongitsmembers.
The rules of the system also permit members to avoid conflict and injury, and promote beneficial
407
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
408 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
reciprocal and cooperative relations. They may even promote values of justice and morality. The
internationallegalsystemissupportednotonlybystates'interestsinpromotingindividualrules,but
alsobytheirinterestsinpreservingandpromotingthesystemasawhole.Thus,statescollectivelyand
severally maintain an interest in encouraging lawabiding behavior. There is also an effective
decentralized system for imposing sanctions on violators of the law through individual state and
collectiveactsof
408
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
409 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
Shaw01[10/3/01MartinShawProfessorofInternationalRelationsandPoliticsattheUniversityof
Sussex.Theunfinishedglobalrevolution:intellectualsandthenewpoliticsofinternationalrelations
http://www.martinshaw.org/unfinished.pdf]
Thenewpoliticsofinternationalrelationsrequireus,therefore,togobeyondtheantiimperialismoftheintellectualleftas
wellasofthesemianarchisttraditionsoftheacademicdiscipline.Weneedtorecognizethreefundamentaltruths.First,in
thetwentyfirstcenturypeoplestrugglingfordemocraticlibertiesacrossthenonWesternworldarelikelytomakeconstant
demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these
movements.TheydeservetheunstintingsupportofintellectualsintheWest.Second,theoldinternationalthinkinginwhich
democraticmovementsareseenaspurelyinternaltostatesnolongercarriesconvictiondespitethelingeringnostalgiaforit
onboththeAmericanrightandtheantiAmericanleft.Theideathatglobalprinciplescanandshouldbeenforcedworldwide
isfirmlyestablishedinthemindsofhundredsofmillionsofpeople.Thisconsciousnesswillapowerfulforceinthecoming
decades.Third,globalstateformationisafact.Internationalinstitutionsarebeingextended,and(likeitornot)theyhavea
symbioticrelationwiththemajorcentreofstatepower,theincreasinglyinternationalisedWesternconglomerate.Thesuccess
oftheglobaldemocraticrevolutionarywavedependsfirstonhowwellitisconsolidatedineachnationalcontextbut
second,howthoroughlyitisembeddedininternationalnetworksofpower,atthecentreofwhich,inescapably,istheWest.
Fromonthesepoliticalfundamentals,strategicpropositionscanbederived.First,democraticmovementscannotregardnon
governmentalorganisationsandcivilsocietyasendsinthemselves.Theymustaimtociviliselocalstates,renderingthem
open,accountableandpluralistic,andcurtailthearbitraryandviolentexerciseofpower.Second,democratisinglocalstatesis
notaseparatetaskfromintegratingthemintoglobalandoftenWesterncentrednetworks.Reproducingisolatedlocalcentres
ofpowercarrieswithitclassicdangersofstatesascentresofwar.84 Embe
ddingglobalnormsandintegratingnewstate
centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way: the
proliferationofpurelynationaldemocraciesisnotarecipeforpeace.)Third,whiletheglobalrevolutioncannotdowithout
theWestandtheUN,neithercanitrelyonthemunconditionally.Weneedthesepowernetworks,butweneedtotamethem
too,tomaketheirmessybureaucraciesenormouslymoreaccountableandsensitivetotheneedsofsocietyworldwide. This
willinvolvethekindofcosmopolitandemocracyarguedforbyDavidHeld85.Itwillalsorequireustoadvanceaglobal
socialdemocratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate
problem:socialandeconomicreformisanessentialingredientofalternativestowarlikeandgenocidalpower ;thesefeedoff
and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth, if
we need the globalWestern state, if we want to
democratiseitandmakeitsinstitutionsfriendliertoglobalpeaceandjustice,wecannotbeindifferenttoitsstrategicdebates.
Itmatterstodevelopinternationalpoliticalinterventions,legalinstitutionsandrobustpeacekeepingasstrategicalternatives
tobombingourwaythroughzonesofcrisis.Itmattersthatinternationalinterventionsupportspluraliststructures ,ratherthan
ratifyingBosniastyleapartheid.86AspoliticalintellectualsintheWest,weneedtohaveoureyesontheballatourfeet,but
wealsoneedtoraisethemtothehorizon.Weneedtograspthehistoricdramathatistransformingworldwiderelationships
betweenpeopleandstate,aswellasbetweenstateandstate.Weneedtothinkabouthowtheturbulenceoftheglobal
revolutioncanbeconsolidatedindemocratic,pluralist,internationalnetworksofbothsocialrelationsandstateauthority.We
cannotbesimplyoptimisticaboutthisprospect.Sadly,itwillrequirerepeatedviolentpoliticalcrisestopushWesternand
othergovernmentstowardstherequiredrestructuringofworldinstitutions.87WhatIhaveoutlinedisahugechallenge;but
thealternativeistoseetheglobalrevolutionsplutterintopartialdefeat,ordegenerateintonewgenocidalwarsperhapseven
nuclearconflicts.Thepracticalchallengeforallconcernedcitizens,andthetheoreticalandanalyticalchallengesforstudents
ofinternationalrelationsandpolitics,areintertwined.
409
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
410 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
410
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
411 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
411
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
412 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
412
Dowling Debate
2008-2009
File Name
413 /413
Nelson
<tournament>
In short, the United States, like all other states, is bound by international law; but, like all other states, it
is also entitled to interpret international law for itself. Whether the U.S. or any other state has been
reasonable in its interpretation is ultimately a political determination.
413