PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON.

DOMINGO PANIS,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo
City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG,Respondents.
Facts:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not
charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person
in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed,
there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The trial court granted this argument. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the
prosecution.

Issue: Whether the number of persons dealt with is an essential ingredient of the
act of recruitment and placement of workers
Ruling:
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and
placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two
or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the
petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only
where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts
mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and are
not necessarily for profit.Neither interpretation is acceptable. According to the
Court, the proviso should speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the
purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts
mentioned in the basic rule.
The Court ruled that the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on

the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons
to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in
the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring (of) workers."The number of persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and
placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely
lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of
recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the trial court are set aside and the four informations
against the private respondent reinstated.
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ
Facts:
In April 1993, eight informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment
and eight informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses
Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl
spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez
remained at large.
The complainants namely, Narcisa Autor de Hernandez, Leonora Perez,
Melanie Bautista Annaliza Perez, Edwin Coling, Estela Abel de Manalo, Anicel
Umahon and Charito Balmes have their own similar stories about the illegal
recruitment conducted by the accused-appellants. They recounted that accused
Hernandez was the one convincing each of them to apply for employment abroad.
Accused Hernandez asked for the payment for the processing of their papers,
travel documents and visas. Complainants then were introduced by Hernandez to
spouse Reichl who in turn promised them for employment abroad. The spouse
issued reciept for the payments made by the complainants. The promises of
employment however did not pushed through and the complainants remained in
the Phillippines. Upon demands, the accused spouse promise them to refund the
payment if their employments never materialized. These agreements were
reduced into a document but the accused spouse never complies with their

obligations. There was also a certification from the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and
Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither licensed nor
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
As for their part, the spouse denied any of involvement of Hernandez's
recruitment and their knowledge of promises for overseas employment. They
further contended that they cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment committed
in large scale as the several information were only filed by single complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants were guilty of syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment.
Held:
They cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Where
only one complainant filed individual complaints as in this case, there is no illegal
recruitment in large scale. However, they are guilty of syndicated illegal
recruitment. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme
defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been
shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with
each other in convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and
giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy
although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, the accused-appellants are liable
for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
People of the Philippines (petitioner) v Jamilosa (repondent)
GR No. 169076 January 23, 2007
Callejo, Sr.,:
FACTS:
Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing to
have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport
workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein
complainants, namely, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E.
Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home
and Care Center.

Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba, Geraldine

Lagman and Alma Singh.
According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her way
to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant introduced himself
as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. Appellant told her he could help
her get employed as nurse. Appellant gave his pager number and instructed her
to contact him is shes interested. Sometime in January 1996, appellant fetched
her at her office, went to her house and gave him the necessary documents and
handed to appellant the amount of US$300.00 and the latter showed her a
photocopy of her supposed US visa. However, the appellant did not issue a
receipt for the said money. Thereafter, appellant told her to resign from her work
because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for USA on Feb,
1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to show up. Instead, called
and informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because she had
to go to province because his wife died. Trying to contact him to the supposed
residence and hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail.
Winess Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January 1996,
she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that time Bamba
informed her that she was going to meet to appellant. Bamba invited Lagman to
go with her. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad. On
their next meeting, Lagman handed to the latter the necessary documents and an
amount of US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label without any receipt issued by
the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company called her
because her number was appearing in appellants cell phone documents. The
caller is trying to locate him as he was a swindler. She became suspicious and
told Bamba about the matter. One week before her scheduled flight, appellant
told her he could not meet them because his mother passed away.
Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first
met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to
her. Appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her
US visa. On their next meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter,
she gave P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They
paged the appellant through his beeper to set up another appointment but the
appellant avoided them as he had many things to do.
The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never told
Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that she wanted to

leave SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba
called him several times, seeking advices from him. He started courting Bamba
and went out dating until latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh
thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad, lest
he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign separate
certifications, all to effect that he never recruited them and no money was
involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him because they
quarreled and separated.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale
HELD:

Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided, That
any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to
prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34
of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused
committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. As
gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the
trial court and the appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full

probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to

prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are
conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored,
misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or
document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have received money
and liquor does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money
or other valuables given as consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter
is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that
the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused
promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment.
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.
480 SCRA 146 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the
termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and separate employment
contract.
Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by
Sunace International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract.
Such employment was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund
Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her
employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.
When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against
Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three
months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her
employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on
the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable
thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed
the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace,
to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the
principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made
with the knowledge and consent of Sunace

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound
under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy
thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of
Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the
New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied
revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the
termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment
contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is
revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent,
dealing directly with third persons.

HELD:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication
was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message
written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the
foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the
execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not
provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld
savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the
contract.
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given
to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign
employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing
about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to
assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons
issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory
conference following Montehermozos filing of the complaint on February 14,
2000.
Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign
principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously,
the act of its principal extending [Montehermozos] employment contract
necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of
imputed knowledge.

PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc v. NLRC (December 14, 2006)

Facts
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as seaman by PCL Shipping Philippines for and
in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine. Rusel thereby joined the vessel
MV Cemtex for 12 months with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living
allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per month, vacation
leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as
a consequence thereof, he suffered a broken/sprained ankle on his left foot. A
request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On
August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the
vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where
he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel
from the hospital and was required to board a plane bound for the Philippines. On
September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages
against PCL Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the

NLRC. In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by
jumping off the vessel.

within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.

Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the
complainant. NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor
Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working
within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by
and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the
Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing
rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a seafarer,
the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be
dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a written
notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal
investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a
representative. Hence, the employer should strictly comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of
employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with
these twin requirements.

Issue: Whether or not respondent was guilty of desertion to justify his

dismissal.
Held: No
For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be
evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to
perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not
returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to
present clear and convincing proof to show that when private respondent jumped
ship, he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped
off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical
assistance for the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to
conclude that he had the intention of deserting his post.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution as well as the
Labor Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees
working abroad.
Held: Yes, it does.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the
charges against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give
him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment is

Wherefore, the petition is partly granted. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated
December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are affirmed with
modification to the effect that the award of US$1620.00 representing private
respondent's three months salary is reduced to US$1200.00. The award of
US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance, overtime pay,
vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof,
an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living
allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with pay for the same period.