Relevant Laws and Cases

(Re: Mayors Authority without Court Order)

CHAPTER 3 - OFFICIALS AND OFFICES COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES Article

One. - The Municipal Mayor
SECTION 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The
municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers
and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall:
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code,particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or
to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any
law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure
within the period prescribed by law or ordinance;

xxx

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations: (a) When
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. In the execution of
eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following
shall be mandatory: (1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior
to the date of eviction or demolition; (2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with
the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in
the areas where they are to be relocated; (3) Presence of local government officials or their
representatives during eviction or demolition; (4) Proper identification of all persons taking part
in the demolition; (5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from
Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise; (6)
No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of

concrete materials; (7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall
occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National
Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days
from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be
executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period,
financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied
by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit
concerned. This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
to carry out the above provision.

Sec. 29. Resettlement. Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the local
government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall implement the
relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the National
Housing Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities
and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the
affected families.

Sec. 30. Prohibition Against New Illegal Structures. It shall be unlawful for any person to
construct any structure in areas mentioned in the preceding section. After the effectivity of this
Act, the barangay, municipal or city government units shall prevent the construction of any kind
of illegal dwelling units of structures within their respective localities. The head of any local
government unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise tolerates the construction of any
structure in violation of this section shall be liable to administrative sanctions under existing laws
and to penal sanctions provided for in this Act.

CASES:
City Engineer of Baguio and Hon. Mauricio Domogan vs. Rolando Baniqued, G.R.
No. 150270, November 26, 2008.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to
hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective
order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This

power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders
against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized
committees within its respective municipalities or cities.
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of
issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as
well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished,
property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as
provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these
functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Moreno, in
his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines quasi-judicial function as applying
to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA
458 [1986]). Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise
of quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.

Extrajudicial Abatement of Nuisance

Caliplip, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 150194, March 6, 2007.

Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners contention that the subject demolition
is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a
common right.[42] In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of
law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per se,
or those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity.[43] Petitioners claim that the public market would pose
danger to the safety and health of schoolchildren if it were built on the place being contested.
[44]

However, petitioners never made known their supposed concerns either to the Governor or to

the CEB. Instead, they took the law into their own hands and precipitately demolished the

subject structures that were built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the
proper authority, which in this case is the CEB.

Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014.
a. The hotels classification as a nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.12
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a
determination that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local
council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No buildzones are intended
for the protection of the public because the stability ofthe grounds foundation is adversely
affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also
justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the areas exposure to
potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan
should be afforded.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents actuations, petitioner posits that the hotel
cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million pesoworth of capital infused in the venture. Citing Asilo, Jr. v. People,13 petitioner also argues that
respondents should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
Preliminarily, We agree with petitioners posture that the property involved cannot be classified
as a nuisance per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the
litmus test for such a determination. More controlling is the propertys nature and conditions,
which should be evaluated to see if it qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisanceper se and nuisanceper
accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is thatwhich depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated
without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.14
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per sesince this type of
nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all
timesand under any circumstances, regardless of locationor surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the
hotels particular incidentits locationand not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.

Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could
have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is
not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

b. Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of

illegal constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se.16 So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:17
We agree with petitioners contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered
to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears
stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance
per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular
thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not
such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing, be in
fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)
Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case
that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,18 property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawfulbusinesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.19
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments,
acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function asthe executive official of the
town; it has also been endowed with authorityto hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20Pertinent herein is
Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing tosecure the necessary permits, to wit:
Section 444.The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
xxxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or
to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any
law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure
within the period prescribed by law or ordinance. (emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 95279 July 25, 1991

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO, herein represented by SILVESTRE F. TAN,
Administrator, petitioner,
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS

The focal issue for determination is whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without
judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.
Respondent justify the demolition in the exercise of police power and for reasons of health,
safety and general welfare. It also relies on Ordinance No. 147 (CA Records, pp. 85-104) of the
Municipality of Isabela. For its part petitioner consistently denies to the Mayor, such power,
invoking provisions of the Local Government Code.
Ordinance No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977, and relied upon by respondents, is entitled
"An Ordinance Establishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the Municipality of Isabela .
. ." It is not disputed that the quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is
located outside the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-conforming

structure, which should be relocated. And in the event that an immediate relocation of the
building can not be accomplished, Section 16 of the Ordinance provides:
A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses shall be applied for
by the owner or agent of the property involved within twelve (12) months from
the approval of this Ordinance, otherwise the non-conforming use may be
condemned or removed at the owner's expense.
Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the foregoing
provision should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming
building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in
contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the respondent Court.
Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with
the Zoning Administrator (Article VII, Secs. 1 and 2, Ordinance No. 147). It is said official who
may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the
provisions of the Ordinance (id., Sec. 2, Ibid.). And any person aggrieved by the decision of the
Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of
Zoning Appeals (id., Sec. 7, Ibid.).
That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is further evident from the penal provisions of
said Ordinance, reading:
Any person who violates any of the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos (P50.00) but not
more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not less than one
(1) month but not exceeding six (6) months, or both, at the discretion of the
Court . . . (ibid., Sec. 11). [Emphasis ours].
Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to
cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local
Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]).
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra
in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting
its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not
authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds
summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that

such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in

navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a
nuisance per accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates
property by causing water to become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra).
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government
Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing
is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the
extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its
nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the
ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the plaintiff is not
a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to
the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating
before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47
[1913]).
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not
squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial
hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a
nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that
respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in
abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property
without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was
subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the
demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a
judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

G.R. No. 206423, July 01, 2015

LEONCIO ALANGDEO, ARTHUR VERCELES, AND DANNY VERGARA v. THE CITY
MAYOR OF BAGUIO, ET AL.

II.
DO No. 532 states on its face that it was issued in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2.5 (a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) Governing Summary Eviction (Summary

Eviction IRR), to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 3. Procedures and Guidelines
xxxx
2.0 Issuance of Summary Eviction Notice
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
2.5 In the Issuance of notice, the following shall be strictly observed:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. For on-going construction, no notice shall be served.Dismantling of the
structures shall be immediately enforced by the LGU or the concerned
agency to demolish.
To note, the Summary Eviction IRR was issued pursuant to Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279,
which equally provides for the situations wherein eviction or demolition is allowed as crafted
exceptions to the moratorium on eviction under Section 44, Article XII33 of the same law.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following
situations:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
xxxx
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out
the above provision. (Emphases supplied)
Section 2 of the Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new squatter34 families whose
structures were built after the effectivity of RA 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992, and squatter families identified by the local government
unit (LGU) as professional squatters35or members of squatting syndicates shall be subject of
summary eviction:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 2. Coverage The following shall be subject for summary
eviction:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1.0 New squatter families whose structures were built after the effectivity of RA7279; and
2.0 Squatter families identified by the LGU in cooperation with the Presidential Commission of
the Urban Poor (PCUP), Philippine National Police (PNP) and accredited Urban Poor
[O]rganization (UPO) as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates as
defined in the Act.
Under the Summary Eviction IRR, the term summary eviction has been defined as the
immediate dismantling of new illegal structures by the local government units or government
agency authorized to [demolish] in coordination with the affected urban poor organizations
without providing the structure owner(s) any benefits of the Urban Development and Housing
Program.36redarclaw
Meanwhile, the terms new squatter, professional squatters,and squatting syndicates have
been respectively defined as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
New squatter refers to individual groups who occupy land without the express consent of the
landowner after March 28, 1992. Their structures shall be dismantled and appropriate charges
shall be filed against them by the proper authorities if they refuse to vacate the
premises.37redarclaw
Professional squatters refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express
consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term shall
also apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelots or housing units by the
Government but who sold, leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or
in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized
housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing
from professional squatters or squatting syndicates.38redarclaw
Squatting syndicates refers to groups of persons engaged in the business of squatter housing
for profit or gain.39
In this case, petitioners cannot be considered as new squatters, since, although their structures
were built after March 28, 1992, they or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied, and were
claimants of the subject property long before the said date.Neither have they been identified by
the LGU as professional squatters nor members of a squatting syndicate. Thus, since petitioners
do not fall under the coverage of the said IRR, the issuance of DO No. 05 had no legal basis at
the onset.
More significantly, none of the three (3) situations enumerated under Section 28, Article VII of

RA 7279 as above-cited, when eviction or demolition is allowed, have been shown to be present
in the case at bar. Specifically, it was not shown that the structures are in danger areas or public
areas, such as a sidewalk, road, park, or playground; that a government infrastructure project is
about to be implemented; and that there is a court order for demolition or eviction. Therefore, the
issuance by the City Mayor of an order for the summary demolition of petitioners structures
finds no basis in the said law permitting summary demolition or eviction.
While respondents make much ado of petitioners lack of building permits, it should be
underscored that under Presidential Decree No. 1096,40 otherwise known as the National
Building Code of the Philippines (NBCP), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a
building permit, as well as non-compliance with work stoppage order, without more, will not call
for a summary demolition, but subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section
212,41 Chapter II of the NBCP, or a criminal case under Section 21342 of the same law.
Indeed, while Section 301, Chapter III of the NBCP states that [n]o person, firm or corporation,
including any agency or instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair,
move, convert or demolish any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first
obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in the place where the
subject building is located or the building work is to be done, the remedy of summary
abatement against the bare absence of a building permit was not provided for.
Meanwhile, Section 215 of the NBCP, and its corresponding IRR provision (both of which are
respectively quoted hereunder) states that before a structure may be abated or demolished,there
must first be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is a
nuisance, ruinous or dangerous:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.
When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building
Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life,
health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
PROCEDURE FOR ABATEMENT/ DEMOLITION OF DANGEROUS/ RUINOUS
BUILDINGS/ STRUCTURES
5. Procedure for Demolition of Buildings
The following steps shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings under this
Rule:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
5.1 There must be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is a
nuisance, ruinous or dangerous.
5.2 Written notice or advice shall be served upon the owner and occupant/s of such finding or

declaration, giving him at least fifteen (15) days within which to vacate or cause to be vacated,
repaired, renovated, demolished and removed as the case may be, the nuisance, ruinous or
dangerous building/structure or any part or portion thereof.
5.3 Within the fifteen-day (15) period, the owner may, if he so desires, appeal to the Secretary
the finding or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation
of the building/structure be made.
x x x x43
To this, it bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the
authority to order the demolition of the structures under the NBCP. As held in Gancayco v. City
Government of Quezon City:44redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The
authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent
provisions of the Building Code provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 205. Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein,the Building
Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as
the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.
Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works
District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers [to]act as Building Officials in their
respective areas of jurisdiction.
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of
Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree.
[x xx x]
SECTION 207.Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the
Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this
Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official
charged with the duties of issuing building permits.
In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all
reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and
the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building
Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work
will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the
discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to
be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)
In this case, none of the foregoing requisites were shown to concur. Plainly, records are bereft of
any declaration coming from the Building Official, and it is undisputed that the demolition order
was issued by the City Mayor. Notably, while respondents invoke the City Mayors authority
under Section 455(b) 3(vi)45 of the Local Government Code46 to order the demolition or removal
of an illegally constructed house, building, or structure within the period prescribed by law or
ordinance and their allegation that respondents structures were constructed without building
permits, records disclose that the same was not raised before the trial court. Since respondents
invoked the said section for the first time in their comment to the instant petition,47 the
argumentation cannot thus be entertained, it being settled that matters, theories or arguments not
brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.48redarclaw
Besides, it is clear that DO No. 05 was not issued pursuant to Section 455 (b) 3 (vi) of the Local
Government Code, but pursuant to Section 3 par. 2.5(a) of the implementing rules and
regulations governing summary eviction jointly issued by the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council x x
x,49 implementing Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279, the application of which, however, has
been herein debunked.
In fine, DO No. 05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners structures, has no
legal moorings and perforce was invalidly issued. Accordingly, an injunctive writ to enjoin its
implementation is in order. It is well-settled that for an injunction to issue, two requisites must
concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.50 Here, the two (2) requisites are present:
there is a right to be protected that is, petitioners right over their structures which should be
preserved unless their removal is warranted by law; and the act, i.e., the summary demolition of
the structures under DO No. 05, against which the injunction is directed, would violate said
right.51redarclaw
As a final note, the Court exhorts that absent compliance with the laws allowing for summary
eviction, respondents cannot resort to the procedural shortcut of ousting petitioners by the simple
expedient of a summary demolition order from the Office of the City Mayor. They have to
undergo the appropriate proceeding as set out in the NBCP and its IRR or avail of the proper
judicial process to recover the subject property from petitioners. In pursuing said recourse, it
would also not be amiss for the parties to await the final resolution of any pending case involving
the subject property between petitioners and Ernesto, before the appropriate government
agencies, in order to avoid any further complication on the matter.
That being said, it is then unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary issues raised in these
proceedings.

Heirs of Spouses Luciano, et al. vs. Hon. Jesus V. Quitain, et al., G.R. No. 157972, October
30, 2006
Respondent City Engineers refusal to issue the building permit and concomitant order for the
Heirs of Venturillo to cause the demolition of their house or else the same shall be summarily
demolished[20]are premised on the fact that the house which the Heirs of Venturillo intended to
refurbish stands in the middle of the proposed extension of Mt. Mayon Street, an area which had
been declared as a road right-of-way by the City Government.
It should be emphasized, however, that the Heirs of Venturillo, through their parents,
have continuously possessed and occupied the land on which the house sought to be refurbished
stands since 1942.This possession was with the tacit consent and authorization of the City
Government. In fact, the City Assessors Office directed the Venturillos to file tax declarations
and pay real property taxes thereon which they have consistently complied with.
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[21] the municipal mayor
of Isabela, Basilan ordered the summary demolition, without judicial authority, of
a quonset building which stood on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority. The municipal
mayor justified the demolition as an exercise of police power and for reasons of health, safety
and general welfare.
The Court awarded just compensation the amount of which was for the trial court to
determine in favor of the petitioner whose building was demolished by the municipality even
before a proper tribunal could decide whether or not the building constituted a nuisance in law.
The ruling was premised on the ground that the owner of the building was in lawful possession
of the lot and the building by virtue of the permit from the authorized government agency when
the demolition was affected.
In the same vein, by virtue of the City Governments tacit consent, the Heirs
of Venturillo are not squatters on public land but are in lawful possession thereof, including the
house subject of the summary demolition order of respondent City Engineer. The Heirs
of Venturillo have a clear and unmistakable legal right not to be disturbed in their lawful
possession of the property unless the proper judicial tribunal has determined that the same
constitutes a nuisance in law.

Nuisance Per Se

In the first, the law specially provides the procedure to be followed in case of demolition; in the
second, there is none stated, although this Court has had occasion to rule that houses erected
without governmental authority on public streets, river bed, and water ways are nuisance per se
(Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino 42 O.G. No. 8, p. 13991: Quinto, et al. v. Lacson, et al., L-14700, May
30, 1960), and could be removed by the government, under the procedure outlined in the law
governing the case.

Having been warned by respondents that his acts were in fact violations of law, petitioner should
have been more circumspect in his actions and should have pursued the proper remedies that
were more in consonance with the dictates of due process.

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. Telmo v. Bustamante, G.R. No.
182567, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 552 citing Tayaban v. People, G.R. No. 150194, 6 March
2007, 517 SCRA 488, 507
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts
summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and
properties, which would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at
most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and
from the national road.