1. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. vs.

NLRC 272 SCRA 596

Issue: PT&T filed a petition for reconsideration regarding the case of a dismissed
employee which was decide by the NLRC in favour of the plaintiff, stating that the
reason for termination was because of dishonesty (defalcation) not due to the policy of
the company that married women are not allowed to be employed

Ruling: Previous decision of the NLRC was upheld. Stating that termination due to
contracting to marriage of a female employee is illegal. That the new reason that was
given does not justify the termination of the employee.

2. Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol 487 SCRA 228

Facts: Both were employed by the company when they were still single, they
only met each during the course of their employment

Issue: was the termination of the employees who married their co-worker valid? Based
upon the policy of the business est. regarding nepotism

Ruling: The SC ruled that such policies if cannot be proven reasonably or be justified,
then such policies are considered unlawful and cannot be exercised

3. Duncan vs. Glaxo 438 SCRA 343

Issue: case for reconsideration regarding a decision of the nlrc regarding a

complaint/dismissal/transfer of a employee of glaxo after getting married to an employee
of a competitor of the latters company

Ruling: the petition was denied, The Management Prerogative of glaxo was reasonable,
justified and fair. The company policy did not prohibit marriage but to protect its right
marriage of their employee to a competitors employees was not allowed. This did not
violate any law.

4. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 699 Jovic Catabona

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion
and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation
and disqualification from medical practice.
Ruling: evidence acquired thru illegal means are not admissible in court. Even if the
person who took is married to the person who owns it. Marriage does not justify such
action. That court permission is still required and only the court may order it.

5. Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines 537 SCRA 373

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien who married a filipina then who filed a divorce and was
granted would be accepted here in the phil.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce granted by a foreign country can be honoured in the phil.

Provided it must go thru the proper procedure.

Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

This Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If
the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

6. Republic of the Philippines vs. Cagandahan 565 SCRA 72

ISSUE:

whether or not the petition od OSG be granted regarding the decidion of the RTC

tyo grant ther petiotion of a person who has an intersex disorder to change her gender
from female to male, her name from Jennifer to jeff.

RULING: NO. the petiotn of ther OSG was denied. Although his argument that the
petioners request does fall within the law of the CIVIL Registration, The SC considers that
it was the true courser of nature that led her to be a him. And that although the law does
not allow change of gender in normal circumstance, it is to the best interest of the person
that his petition be held as the state protect those who are considered underdogs.

7. Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 256

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano in the State of Nevada is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
Ruling:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than
the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the
other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not
lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

8. Republic of the Philippines vs. Orbecido III 472 SCRA 114

Facts; Left to the states with their son

Issue: 1. Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

9. Quita vs. Court of Appeals 300 SCRA 406

Issue:
(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving
spouse of Arturo.

Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the
time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was
already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys
national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, t

Although a divorce decree was granted, at that time the person who filed
the divorce is still a Filipino then in phil law the 1 st marriage is still binding
unless a annulment case is file by either parties. Or in this case the OSG
failed to prove the foreign citizenship and the divorce decree nof the wife
therefore she was considered still a fil

10.

Van Dorn vs. Rocerillo 139 SCRA 139

Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.

(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary
as
surviving spouse of Arturo.

Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe
D. Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is
valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce,
and such is valid in their countrys national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot
be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of
Arturo.
Marriage by 2 Aliens who got divorced are covered by the law of their
respective country including the law the govern properties even if outside theie
country. Therefore they can not use the local law of the place where the property is
situated

11.

Pilapil vs. Ibay Somera 174 SCRA 653

Facts:

A Filipina married a german, then the german acquires a divorce in

his country, then filed a case against his ex-wife

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against thepetitioner is
still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filingof charges.
HELD:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage theperson who can
legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. Thefact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, isadmitted. According to Article
15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad,
since the legal separation of the petitionerand respondent has been finalized through the
courts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple were already finished,
thus giving no merit to thecharges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private
respondent, being nolonger married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the
adultery case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary
restrainingorder issued in this case was made permanent

Once a marriage is divorce/annulled the innocent spouse can not file a case agains
the offending spouse. The states that the offended spouise may only file a case if the
marriage is still valid

12.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Dayot 550 SCRA 435

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they
had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for
annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also
ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

13.

De Castro vs. Assido- De Castro 545 SCRA 162

FACTS: they met on 1991, at 1994 got a mar. lic but got expired, they
faked a affidavit of cohabitation so they can get married, after the
celebration they did not cohabitate

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.

Only thru a proper annulment case a marriage may be deem annulled

14.

Santos vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS:
Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.
The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at
the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was
named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a
number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their
family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband
and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he
underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE:

Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of

the Family Code.

HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate,
in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
Wherefore, his petition was denied.

15.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals 78 SCRA 57

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their
fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio
but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the
defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the
living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept
confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does
not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have
their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and
is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they
can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.
ISSUE:

Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the
marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant

non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.

16.

Republic of the Philippines vs. vs. Hamano 428 SCRA 735

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave
birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her
friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy
of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to
file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita
filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due
to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as
psychologically incapacitated.

17.

Bier vs. Bier 547 SCRA 123

FACTS:

Petitioner Renne Enreque Bier married Ma. Lourdes Bier onJuly 26 1992 at UST

Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Theireunion went on well, until three years had passed and
Ma.Lourdes has changed. She became alcoholic, chain smokerand always staying out with her
friends and neglects her dutyas a wife to her husband and finally, on April 10,
1997,respondent suddenly left for the United States. Petitioner hasnot heard from her ever
since. On April 1, 1998, petitionerinstituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City,Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriageon the ground that
respondent was psychologicallyincapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations
topetitioner. But the, Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed acertification and manifested
its disfavor towards declaring themarriage null and void. It argued that no persuasive
evidencewas presented warranting the grant of the petition, speciallysince petitioner failed to
comply with the guidelines laid downin Republic v. CA and Molina[4] (Molina). In
Molinapsychological incapacity is elucidated as follows: (a) gravity,(b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability.

ISSUE:

Is the negligence of Ma. Lourdes Bier to perform herobligation as wife is a

psychological incapacity?

RULING: NO, psychological incapacity must be confined only to themost serious cases of
personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to givemeaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologicalcondition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.Furthermore, there is absolutely no showing that her defectswere
already present at the inception of the marriage or thatthey are incurable. Apparently the wife
lost the emotionalaffection for her husband, thus, it was her purpose to neglecther duties as a
wife. Thus the court DENIED the petition tonullify the marriage.

18.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Cabantug-Baguio GR No. 171042, June 30,

2008

ACTS: Petition for review on the declaration of the nullity of marriage between
Lynette Cabantug-Baguio and Martini Dico Baguio y
August 12, 1997 Lynette and M
artini were married after being pen pals since 1995 y
Initially, the couple stayed with Lynettes parents.
Martini only stayed with his wife duringweekends, and on weekdays he was at his
parents house. Lynette soon discovered that
Martini was a mamas boyy
Upon the insistence of Martinis mother, his allotment was divided equally between
her andLynette
January 1999 No information about Martini. Lynette also stopped receiving her
share of the allotment and upon inquiry with Martinis employer, she found out that
he was inAlabang,Muntinlupa
October 12, 2000 Lynette filed a complaint for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage onthe basis of Martinis psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital dutiesand obligations as stated in Art. 68-70 of the Family Code
Summons were served upon Martini to which he did not file any response.
No collusion was also established.
October 14, 1999 Lynette learned that
Martini declared in his employment records that hewas SINGLE and named his
mother as principal allotee. Respondent presented the letter of clinical psychologist
who evaluated the behavior of Martini. Based on the report,
Martini shows immature personality disorder, dependencypatterns and self-centered
motives. The situation is serious, grave, existing already duringthe adolescent
period and incurable. As such,
Martini is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in
marriage and family
January 2, 2002 Cebu City RTC declared that marriage void since
Martini was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential martial
obligations of marriage and that same incapacity existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinis being a mamas boy constitutes as a
psychological in capacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code

HELD: Art. 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the material bond
at the time thecauses manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. The term "psychological
incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and
its incapacitating nature must be fully explained. For psychological incapacity to
render a marriage void ab initio it must be characterized by:1.
Gravity must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying outthe ordinary duties required in a marriage2.
Juridical antecedence it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage3.
Incurability must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involvedIn petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proving the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage,
and against the dissolution and nullity (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio)As seen
in this case, Lynette failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove
Martinis psychologicalincapacity. While the court sympathizes with her predication,
its first and foremost duty is to apply the law.
Psycho incapacity must be proven by the petitioner beyond doubt or adequately
proven, and that it is incurable. Legal separation can be used instead of annulment
in cases that does not apply to the latter. The requisites of annulment must be
present thus for the petition to be granted. Being Mamas boy is not a sufficient
ground

19.

Paras vs. Paras 529 SCRA 81

Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in
Bindoy,Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul
(deceased), Cindy Rose(deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29)
years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosafiled with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil
Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances: (a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her
signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a oncubine and
sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children;
and (d)he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
She met Justo in 1961in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos
University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her
"Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he loved her, she agreed to
marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated"marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy
Rose was afflicted with leukemia.It was her family who paid for her
medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo
was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier
advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of
climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire
family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the
Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses
heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of
land. At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take
gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of maintaining a
mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted
her to file the present case. She found thatafter leaving their conjugal
house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted
in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa)
and
Justos

deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.He also denied forging her signature
in one mortgage transaction. He maintained thathe did not dispose of a
conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal ofa
sugar crop loan before the
banks
authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United States.
For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal
mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He
spent for his
childrens
education.At first, he resented supporting them because he was just
starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more
than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there
were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of
income. What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of
embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not
prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has
nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern.
This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil
when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As
to the charge of concubine, he alleged that JocelynChing is not his
mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by
herboyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is
not his daughter. After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a
Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did
not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa
posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets were
sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to
shell out his limited salary; and (c) the charge of infidelity is
unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between the
parties started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
And lastly, it ruled thatthere appeared to be a collusion between them as
both sought the declaration of nullity of theirmarriage.On October 18,
2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying
Rosas

signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family.

He wassuspended from the practice of law, thus: the respondent is
suspended from the practice of lawfor SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his
wifes
signature in bank documents andother related loan instruments; and for
ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the chargesof immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously.
Letnotice of this Decision be spread in respondents
record as an attorney, and notice of the sameserved on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
forcirculation to all the courts concerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court
of Appeals affirmed theRTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short ofthe standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos allegeddefects or
idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa
contends that this Courts
factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the
presentcase. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering
contrary factual findings. Also, sheargues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the presentcase;2) Whether a remand of this case to the
RTC for reception of expert testimony on the rootcause of
Justos
alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and3) Whether the totality
of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part ofJusto
Held:
1) A reading of the Court of
Appeals
Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved.In fact, the
appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded
that theyare insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Justo'salleged infidelity, failure to support his
family and alleged abandonment of their family home aretrue, such traits
are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and

father.However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare

the marriage void due toan incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest thathe was truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and
discharge as amarried person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of
his alleged psychological incapacity,they do not necessarily show
incurability,
such that while his acts violated the covenants ofmarriage, they do not
necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless stateof
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations ofmarriage in the future.2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,(b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained
inthe decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological --not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must

convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or
psychically ill to such anextent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need begiven
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and itsincapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatristsand clinical psychologist \
3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage shalllikewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;
and (c)incurability

20.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Molina GR No. 108763, February 13, 1997

FACTS
Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church. They had a
son, Andre Molina. A year after the marriage, Reynaldo started manifesting signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents for aid &
assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making Roridel the breadwinner
of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo abandoned her and
the child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her
husbands psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridels strange behavior, refusal to
perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle finances caused their quarrels.
Roridel on the other hand claims that her husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent,
disrespectful, arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with whom he has a
child.
ISSUE
WON Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated?
HELD
NO. Marriage is valid.
RATIO:
1. They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect in performing their obligations.
Theyre not incapable of doing them.
2. Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity.
3. Guidelines for Art. 36
a. Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage: plaintiff. Presumption of existence of marriage
over its dissolution & nullity.
b. Root cause of incapacity should be: medically/clinically defined, alleged in complaint, proven
by experts, clearly explained in decision.
c. Existing at time of celebration of marriage.
d. Medically/clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or relative. Incapacity directly
related to assumption of marital obligations, doesnt include incapacity in profession, etc.
e. Grave to render them incapable. Not mere refusal, neglect or difficulty or ill will.
f. Essential obligations outlined in FC Art. 68-71 and 220, 221, 225. State non-compliance in
petition with evidence, include in decision.
g. Consider National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines
interpretations. Not binding should be given respect since this law originated from Canon law.
Harmonize civil law w/religious faith.
h. Prosecuting attorney/fiscal and Sol. Gen. will appear as counsels for the state. They should
submit certification within 15 days from submission of case for resolution