Project Safety Studies

Abbott Risk Consulting Limited
Woodfibre PMC Project Safety Studies

HAZID Study Report
Prepared for:
Woodfibre PMC
111 Dunsmuir Street
Vancouver, B.C.
Canada, V5B 5W3
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APPROVAL AND REVISION RECORD

Issue
No.
Date
Prepared
01
October 2014
S Cowie
02
April 2015
S Cowie
Reviewed
Approved
Revision Notes
C Rettie
M OFlaherty
First Issue
C Rettie
M OFlaherty
Minor editorial
comments
addressed
Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd.

11 Albyn Place
Edinburgh
Scotland
EH2 4NG
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 (0) 131 220 0164
www.consultarc.com
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Executive Summary
Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd. (ARC) was contracted by Woodfibre PMC to conduct a
HAZID (HAZard IDentification) study of the Woodfibre LNG project. The workshop
was held from the 6th October to the 9th October 2014 at the AMEC Offices in
Vancouver, B.C.
The HAZID covers the Woodfibre LNG facility site as a whole and was conducted in
accordance with BC OGC Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Permit Application and
Operations Manual [Ref 1], CSA Standards Liquefied Natural Gas Production,
Storage and Handling Z276-11 [Ref 2] and the associated Z276-11 update 01 [Ref
3].
The HAZID forms part of a series of Safety Studies which have been performed in
order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and to
demonstrate compliance with the above requirements.
The HAZID consisted of a review and update of the previous HAZID/ ENVID study
of the process areas (conducted for previous the Woodfibre facility FLNG-based
design), which was carried out in April 2014 [Ref 4], with additional nodes
considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as a whole.
A total of 98 recommendations were made during the HAZID study, provided in
Appendix B.
Completed worksheets for the HAZID study are provided in Appendix A.
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Abbreviations
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AFP / PFP
Active Fire Protection / Passive Fire Protection
AR
Approval Required
ARC
Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd.
BC
British Columbia
BOG
Boil Off Gas
BOP
Balance Of Plant
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
COC
Certificate Of Compliance
CR
Confirmation Required
DAL
Design Accidental Load
EA
Environmental Assessment
EIA
Environmental Impact Assessment
EERA
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment
ENVID
Environmental [hazard] Identification
ESD / EDP
Emergency Shut Down / Emergency Depressurisation
ESDV
Emergency Shut Down Valve
FERA
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
FLNG
Floating Liquefied Natural Gas vessel
FSO
Floating Storage and Offloading vessel
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability
IGG
Inert Gas Generator
KO
Knock Out
LE
Linde Engineering
LER
Local Equipment Room
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LP / HP
Low Pressure / High Pressure
OGC
[BC] Oil and Gas Commission
OSBL
Outside Battery Limit
PMC
Project Management Company
PMT
Project Management Team
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Abbreviations (Continued)
PPE
Personnel Protective Equipment
PSV
Pressure Safety Valve
QRA
Quantified Risk Assessment
RPT
Rapid Phase Transition
SCE
Safety Critical Element
SIS
Safety Instrumented System
TERMPOL
Technical Review Process of Marine Terminal Systems

and Transhipment Sites
VCE
Vapour Cloud Explosion
WLNG
Woodfibre LNG
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Contents
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7
Overview ................................................................................................................... 7
Objective of the Study................................................................................................ 7
Scope of the Study .................................................................................................... 7
HAZID Study Methodology ........................................................................................ 9
Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 9
Methodology .............................................................................................................. 9
Guidewords ............................................................................................................. 10
Recording and Reporting ......................................................................................... 11
Study Team ............................................................................................................. 12
Nodes ...................................................................................................................... 13
Drawings ................................................................................................................. 15
Results ....................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
References .............................................................................................................. 16
Appendices
Appendix A HAZID Worksheets
Appendix B HAZID Recommendations
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1.0
Introduction
1.1
Overview
Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd. (ARC) was contracted by Woodfibre PMC to conduct a
HAZID (HAZard IDentification) study of the Woodfibre LNG project. The workshop
was held from the 6th October to the 9th October 2014 at the AMEC Offices in
Vancouver, B.C.
The HAZID study consisted of a multi-disciplined team review of the Woodfibre LNG
facility phase 1 design. The study used a step-by-step methodology and a checklist
of guide words to identify hazards and assess the influence these hazards may have
on the project development strategy.
The relevant causes of the accidental events leading to hazardous situations were
analysed and recorded in the HAZID Worksheets, provided in Appendix A.
1.2
Objective of the Study

The objective of the Study was to review all elements of the engineering design of
the Woodfibre LNG facility. The HAZID covered safety and environmental hazards.
Where improvements could be made to mitigate or eliminate these hazards or to
improve the level of risk reduction provided by safety functions, recommendations
were outlined and assigned to relevant departments in order to reduce risk to a level
as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). A full list of recommendations is provided
in Appendix B.
1.3
Scope of the Study

The HAZID study reviewed the engineering design of the Woodfibre LNG project,
as represented on the project drawings listed in Table 5.1.
The HAZID covers the Woodfibre site as a whole and was conducted in accordance
with BC OGC Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Permit Application and Operations
Manual [Ref 1], CSA Standards Liquefied Natural Gas Production, Storage and
Handling Z276-11 [Ref 2] and the associated Z276-11 update 01 [Ref 3].
The HAZID forms part of a series of Safety Studies which have been performed in
order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and to
demonstrate compliance with the above requirements, and has raised specific
recommendations, where required, in order to address any issues that the team
identified.
The HAZID consisted of a review and update of the previous HAZID/ ENVID study
of the process areas (conducted for the previous FLNG-based design of the
Woodfibre facility), which was carried out in April 2014 [Ref 4], with additional nodes
considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as a whole.
The following nodes were reviewed as part of the HAZID study:
General node ( to record hazards that are ubiquitous throughout the facility);
LNG train, updated from previous HAZID/ ENVID study:
o
o
o
Inlet Facilities;
Liquefaction and Refrigeration;
Refrigerant Make-up and Fractionation Area;
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LP Compression, End Flash and Fuel Gas System; and
o Substation.
Additional nodes considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as
a whole.
o
BOP (Balance of Plant);
Flare Systems;
FSO (Rundown and Storage Mode); and
LNG Offloading.
Complete node listings and information on what each node covers are shown in
Table 4.1.
The HAZID considered only the operational phase of the site. Construction and
commissioning activities will be considered separately.
It is also noted that marine operations, including the berthing of LNG carriers at the
FSO, will be assessed in a TERMPOL study. The HAZID did not consider marine
operations.
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2.0
HAZID Study Methodology
2.1
Purpose
The overall purpose of HAZID study is to focus the attention of the Project team on:
The impact of the operations on surroundings;
The impact of the surroundings on the operations;
The interferences between the main items;
The general hazards and particular aspects of the project which require special
development in order to contain any hazards identified; and
Any further analysis required to produce an effective design (separation
distances, toxicity of materials, flammability limits, etc.).
A HAZID study provides a structured and analytical approach to hazard
identification. It is a brainstorming exercise, guided by a typical set of guidewords,
and taking benefit from the previous experience of the HAZID study team members.
The HAZID study is used to identify hazards associated with the project operations
and recommend improvements, modifications, or further studies where preventative
/ mitigative safety measures are required.
Conducting the HAZID study allows inherently safe features to be adopted as the
design evolves. Hazards can then be eliminated or, if this is not possible, have their
consequences reduced and taken into account in early design, rather than later in
the project lifecycle, in order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
The concept of ALARP is defined by BC OGC [Ref 1] as follows:
The concept of ALARP defines how the Commission measures risk mitigation and
gives a goal to the risk management process. Demonstrating ALARP is a critical
element to satisfying the Commission that all safety and environmental risks have
been appropriately managed. A design that can demonstrate ALARP will have
reduced the risk until the incremental sacrifice (in terms of time, effort, cost, or other
expenditure of resources) is grossly disproportionate to the value of incremental risk
reduction achieved.
It is to be noted that a HAZID study is not an audit. Also, a HAZID study does not
preclude the need for further hazard assessment; instead, it is a precursor to
subsequent hazard analyses and risk assessments.
2.2
Methodology
HAZID studies are systematic, multi-disciplinary reviews carried out on a process
design to identify major hazards (and thereby potential major accident events
safety or environmental related) associated with the site or operation of the process.
The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by reference to an agreed
set of guidewords.
This HAZID study applied the Guideword Method, where the operation was broken
down into manageable sections (nodes), and a set of standard guidewords was
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applied. The structure of the HAZID was to only consider events / concerns that
arise within the node being reviewed at the time.
Once all the events had been identified then the ultimate consequences of each
event / concern was identified irrespective of any safeguards that may be in place.
The HAZID team then considered the risk, taking into account existing safeguards,
and, where necessary, recommended additional safeguards as actions.
The HAZID methodology can be summarised by the following sequential steps:
Select a Sub-operation (referred to as a node);
Apply a guideword to act as a prompt;
Identify the events relevant to that guideword;
Identify the ultimate consequences associated with the events irrespective of
safeguards;
Identify the existing safeguards;
Decide on any actions to eliminate or mitigate the identified problem if
necessary;
Repeat for other guidewords as relevant; and
Repeat for all sub-systems.
2.3
Guidewords
The HAZID study methodology followed a set of standard guidewords.
It is noted that these guidewords are not necessarily exhaustive and are intended
to prompt the team to consider as broad a range of potential scenarios as possible.
The team were encouraged to think outside the box and challenge the design in
any way they could, regardless of whether a challenge falls under one of the specific
guidewords.
Two sets of generic guide words were selected for use in this HAZID study; one set
for the general node to record any hazards that are ubiquitous throughout the facility
and another set which was applied for each specific node. These are shown in Table
2.1 and Table 2.2, respectively.
Table 2.1 HAZID General Node Guidewords
Guidewords
Pressure and Temperature Safeguarding Concept
Concept for Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Explosion Protection Concept
Fire & Gas Detection Concept
Fire Protection Concept
Concept for Block-in and Depressurising System
Flare Concept
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Guidewords
Concepts for Occupational Health and Safety
e.g.
- Escape Route and Rescue Concept
- Eye and Emergency Shower Concept
- PPE Concept
- Safe Location Concept
- Safety Sign Concept
Concepts for Environmental Protection
e.g.
- Noise Control Concept (including noise control - marine)
- Emission Control Concept
- Drainage & Effluent Treatment Concept
- Waste Management Concept
Impact of the site on the human environment
Communication links with the facility
Effects on the plant of environmental constraints
Table 2.2 HAZID Specific Node Guidewords

Guidewords
External Fire
Internal Fire
External Explosion
Internal Explosion
Exposure to harmful substances (acute/chronic)
Noise
Environmental Pollution
HAZARD from OSBL
Continuous / frequent plant discharges to air
Continuous / frequent plant discharges to water
Continuous / frequent plant discharges to soil
Emergency / upset discharges
2.4
Recording and Reporting

During the study each hazard identified by the Team, together with the potential
consequences, designed safeguards and required actions, were recorded in a
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HAZID worksheet, using the process hazard analysis software package PHA-Pro
version 8.3.2.0.
The HAZID worksheets were displayed at all times via a data projector, to enable
the entire team to view the study documentation in real-time. This allowed any
corrections to be made as and when required, and an overall consensus to be
achieved from the participants, and hence the HAZID record is considered to be a
direct representation of the views of all personnel present during the workshop
discussions.
3.0
Study Team
A list of personnel that participated in the HAZID study and their attendance is listed
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 HAZID Study Team
Team Members
Full Name
Department
Sessions
Company 06/10/2014
PMC
Present
07/10/2014
08/10/2014
Present
09/10/2014
Penny Armitage
Eng Manager
Paul Baluch
Civil Project Engineer PMC
Present
Peter Barry
Structural Lead
PMC
Present
Charles Casgrain
Project Engineer
BOP
Gurprit Chahal
Water Treatment
BOP
Steve Cowie
Scribe
ARC
Present
Sepidah Dalil
Process
BOP
Present
Frank Hamilton
Technical Manager
PMT
Partial
Meetal
Khanderia
Project Engineer
BOP
Ken Leong
Process Engineer
Solaris Flare
Michelle Ng
Project Engineer
M&N
Colin Rettie
Chairman
ARC
Present
Present
Present
Paul Robinson
Integration manager PMC
Present
Present
Present
Dietrich Roeben
Operations and Start- PMC

up Manager
Cristian Ruilova
Prject Manager
PMT
Jim Ryan
Tech Safety Lead
PMC
Farhad
Shushtarian
Project Manager
M&N
Partial
Alex Taimuri
BOP Engineering
BOP
Partial
Mario Tancredi
Project Manager
Solaris Flare
Present
Present
Present
Present
Partial
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Present
Partial
Partial
Present
Present
Partial
Present
Present
Partial
Present
Present
Partial
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Team Members
Full Name
4.0
Sessions
Department
Company 06/10/2014
Joan Wang
Process
PMC
Yan Zhang
Engineering Manager PMT
Amanda Zinter
Regulatory
Compliance
PMT
Present
07/10/2014
08/10/2014
Present
Present
Present
Present
Partial
Partial
Partial
Present
09/10/2014
Nodes
The HAZID study was broken down into nodes, as described in Table 4.1.
It is noted that nodes 1 to 6 are nodes were carried out by a review and update of
the previous HAZID/ ENVID study of the process areas (conducted for an FLNGbased design), which was carried out between the 23rd April and the the 25th April
2014 at the Linde Engineering offices in Pullach, Munich, Germany [Ref 4]. Nodes
7 to 10 are additional nodes considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the
site as a whole.
Table 4.1 HAZID Node List
Nodes
Comment
1. General Node
This node addresses external hazards affecting the whole site area in general, and
general site philosophies which apply to multiple areas.
2. Inlet Facilities
Streams: Feed gas, amine, CO2, waste water.
Feed gas is treated by mercury removal bed, then acid gas removal by amine system,
finally dehydrated by molsieves.
Acid gas stream is treated in catalytic oxidiser and vented to atmosphere.
System located in modules 1 and 2.

3. liquefaction and
Two identical trains in modules 4 and 6.
Refrigeration.
Inventories: Feed gas producing LNG, mixed refrigerant cycle with gas and liquid
phases (methane, ethane, N2, butane, traces of propane).
Electrical drive compressors.

4. Refrigerant Make-up and
Located in module 5.
Fractionation Area.
Inventories: Butane and ethane/ ethylene storage in LP tanks - ethane at low
temperature.
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Nodes
Comment
Fractionation produces required refrigerants from feed gas and removes heavier
condensate.
Flare KO drums are also located in the module.

5. LP Compression, End
Located in module 3.
Flash and Fuel Gas

System.
BOG from storage and flash gas from end flash drum are compressed and returned
to the main process.
End flash drum for LNG product and LNG transfer pumps are also in this area.
6. Substation
Includes substation and electrical equipment, within a building.
Note: Originally considered utility area on the FLNG. Apart from hot oil, these have
been relocated into the utility area - See BOP node. Hazards relating to the hot oil
heater are now considered in node 2.
7. BOP
Includes:
-Utilities (instrument air / plant air, N2, plant water, tempered cooling water, sea water
cooling system)
-Chemical storage
-Effluent / waste water treatment
-Substations (x3)
-Condensate storage and truck loading
-Utility gas supply to building heating and flare
-Diesel storage and truck filling
-Emergency generation
-Non-process buildings (warehouse and storage areas, maintenance building, admin
building, control room and lab, temporary construction and engineering building,
canteen)
-firewater tank and water supply, including water source from Henriette dam
-Landfill and leachate treatment
-Access to site (small craft and material jetties)
It is noted that flares/ LNG rundown system/ feed gas pipeline, although part of BOP
scope, are considered in relevant specific nodes (flare node 8 / LNG offloading 10).
8. Flare Systems
4 x elevated flares- HP warm and cold, LP warm and cold, located on a common
support structure.
Currently KO drums etc. are located in the LNG train.
Flares are air-assisted, smokeless flares, with N2 purge and continuous pilots.
9. FSO (Rundown and
Storage Mode)
Two existing LNG carriers will be converted into a single floating storage and
offloading unit. The hulls will be welded into a single structure and manifolds will be
combined in a single system.
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Nodes
Comment
Storage consists of 10 Moss-type tanks, each with two offloading pumps and
associated manifold systems. New boil off gas recovery compressors and inert gas
generator / dry air system will be provided.
Utilities are primarily provided from shore via hoses on the utility bridge, but backup
N2 generation/ emergency power will be onboard.
Existing ships fire water system will be retained and upgraded.
The FSO will be controlled by a common control system with the plant. Local control
will also be provided onboard.
The FSO is permanently moored by vertical piles and LNG rundown, BOG and other
process connections are connected via permanently connected flexible loading arms.
Personnel access points are provided at fore and aft ends. The aft access is also
suitable for small mechanical handling (2.5 T)
10. LNG Offloading
5.0
This node considers the FSO during the operation to offload LNG into an adjacent
LNG Carrier.
Drawings
Table 5.1 lists all drawings referred to during this study.
Table 5.1 Drawings Used in the HAZID Study
Drawing
Description
Place(s) Used
3861-MM-PD-101-001 Rev 03
FSO Layout Drawing
Nodes: 9, 10
176258-0000-DD10-LYD-1201 Rev A
Civil - Plan -Site Layout
Nodes: 1
176258-0300-DD00-BLD1001.001 Rev C Block Flow Diagram
Nodes: All
176258-0300-DD10-LYD-1501 Rev D
Site Layout Drawing
Nodes: All
&AA-05-P-FF 01 Rev C1
Inlet Facilities - Inlet Facilities
Nodes: 2
Sour Gas Removal/ Mercury Removal - Sour Gas Nodes: 2

Removal/ Mercury Removal
Sour Gas Removal/ Mercury Removal - Solvent

Removal
Nodes: 2
Dehydration - Gas Dehydration
Nodes: 2
Dehydration - Regeneration Cycle
Nodes: 2
liquefaction - Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger 1
Nodes: 3
liquefaction - Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger 2
Nodes: 3
liquefaction - HHC Removal Column 1
Nodes: 3
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Drawing
6.0
Description
Place(s) Used
liquefaction - HHC Removal Column 2
Nodes: 3
liquefaction - End Flash
Nodes: 5
Refrigeration -Refrigerant Cycle Compression 1
Nodes: 3
Refrigeration -Refrigerant Cycle Compression 2
Nodes: 3
Refrigerant Make Up System - Refrigerant Make

Up Tanks 1
Nodes: 4
Refrigerant Make Up System - Refrigerant Make

Up Tanks 2
Nodes: 4
Fractionation System - Deethanizer
Nodes: 4
Fractionation System - Debutanizer
Nodes: 4
Tank Return Gas System - LP Tank Return Gas

Compression
Nodes: 5
Tank Return Gas System - HP Tank Return Gas

Compression
Nodes: 5
Fuel Gas System - Fuel Gas Distribution
Nodes: 4
Flare Gas and Vent System - Warm Flare System Nodes: 4
Flare Gas and Vent System - Flare Package
Nodes: 4
Conclusions and Recommendations

The complete HAZOP worksheets are provided in Appendix A.
A total of 98 recommendations were made during the course of the HAZID study.
The complete list of recommendations, along with the responsible party are provided
in Appendix B.
It is concluded that a comprehensive HAZID review has been conducted appropriate
to the current stage of design, and that major accident hazards have been identified
and will be managed by addressing the recommendations.
7.0
References
BC Oil & Gas Commission: Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Permit Application
and Operations Manual, July 2014, Version 1.0
CSA Standard Z276-11: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) - Production, Storage,
and Handling, December 2011
CSA Standard Z276-11: Update 1, February 2014
Woodfibre FLNG HAZID/ ENVID Study Report, ARC-027-103, Abbott Risk
Consulting, April 2014 Issue-01.
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Appendix A
HAZID Worksheets
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Node: 1. General Node
Guide
Word/Deviation
Pressure and
Temperature
Safeguarding
Concept
Causes
Consequences
1.1. Exceeding design

1.1.1. Loss of containment leading to
conditions in process
fire/ explosion hazard.
upset.
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
1.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1001 - Pressure and 67. Confirm that consistent pressure and PMC temperature process
temperature safeguarding
Process
safeguarding philosophy for
philosophies are developed for BOP,
LNG train, has been prepared
flare and FSO scopes, and cover
and aligned with CSA Z276.
interfaces with the LNG train.
Category
CR
1.1.1.2. HAZOP study at later design

stages.
Concept for Safety
Instrumented
System (SIS)
2.1. Incompatible safety 2.1.1. Loss of safety functions.

systems.
2.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1002 - Safety

Instrumented Systems
philosophy for LNG train.
1. Ensure that Safety Instrumented

Systems (SIS) philosophies for all
areas are compatible, as these form
part of a single plant SIS.
PMC
CR
Previous HAZID Recommendation 1

Explosion Protection 3.1. Ignited gas release
Concept
on LNG train
3.1.1. Escalation to SCEs (Safety

Critical Elements), risk to
personnel.
3.1.1.1. Low-manned facility.

3.1.1.2. Manned buildings remote from
LNG.
68. Confirm that consistent fire and

PMC CR
explosion protection philosophies are Fire
developed for BOP, flare and FSO
Protection
scopes, and cover interfaces with the
LNG train.
3.1.1.3. Siting study to be carried out,

including separation of
equipment.
3.1.1.4. &AA S-PC 1008 - Explosion
protection philosophy defines
requirements for ignition
prevention for LNG train.
Fire & Gas Detection 4.1. Hydrocarbon release 4.1.1. Fire/ explosion hazard.
Concept
4.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1009 - Fire and gas 69. Confirm that consistent fire and gas PMC CR
detection philosophy, specifies
detection philosophies are developed Fire
detector coverage requirements
for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and Protection
(number, location, setpoints,
cover interfaces with the LNG train.
types, actions.) for LNG train.
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Fire Protection
Concept
5.1. Loss of containment 5.1.1. Hazard to personnel, damage to 5.1.1.1. Fire zones.
and fire.
equipment, escalation to other
inventories (including BLEVE of
liquids).
2. Conduct AFP and PFP study to identify PMC the benefits and hazards of deluge in Linde
each area.
AR

5.1.1.2. Potential to blowdown entire
plant in sequences.
70. Confirm that consistent PFP and AFP PMC philosophies are developed for BOP, HSE
CR
6.1.1.1. Each module is an ESD zone.
71. Confirm that blowdown philosophy

has been updated to the latest LNG
train configuration, and blowdown
study remains valid.
CR
6.1.1.2. Liquid inventories are not

removed, but fire case relief
loads are considered and
inventories can be
depressurised.
72. Confirm that consistent ESD and EDP PMC philosophies are developed for BOP, Process
5.1.1.3. PFP on equipment supports/

structure, as required to meet
DAL (Design Accidental Load)
conditions.
5.1.1.4. Drainage system to minimise
pool fire potential. Very limited
warm liquid inventory.
5.1.1.5. Cryogenic liquid spill
containment system routes
spillages to a spill basin.
5.1.1.6. &AA S-PC 1007 - Active and
passive fire protection (AFP /
PFP) philosophy for the LNG
train.
Concept for Block-in 6.1. Loss of containment. 6.1.1. Loss of multiple inventories
and Depressurising
System
PMC Linde
CR
6.1.1.3. &AA S-PC 1010 - Process

safeguarding ESD isolation and
depressurising systems
philosophy for the LNG train.
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Flare Concept
7.1. Routine and

emergency flaring See flare node
8.1. Working
Concepts for
Occupational Health
environment.
and Safety
8.1.1. Health and safety risks to

workers.
- Escape Route and

Rescue Concept
8.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1031 - Working

3. Ensure that BC Work Safe BC OHS
Environment Philosophy for the
regulations are complied with in &AA
LNG train.
S-PC 1031 - Working Environment
Philosophy.
- Eye and
Emergency Shower
Concept
PMC Linde
CR

73. Confirm that consistent working
PMC
environment philosophies are
developed for BOP, flare and FSO
scopes, and cover interfaces with the
LNG train.
- PPE (Personal
Protective
Equipment) Concept
- Safe Location
Concept
8.1.2. Inability to escape in a fire

scenario.
- Safety Sign
Concept
8.1.2.1. Multiple escape routes - at least 74. Consider the philosophy for
2 from each area.
evacuation and mustering of whole
site area, including remote locations
such as metering station, flare area,
8.1.2.2. EERA (Escape and Evacuation
fire water tank, etc.
Risk Analysis) will be conducted
for LNG train.
PMC HSE
CR
AR
8.1.2.3. Facility has at least two escape

routes from each main plant
area, including means to
evacuate trapped personnel
from the north end and to
evacuate the main manned area
at the south end.
Concepts for
Environmental
Protection
- Noise Control
Concept (including
noise control marine)
- Emission Control
Concept
9.1. Environmental
considerations.
9.1.1. Atmospheric discharges and flue 9.1.1.1. Plant power is external electric
gasses.
source, to minimise combustion
exhausts.
9.1.1.2. Burners selected for low
emissions.
9.1.1.3. Thermal oxidiser on acid gas
removal discharge.
9.1.1.4. No flaring concept.
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- Drainage & Effluent
Treatment Concept
9.1.1.5. Waste Discharge Permit to be

prepared to meet BC Air Quality
Objective (expected discharges
are well below allowable).
Includes dispersion modeling
assessment.
- Waste
Management
Concept
9.1.2. Water discharges of hydrocarbon 9.1.2.1. See BOP node for water
contamination.
treatment systems.
9.1.3. Water discharges of cooling
9.1.3.1. Discharge consent to meet BC
water with biocide and increased
requirements.
temperature can harm marine
species (See, also, BOP node). 9.1.3.2. Deep intake to minimise biocide
demand.
9.1.3.3. Continuous online monitoring for
temperature and biocide
residue.
9.1.3.4. Outfall location design and depth
to minimise impact to marine life.
9.1.4. Water-borne noise, potentially
9.1.4.1. Equipment designed to control
leading to disturbance to marine
noise and vibration.
life.
9.1.4.2. Water-borne noise modelling
has been carried out and results
submitted with the EIA.
9.1.5. Air-borne noise - Hazard to
personnel/ disturbance to
environment.
9.1.5.1. &AA S-PC 1501 - Noise control 75.

philosophy to meet requirements
of BC OHS and BC noise control
best practice guideline for LNG
train.
Confirm that noise control

PMC
philosophies are developed for BOP,
interfaces with the LNG train and that
this meets the requirements of the
site noise limits.
CR
9.1.6.1. Preliminary light pollution impact 86. Confirm that requirements for the EIA PMT
assessment has been carried
are incorporated in the basis of
out for all continuous plant light
design. Note this applies to all
sources.
environmental issues, not just lighting.
CR
9.1.5.2. Initial noise study has been

conducted for the site
9.1.6. Light pollution
9.1.7. Waste generation and transport. 9.1.7.1. Maintenance waste to be

collected for disposal.
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9.1.7.2. Minimal routine waste - no
routine solid process waste
generated by LNG train.
9.1.7.3. All solid waste from BOP areas
(e.g. waste water treatments and
domestic buildings) is
transported off site.
9.1.7.4. EIA has identified all waste
streams and means of disposal.
This will be controlled by waste
management plan.
9.1.8. Hazardous maintenance waste
(e.g. molsieve materials).
9.1.8.1. Transfer to competent contractor 87. Ensure the operations philosophy

PMT
off-site for disposal, under
complies with the requirements of the
EA, for the handling of hazardous
specific procedure.
materials.
Impact of the site on 10.1. Operation of facility 10.1.1. Impact on other users of the
the human
area, e.g. leisure, tourism,
environment
fishing, agriculture.
10.1.1.1. Human health impact

assessment and assessment
of other impacts will be
included in EA.
Communication links 11.1. Ferries

with the facility
11.1.1.1. Sheltered location.
11.1.1. Possible lack of access due to

weather conditions
11.1.1.2. Marine travel procedure.
4. Consider operation for scenario where PMT

site access is not available (due to
weather conditions, boat failure, etc.)
Ensure that safe operation can be
maintained, with personnel on site.
CR
AR

11.1.2. Any attendant vessel accident
(e.g. personnel vehicle ferries,
supply deliveries, etc.)
11.2. Helicopters
11.1.2.1. TERMPOL study, including

marine operation safety in the
area.
11.2.1. Helicopter crash on equipment. 11.2.1.1. Canadian Aviation Regulations 5. Confirm that the helipad locations are
requirements
suitable and meet regulations.
11.2.1.2. Presence of facility and flare
notified to NAV Canada to
inform aviation.
BOP
CR
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Effects on the plant 12.1. Dangerous wildlife 12.1.1. Personnel hazard.
of environmental
(e.g. bears)
constraints
12.1.1.1. Site fence.
76. Confirm location, extent and

specification of site perimeter fence
and control of access at road
crossings and river crossing.
BOP
CR
12.1.1.2. Waste management to avoid

attracting wildlife.
77. Develop wildlife management plan

(including bear hazards).
PMT
CR
12.2. Sea birds.
12.2.1. Build up of guano - personnel

health hazard.
12.2.1.1. Routine cleaning.
12.3. Sabotage
12.3.1. Damage to plant - fire and

explosion hazard.
12.3.1.1. Site fence - no land access, all 76. Confirm location, extent and
personnel are under access
specification of site perimeter fence
control.
and control of access at road
crossings and river crossing.
BOP
CR
12.3.1.2. Exclusion zone, monitored by

patrol vessel.
78. Develop project safety and security

plan, including potential for public
protest.
PMT
CR
78. Develop project safety and security

plan, including potential for public
protest.
PMT
CR
12.3.2. Public protest affecting site or

site personnel.
Extreme Wind/
Wave
13.1. Extreme weather

conditions
13.1.1. Risk of damage to marine

mooring and transfer system See FSO node.
13.1.2. Risk of damage to structures
and buildings on site.
Extreme
Temperature
13.1.2.1. Structures designed for 1/100 79. Confirm that structural/ marine/ civil PMC CR
year wind load combinations.
design criteria are consistent with the Structural
basis of design requirements, for all
areas of the site.
13.1.2.2. Shore protection for the 1/100
year wave conditions
14.1. Ambient conditions. 14.1.1. High ambient temperature 14.1.1.1. Design basis covers expected
possible process disturbance
extreme conditions.
but no hazardous consequence.
14.1.2. Low ambient temperature - Risk 14.1.2.1. Winterisation philosophy to
of freezing in liquid systems.
address low temperature
Potential process hazards.
hazards.
Seismic
15.1. Earthquake.
15.1.1. Damage to structures. Potential 15.1.1.1. Stored inventory on the FSO is

loss of containment.
floating and largely isolated See FSO node.
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15.1.1.2. Design criteria comply with
national building code, with
appropriate importance factor
for LNG.
15.1.1.3. Soil study has been conducted.
LNG train sited in a preferred
zone.
Earthquake
Landslip
17.1. Ground liquefaction 17.1.1. Loss of foundations and

17.1.1.1. Soil study has been conducted.
due to earthquake.
damage to the LNG train, loss of
LNG train sited in a preferred
zone.
containment.
17.1.1.2. Ground improvement
incorporated in to design to
meet building code.
17.1.2. Damage to existing landfill
leading to possible impact on
the plant area.
17.2. Landslip above the 17.2.1. Damage to buildings and
site.
equipment on site. Loss of
containment in process.
17.1.2.1. Landfill has been assessed to

current seismic standards and
show to withstand liquefaction,
with the addition of a berm.
17.2.1.1. Geotechnical terrain hazard
assessment has been
conducted and found rockfall
hazards to be low.
17.2.1.2. New cut slopes designed to
geotechnical
recommendations, including
anchoring where required.
17.3. Subsea landslip in 17.3.1. Damage to waterfront

the foreshore area.
structures. Loss of process
equipment.
17.3.2. Damage to cooling water inlet
and diffusers.
17.3.1.1. LNG train is far enough from

the foreshore not to be affected
by credible subsea landslip.
17.3.2.1. Major marine structures,
81. Conduct additional study into the
including sea water intake are
likelihood and consequences of
located in a lower risk area.
marine landslip, and identify
additional design protection if
practicable.
17.3.2.2. FSO moorings are rock
socketed and designed for
lateral spreading of soil.
BOP
AR
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Tsunami
18.1. Submarine
earthquake or
landslip.
18.1.1. Wave damage to site.
Other extreme
weather
19.1. Drought.
19.1.1. Dust generation leading to

reduced visibility. Hazard to
personnel.
18.1.1.1. Tsunami study has been

conducted and shown that the
credible wave is not significant
compared with the extreme
wind and wave conditions.
82. Ensure that civil design includes
requirements to control dust from
external areas.
Ice/Snow
20.1. Failure of Henriette 20.1.1. Flood down Woodfibre creek

dam.
valley. Possible damage to
south-end of the site.
CR
83. Ensure that operational management PMT

plan includes dust control measures.
CR
85. Review if raw water supply from Mill

creek is sufficiently reliable to avoid
operational upsets in the event of
drought, considering the buffer
volume available in the raw water
tank.
BOP
AR
20.1.1.1. Dam inspection and

80. Review the consequences of failure of PMT
maintenance will be
the Henriette dam, and identify any
undertaken by WLNG, to meet
additional safeguards required.
BC dam safety regulations.
AR
19.1.2. Loss of water in Mill creek

19.1.2.1. Design to retain minimum
leading to loss of supply to plant
firewater volume in the raw
and firewater.
water tank (as required by
code).
Flooding
PMC Civil
20.2. Flooding of Mill

creek, e.g. high
rainfall or
temporary debris
flow.
20.2.1. Potential flooding of plant area 20.2.1.1. Flood protection measures

and damage to pipebridges and
incorporated at Mill creek.
equipment.
21.1. Weather
conditions.
21.1.1. Build up of load on structures.
84. Study potential flooding of Mill creek

and confirm that flood protection
measures are appropriate for the
hazard.
PMT
CR
98. Conduct avalanche hazard

BOP
assessment, as required by Worksafe
BC, and comply with requirements.
CR
21.1.1.1. Will be covered by

winterisation philosophy.
21.1.2. Falling ice hazard to personnel. 21.1.2.1. Will be covered by

winterisation philosophy.
21.2. Avalanche from
uphill
Fog/ Visibility
21.2.1. Hazard to personnel and

equipment.
22.1. Fog, smoke, snow 22.1.1. Interference with LNGC marine 22.1.1.1. Marine operation procedures to
storm.
operations.
be confirmed by TERMPOL.
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22.1.2. Interference with transport to
and from site.
22.1.2.1. Ferries designed for all

weather operation, including
poor visibility.
22.1.2.2. Helicopter is an unusual
operation and would not be
operated in unsuitable
operation.
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Node: 2. Inlet Facilities
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
Consequences
1.1. Other inventories in 1.1.1. Exposure to fire, risk of

train.
overpressure leading to
escalation.
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
Category
1.1.1.1. PSVs sized for fire case in the

area.
1.1.1.2. Fire and gas detection.
1.1.1.3. ESD and EDP of the feed gas
inventory.
1.1.1.4. Active and passive fire
protection - see general node.
1.1.1.5. FERA to be carried out.
1.2. Leak from hot oil

system within the
unit.
1.2.1. Pool fire.
1.2.1.1. Vents and relief from hot oil to 6. Check if hot oil is always below its flash PMC closed system to prevent hot oil
point, and therefore is non-hazardous Linde
relief feeding a fire.
in case of leak. If not practicable,
review area classification for hot oil
system area.
AR

1.3. Leak of feed gas
within the unit.
1.3.1. Jet fire, flammable cloud, flash

fire.

area.
inventory.
1.4. Leak from upstream 1.4.1. Jet fire, flammable cloud, flash
pipeline.
fire.

area.
34. Review the detection and isolation of PMC leaks at the inlet startup heater area, Linde
which is upstream of the ESDV.
AR
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1.4.1.3. ESD of the feed gas inventory
and EDP
1.4.1.4. ESD of feed gas at plant
boundary, downstream of
metering station.
Internal Fire
2.1. Malfunction of
catalytic oxidiser
2.1.1. Loss of burner control, risk of fire 2.1.1.1. Burner management system.
and overheating in oxidiser,
2.1.1.2. Oxidiser located outside
possible ignition source.
hazardous area.
External Explosion
3.1. Gas leak.
3.1.1. Overpressure, hazard to

personnel, damage to equipment,
potential hazard to other facilities 3.1.1.2. Hazardous area classification.
3.1.1.3. ESD and EDP to reduce
duration and extent of clouds.
Internal Explosion
4.1. Malfunction of
catalytic oxidiser See above.
Exposure to harmful 5.1. Harmful substances 5.1.1. Risk to personnel, risk of spill.
substances
for desalination.
(acute/chronic)
5.2. Contact with amine. 5.2.1. Health hazard to personnel.
5.2.1.1. Procedures for handling.
7. Review the open drains from the amine PMC area, consider means to prevent amine BOP
spills contaminating the general water
5.2.1.2. Segregated amine drain system
for draining.
treatment system.
AR

5.3. Sour gas discharge. 5.3.1. Health hazard to personnel.
5.3.1.1. Release point located to safe

8. Check if credible leak from stripping
location, to be confirmed by gas
column overhead system discharge
dispersion study.
PMC Linde
AR
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5.3.2. Environmental discharge.

Noise
6.1. See general node.
Environmental
Pollution
7.1. See general node

and cases above.
HAZARD from
OSBL
8.1. Landslip/
earthquake.
8.1.1. See general node.
8.2. Sea level change

(e.g. storm surge,
tsunami effects).
8.3. Extreme wind and

wave.
8.4. Lightning.
8.4.1. Standard design consideration.

No additional hazard identified.
8.5. Ice storm / freezing

rain.
8.5.1. Build up of ice falling and causing

structural damage or direct
overload.
5.3.1.2. Primary discharge is through

catalytic oxidiser, to oxidise any
residual hydrocarbon and H2S.
could lead to a health hazard, if so

consider detection requirements.
5.3.1.3. Secondary discharge is to flare.
5.3.2.1. Discharge permit.
9. Establish criteria for ice build up to be

considered in design and concept for
dealing with ice build up, including
potential dropped object during thaw.
PMC
AR

Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air
9.1. No new scenarios

identified.
Continuous /
frequent plant
identified.
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil

identified.
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Emergency / upset
discharges
12.1. All discharges to

flare system - see
general node.
12.2. Hot oil spill or leak. 12.2.1. Release to environment and
hazard to personnel.
12.2.1.1. Area containment and drainage 39. Ensure that liquid hydrocarbon
BOP
system to a sump and pumped
entering the surface drains in each of
to treatment system.
the train areas is separated before the
water is discharged.
CR
12.3. Spill or leak of

12.3.1. Release to environment.
pentane fuel for hot
oil heater.
12.3.1.1. Area containment and drainage 39. Ensure that liquid hydrocarbon
BOP
system to a sump and pumped
entering the surface drains in each of
to treatment system.
the train areas is separated before the
water is discharged.
CR
40. Conduct drainage philosophy review, PMC

to ensure that the safety and
environmental hazards for
hydrocarbon into the drain system are
addressed.
CR
It is noted that an LNG train

philosophy is available from Linde,
but has not been integrated into the
plant water treatment philosophy.
12.3.2. Pool fire hazard. Vapour
generation and fire / explosion
hazard.
12.4. PSV relief from hot 12.4.1. Potential hydrocarbon vapour
oil system or
release to atmosphere.
tempered water
(e.g. heat
exchanger leak
from the process).
35. Review the hazard from pentane fuel PMC in module 2, near the fired equipment. Linde
AR
16. Route hot oil and tempered water

PMC expansion vapour vent and PSVs to Linde
flare system (LP warm flare), to avoid
hydrocarbon release to atmosphere.
CR
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Node: 3. Liquefaction and Refrigeration.
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
Consequences
1.1. Other inventories on 1.1.1. Exposure to fire, risk of

the train.
escalation. Potential for BLEVE
(in particular mixed refrigerant
buffer vessels).
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
Category

area.
1.1.1.3. ESD.
EDP of the gas inventories.
1.1.1.5. Liquid leaks routed away from
process area by bunding
arrangement, to minimise pool
fire potential.

within the unit.

fire.

area.
inventory.
1.3. Leak of cryogenic

liquid.

fire.

area.
inventory.
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PFP for cryogenic area designed
for cold shock and fire case.
1.3.2. Direct hazard to personnel from
temperature.
1.3.2.1. Spray protection e.g. flange

shields to control likely leak
sources.
1.3.3. Damage to structures and

equipment, risk of escalation.
1.3.3.1. PFP designed to protect steel

against low temperature in areas
with cryogenic liquid.
1.3.4. Evaporating pool at spill basin,

leading to flammable cloud.
10. Provide means to limit evaporation

PMC
from LNG spill pit, e.g. high expansion
foam or floating block systems.
Assess the impact of the resulting
cloud in a spill event when the pit
location is defined.
AR

1.3.5. Spill in to water leading to RPT.
1.3.5.1. All drains lead to a sump with a 41. Confirm the design of LNG
BOP
low water level to minimise
catchments and the means to prevent
evaporation and ensure the
LNG ingress to the drain system.
volume is available.
Select a passive means if practicable.
Internal Fire

identified.
External Explosion
3.1. Gas leak or flashing 3.1.1. Overpressure, hazard to

liquid leak.
11. Check the requirements for rotating PMC equipment in hazardous areas as
Linde
potential ignition source (e.g. bearing
temperature monitoring). Concern is
that the only known standard is EN13463, which may not be applicable
in BC.
CR
CR

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Internal Explosion

identified.
Exposure to harmful 5.1. Contact with water / 5.1.1. Hazard to personnel health.
substances
glycol.
(acute/chronic)
5.1.1.1. Low hazard fluid.

5.1.1.2. Handling procedures.
Noise
Environmental
Pollution
7.1. Spill of tempered

cooling water.
7.1.1. Potential release of glycol to the 7.1.1.1. Glycol will not be added to
environment.
tempered water. System is water
only.
HAZARD from
OSBL
8.1. Landslip/
earthquake.

(e.g. storm surge,
tsunami effects).

wave.
8.4. Lightning.


rain.

overload.

PMC
AR
8.6. Lifting operations for 8.6.1. Dropped load on plant, leading to 8.6.1.1. Material handling philosophy
12. Establish position of cranes/ lifting
PMC
maintenance.
(including Dropped object study
equipment for plant maintenance,
) to be prepared.
consider minimising requirements for
lifting over live plant (e.g.
maintenance of one liquefaction train
with the other in operation).
AR
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Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air

identified.
Continuous /
frequent plant
identified.
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil

identified.
Emergency / upset
discharges

flare system - see
general node.
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Node: 4. Refrigerant Make-up and Fractionation Area.
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards

the train.
area.
escalation. Potential for BLEVE.
Potential to impair flare system
and prevent safe disposal from
FSO and other inventories.
Recommendations
Resp
36. Review the segregation of refrigerant PMC

storage and flare system from plant
hazards.
Category
AR
1.1.1.3. ESD.
EDP of the HP gas inventories.
fire potential.

within the unit.

fire.

area.
inventory.

liquid.

fire.

area.
inventory.
ARC-579-002-R01
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temperature.

sources.

1.3.3.1.
equipment due to embrittlement
or thermal stress and bowing, risk
of escalation.
1.3.3.2.
PFP designed to protect steel

HAZOP to consider thermal
stress cases.
PMC
AR

1.3.5. Spill in to water leading to RPT.
1.4. Leak of hydrocarbon 1.4.1. Build up of hydrocarbon

condensate.
condensate in drain system and
effluent treatment, risk of
flammable vapour, fire and
explosion.
BOP
13. Ensure that effluent drainage and
AMEC
treatment is designed for the
possibility of hydrocarbon condensate
leakage (low flashpoint hydrocarbon)
from any condensate handling areas
in the LNG train.
CR
AR

Internal Fire

identified.
ARC-579-002-R01
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External Explosion

liquid leak.
Linde
in BC.
CR

Internal Explosion

identified.
Exposure to harmful 5.1. Contact with water / 5.1.1. Hazard to personnel health.
substances
glycol.
(acute/chronic)
Noise
Environmental
Pollution
HAZARD from
OSBL
8.1. Landslip/
earthquake.

(e.g. storm surge,
tsunami effects).

wave.
8.4. Lightning.


rain.

overload.
5.1.1.1. Low hazard fluid.

5.1.1.2. Handling procedures.

PMC
AR
ARC-579-002-R01
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PMC
maintenance.
(including Dropped object study)
to be prepared.
AR

8.7. Filling of refrigerants 8.7.1. Potential for spill of refrigerant,
leading to fire / explosion risk and
(e.g. for startup)
hazard to personnel.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air
37. Establish the means for refrigerant

PMT
supply to site and filling of refrigerant
makeup storage.
AR
38. When refrigerant delivery method is PMC defined (refer to recommendation 37), BOP
review the hazards and controls
required.
AR

identified.
Continuous /
frequent plant
identified.
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil

identified.
Emergency / upset
discharges

flare system - see
general node.
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Node: 5. LP Compression, End Flash and Fuel Gas System.
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
Category

the train.
area.
escalation. Potential for BLEVE in
end flash drum.
1.1.1.3. ESD.
EDP of the gas inventories.
fire potential.
within the unit.

fire.

area.
inventory.

liquid.

fire.

area.
inventory.
ARC-579-002-R01
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temperature.

sources.

equipment, risk of escalation.
1.3.3.1. PFP designed to protect steel



PMC
AR

1.3.5. Spill in to water leading to RPT
(Rapid Phase Transition).
BOP
Internal Fire

identified.
External Explosion

liquid leak.
3.1.1.3. ESD.
3.1.1.4. Low pressure of systems.
Limited compressed gas
inventory.
Linde
in BC.
CR
CR
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Internal Explosion

identified.
Exposure to harmful 5.1. No new scenarios

substances
identified.
(acute/chronic)
Noise
Environmental
Pollution
HAZARD from
OSBL
8.1. Landslip/
earthquake.

(e.g. storm surge,
tsunami effects).

wave.
8.4. Lightning.


rain.

overload.

PMC
AR
PMC
maintenance.
) to be prepared.
AR
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8.7. Shutdown on
storage unit.
8.7.1. Possibility of surge in LNG

transfer line, leading to
overpressure.
8.8. Starting or stopping 8.8.1. Potential for exceeding cool down 8.8.1.1. Continuous cool down using
LNG flow.
limits, leading to damage and
dedicated liquid return line.
possible loss of containment from
transfer line.
8.8.1.2. cool down procedures.
42. Conduct transient analysis of flow in PMT

the rundown line from LNG train to
FSO, including surge and other upset
conditions.
CR
14. Confirm isolations on LNG transfer

PMC
lines to limit LNG spill in the case of
leakage, particularly for flexible joints
at the moorings.
CR

Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air

identified.
Continuous /
frequent plant
identified.
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil

identified.
Emergency / upset
discharges

flare system - see
general node.
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Node: 6. Substation
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
1.1. Fire in adjacent

process area.
1.1.1. Impairment of substation.

damage to equipment. Potential
loss of emergency power and
control to the plant.
1.1.1.1. Fire and gas and ESD from

process area.
1.2. Electrical fault.
1.2.1. Risk of fire in, or close to,

substation leading to loss of
power and control, risk to
personnel.
1.2.1.1. Fire detection and fire fighting

system.
1.2.2. Potential for transformer

explosion, causing impact
damage to process plant and loss
of containment.
Recommendations
Resp
43. Confirm that fire and explosion

protection of substation in the train
area is adequate to mitigate against
1.1.1.2. Fixed fire fighting system for the
common cause loss of power and
plant area.
control to train and equipment.
15. Review potential for transformer

failure leading to a hazard to the
process plant. If required, consider
additional safeguards.
Category
PMC
CR
PMC
AR

Internal Fire

identified.
External Explosion

identified.
Internal Explosion

identified.

substances
identified.
(acute/chronic)
Noise
Environmental
Pollution
HAZARD from
OSBL
8.1. See process nodes.
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Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air

identified.
Continuous /
10.1. All routed to
frequent plant
effluent treatment discharges to water
see general node.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil

identified.
Emergency / upset
discharges
ARC-579-002-R01
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Node: 7. BOP
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
1.1. Condensate spill at
tank.
Consequences
1.1.1. Pool fire at condensate tank.
Damage to tank. Risk of
escalation to LNG area.
1.1.2. Potential gas cloud and VCE

hazard in LNG area.
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
Category
1.1.1.1. Containment bund designed for 17. Review fire fighting means for pool
PMC 110% tank volume.
fires at the condensate tank or diesel BOP
storage, e.g. foam or dry powder
system.
CR
1.1.1.2. Process causes to be addressed 18. Review segregation distance between PMC through HAZOP.
condensate tank and LNG area.
BOP
Confirm that code requirements are
1.1.1.3. AFP and PFP in LNG area.
met.
AR
1.1.2.1. Gas detection area.

1.1.2.2. Control of ignition sources.
1.2. Overpressure of
condensate tank.
1.2.1. Release of condensate,

flammable atmosphere. Risk of
fire.
1.2.1.1. Tank relief protection,

discharging to flare.
1.2.1.2. N2 blanketing.
1.3. Spill during truck

loading of
condensate.
52. Check overpressure protection of the PMC AR

condensate tank. If routed into the LP Interface
flare system, this has a design
pressure greater than the tank, but if
routed to atmosphere, there may be a
flammable hazard in the area of the
train.
1.3.1. Pool fire at loading area. Damage 1.3.1.1. Designated loading area with
17.
to tank. Risk of escalation to LNG
containment.
area.
1.3.1.2. Process causes to be addressed
through HAZOP.
Review fire fighting means for pool

PMC fires at the condensate tank or diesel BOP
system.
CR
1.3.1.3. AFP and PFP in LNG area.

1.3.2. Potential gas cloud and VCE
hazard in LNG area.
1.3.2.1. Gas detection area.

1.3.2.2. Control of ignition sources.
1.4. Utility gas supply

leak.
1.4.1. Potential gas cloud and fire /

explosion hazard.
1.4.1.1. All utility gas installed in

accordance with BC Natural Gas
Code.
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1.4.1.2. Utility gas is reduced to normal
supply pressure at Fortis station,
and includes mercaptan as leak
indication.
1.5. Diesel tank leak or
diesel loading spill.
1.5.1. Pool fire at diesel storage.

Damage to tank.
1.5.1.1. Containment bund designed for 17. Review fire fighting means for pool
PMC 110% tank volume.
fires at the condensate tank or diesel BOP
system.
CR
1.6. Forest fire.
1.6.1. Fire spread to plant area. Risk of 1.6.1.1. Emergency response, including 19. Consider safeguards against external PMC escalation.
fire water / fire fighting
forest fire (e.g. fire break at plant
BOP
equipment to protect essential
boundary and/or perimeter boundary
areas (e.g. LNG train).
and vegetation control around plant
area).
1.6.1.2. Ability to shutdown and
depressurise plant.
AR
1.7. Electrical fire.
1.7.1. Potential ignition of hazardous

inventories.
1.7.1.1. In BOP area, electrical

20. Select equipment for piperack area as PMC equipment is segregated from
minimum of Zone 2, or equivalent.
BOP
hazardous inventories, except at
piperack area.
CR
1.8. Fire on road truck.
1.8.1. Risk of escalation to plant.

Potential ignition source for gas
leaks.
1.8.1.1. Control of vehicles on site - only 21. Develop standards for external
diesel vehicles associated with
vehicles (e.g. condensate trucks)
the plant.
within the safety management plan.
CR
1.9. Fire on attendant

vessel.
1.9.1. Hazard to personnel on vessel.
1.9.1.1. Dedicated ferry vessels, meeting

Transport Canada requirements.
PMT BOP
1.9.1.2. Selection of suitable vessels for

infrequent operations (e.g.
material transport), meeting
Transport Canada requirements.
1.9.2. Potential hazard to FSO and
1.9.2.1. All routine marine transport is
remote from FSO and process
carrier, and exposed inventories.
area.
Internal Fire
2.1. Warehouse fire.
2.1.1. Damage to equipment. Risk to

personnel in the area. Risk of
escalation to adjacent buildings
and vegetation.
2.1.1.1. Fire protection design criteria.

2.1.1.2. Static and mobile fire fighting
equipment and water supply
available.
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2.1.1.3. Evacuation plans in the safety
management plan.
2.2. Chemical storage
fire.

and vegetation.

available.
management plan.
2.2.2. Potential health risk to personnel

fighting the fire.
2.3. Substation fire.

and vegetation.
22. Review hazards from stored

PMC chemicals in the case of fire, and
BOP
include mitigation requirements in the
building basis of design.
AR
24. Review common cause loss of normal PMC

and emergency power, particularly to
process plant, and the required
system integrity.
AR

available.
2.3.2. Internal explosion (e.g. batteries,

transformers, etc.)
2.3.3. Risk of escalation to rundown
piperack from north substation.
2.3.4. Loss of supply to the plant.
Potential hazards from loss of
power and control.
2.4. BC hydro substation 2.4.1. Loss of power supply.

fire.
2.4.1.1. Two segregated transformers

and supply routes.
2.4.1.2. Emergency power from the site
does not pass through the same
switch gear.
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2.5. Fire at interim
substation.
2.5.1. Loss of power supply.
2.6. Non-process building 2.6.1.

(i.e. admin building,
workshop, guard
house building,
emergency response
building, canteen)
fire.
Damage to equipment. Risk to

and vegetation.
2.7. Process building (i.e. 2.7.1.

utility building,
cooling water pumps
building, effluent and
water treatment
shelter) fire.
Damage to equipment. Risk to

and vegetation.
58. Review scenario of prolonged loss of BOP

power if the interim substation
transformer fails. In this case, the
plant could require to be maintained
in a safe condition without external
power for a period of months.
Consider if offloading remaining
stored inventory is possible without
external power.
AR
23. Review hazards from fire in BOP

PMC systems and buildings adjacent to the BOP
rundown piperack and provide
separation where required.
AR
59. Review the alternative means of

control and shutdown, in the event
that the control room has to be
evacuated due to internal hazard.
AR

available.
management plan.
available.
management plan.
2.7.2. Risk of escalation to rundown

piperack from cooling water
system buildings,
2.7.3. Loss of supply to the plant.
Potential hazards.
2.8. Control room fire.
2.7.3.1. Utility failures to be addressed in

HAZOP.
2.8.1. Loss of control and management 2.8.1.1. Fire and smoke detection.
functions, if evacuated.
2.8.1.2. Fire suppression / protection
systems.
PMC BOP
2.8.1.3. Designated emergency

response room, outside the
control room.
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External Explosion
3.1. See relevant process

area nodes.
Internal Explosion
4.1. Vapour cloud from

process area.
4.1.1. Flammable atmosphere in

4.1.1.1. Electrical rooms and substations 55.
buildings and confined spaces in
are ventilated with positive
the utility areas. Risk of
pressure and ventilation
explosion.
shutdown on gas detection.
Review requirement for enclosed

BOP
buildings in the utility and cooling
water areas. Eliminate, where
possible, to minimise the potential for
vapour clouds inside buildings.
AR
56. Review the hazard from temporary

BOP
substation as a source of ignition, or a
fire hazard which might affect process
equipment.
AR
5.1.1. Health hazard to personnel.
54. Identify the hazards from chemicals to BOP

be stored, when they are selected,
and ensure that handling and storage
arrangements are suitable to protect
personnel and releases to the
environment.
CR
5.1.2. Environmental hazard.
54. Identify the hazards from chemicals to BOP

be stored, when they are selected,
and ensure that handling and storage
arrangements are suitable to protect
personnel and releases to the
environment.
CR
5.2.1. Personnel asphyxiation hazard.
53. Review the hazard of N2 in utility

BOP
building, and ensure that asphyxiation
hazard is addressed.
CR
60. Confirm that physical protection is

BOP
provided around process areas and
structures (e.g. pipe and cable
bridges), to protect against accidental
impacts from vehicles and handling
operations.
CR
4.1.1.2. Separation distance between

process area and manned
buildings. To be confirmed by
siting study.
Loss of Containment 5.1. Chemical leak.
5.2. N2 leak inside

building.
Cryogenic Hazard
6.1. Not applicable.
Impact/Mechanical
Damage
7.1. Vehicle movements 7.1.1. Risk of collision with and damage

on site.
to structures and process
equipment.
7.2. Vessel collision with 7.2.1. See general node

personnel and
material access
jetties.
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Exposure to harmful 8.1. Contamination from 8.1.1. Hazard to personnel.
substances
existing asbestos
(acute/chronic)
disposal site.
8.1.1.1. Site to be capped to meet the

requirements of COC (Certificate
Of Compliance), before
handover to Woodfibre.
Noise
9.1.1. Exposure of personnel.
9.1.1.1. Equipment and noise

attenuation (where required) to
be designed to meet Worksafe
BC requirements for noise.
9.1.2. Noise nuisance in area.
9.1.2.1. BOP equipment noise included

in noise model for off-site noise
(to meet OGC requirements).
10.1.1. Release to water or soil.
10.1.1.1. Tanks and loading areas are in

bunded areas.
10.1.2. Vapour from condensate

release to air.
10.1.2.1. No routine handling of

condensate in the open. Tank
is blanketed and connected to
flare system.
10.2.1. Possible contaminated water

running to surrounding
environment.
10.2.1.1. Runoff within BOP area is

collected and passed through
oily water separation.
Environmental
Pollution
9.1. Noisy equipment

(e.g. emergency
generators, utility
pumps,
compressors, etc.)
10.1. Spill of diesel or

condensate.
10.2. Runoff from plant

areas.
HAZARD from
OSBL
11.1. See general node

for external
hazards.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air
12.1. HVAC unit

refrigerant leak
(fugitive
emissions).
12.1.1. Release of refrigerant to

environment.
12.2. Landfill gas.
30. Identify any chemicals handled in the PMC BOP area which may pass through
BOP
oily water separation. If any are
identified, provide separate
containment to prevent drainage into
the surface water system.
AR
10.2.1.2. Spill response procedures and 31. Review the disposal of lab drains to PMC local drip trays and catchments
ensure that they are correctly treated. BOP
around equipment.
AR
12.1.1.1. Maintenance and integrity.

12.1.1.2. Considered in EIA.
12.2.2. Potential build up of flammable

gas.
12.2.1.1. Considered in EIA.

32. Review if flammable gas hazard from PMC landfill is credible.
BOP
AR
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12.3. Sea water
12.3.1. Local hazard at the release
chlorination
point.
hydrogen/ chlorine
discharge.
33. Review the potential hazards from

venting from chlorination system
when the technology has been
chosen.
BOP
AR
BOP
AR
57. Ensure that oxygen-rich gas from N2 BOP

generation is dispersed safely.
CR
Also consider the environmental

implications of any routine venting to
atmosphere from the process.
33. Review the potential hazards from

venting from chlorination system
when the technology has been
chosen.
Also consider the environmental
implications of any routine venting to
atmosphere from the process.
12.4. Vapour displaced 12.4.1. Release of flammable

during condensate
hydrocarbon vapour.
truck filling
operation.
12.4.1.1. Closed vapour return to the

tank vapour space from the
truck.
12.5. Oxygen-rich offgas 12.5.1. Increased fire hazard in the

from N2
area.
generation.
Continuous /
13.1. Closed process
frequent plant
drains (produced
discharges to water
water).
13.2. Surface runoff.
13.1.1. Potential discharge of

hydrocarbons to the
environment.
13.1.1.1. All oily water drains from

process are treated in
biological treatment.
61. Consider if a buffer storage is

BOP
required for off-spec produced water,
to enable plant operation to continue
in an upset case at the treatment
13.1.1.2. Discharge monitoring system.
plant.
AR

hydrocarbons to the
environment.
13.2.1.1. All surface drains from open

plant contacted area are
collected in a surface runoff
pond, with sufficient capacity
for maximum rainfall event.
CR
62. Check the basis for the maximum

rainfall event used in sizing the
surface runoff retention pond.
BOP
13.2.1.2. Liquid from the pond and

drains from buildings with
potential hydrocarbon are
treated in biological treatment.
13.2.1.3. Discharge monitoring system.
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13.3. Contamination of
non-process area
runoff (e.g. diesel
from vehicles,
chemical spill
during transport,
etc.)

hydrocarbons to the
environment.
13.3.1.1. Hydrocarbon containing areas 63. Consider if discharge points for runoff BOP
(e.g. transformers, diesel
to sea should be provided with valves
equipment) are locally bunded
to stop the runoff in the case of a spill,
and can be drained to the
e.g. on a roadway.
contacted area drainage
treatment system.
AR
13.3.1.2. Oily water separator at each

discharge point to intercept
hydrocarbon spills.
13.4. Discharge of
13.4.1. Discharge to the environment.
domestic sewage
from buildings and
FSO.
13.4.1.1. All sewage collected and

routed to sewage treatment
plant, to meet BC
requirements.
13.5. Discharge of sea

water cooling.
13.5.1.1. System designed to achieve

acceptable temperature at the
discharge dispersion. Location
confirmed by modeling.
13.5.1. High temperature at the

discharge, possible chlorite
content leading to
environmental hazard.
13.5.1.2. Dechlorination by a passive

aeration in the outflow, with
discharge monitoring.
13.5.1.3. Temperature and flow
monitoring of discharge.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil
Emergency / upset
discharges
14.1. Leachate from

landfill.
14.1.1. Contamination of the soil and

ground water.
15.1. Damage to sea

15.1.1. Discharge of concentrated
water inlet
hypochlorite to sea at the inlet.
hypochlorite dosing
system or
maloperation.
14.1.1.1. Existing landfill is lined.

Leachate is collected and
treated.
64. Sample existing leachate to

PMT
determine the contaminants that are
present and ensure that treatment is
adequate.
CR
14.1.1.2. Sampling to confirm the

discharge quality.
65. Review the expected material to be BOP

added to the landfill and predict the
leachate composition and flow which
must be treated. Design the leachate
treatment appropriately.
AR
66. Consider if hypochlorite injection

BOP
pipework should be inside the sea
water intake, so that leakage is not to
the sea.
AR
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Node: 8. Flare Systems
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
1.1. Emergency flaring
case.
Consequences
Resp
Category
1.1.2.1. Clear area to be established

around the flare, based on flare
radiation study.
1.2.1. Inability to blowdown.
1.3. Fire affecting flare

1.3.1. Inability to vent gas from FSO to
piperack from FSO.
flare safely.
Internal Fire
Recommendations
1.1.1. Thermal radiation to plant areas, 1.1.1.1. Flare to be designed so that

personnel access routes, etc.
manned and accessible areas
are not exposed to excessive
radiation (to be confirmed by
flare study).
1.1.2. Risk of ignition for foliage.
1.2. Fire in LNG train

affecting flare
piperack.
Safeguards
25. Review the protection of flare headers BOP

and support structures against
process area fire, to ensure blowdown
duration is protected.
CR
26. Review the protection of flare headers BOP

and support structures from FSO
against process area fire. Ensure that
safe venting is available in the case of
impairment of the flare system.
CR
27. Review the implications of damage to BOP

the flare system in the event of a
vapour cloud explosion in the LNG
area. Identify if a design accidental
load for blast is required.
AR
2.1. Air ingress into flare 2.1.1. Fire or explosion in flare headers. 2.1.1.1. N2 purge.
system.
2.1.1.2. Flare design.
2.1.1.3. HAZOP to consider process
causes.
External Explosion
3.1. Explosion in process 3.1.1. Damage to piperacks, lines and

area.
flare structure. Inability to
depressurise unaffected
inventories and FSO off-gas.
Internal Explosion

identified.
Loss of Containment 5.1. No new scenarios

identified.
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Cryogenic Hazard

identified.
Impact/Mechanical
Damage

identified.

substances
identified.
(acute/chronic)
Noise
9.1. Flare noise.
Environmental
Pollution
10.1. See discharges,

below.
HAZARD from
OSBL
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air
12.1. No routine flaring.
9.1.1. Exposure of personnel.
9.1.1.1. Flares to be designed to meet

Worksafe BC requirements for
noise.
9.1.2. Noise nuisance in area.
9.1.2.1. Flare noise included in noise

model for off-site noise.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil
Emergency / upset
discharges
15.1. Flare flame-out.
15.1.1. Unignited gas release. Risk of 15.1.1.1. Multiple pilots with flame
flammable gas cloud in process
monitoring and ignition
areas, particularly from cold
systems.
releases.
28. Conduct unignited gas dispersion

Solaris studies to confirm that emergency
Flare
flare releases, without ignition, do not
lead to an unsafe condition due to
flammable gas cloud formation.
AR
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29. Review the reliability of utility gas
PMC supply to pilots, and if a backup
BOP
supply is required (e.g. from BOG or
local bottle supply). Concern is that
Fortis maintenance or defect may
require isolation of utility gas.
15.2. Build up liquid in
KO drums.
15.2.1. Liquid carryover through the

flare - "burning rain".
AR
15.2.1.1. KO drum volume and level

indication.
15.2.1.2. See HAZOP study for process
causes and safeguards.
15.3. Emergency flaring See External Fire,

above.
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Node: 9. FSO (Rundown and Storage Mode)
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
Consequences
1.1. Fire at substation or 1.1.1. Risk of escalation to adjacent

adjacent building
rundown and BOG pipework on
onshore.
the piperack. Potential loss of
ability to discharge BOG.
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
Category
1.1.1.1. ESD.
1.1.1.3. FSO is separated by distance.
1.1.1.4. In the event that the piperack is
lost, FSO tank pressure build up
can be contained for at least 3
days, before local relief to
atmosphere at each tank.
1.2. Major fire on LNG

1.2.1. Risk of escalation to FSO.
train or condensate
storage.
1.2.1.1. ESD / blowdown at the train.

1.2.1.3. FSO is separated by distance (to
be reviewed in siting study).
1.2.1.5. Moss tank design has heat
protection capability.
1.2.2. Loss of normal BOG discharge

route.
1.2.2.1. Direct connection to LP flare.

1.2.3. Loss of power / utilities to FSO.
1.2.3.1. Onboard emergency power

generation supplying safety
systems.
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1.2.3.2. Onboard N2 generation,
supplied by emergency power.
1.2.4. Personnel on FSO are unable to 1.2.4.1. Two escape routes (fore and aft) 44. Consider if FSO control room should FSO
evacuate past the process area.
and evacuation by boat from the
be permanently manned, and if it
should remain manned in the case of
north end of the site.
a fire on the jetty or train. If so, review
fire and blast protection requirements.
45. Review evacuation routes from all
areas on the FSO.
1.3. Fire on vehicle on
jetty or utility ramp
area.
1.3.1. Escalation to rundown and BOG 1.3.1.1. Fire detection and fire fighting
lines. Fire adjacent to FSO.
system on jetty.
1.3.1.2. ESD on shore to FSO, on both
sides of flexible connections.
AR
FSO
AR
46. Review access and mechanical

BOP
handling for maintenance on transfer
arm between jetty and FSO, as this
may be conducted during operation
with the spare arm in use.
CR
1.3.1.3. Control of access, only required

for loading arm maintenance.
Internal Fire
2.1. Fire on FSO

equipment (e.g.
emergency
generator,
compressors or
equipment room).
2.1.1. Escalation to cargo systems,

2.1.1.1. Non-process (emergency
leading to major fire on the FSO.
generators, etc.) will be located
in compartments, outside the
cargo area and separate from
essential utilities (N2, control,
etc.)
2.1.1.2. Fire detection, fire protection
and fixed fire fighting systems to
class requirements
2.1.2. Loss of utilities, control, etc.
between FSO and shore.
2.1.2.1. Fire detection, fire protection

and fixed fire fighting systems to
class requirements
2.1.2.2. Non-process (emergency
generators, etc.) will be located
in compartments, outside the
cargo area and separate from
essential utilities (N2, control,
etc.)
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External Explosion
3.1. Explosion in the LNG 3.1.1. Overpressure on the FSO. Risk

of damage leading to loss of
train.
containment.
3.1.1.1. Separation by distance and

44.
withstand capability of the Moss
tank system. To be confirmed by
siting study.
Consider if FSO control room should FSO

be permanently manned, and if it
should remain manned in the case of
a fire on the jetty or train. If so, review
fire and blast protection requirements.
AR
3.2.2. Cold damage to FSO hull, risk of 3.2.2.1. Compartmentalisation - double 47. Consider cold protection in the area of FSO
structural failure.
hull with ballast tanks - localised
the rundown line from shore to avoid
damage would not cause loss of
damage to the hull in case of leakage
stability or buoyancy.
(e.g. sacrificial splash plate).
AR
48. Consider cold protection in the area of Jetty

damage to the jetty piles in case of
leakage.
AR
3.2. LNG release to sea 3.2.1. Possible RPT between jetty and 3.2.1.1. Inherent strength of ship's hull
from jetty to FSO
FSO. Risk of damage to
sufficient to withstand RPT
connection failure.
equipment.
pressure.
Internal Explosion
4.1. LNG leak into hold

space.
4.1.1. Flammable atmosphere, potential 4.1.1.1. No equipment or ignition

49.
sources in the hold space.
explosion in the hold space.
Escalation to other tanks.
4.1.1.2. Annular space between tank and
insulation is N2 purged and has
gas detection at the purge outlet.
Review reliability and availability of

hold space LNG secondary
containment sump pumps, and if
emergency power is required.
FSO
AR
4.2. Air ingress into cargo 4.2.1. Possible explosive mixture inside 4.2.1.1. Maintenance procedures to inert 50. Identify if vacuum breakers on LNG FSO
tank due to
and refill tanks following
the tank.
tanks could be removed, as is current
underpressure or
maintenance.
practice for Moss tanks, and develop
incorrect operating
vacuum protection design.
(e.g. maintenance
release).
51. Review LNG tank protection against PMC
air ingress at HAZOP.
AR
4.1.1.3. Gas detection in the hold space,

with ability to inert the hold
space with inert gas or N2.
4.1.1.4. Liquid containment system with
recovery pump, to control
credible liquid leaks.
4.3. Malfunction of IGG 4.3.1. Potential explosion in the IGG.

(inert gas generator).
CR
4.3.1.1. IGG located in the machinery

area, in a dedicated
compartment.
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4.3.1.2. Burner management system in
IGG package.
Loss of Containment 5.1. Loss of containment 5.1.1. Vapour release leading to
on cargo system or
flammable gas cloud.
jetty connection.
5.1.1.1. ESD for rundown lines and jetty

connections.
5.1.1.2. Gas detection system.
5.1.1.3. All vapour lines are low
pressure.
5.1.1.4. All lines and cargo headers are
freely ventilated, open area.
5.1.1.5. Compressor rooms provided
with forced ventilation and gas
detection to meet class
requirements.
5.1.2. LNG release leading to

flammable gas cloud and
cryogenic damage to structures
and equipment.
5.1.2.1. ESD for rundown lines and jetty 47. Consider cold protection in the area of FSO
connections.
damage to the hull in case of leakage
AR
48. Consider cold protection in the area of Jetty

damage to the jetty piles in case of
leakage.
AR
5.1.2.3. All lines and cargo headers are 88. Review the risk of cryogenic damage FSO
to structures on the FSO from header
leaks, and identify if any additional
cryogenic protection is required.
5.1.2.4. Compressor rooms (containing
LNG vapourisor for gas up of
tanks) provided with forced
ventilation and gas detection to
meet class requirements.
AR
5.1.2.5. All connections have catchment

to protect against small
cryogenic leaks.
5.2. Loss of containment 5.2.1. Vapour release leading to
on rundown system
flammable gas cloud.
ashore.
5.2.1.1. ESD for rundown lines and jetty

connections.
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5.2.1.3. All vapour lines are low
pressure.
5.2.2. LNG release leading to
flammable gas cloud and
cryogenic damage to structures
and equipment.
5.2.2.1. ESD for rundown lines and jetty 89. Review the possibility of LNG leak on BOP
connections.
the rundown line. If credible leak
sources are identified, provide LNG
leak containment.
AR

5.2.2.4. LNG jetty has containment
sloped to spill basin.
5.3. Loss of containment 5.3.1. Spill of diesel to the environment.
of diesel in
machinery area or
transfer.
90. Relocate FSO diesel bunkering point BOP

to the aft access bridge, to avoid
unnecessary vehicle operations near
the process connections. Ensure that
spill protection is provided.
CR
90. Relocate FSO diesel bunkering point BOP

to the aft access bridge, to avoid
unnecessary vehicle operations near
the process connections. Ensure that
spill protection is provided.
CR
5.5. Activation of CO2

5.5.1. Hazard to personnel in the area.
fire fighting system.
91. Review hazards from existing CO2

fire fighting system. Consider
upgrading to modern standards.
FSO
AR
6.1. Roll over.
92. Review the potential for roll over in

FSO
the FSO tank, considering the feed
composition. If required, confirm that
roll over is within the sizing basis for
FSO tank PSVs.
CR
5.3.2. Risk of damage to process

equipment during the transfer
due to vehicles on the jetty.
5.4. Loss of containment 5.4.1. Asphyxiation hazard on entry.

of N2 into a confined
space.
Cryogenic Hazard
5.4.1.1. Normally no entry. Confined

space entry procedures.
6.1.1. High pressure in the cargo tank, 6.1.1.1. Operating procedures to

risk of overpressure and failure.
circulate tanks to avoid
stratification.
6.1.1.2. Roll over requires static tank
conditions for prolonged period unlikely in a floating facility with
frequent loading / offloading.
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6.1.1.3. LNG composition is reasonably
consistent, significant density
differences between
components are unlikely in this
feed.
Impact/Mechanical
Damage
7.1. Ship collision.
7.1.1. Damage to FSO hull. In extreme 7.1.1.1. Marine operation procedures

case, loss of containment.
and ship exclusion to be
confirmed by TERMPOL.
7.1.1.2. Double hull design with damage
stability criteria.
7.1.1.3. Fendering system reduces
impact energy.
7.1.1.4. Nav lights.
7.2. Mechanical handling. 7.2.1. Risk of damage to process lines 7.2.1.1. Material handling philosophy
FSO
leading to loss of containment.
equipment for plant maintenance and
) to be prepared.
loading and offloading operation,
lifting over live plant .
AR
Exposure to harmful 8.1. Asbestos present in 8.1.1. Hazard to personnel if disturbed. 8.1.1.1. Hazardous material study to
substances
existing marine
identify existing hazardous
(acute/chronic)
equipment onboard.
material and prevent exposure
hazards.
Noise
Environmental
Pollution
HAZARD from
OSBL
11.1. Extreme wind and 11.1.1. Damage to mooring. Risk of

breakaway of FSO.
wave.
11.1.1.1. Designed for 1/100 year storm 93. Consider the margin available above BOP
event in normal operation.
the design storm event and confirm
that break away will not occur due to
small exceedance.
11.2. Seismic activity.
11.2.1.1. Designed for 1/475 year

seismic event in normal
operation, including
accelerations and ground
movement (lateral spreading).
11.2.1. Damage to mooring. Risk of

breakaway of FSO.
CR
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11.2.1.2. Designed to survive 1/2475
year seismic event, including
accelerations and ground
movement (lateral spreading).
11.3. Incorrect attitude of 11.3.1. Possible load on mooring
FSO, e.g. damage,
system leading to damage.
ballasting or
loading error.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air
11.3.1.1. Damage stability analysis

identified maximum heel and
trim angles, in worst case
loading and damaged
conditions.
94. Confirm that mooring design can

FSO
accommodate maximum angles from
damage stability analysis, when
available.
CR
97. Consider requirement for dispersion

modelling of FSO tank PSVs to
ensure release to safe location.
AR

identified.
Continuous /
13.1. Surface runoff from 13.1.1. Minor contamination (e.g.
frequent plant
FSO deck.
maintenance fluids).
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil
Emergency / upset
discharges
15.1. Venting from FSO 15.1.1. Release of flammable gas

tank PSVs or vent
cloud.
mast.
13.1.1.1. Maintenance procedures and

local drip trays where required.
15.1.1.1. Designed to release to safe

location.
PMC
15.1.1.2. Hazardous area zoning of

FSO.
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Node: 10. LNG Offloading
Guide
Word/Deviation
External Fire
Causes
1.1. Fire on LNGC.
Consequences
1.1.1. Risk of escalation to the FSO.
Safeguards
Recommendations
Resp
Category
1.1.1.1. Quick release mooring system.

1.1.1.2. Breakaway couplings.
1.1.1.3. Tugs available continuously
during loading operation with fire
fighting capability and LNG
carrier has wires readily
available for tugs.
1.1.1.4. Electrical supply to LNGC has
staged shutdown and
breakaway built in.
1.1.1.5. Emergency procedures to be
developed as part of TERMPOL.
Internal Fire

identified.
External Explosion

identified.
Internal Explosion

identified.
Loss of Containment 5.1. Loading arm failure. 5.1.1. Release of LNG between FSO
5.1.1.1. Gas detection in the area.
and the LNGC. Risk of cryogenic
damage to both hulls. Formation 5.1.1.2. Loading operation is
of gas cloud and risk of fire /
permanently supervised,
explosion.
operator has ESD function.
5.1.1.3. Water curtain to protect both
hulls.
5.1.1.4. Spill protection at both manifolds
and joints.
5.2. Excess vessel
movement.
5.2.1. Exceeding motion limits of arms

5.2.1.1. Motion monitoring with alarms

and shutdown on arm positional
envelope.
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5.2.1.2. Mooring load monitoring system
with alarm.
5.2.1.3. Operating procedure to restrict
weather conditions.
5.2.1.4. Breakaway coupling with
mechanical isolation at both
sides in the event of
uncontrolled breakaway.
5.2.2. Possible loss of electrical supply 5.2.2.1. Electrical supply to LNGC has
leading to LNGC blackout.
staged shutdown and
breakaway built in.
Cryogenic Hazard

identified.
Impact/Mechanical
Damage
7.1. Collision during

berthing.
7.1.1. Damage to FSO LNGC and

mooring.
7.1.1.1. Mooring design and fendering

system.
7.1.1.2. Marine operation procedures to
be confirmed by TERMPOL.
7.2. Mechanical handling 7.2.1. Risk of damage to process lines 7.2.1.1. Material handling philosophy
FSO
- transport between
equipment for plant maintenance and
FSO and LNGC.
) to be prepared.
loading and offloading operation,
lifting over live plant .
AR

substances
identified.
(acute/chronic)
Noise
Environmental
Pollution
HAZARD from
OSBL

identified.
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to air
12.1. Venting from LNGC 12.1.1. Discharge from the LNGC to the 12.1.1.1. LNGC gassing up procedures 96. Consider if gassing up of LNGCs
PMT
and safe vent location.
(e.g. gassing up or
environment of inert gas and
should be considered as an operation
for the site, including the discharge
maloperation)
some hydrocarbon.
that this involves.
AR
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12.1.2. Flammable gas release from the 12.1.2.1. Cargo area of FSO is a
hazardous zone and is a freely
LNGC, potentially affecting the
vented open area.
FSO.
12.1.2.2. Vent location on LNGCs to
disperse gas as far as
practicable.
Continuous /
frequent plant
identified.
discharges to water
Continuous /
frequent plant
discharges to soil
Emergency / upset
discharges

identified.
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Appendix B
HAZID Recommendations
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Recommendations
Place(s) Used
1. Ensure that Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) philosophies for all areas are compatible, as these form part of a single Consequences: 1.2.1.1
plant SIS.
Responsibility
Category
PMC
CR
Consequences: 1.5.1.1
PMC - Linde
AR
PMC - Linde
CR
PMT
AR
BOP
CR
PMC - Linde
AR
PMC - BOP
AR

2. Conduct AFP and PFP study to identify the benefits and hazards of deluge in each area.

3. Ensure that BC Work Safe BC OHS regulations are complied with in &AA S-PC 1031 - Working Environment
Philosophy.

4. Consider operation for scenario where site access is not available (due to weather conditions, boat failure, etc.) Ensure Consequences: 1.11.1.1
that safe operation can be maintained, with personnel on site.

5. Confirm that the helipad locations are suitable and meet regulations.

6. Check if hot oil is always below its flash point, and therefore is non-hazardous in case of leak. If not practicable, review Consequences: 2.1.2.1
area classification for hot oil system area.

7. Review the open drains from the amine area, consider means to prevent amine spills contaminating the general water
treatment system.
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Recommendations
8. Check if credible leak from stripping column overhead system discharge could lead to a health hazard, if so consider
detection requirements.
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
PMC - Linde
AR
PMC
AR
PMC
AR
PMC - Linde
CR
PMC
AR
AMEC
AR
PMC
CR

9. Establish criteria for ice build up to be considered in design and concept for dealing with ice build up, including potential Consequences: 2.8.5.1,
dropped object during thaw.
3.8.5.1, 4.8.5.1, 5.8.5.1

10. Provide means to limit evaporation from LNG spill pit, e.g. high expansion foam or floating block systems. Assess the Consequences: 3.1.3.4,
impact of the resulting cloud in a spill event when the pit location is defined.
4.1.3.4, 5.1.3.4

11. Check the requirements for rotating equipment in hazardous areas as potential ignition source (e.g. bearing
temperature monitoring). Concern is that the only known standard is EN-13463, which may not be applicable in BC.
Consequences: 3.3.1.1,
4.3.1.1, 5.3.1.1

12. Establish position of cranes/ lifting equipment for plant maintenance, consider minimising requirements for lifting over Consequences: 3.8.6.1,
live plant (e.g. maintenance of one liquefaction train with the other in operation).
4.8.6.1, 5.8.6.1

13. Ensure that effluent drainage and treatment is designed for the possibility of hydrocarbon condensate leakage (low
flashpoint hydrocarbon) from any condensate handling areas in the LNG train.

14. Confirm isolations on LNG transfer lines to limit LNG spill in the case of leakage, particularly for flexible joints at the
moorings.
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Recommendations
15. Review potential for transformer failure leading to a hazard to the process plant. If required, consider additional
safeguards.
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
PMC
AR
PMC - Linde
CR
17. Review fire fighting means for pool fires at the condensate tank or diesel storage, e.g. foam or dry powder system.
7.1.3.1, 7.1.5.1
PMC - BOP
CR
18. Review segregation distance between condensate tank and LNG area. Confirm that code requirements are met.
PMC - BOP
AR
19. Consider safeguards against external forest fire (e.g. fire break at plant boundary and/or perimeter boundary and
vegetation control around plant area).
PMC - BOP
AR
20. Select equipment for piperack area as minimum of Zone 2, or equivalent.
PMC - BOP
CR
21. Develop standards for external vehicles (e.g. condensate trucks) within the safety management plan.
PMT - BOP
CR
22. Review hazards from stored chemicals in the case of fire, and include mitigation requirements in the building basis of Consequences: 7.2.2.2
design.
PMC - BOP
AR
23. Review hazards from fire in BOP systems and buildings adjacent to the rundown piperack and provide separation
where required.
PMC - BOP
AR
24. Review common cause loss of normal and emergency power, particularly to process plant, and the required system
integrity.
PMC
AR
25. Review the protection of flare headers and support structures against process area fire, to ensure blowdown duration Consequences: 8.1.2.1
is protected.
BOP
CR
26. Review the protection of flare headers and support structures from FSO against process area fire. Ensure that safe
venting is available in the case of impairment of the flare system.
BOP
CR
27. Review the implications of damage to the flare system in the event of a vapour cloud explosion in the LNG area.
Identify if a design accidental load for blast is required.
BOP
AR

16. Route hot oil and tempered water expansion vapour vent and PSVs to flare system (LP warm flare), to avoid
hydrocarbon release to atmosphere.
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Recommendations
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
28. Conduct unignited gas dispersion studies to confirm that emergency flare releases, without ignition, do not lead to an
unsafe condition due to flammable gas cloud formation.
Solaris - Flare
AR
29. Review the reliability of utility gas supply to pilots, and if a backup supply is required (e.g. from BOG or local bottle
supply). Concern is that Fortis maintenance or defect may require isolation of utility gas.
PMC - BOP
AR
30. Identify any chemicals handled in the BOP area which may pass through oily water separation. If any are identified,
provide separate containment to prevent drainage into the surface water system.
PMC - BOP
AR
31. Review the disposal of lab drains to ensure that they are correctly treated.
PMC - BOP
AR
32. Review if flammable gas hazard from landfill is credible.
PMC - BOP
AR
33. Review the potential hazards from venting from chlorination system when the technology has been chosen.
7.12.3.2
BOP
AR
34. Review the detection and isolation of leaks at the inlet startup heater area, which is upstream of the ESDV.
PMC - Linde
AR
35. Review the hazard from pentane fuel in module 2, near the fired equipment.
PMC - Linde
AR
36. Review the segregation of refrigerant storage and flare system from plant hazards.
PMC
AR
37. Establish the means for refrigerant supply to site and filling of refrigerant makeup storage.
PMT
AR
38. When refrigerant delivery method is defined (refer to recommendation 37), review the hazards and controls required.
PMC - BOP
AR
39. Ensure that liquid hydrocarbon entering the surface drains in each of the train areas is separated before the water is
discharged.
2.12.3.1
BOP
CR
40. Conduct drainage philosophy review, to ensure that the safety and environmental hazards for hydrocarbon into the
drain system are addressed.
PMC
CR
41. Confirm the design of LNG catchments and the means to prevent LNG ingress to the drain system. Select a passive
means if practicable.
4.1.3.5, 5.1.3.5
BOP
CR
42. Conduct transient analysis of flow in the rundown line from LNG train to FSO, including surge and other upset
conditions.
PMT
CR
Also consider the environmental implications of any routine venting to atmosphere from the process.
It is noted that an LNG train philosophy is available from Linde, but has not been integrated into the plant water
treatment philosophy.
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Recommendations
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
43. Confirm that fire and explosion protection of substation in the train area is adequate to mitigate against common cause Consequences: 6.1.1.1
loss of power and control to train and equipment.
PMC
CR
44. Consider if FSO control room should be permanently manned, and if it should remain manned in the case of a fire on Consequences: 9.1.2.4,
the jetty or train. If so, review fire and blast protection requirements.
9.3.1.1
FSO
AR
45. Review evacuation routes from all areas on the FSO.
FSO
AR
46. Review access and mechanical handling for maintenance on transfer arm between jetty and FSO, as this may be
conducted during operation with the spare arm in use.
BOP
CR
47. Consider cold protection in the area of the rundown line from shore to avoid damage to the hull in case of leakage
9.5.1.2
FSO
AR
48. Consider cold protection in the area of the rundown line from shore to avoid damage to the jetty piles in case of
leakage.
9.5.1.2
Jetty
AR
49. Review reliability and availability of hold space LNG secondary containment sump pumps, and if emergency power is Consequences: 9.4.1.1
required.
FSO
AR
50. Identify if vacuum breakers on LNG tanks could be removed, as is current practice for Moss tanks, and develop
vacuum protection design.
FSO
AR
51. Review LNG tank protection against air ingress at HAZOP.
PMC
CR
52. Check overpressure protection of the condensate tank. If routed into the LP flare system, this has a design pressure
greater than the tank, but if routed to atmosphere, there may be a flammable hazard in the area of the train.
PMC - Interface
AR
53. Review the hazard of N2 in utility building, and ensure that asphyxiation hazard is addressed.
BOP
CR
54. Identify the hazards from chemicals to be stored, when they are selected, and ensure that handling and storage
arrangements are suitable to protect personnel and releases to the environment.
7.5.1.2
BOP
CR
55. Review requirement for enclosed buildings in the utility and cooling water areas. Eliminate, where possible, to
minimise the potential for vapour clouds inside buildings.
BOP
AR
56. Review the hazard from temporary substation as a source of ignition, or a fire hazard which might affect process
equipment.
BOP
AR
57. Ensure that oxygen-rich gas from N2 generation is dispersed safely.
BOP
CR
58. Review scenario of prolonged loss of power if the interim substation transformer fails. In this case, the plant could
require to be maintained in a safe condition without external power for a period of months. Consider if offloading
remaining stored inventory is possible without external power.
BOP
AR
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Recommendations
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
59. Review the alternative means of control and shutdown, in the event that the control room has to be evacuated due to
internal hazard.
PMC - BOP
AR
60. Confirm that physical protection is provided around process areas and structures (e.g. pipe and cable bridges), to
protect against accidental impacts from vehicles and handling operations.
BOP
CR
61. Consider if a buffer storage is required for off-spec produced water, to enable plant operation to continue in an upset
case at the treatment plant.
BOP
AR
62. Check the basis for the maximum rainfall event used in sizing the surface runoff retention pond.
BOP
CR
63. Consider if discharge points for runoff to sea should be provided with valves to stop the runoff in the case of a spill,
e.g. on a roadway.
BOP
AR
64. Sample existing leachate to determine the contaminants that are present and ensure that treatment is adequate.
PMT
CR
65. Review the expected material to be added to the landfill and predict the leachate composition and flow which must be Consequences: 7.14.1.1
treated. Design the leachate treatment appropriately.
BOP
AR
66. Consider if hypochlorite injection pipework should be inside the sea water intake, so that leakage is not to the sea.
BOP
AR
67. Confirm that consistent pressure and temperature safeguarding philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO
scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.
PMC - Process
CR
68. Confirm that consistent fire and explosion protection philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and Consequences: 1.3.1.1
cover interfaces with the LNG train.
PMC - Fire Protection
CR
69. Confirm that consistent fire and gas detection philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover
PMC - Fire Protection
CR
70. Confirm that consistent PFP and AFP philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover
PMC - HSE
CR
71. Confirm that blowdown philosophy has been updated to the latest LNG train configuration, and blowdown study
remains valid.
PMC - Linde
CR
72. Confirm that consistent ESD and EDP philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover
PMC - Process
CR
73. Confirm that consistent working environment philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover
PMC
CR
PMC - HSE
AR
74. Consider the philosophy for evacuation and mustering of whole site area, including remote locations such as metering Consequences: 1.8.1.2
station, flare area, fire water tank, etc.
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Recommendations
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
75. Confirm that noise control philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the
LNG train and that this meets the requirements of the site noise limits.
PMC
CR
76. Confirm location, extent and specification of site perimeter fence and control of access at road crossings and river
crossing.
1.12.3.1
BOP
CR
77. Develop wildlife management plan (including bear hazards).
PMT
CR
78. Develop project safety and security plan, including potential for public protest.
1.12.3.2
PMT
CR
79. Confirm that structural/ marine/ civil design criteria are consistent with the basis of design requirements, for all areas of Consequences: 1.13.1.2
the site.
PMC - Structural
CR
80. Review the consequences of failure of the Henriette dam, and identify any additional safeguards required.
PMT
AR
81. Conduct additional study into the likelihood and consequences of marine landslip, and identify additional design
protection if practicable.
BOP
AR
82. Ensure that civil design includes requirements to control dust from external areas.
PMC - Civil
CR
83. Ensure that operational management plan includes dust control measures.
PMT
CR
84. Study potential flooding of Mill creek and confirm that flood protection measures are appropriate for the hazard.
PMT
CR
85. Review if raw water supply from Mill creek is sufficiently reliable to avoid operational upsets in the event of drought,
considering the buffer volume available in the raw water tank.
BOP
AR
86. Confirm that requirements for the EIA are incorporated in the basis of design. Note this applies to all environmental
issues, not just lighting.
PMT
CR
87. Ensure the operations philosophy complies with the requirements of the EA, for the handling of hazardous materials.
PMT
CR
88. Review the risk of cryogenic damage to structures on the FSO from header leaks, and identify if any additional
cryogenic protection is required.
FSO
AR
89. Review the possibility of LNG leak on the rundown line. If credible leak sources are identified, provide LNG leak
containment.
BOP
AR
90. Relocate FSO diesel bunkering point to the aft access bridge, to avoid unnecessary vehicle operations near the
process connections. Ensure that spill protection is provided.
9.5.3.2
BOP
CR
91. Review hazards from existing CO2 fire fighting system. Consider upgrading to modern standards.
FSO
AR
ARC-579-002-R01
Issue 02
April 2015
Page 73 of 50

Recommendations
Place(s) Used
Responsibility
Category
92. Review the potential for roll over in the FSO tank, considering the feed composition. If required, confirm that roll over is Consequences: 9.6.1.1
within the sizing basis for FSO tank PSVs.
FSO
CR
93. Consider the margin available above the design storm event and confirm that break away will not occur due to small
exceedance.
BOP
CR
94. Confirm that mooring design can accommodate maximum angles from damage stability analysis, when available.
FSO
CR
95. Establish position of cranes/ lifting equipment for plant maintenance and loading and offloading operation, consider
minimising requirements for lifting over live plant .
10.7.2.1
FSO
AR
96. Consider if gassing up of LNGCs should be considered as an operation for the site, including the discharge that this
involves.
PMT
AR
97. Consider requirement for dispersion modelling of FSO tank PSVs to ensure release to safe location.
PMC
AR
98. Conduct avalanche hazard assessment, as required by Worksafe BC, and comply with requirements.
BOP
CR
ARC-579-002-R01
Issue 02
April 2015
Page 74 of 50

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Abbott Risk Consulting Limited

Woodfibre PMC Project Safety Studies

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APPROVAL AND REVISION RECORD

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As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Active Fire Protection / Passive Fire Protection

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Boil Off Gas

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

Design Accidental Load

Environmental Impact Assessment

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment

Environmental [hazard] Identification

Emergency Shut Down / Emergency Depressurisation

Emergency Shut Down Valve

Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

Floating Liquefied Natural Gas vessel

Floating Storage and Offloading vessel

Hazard and Operability

Inert Gas Generator

Local Equipment Room

Liquefied Natural Gas

Low Pressure / High Pressure

[BC] Oil and Gas Commission

Outside Battery Limit

Project Management Company

Project Management Team

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Personnel Protective Equipment

Pressure Safety Valve

Quantified Risk Assessment

Rapid Phase Transition

Safety Critical Element

Safety Instrumented System

Technical Review Process of Marine Terminal Systems

Vapour Cloud Explosion

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Objective of the Study

Scope of the Study

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LP Compression, End Flash and Fuel Gas System; and

BOP (Balance of Plant);

FSO (Rundown and Storage Mode); and

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HAZID Study Methodology

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Table 2.2 HAZID Specific Node Guidewords

Recording and Reporting

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Civil Project Engineer PMC

Integration manager PMC

Operations and Start- PMC

Tech Safety Lead

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Engineering Manager PMT

Streams: Feed gas, amine, CO2, waste water.

Acid gas stream is treated in catalytic oxidiser and vented to atmosphere.

System located in modules 1 and 2.

Two identical trains in modules 4 and 6.