Running Head: EduEmergency Resources

Christina Ritter
Topic: Interoperability
Achieving Interoperability in School Violence Incidents
Introduction
School violence, be it on college campuses or public and private primary and secondary
schools, has become an unfortunately common discussion in both the media and public arena in
recent years. While not a completely new phenomena, the coverage and severity of school
violence, namely those involving firearms, appears to be taking a dangerous upward turn. The
motives behind recent school violence have also been indicative of a frightening pattern of desire
for mass carnage rather than specific targets, extensive premeditation, and attempts to harm
emergency responders and investigators post-incident. The nature of violence in schools seemed
to change overnight from isolated acts of disaffected students or gang power struggles to
premeditated acts of terrorism (Greenough, 2004). As the nature of the threat continues to
develop, so too should the way in which schools, emergency responders, and those in public
office plan for and respond to school violence events. Viewing school violence through the lens
of a terrorist threat, or complex criminal plot, rather than isolated acts of random violence, allows
for a more comprehensive strategy to be developed prior to an incident, limiting the amount of
on-scene decision making and hindsight regrets regarding preparation and coordination as much
as possible. One area that is regrettably neglected in many emergency response cases is
interoperability. This is shown to be true in the case of school shootings like Columbine and the
Sandy Hook massacre, which prove to be case studies in failed interoperability. There are
measures that schools, responders, and legislators can take to increase interoperability and
overall effectiveness of response to a school violence incident. These measures should be

carefully considered prior to the anticipation of an incident, as it is often too little, too late,
when an event occurs. Increasing interoperability among school personnel and emergency
responders, as well as providing training and exercises for students, staff, and community
members can greatly contribute to a more successful outcome in the face of school violence. This
paper aims to highlight the necessity for practiced interoperabilityincluding technology, drills
and exercises, and effective multi-agency communication and planningwhen considering
school violence prevention and response. Columbine and Sandy Hook will be used as case
studies to illustrate the potential devastation of failed interoperable communications, concluding
with recommendations for educators and emergency personnel to increase interoperability in
future incidents.
Interoperability Defined
Interoperability is the ability of public safety personnel to communicate by radio with
staff from other agencies, on demand and in real time (PSWN, 1). While, to most outside the
emergency management field, this seems to be a common sense consideration
communicationit is, in many cases, difficult to achieve. If first responders from multiple
agenciesfire, EMS, police and those coordinating response efforts are not able to
communicate with each other, the result can be a chaotic, disorganized, and sometimes
incredibly dangerous situation. There are three primary obstacles to interoperability that must be
addressed- finding suitable technology, establishing a common frequency/standard, and securing
funding (Mayer-Schnberger, 2002).
A truly interoperable public safety communications network will have to integrate
the radio networks of local law enforcement, firefighters, EMS, and other local,
state, and federal public safety organizations. It will also have to accommodate
the communications systems of neighboring public safety agencies, so that
officers from one locality can talk with their colleagues in others. Hence

hundreds, even thousands of users will have to be linked through a network

extending beyond states and even nations (2002).
The type of technology selected should be accessible and usable by al agencies and jurisdictions
involved, allow for multiple pathways of communication by multiple users simultaneously, and
be scalable and adaptable to the necessity of the specific situation.
Once a suitable technology is established, a common frequency and standard must be
defined. This allows for all users to communicate within the same set of channels. Once a
frequency is established, there has to be a standard method of implementing communication over
the frequency in order to avoid confusion and network congestion. It cannot be left until an
incident is occurring to determine who is able to communicate with whom over what channel.
Perhaps the most difficult, yet most critical, aspect of interoperability is securing funding
for the technology and training associated with it. Implementing a new technology or system of
technologies is a costly and lengthy process that truly rests on the shoulders of local, state, and
federal officials. Governance is a major obstacle to interoperability, with prioritizing resource
allocation and regulations frequently tying up the process in the red-tape of bureaucracy. A data
management system and communications technologies must be sustainable enough to warrant
the expenditure associated with redesigning the system. Create a sustainability model that is
stable enough to encourage long-term (top-down) commitments while maintaining enough
flexibility in governance and funding structures to allow full participation of the emerging
(bottom-up) activities (Heikkurinen, 2013).
Overcoming these obstacles may be challenging, but it is a necessary hurdle.
Interoperability is often considered in hindsight, as responders and officials consider what went
wrong, in a catastrophe. Interoperable communications must be considered a priority prior to an

incident, especially when a situation as unpredictable as a school shooting, where wasted

seconds can mean the lives of children, occurs.
Case Study: Columbine
On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, students at Columbine High School in
Colorado, opened fire on their classmates and teachers, killing twelve and injuring 21 others.
This unprecedented school massacre shook the nation, as terrified high school students fled from
the school and responders were tasked with securing and assessing a scene of unparalleled
horror. The Columbine massacre sparked national discussion of gun laws, mental health,
bullying, and school security, as a community and a nation was faced with a potential new
reality. As police, SWAT teams, and first responders approached the scene, it was unknown
what the status of the shooters was, or the extent of the devastation inside of the school. While
the shooters has killed themselves, thus posing no threat, it was determined, after the event, that
Harris and Klebold did, in fact, assemble 99 homemade explosives that could have posed a fatal
hazard to responders. Despite the immediate challenge of securing a scene as extensive and
sensitive as this, a major hurdle was revealed in the form of interoperable communication.
as it turned out, the biggest challenge on that Tuesday afternoon was not
battling the two attackers. They had already killed themselves when the first law
enforcement team entered the school. The biggest challenge was coordinating
heavily armed and ready-to-fire police forces from half a dozen sheriffs offices
and twenty area police departments, forty-six ambulances, and two helicopters
from twelve fire and EMS agencies, as well as personnel from a number of state
and federal agencies. Coordination was difficult not primarily because of turf
wars or lack of crisis management The real challenge was simplerand much
more serious. Responders from the various agencies had no communications
system that would permit them to communicate with each other. (MayerSchnberger, 2002).
Columbine was a striking lesson in the importance of planning for multiagency and
multijurisdictional response. The Governors commission report following the incident alludes to

the fact that, while communications systems works effectively among personnel in their
respective agencies, there was inadequate support for communications among the multitude of
responders required for a large-scale effort such as Columbine. For example:
requests for additional support or for specific equipment had to be relayed
person-to-person by officers running on foot because the information could not be
relayed on compatible radio frequencies (Erickson, 2001, pp.83)
One can imagine that having officer relying information on foot is not only remarkably
inefficient and inaccurate, but can compromise any level of concealment if necessary, and leaves
officers vulnerable. Further the report states:
Many responders indicated that radios and cell phones were useless as a
communication method. Airwaves were jammed and calls would not go through.
This hampered responders communicating with each other, sharing information
within and among agencies and alerting families of the status of students at staff
at Columbine High School (2001, pp. 85).
The Jefferson County dispatch center lost access to the local command post within the first hour,
and responders were essentially going in without direction or collaboration on the ground aside
from that which could be done face to face.
Situations like these are not uncommon, as interoperability can tend to be an afterthought,
however, another element is added to the interoperability spectrum in school shootings
communication and relationships between schools and law enforcement, which will be addressed
in a subsequent section of this paper.
Case Study: Sandy Hook Elementary
On December 14, 2012, 20 year old Adam Lanza murdered his mother Nancy and
proceeded to conduct an armed assault on Sandy Hook Elementary School, in Newtown CT.
Lanza breached the locked door to the school with an assault rifle and continued down the halls
of the school, brutally killing twenty students, all around the ages of six and seven, and six

teachers. Despite this incident occurring thirteen years after Columbine, similar weaknesses were
exposed in the capabilities of communications systems and interoperability in the Sandy Hook
response.
Sources have said many state police radios did not work inside the school,
making it difficult for officers to communicate, a potentially deadly situation with
so many officers searching from different areas looking for the shooterAt one
point, an officer had to go outside the school and use a cellphone to call
headquarters and relay the gravity of the situation (Altimari, 2015).
Inability to communicate with one another in an active shooter situation is a potentially lethal
misstep, with the potential for friendly-fire incidents or other costly missteps. Beyond
communication among personnel, officers were unable to communicate with headquarters to
provide information that could guide decision-making in terms of strategic oversight, additional
resources, public safety information, etc.
There also were questions about the 911 calls going to the regional dispatch
center in Litchfield rather than to the closest state police barracks in Southbury,
and whether that affected the response times of troopers who were unfamiliar with
the Newtown area (2015).
In most emergencies, but especially in the case of an active-shooter situation in a
crowded school, seconds can mean the difference between survival and devastation. Misdirected
9-11 calls can delay response and critically hinder an operation. The Final Report of the Sandy
Hook Advisory Commission addresses a number of concerns that would be rectified going
forward regarding communications systems. This report indicated that these systems were not in
place at the time of the shooting, thus necessitating direction by the commission for
implementation. Many of these updates address the need for interoperability, not only among
emergency personnel, but between responders and the school as well. For example:
Emergency Communication Systems (ECS) and/or alarm systems shall have
redundant means to notify first responders, supporting agencies, public safety
officials and others of an event to allow for effective response and incident

management. Alarm systems must be compatible with the municipal systems in

place. These systems may include radio, electronic, wireless or multimedia
technology which provides real time information (such as audio, visual, mapping
and relevant data) directly to first responders. Points of Broadcast input for these
systems shall be reviewed with emergency responders. (SHAC, 2015).

The report continues, suggesting:

All new buildings shall have approved radio coverage for first responders within
the building based upon the existing coverage levels of communication systems at
the exterior of the building. The system as installed must comply with all
applicable sections of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Rules for
Communication Systems and shall coordinate with the downlink and uplink pass
band frequencies of the respective first responders. Perform a radio audibility and
intelligibility test and modify system design accordingly (2015).
These considerations bridge the communication gap between schools and responders in
the event of an incident that requires immediate response. Real-time audio and visual
transmission from within the school to responders and officials provides invaluable situational
awareness, while ensuring radio coverage allows responders to communicate with each other,
dispatchers, and command centers to facilitate a fluid, informed, response to the situation.
Interoperable Technology for Schools
Undoubtedly in response to events like Sandy Hook, the Virginia Tech Massacre, and a
number of other active shooter incidents involving schools, a number of new technologies
exist that may aid in interoperability within schools and between schools and first responders.
These technologies combined with education, training, drills, and exercises in active shooter and
school violence scenarios can greatly reduce the loss of life associated with these horrific
incidents.
One such technology is Mutualink, that works to provide solutions for interoperability
geared toward school personnel in the event of a school shooting. The technology provided by
Mutualink includes a smartphone application, a Rave Panic Button that immediate alerts local

emergency personnel to a specific emergency occurring at a school, and connects responders

with those inside of the school. This application connects the user directly to emergency dispatch
and responders on scene, eliminating telephone relays and message delays (Mutualink, 2016). In
addition to the user-friendly application, Mutualink offers a portable K12 Interoperable
Workstation that can be used by school personnel to communicate with local public dispatch and
responders, utilizing interconnected talkgroups and radio channels over a secured network. The
workstation facilitates file sharing between school personnel and responders, live video feeds via
school security cameras, text messaging and voice data sharing, and access to PA systems.
SchoolSAFE is another communications system designed to aid in situational awareness
and interoperability in an active shooter situation. In Colorado and Ohio, over 2,000 students,
teachers, and emergency personnel conducted active shooter drills using SchoolSAFE
technology.
the drills allowed school staff and public safety to utilize cameras, drones and
SchoolSAFEs radio communications systemsequipped with Motorola
Solutions MOTOTRBO radiosand enhanced notification software to imitate
the communications that would be necessary in the event of a school shooting
(Toone, 2015).
As with any equipment or technology, training is essential. Technology is only as
effective as the people handing itthus it is also necessary to create a level of organization,
responsibility and command within a school setting. An FBI Academy report The School
Shooter: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE suggests the creation of a
multidisciplinary team to address the planning, preparation, and response to school violence:
Consider forming a Multidisciplinary Team: As well as appointing a threat
assessment coordinator, schools may decide to establish a multi disciplinary team
as another component of the threat assessment system. Schools could draw team
members from school staff and other professionals, including trained mental
health professionals. The team would constitute an experienced, knowledgeable
group that could review threats, consult with outside experts, and provide

recommendations and advice to the coordinator and to the school administration.

It is strongly recommended that a law enforcement representative should either be
included as a member of the team or regularly consulted as a resource person
(OToole, 1999).
This exemplifies interoperability in terms of multiagency training and exercises.
Collaboration between school personnel, parents and students, law enforcement, mental health
and healthcare professionals, and other relevant parties prior to an incident will facilitate more
effective communication during an event.
Conclusion
Interoperability is at the core of effective emergency response, yet often overlooked until
it is too late. The ability for first responders to communicate with each other, cooperating
agencies and across jurisdictions is essential for the safety of all involved and in order to produce
the most successful and efficient response to an emergency. This is especially true in events
requiring rapid response by multiple agencies with little time for preparationfor example, and
active shooter situation in a school setting. Lessons learned from such incidents, like Columbine
and Sandy Hook, illustrate a failure to consider interoperable communications both among
responders and between school personnel and emergency response and dispatch. Bridging these
gaps with technologies like Mutualink and SchoolSafe, as well as implementing
multidisciplinary training, education, and exercises, can reduce the devastating impact of school
shootings going forward.

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