PEACE MONITOR

AN ISSUE DIGEST OF THE POLICY GROUP

May 2016

Volume III, Issue No. 2

The Nexus of SSR and the Peace Process

The Peace Process
The Philippine Development Plan (2013), states that (t)he challenge for the government is to sustain the gains in the peace process and in the security reforms
in order to attain an end to armed conflict by the end of the term of this administration. This will be done through a determined and deliberate strategy of negotiated political settlement, accompanied by a complementary track that aims to mitigate the impact of armed conflict
and address the basic issues that sustain armed hostilities. (Philippine Development Plan, Chap 9, 2013)
Peace process is the primary strategy of the State in addressing the armed conflict and achieving peace. To this, two
main platforms are pursued: (a) negotiated political settlement with armed groups through peace talks (Track 1), and
(b) addressing and/or mitigating effects of armed conflict through a deliberate convergence mechanism of government programs.
The State is managing five peace tables which are in various stages of negotiations. The peace process with the
MILF moved forward, with the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014,
and translated into the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). The CPP-NPA-NDF table continues to be at an impasse; in the meantime, armed violence on the ground especially in areas affected by the presence of the New Peoples Army (NPA) continues. Meanwhile, the CPLA and the RPM/P-RPA-ABB Peace Tables are in the completion
stages.
Complementing the peace negotiation is the deliberate downloading of development and governance interventions to
conflict-affected communities through PAMANA.
DDR and the Peace Process
Some of the peace tables are already moving towards the post-agreement phase in international parlance, this is
the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration) stage. The DDR, in the Philippine context, is appropriated as
the following:
Arms Control and Management: Removing or managing the possession of arms of former rebels, and controlling/managing the proliferation of firearms in communities.
Force Management/ Demobilization: Dismantling the military-like chain of command of liberation armies, and
helping transform the armed organization into a civilian groupeither as a civil society organization or political
party. This process also attempts to facilitate the re-civilianization of former rebels.
Rebuilding, Rehabilitation: Facilitating interventions that aim to rebuild individual lives and relationships among
members of communities, and rehabilitate communities affected by armed conflict.
Security Reform/ Security Transformation
(1) The Armed Forces of the Philippines
The reform initiatives in the security sector, particularly the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), are contained
in the following documents: the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP-Bayanihan), and the AFPTransformation Roadmap (ATR).
The IPSP and the ATR are attempts to create new perspectives, processes, mechanisms, and rules towards a
more cohesive, unified, and professional military that adhere to human rights, civilian supremacy, and democratic
control. With the IPSP-Bayanihan and ATR, the military moves away from simply protecting the survival of the
state. It equally emphasizes protecting the survival of the people or people-centered security. A clear implication is a shift in the doctrines, equipment, rewards and promotion scheme, the military justice system, and even,
a review of the core competencies of soldiery.
(2) Philippine National Police Transformation Roadmap
The PNP is also in the process of modernization through their Transformation Roadmap Patrol Plan 2030. Its

goal is to modernize the police force in terms of personnel capability, equipment and hard ware.
As for the security reform agenda, the important question is: What, where, and when will the Transformation
Roadmaps of the PNP and the AFP converge?
Convergence of the Security Reform and the Peace Process
There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the peace process and the SSR agenda: Security Reform aims
to (a) ensure that internal stability is promoted and sustained, and (b) enhance the resilience of communities; while
Peace Process aims to (a) have a negotiated political settlement with armed groups, (b) ensure that conflict-affected
communities benefit from peace dividends (i.e. inclusive development for all), and (c) remove violence from the political processes of the country.
Together, the peace process and security reform/security transformation can address the domains of peace and security: (1) physical security, addressing the internal and external armed threats to the state; and (2) human security,
addressing the survival and development needs, and sustainable development requirements of the people.
Current Challenges
The major question is: How comprehensive should the peace process-SSR nexus be?
1. INSTITUTIONAL
Monies involved: Can the local economy support and sustain the processes?
Commitment of political leaders: How long, how deep should the leaders commitment to the process be both
government leaders and the rebel groups?
Acceptance of communities: Will communities who are not party to the process hence, will not directly benefit
from the windfall of peace dividends, be warm to the process? This is especially a concern given that majority of
the people also need the same support provided to former rebels. The major challenge is how to clarify to the
larger population that the peace dividends is not rewarding the rebels but investing in peace.
2. COMBATANTS and AFFECTED COMMUNITIES: Combatants would want to enter DDR/ Post agreement programs if conditions in their communities improve.
- E.g. turning-in firearms can happen if there are no longer threats to their lives
Demobilization of forces can happen if combatants see and feel that services are flowing; and that structural
changes are happening (hence, less reliance on liberation front leadership). But the paradox is that improvement
in community condition will not happen/is slow to happen if armed combatants will not undergo demobilization.
FINAL WORDS
Some fundamental and philosophical questions remain:
Can political settlement ensure that the communities will actually enjoy peace? Will the process finally address
and end the decades-long armed conflict?
What is the governments over-all strategic plan in managing internal and external conflicts?
How does the involvement of the military in internal strife impact on its capability to handle external threats?
NOW, more than ever, the need for a National Security Strategy (NSS) is underscored:
For the on-going peace process in the post-agreement/DDR phase, the NSS can help the political leaders
understand how the transition can be operationalized, and when the exit strategy can commence.
For communities not party to the process and are critical of the process, the NSS can outline the general strategy on how to win the peace on the ground.
For the defense establishment, the NSS can clarify the engagement-dis-engagement plan of the military and
police vis-a-vis internal security process, as well as the role of different institutions to address the various stages of security and peace concerns.
Security reform in the peace process is not just about changes in management or organizational structure. It is centrally concerned with changing power relations and often occurs within a highly charged and politicized environment.
It is necessary to have a national consensus on security issues. It also necessitates change in the behavior of the
armed forces towards the security environment of the state and its people. Finally, it also requires dedicated leadership, communication and consultation with all stakeholders, and commitment and political will to see reform through.

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