ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.

CELERA
A.C. NO. 5581
January 14, 2014

Legal Ethics: Rule 1.01, Canon 7; Rule 7.03

FACTS:
Rose Bansig filed a complaint againts Atty. Juan Celera for Gross Immoral
Conduct.
On May 8, 1997, Atty. Celera and Grace Marie R. Bunagan (Bunagan) entered
into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate
of marriage issued by the Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Grace
Marie, legal wife of respondent. However, Atty,. Celera contracted another marriage
on January 8, 1988 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration
Officer of San Juan, Manila.
Bansig stressed that the marriage between Atty. Celera and Bunagan was still
valid and in full existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and
that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.
Despite repeated summons and resolutions issued by the court, Atty. Celera
failed to properly answer the complaint. The complaint drags on for over a decade.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Celera is guilty of gross immoral conduct and wilful disobedience
of lawful orders.
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent
contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these marriage certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove
that he committed bigamy which renders him unfit to continue as member of the
Bar.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his
first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and is grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather
respondents defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive
disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This
case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has
issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to
have pre-selected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore.
The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto.
He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to
comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show
cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming
that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however,

feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this
Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone
a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We
have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the
land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

PENA VS. ATTY. PATERNO

A.C. No. 4191

June 10, 2013

FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C.
Paterno for acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial
Law. Complainant , the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200,
located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244, Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eightdoor apartment constructed thereon.
The complainant alleged that she gave respondent her owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in
constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent
for seven years. Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to
return it. Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner.
Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her
property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to
respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years,
complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor
visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant
explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the
submission of her title in order to process her loan application.
In the course of investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Krausto sell
complainant's land to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by
Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the property
described therein to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd. for P200,000.00. Respondent
alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her office.
However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she
notarized the instrument in her direct examination, but on cross-examination, she
stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed
of Sale. Estrella Kraus' affidavit supported respondent's defense.
Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita
Pea, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said
person did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be
faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of
sale in her notarial register. Recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law and her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of respondent, if
still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from
reappointment as a notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was clear and preponderant evidence showing that
respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by(a) deceiving
complainant Anita C. Pea; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto
Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c)
knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.

HELD:

As a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards

embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following
Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C.
Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually REVOKED.

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA

A.C. No. 7907

December 15, 2010

FACTS:
In the Complaint of the spouses Aranda, they alleged that Atty. Elaydas
handling of their civil case wassorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow
elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence. However, they were surprised
that an adverse judgment was rendered against them resulting to the loss of their
Mitsubishi Pajero. Apparently, Atty. Elayda failed to inform the spouses of the date of
hearing as well as the order of judgment. No motion for reconsideration or appeal
was interposed by the lawyer as well. In his reply, Atty. Elayda said that the
spouses did not bother to keep in touch with him and they were the ones who
neglected their case in court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Elayda should be sanctioned by the court.
HELD:
From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and
safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious, competent and
diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention,
care, and time to all the cases heis handling. As the spouses Aran das counsel, Atty.
Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses case and is obligated to
exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the
cause espoused by the spouses Aranda. Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these.
Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled
hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the
spouses whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility
between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary duty to inform his
clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued by the
court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the
developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is
necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively
monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer
and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have
constant communication with each other. Again, address is simply unacceptable.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a
member of the legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to
exercise due diligence in handling his clients case but in fact abandoned his clients
cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless
clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the
Court of which he is an officer. On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a
lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended a 6 month suspension. This was adopted by the court.
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL vs.ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT
FLORIDO A.C. No. 5736
June 18, 2010

FACTS:
According to RBCI, respondent and his clients(Nazareno-Relampagos group),
through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the
management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay
(Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their
own staff to run the bank.
In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained
that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the NazarenoRelampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove
their allegations.
Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never
identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary
exhibits were originals or certified true copies. IBP, through its Commissioner, said
that respondent had no legal basis to implement the takeover of RBCI and that it
was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.
Respondent appealed from the IBPs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florido violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a
lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness.
A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in
seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. A
lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his
clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating
Canon 19
and
Rules
1.02
and15.07
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one
year effective upon finality of this Decision.

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA v. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO

A.C. 6281
September 16, 2011
FACTS:

Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land

located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. Complainant initiated
Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case for the registration of the property. During
the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty.
Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit, complainant and respondent agreed that
complainant was to pay P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P2,000.00 as
appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced
by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent
demanded the additional P10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum, which
he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus 20% of the
total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to
their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his
siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by
respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of
complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious
and their relationship became sore.
A Decision was rendered, granting the petition for registration, which Decision
was declared final and executory. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent
complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las
Pias City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and owner's
duplicate of the title of the property.
Complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT).He was surprised to discover that the same had already
been claimed by and released to respondent on. Complainant talked to respondent
on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he
had
claimed
without complainant's
knowledge,
consent and
authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and
the 20% share in the property in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the
owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not
having been agreed upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Carpio violated Canon 20
HELD:
Yes. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would legally
give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives what is
allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
In collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose
additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed
upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset,
respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees
that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion
of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the
financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of

additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no
merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for
determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract
but recoverable by him from his client." The principle of quantum meruit applies if a
lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he
would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has
earned.[13] In the present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement
as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of
quantum meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already
compensated by such agreement.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his
client and imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title
deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to
the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of
this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.

QUIACHON V. ATTY. RAMOS

A.C. NO. 9317
June 4, 2014

FACTS:
A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against her lawyer Atty. Ramos who
represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special proceeding case before
the RTC. Complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in
violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP conducted an investigation on the disbursement case filed by the
complainant against her lawyer and the report found out that the respondent had
been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases
being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform
complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the
client from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard.
However inspite of finding neglect on respondents part, the complainant
during the pendency of the proceedings, withdrew the disbarment case.
ISSUE:
Whether the withdrawal of the disbarment case will terminate or abate the
jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding
against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
HELD:
No. The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate
or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative
proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos
violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of
complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.

GERLIE M. UY VS. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666
September 5, 2012

FACTS:

This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross

ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty,
conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed
by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against Presiding Judge Javellana of the
Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

In People vs. Cornelio (Malicious

Mischief)
-

Judge Javellana issued warrant of

arrest after the filing of a certain
criminal case despite Sec. 16 of
the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.

In People
Mischief)
-

vs.

Lopez

JAVELLANAS DEFENSE

- The necessity of holding the accused in

detention became evident when it was
revealed during trial that the same
accused were wanted for Attempted
Homicide in another case.

Malicious

Judge Javellana did not apply the

Revised
Rules
on
Summary
Procedure and instead conducted
a preliminary examination and
investigation in accordance with
the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, then set the case for
arraignment and free trial, despite
confirming that complainant and
her witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the material facts
alleged in their affidavits, which
should had been a ground for
dismissal of said case.

- Judge
Javellana
reiterated that a
motion to dismiss is a prohibited
pleading under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure and he added that
he could not dismiss the case outright
since the prosecution has not yet fully
presented its evidence.

In Trespass to Dwelling
-

Judge Javellana did not grant the

motion to dismiss for noncompliance
with
the
Lupon
requirement under Sec. 18 and
19(a) of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.

- The Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a

jurisdictional requirement and the Motion
to Dismiss on said ground was a
prohibited pleading under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD:

YES. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious
mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO VS. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM JR.

A.C. 9872
January 28, 2014
FACTS:

In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr.
to help her in the quieting of her title over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Solidum
P50,000.00 as acceptance fee.
In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the
services of Solidum for the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the
help of her sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the case. Hence, Navarro gave
Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration expenses.
Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million
from Navarro. The loan was covered by two Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs).
The MOA was prepared by Solidum. The MOA stated that the monthly interest shall
be 10%.
Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period.
He again drafted a MOA containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro.
As additional security for the loan, Solidum mortgaged his 263-hectare land for P1
million in favor of Presbitero.
Nothing happened in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since
Solidum did nothing after receiving the acceptance fee.
In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found
out that the land was already registered to someone else. Navarro claims that she
should not have financed the case if only Solidum advised her of the status of the
land.
Anent the loans, Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned the
terms of the loans as he claimed that the interest rate of said loans at 10% is
unconscionable.
Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against Solidum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.
HELD: Yes.
Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of
Php3 million from Navarro and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether
it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In this case, such act
displayed by Solidum merited his disbarment.
Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private
capacity with respect to Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Splidum to
draft the terms of the loan agreements. Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing that the
interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the
validity of the same MOAs he prepared.
In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that Navarro is not actually his client in
the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case.
In Presbiteros case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall

not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Even though Solidum secured the
loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbiteros interest was not fully protected
because the property Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed that his 263hectare land was worth P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only
P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidums ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

ERLINDA FOSTER VS. JAIME AGTANG

A.C. NO. 10579
December 10, 2014
FACTS:

In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a realty
dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtangs acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for
incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He also
advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get
a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtangs demands.
various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his personal
use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent,
asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtangs
negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out that the
filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang
was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her
the balance, the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she filed an administrative
complaint against Agtang.
IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return the
balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed from
Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for three
months only.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.

HELD:
No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light. Agtang
was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled Foster
into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed
amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land
involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words,
he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and even
had the temerity that it was all the clients idea. . A lawyers failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.

It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various amounts
from Foster but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the
authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster.
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his client.
Second, his refusal to pay reflects his baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration
of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from
Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondents administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other
judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise
would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases
are filed directly with the Court.

GLORIA P. JINON VS. ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ

A.C. NO. 9615
March 5, 2013
FACTS:

In 2003, Gloria Jinon engaged the services of Atty. Leonardo Jiz to help
her recover a land title from her sister-in-law. Jinon paid Atty. Jiz Php17,000.00 as
acceptance fee.
After accepting the case, Atty. Jiz sent demand letters to Jinons sister-in-law,
collected rents from the tenant of the disputed property, and gave legal advice to
Jinon. At the same time, he asked Php45,000.00 from Jinon which he said will be
used as expenses in the transfer of title. But Atty. Jiz never made a move to cause
the title to be transferred in Jinons name.
Eventually, Jinon decided to terminate the services of Atty. Jiz. And since the
title was not transferred in her name, she demanded that Atty. Jiz return the
Php45,000.00 she earlier paid as well as the rents that Atty. Jiz had been collecting
(amounting to Php12,000.00). Atty. Jiz only returned Php5,000.00 from the rent.
Jinon then filed an administrative case against Atty. Jiz. Jinon demanded that Atty. Jiz
return the Php45,000.00, the remaining Php7,000.00 rent, as well as the
Php17,000.00 acceptance fee.
In his defense, Atty. Jiz averred that Jinon agreed that his services will be
worth Php75,000.00; and that his services will only cover the protection of the rights
of Jinon against her sister in law and not for the recovery of title. As such, deducting
the Php45,000.00 and the acceptance fee of Php17,000.00, Jinon actually still owe
Atty. Jiz Php13,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Leonardo Jiz violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes, he violated Canons 16 and 18. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a
lawyer in neglecting his clients case and misappropriating her fund. The defense
raised by Atty. Jiz cannot be given credence because it appears that the receipt for
the acceptance fee he received from Jinon showed that the Php17 k was the full
payment. The receipt was even signed by him. Said amount is also sufficient to
cover the actual legal services he rendered to Jinon.
Since he was not able to act on the transfer of title, he must return Jinons
money. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the
processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be
immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Atty. Jiz was suspended for two years.

ATTY. CONRADO GANDEZA, JR. VS JUDGE MARIA CLARITA TABIN

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736
July 25, 2011

FACTS:
November 2007, the cars of Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. and Paul Casuga
collided with each other. Later at the scene of the collision, Judge Maria Clarita Tabin
arrived. She was the aunt of Casuga. Atty. Gandeza observed that the judge kept on
reminding the investigating officer that the driver of Gandeza was drunk.
Later at the hospital, blood alcohol test was conducted on the driver of
Gandeza. The initial result returned negative. But Judge Tabin insisted that the
doctor do a second test. This time, the result was positive.
About a week later, a criminal case was filed against the driver of Gandeza.
The wife of Atty. Gandeza, also a lawyer, later observed that a court employee was
bringing the records of the case outside the premises of the court where the case
was filed. The court employee said that the records were requested by Judge Tabin.
The case also went to mediation where Gandeza also learned that Judge Tabin went
to the mediation center and inquired about the case.
All these acts of the judge led to Gandezas filing of an administrative case
against Judge Tabin for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
In her defense, Judge Tabin said that she never publicly made known that she
was a judge when she was at the collision scene. But she did admit that the
investigating officer as well as the doctor knew her to be such. She also said that
she merely borrowed the records of the case because she learned that her nephew
still did not have a lawyer. She also said that when she was at the mediation center,
she merely went there to assist her sister (Casugas mom) as the latter did not
know where the mediation center was located.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge.

HELD:
No. But she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Her being concern of her nephew is just but natural but as member of the
judiciary, she should know that she should not interfere in the conduct of an
investigation. She should always appear impartial this did not happen when she
interfered with the investigation and when she borrowed the records as well as
when she was at the mediation center inquiring about the records of the case. She
may have the best intention devoid of any malicious motive but sadly her actions,
however, spawned the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence
or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical examination as well as the
investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while Judge Tabins concern over the safety of her nephew and the
outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not have disregarded
the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court. Although

concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, she, being a
judge, should bear in mind that she is also called upon to serve the higher interest
of preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

ATTY. ELMER SOLIDON VS. ATTY. RAMIL MACALALAD

A.C. NO. 8158
February 24, 2010
FACTS:

In 2005, Atty. Elmer Solidon engaged the services of Atty. Ramil Macalalad for
the latter to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by the Solidons in
Borongan, Samar. They agreed for a fee of P80k. Solidon gave P50k as
downpayment to Macalalad and the remaining P30k shall be paid after Solidon shall
receive the title over the said property.
But for 6 months after the P50k was given, Atty. Macalalad never gave an
update to Solidon. It turns out that Macalalad never filed any petition to register the
land.
Solidon then filed an administrative case against Macalalad. Solidon alleged
that Macalalad neglected his duties and even avoided talking to him despite efforts
from Solidon to communicate with Macalalad.
In his defense, Macalalad averred that he did not file the petition because
Solidon failed to update him and that Solidon never gave the documents he was
asking for.
Eventually, the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended Macalalad to be
suspended for three months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Macalalad should be suspended.
HELD:
Yes. Macalalad is guilty of negligence when he neglected his clients cause.
This is a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his clients
interest after receiving his acceptance fee. Further, there is also negligence when
he failed to update his client about the status of the case.
Even if assuming that Solidon was also negligent, Macalalad cannot shift the
blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers
duty to inform his client of the status of the case. Even if the client has been equally
at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains with the
lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information. The
act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling Solidons
case, and subsequently failing, without valid excuse, to render the services, is a
clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court also found that not only did Macalalad violated Canon 18,
he also violated Canon 16 when he failed to account for Solidons money. It appears
he failed to return Solidons downpayment of P50k. A lawyer, when he fails to
render legal services, shall immediately account for and promptly return the money
he received from his client. Hence, on top of the recommended 3 months
suspension, Macalald was suspended for an additional 3 months or for a total of 6
months.

CONCHITA BALTAZAR,ET AL. V. ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, JR.

A.C. NO. 9091
December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Baez, Jr. in connection with
the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of
legal services, where they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty.
Baez Jr., but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the
contract, complainants would pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his services and entered into
an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their
complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case against him alleging that the
motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorneys charging lien was the
legal problem preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract of legal services entered into between the complainants
and Atty. Baez, Jr. is champertous.
HELD:
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a
case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to
the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by
the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is in the nature of a
champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the
expenses of the proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for some
bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public
policy and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money
to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus, the Court held that
Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Re: Rodolfo Pactolin

A.C. No. 7940
April 24, 2012

FACTS:
In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs
Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual). It was
duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented said letter as evidence in a
court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor
illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said decisions, the Supreme
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate
administrative actions against Pactolin.

ISSUE:
What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering
his conviction?

HELD:
Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of
falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great
caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for
the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing
and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar. But it has always been held that it is appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is
convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins
situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has been affirmed,
he has not served his sentence yet.

Corazon Nevada vs Atty. Rodolfo Casuga

A.C. No. 7591
March 20, 2012

FACTS:
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga. Nevada alleged the following:

1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries
include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex
gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but
despite repeated demands, Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return
said jewelries.
2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada
(they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel
administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was
able to enter into a contract of lease with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an
office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said
agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never
remitted the P90k to Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:
3. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later
advised Casugas wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casugas wife; that
Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still
has possession of said jewelries.
4. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain Pastor
Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said contract
of lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casugas defense.
HELD:
No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized
representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence
showing that he was duly authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to
adduce evidence proving that he never received the P90k from Chul. On the
contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga did receive the money. His
misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere denial does not
overcome the evidence presented against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty
as a lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to
his possession. This is still applicable even though said property/money did not
come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client relationship. He failed to adduce
evidence to prove his claim that Nevada pawned said jewelries. He never presented
receipts. Further, even assuming that Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still
duty bound to return said jewelries upon demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in
behalf of another person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual
party to the contract. In effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in
violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is
guilty of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is
too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was suspended for 4 years from the
practice of law. His notarial commission was likewise revoked and he is disqualified
to be a notary public while serving his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized:
the penalty of disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyers misconduct
borders on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.

Elpidio Tiong vs Atty. George Florendo

A.C. No. 4428
December 12, 2011

FACTS:
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio and
Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two years, he
suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he
was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he heard Atty. Florendo
mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo confronted the two and both

eventually admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then
executed and signed an affidavit, which was later notarized, stating that they admit
of their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective
spouse. Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a
disbarment case against Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already
pardoned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.
HELD:
No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis case.
This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the courts of undesirable
members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the offended party of the act
complained of does not operate to offset the ground for disbarment or suspension.
Florendos act of having an affair with his clients wife manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed
his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He
violated the trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and
grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his
office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be also said, as he claims, that their
relationship is merely a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on
for more than two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.

Urban Bank, Inc. vs Atty. Magdaleno Pea

G.R. No. 145817
October 19, 2011

FACTS:
In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban
Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was occupied by
unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea had to negotiate with
them for them to relocate. But the said occupants, knowing that the land was
already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Pea. ISCI then communicated with
UBI so that the latter may authorize Pea to negotiate with the tenants. Pea had to

barricade himself inside the property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their
way in especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Pea then had
a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Pea
explained to him the situation. In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from
Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Pea also asked that he be paid 10% of the
purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on
the condition that Pea should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he
forfeits said 10% fee. Pea also asked that said authorization be put into writing.
The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards
the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written authorization
released by UBI). Pea was able to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything
was settled and the property is now formally under the possession of UBI, Pea
began sending demands to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed
upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of security
guards or an additional P3 million. But UBI refused to make payment hence Pea
filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a contract of
agency created between and UBI and that Pea is entitled to the 10% fee plus the
expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded
him P28 million.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled
that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Pea is entitled to payment
but applying the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, Pea should
only be paid P3 million.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28 million.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Pea is
entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank,
but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In the
first place, other than the self-serving testimony of Pea, there was no other
evidence presented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10%
over the phone. The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power
granted him to negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the
existence of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea
should be paid.
Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be
applied. In this case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his services, or as
much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants, Pea didnt have to perform
any extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering. Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5
million for his legal services. He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses
in securing the property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security guards he had to hire
and another P1.5 million for settling and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5
million.
The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

Dalisay Capili vs Atty. Alfredo Bentulan

A.C. No. 5862
October 12, 2011

FACTS:
Capili engaged the legal services of Atty. Alfredo Bentulan as her counsel in a
civil case. Capili lost in the trial court. She wanted to appeal but despite her
payment for the preparation and filing of an appeal brief, Atty. Bentulan failed to file
the said pleading. This resulted to the dismissal of her appeal. Ten years after said
dismissal, Capili filed a disbarment case against Bentulan.
In his defense, Bentulan said that Capilis action is already barred by laches; that in
the first place, Capili knew that the appeal was unmeritorious; that she never
actually paid Bentulan for the preparation and filing of said appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Bentulan should be disciplined.
HELD:
Yes. The lapse of ten years from the alleged misconduct does not bar the
filing of this case. Ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or
suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. These proceedings are sui
generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and
rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather
investigations into the conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme
Court within the context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the Constitution
to regulate the practice of law.
In preparing and filing the appeal brief, the question of whether or not
Bentulan was paid his legal services is of no moment. As a lawyer, he owes fidelity
to both cause and client, even if he is not paid any fee for the attorney-client
relationship. Further, if he believed that Capilis case was unmeritorious, he should
have advised Capili accordingly.
The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes
inexcusable negligence. This violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Canon 18 A lawyer shall service his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03: A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.