GROUP 1

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any

criminal liability:
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which
causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.

People of the Philippines Vs. Ricohermoso

G.R. Nos. L-30527-28 March 29, 1974
Facts:
The victim, Geminiano de Leon (Geminian), owned a parcel of land
which Pio Ricohermoso (Ricohermoso) cultivated. Geminiano asked For his
share of the palay harvest. Ricohermoso answered that he could go to his
house anytime and would give him the palay. At about 2 PM of January 30,
1965, Geminiano together with his son, Marianito, went to Ricohermosos
house to claim his share of the palay, the latter refused. Thereupon,
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached from Geminianos left
side while Severo Padernal (Severo), the father-in-law of Ricohermoso, was
on the right side of the victim. While the victim was pleading for his dear
life, Ricohermoso stabbed him at the neck causing him to fall face down on
the ground. While in that helpless position, he was hacked on the back with
an axe by Severo Padernal.
While all these were going on, Juan Padernal (Juan), brother-in-law of
Ricohermoso and son of Severo, lunged at Marianito from behind which
disabled him from using his .22 caliber rifle to help his father. The duo rolled
downhill on a patch and Marianito passed out. Upon awakening, Marianitos
rifle was gone and he walked uphill and saw his father dying. He carried his
father for a short distance but Geminiano died at about 2PM of the same day.

Defendants, Severo and Juan Padernal, countered that it was the de

Leons who attacked them and that they were merely defending themselves.
The defendants later on recanted their statement.
The trial court found that Severo conspired with Ricohermoso and his
son, Juan, to kill Geminiano de Leon.
Issue:
Whether or Not Art. 11, Par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to
Juan.
Held:
No, Art. 11, Para. 4 of the RPC is not applicable to Juan. The act of Juan
in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo, who were
the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano without any
risk to his assailants. Juan was not avoiding any evil when he sought to
disable Marianito. Juans malicious intention was to forestall any
interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-law on
Geminiano.
Art. 11, Para. 4 states:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
xxx
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not
act which causes damage to another, provided that the following
requisites are present;
First. The evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing
it.
The decision of the lower courts were affirmed by the SC.

VICKY C. TY Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
TINGA, J.

FACTS:
This for the Petition to Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, dated April 21, 1997, finding
her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
It shows that Tys mother was confined, sometime in 1990 to 1992 at the
Manila Doctors Hospital and being the patients daughter, Ty signed the
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of
Admission. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital for
almost a year, sometime in 1991 to 1992. The total hospital bills of the two
patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a
promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in
installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. Accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of the check she issued in full. So
then the seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all
deposited on their due dates. Were all dishonored by the drawee bank and
returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the
Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent
demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not
heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant
case.
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the
Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant
her exemption from criminal liability.
RULING:
No. The petition is without merit and accordingly DENIED and
sustained the Decision of the Court of Appeals,finding petitioner Vicky C.
Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22..
The court do not agree on her contention, for The law prescribes the
presence of three requisites to exempt an accused from criminal liability
under this paragraph of Article 11 in the Revised Penal Code: (1) that the
evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater
than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
In this case, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent.
Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks for fear that her
mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of
the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative
fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. Ty has also failed
to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime.
Moreover, Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject
of this case. And what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum..

PP v Delima
G.R. No. L-18660, December 22, 1922

Facts:
Lorenzo Napilon was an escaped convict. When Felipe Delima, a
policeman, found him at the house of Jorge Alegria, the escapee was armed
with a lance. The policeman demanded his surrender but stroke him with the
lance, Delima fired his gun at Lorenzo but missed. Lorenz ran and was
chased by Delima. Delima again fired at Napilon, this time he killed the
fugitive.
The lower court tried and convicted Delima for homicide
Issue:
Whether or Not there were justifying circumstance in the killing of
Lorenzo.
Held:
Yes. The killing was done in the performance of a duty. Being a fugitive,
the deceased was under the obligation to surrender. Art.11, Para 5 of the
RPC states:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
xxx
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of right or office.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendantsappellants.

G.R. No. L-47722

Morgan, J.:

July 27, 1943

FACTS:
Antonio Z. Oanis , Chief of Police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto
Galanta, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, charged with the murder of
one Serapio Tecson, were found guilty by the lower court of homicide
through reckless imprudence. Defendants appealed separately from this
judgment. They invoked the justifying circumstance of Article 11, Par. 5 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938, upon receiving from Major
Guido a telegram with the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him
dead or alive." Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija showed them a copy of the abovequoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas
and instructed them to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the
chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.
Upon receiving information of the fugitives whereabouts, they went to the
house of Irene where Balagtas was said to be staying. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, wherein they saw a man sleeping
with his back towards the door, where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him . They found out later that the person shot and
killed was not Anselmo Balagtas but Serapio Tecson. These are the facts as
found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by
the testimony of Irene Requinea.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of Art. 11, Par. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable to the accused.
HELD:
No. It is an incomplete justifying circumstance as defined in Art. 11, Par.

5 of the Revised Penal Code. Although Oanis and Galanta were both
performing acts in the fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office, they were not able to comply with the second requisite in order
that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one, which is: that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
For the killing of Tecson while sleeping and with his back towards the
door, the Supreme Court charged them with murder instead of homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP

GR no. 132547 9/20/2000
FACTS:
At around 2 oclock in the morning of December 22, 1995,
Buenaventura Wapili, was having a high fever and his brother-in-law
heard him talking inside the room. The brother-in-law convinced him
to come out and talk to him.
Wapili went back to his room and for the second time his brother-inlaw heard some disturbance as if the former was smashing the
furniture. This time Wapili can no longer be pacified as he became
wild and violent.
The brother-in-law sought help from their neighbors who attempted
to tie Wapili with a rope but unfortunately it was unsuccessful.
Their police neighbor knew the situation asked assistance from his
co-police officers, until SPO1 Ermest Ulep, SPO1 Espadera and
SPO1 Pillo arrived at the scene.
When these police officers saw Wapili armed with rattan stool, SPO 1
Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his
weapon or else they will shoot him. But Wapili instead continued

advancing towards the police officers and retorted fire.

When Wapili was about 2 to 3 meters away from the police officer,
Ulep shot him hitting various parts of his body. As Wapili slumped to
the ground, Ulep came closer and pumped another shot into his head.
The trial court convicted Ulep, the accused-appelant beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The accused appealed before the SC for review of his case and
praying for acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that the killing
of the victim was in the course of the performance of his official duty
as a police officer and in self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appelant be acquitted on the basis of
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 par. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
NO. The accused cannot be acquitted on the basis of Article 11, par. 5 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The accused has the burden to prove the presence of two (2) requisites to
justify Article 11, par. 5 of the RPC. First, he acted in the performance of his
duty or in the lawful exercise of the right or an office. Second, that the injury
caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In the case at bar, the second requisite is absent or lacking. There are two
stages occurred during the crime scene. The first stage was when Ulep made
a warning shot in the air and told the victim to put down the weapon, but the
latter unheeded so Ulep shot the various parts of his body causing the victim
to fall off the ground. This act of the accused was lawful because it is in
accord with his duty to calm down the violent moves of the victim being a
police officer. However in the second stage wherein Ulep moved closer to
the victim and shot his head while the latter was already incapable of

threatening the life of the accused, the act of the latter is no longer lawful. It
cannot be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary
consequence of the accused appellant in the performance of his duty or
lawful exercise of the right or office.
MAMAGUN Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149152, 2007
FACTS:
The said accused Mamagun, a public officer, duly appointed as such and
acting in relation to his office, armed with a gun, with intent to kill and
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and abuse of superior
strength, attack, assault and shot Contreras with the said gun. Mamagun was
walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the man. The
man turned out to be Contreras who was not the robbery suspect. Contreras
died from the gunshot wound.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the accused is liable for murder or homicide even though
the killing was done in the fulfillment of his duty as a policeman.
RULING:
Yes. Defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, the
accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.

GROUP 3

PP vs Dungo
G.R. No. 89420, July 31, 1991
Facts:
On March 16, 1987, a male person, identified as RosalinoDungo, went to the
place where Mrs.Siguawas holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he
was carrying and stabbed Mrs.Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he
went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes,
carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon.
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show in court that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the offense. On January 20, 1989, the trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of murder.
Issue:
WON the accused is exempted from criminal liability due to insanity?
Held:
No. Under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite
test or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition
of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that
insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain,
or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act. Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence. In the case at bar, it is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks
prior to the commission of the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of
the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained against the various
requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim. It is not
usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged
him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of
the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts.
This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted
of lucid intervals. Also, as stated by the trial court: After the accused ran away from
the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order
to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious
and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.
Notes:
a. We refers to the Supreme Court

b. Kindly take note of the three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity based on foreign jurisdiction enumerated in the case, namely;
Delusion Test, Irresistible Impulse Test and Right and Wrong Test.
c. In the Philippines, there is no definite criterion for insanity. But the Supreme
Court in this case adopted the definition of the Revised Administrative Code,
Section 1039 regarding insanity.

Submitted by:
APRIL GEM BALUCANAG
Group 2

People VS Pambid
GR No. 124453, March 15, 2000
Facts:
Pambi, 23 years old, and Maricon, six years old and a Grade 1 student, were
neighbors. The two incidents of rape happened sometime between April and May
1993. The first rape took place when was on her way home, Pambid pulled her and
took her to his house. Pambid got a knife from the kitchen and, at knifepoint, ordered
Maricon to remove her short pants, then ordered her to lie on the bed while issuing
threats that he would beat her up. At first, accused-appellant inserted his forefinger
into Maricons vagina. He then inserted his penis and commenced the sexual act, but
was interrupted by the arrival of his mother who asked why the door was closed.
Because of accused-appellants threat, Maricon never reported the incident to
anyone.
The second rape happened in the house of Pambids aunt. Pambid saw Maricon
on her way to a nearby store. As nobody was present, accused-appellant took
Maricon to his aunts house. He ordered her to remove her clothes and to lie down on
the sofa. Accused-appellant then went on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Thereafter, he licked her private parts. The medical examination showed that
Maricon is in non- virgin state physically. The defense evidence contained plea of
insanity. The result of the psychiatric examination shows that Pambid had suffered
from Insanity or Psychosis classified under Schizophrenia. He is like wise suffering
from mental retardation.
Issue:
WON Pambid is exempted from criminal liability by reason of his insanity?
Held:

No. While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or
insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he has acted during a lucid
interval, the presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every man is sane.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it. He must show that he was completely deprived of reason when he
committed the crime charged because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.
As to the first incident of rape, it is established that Pambid closed the door upon
entering his house, apparently so that he would not be seen with Maricon. Then, he
got a knife from the kitchen and pointed it at the child. When he heard his mother get
into the house, he stopped having intercourse with Maricon, hid the knife under the
bed and told the child not to report the incident to anyone, otherwise, he would kill
her. As to the second incident of rape, Pambid kept threatening Maricon as he forced
himself on her while they were in the house of his aunt. By the totality of his acts,
accused-appellant showed that he was fully conscious of what he was doing.

Note [Rule on Schizophrenia]:

When such mental illness completely deprives the offender of the consciousness
of his acts, then it shall be an exempting circumstance. It may also be considered
mitigating under Art. 13(a) of the Revised Penal Code if it diminishes the exercise of
his will power.

Submitted by:
JEREMIAH N. CABALLERO
Group 2 Leader

People vs. Domingo

GR No. 18434, March 2, 2009
Facts:
The Court of Appeals found the accused, Jesus Domingo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of: 2 counts of murder, 2 counts of frustrated murder
and one attempted murder. On or about the 29th day of March 2000, Raquel Indon,
complainant and her children were sleeping inside their house when she was
awakened by the sound of the the accused who then entered their kitchen armed
with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He then stabbed the complainant and her two
children. Complainant pleaded the appellant to spare her daughter but the appellant
replied Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Two of her children died namely Marvin and
Melissa.
Five years had passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission
of the crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness.

Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained
his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he was already
detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as
evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized
by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and
behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not
find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of
Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from
the illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. Thus, the counsel of
the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the appellant as ground to exempt him
from the crime of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is exempted from criminal liability on the ground
of insanity?
Held:
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused
only when the finding of mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind
immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the crime.
This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was presented was proof of
appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the
time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant
had the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be
spared by saying, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Even assuming that nine days prior
the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to kill people, while
suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total
deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law
presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are
done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he
or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.

Submitted by:
JOHN KESSLER MISTERIO
Group 2

People VS Bulagao
GR NO. 184757, October 5, 2011
Facts:
Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape, who willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA] 14 years old,
against the latters will and consent. AAA was living with the family of the accused as
she was adopted by the latters parents. On redirect examination, AAA testified that
accused-appellant did not force himself upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant
had a little defect in his mind. Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a
clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on
September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental
retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. RTC rendered decision convicting the
accused. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON Bulagao is exempted from his criminal liability?
HELD:
No. Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial
court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, the court agree
with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental condition
accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was
already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence.[32] Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accusedappellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete
deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the
commission of the crime.[33] Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of
insanity be considered.

Submitted by:
ALMENA MACASA
Group 2

People vs Doquena
GR No. 46539, September 27, 1939
Facts:
Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and EpifanioRarang were
playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena,
the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach.
Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the
nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to
resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at
Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's (RomualdoCocal) knife, and confronted
Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and resumed playing.
Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter.
Issue:
WON the accused is criminally liable for acting with discernment in committing
the crime?
Held:
Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment
for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance.
However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between
right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial. Article 12 section 3 of the Revised Penal Code states
that: A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be
criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions of this and the
preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who

shall be charged with his surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall be

committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Article 80.

Submitted by:
LUZVIMINDA CORONG
Group 2

GROUP 4
Taming, Kristi Lou S.
Lozada, Leah
Erezo, Reymon
Bantugan, Roseller
Coboverde, Rock Jhun
Article 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Paragraph 2 & 3: Minority Superseded by RA 9344

PEOPLE VS. ALCABAO

CA, 44 OG 5006
FACTS:
A child, 11 years of age, with a sling shot hit the right eye of the
offended party causing serious injuries, and after hitting him, still
uttered bad remarks. This showed that the accused realized the nature
of his wrongful act and he, therefore, acted with discernment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acted with discernment upon committing the crime.
HELD:
Yes. It was held that discernment was present in a case where the accused, shot
with a slingshot the right eye of the offended party, and the accused even remarked
Putangina mo, mabuti matikman mo, which shows the accused realized the nature and
illegality of his wrongful act. The Court of Appeals ruled that the remark coming from a
minor 'putang ina mo' is a clear indication of the minor's perverted character.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of

intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony

either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is
the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
However, Article 12 Paragraph 2 & 3 of Revised Penal Code has been amended
by Sec. 6 of RA 9344. It states that a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A child above
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability unless he/she acted with discernment. Discernment is the capacity of
the child at the time of the commission of the offense to understand the differences
between right and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act which can be shown
by the (a) conduct of the offender; (b) manner of committing the crime (c) the extent of
participation.
LLAVE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006

FACTS:
On September 24, 2002, Debbielyn, 7 years old accused Neil Llave, 12 years old
of raping her in a vacant house near their place. Debbielyn is a grade 2 pupil at Villamor
Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City, attending class from 12noon to 6pm. Her
mother sells quail eggs at a nearby church and her father is a jeepney driver. Neil on the
other hand is an outstanding grade school student and even received award and finished a
special course in computer.
Teofisto, a witness, testified that when he came out of their house and heard a girl
crying. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the
waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told
Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened. She told her father about the
incident. Her parents later reported what happened to the police authorities.
The RTC finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of
minority, the Court sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1)
day to Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).
CA affirmed the RTCs decision but with modification, CA ordered Llave to pay P50,
000.00 as moral damages and P20, 000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Neil Llave acted with discernment in raping the victim.
HELD:

Yes. The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he
had carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for
affirming the trial courts ruling.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony
either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is
the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of
physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and
shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting
victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby
would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto
Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape
arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house
to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived
and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student
and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic
subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest. At his the age of 12, he finished a
computer course.
However, Article 12 Paragraph 2 & 3 of Revised Penal Code has been amended
by Sec. 6 of RA 9344. It states that a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A child above
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability unless he/she acted with discernment.
ALVIN JOSE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162052, January 13, 2005
Facts:

On November 14, 1995, P/Supt Joseph Castro received an information from an

unnamed informant that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver
100 grams of shabu at at a certain fastfood/restaurant. SPO1 Bonifacio Gueverra was
assigned to act as a poseur buyer in response to the report.
They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view
of people going in and out. In the afternoon a Toyota Corolla arrived, Sonny Zarraga was
the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny
Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter
that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams ofshabu. SPO1 Guevarra offered to buy the
shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money. Guevarra
said yes. He showed the aforecited bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked
Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover to Guevarra. SPO1 Guevarra, in turn,
handed the bundle of "money bills. Then the other police approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose.
The RTC finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425. On appeal to the CA, the CA rendered
judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate court
reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only
thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime. Jose filed his petition for review
on certiorari, alleging that under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a
minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime is exempt from criminal liability.
Issue:
Whether or not Alvin Jose can be exempt from criminal liability under the
mitigating circumstances of minority.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age
and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law
applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special
penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to
be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such
age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed,
acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer.
Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the
petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the
transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that
the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the
time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to

ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their
transactions for illegal drugs.

U.S VS MARALIT
G.R NO. L - 11979 JANUARY 25, 1917
.
FACTS:
Maximo Maralit was convicted of homicide and sentenced to five
(5) years of prision correccional; to the accessories provided by law in
stabbing Florentino Luistro with a knife and cause his death. The
accused was less than 15 years of age at the time the crime was
committed. The deceased was less than 16 years old. Appellant
strenuously contends that he should be acquitted on the ground of
discernment, that is, with a full understanding of the nature and
consequences of his act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused in committing the act complained of acted with
discernment.
HELD:
The trial court taking into consideration all of the facts and
circumstance presented by the records, together with the appearance
of the accused as he stood and testified in court, drew the conclusion
that he was of sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with
judgments to know that the act which he committed was wrong and
that it was likely to produce death. In pursuance of that conclusion the
court made the finding that the accused in committing the act
complained of acted with discernment.
However, that the penalty imposed is not correct. Article 85 of
the Penal Codes provides that:
In the case of minor of less that fifteen and over nine years of
age, who is found by the court to have acted with discernment, and,
therefore, not being exempt from criminal liability, a discretional
penalty shall be imposed, provided that the same shall always be less
by two degrees, at least, than that prescribed by the law for the
offence committed.

Following the provisions of this article the penalty imposed

should have been two (2) years of prision correccional instead of five
years. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

PEOPLE VS. CORTEZANO & CORTEZANO

GR No. 123140, September 23, 2003
Facts:
On November 22, 1994, two separate Informations for rape were filed against the
appellants. The first Information docketed as Criminal Case No. L-1679 and Criminal
Case No. L-1680. That on or about the 6th day of May, 1990, in the afternoon and on or
about the 10th day of June, 1990, in the afternoon at Bgy. (sic) Azucena, Municipality of
Sipocot, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, the accused BERNARDO
CORTEZANO and JOEL CORTEZANO, with lewd design, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, taking advantage of their superior strength
with force, intimidation and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully
(sic), feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge one after the other with Leah C.
Cortizano (sic), 7 years old, minor, against her will.
Sometime in March 1990, Lourney Cortezano spend her vacation with her three
children: eight year old Leah (Victim), three year old Leah lou, and Lionel, who was
barely a year old. As the family decide to stay at Lourneys parents-in-laws house at Brgy.
Azucena, Sipicot, Camarines Sur. The three children was left in the custody of their
grandparents house due to Lourneys work.
By mid-April of 1990, Lourney returned to Caloocan City, leaving her children in
the care of her parents-in-law. Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo

ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their parents room. Leah suddenly awoke when she
sensed pressure on her arms and legs. When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncles Joel
and Bernardo; they were holding her hands and feet as she was being undressed. Leah
struggled but was easily overpowered by her uncles. She threatened to shout, but she was
told that nobody would hear her. Joel and Bernardo wet her vagina with their
saliva. Bernardo then held her hands as Joel mounted her. Joel inserted his penis into her
vagina, while Bernardo stood by the window to serve as a lookout. Leah felt something
slippery inside her vagina. After Joel dismounted, Bernardo went on top of Leah and
inserted his penis into her vagina. It was Joels turn to stand by the window as a
lookout. Leah once more felt something slippery in her vagina. Bernardo then stood up.
Momentarily, Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what Joel and Bernardo were
doing to Leah. Joel and Bernardo ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened to box him
if he refused. Joel and Bernardo laughed as Boyet was having his turn with Leah. Joel
and Bernardo then called Leah Lou and Lionel into the room, letting them see their sister
naked.
Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of the family if she told
anyone about what happened to her. Joel, Bernardo and Boyet left the room
together. Leah went out of the room and washed her vagina. Petrified, Leah did not reveal
to her grandparents what happened to her. After that first harrowing incident, Joel and
Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily. As she was threatened by her uncles to kill
her and her family if she will say a thing to anyone about what they are doing to her.
June 10, 1990, Joel and Bernardo again ordered Leah to go to her grandparents
room. She did as she was told and done the same as what they had been doing to Leah.
On May 27, 1994, Lourney learned from Boyet Orcine that her daughter Leah had
been sexually abused by Joel and Bernardo way back in 1990. Boyet told Lourney that
Leah Lou had suffered the same fate as Leah.
After trial, the court rendered a decision convicting the appellants of four counts
of rape, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforecited considerations, this Court finds the
accused, JOEL CORTEZANO and BERNARDO CORTEZANO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the two crimes of Rape as defined and punished under Article 335, of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants are exempt from their criminal liability in citing
Article 12/ Paragraph 3 of the RPC?
Ruling:
The Court notes that the appellants were still minors when they committed the
offense. At the time, Joel was 13 years and 6 months old, while Bernardo was 12 years
and 4 months old. Nevertheless, they are not exempt from criminal liability.

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 12. Circumstances, which exempt from liability. The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he acted with discernment, in
which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of
Article 80 of this Code.
A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crimes is exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor
acted without discernment. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove that a minor acted
with discernment when he committed the crime charged. In determining if such a minor
acted with discernment, the Courts pronouncement in Valentin v. Duquea[34] is instructive:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the appellants acted
with discernment when they raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victims vagina
before they raped her; (b) one of them acted as a lookout while the other was raping the
victim; (c) they threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her parents what they did
to her; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping the
victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked after the
appellants had raped her.
GROUP 5
Article 12 . Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. the following are exempt from criminal
liability:
Paragraph 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in
which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this
Code.

People vs Capistrano
G.R. No. L-4549 October 22, 1952
Paras C.J
Submitted by: Erick Jay Inok
Facts :

At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945, the defendant with other
Filipino members of the Yoin and several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near the
house of Carmen Verdera in Barrio Malay, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas
(now Quezon), and ordered the inmates therein to open the door. The appellant and his
companions entered the house, raised the mosquito nets and ordered the inmates to
rise. The appellant and his companions tied Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera, Alejo
Enriquez Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio Canada, Remedios Anastacio,
Dolores Enriquez, Teodora Zamora, Presentacion Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a
rope which was used as a clothesline. The intruders then searched the premises and
seized from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1,000, U.S. currency, and P4,000, Philippine
currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and other inmates to the Japanese garrison at
Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The
motive for the raid was that Pedro Canada, a brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant
in Lopez
and Salvador Fortuna, son of Graciano, was a soldier in the said
organization. During the detention of Placer and her companions in the Yoin garrison,
the appellant attempted to sexually abuse Placer and her companions, but when the
women cried and the Japanese came, the defendant escaped.
Placer and her companions were released after one month when they paid to the chief
of the Yoin and the appellant the sum of P2,500 Japanese war notes. The charge was
testified to by several victims.
Issue :
Whether or not the appellant can be exempt from criminal liability under the mitigating
circumstances of minority.
Held :
No . The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen (15) years of age at
the time that he committed the crime. However, the court which had the opportunity to
see and hear the accused at the trial found that he acted with discernment. It should
be noted, furthermore, that he appeared as the leader or commander of the raiding party.
Although his minority does not exempt him from criminal responsibility for the reason
that he acted with discernment, yet it may be considered as a special mitigating
circumstance lowering the penalty by two (2) degrees.
Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense
to understand the differences between right and wrong and the consequences of the
wrongful act.
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the accused because he was
over eighteen (18) years old at the time of the trial (People vs. Estefa, 47 Off Gaz. No.
11, 5652; 86 Phil. 104).

Valcesar Estioca vs. People

GR 173876 (June 27, 2008)
Nazario., J.

Facts:
A number of persons were accused of conspiring and robbing an elementary school.
One of which is Boniao who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
On 28 July 2001 (Saturday), at about 8:00 in the morning, Nico, then eleven years old
and a Grade VI student of Ozamiz City Central School (OCCS), and his cousin, Mark
Alforque (Mark), went to the OCCS and cleaned the classroom of a teacher named Mrs.
Myrna Pactolin (Mrs. Pactolin). Nico saw petitioner and Bacus enter the OCCSs
premises by climbing over the OCCSs gate. Petitioner and Bacus then proceeded to the
classroom of another teacher, Mrs. Panal, which was located near the OCCSs canal.
Thereupon, petitioner and Bacus destroyed the padlock of the classrooms door using an
iron bar and entered therein. Subsequently, petitioner and Bacus walked out of the
classroom carrying a television, a karaoke and an electric fan, and thereafter brought
them to the school gate. They went over the gate with the items and handed them over
to Boniao and Handoc who were positioned just outside the OCCSs gate. The items
were placed inside a tricycle. After petitioner, Bacus and Boniao boarded the tricycle,
Handoc drove the same and they sped away. They were found guilty by the lower court.
When the case was appealed to the CA, RA 9344 took effect and Boniao was acquitted
since he was a minor at the time of the crime but without prejudice to his civil liability.
Custody was given to his parents.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 9344 can retroact to Boniaos case.

HELD:
Yes, the reckoning point in considering minority is the time of the commission of the
crime. In this case Boniao is 14 years old hence exempted from criminal liability without
prejudice to his civil liability. Art 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws
may be given retroactive effect if they are in favor of the accused.

SIERRA vs PEOPLE
GR No. 182941
July 3, 2009

Submitted by: Arlene Costan

FACTS:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB in the second
floor of her familys house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and
told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB
and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and
also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner
warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to
Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to the
barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a
laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the
complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape.
Petitioner Robert C. Sierra was only 15 years old when he raped the minors.

RTC RULING:
He was convicted of rape and was imposed a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and a fine.
CA RULING:
He elevated the case to CA and during the pendence of the case, RA
9344 took effect. CA affirmed the conviction and denied the defense of minority
since it was not clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was 15
years old or below at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, it was only alleged
in the testimonial of the petitioner and his mother. Neither is the suspension of
sentence available to Robert.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sierra shall be exempt from the crime charged in lieu of the
enactment of RA 9244 during the pendency of the case.

HELD:
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution but on the
accused. Age can be established by birth certificate. Sec. 7 provides that in the absence
of such document, age may be based from the information of the child, testimonies of
other persons, physical appearance and other relevant evidence. Also in case of
doubt, minority should be in favor of the child. In the case at bar, minority was
established by the testimonies of the petitioner and his mother. This was not objected by
the prosecution and did not even presented contrary evidence. Thus, minority is
established.
Moreover, the law should be given retroactive application since this favors the
accused as provided for in the Revised Penal Code penal laws favoring accused
should be given retroactive effect. Hence the accused is considered a minor with an age
of not above 15 years old. Therefore, The case is dismissed and the petitioner is referred
to the appropriate local social
Raymund Madali and Rodel Madali vs. People
GR 180380 (August 4, 2009)
Nazario, J.

Submitted by: Lovella Fe. Tacder

Facts:

Petitioners inflicted physical injuries to the victim which caused the latters death. At
the time of the crime, Raymund and Rodel were minors 14 years old and 16 years old
respectively. The lower court found them guilty of homicide. Petitioners elevated the
case to the CA and during the pendency of the appeal, RA 9344 took effect.
CA:
Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should
be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or
guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.

ISSUE
Whether petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.

HELD
Yes. At the time of the commission of the crime, petitioners were minors. By
provisions of RA 9344, they are exempted from liability but not from criminal liability.
Their exemption however differs. In the case of Raymund, the case is dismissed as to
him since he was below 15 years old. He is to be released and custody is given to the
parents by virtue of RA 9344 Secs. 6 and 20 setting the minimum age of criminal
responsibility and who will have custody respectively. In the case of Rodel, who was 16
years old at that time, It is necessary to determine whether he acted with discernment or
not. Sec 6 provides that children above 15 but below 18 will be exempt from criminal
liability unless he acted with discernment. He, however, should be subjected to an
intervention program. Sec 38 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence.

ORTEGA vs PEOPLE
GR No. 151085 August 20, 2008
Nachura.J

Submitted by: Maria Anny Yanong

FACTS:

The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was charged with the
crime of rape for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That the rape
happened in 3occasions, the first one happened sometime August 1999, when AAAs
mother left her in the care of the petitioners mother, Luzviminda. That the petitioner
woke up AAA and led her in the sala and raped her. The second occasion happened the
next day when the petitioner led AAA into the bathroom and raped her there. In all the
instances, petitioner warned AAA to not tell her parents or he will spank her. The third
and last time happened in the house of AAA, where her brother caught her and the
petitioner naked waist down and having intercourse. The brother then told the incident to
his mother. MMM testified that when she asked AAA what happened,AAA told her that
petitioner inserted his fingers and penis into her vagina. And when MMM examined the
private part of her daughter, she noticed that it was reddish and white fluid was coming
out of it. MMM called Luzviminda and confronted her about what happened. Luzviminda
then demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination. The Rural
HealthOfficer, however, did not find any indication that AAA was molested.
Subsequently, the two families reached an amicable settlement that requires the
petitioner to depart from their house and stay with a certain priest. However, a year later,
the family of AAA charged the petitioner with 3 counts of rape, in which the petitioner
plead not guilty. The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
the crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the ruling of
the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to manage children
in conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15
years of age at the commission of the crime,he can be relieved from criminal liability.

RTC RULING:
The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of
rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal.

CA RULING:
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the
SC, RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law. At the case at bar,
because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years of age at the commission of the
crime,he can be relieved from criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by the
newly enacted law on minors in conflict with law.

HELD:

Yes, the petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him from
criminal liability because the law enacted was favorable to the accused, and is therefore
retroactive in application. The RA 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides
that a child under 15 years of age in the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability, but is subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal
liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of
the newly enacted law also provides that cases of children under 15 years of age at the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer.

Therefore, the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is

hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality
appropriate intervention program.

Group 6 Case Digests (Remiendo Fallorina)

Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines
GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)
Facts:
Petitioner, Robert Remiendo was a minor whose age is above 15 but below 18
years old when he raped a minor when the latter was left alone in her house on or
about the month of March 1997 and in his house for the second time on or about
the month of May 1997. This case arose from the filing of two criminal
informations, both dated March 10, 2008 against the petitioner.
In violating the minor, he threatened to kick the latter if she would shout for
help and on the second time of sex congress, threatened to kill her if she tells
anyone. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked a suspension of
sentence pursuant to R.A. 9344. But by the time he was convicted by the trial court
and before the case was elevated to the CA, he was already 22 years old.
Issues:
Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. Whether petitioner is
entitled to a suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 of R.A. 9344?
Held:

No. Since his age is above 15 and below 18, the finding of discernment is
necessary to determine if he would be exempted from criminal liability. In this case,
his act of waiting for the victims parents to leave the house before defiling the latter
and threatening to kick her if she should shout prove that petitioner can
differentiate what is right and wrong.
Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of sentence, can no longer be availed
since by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial court, he was already 22
years old. Sec 40provides that If the child in confict with the law has reached
eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

*******
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in confict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule
on Juveniles in Confict with the Law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in confict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in confict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in confict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in confict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

******* (2nd case)

Article 12 Exempting Circumstances
Par. 4: Accident without fault or intention of causing it (Damnum Absque Injuria)
People vs Josefina Bandian

G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936

Diaz, J.:
Facts:
Josefina Bandian was charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua
According to the witness he saw Bandian go to a thicket to respond to the call of nature. A
few minutes later he saw her again with her clothes stained with blood and was very weak and
dizzy un aware that she has given birth, firstborn, already. He came to her aid and called
another neighbour to help him. It was later discovered that there was a newborn left where
Bandian defecate.
Dr. Nepomuceno was notified of the incident and when he reached the house, he found her
lying in her bed. He testified that Bandian gave birth to her child inside her house and threw
her child in the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonour from his husband
because the child allegedly was not of her husband, one year of marriage, but of her ex lover.
Although uncorroborated, the trial court gave credit to the doctors testimony and convicted
her of infanticide.
Issue

WON the appellant is guilty of infanticide?

Ruling
No, she is not guilty of infanticide in accordance to the provision of Paragraph 4 of Article 12
of the RPC. According to the Supreme Court, The act performed by the appellant by going to
the thicket to respond to the call of nature, while having a fever for a long time, wasperfectly
lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same
place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence but he was very dizzy and
debilitated, she should not be blamed therefore because it all happened by accident.
Unconscious precipitate are very well known in legal medicine among young primipare who,
by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition ad of the process of expulsion of
fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they responding to an urgent call of
nature.

*********** (3rd case)

Article 12 Exempting Circumstance

Par. 2&3: Minority (Superseded by RA 9344)
PP vs. Mantalaba
G.R. No. 186227, 20 July, 2011
Peralta, J.
Facts:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report
from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was
organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were
provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase. Around 7 o'clock in the
evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay
3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen
who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers
and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the
poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to
the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and
Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place. The police
officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and
Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed
to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the
ground.
Issue:

WON there should have been a suspension of sentence by reason of minority?

HELD:
YES.
The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when
the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
RTC's Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a
minor.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child
and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the
imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and
68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is

already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of
21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds
that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child
in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail
of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is
already moot and academic.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

**** 4th case

CRIMINAL LAW Par. 2 & 3: Minority (Superseded by RA 9344)
Article 12. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 182239,
March 16, 2011

645 SCRA 590

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, AccusedAppellant.
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
Accusedappellant Hermie Jacinto, was charged and convicted in the lower courts
of raping a 5year old child, AAA. Jacinto was a neighbor of the family of AAA for
a long time and he was a friend of the victim's father. The victim, AAA, knew
Jacinto well, as she calls him kuya.
On January 28, 2003, the victims father sent his other daughter, CCC, to the
store to buy cigarettes and the victim followed her older sister but did not return
with the latter. The father thought that she was left behind to watch television at
another house. A witness saw Jacinto with the victim later on at the store where
the latter was seated on his lap.
It was found that Jacinto had carnal knowledge with the victim when she left the
store with him. She went home crying after the incident. The victims father
confronted Jacinto and called the police. AAA underwent a physical checkup
which led to findings that she had been raped. For his defense, Jacinto interposed
an alibi, that he attended a birthday party at the time of the incident and that the
victim merely followed him when he went to the store.
The RTC found Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the defense
moved to reopen the trial for reception of newly discovered evidence. It was
stated that appellant Jacinto was born on March 1, 1985. This meant that at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was merely 17 years old. The
RTC appreciated the new evidence and reduced the penalty. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accusedappellant Jacinto should be convicted of rape. What is
the imposable penalty on the appellant?
RULING:
Yes, accusedappellant Hermie M. Jacinto is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. The rape that took place has been sufficiently proven in the court.
The Supreme Court found sufficient ground for his conviction. The court
sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay indemnity and moral damages.
However, due to the retroactive effect of RA9344, and defense having proven
that Jacinto was a minor at the time the crime was committed that he was 17
years old at the time of the
commission of the crime the court reduced the penalty imposable upon the
accused from death to reclusion perpetua to consider the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.

Though the RA9344 took effect only in 2006, it is given a retroactive effect. Sec.
6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have
acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in
accordance with the Act shall be observed. In the case at bar, Jacinto showed
discernment in committing the crime as proven by the facts that he chose an
isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection and he
boxed the victim to weaken her defense. These are indicative of then 17 yearold
appellants mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful
action. To give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twentyone (21) years, so long as he/she committed
the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right
to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order
that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive
member of the community.
The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. RA No. 9344 warrants
the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that
he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced.
According to the law, the appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or
any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344,
which states:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in AgricuItural Camps and other
Training Facilities.
A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

Article 12. Exempting Circumstances

Paragraph 4, Any Person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECILIO TANEDO, DefendantAppellant.
G.R. No. 5418. February 12, 1910
FACTS:

The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with
Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a
malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. They crossed the stream. On the
other side of the stream he met the Feliciano Sanchez, deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had
been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked
the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle
was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever.
The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga
tree a short distance from the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of
the shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest
near the edge of which stood the shack.
There is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the Government
witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited
each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused,
however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased
go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "tying something." At any rate the accused
went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused.
He narrated that when he arrived at that place he saw a wild chicken and he shot him. And
after he shot that chicken he heard a human cry. He went near the place where I heard the noise, and
saw a wounded man. He then confide it his laborers and together they concealed the body and buried
it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose
of concealing it.. Even the family of the deceased testified that they have only heard one shot.
Evidence shown that there was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between the deceased
family and the accused. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no motive
whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a
sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negatived by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is exempt from criminal liability.
HELD:
Yes. In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused.
Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial. The Supreme Court relied on the case of the State v. Legg, wherein,
"Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the
burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . But where accidental killing is relied
upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show
that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it
was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly
held to be erroneous."
Supreme Court affirmed that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of
conviction. Hence, the judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted.

JANAMJAM
Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Isaias Castillo y Completo
G.R. No. 172695 29 June 2007
FACTS:
In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and angry. His
father-in-law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former to leave the
house. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the
accuseds wife, was heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out of the house and was later taken to the hospital but
to no avail. Cause of death was the cut jugular vein caused by a fatal weapon which could have
been a pointed instrument like a nail.
ISSUE:
Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was accidental
RULING:
The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful
act (2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4) without fault or
intention of causing it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In
penalizing the act, the consideration of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to
inflict injury. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared while his wife was in the
hospital is unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defenses
evidence, the claim that the act was accidental cannot be appreciated in favour of the accused.
Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CABAOG

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y CULTURA. [G.R.
No. 126171. March 11, 2004].

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, while the victims Reynaldo
Timbal and Jesus Bascon were loading firewood in a truck in Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City,
appellant who was drunk and armed with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas
gift. Reynaldo told him to just come back because they were still loading firewood. Appellant left
the place. Not long after, he returned and fired his gun at Jesus feet, hitting his left leg. He
immediately jumped into the truck. Appellant then went near its bumper and fired at the tire near
the chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun and fired again at Jesus, this time, hitting
his right leg. Reynaldo ran away, his right hand covering his head. Appellant chased him and fired
at him, hitting his nape and right hand. After the commotion, the victims co-workers who were
able to take refuge from the cascade of bullets returned to the scene and found the dead body of
Reynaldo. Jesus was immediately brought to the Butuan City General Hospital but died
thereafter.[3]
Appellant, relying on the exempting circumstance of accident as his defense, presented a
different version. He testified that he was a member of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) stationed at Bugsukan, Butuan City, hence, he was officially issued an M-14
rifle. On the evening of December 17, 1991, while on his way to his camp, he saw a truck parked
at the right side of the road with its rear lights on. While approaching the vehicle, somebody
grasped his neck. As a consequence, he accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on
his shoulder. The weapon automatically fired. At this instance, his assailant set him
free. Immediately he rushed to the camp and reported the incident to Sgt. Montealto who placed
the camp on alert. Appellant stayed in the camp during the entire evening. The following morning,
he learned that two persons were killed.[6] Appellant contends that he was performing a lawful act
with due care when the victims were killed. He was then on his way to the CAFGU station to
report for duty. He had no intention to kill the victims. He accidentally pulled the trigger of the rifle
and the bullets hit the victims. Thus, he should have been exempted from any criminal
liability. Even assuming that he is liable for the death of the victims, he contends that the trial
court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an exculpatory weight to the exempting circumstance of

accident interposed by the accused-appellant?

HELD:
NO. The number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the victims is considered, the shooting could
not have been an accident. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General agrees with appellant that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently proven, stressing that the latter was
drunk when he approached Reynaldo. Appellants version that he accidentally shot the two
victims is incredible. Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code. It must be stressed that in raising this defense, appellant has the burden of the evidence
and it was incumbent upon him to establish that he was exempt from criminal liability. He must
show with clear and convincing proofs that: 1) He was performing a lawful act with due
care, 2) The injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing
the injury. Considering appellants evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven. Appellants manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates

his claim of due care in the performance of an act, number of wounds sustained by the victims
shows that the shooting was not merely accidental and appellant manifested an unmistakable
intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them.
In the instant case, it appears from the record that the attack was not so swift so as to render the
victims off guarded. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, appellant could not have managed to
stealthily approach and suddenly fire at the victims. Therefore the means in executing the crime
cannot be considered deliberate. Besides, Jesus had the chance to jump into the truck after he
was hit at the left leg. Reynaldo, on the other hand, was able to run away and take cover, though
unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, the other laborers who were with the victims managed to evade
the volley of bullets. It cannot be said, therefore, that the victims were unprepared to put up a
defense. The Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of homicide. He is sentenced to suffer (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for each crime of homicide.

BUCAYAN
[G.R. No. 29396. November 9, 1928.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRAXEDES
AYAYA,Defendant-Appellant.
CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; INJURY CAUSED BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR
INTENTION OF CAUSING IT.
FACTS:
January 16, 1928 1:00am Jose Fajardo (Chief of police) was informed by a policeman
that one Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his house. He went to
the place and found Benito the deceased , lying in his bed with a wound in his left eyelid,
and unconscious.
His wife Praxedes Ayaya was asked as to what caused that wound, she replied that it
was due to the fact that she had jabbed her husband with an umbrella.
In view of Benitos condition he was later taken to the hospital where he died four days
after the incident.
The cause of death was due to cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound he received.
Ayaya was tried and charged for the death of his husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime.
Held.

No. In the defendants sworn statement she states, among other things, that at about 8
oclock at night on January 15, 1928, she, with her husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son
Emilio, drank tuba in the store of one Felicidad Losloso; that afterwards they went to a cinema;
that while returning home and without any warning, her husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow
which she dodged; that then her husband went home, preceding her and her son and when they
arrived at the house they found the door closed; that she and her son pushed the door and
attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside, prevented it; that then the door gave way
somewhat and her son Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the opening of the door and
the wall and;n order to prevent the door from crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito then poked
his head out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she jabbed him with the umbrella
she carried; that she does not know where she jabbed him although she thinks it was in the body;
and that when she and her son finally succeeded in entering the house, they found that Benito
was already in bed with a wound in the forehead. The accused herself, in her testimony in her
own behalf, substantially repeated what she had declared before the justice of the peace of
Pagbilao, stating, however, that when the door was opened and her son put his head between the
opening of the door and the wall, in order to prevent the door from crushing her sons head, she
jabbed her husband with her umbrella with a downward motion, though she could not tell if she
touched him or not. She stated, furthermore, that she did not know how the wound in her
husbands forehead was caused. This point of the defendants testimony has not been
contradicted by any evidence to the contrary; rather it has been corroborated by her son Emilio de
la Cruz who also testified at the trial.
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of the defendant and of her son that the
husband and wife did not quarrel in the street while returning home on the night in question, and,
moreover, that during the marriage they lived together in peace with no disagreements between
them, either on or before the date of the incident.
In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein prosecuted, with the exception of
the defendant and her son Emilio de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the declaration of the
defendant that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from
closing and crushing her sons head which was inserted between said door and the wall of the
house. Said defendant, explaining what took place, says in part: "When the door was ajar my son
went in, and then my husband pushed it and as I saw that he was about to crush my sons head, I
jabbed my husband with the point of the umbrella downwards to prevent him from crushing my
sons head." We find nothing improbable in this statement and if we add to this the absence of
any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant to injure her husband, we are compelled to
conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, she did so to free
her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled; and if she thus
caused her husbands injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it.
This being so, we believe that she incurred no criminal liability in accordance with article 8, No. 8,
of the Penal Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son from the grave danger threatening
him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of her husband, who was behind the door, with
the end of her umbrella, does not make her criminally liable. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 30, 1888.)
Wherefore the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Praxedes Ayaya must be,
as she hereby is, acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

PAMISARAN
Article 12 Exempting Circumstances
Part 4: Accident without Fault or Intention of Causing it (Damnum Absque Injuria)
Amployo vs. People
G.R No. 157718, April 26, 2005
Facts:
Around seven (7) oclock in the morning, the day before June 27, 1997 which is her eight (8)
birthday, Kristine Joy Mosquera, a grade III student, was walking to school when she met by
petitioner Alvin Amployo y Ebalada a.k.a. Tikboy who was her neighbour. The Petitioner emerged
from hiding a nearby store and approached Kristine Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on
her shoulder then moved down and touch her breast several times. Petitioner told Kristine Joy
not to report to anybody what he did to her. This was not the first time that the incident happened
as petitioner had done this several times in the past, even when Kristine Joy was still in Grade II.
However, it was only during the last incident that Kristine Joy finally told her grandmother, who
immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera, Kristine Joy's mother. Mrs. Mosquera conferred with
Kristine Joy who narrated that the petitioner would sometimes even insert his hand under her shirt
to caress her breast. Thereafter they reported the matter to thebarangay and the case was
referred to the DSWD then to the Police Department of Subic, Zambales. According to the
psychologist, Lucrecia Cruz, who reported that Kristine Joy was a victim of sexual abuse and was
showing unusual behaviour as a result and feelings of insecurity, anger, anxiety and depression.
Guilt feelings were also noted. All in all, Kristine Joy appeared on the surface to be a child with
normal behaviour despite the experience, but on a deeper level, she developed a fear of going to
school as petitioner might again be hiding in the store waiting for her.
On September22, 1999, the trial court finds the accused Alvin Amployo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Child Abuse defined under Section 5 of Republic Act 7610 and hereby
sentenced him to Reclusion Temporal in its medium period or fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and to pay the costs.
The Petitioner questioned the sufficiency of the evidence adduced to prove acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and contended that even assuming that the
acts imputed to him amount to lascivious conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and not child abuse under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7610
The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial court by dismissing petitioner's appeal for
lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration is denied. However, the penalty is modified such
that accused-appellant is sentenced to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged act of the petitioner constitutes acts of lasciviousness as penalized
under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610
Rulings:
Yes. According to Republic Act No. 7610, Article III, Section 5 defined: Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in

its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed to those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse. Provided, that when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended
in the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct. In the case at bar, Kristine Joy, eight
(8) years old, intimidated by her neighbour, a full grown adult male, who constantly accosted her
while she was alone and on her way to school and who consistently ordered her not to report
what he had
been doing to her. Kristine Joy was cowed into silence and submission and was traumatized in
the process as reflected in the psychological report made by psychologist, Lucrecia Cruz. It was
noted that no award for moral damages was made by both the Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals despite the fact that the mental anguish suffered by Kristine Joy. Therefore, the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City, Branch 72, finding accused-petitioner Alvin Amployo y Ebalada alias Tikboy guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum is affirmed with the
modification that petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) and
moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). No cost

PASAOL
People of the Philippines vs Federico Abrazaldo @ Peding
G.R. No. 124392
February 7, 2003
Facts:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, Abrazaldo attempted to hack his uncle Bernabe Quinto but instead he hit the post of
the latters house. He was intoxicated during the performance of the said act. The barangay
authorities namely Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste, were informed about
the incident and rushed to the scene. Fajardo heard Abrazaldo shouting at his uncle, I will kill
you!. Thereafter, Guban tried to assist Abrazaldo since the latter came out of Quintos house with
blood oozing from his forehead. However, for an unknown reason, Abrazaldo and Guban shouted
at each other and grappled face to face. Abrazaldo pulled out a knife and stabbed Guban in the
abdomen and fled. The authorities rushed Guban to the nearest hospital but unfortunately, he
died.
Abrazaldo was located and the murder weapon was recovered. However, he claimed he
killed Guban by accident saying it was an act of self-defense. According to him, Delfin Guban,
who was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, Get out Feding I will kill
you! When Arbazaldo went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Arbazaldo ran towards his house
and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and they grappled for its
possession. In the course thereof, both of them fell down. It was then that the knife held by
Guban accidentally hit him. Abrazaldo did not know which part of Gubans body was hit.
Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.
Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is her brother. On July 15, 1992, at
about 6:00 in the evening, Arbazado, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a drinking

spree. At about 10:00 oclock in that evening, Arbazado caused trouble at the house of his uncle,
Bernabe Quinto. He attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of the latters house.
While running away from his uncles place, he bumped into an artesian well, causing a wound on
his forehead. Afterwards, accused-appellant killed Guban. Thus, the trial court rendered a
decision convicting Abrazaldo of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Abrazaldo the act done can be justified as self-defense.
Whether or not Abrazaldo can be exempt from criminal liability by invoking article 12
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No. While the accused admitted the commission of the crime in order to save his own, he
stated that the victim accidentally stabbed himself. There is a contradiction with his
statements. Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense
presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity. Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim,
his natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the
authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense or the exempting circumstance of
accident cannot be appreciated considering Abrazaldos flight from the crime scene and his failure
to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the
authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the
crime charged

EROY
People of the Philippines versus Susan Latosa y Chico
G.R. No. 186128

FACTS:

This is a crime of parricide committed by the accused-appellant, Susan C. Latosa. Whereas,

on April 12, 2006, the lower court judgment, convicted the said accused. On April 23, 2008, the
Court of Appeal (CA) which affirmed the decision from the lower court (RTC, Br. 159, Pasig City).
The accused-appellant, who is a former school teacher, alleged and accidentally fired a .45
Caliber Revolver Pistol directly to her military husband, Felixberto Latosa, Sr. hitting to the victim
head and caused of his death.
On February 5, 2002 at afternoon, the victim woke up and asked the accused-appellant to
get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she get his service pistol to him it
suddenly fired and hitting toward Felixberto, Sr, who was still lying down. The unlicensed firearm
(gun pistol) placed at victim left hand. After the gun fired, she was shocked and ran quickly to
Felixberto Sr.s office and asked for help.
Prior from that incident, only the victim and accused appellant was in the house but later,
she was on her way out of the house to follow her twin child at the market and drive for them
going back home but when she realized that she did not have with her the key to their jeep, she
went back to their house. He saw Felixberto Sr. asked for his gun and it was then that it fired as
she handling it to him.
In court proceedings, accused-appellant two (2) children, Sassymae Latosa and Michael
Latosa, who were testified against to their mother (accused-appellant). While, victims brother,
Francisco Latosa also testified against her in support of her children testimonies, that she was
terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality due to having an affair with a policeman,
Col. Efren Sta. Inez, who investigated the death of the accused-appellants younger brother on
June 6, 2001 and allegedly threaten their family more particularly on the part of the victim prior
from that shooting incident.
ISSUED:
Whether or not the accused appellant liable for parricide?
Whether or not the Exempting Circumstance of accident has established by
accused-appellant is applicable in this case?
HELD / RULING:
The Supreme Court (SC) dismissed the appeal of Susan Latosa and affirmed the judgment
rendered by the CA and lower court but with modification of civil liability.
Yes. The accused-appellant is liable for a crime of parricide. The prosecution established the
following circumstantial evidences:
Investigation (scenario) Report
1. Prior from incident, the accused-appellant asked her children to do errands
for her. She first asked Sassymae to go Commissary to buy ice cream and
she also asked Michael to follow his sister Sassymae which was not the
usual thing the accused would do.
2. Accused-appellant turned up the volume of the television and radio while the
victim is sleeping.

3. The accused-appellant and victim who were left alone in the house.
4. A revolver pistol is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is
necessary to make the gun fire.
5. On crime scene, the gun was found near in victims left hand. The Victim was
identified as a right-handed.
Medico-Legal Report
6. The accused-appellant paraffin test yield positive result for the presence of
nitrate in her right hand, a chemical element used for gunpowder.
7. The point of entry of the gunshot wound found on the victim was located at
the left temporal region
8. The cause of death of the victim was intracranial hemorrhage due to gunshot
would of the head.
On Court Proceedings (based of TSN)
9. Accused-appellant and victim son, Michael witness that the accusedappellant seen running way from the house by Michaels friend after shooting
incident.
10. Daughter of the parties, Sassymaes testimony, said bakit mo inamin.
Sana pinahawak mo kay Major (referring to victim) iyong baril saka mo
pinutok. A translucent indications that gun shooting is not a mere accident.
11. Prosecution cross examination, the accused appellant failed to explain
why she handy pointed the gun barrel or muzzle toward her husband (victim),
that since she had no experience in gun handling.
12. The CA ruling found that it was contrary to human nature that a trained
military man would suddenly ask favor to his wife (accused-appellant), who
was busy doing other things, to bring his (victim) firearm without experience
in gun handling, and patiently wait for her to come back to their house, when
the gun just inside an adjacent cabinet only 2 meters way from his bed.
No. The accused-appellant cannot use Article 12, par. 4 of RPC as her defense of accidental
shooting aside from her admittance. Based on the prosecution evidence presented in CA, to
prove the circumstance she must rely on the strength of her (accused-appellant) own evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. However, by no stretch of imagination
could the pointing of the gun towards her husbands head and pulling the trigger be considered as
performing a lawful act with due care.
The accused-appellant tried to prove in her children that the victims death was made of
suicide because of the gun found near at his left hand but overlooked the fact that the victim was
a right handed then she admitted in court that she accidentally shoot her husband. It is very
unusual to a person to pull a trigger of a gun and shot direct to his aim using his other arm or
hand that us not commonly employ. This scenario leads the truth, why she handy pointed the gun
barrel or muzzle toward her husband (victim), that since she had no experience in gun handling.

The worse, the type of gun is a revolver pistol, that not prone to accidental firing as pressure on
the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire.
Thus, the accused-appellant committed the crime of parricide and not exempt of
circumstances from criminal liability because of accidental gun firing towards her husband-victim
that caused of death.
GROUP 8
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RODEL LANUZA y BAGAOISAN
G.R. No. 188562; August 17, 2011
FACTS:
Complainant was an outgoing security guard while the accused was an
incoming security guards. Instead, complainant placed the shotgun, together with
one bullet, on top of the security guards table. Although he was turning over six
bullets to the accused, the private complainant asserted that the five others were
inside a drawer on the security guards table at their office upstairs. While the private
complainant who was about to go home was asking why the accused did not report
on his scheduled shift, the latter got the shotgun, placed the ammunition inside it,
and shot him. The private complainant fell down on his buttocks. The accused went
near the private complainant and pulled the trigger a second time, but the shotgun
did not fire and the private complainant heard only a click. The accused ran upstairs,
and the private complainant crawled to his motorcycle and drove it himself to the
provincial hospital. Subsequently, accused was charged and convicted by the RTC of
frustrated homicide. In his Brief, accused-appellant maintained that he shot private
complainant by mere accident. In the alternative, accused-appellant contended that,
at the most, he could only be held accountable for the crime of physical injuries in
the absence of proof of his intent to kill private complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was intent to kill.
RULING:
YES. The Court sustains the verdict of guilt against accused-appellant. The
elements of frustrated homicide are:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of
timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is present.
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter
alia, of the means used by the malefactors; the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time
of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; the circumstances under which the

crime was committed; and the motive of the accused.

These elements are extant in the case at bar. The prosecution has
satisfactorily proven that accused-appellant intended to kill private complainant
based on the method of attack, the weapon used, and the location of the gunshot
wound. Accused-appellant shot private complainant with a shotgun at close range
hitting the latters abdomen. Resultantly, private complainant sustained a wound that
could have caused his death if not for the timely medical attention given to him. As
aptly elaborated by the RTC: The medical certificate shows that the gunshot hit the
body of the private complainant, causing injuries to his spleen and left kidney. In fact,
the hemopentoneum referred to therein means that there was bleeding inside his
abdomen and that 100 cc of blood was taken from it. As a result, the attending
physician had to operate on him, repair his spleen and place a drain in the vicinity of
the kidney. Moreover, the private complainant had to be confined at the provincial
hospital for twelve days, a fact underscoring the gravity of his condition. Clearly, one
does not have to be a physician to realize that a person would die if the said injuries
would remain untreated. Accordingly, the accused must be deemed to have
performed the last act necessary to kill the private complainant.
Submitted by:
Alan Lloyd Libre
People of the Philippines Vs. MIGUEL M. MORENO
G.R. No. L-64; October 28, 1946
FACTS:
Mr. Miguel M. Moreno was at the outbreak of war a prisoner serving sentenced
in San Penal Colony Farm situated in Zamboanga City. He was released, hired to be
the Captain of SEMI Military Organization known, KAIGUN JEUTAY, a Filipino and
sponsored Japanese navy.
November 23, 1944 defendants soldier, when to the house of Mr. Paciano
Delos Santos and took their two single daughter.
December 1 1944 during the meeting set by the Assistant Superintendent of
the institution, the defendant serves words for prison official the he is not afraid to
cut anybodys head.
December 2, 1944 Mr. Paciano de los Santos was taken in Fishery Division of
the colony while both arms tied at the back, ordered to kneel down with head bend
forward and cut his head.
On this matter, while seen by the witnesses, he allegedly denies the
prosecution, mentioned in courts that, When I arrived at the place the deceased, Mr.
Ponciano de los Santos was already in place where I was execute him, and was taken
by four Japanese and several guards of San Ramon.
Based on the proceedings, Mr. Miguel M. Moreno shown, he made it by own
incredible, contradictory and unsupported testimony relating ordered by Japanese
naval officer to kill deceased, testified by Mr. Gregorio Magalit stated no words,
written received from Major Sasaki. As figured, He expressingly informed all to
witness the event, killing Mr. Paciano de los Santos, in front of humane, for them to
know that this event made is against the will of Mr. Miguel Moreno, for so by orders of
Japanese Soldiers head officer. As insisted for not doing so, Captain Susuki told me:
Thats an order, you have to comply with the orders.
ISSUE:

W/N Moreno be charge for Murder without proper prosecution, under Article 3
section 1 subsection 15 and 17?
RULING:
Upon the said execution, precede by the Court, the accused Mr. Moreno held
in court without the presence of the said lawyer given the institution to set the
accused, as mentioned by Judge to let somebody be at the accused, In the presence
of Atty Villaflor, AttyJaime OHara, Timoteo delos Santos, waive their rights in Court.
As mentioned the accused should be given what is right to execute as due
process of law. Under Article 3 Section 1, sub.15 and 17 Stated:
(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
(17) In all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf.
That there was no such order, oral or written, is clearly shown by the
defendant's own incredible, contradictory and unsupported testimony relating to his
having been ordered by the Japanese naval officer to kill the decease.
There was no such evidence to prove for the crime committed by the accused.
Submitted by:
Jun Mata
People vs. Rudy Fronda
G.R. Nos. 102361-62; May 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brothers, Edwin & Esminio Balaan were taken by 7 armed men in fatigue
uniforms with long firearms, suspected to be NPA members, accompanied by the
accused Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua from the house of Ferminio Balaan. The
armed men tied the hands of the deceased at their back lying down face downward,
in front of the house of Ferminio. They all proceeded towards Sitio Tulong passing
through the rice fields. Three years later, the bodies or remains of the Balaan
brothers were exhumed. Afterwhich, the remains, were brought to the house of
Freddie Arevalo, a reltive of the deceased where they were laid in state for the wake.
The RTC declared Fronda guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The
appellant says he was only taken by the armed men as a pointer & interposes the
exempting circumstance under RPC A12(6) claiming that all his acts were performed
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear and to save his life.
ISSUE:

Whether or
uncontrollable fear.

not

Fronda

can

claim

the

exempting

circumstance

of

HELD:
No. Fear in order to be valid should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for ones life or limb. (People vs. Abanes) In the case at bar, the records indicate
that appellant was seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed men a

hunting knife. Also, as aforesaid, appellant was not able to explain his failure to
report the incident to the authorities for more than three years. These circumstances,
among others, establish the fact that the appellant consciously concurred with the
acts of the assailants. In order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may
apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People v. Loreno) Appellant
had the opportunity to escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go home
after bringing the victims to the mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the armed
men when required to bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig the grave.
Appellant also chose to remain silent for more than three years before reporting the
killing to the authorities. Based on these circumstances, it was hold that the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of appellant cannot be regarded as having
been done under the impulse of uncontrollable fear.
Submitted by:
Alan Lloyd Libre

People of the Philippines Vs. Antonio Z. Oanis

(G.R. No. 47722. July 27, 1943)
FACTS:
Upon receiving a telegram from Major Guido ordering the arrest of Anselmo
Balagtas, Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, asked that he be given four men, one of whom who
reported was defendant Alberto Galanta. The same instruction was given to
defendant Antonio Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, who was likewise called by
the Provincial Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups
with defendants Oanis and Galanta taking the route leading to the house of a
bailarina named Irene, where Balagtas was believed to be staying. Upon arriving, the
group went to the Irenes room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not
Balagtas but an innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irenes paramour.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for the death of Serapio
Tecson.

2) Whether or not the defendants are entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance

in case they are found criminally liable
HELD:
1) Yes.
If a person acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of his
official duties, then he incurs no criminal liability. Nonetheless, the maxim ignorantia
facti excusat, applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. In the instant case, the defendants found no circumstances whatsoever
which would press them to immediate action, as the person in the room being then
asleep would give them ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity.
Moreover, they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to
get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the
crime committed by defendants was not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental.
2) Yes.
The Court held that the defendants committed the crime of murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia, but may be entitled to an incomplete justifying
circumstance as provided in Article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a)
that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the
instant case, only the first requisite is present. Thus, Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law in case the crime committed is not wholly excusable, was imposed, entitling
the defendants to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Submitted by:
Alan Lloyd Libre

People of the Philippines Vs. Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue

C.A. No. 384; February 21, 1946
FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted,
but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando
Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited
with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the
Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8oclock in the evening, Nicolas Jaurigue
went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious services. Avelina

Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose
of attending religious services,
Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the
bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a
word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of
her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with
her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention
of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she
quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of
the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which
was necessarily mortal.
Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada
advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home
immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the
house, unless accompanied by him.
Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night,
and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately
surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of
what had actually happened
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant had
acted in the legitimate defense of her honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional
mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense attended by aggravating circumstance.

HELD:
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances
above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with
no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor.
Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric lights and
there were several people inside; under the circumstances, there was and there could
be no possibility of her being raped. The means employed by her in the defense of
her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the
case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.
The facts that the defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered and admitted having stabbed the deceased, (2) had
acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense committed against her, (3) had
not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be
considered as mitigating circumstances.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the
benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered
confiscated.

Submitted by:
Ma. Zenfanie Sandoval