Criminal Law Cases

1.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003]
BENITO
ASTORGA, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001, as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and
July 10, 2002.
[1]
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following
Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a
number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto,
at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidentified
persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who were
armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,
Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the
Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal and
valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[2]
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8,
Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
governments campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of
Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger

Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon,
Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian.
[3]
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m.,
where they saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with
the local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a
certain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the
time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay.
[4]
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more
boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar,
between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus,
Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor
Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for
the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga.
[5]
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1

Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their
mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor
Astorga, who exclaimed, Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha
Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo
makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter. (I can make you
swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can box? I can box. Dont you
know that I can declare this a misencounter?) Mayor Astorga then ordered
someone to fetch reinforcements, and forty-five (45) minutes later, or
between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them
dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles,
and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team
members. At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams
mission. He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going
to contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the teams
whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simons radio,
saying, Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon
hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig. (Its better if you have no radio
so that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot
ask for help). Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon,
adding, Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri
kamo puwede ha akon. (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to
Samar because I will not tolerate it here.) Simon then asked Mayor Astorga
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they would
not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to
Daram. Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, Kon magdakop
man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an
kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon. (If you
really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you
confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender
mine.) Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave,
which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, Diri
kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya. (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We
will have many things to discuss there.)
[11]
[12]
[13]
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be
served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at
a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. After dinner,
Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the
house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and
the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed
to leave.
[14]
[15]
[16]
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against

Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted
Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he
pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. At the trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as
their Joint Affidavit. However, the presentation of Simons testimony was not
completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to
testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed
a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.
[17]
[18]
[19]
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing

of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correctional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[20]
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11,

2001 which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated
September 28, 2001. A Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October
24, 2001 was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated
July 10, 2002.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for
review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary
Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code,
based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein the
latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged.
[25]
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required

quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, especially in light of
the fact that the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is
there any competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that
restraint
was
employed
upon
the
persons
of
the
team
members. Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at
the scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in
fact instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they would
feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who,

without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
[30]
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2.
That he detains a person.
3.
That the detention is without legal grounds.
[31]
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was
then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of
Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is
undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that
his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted
that his acts were motivated by his instinct for self-preservation and the
feeling that he was being singled out. The detention was thus without legal
grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
[32]
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually
detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta, which involved the illegal detention of a
child, we found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the
lack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the
victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was
warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned,
he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave because of
his fear to violate such instruction.
[33]
[34]
In the case of People v. Cortez, we held that, in establishing the intent to

deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be
kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of
her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to the
owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did
not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make
good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear
was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had
earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him
on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people
immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to
kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.
[35]
[36]
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the

curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon
the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce
such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent
that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents
and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of
their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner
to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of
almost a dozen reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the
witnesses. Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1
Capoquians statement that it was not safe to refuse Mayor Astorgas
orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident
effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they
[37]
[38]
[39]
felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the

departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private
complainants, suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of such
instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus,
in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the
truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge. Here, there are no such circumstances. Indeed, the belated claims
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the
incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team acceded to
Mayor Astorgas orders out of respect, are belied by petitioners own
admissions to the contrary. The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private
complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged
in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of
interest of private complainants to pursue the case. This conclusion is
supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
[40]
[41]
11.
That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and
improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and other
official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be
effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the
betterment of the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties
and are much dependent on government support.
[42]
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence,
pointing out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1
Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of
the private complainants in the case. He also makes much of the fact that
prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly not exactly privy to, and
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein accused and the
DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged confrontation,
until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2 September
1997.
[43]
[44]
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are

conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted. Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to
deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of
[45]
the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the
rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively supplied by
the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorgas claim that SPO1 Capoquian was not exactly privy to what
transpired between Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1
Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to
petitioner. He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening remarks. He was
with Simon when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and
wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles. In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the
circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of
Mayor Astorga.
[46]
[47]
[48]
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented
from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to while
away the time and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the
accused. On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that
they were simply whiling away the time between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following morning. SPO1 Capoquian
gave similar testimony, saying that they did not use the time between their
dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning to
enjoy the place and that, given a choice, they would have gone home.
[49]
[50]
[51]
Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an impartial

judge, because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate
and advocate when he propounded very extensive clarificatory questions on
the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle
arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in
order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on
the ground that clarificatory questions were asked during the trial.
[52]
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that, where the detention has not exceeded
three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4)
months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto
in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity
enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and
called for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by
government officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect during
the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued in effect
under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not repealed.
The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic
of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations
of said provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted
due to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same government
to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time that every one must do his
duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold
shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal
detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton
trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officials
should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right to the indemnity to
which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.
[53]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months ofprision correccional, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
3. EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993
FERNANDO CAYAO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JUSTINIANO A.

DEL MUNDO,Respondent.
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PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Fernando R. Cayao with
the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Judge
Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC, Indang Cavite with abuse of
authority.
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Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator

directed Judge Enrique M. Almario, Regional trial Court Branch XV,
Naic, Cavite, to conduct an investigation and to submit his report
and recommendation thereon.
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Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the

investigating Judge, it appears that on or about October 22, 1992 at
9:25 a.m., while traversing the stretch of Mataas na Lupa, Alulod,
Indang, Cavite, complainant, as driver of Donny's Transit Bus with
Plate No. DWB 315, overtook a Sto. Nio Liner with Body No. 5282
driven by one Arnel Ranes Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the
bus driven by complainant almost collided head-on with an
oncoming owner-type jeepney with Plate No. PJT 752. It turned out
later that the jeepney was registered in the name of respondent
Judge Del Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was one of the
passengers therein along with his sons Rommel and June and one
Edward Rommen. Respondent's son Rommel was behind the
wheel.
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At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could

properly park his bus, he was picked up by policemen of the
Philippine National Police Station of Indang, Cavite at the Indang
Public Plaza and was immediately brought before the sala of
respondent judge. There, complainant was confronted by
respondent judge and accused by the latter of nearly causing an
accident that morning. Without giving complainant any opportunity
to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be punished
for the incident. Whereupon, complainant was compelled by
respondent judge to choose from three (3) alternative punishments
none of which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple
attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to

be put in jail for three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant
chose the third, i.e., confinement for three (3) days, as a
consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention"
by respondent judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately
escorted by policemen to the municipal jail. Though not actually
incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the municipal
jail for three (3) days, from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by
way of serving his "sentence". On the third day, complainant was
released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo Cayao,
complainant's co-driver and cousin.
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The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the

municipal jail for three (3) days was confirmed and corroborated by
the testimony of the jail warden of Indang, Cavite, SP04 Adelaida
Nova. The fact of complainant's release therefrom after three (3)
days detention was testified to by SPO1 Manolo Dilig who prepared
the corresponding document of release. For his defense, respondent
judge merely made general denials.
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The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute

abuse of authority. To begin with, respondent's verbal order for the
arrest of complainant at the Indang Public Plaza without the
requisite complaint having been filed and the corresponding warrant
of arrest having been issued in order that complainant may be
brought to his sala is characteristic of personal vengeance and the
abusive attitude of respondent. Being a judge, respondent above all,
should be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for
others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]). Instead,
respondent judge opted to avail of his judicial authority in excess of
what is allowed by law to gratify his vindictive purposes.
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If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed

violations of traffic rules and regulations which nearly caused the
accident involving their respective vehicles, respondent judge
should have caused the filing of the appropriate criminal charges
against complainant and left it at that. On the contrary, respondent
is not one to let the law run its own course. This is a classic case
where respondent took it upon himself to be the accuser,
prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same time to condemn

complainant for his alleged wrongdoing without the benefit of due
process. Without even an opportunity to air his side, complainant
was unceremoniously made to choose his own penalty. Left with no
other choice but to face his predicament and overpowered by the
imposing authority of respondent, complainant picked the lesser evil
of the three alternatives given to him. Complainant can hardly be
blamed for so doing. A perusal of the two (2) other choices
presented to him will illustrate why.
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The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of

multiple attempted homicide. To threaten complainant with a
criminal case for multiple attempted homicide is indicative of
respondent's gross ignorance of the law. As a judge, he should
know very well that such at charge will not hold water in any court
of law considering that no accident per se ever occurred and hence,
no life threatening injury was even sustained. To a mere bus driver
who is not at all familiar with the intricacies of the law, such a
threat spelled not only the possibility of long-term imprisonment
and all the hardship it entails but also the onus and shame that will
forever attach to his name. Surely, to his mind, a threat of
prosecution coming from a municipal trial court judge is alarming
enough.
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The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose

from involves his very means of livelihood - revocation of his
driver's license. This is tantamount to economic death penalty and
just as repulsive as the first alternative.
Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted

himself to the jail warden of the Indang Municipal Jail for detention
after executing his "waiver of detention," complainant felt that he
had no other choice but to serve out the "penalty" forcibly and
arbitrarily imposed upon him by respondent.
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as

respondent had intended, however, complainant was not allowed to
leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not
synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to
qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or
physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270

[1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact
guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered
the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds
(Article 124, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Battallones 23 Phil. 46
[1912]). In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not
committing or had not actually committed a crime in the presence
of respondent judge (Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such
being the case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of
complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no less than the
testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was
indeed deprived of his liberty for three (3) days:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
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Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain Fernando Cayao on
that premises? On the ground of that premises?
WITNESS (jail warden):
A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor, but he was inside the
police station.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did you or did you not
detain Fernando Cayao based on the premises that you said under
oath before this Court?
A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone freely of his own
volition outside the police station without your authority or
permission?
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A He can move freely.
COURT:
Q When you said that, you meant he could have gone home, he
could have gone eating in restaurant, he could have gone to a
theatre or in any public place. Is that what you mean?
WITNESS:
A No, your Honor. Only inside the police station.
Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What is your order? What
did you tell him?
A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be

detained.
Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would have gone to other
places, you will have no objection? You will have no interpolation or
you would not feel that you have a right to have him under your
custody. Is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A I will still prevent him.

(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)
Of equal importance is the perception of complainant himself as to
whether his liberty, was actually restricted or not:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the
municipal jail of the station of Indang, Cavite?
A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police
station from the time that I was detained.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the

misconduct of respondent is not alone centered on his order for the
detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that
complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional
rights.
As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own

accuser without the benefit of due process. Complainant was not
even accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is
entitled. When respondent insisted on punishing hire without a
chance to air his side, complainant was deprived of the presumption
of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial. Moreover,
complainant was made to execute a waiver of detention without the
assistance of counsel. Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even
subscribed by complainant before the very same judge who was his
accuser. Certainly, such intentional and blatant violations of one's
constitutional rights committed by respondent cannot be tolerated
by this Court.
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as

the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of
justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to
obey the law (De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 (1975)). If judges,
who swore to obey and uphold the constitution, would conduct
themselves in the way that respondent did in wanton disregard and
violation of the rights of complainant, then the people, especially
those with whom they come in direct contact, would lose all their
respect and high regard for the institution of the judiciary itself, not
to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which the
judiciary is founded.
Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind

of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are
charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice that so quickly and severely corrodes the respect
for law and the courts without which the government cannot
continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity (Ompoc
vs. Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).
Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent

judge in the case at bar exposed his total disregard of, or
indifference to, or even ignorance of the procedure prescribed by
law. His act of intentionally violating the law and disregarding wellknown legal procedures can be characterized as gross misconduct,
nay a criminal misconduct on his part (Babatio vs. Tan, 157 SCRA
277 [1988]). He used and abused his position of authority in
intimidating the complainant as well as the members of the Indang
police force into submitting to his excesses. Likewise, he closed his
eyes to the mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct to always
conduct himself as to be beyond reproach and suspicion not only in
the performance of his duties but also outside his sala and as a
private individual. (Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75 [1991]).
chanroblesvirtualawl ibrarychanrob les
virtual law l ibrary
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his

oppressive and vindictive actuations, has committed a disservice to
the cause of justice. He has unequivocably demonstrated his
unfitness to continue as a member of the judiciary and should
accordingly be removed from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the

Municipal Trial Court of Indang, Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave
credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any
public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
4. THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN
CARIO
PADILLA
@
ROBINHOOD
PADILLA,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were

found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6)
live ammunitions;
"(2)
One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long
and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver."
[1]
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 thru the following Information:
[2]
[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby
Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines
with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SNA35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."
[4]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his
application for bail. During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of
not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, upon advice of
counsel, to make any plea. Petitioner waived in writing his right to be
present in any and all stages of the case.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment
dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced
him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years ofreclusion perpetua, as

maximum". Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. Pending
the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General,
convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on
December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of
this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision
sustaining petitioner's conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed

decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond
posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance
Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of
accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant
shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The
Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance
herewith.
SO ORDERED."
[15]
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. On August 9,

1995 he filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of
arrest)" but the same was denied by respondent court in its September 20,
1995 Resolution, copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27,
1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari with application for bail followed by two "supplemental
petitions" filed by different counsels, a "second supplemental petition" and
an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again,
the Solicitor-General sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the
Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. The Court also
granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the
petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. However, after
his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the
respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in
his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a
complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for
petitioner's acquittal.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on

record and given credence by respondent court, is as follows:
[26]
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang
and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway
Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the
heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their
ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While
inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero,
running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle
might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In
the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota
makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle
had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 78, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p.
8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na'
signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side
(pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic
group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the
incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He
took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine
National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang
completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident
taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle
had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant,
rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase
he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33,
TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again
(p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA
777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The
Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio call
flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to
apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City
reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the
Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III
and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle
(Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan
bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It
took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office
and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from
SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was
then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8,
1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar
(p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to
the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777
(p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in
the hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the
MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church
but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15,
1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he
proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not
passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found
Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles
coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and
informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon
learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident,
Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When
Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had
figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's
Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate
hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he
followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of
Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about
twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded
their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light
and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of
the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN,
February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number
PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They
recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p.
13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that
moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle
behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to
alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather
jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with both his
hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was
revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p.
15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held
the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p.
16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by
legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After
disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident
which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had
formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun
and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO
Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12,
TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO
Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant
the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and
the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his
misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one
hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang
baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture
exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right
pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPOMercado saw this and so when appellant turned
around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated
the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant
could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening
himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite
rifle(Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a
long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 1721, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant
answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado
modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession
of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third
firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber
and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live
bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp.
36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic
Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto.
Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and
ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN,
July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the
firearmsstating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able
to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three
firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain,
Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms
and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification
stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN
32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name
of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11,
1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also
registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a
confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced
that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma,
notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
[27]
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of

his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of
petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge
illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
[28]
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both
elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang,
a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at
this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees
the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND
proceeds at once to the scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the
screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to
the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its
driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the
actual arrest of petitioner.
[29]
[30]
[31]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing

that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit
and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the
policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in
effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have
taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a
degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration
with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense
[32]
herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list
of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner
herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place
for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to
render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The
Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had
more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of
the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught
inflagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson)
and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper
as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be

justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report,
the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang),
and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting
police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's
Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then,
the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not
on unreliable hearsay information.
[38]
[39]
[40]
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection,

defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure
to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise,
by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.
[41]
[42]
[43]
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without

a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure
of property is valid, are as follows:
[44]
1.
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence ,
[45]
[46]
2.
Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
[47]
(a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b).
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
(c).
the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d).
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
[48]
3.
search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
[49]
[50]
4.
consented warrantless search, and
5.
customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that

the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without
even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a
prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they
came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The
same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
wasimmediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the
Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has
been held that:
[51]
[52]
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal

offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the corpus delicti."
[53]
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain

view are subject to seizure even without a warrant."
[54]
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter
gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search
and seizure , and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect.
[55]
[56]
[57]
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an

active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner,
their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was
effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle)
was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the
search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search
are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like
herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense.
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be

convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent
authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as
evidenced by a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by
PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila,
Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
[64]
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be

established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from
petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
[65]
[66]
evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly
proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence
for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived
and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were
seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That
is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been
apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his
authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary
investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any
proper document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the
Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those
documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the
preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the
prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject
firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial
presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these
documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not
even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested
contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one
James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was
not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented
by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found
Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January
13, 1994."
[67]
The
Mission
existing
subject
Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the

Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and
before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the
firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were
owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their
irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence,
like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from
the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent
excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the
AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by
enforcement units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other
Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without
resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential
instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover
an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is
rendered inoperative in respect to such violation."
[68]
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.

The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution
Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of
the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to
sign in his behalf. His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes." In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have
the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under
the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. PNP Supt.
Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere
deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source,
petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in
force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio
City," areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing
prior approval "by next higher Headquarters" which is absent in this
case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as
required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense
which pertinently provides that:
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72]
[73]
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without

corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply
Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially
taken up in that units property book, and that report of such action has
been reported to higher AFP authority."
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why
he cannot present the corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the
Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of
Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the
PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by
petitioner's counsel. The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then
PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and
unambiguous, thus:
[74]
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the
same to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the
regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement
and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering
in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which
specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and
that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its
equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher
levels of command."
[75]
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise
provides as follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed
service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular
compensation for the service they are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated
pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the testimony and
certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and Explosives
Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not
licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner. Thus:
[76]
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if
any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm
pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms
being asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the
same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in
the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C.
Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT
8214?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the
names of the accused in this case?
"A. Yes, sir.[77]
xxx
xxx
xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
"PNPFEO5
1992
28 November
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number
TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office
per verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol
Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch"
[78]
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we reiterated that such
certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the
foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or
permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The
certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence that an
M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the
confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, as in the case of
petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented,
to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court
which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality.
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying
P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and
adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on
illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under
P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4
months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and
excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
[84]
[85]
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of
appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not
be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes
adverted to by petitioner.
[86]
[87]
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The
severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 11871188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' "
[88]
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so

much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is,
or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.
[89]
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question
lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has
been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that "the
pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary
to any provision of the Constitution. . ." Appellant's grievance on the wisdom
of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief
Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
[90]
[91]
[92]
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by

respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the
same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian where the Court en
banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal
possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years
(12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is
discernible from the following explanation by the Court:
[93]
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or
proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v.
Simon, although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein
were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating
by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Consequently, the
penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of
the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20
years.
[94]
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules
therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the
maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be
taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
[95]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals

sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED
5. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 73786 October 12, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIO D. AGAPITO, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXXX
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II, of R.A. 6425.
(Dangerous Drugs Act), and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and the costs. 1
Accused-appellant was charged under an information filed on October 6, 1982 which reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1982, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully and feloniously sell and deliver to
Efren Vergara, a civilian informer, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of
brown paper, a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such. 2
The antecedent facts established on record and as summarized by the Solicitor General are, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In the late afternoon of August 23, 1982, police officers Reynaldo Domingo, Ernesto
Labucay and Henry Chao, all from the Narcotics Command Unit based at Camp
Datuin Sikatuna, Quezon City, conducted a narration "buy-bust" operation in
Caloocan City. They planned to entrap a certain "Emil" who was a suspected drug
pushers in the area of Mabalacat Street and 6th Avenue, Caloocan City. They
enlisted the help of an informer named Efren Vergara. Pat. Domingo gave Vergara a
20-peso bill to be used as the purchase money (p. 7, tsn, April 4, 1984).
At about 6:30 that evening, Vergara spotted "Emil," who is appellant, with two
companions smoking cigarettes outside a billiard hall along Mabalacat Street.
Vergara approached appellant Pat. Domingo, in civilian clothes, followed him a few
meters behind. Pat. Labucay and Chao, also in civilian clothes, stayed farther away
but within seeing distance. Vergara asked appellant where he could buy
"panggamot." In turn, appellant inquired whether Vergara was an old customer and
Vergara relied "yes." Appellant asked how much marijuana Vergara needed.
Immediately, Vergara gave appellant the 20-peso bill that came from Pat. Domingo
(p. 7, Ibid).
Appellant took the money and walked into an alley where he disappeared. Within a
few minutes he returned and handed Vergara something wrapped with brown paper
(Exh. A-2). Thereupon, Pat. Domingo Identified himself as a police officer. Appellant
and his two companions scampered away. The two disappeared into the feeder
roads, while appellant dashed towards his house which was about twenty meters
from the billiard hall (p. 9, tsn, July 21, 1984).
The policemen chased appellant and were able to collar him in front of his house.
Due to the intervention of appellant"s relatives who pushed the policemen and pulled
appellant, appellant was able to wrest himself free. He ran inside his house (p. 8,
Ibid).
The policemen enlisted the assistance of the barangay captain, but were
nevertheless unsuccessful in arresting appellant.
Pat. Domingo brought the matter wrapped with brown paper confiscated from
appellant to the police headquarters where he handed it over to Pat. Chao. Pat.
Chao submitted the confiscated matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for examination (p. 12, tsn, March 12, 1984).
When the confiscated matter was examined by NBI Forensic Chemist Demelen de la
Cruz, it was found to contain marijuana (p. 9, tsn, January 16, 1984). 3
On the other hand, the appellant and his mother narrated a different version of what transpired. As
stated by the trial courts:
xxx xxx xxx
... When he took the witness stand on September 6, 1984, the accused Emilio
Agapito declared that he was 25 years old. He testified that between 6:30 and 7:00
o"clock in the evening of August 23, 1982 he was beside the "poolan" or billiard hall,
about four to five meters away, when something unusual happened. At that moment,
according to home, Patrolman Domingo arrived with his companions; that they asked
who Emilio Agapito was and when he replied "I am the one," the police asked him to
go with them, telling him that he was selling marijuana; that he did not go with them,
instead he ran inside his house where the police followed him; that the police mauled
him and tried to force him to go with them, but they failed because his parents
intervened. He denied selling marijuana to civilian informer Efren Vergara. Asked
why the policy had filed this case against him, accused explained that because he
was mauled by the police and his mother was also hurt, his parents had threatened
to charge the police for what they did to him and to his mother. 4
xxx xxx xxx
In his lone assignment of error, appellant maintains that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REJECTING THE VERSION OF THE DOMINGO FOR THAT OF THE PROSECUTION. 5 Thus, the
issue in this case boils down to "credibility" on who among witnesses asserting contradictory or
different versions should be believed.
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, we find ourselves in complete agreement with
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
In a well-written decision, the trial court stated;
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the accused and her mother did not impress the Court as
trustworthy witnesses. Their version of the incident would portray the law enforcers
as completely wanting not only in obedience of the law which they are sworn to
enforce and uphold but also in elementary conduct and good manners as human
beings, let alone as police officers. There was no compelling motive for the police to
insist in arresting the accused if the latter had not committed an offense
in flagrante within their view and knowledge. Their plan of entrapment was executed
with success and their immediate arrest of the offender would have crowned their
collective efforts.
After the case was filed and a warrant of arrest issued against the accused, he was
nowhere to be found and it took the authorities seven months later to apprehend him.
This circumstance alone does not sit well with the claim of innocence of the accused
made by him and his mother. ... 6
xxx xxx xxx
As clearly expressed in his Brief, the underlying premise of all of the appellant"s arguments in
support of his position is that police officers are dishonest, corrupt, and wicked. In the exact words of
the appellants "planting evidence is common practice of the police;" and "police brazenness for
distorting the truth" is widely known. 7
We cannot possibly accept the validity of this premise since our acceptance would mean the
sweeping and unjust condemnation of the entire police force, on whom the maintenance of a
peaceful and orderly society greatly depends, merely on account of the misdeeds of some
misguided policemen or on the "say so" of an accused drug seller and his mother.
In cases involving persons accused of being drug pushers or sellers, almost always the defense is
that the accused was framed by the apprehending police officers. We realize the disastrous
consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-being of society, if the
courts, solely on the basis of the policemen"s alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance this
form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal
presumption, that official duty has been regularly performed, exists.
We accept the finding of the trial court on the credibility of the police officers who testified for the
prosecution. Thus, we give credence to their narration of the incident because they are law enforcers
who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the
contrary. 8
The appellant admits that Patrolman Domingo and his companions approached him and spoke to
him. But according to him, their purpose was not to buy marijuana, instead, he was asked to
accompany them to the police station as he was being accused of selling marijuana.
It is not difficult to discern why the police did not persist in arresting the accused after the latter ran
towards his house and sought the help of his relatives. It was not because, as argued by the
appellant, the police had no case against him, rather, the police wanted to avoid the needless
spilling of blood on both sides or unnecessary violence, it appearing from the testimony of the
appellant"s mother that she and her relatives vigorously resisted the arrest of the appellant.
The records of this case would show that in the evening of the same day that the buy-bust operation
was conducted, the police involved therein brought the piece of brown paper, the same one which
the appellant handed over to the civilian informer, to the National Bureau of Investigation; and the
results of the tests confirmed that the said paper contained dried marijuana leaves. The fact remains
that the information was filed in due time, and a warrant of arrest was issued against the appellant.
If, as argued, the police had no strong case would they persevere in searching for the accused for
more or less seven months after the buy-bust operation?
On the contrary, it is the appellant who, by his sudden disappearance from his place of residence
soon after the failed attempt by the police to arrest him, acted as though he was really guilty of the
crime. He knew that the police, being unsuccessful the first time, would be back to rearrest him.
Indeed, flight is inconsistent with innocence.
The appellant claims that the charge was filed against him because of his mother"s threat that she
would sue the policemen for trespass to dwelling. This reason is too superficial and self-serving to
be accorded any consideration. If the declarations of the appellant and his mother that they were
mauled by the police officers were indeed truthful, with more reason should they have made good
their threat by charging the police with physical injuries, not trespass to dwelling, and the fact that
they did not file any charge only proves that they did not really have a case against the police; that
they have been less than truthful; and that they are simply bent on discrediting the testimonies of the
policemen.
On the other hand, Pat. Domingo explained why they did not file any case against the resisting
relatives. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And did you file any case from interfering your police duties.
A: We did not filie, sir.
Q: Please tell the Honorable Court why?
A: We were not able to file because in my place they have no criminal
act I think because they are the relatives of the accused, sir. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant moreover argues that if, as alleged by the police, the offense was committed near his
house, how is it possible for his mother to know nothing about her son"s commission of said offense.
The answer has been given by the appelant"s mother herself. She testified that she was at home
ironing clothes, and from where she was working she could not see the billiard hall, in the vicinity of
which the buy-bust operation took place. 10
Knowing that the positive eyewitness account of Vergara was convincing, the defense sought to
discredit him by emphasizing his close relationship with the police, he being a civilian informer. We
find Vergara"s testimony to be clear, factual, and straightforward. More importantly, his testimony
was not rebutted by the defense.
In any case, the testimonies of the three other eyewitnesses to the sale of marijuana by the
appellant to Vergara are more than sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Pat. Domingo testified that he introduced himself as a police officer immediately after he saw the
appellant hand over the marijuana to Vergara. 11
Similarly, Pat. Labucay testified that he witnessed the delivery by the appellant to Vergara of the
brown paper containing the marijuana after the payment of the twenty-peso price. 12
Pat. Chao, who was with Pat. Labucay, likewise testified that he actually saw the appelant hand over
a piece of wrapped paper to Vergara. 13 The contents of this same piece of brown paper were subsequently analyzed by
Demelen Renton de la Cruz, an NBI chemist, and, as she testified, the results came out positive for marijuana. 14
Thus, on the whole, the testimonial and physical evidence for the prosecution is overwhelmingly
against the pretended innocence of the accused.
Considering that the accused-appellant does not appear to be a habitual delinquent or recidivist;
considering, further, that he is in the prime of his youth and to accord him the opportunity to turn a
new leaf, we recommend the granting of executive clemency.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED, with the recommendation to the
President, through the Secretary of Justice, that executive clemency be extended to Emilio Agapito
after he shall have served a term of imprisonment, consistent with the ends of retributive justice and
the objectives of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial
Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No.
885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided
for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army
(NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent means, of
which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in
the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to
the NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M.
at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco
asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt.
Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below
their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October
14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three
(3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored
maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan
ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo
Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and
another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March
and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's
Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert
was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at
Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house
at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he
and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on
April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38
caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away
from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as
Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,
Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias
Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an
inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question
propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that
among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of
accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons
who applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision
as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his
own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and
over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, HearingJune 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of
explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or
contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those
questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his
person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by
an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his
admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly
questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to
those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her
to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him.
(TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to
his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by
the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and
were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance
with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform
him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm,
was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22,
1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE
LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION
TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid
manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos
for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused
allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest
or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
[19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the
Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is
lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok
was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led
the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis
of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought
to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who
was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982).
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal.
The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not
armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you
went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you
surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights
under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the
accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership
of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions
were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV
of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the
failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office
was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19,
1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4,
1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81;
People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs.
Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA
634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People
vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga
124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to
be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an
alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has
resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and
abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum
in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of
our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime
with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance
with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46250
July 26, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE P. ANCHETA, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta for appelle.
PER CURIAM:
Again this case occupies the attention of this court by reason of the petition filed by the accused and
appellant Vicente P. Ancheta for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, which
affirms that formerly entered by the Court of First Instance of Palawan sentencing him to the
indeterminate penalty of from six months ofarresto mayor to four years of prision correccional, with
the costs of the proceedings. His petition is based on the following grounds:
I. That it is an error to hold that the detention of Bibiana Sanson ordered by the appellant
was not justified, on the ground that it has not been proven that she had conspired with her
brothers to assault said appellant.
II. That the conviction of the appellant in this case, after this Supreme Court has found in its
decision that "there are circumstances in support of the theory of the defense" that the
appellant ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson for having conspired with her brothers and
with the deceased Salazar to assault said appellant, is a deviation from the uniform ruling
that peace officers are empowered to make arrests without warrant when they have
reasonable cause to believe that an offense or violation of law has been committed and that
the accused is guilty thereof, and is likewise contrary to the express provision of section 848
of the Administrative Code pertinent thereto.
We have reviewed the record and firmly adhere to the finding that it was the accused-appellant who
really ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson upon the belief that she had taken part in the assault
committed upon him by the Sanson brothers, Rufo and Cirilo and by justice of the peace Guillermo
Salazar. The only question now to be determined anew is: "Was the detention of said woman
arbitrary under said circumstances?"
Without making a tedious repetition of the facts pertinent to the case, which already appear in the
decision rendered in case, which already appear in the decision rendered in case G.R. No. 45344
(37 Off. Gaz., 620), and in the one under reconsideration, it should be stated, however, that the
assault committed by the Sanson brothers and justice of the peace Salazar upon the accusedappellant took place immediately after the latter had been approached by Bibiana Sanson in the
middle of the street, while he was passing in front of the store situated under the house owned by
the Sansons. Under said circumstances, the appellant undoubtedly had well founded reasons to
believe that Bibiana Sanson was not innocent of said aggression: first, because it was strange for
her, to approach him in the middle of the street feigning friendship, a thing she had never done
before, and her brothers, Rufo and Cirilo and justice of the peace Salazar, immediately afterwards
and knowing him to be a peace officer, to fall upon him and assault him, punching and kicking him
until he fell to the ground, and at the same time wresting from him the revolver which he carried in
his belt; second, because the four of them harbored a grudge against him, and he knew it, by reason
of his break with Bibiana and of the slander of which she had allegedly been informed and which she
had reached the ears of the Sansons thereby naturally offending them, that he had been spreading
the news that she had in his possession some of the Bibiana's innermost garments, and by reason
of having complained of the behaviour and investigated the conduct of justice of the peace Salazar
in various cases in which the latter had intervened as such justice of the peace; third because
Bibiana made no efforts to prevent her brothers and said justice of the peace from maltreating as
they in fact maltreated him; and lastly, because after the assault, all the four went up the house of
the Sansons, locking up themselves therein until they were compelled to surrender by the
Constabulary.
There is no doubt that the above-stated facts constitute in themselves strong circumstantial evidence
that the aggression was premeditated and was the result of a previous conspiracy in which Bibiana
Sanson could not but have a part. Anybody who found himself in the same circumstances as the
appellant, who have believed so himself and would have made the same decision, all the more so
because the person involved was not merely a peace officer but a commanding officer of a
detachment of constabulary soldiers, called upon, by reason of his position, to act promptly in order
to preserve order and to bring to the authorities those whom be believes in good faith to be violators
of the law. It should be borne in mind that on the same day on which the appellant ordered the
detention of Bibiana Sanson, he caused the presentation of a complaint for frustrated homicide,
which was so done in fact not only against her but also against her to brothers, because he was then
of the opinion that such was the crime committed by them against him. The complaint was filed with
the acting vice-president Emilio Castro, on the belief that said official could act upon it, in the
absence of the justice of the peace and of the municipal president of Balbac. It seems clear that the
appellant ceased to have any responsibility from the time the complaint was filed with the authorities,
because it was not then incumbent upon him to take the steps subsequent to said act, such as that
of effecting the provisional release of Bibiana Sanson on bail, or that of dismissing the complaint
against her for the reason that she does not appear to be liable for any crime, after the
corresponding preliminary investigation.
In crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, which is equivalent to article
200 of the old Penal Code), the legality of the detention made by a person in authority or an agent
thereof, as stated by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of January 27, 1855, does not
depend upon the judicial and much less judicial fact of a crime which, at the time of its commission,
is not and cannot definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of jurisdiction, but
upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the
officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of
suspending the liberty of the citizen.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose
as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the
detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated
therein (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 5, 1892).
This same ruling was upheld by this court in several cases, among them being that of United
States vs. Santos (36 Phil., 853), where it was stated that the reasonable or probable cause which
must exist to justify an arrest without warrant consists in a ground sufficient in itself to convince a
reasonable man to believe that the person arrested by him is guilty; and that, besides reasonable
ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the peace officer making
the arrest. It was likewise stated therein that under such conditions, even if the suspected person is
later found to be innocent, the peace officer who arrested him is not liable, adding that one should
not expect too much of a policeman, and the same is true with a constabulary officer as the
appellant, because both are not presumed to have the training and preparation of a judicial officer,
not having as they do not often have the opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in
haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. It should likewise be borne in mind
that the law (section 848 of the Administrative Code and article 124 of the Revised Penal Code)
allows members of the Constabulary or policemen, and in general, every public officer or employee,
to make arrest without warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be
committed in their own presence, but also when they reasonably believe or have ground to suspect
that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely by the person arrested
(U.S . vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516; U.S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46;
U.S. vs. Santos, supra; People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil., 221). Bibiana Sanson's detention
ordered by the appellant took place exactly under these same circumstances.
Wherefore, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Vicente P. Ancheta, lieutenant of the
Constabulary, of the crime of arbitrary detention with which he was charged, the detention of Bibiana
Sanson ordered by him being as it is now declared sufficiently justified, in view of the circumstances
surrounding the same, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9294
March 30, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EULOGIO SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant.
Leodegario Azarraga for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appelle.
ARAULLO, J.:
Eulogio Sanchez was accused of the crime of illegal detention, provided for and punished in article
200 of the Penal Code, for having detained one Benigno Aranzanso by keeping him in the municipal
jail of the pueblo of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, for a period of less than three days.
The Court of First Instance of said province sentenced the defendant as guilty of said crime to a fine
of P1,000pesetas and to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, such
imprisonment not to exceed six months. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant, being a municipal policeman of the town of
Caloocan, did, at about 9 o'clock in the morning of August 13, 1912, arrest Benigno Aranzanso in the
cockpit of Maypajo of that town and take him to the town hall, where he was detained until just
before nightfall of the same day, when he was set at liberty by order of the president. But it also
appears from the same evidence: (1) That both the municipal president and the sergeant of police
who was acting as chief of police of the town, had information that two nights previous a robbery had
occurred in a boat on the Maypajo River in that jurisdiction, for the boatman had presented himself to
the said sergeant and indicated as one of the assailants of the boat an individual who was the son of
one Eto and who had been in a billiard room the same night; (2) that on the said night on the 12th of
August the Constabulary had been in Caloocan to investigate, in company with the policeman of the
pueblo, a robbery that had occurred in a billiard room, and the said sergeant had acquired the
information that Benigno Aranzanso had been in that billiard room that night and that about five
minutes before he had left on the run; (3) that in view of this the sergeant of police directed not only
the defendant Eulogio Sanchez but also all the patrolmen under his orders to look for the said
Benigno Aranzanso in order that he might be identified by the boatmen; and (4) that by virtue of said
order and because the description they had given him of the person who had been in the billiard
room fitted Aranzanso, the defendant Eulogio Sanchez proceeded to arrest him in the cockpit on the
next morning, the 13h, and took him to the town hall, as has already been stated, where he
remained in confinement until before nightfall of the same day. He was not identified because when
the sergeant of police arrived at the station he had already been set at liberty. No Warrant was
previously issued for his detention because the fact had not been reported to the justice of the peace
and the 13th of August was a legal holiday.
The defendant, therefore, acted in compliance with orders of his chief, the sergeant of police, in
arresting Benigno Aranzanso and his detention was justified for the purpose of identifying his
person, since, according to the sergeant himself, reasonable grounds existed for believing in the
existence of a crime and suspicion pointed to that individual.
It was necessary that the fact of the robbery committed in the boat should have been established in
order to regard such detention as legal:
The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but . . . . upon the
nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the
officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent
purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain,
January 27, 1885.)
One of the duties of the police is to arrest law breakers in order to place them at the disposal of the
judicial or executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the
violation or to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. One of the means conducing to these
ends being the identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that directly
devolves upon the police to make the arrests or detentions for the purpose of such investigation
cannot be questioned.
The same supreme court has so declared in a decision of April 21, 1884, in a case wherein the
person who had threatened another was unknown and suspicion pointed to a man whom an officer
of the law proceeded to arrest. The court said:
The mere fact that an officer of the law compelled a person to appear before the chief of the
department to establish or prove his identity does not justify the classification of illegal
detention. It was merely in the nature of an administrative measure, justified by the suspicion
that he may have made certain threats against another person.
It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the defendant Eulogio Sanchez, did not commit the crime
charged against him in the complaint, and we therefore reverse the judgment appealed from and
freely acquit him; with the costs of both instances de officio.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2128
May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY
OF MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of
robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2,
1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948,
when the petition for habeas corpusfiled with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained
or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the
proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of
Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in
division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as
to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the
petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have
to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information
and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila
a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of
six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our
Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest
and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article,
mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code
formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who,
without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to
the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial
authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper
investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the
city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which
complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its
minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer
who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail
to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a
statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated
in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed
as having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of
arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may
produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by
warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public
officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to
issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the
case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for
than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the
duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground
shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the
person arrested to the proper court orjudge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and
by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the
Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed
of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or
to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the
witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and
"if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ
shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of
arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention
of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th
Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The
investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper
provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses
cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made
by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with
the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so
warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is
provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid
or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the
courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of
temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and
section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2,
Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the
courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as
above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint
must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants,
makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with
the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so
warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making
the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested,
within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having
jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the
court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense
charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the
provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of
First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the
person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and
file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the
accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is
materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the
arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the
investigation, either release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal
has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not
ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should
release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal
Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper
information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course,
for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six
hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of
arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer
than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city
fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting
the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks
without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or
the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly
with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal
has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that
there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint
of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers
who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good
faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and
the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained
by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1159
January 30, 1947
CECILIO M. LINO, petitioner,

vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and JOHN DOE, in their capacity as Mayor,
Chief of Police and Officer in charge of municipal jail, all of the City of Manila,
respectively, respondents.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Enrique M. Fernando, Manuel M. Crudo Claudio,
Teehankee, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be unlawfully
detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in their capacity as
mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively. It
is alleged in respondent's return that ten of the petitioners had already been released, no sufficient
evidence having been found to warrant their prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the
remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of
charges filed against them in the municipal court for unjust vexation and disobedience to police
orders, respectively.
After hearing, by minute-resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the ten petitioners already
released and we ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel and Deoduco, without
prejudice to a reasoned decision which we now proceed to render.
The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The purpose of a writ of
habeas corpus is only to set them free. After they are freed, the writ is purposeless. If they have
been the victims of illegal arrest or detention, they can have recourse to criminal actions in the
proper courts.
As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at the hearing by
respondents, are as follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of
Manila on November 8, 1946, for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946,
for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On November 11 when this petition for habeas
corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still under arrest. They were thus held in confinement for
three and four days respectively, without warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The
papers of their cases were not transmitted to the City Fiscal's office until late in the afternoon of
November 11. Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the
prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest,
but both remained under custody because of informations filed with the municipal court charging
Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent of a person in authority
under the second paragraph of article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. These informations were filed
on the same day when this case was heard before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so
far, no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment are shown to have been issued by the municipal
court pursuant to the informations thus filed.
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even
assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively,
their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen. Code, as amended by Act
No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946,
that is, four and three days, respectively, after they were arrested. The illegality of their detention
was not cured by the filing of information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of
commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this case before this
Court.
It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informations, the two petitioners are charged with
light offenses punishable by law with arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both,
according to the second paragraphs of articles 151 and 287, respectively, of the Revised Penal
Code. Under the Rule 108, section 10, when the offense charged is of that character, "the judge with
whom the complaint or information is filed, shall not issued any warrant or order for the arrest of the
defendant, but shall order the latter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the
complaint or information," although in particular instance he may also "order that a defendant
charged with such offense be arrested and not released except upon furnishing bail." The general
rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be arrested, except
in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. In the
instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor exercised its discretion to
order the arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore, they are still detained not because of the
information filed against them but as a continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers.
While an arrest maybe made without warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109,
section 6, Rules of Court), the prisoners cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law,
unless a warrant is procured from a competent court. (4 Am. Jur., p. 49; Diersvs. Mallon, 46 Neb.,
121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598; Burk vs. Howley, 179 Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607;
Karnervs. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S.W., 656; Johnson vs. Americus, 46 Ga., 80;
Leger vs. Warren, L.R.A., 216-218 [Bk. 51.] It is obvious in the instant case that the City Fiscal had
no authority to issue warrants of arrest (vide authorities cited above, and Hashim vs. Boncan and
City of Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely filing
informations or by any order of his own, either express or implied.
It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within the purview
of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, for even if he were, the
petitioners' case was referred to him long after the expiration of the six hours provided by law. And
since the City Fiscal, unlike the judicial authority, has no power to produce to order either the
commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offense (Adm. Code, section
2460), the petitioner's further confinement after their case had been referred to the City Fiscal was
but a mere continuation of their illegal detention by the police officers. In the eyes of the law,
therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations were filed
with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because of the filing of such
informations it appearing particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general
rule, grounds for arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of
commitment could legalize the prisoner's continued confinement, and no such order has been
issued. Indeed, the municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over said prisoners only by the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or a writ of summons as provided in the
aforementioned rule.
We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Hilado, JJ., concur.
Moran, C. J., I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in this decision.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
The facts in this case can better be gathered from the pleadings. Copies of the petition and of the
return, the latter with the annexes, accompany this opinion as appendices A and B. 1
At the hearing of this case, counsel of both parties disclosed the additional fact that the twelve
detainees in whose behalf these proceedings have been initiated after their arrest, were required to
post a bail bond for their provisional release of P12,000 each.
The petition was filed in the morning of November 11, 1946. The case was heard the next morning,
and in the evening of November 12, it was possible for this Court to obtain the necessary majority for
the early disposal of this case, with the result that the two remaining detainees were then
immediately released. The first ten were released by respondents in the very afternoon of the day
when the petition was filed.
If we could only have our own way, we would have the case heard and disposed of in the very day
the petition was filed, by expediting the procedure in the same way as we did when we ordered the
release on habeas corpus of Special Prosecutor Liwag, in Taada vs. Quirino (42 Off. Gaz., 934).
The Rules of Court, which provide that the writ of habeas corpus may be issued at any hour in the
day or at night, and the very nature of the writ, make imperative the immediate disposal of cases like
the present one, if the remedy is to be effective and there is an earnest desire to avoid a failure of
justice, especially as respondents are bent on exerting all the power and ability at their command to
mock at the action of the courts, as exemplified by the case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil.,
778-812).
At the hearing of this case, our attention was called at the significant fact that petitioner himself, the
ten released detainees, and other persons who came to attend the hearing in this Court, were
refused entrance in the Malacaan compound where the building of the Supreme Court is located.
They were allowed to come in after we asserted that all the people are free to come to the Supreme
Court which is an institution that belongs to them.
The present case offers one of the most shocking examples of official disregard for fundamental
human rights, as guaranteed in our Constitution, and as is intended to be promoted and encouraged
by the Charter of the United Nations.
While Carlos P. Romulo, the eloquent spokesman of the Republic of the Philippines in the General
Assembly of the United Nations, is making world history with his courageous sponsorship of the
independence of all subjugated peoples and countries and is making for our Republic the proud
record as one of the staunchest champions of fundamental human rights, always placed in the
forefront whenever there is a battle for freedom, it seems paradoxical that here, in Manila, in the very
heart of our country, in the nucleus of our national culture, twelve humble, peaceful and law-abiding
citizens, while in the peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights of freedom of expression and to
peaceably assemble, the right to enlist public support in the pursuit of their right to a decent living
wage, and the right to petition their own Government for the redress of their grievances, are abruptly
interrupted in the exercise of their rights and violently hauled into prison as dangerous criminals.
Counsel for respondents tried to justify the unwarranted official invasion of private civil liberties by
the ignorance of erring officials of the Constitutional Bill of Rights. Such ignorance does not justify
anything. It only aggravates the situation. It shows unpardonable dereliction of duty and
recklessness of responsible high authorities.
It is a universal rule that ignorance of the law does not exempt anyone from any responsibility for
violating it. They are also known as law officers, because it is their essential function to enforce the
laws. They form part of the Executive Department of our Government, the department whose
primary function is to execute the laws. No peace officers should be allowed to enter in the actual
performance of his functions without first acquiring the indispensable knowledge of the laws they are
called upon to enforce. At least they ought to know the Constitution, a copy of which they should
always carry in their pockets for immediate consultation, with the same fidelity as the priests stick to
their breviary of prayers. They should be compelled to learn by heart the Bill of Rights, if possible,
commit to memory all its provisions. Peace officers are supposed, not only to enforce the laws, but
also to protect the citizens in their rights, and in order that they may perform this duty, they should
first know what these rights are. Without that knowledge, they become a menace to social order. If it
is dangerous to let a person drive an automobile when that person does not know how to drive it, it is
no less dangerous to entrust the enforcement of laws to armed individuals who are ignorant of them.
It has been alleged that the twelve detainees were not deprived of their personal liberty absolutely,
because they were allowed to enjoy provisional release upon a bail of P12,000 each. If they choose
not to post said bail, they cannot complain for having to remain in prison.
If the detention was illegal, and there is no doubt about it, respondents themselves admitting the
illegality as to the ten detainees they released before the hearing of this case, the fact that
respondent required them to post bail does not legalize their illegal detention. The bail requirements
tends only to show respondents' stubbornness in insisting to enforce an illegal power to have the
detainees under an involuntary control.
But even in the false hypothesis that respondents could require the detainees to post bail for their
provisional release, the fact that respondents fixed the large amount of P12,000 for each, seems
unbelievable sarcasm.
It is fact that the twelve detainees joined the worker's strike in a desperate endeavor to secure a
decent living wage. They went into strike because with what they were being paid for their daily labor
they had not enough to make both ends meet. At the time of their arrest, they were not even earning
the insufficient salary or wage against which they were protesting by means of strike. If those
persons were not earning enough to live as decent human beings, and at the time of their detention
they were not receiving even the miserable pittance they were complaining of, it is not an insulting
joke to require them to raise each P12,000 for bail, an amount, which even we, the members of the
Supreme Court, occupying the highest rank in our judicial system, and receiving the highest salary
allowed by law to a judicial officer, could not raise with the urgency required by the situation of a man
who is deprived of his personal freedom?
It is also alleged that the officers who arrested the detainees believe that the latter committed
sedition. Respondents themselves confess that the detainees did not commit such crime. Sedition is
the crime usually resorted to by tyrants as a pretext to silence or suppress those persons who have
the firmness of character to oppose them and expose their abuses. Socrates was sentenced to drink
hemlock for the sedition of giving freedom and wings to the Greek thought in his painstaking
philosophical search for truth. Because he preached the gospel of human brotherhood, Jesus was
crucified for sedition.
The tyrants of one-fourth of a century ago, who controlled the situation in the Philippines tyrants
are wild animals that may appear in any country following the foot-steps of their predecessors in
other places, tried to smash the crusade for clean government, which was our lot towage in one of
the newspapers of Manila, by prosecuting us for the crime of sedition. (United States vs. Perfecto
and Mendoza, 43 Phil., 58,62-64.) The following paragraphs in the decision of the Supreme Court in
that case, seem to us to ring with trenchant actuality:
When the citizens of a state convinced that the administration of the affairs of their
government is not carried on in accordance with the law, or is not conducted for the best
interest of all concerned, they have not only a right but it is their duty to present the case of
their grievances to the public, and the free press of the state usually affords the best avenue
for that purpose. To that end, the organic laws of all modern free states have wisely provided
that "no law shall be passed, abridging the freedom of the press" and that no person shall be
punished except for an abuse of that freedom. The interest of civilized society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full and free discussion of all affairs of public
interest. Complete liberty to comment upon the administration of the Government, as well as
the conduct of the public men, is necessary for free speech. The people are not obliged,
under modern civilized governments, to speak of the conduct of their officials, of their
servants, in whispers or bated breath. (United States vs.Bustos, 37 Phil., 731.)
The right to assemble and petition the Government, and to make requests and demands
upon public officials, is a necessary consequence of republican and democratic institutions,
and the complement of the right of free speech. (United States vs. Bustos, supra.)
The freedom of the press consists in the right to publish the truth, with good motives and for
justifiable ends, although said publication may be offensive to the Government, to the courts,
or to individuals.
Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the freedom
of the press, said: "The spirit of the constitution and the opinion of the people cannot be
curbed by those who administer the Government. Among those principles which are held
most sacred by the people of America, there is none more deeply rooted in the public mind
than that of the liberty of the press"
Mr. Daniel Webster had occasion to discuss the same question. He said: "It is important to
safeguard to the utmost the right to free speech and the free press. It is the ancient and
constitutional right of our people to judge public matters and public men. It is such a self-
evident right as the right to breathe the air and to walk on the surface of the earth. I will
defend this high constitutional prerogative in time of war, in time of peace, and all the time.
Dead or alive I shall maintain it."
It is the particular duty of the people of the state to zealously maintain the right to express
freely, either verbally or by publication, their honest convictions regarding the acts of the
public officials and the governing class. If the people of the free state should give up the right
of free speech; if they are daunted by fears and threats, and abdicate their convictions; if the
governing body of the state could silence all the voices except those that extol their acts; if
not relating to the conduct of the governing class can reach the people except that which will
uphold the men in power, then we may well say "Good-bye" to our liberties forever. While
under such circumstances free governments may still be maintained, their life, their soul, and
their essentials will be gone. If the publication of the conduct of the public officials annoys
them, let them examine their own act and determine the fundamental cause of the complaint.
Even during the time of illustrious Voltaire, he expressed the opinion that "tolerance was
never the cause of internal strife in the state, but, on the contrary, the pursuit of intolerance
has covered the world with blood. The tyrants of our thoughts have caused the greater part
of the misfortunes of the world."
Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson in discussing the question before us, said: "If there were a
country where knowledge could not be spread without incurring the penalty of the law; where
there is no free speech, where correspondence and publicity are violated, that country would
not be civilized, but it would be barbarous."
Mr. Henry Ward Beecher on one occasion said: "The term 'free' is akin to the wind that blows
over the regions infected with malaria and exposes to the light and germs of the disease.
When the freedom of speech is curtailed, infection sets in and death quickly follows.
Our schoolboys are no more compelled to count "Ichi, ni, san, si," to sing "Hamabe No Uta," to
salute "ohayoo," or "kombanwa," or to intersperse their talk with "arigatoo" or "sayoonara." No more
lecturer is teaching us the "tyu no yu" and flower arrangement as the highest expressions of culture.
The political philosophy of "Daitoa Kyoeiken" (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, under the
Japanese hegemony) has banished as unwanted nightmare. The voice of the Nippon geo-politicians
preaching "Hakko Ichiu," the Emperor's way, the universal brotherhood under the benevolent
guidance of the direct descendant of Amaterasu Omikani, we do not hear any more. The bow-legged
and be-sworded samurai successors, indoctrinated in the traditions of bushido knighthood, ceased
to plunder, to rape, and to cut throats in our midst. Our sleep is no more disturbed by the hobnail
terror stalking in our sidewalks at midnight. The public bowings to brutal sentries, and by high
officials and employees of the government towards the Imperial Palace at Tokyo, are no more. But it
seems, as exemplified in this case, that the feudalistic ideology behind all occupation facts and acts
has left its pernicious in our soil.
The wanton disregard shown by those responsible for the arrest to the rights of the twelve detainees,
those rights being among the fundamental ones guaranteed by the constitution, cannot be explained
otherwise.
There was no absolutely legal ground to disturb or obstruct the twelve detainees in their absolutely
lawful and peaceful activities, and much less to deprive them of their personal freedom and then
keep them in jail for an indefinite period of time, only interrupted upon the filing of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in this case.
It is our opinion that those government officers who are responsible for the detention and
confinement of the twelve detainees, depriving them of personal liberty without due process of law,
as guaranteed by the Constitution, are liable for prosecution under article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides as follows:
Arbitrary detention. Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention
has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but
not more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory
confinement of the patient in the hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention
of any person.
But even if the detention in question was made "for some legal ground," a conjecture in support of
which no sufficient ground appears in this case, still those who made the arrest are liable for
prosecution under article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, because they failed to deliver the twelve
detainees to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours after detention. Said article
is as follows:
Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee
who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours. (As amended by Com. Act No.
3940.)
The idea of prosecuting them under the above cited articles of the Revised Penal Code may appear
to be hard, but we must not forget that "dura lex, sed lex" and whatever may be the consequences
the law must be given its way.
We can imagine how the erring officials will feel at the prospective prosecution and how they might
consider unbearable the idea of being sent to jail, but was it sweet or delicious for the twelve
detainees to be illegally deprived of their freedom and confined in prison for so many days and
nights, without any fault on their part at all? If respondents are zealous in keeping their own personal
freedom, they cannot deny the victims of their recklessness the same legitimate desire.
Everybody can imagine the indescribable physical, mental and moral sufferings endured by the
twelve detainees and their respective families. The indignation felt by one who is the victim of
unjustifiable onslaught upon his individual dignity, the paralyzing anguish of the down-trodden who
feels overwhelmed by brutal superior force against which his weakness cannot offer but the answer
of futile despair, the excruciating thought of the alarm their absence will produce in their humble little
homes, where their unprotected wives will try to drown their worries in bitter tears, while their little
ones are trying to understand in infantile amazement the absence of their father and the tragedy
entailed by that absence, are things that can hardly be attenuated by the thought that, after all, the
Nippon kempei has already banished as an asphyxiating dream, and the unfortunate situation
cannot be as bad as the sadistic and bestial horrors that the very mention of Fort Santiago conjure in
our imagination, the mere memory of which produces thick sweat and blood congelation. There is no
treasure in the world that can adequately compensate such sufferings. The only consolation that the
situation may offer is the bereft hope that such sufferings may have the effect of awakening the
conscience of our public officials so as to induce them to make the firm resolve to avoid the
repetition of such abuses as the ones depicted in this case, that the guilty ones will earnestly repent
of their misdeeds and will henceforth endeavor to accord the proper regard to the rights and liberties
of their fellow human beings, thus contributing to diminish so many rampant manifestations of moral
misorientation, including attempts to degrade the highest tribunal of the country, that now offend the
good sense of the average citizen.
The provision of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government officers form
part or our statute books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country. Those
provisions were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under the
American rule; continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they
were not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign
Republic of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violation of said
provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that
the erring individuals happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting officers
belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting
officers should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of
arbitrary or illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code
will it possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted in
this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees' right to
the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.
The question of an economic rehabilitation of our country is an everyday topic in the newspapers.
We deem more important still the moral rehabilitation of our people; especially that of the officialdom.
The Constitution requires (section 5, Article 41) that "All schools shall aim to develop moral
character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency and to teach the duties of
citizenship," and it will be highly desirable that this mandate should be borne in mind all officers of
the government, and that the qualities The Constitution ordains to be developed in all citizens should
be, with more emphasis, required from officials and employees of the government, thus correcting
the negative tropism shown in this case in regard to fundamental civil liberties.
The filing of information for insignificant misdemeanors against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico
Deoduco appears to us as a poor face-saving device to justify, in some way, their further detention,
and should not be countenanced as a means to defeat the release of said two detainees.
In explaining in this concurring opinion, our position in voting in favor of the resolution of November
12, 1946, we wish to make clear that we do not interpret article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as
legalizing detentions not exceeding six hours. Said article does not legalize an illegal detention. It
only offers a justifying circumstance which exempts the erring officials from criminal prosecution,
provided that the detention is made upon legal grounds and do not last more than six hours, but it
will, and cannot, defeat a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person illegally detained
although the petition is filed before the termination of the six hours period mentioned in the article, as
the constitutional guarantee of personal freedom is not subject to any time limit.
We wish to emphasize that it is highly dangerous to make the fundamental rights to the citizens a
kind of shuttlecock of passing moods or momentary whims of persons wielding some kind of
government powers. When the oestrous of official intolerance and braggadocio employed to cow into
submission the twelve detainees has subsided, everybody will recognize in the cool and serene
recesses of their conscience, that those who, under the pretext of subduing allegedly seditious
persons; committed the arbitrariness complained of in the petition, trod a perilous path that, as
shown by the experience of other countries, usually lead to the implantation of a dictatorship, whose
whole philosophy is built upon the hateful slogan that everything, including the most cherished
possessions and the most blessed ideals of the people, should be sacrificed for the sake of the state
supremacy.
We are glad that two civic-minded groups of citizens, the Philippine Civil Liberties Union and the
Philippine Lawyers Guild, have taken pains to appear in this Court in behalf of the twelve detainees,
and we congratulate them for the success of their endeavors.
By actual personal experience and upon conclusive evidence, we know that it is not enough that the
civil liberties and fundamental human rights be guaranteed in express constitutional provisions in
order that they should effectively be protected. Eternal vigilance and constant willingness and
readiness to fight for them are necessary.
When World War I was nearing its end, in the exercise of the freedom of the press, guaranteed by
the Jones Law, as Editor of La Nacion, we made exposures of many unsatisfactory aspects of public
affairs as they were then conducted. We made revelations regarding the scandals of the Philippine
National Bank which caused many millions of losses to our Government. The powerful wanted us to
be silenced. The Governor General, first through his Secretary, Mr. Irwin, and later through General
Crame,Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, tried to intimidate us with drastic action by the
Government if we should not stop the publications of the irregularities and illegalities we were
denouncing then in the columns of our paper. They reminded us that the war justified any
extraordinary measures by the Government, and that our denunciations, by tending to destroy public
confidence in the authorities, were highly seditious. Our invariable answer to Mr. Irwin and General
Crame was that the Governor General and they themselves were free to do what it would please
them, but nothing shall deter us from doing what according to our conscience, was our public duty.
As we did not allow ourselves to be intimidated, a series of criminal prosecutions were instituted
against us. Although the lower courts should invariably find us guilty, the Supreme Court had always
acquitted us, by upholding the freedom of the press.
The existence of the liberal elements, always watchful and ready to defend the victims of violations
of the Bill of Rights, is necessary to vitalize democracy and to give tangible reality to the guarantees
of the Constitution. The fight for personal freedom must go on, over and over again, as the forces of
reaction are always ready to snatch any opportunity to set at naught the guarantees of the
fundamental laws, as happened in the bail incident inPeople vs. Jalandoni (G.R. No. L-777),and all
liberal forces must always be ready to answer the summons of endangered liberties.
The attainment of great ideals needs faith, passionate adherence to them, the militant attitude
manifested in the unflinching readiness to fight and face hardships and sacrifices, unconquerable
steadfastness and unbreakable perseverance in the face of obstacles and setbacks. These are the
conditions and qualities with which thinkers and philosophers were able to discover the truth which
have guided humanity as beacons in the path of progress; the founders of great religions, to transmit
to millions their message of hope and gospel of eternal moral principles: Columbus, to discover the
New World, and Magellan to transverse the two largest oceans and encircle the globe; astronomers,
to pierce the immensity of space to conquer new stars, parsecs away; bacteriologists, to scavenge
dangerous micro-organisms; scientists, to fossick in the mysteries of matter to wrest new revelations
which enhance the intellectual horizon of man increase his means for enjoyment of life and
happiness. The same conditions and qualities are among those needed by all liberal and
progressive spirits to keep lighted the torch of liberty, to squelch the hydra of reaction, to conserve
the moral heritage of advancement and conquest in the emporium of human rights bequeathed by
the champions and martyrs who waged the heroic battles for real spiritual values and for the dignity
of man as the image of God.
Appendix A
PETITION
Petitioner Cecilio M. Lino, through his undersigned counsel, respectfully alleges:
1. That the petitioner is of legal age and a resident of the City of Manila, Philippines; the respondent
Valeriano E. Fugoso is the Mayor of the City of Manila; the respondent Lamberto T. Javalera is the
Chief of Police of the said City; and the respondent John Doe is the Officer in Charge of the
Municipal Jail of the same City;
2. That the petitioner is the President of the City Employees' and Workers' Union, Congress of Labor
Organization (CLO), duly registered as a labor organization under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 213; and he files this petition on behalf of the following persons, members of the said labor
organization, who are imprisoned and deprived of their liberty, to wit:
1. Ricardo Suarez (Juarez)
2. Gregorio Santiago
3. Ismael de Jesus
4. Serafin Pascual
5. Amado Racanday
6. Antonio Bulagda (Burlagada)
7. Mauro Fernandez
8. Jose Badeo
9. Francisco Nevado (Lebado)
10. Pascual Montaniel
11. Pedro Martinez and
12. Pacifico Deoduco;
3. That, within the time comprised between November 5 and November 8, 1946, the persons above
named were arrested without warrant and without lawful cause, upon order of the respondent
Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of City of Manila, by members of the Police Department of said City,
of which the respondent Lamberto T. Javalera is the Chief, and, immediately thereafter, were taken
to, and detained at, the Municipal Jail of the aforementioned City, of which the respondent John Doe
is the Officer in Charge;
4. That since their arrest all the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof have been detained and
deprived of their liberty by the respondents at said Municipal Jail, although no charges have been
filed against any of the above mentioned persons in any lawful court, nor has any judicial or other
proper authority issued any order authorizing their continued detention, and notwithstanding the
lapse of the period of six hours from the time of their arrest and/or commitment;
5. That the aforementioned persons were arrested while in the peaceful exercise of their
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of the press and peaceably to assemble and petition
the Government for the redress of their grievances, specially, while performing the following acts to
enlist public support in the pursuit of their right to a living wage, to wit:
(a) Ricardo Suarez (Juarez), Gregorio Santiago, Ismael de Jesus and Serafin Pascual
arrested on November 5, 1946 at Pinkian Street, Tondo, Manila, for no apparent reason, but
for posting and distributing handbills explaining the plight of the city laborers on strike, and
appealing to and for the sympathy and lawful support of the public; (b) Amado Racanday,
Antonio Bulgada (Burlagada) and Mauro Fernandez arrested on November 6, 1946, while
standing at the corner of Gral. Luna and California streets, Paco, Manila, for no apparent
reason, except that they had joined the city laborers' strike, and for having in their
possession some copies of the handbills above mentioned;
(b) Jose Badeo and Francisco Nevado (Lebado) arrested on November 6, 1946, while
standing at the corner of Perez and California Streets, Paco, Manila, for no apparent reason
except that they had joined the city laborers' strike and had in their possession a notice of a
meeting of their labor organization;
(c) Pascual Montaniel arrested on November 8, 1946, at Cristobal Street, Paco, Manila,
for no apparent reason, except that he made a friendly greeting to a non-striker;
(d) Pedro Martinez arrested on November 8, 1946, at Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin,
Manila, for no apparent reason, except that he had joined the city laborers' strike and walked
along the street with a paper band strung diagonally from his shoulder around his body
bearing the following words: "Damayan Kami! Huag Mageskirol" (Help us! Do not be scab);
and
(e) Pacifico Deoduco arrested on November 7, 1946, at Cristobal Street, Manila, for no
apparent reason except that he had joined the city laborers' strike.
Wherefore, petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus be directed forthwith to the respondent
commanding them, or any of them, to have the bodies of the above named persons who are
restrained and deprived of their liberty before this Honorable Court at a time and place to be
designated by this Court; and, after due hearing, forthwith to order their discharge from confinement,
with cost against the respondents.
Manila, Philippines, November 11th, 1946.
Emmanuel Pelaez
Francisco A. Rodrigo
Enriquez M. Fernando
Manuel M. Crudo
Claudio Teehankee and
Jose W. Diokno.
By: (Sgd.) Emmanuel Pelaez Pelaez
Counsel for the petitioner %
Philippine Civil Liberties Union 503
China Bank Building, Dasmarias
Manila
By: (Sgd.) Claudio Teehankee

Counsel for the Petitioner %
Philippine Lawyers' Guild, 319
Lardizabal Street, Manila
VERIFICATION
Cecilio M. Lino, of legal age, after being duly sworn in accordance with law, deposes and says:
1. That he is the petitioner in the foregoing petition for a writ of habeas corpus;
2. That he caused the same to be prepared and presented; and
3. That all the facts therein alleged are true and correct.
Further affiant sayeth naught. Manila, November 11, 1946.
(Sgd.) Cecilio M. Lino
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of November, 1946, at the City of Manila,
Philippines. The affiant exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. A-20721, issued at the City of
Manila, on January 9, 1946.
(Sgd.) F.A. Rodrigo
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1947
Doc. No. 36
Page No. 9
Book No. 1
Series of 1946.
Appendix B
RETURN OF WRIT
Come now in the above-entitled case, Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto T. Javalera and John Doe, in
their respective capacities as Mayor, Chief of Police and Officer in Charge of the Municipal Jail, all of
the City of Manila, through their counsel, the undersigned City Fiscal, and in making their return to
the petition filed herein, to this Honorable Court respectfully allege:
1. That they admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of said petition.
2. That they admit the fact, stated in paragraph 3 of said petition, regarding the arrest of the persons
whose names are listed in paragraph 2 thereof, without warrant, by members of Manila Police
Department, and their detention until yesterday, November 11, 1946, at the Municipal Jail of the City
of Manila; but they deny the rest of the allegations especially that which states for a fact that said
detained persons were arrested without lawful cause upon order of the respondent Valeriano E.
Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, the truth of the matter being that the arrest was lawful, it
having made by members of the Manila Police Department duly appointed and qualified as such
who acted in the performance of their official duties, and acting in the belief that the said detained
persons, before or at the time of their arrest, were committing acts in violation of the laws of the land.
3. That they admit the fact, alleged in paragraph 4 of said petition, that all the arrested persons have
been placed under detention until yesterday, November 11,1946, at the Municipal Court of the City
of Manila; but they deny the rest of the allegations, specially that part which says that no charges
have been filed against them notwithstanding the lapse of the period of six hours from the time of
their arrest and commitment, the truth of the matter being that charges for inciting to sedition,
disobedience to police orders and resisting arrest have been filed against them by the arresting
police officers with the Office of the City Fiscal which has conducted the preliminary investigation of
said cases in accordance with law.
4. That they deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of said petition, the same being merely
conclusions of facts and/or of law.
As special defenses, respondents hereby allege:
(a) That all of the twelve detained persons were arrested by police officers for acts which the
arresting officers believed to constitute inciting to sedition, resisting arrest and disobedience to police
orders, filing the corresponding cases against them with the Office of the City Fiscal immediately
thereafter.
(b) That yesterday, November 11, 1946, before and after the receipt by them of their respective
copies of the petition for habeas corpus herein filed, complaints had already been presented with the
Municipal Court of Manila against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco not for inciting to
sedition but for unjust vexation and for disobedience to police orders, respectively, the same being
criminal cases Nos. 6765 and 7666 of the Municipal Court of Manila, copies of which complaints are
being attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annexes 1 and 2.
(c) That likewise, before and after the receipt by them of their respective copies of the petition of
habeas corpus, said respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso and Lamberto T. Javalera had already been
notified of the dismissal by the Office of the City Fiscal of the cases for inciting to sedition against all
the detained persons, for insufficiency of the evidence, and of filing in the Municipal Court of Manila
complaints against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco, as aforesaid.
(d) That, similarly, before and after his receipt of a copy of the petition for habeas corpus, the
respondent John Doe, in his capacity as Officer in charge of the Municipal Jail, had received from
the City Fiscal letters bearing date of November 11, 1946, copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes 3 and 4 of this Return, wherein he was advised that the cases against said detained
persons for inciting to sedition have been dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but the complaints
were being filed against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco for unjust vexation and for
disobedience to police orders, respectively, and wherein said respondent John Doe has been
ordered by the City Fiscal to forthwith release all of said detained persons with the exception of
Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Diodoco, an order which has been complied with by said respondent
John Doe as shown by the fact that said detained persons, with the exception of the latter two, had
forthwith been released from custody.
(e) That Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco continue to be detained and are deprived of their
liberty not without lawful cause, for the reason that there are at present pending against them
criminal complaints with the Municipal Court of Manila for unjust vexation and disobedience to police
orders as stated above.
Wherefore, respondents herein pray this Honorable Court to dismiss the petition, with costs against
the petitioner.
Manila, November 12, 1946.
(Sgd.) Jose P. Bengzon

City Fiscal
Annex 1
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses Pascual Montaniel y Avelar of the crime of unjust vexation,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th of November, 1946, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and unjust vex and annoy one
Jesus Cambare, who was then a driver at the City Motor Pool assigned to the Department of
Engineering and Public Works of the Government of the City of Manila, while in the act of
managing, driving and operating a jeep being used by the Assistant City Engineer of said
City in the latter's capacity, by then and there stopping the jeep driven by said Jesus
Cambare without any just cause therefor and telling him to stop driving for the City of Manila
while the strike of city laborers was still going on, all in a threatening attitude, and to the great
disgust and annoyance of the aforementioned Jesus Cambare. Contrary to law.
(Sgd.) JULIO VILLAMOR
Assistant Fiscal
Witnesses:
Jesus Cambre 615 Merced, Paco
Dets. Felix T. Pineda and
Victoriano Antonio Det. Bureau
Chief Clerk Dept. of Engineering and
Public Works, City Hall (bringing records re
appointment of Jesus Cambare as driver at the
City Motor Pool)
Annex 2
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses Pacifico Deudoco of a violation of the second paragraph of Art.
151 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1946, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously disobey Vicente Celeridad, a
duly appointed and qualified police officer of the City of Manila and, therefore, an agent of a
person in authority, while the latter was acting in the performance of his official duties, to wit:
while he was guarding the premises of the City Motor Pool on Cristobal St., in said City,
which acts of disobedience was in the following manner: That said accused, having entered
and was actually found in the aforesaid premises where he had no right to be, without the
knowledge and consent of the authorities concerned, and having been ordered several times
by the aforesaid police officer to go out of and leave the said premises, defiantly and
persistently refused to do so, but instead he continued to remain therein. Contrary to law.
(Sgd.) JULIO VILLAMOR

Assistant City Fiscal
November 11, 1946.
Witnesses:
Pat. V. Celeridad, Precinct No. 3.
Pat. Pedro Camata, Precinct No. 3.
Chief Clerk, Manila Police Dept., to bring a certified
copy of the latest appointment of Pat. Vicente Celeridad of
the Manila Police Dept.
Bail recommended: P200
Annex 3
November 11, 1946
The Prison Officer
City Jail, Manila.
Sir:
With reference to the case of inciting to sedition presented with this Office against (1)
Ricardo Suarez, (2) Gregorio Santiago (3) Ismael de Jesus,(4) Serafin Pascual, (5) Amado
Racanday, (6) Antonio Bulagua (Burlagua),(7) Mauro Fernandez, (8) Jose Radeo, (9)
Francisco Navado (Levado), (10) Pascual Montaniel, and (11) Pedro Martinez, please be
informed that after an investigation has been conducted in the premises, it was found out
that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of said accused in court, it
appearing that the leaflets, posters and other propaganda sheets which said accused
distributed to the public and pasted or posted at different places within the city, did not
contain any statement or phrases of seditious nature or of the nature to incite to the
commission of sedition. This Office, however, is filing a complaint with the Municipal Court
against Pascual Montaniel y Avelar for unjust vexation only, wherein a bail of P100 has been
recommended for his temporary release.
In view of the foregoing, of the said accused, except Pascual Montaniel y Avelar, should be
released from the custody or their bonds cancelled, if any have been put up for their
temporary release unless they are held on other charges.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) JOSE P. BENGZON
City Fiscal
ANNEX
November 11, 1946

The Prison Officer
City Jail, Manila.
Sir:
With reference to the cases of disobedience to the Police and resisting arrest presented to
this Office against Pacifico Deoduco y Docio, please be informed that after an investigation
has been conducted in the premises, it was found out that there is no sufficient evidence to
warrant his prosecution in court for the offense of resisting arrest. This Office, however, is
filing today a complaint with the Municipal Court against the said accused for disobedience to
an agent of a person in authority, under the second paragraph of Art. 151 of the Revised
Penal Code, wherein a bail of P200.00 has been recommended for his temporary release.
Very respectfully,
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Jose P. Bengzon
City Fiscal
BRIONES, M., conforme:
El presente caso es un incidente de la famosa huelga declarada y efectuada en Noviembre del ano
pasado (1946)por obreros organizados de la ciudad de Manila en el servicio municipal de limpieza
de calles y en obras publicastambien municipales. Como fondo historico del caso en general, y de
esta opinion en particular, cabe incluir en lanarracion de hechos el de que como es
acostumbrado eneste genero de convulsiones sociales despues de mucho apasionamiento por
ambos lados, de no poca nerviosidad y delaboriosas negociaciones, la huelga que duro unas dos
semandasquedo satisfactoriamente solucionada, aviniendoselos huelguistas a volver a su trabajo a
cambio de ciertasconcesiones que hizo el Municipio de Manila, particularmenteen la cuestion de
bonificaciones y salarios. Sin embargo, resulta de autos y de la historia el dia reflejada
principalmente en la prensa (de lo cual podemos naturalmente tomar conocimiento judicial) que la
exaltacion de los animos, la pasion al rojo vivo produjeron algunos incidentes,unos dramaticos,
otros comicos, llegando la tension nerviosade algunos a exagerar tremendamente las proporciones
delmovimiento hasta el extremo de imaginarse rebeliones y sedicionesalli donde no habia sino un
espiritu algun tantomilitante de parte de los obreros en la defensa de sus derechose intereses y en
la propaganda de su causa con lamira de ganarse la simpatica del publico. Uno de esos
incidenteses la cogida o aprehension por la policia, sin previaorden de arresto, por el especioso
pretexto de que estabanincitando y promoviendo nada menos que una sedicioncontra el gobierno
constituido, de doce obreros huelgistas,confinandoseles en la carcel por dicho motivo.
En nombre de esos doce se ha presentado esta solicitudde mandamiento de habeas corpus por
Cecilio M. Lino, presidente de la Union de Empleados y Obreros de la Ciudad, filial del "Congress of
Labor Organizations" (CLO), defendiendo les como abogados Emmanuel Pelaez, Francisco A.
Rodrigo y Enrique M. Fernando, miembros y representantes de la sociedad civica "Philippine Civil
Liberties Union," y Manuel M. Crudo, Claudio Teehankee y Jose W. Diokno, miembros, y
representantes del "Philippine Lawyers' Guild." En nombre de los recurridos ha comparecidoante
esta Corte el Fiscal auxiliar Julio Villamor, de la ciudad de Manila.
Alegase en la solicitud que los doce obreros de que setrata fueron arrestados mientras estaban
ejerciendo pacificamentesus derechos constitucionales, a saber: la libertadde la palabra y de la
prensa, y el de reunion pacificapara pedir del gobierno el alvio de sus agravios. Se
detallanespecificamente los actos en que estaban ocupados cuando fueron arrestados, a saber:
(a) Ricardo Suarez (Juarez), Gregorio Santiago, Ismaelde Jesus y Serafin Pascual fueron
arrestados el 5 de Noviembre, 1946, en la calle de Pinkian, arrabal de Tondo, Manila, mientras
estaban distribuyendo y pegando en lasparades hojas volantes en que se explicaban las miserias y
tribulaciones de los obreros en huelga y se apelaba a lasimpatia y sentimientos humanitarios del
publico para que apoyara la causa de los huelguistas.
(b) Amando Racanday, Antonio Bulagada (Burlagada) y Mauro Fernandez fueron arrestados el 6 de
Noviembre,1946, mientras estaban tranquilamente parados en la esquinade las calles de California
y Gral. Luna, Paco, Manila,y sin ningun motivo aparente como no fuese el deque se habian
adherido a la huelga y se hallaron en suposesion copias de las hojas volantes mencionadas en
alparrafo anterior.
(c) Jose Badeo y Francisco Nevado (Levado) fueron arrestados el 6 de Noviembre, 1946, mientras
estaban tranquilamenteparados en la asquina de las calles de Perez y California, Paco, Manila, y
tambien sin ningun motivo manifiestocomo no fuese el de que se habian adherido igualmentea la
huelga y tenian en su poder el aviso de unareunion que la organizacion obrera a que estaban
afiliadosiba a celebrar.
(d) Pedro Martinez fue arrestado el 8 de Noviembre,1946, en la calle de Juan Luna, Gagalagin,
Manila, y sinninguna razon aparente excepto que el mismo se habiaadherido a la huelga y andaba
paseandose a lo largo dedicha calle con una banda llamativa que llevaba diagonalmentealrededor
de su cuerpo y en la cual estaban escritaslas siguientes palabras en tagalo: DAMAYAN KAMI,
HUAGMAG-ISKIROL! (Help us! Don't be a scab! Ayudadnos! No seais desertores!)
(e) Pascual Montaniel fue arrestado el 8 de Noviembre,1946, en la calle de Cristobal, Paco, Manila,
sin ningunmotivo aparente como no fuese el de que habia saludado amistosamente a uno que no
era huelguista.
(f) Pacifico Deoduco fue arrestado el 7 de Noviembre1946, en la citada calle de Cristobal tambien
sin razonmanifiesta excepto que se habia adherido a la huelga.
Se puso de manifiesto en la audiencia, en los informesorales producidos por las partes, que los
obreros arribamencionados fueron recluidos en los calabozos desde quefueron arrestados hasta
que, por recomendacion del PromotorFiscal de la Ciudad, la Policia los puso en libertad,menos
Montaniel y Deoduco, a las tres y media de la tardedel 11 Noviembre, por haberse hallado, segun la
cartade dicho Fiscal al oficial de las prisiones de Manila, "queno hay prueba suficiente para justificar
la prosecucion dedichos acusados ante los tribunales, apareciendo que las hojas volantes,
manifiestos y otras hojas de propaganda quetales acusados distribuyeron entre el publico y
exhibierono fijaron en diferentes lugares dentro de la ciudad, no contenianninguna frase o expresion
de caracter sedicioso ode tal naturaleza que incitase la comision del delito de sedicion" (Carta del
Fiscal de la Ciudad de Manila, Jose P. Bengzon, de 11 de Noviembre de 1946, al oficial de
lasprisiones de la ciudad, anexo 3). Se ordeno, sin embargo,la continuacion de la detencion de
Montaniel y Deoduco, a pesarde que tampoco habia pruebas de sedicion contra ellos, porque la
Fiscalia decidio a ultima hora presentar querellas,a saber: (a) contra Montaniel, por supuesta
vejacioninjusta, alegandose que el 8 de Noviembre, mientras Jesus Cambare guiaba y manejaba un
"jeep" de la oficina del Ingeniero de la ciudad, Montaniel trato de pararle diciendoleque dejase de
guiar al servicio de la ciudad de Manilamientras durase la huelga, 'con gran disgusto y molestiade
dicho Jesus Cambare"; (b) contra Deoduco, por supuestadesobediencia a un policia, alegandose en
la querella queel 7 de Noviembre, 1946, el acusado entro sin permiso en el deposito de vehiculos de
motor (motor pool) de la ciudadsituado en la calle de Cristobal, Paco, y que cuando el policiade
guardia, Vicente Celeridad, le intimido que salieradel lugar, dicho acusado persistio en quedarse
desobedeciendo asi al policia.
Al llegar a este punto parece importante, y hasta necesario, fijar especificamente el tiempo en que
tuvieron lugarciertos acaecimientos y tramites. Esto nos servira paraponer de relieve ciertos hechos
capitales y ciertos puntosen contencion, y evaluarlos en toda su densidad. De autose informes
resultan los siguientes hechos: (a) que lapresente solicitud de habeas corpus se presento y
registroen la escribania de esta Corte el 11 de Noviembre, 1946,a las 9 de la maana poco mas o
menos; (b) que el recurrido Alcalde Valeriano E. Fugoso fue emplazado de la solicituden aquella
misma manana, a las 11:20; (c) que elrecurrido jefe de policia Lamberto Javalera tambien
fueemplazado de la solicitud en aquella misma manana, a las11:30; (d) que el recurrido oficial de
las prisiones de laciudad John Doe fue asumismo emplezado en aquella manana, a las 11:30; (e)
que a la 1:05 p.m. de aquel dia el Fiscal de la Ciudad envio su carta ya citada al oficial de las
prisiones, dando instrucciones para que se pusiese immediamente en libertada los detenidos,
menos Montaniel y Deduco; (f ) que la policiarecibo dichas instructiones a las 2 de la tarde, y las
3:30 p.m.las cumplimento soltando a los detenidos, excepto los y amencionados Montaniel y
Deduco; (g) que, a pesar de que estos dosultimos fueron arrestados el 8 y 7 de Noviembre,
respectivamente, la policia no envio a la Fiscalia los papelesacerca de sus casos sino en la tarde
del 11 de Noviembre, esdecir, del mismo dia en que se presento la solicitud de habeas corpus; (h)
que la querella contra Montaniel, por vejacion injusta, se presento ante el juzgado municipal
deManila a las 2 de la tarde del 11 de Noviembre, es decir, algunas horas despues de presentada la
solicitud de habeas corpus; (i) que la querella contra Deoduco, por desobedienciaa un policia, se
presento ante el juzgado municipalsolamente en la manana del 12 de Noviembre, o sea, al
diasiguiente de interpuesto el recurso de habeas corpus.
Tambien resultan de los autos e informas los siguienteshechos: (1) que respecto de los diez
detenidos que posteriormentefueron puestos en libertad por no habersehallado ningun cargo
fundado contra ellos, la Fiscalia admitehaber recibido a tiempo de la policia los papeles
correspondientes, es decir, dentro de 6 horas despues deverificados los arrestos, pero que si no
pudo presentarninguna querella durante un periodo de 7 dias del 5 al 11de Noviembre o
decidir que no habia ninguna sedicioncomo despues decidio, fue porque tenia otros muchos
trabajosy porque, ademas, necesitaba de tiempo para leer ydesentranar el significado de las hojas
volantes y manifiestos,y ver si en ellos habia alguna manifestacion sediciosao criminal; (2) la
Fiscalia admite que las hojas volantesy manifiestos no era voluminosos sino que se componia
deunas cuantas hojas y que normalmente no se necesitabandias ni siquiera horas para leerlos y
determinar su significaciony sentido, pues no estaban concebidos y escritosen jeroglificos, sino en
un tagalo sencillo, llano y popular,como es usual en papeles de propaganda; (3) que durantela
detencion de los arrestados se trato de gestionar yobtener su libertad provisional y la Fiscalia senalo
a dichoefecto la prestacion de una fianza de P12,000 para cadauno, basando la Fiscalia su
requerimiento en la gravedaddel delito supuestamente cometido el de sedicion; (4) queasi
continuaron las cosas hasta que se presento ante estaCorte la solicitud de habeas corpus en la
manana del dia11, viniendo luego la rapida sucesion de acontecimientos deque ya se ha hecho
merito.
Habiendo sido puestos en libertad diez de los doce detenidosantes de que se viera la presente
solicitud dehabeas corpus se todavia pertinente que examinemos la totalidadde los hechos,
incluso los relativos a los ya liberados? Creemos que si; la cuestion, a nuestro juicio, no ha venidoa
ser meramente academica, por las siguientes razones: primera, porque ya esta Corte habia
asumido jurisdiccionsobre el caso mediante la presentacion de la solicitud dehabeas corpus cuando
los diez detenidos fueron soltados de hecho, cabe afirmar que la interposicion de este recursofue
el motivo de que se les soltase, pues no podia ser simplecoincidencia casual el que, al cabo de
varios dias de extranainaccion, se diese como de prisa y corriendo la orden delibertad provisional
unas cuantas horas despues de registradaen la escribania de esta Corte al solicitud de habeas
corpus; segunda, porque si bien es cierto que Montaniel y Deoduco, los dos que no han sido
soltados, fueron arrestados independientemente de los otros y en diferentes fechas, sus casos, sin
embargo, son perfectamente identicos a losde los otros, pudiendo decirse que la policia arresto y
detuvoa todos ellos como partes de una conspiracion y sedicionorganizada; asi que para lograr una
adecuada perspectivano hay mas remedio que enfocar conjuntamente los casos,o hay que decirlo
mas bien en singular el caso de los doce;y tercera, porque si bien es verdad que en los
procedimientos de habeas corpus la cuestion principal es la liberacionfisica de la persona que esta
privada de libertad y quecuando se ha obtenido tal resultado parece que los procedimientos deben
darse por terminados, y por lo general, huelga todo comentario o exposicion de criterio sobre
loshechos y la ley o doctrina juridica aplicable o deducible delos mismos, es evidente, sin embargo,
que se dan casos enque los hechos son de tal transcendencia en relacion con lavida de las
instituciones, con la existencia del Estado, conlas libertades publicas, con el orden social, o con la
existenciade la misma comunidad civil y politica, que no porque deliberada o indeliberadamente se
logra hurtarlos a la acciony decision de los tribunales, estos quedan excusados de exponer su
criterio o hacer algun pronunciamiento, maximesi como en nuestro caso, en el caso de esta Corte
Suprema, el pronunciamiento judicial, la exposicion de criteriopuede no ser una cosa meramente
teorica y academica, sino que puede irradiar un activo y eficaz influjo de saludableejemplaridad y
repercusion en la vida juridica sentandonormas inequivocas de politica y conducta publica,o bien
condenando y corrigiendo desmanes y abusos si abusosy desmanes se han cometido; y no cabe
duda de queel que tenemos ante Nos es uno de esos casos. Este es uncaso en que no hay mas
remedio que hablar claro y fuertepara que lo oigan hasta los sordos, si se quiere que esta
republicapise terreno firme y seguro en su lento caminar haciael cumplimiento de sus destinos
humanos e historicos;si se quiere que entre nosotros la constitucion, la ley, el orden,la libertad y la
democracia no sean un mito, juguetede tiranuelos y despotillas, sino realidades vivientes
ycotidianas; si se quiere, en una palabra, que este colosalexperimento en que estamos empenados
experimento dedemocracia politico-economico-social-cristiana en el granpielago de la Oceaia
resulte un acabado exito y una obraque podamos legar con orgullo a nuestros descendientes.
Lo primero que salta a la vista es que los doce obrerosde que se trata no estaban cometiendo
ningun delito, muchomenos el de sedicion, cuando sin previa orden judicial dearresto fueron
aprehendidos como si hubiesen sido cogidos in fraganti en el preciso momento de perpetrar un
crimen,de esos que dan lugar a procedimientos de oficio y capturay detencion inmediatas por
cualquier agente de seguridadpublica. Es verdad que eran huelguistas, pero es acasola huelga un
crimen? Es verdad tambien que algunos deellos fueron cogidos repartiendo y distribuyendo en las
calles ciertas hojas volantes y pegando en muro y paredes ciertos manifiestos, pero eran
criminosos, incendiarios o subversivos estos papeles? Tampoco: la Fisacalia de la ciudad,despues
de examinarlos por varios dias paciente y minucioso examen! acabo por dictaminar a ultima
hora que se trataba de literatura inocente, esto es, que no contenia ninguna manifestacion
sediciosa, recomendando en consecuencia que diez de los doce fuesen inmediatamente soltados
despues de una detencion no solo absolutamente injustificada, sino ademas ilegal porque excedio
con mucholas 6 horas que fija el codigo penal como tiempo maximo de detencion en los casos en
que no hay previa orden judicial de arresto y no se entrega al detenido a la autoridad judicial
correspondiente dentro de dichas 6 horas.
Es cierto asimismo que algunos de los mencionados obreros fueron cogidos por la policia mientras
estaban pacificamente parados en una esquina formando pequenos grupos, hallandose a lo mas en
su poder copia del aviso para un mitin de la organizacion obrera a que estaban afiliados; pero de
cuando aca ha sido un crimen el estar pacificamentelevantados en una esquina, siquera fuese en
pequeos grupos, y el tener en el bolsillo la copia de una convatoria un mitin pacifico? Esto jamas
habia sido un crimen ni en los dias mas obscuros de nuestra sujecion a la soberania americana;
menos ha de serlo ahora en eque somos una nacion independiente, constituimos una republica, y
estamos cobijados bajo la sombra de nuestra propia bandera, teida en grana de la sangre de
tantos y tantos martires de la libertad que no, no es posible hayan muerto en vano!
Es cierto igualmente que a uno de dichos obreros se le cogio porque andando por las calles tenia
arrollada al cuerpo notable experto en el arte de la propaganda! Una banda en que se leian
siguientes palabras en tagalo:"Damayan kami, huwag mag-eskirol!" (Help us, don't be a scab!
Ayudadnos, no seais desertores!); parece que la policia hallo esto como algo subversivo, como una
incitacion a cometer sedicion. Resulta patente, sin embargo, que el gesto de este obrero
progandista no podia ser mas subversivo ni mas incendiario que el de Diogenes, el cinico,aquel
que, metido en una barrica y portando una linterna, rodaba por las calles de Atenas en pleno dia
buscando un hombre. Que sepamos, a ningun policia ateniese se le ocurrio coger a Diogenes por
atentar contra la seguridad de la repoublica ...
Ahora llegamos al caso de Montaniel y deoduco: el primero fue cogido porque trato de parar a un
chofer de la ciudad mientras guiaba un "jeep" y le invito a que se sumase a la huelga; y el segundo
porque entro sin permiso en un deposito de vehiculos de motor de la ciudad y no quiso salir de alli
desobedeciendo las ordenes del policia de guardia. La policia creia que estos actos eran sediciosos,
y arresto y detuvo a Montaniel y Deoduco por varios dias. Sin embargo, la Fiscalia, al igual que en
los otros casos, dictamino que tampoco habia aqui sedicion, pero recomendo la continuacion de la
detencion querellandoles por faltas que no sguiera dan lugar a obligado arresto, segun el codigo
penal: contra Montaniel, por supuesta vejacion injusta; y contra Deoduco, por supuesta
desobediencia ligera a unas ordenes policiacas. Verdad que esto hace recordar el laborioso parto
de los montes? Un raton despues de tanto estruendo, tanta batahola ... Pero tambien hace recordar
algo mas: la hoja de parra biblica para cubrir embarazos y verguenzas de ultima hora ... Algunos
podran incluso decir que para el buen nombre y prestigio de la autoridad acaso hubiera sido mejor
reconocer el error paladinamente, con gallarda, soltando a todos los detenidos sin excepciones
forzadas y especiosas. Hay hasta grandeza y respetabilidad en la valiente admision de las propias
faltas, yerros y limitaciones.
Se ha querido atenuar la gravedad de la accion policiaca tomando poor sedicion lo que no era mas
que llano ejercicio de derechos elementales de ciuadadania, con la excusa de la ignorancia,
alegandose que los aprehensores eran simples patrulleros o reclutas, por lo que no cabia esperar
de ellos que discerniesen bien entre el delito de sedicion y un acto puramente inocente o una mera
falta. Pero es posible tal cuantia de ignorancia en el personal policiaco de este pais? No se
celebran acaso examenes de servicio civil para la calificacion de dicho personal, fijandose ciertas
reglas, normas y requisitos de estudios escolares para poder ser admitodos en tales examenes?
Pero suponiendo ya lo que es mucho suponer que cupiera invocar la ignorancia o falta de
instruccion a favor del policia, patrullero o recluta de una aldea, de un villorrio es posible, es
siquiera medianamente decoroso que eso se invoque a favor del policia metropolitano de la ciudad
de Manila, la capital de la republica? Ademas, tratandose de una huelga obrera de tales
proporciones como la que motivo los arrestos que nos ocupan suceso dramatico, sensacional
que agito y conmovio a todo el vecindario de la ciudad de Manila por afectar a ciertos servicios
municipales indispensables como se puede concebir que los patrulleros y reclutas del cuerpo
de policia salieran a la calle para cumplir sus deberes en la custodia y mantenimiento del orden
publico sin un plan previamente concertado y preparado por sus jefes y superiores, y sobre todo, sin
recibir antes de estos las necesarias instrucciones sobre como iban a cumplir tales deberes, sobre
que actos debian considerarse delictivos o sediciosos, sobre que actos manifestaciones podian
permitirse y tolerarse, etc., etc.? Es mas: suponiendo ya que los aprehensores, en la precipitacion o
el calor del momento, se equivocaran o se excedieran abusando de sus poderes, haciendo lo que
hicieron, esto es, arrestando sin motivo justificado a los doce huelguistas de que se trata no tenia,
no tiene la policia de Manila un cuerpo o una division legal, compuesta de abogados, trabajando
tranquilamente en sus mesas, entre las cuatro paredes de una oficina, rodeados de libros, sin
prisas, sin excitaciones, depurando los hechos de cada caso, de cada arresto, examinando su fase
legal, compulsando y analizando papeles y documentos, evaluando procedentes locales y
extranjeros, etc., etc.? Y no tenia la policia de Manila, con toda su division legal, el periodo de 6
horas que seala la ley para todo ese trabajo de investigacion, de examen, de analisis de los
hechos y de la ley, para ver si se habia cometido o no un crimen, si se habia perpetrado o no el
delito grave de sedicion? Si hubiera habido el debido respeto, la debida consideracion a la libertad,
a los derechos constitucionales del individuo derechos sagrados, inviolables, aunque ese
individuo fuese un simple obrero, un humilde recogedor de cubetas municipales por que la
policia de Manila, con toda su bateria de abogados, comenznado por el Jefe hasta el ultimo oficial,
no habia de exprimier ese periodo legal de 6 horas, sacar de el todo el partido posible para estudiar
y depurar los arrestos y ver que no estaban justificados a la luz de la ley de sedicion conclusion a
que despues se llego, pero varios dias despues de tener pisoteada la libertad en los calabozos
municipales, en contravencion de la ley?
Los abusos, arbitrariedades, extralimitaciones y excesos autoritarios por parte de la policia o de
cualquier agentede seguridad y orden publico son una cosa que jamas debe ser tomada
ligeramente, frivolamente, con la indeferencia y despreocupacion con que muchas veces se toman
ciertas cosas que se estiman inevitables o rutinarias "matter of course," como se dice en ingles
si se quiere que la causa de la democracia y libertad no sufra entre nosotros un quebranto que
puede ser fatal par la existencia misma de la repulica. La historia y la experiencia nos demuestran
de consuno que la indeferencia, la dejadezs de los pueblos es la que siempre ha echado a perder la
libertad en el mundo. Es harto significativo que en nuestra misma epoca los gobiernos totalitarios,
de sangre y de fuerza, hayan todos tenidos que afianzarse en la policia para consolidar su poder
por los cuatro costados y asegurar la castracion, mejor todavia, la estrangulacion de la voluntad
popular, el abatimiento de toda resistencia ciudadana: el nazismo, en Hitler y su gestapo; el
fascismo, en los rufianes de camisa negra de Mussolini; el despotismo nipon, en su
famoso kempetai; y el absolutismo comunista, en la ogpu.Y el proceso de disolucion ha comenzado
siempre por la inercia, la abulia de las masas. Pocas frases historicas tienen la perenne
significacion vital de esta: "La vigilancia es el eterno precio de la libertad." o de estas otras de
nuestro gran Dr. Rizal: "La resignacion no siempre es virtud; es crimen cuando alienta tiranias"
"No hay tiranos donde no hay esclavos." O de esta otra: "Cada pueblo tiene el gobierno que se me
merece."
(Asi que, entre parentesis, merecen placemes las sociedades de caracter civico y profesional y
algunos de sus miembros que romanticamente, desintersadamente, han comparecido en el
presente caso para romper lanzas por la causa de la libertad. ellos pertenecen a una orden
benemerita que puede propieamente llamarse la Orden de los Vigilantes de la Libertad.)
Se arguye en favor de los recurridos que la policia entrego a la Fisacalia de Manila los papeles
corespondientes dentro de las 6 horas que fija el articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado y que, por
tanto, la demora ilegal, si la hubo, no tuvo lugar en los cuarteles de la policia sino en la oficina del
Fiscal. Aunque ello no se trasluce clara e inequivocamente en autos, parece que se puede admitir
que respecto de los 10 que han sido puestos en libertad los papeles se entregaron a la Fiscalia
oportunanment; no asi respecto de Montaniel y Deoduco, los dos cuya detencion se ha prolongado.
Resulta de autos y de los informes producidos en la audiencia que Deoduco fue arrestadoel 7 de
Noviembre y Montaniel el 8; que los papeles en ambos casos se entregaron por la policia a la
Fiscalia en la tarde del 11 de Noviembre, 4 y 3 dias respectivamente despues del arresto, es
decir, mucho despues de las 6 horas fijadas por la ley; que la querella contra Montaniel se presento,
como queda dicho mas arriba, en la misma tarde del dia 11, y la querella contra Deoduco, por
desobidiencia, ya en la maana del 12, esto es, en el mismo dia de la vista de la presente solictud
de habeas corpus.
La Fiscalia explica la demora diciendo que por aquellos dias estaba sobrecargada de trabajos; que,
adde los 12 obreros detenidos de que se trata, habia otros muchos por diferentes delitos y faltas;
que necesitaba de tiempo para examinar bien las hojas volantes y demas papeles; que tambien
necesitaba de tiempo para atar bien los cabos y las circunstancias a fin de ver si con la huelga
estaba relacionado un movimiento coordinado de sedicion, y si los actos de los 12 arrestados
formaban parte de ese movimiento. La Fiscalia admite haber fijado en la cantidad prohibitiva de
P12,000 la fianza que debia prestar cada detenido para su libertad provisional mientras se
estudiaban los casos. Mas tasrde, cuando la Fiscalia se convencio de que no habi sedicio ni nada
que se le pareciera, recomendo una fianza de P100 para Montaniel y de P200 para Deoduco.
Sin discutir la responsabilidad de la Fiscalia por la demora si esta se puede o no justificar
administrativamente es cuestion que no compete considerar ni resolver vamos a limitarnos a
comentar y discutir la fase juridica, legal. Esta en orden naturalmente el hacer la siguiente pregunta:
es correcta, es acertada la asercion de que el "Promotor Fiscal de Manila es un funcionario judicial
(judicial officer)," y que, por tanto, la entrega al mismo de la persona de un detenido dentro del
periodo de 6 horas equivale a la entrega a las autoridades judiciales correspondientes (proper
judicial authorities) de que habla e articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado? Creemos que no: ni por
su letra ni por su espiritu puede aplicarse por extension la fraseologia de ese articulo al Fiscal de la
ciudad de Manila o a cualquier otro Fiscal; ese articulo no puede referirse mas que a un tribunal, a
un juzgado, sea municipal, sea de primera instancia. Asi que estoy de perfecto acuerdo con la
ponencia cuando positivamente sienta la doctrina de que "si bien un arresto puede hacerse sin
orden cuando hay motivos razonables para ello (regla 109, articulo 6, Reglamento de los
Tribunales), el detenido no puede ser recluido fuera del periodo prescrito por la ley, a menos que
una orden de arresto se obtenga antes de un tribunal competente" (veanse las autoridades que se
citan), y que "en el presente caso el Fiscal de la ciudad no tenia autoridad para expedir ordenes de
arresto y caracia de facultad paraconvalidar tal detencion ilegal consolo presentar las querellas, o
con una orden de su propia cuenta, ora tacita, ora expresa" (veanse asimismo las autoridades que
se citan).
De lo dicho se sigue que cuando la policia entrega a la Fiscalia de la ciudad despues del periodo de
6 horas prescrito por la ley los papeles sobre un detenido arrestado sin previa orden al efecto, no
por ello se cura la ilegalidad del arresto y detencion, sino que dicha ilegalidad continua y persiste
hasta que el Fiscal presenta la querella y obtiene una orden de arrestro del tribunal cometente, o
que, tratandose de delito, mediante la prestacion de una fianza cuya cuantia se fijare y recomendare
por dicho Fiscal, la policia soltare al detenido, a tenor de lo previsto en el articulo 2460 del codigo
administrativo.
Puede ocurrir, sinembargo, que la policia entregue los papeles a la Fiscalia de la ciudad dentro del
periodo de 6 horas, pero que la Fiscalia no solo deja pasar dicho periodo, sino que transcurren dias,
hasta semanas sin actuar sobre el caso en uno u otro sentido. La cuestion en orden naturalmente
es la siguiente: es legal o ilegal la detencion del arrestado en tal caso? En otras palabras: queda
suspendido el periodo de 6 horas durante el tiempo que el Fiscal de la ciudad tarda en actuar sobre
el caso? La contestacion tiene que ser necesariamente negativa. La rigidez, la inflexibilidad del
poerido de 6 horas reza no solo para la policia, sino hasta apra cualquier otra agencia o ramo oficial,
sin excluir a la Fiscalia de la ciudad de Manila. Si por cualquier motivo la Fiscalia dejare de actuar
dentro de dicho perido, el deber de la policia o del que tenga la custodia del detenido es soltarle,
quiera o no quiera el Fiscal, lo recomiende o no lo recomiende. De otra manera, la restriccion que
estatuye la ley a favor de los detenidos sin previa orden de arresto restriccion que implementa las
garantias de la libertad establecidas en la Constitucion resulataria un mito. La filosofia de la ley
es, a saber: solamente se verifica un arresto sin previa orden cuando hay motivos razonables para
ello, v. gr., cuando un individuo es cogido in fraganti cometiendo un delito. La ley presupone, por
tanto, que el Estado tiene a mano todos los elementos necesearios para decidir que accion ha de
tomar dentro del periodo de 6 horas, ya entregando la persona del detenido a las autoridades
judiciales correspondientes mediante la querella procedente, a tenor del articulo 125 del codigo
penal revisado; ya poniendole en libertad provisional bajo una fianza razonable, de acuerdo con el
citado articulo 2460 del codigo administrativio; o ya poniendole completamente en la cale por falta
de meritos en el caso. Si ninguna de estas cosas puede hacer el Estado en 6 horas no puede ser
mas que por dos motivos: o porque se guiere cometer una artibrariedad, o la maquinaria oficial se
halla en un deplorable estado de cofusion, ineptitud o impotencia.
Se arguye conenfasis que bajo esta interpretacion la prosecucion del crimen sufriria un serio
quebranto, sobre todo en la ciudad de Manial; que materialmente la Fiscalia no puede actuar
adecuadamente sobre algunos casos en el plazo perentorio de 6 horas. Si esto es verdad el
remedio no es infringir la ley como cosa inevitable, rutinaria; el remedio seria o recabar de la
Legislatura que se reforme la ley en la forma que se estime conveniente, o implementar y
perfeccionar la maquinaria de la prosecucion criminal, colocandola a la altura de las circunstancias.
No hay nada mas anarquico, mas subversivo y fatal para el principio de la autoridad del buen
gobierno que el tener leyes que no se cumplen, leyes que se infringen hasta por los llamados a
ponerlas en vigor. "To be or not to be, that is the question." O existe la ley y hay que cumplirla; o si
la ley es mala o impracticable, hay que reformarla o derogarla. Lo que nose debe permitir es el
disolvente espectaculo de la diaria inobservancia de la ley.
Tenemos un precedente recientisimo: la ley sobre el Tribunal del Pueblo (Ley del Commonwealth
No. 682, articulo 19). Una de las disposiciones mas importantes de esa leyes precisamente la que
reforma el articulo 125 del codigo penal revisado, extendiendo el periodo de 6 horas a 6 meses a fin
de legalizar la detencion de los que, sospechosos de traicion, fueron arrestados y detenidos por las
autoridades del ejercito americano inmediatamente despues de la liberacion de Filipinas de la
conquista japonesa. De pasose puede precisamente decir que esa reforma es uno de los mejores
argumentos contra la tesis de que durante el tiempo en que la Fiscalia de la ciudad estudia el caso
el periodo de 6 horas queda en suspenso y se legaliza la detencion. Si esto fuese correcto, no
hubiera habido necesidad de insertar esa disposicion reformatoria en la ley sobre el Tribunal del
Pueblo.
TUASON, J., dissenting:

The writ should have been denied or dismissed as to the all persons on whose behalf the petition
was filed, including Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco.
According to the return the last two had been arrested by the police for inciting to sedition on the
occasion of the strike of the City of Manila workers and had been duly charged after their arrest with
unjust vexation and disobedience to public orders, respectively. The complaints had been filed by
the City Fiscal with the municipal court, and the Fiscal had recommended a bail of P100 for
Montaniel and P200 for Deoduco for their temporary release. The fiscal in his return further stated
that these complaints had been docketed on "November 11, 1946, before and after the receipt by
them (respondents) of their respective copies of the petition for habeas corpus herein filed." The last
allegation contradicts the finding in the decision of the majority that "the complaints were filed on the
same day when this case was heard before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946."
The allegations in the return are presumed to be correct, the same not having been controverted.
The return to the writ, of itself, is not conclusive of the facts alleged therein, but is prima facie proof
of such facts. In the absence of a denial, or appropriate pleading avoiding their effect, they will be
taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the petition, and the only
question for determination is whether or not the facts stated in their return, as a matter of law,
authorizes the restraint under investigation. (39 C.J.S., 664, 665.)
Here Pascual Montaniel or Pacifico Diaduco entitled to be discharged upon the facts set forth in the
return? The decision of the majority says yes. It reasons that "Even assuming that they (the
prisoners) were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their
continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen. Code, as amended by Act
No. 3940.) their cases were referred to the City Fiscal late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946,
that is four and three days, respectively, after they were arrested. The illegality of their detention was
not cured by the filing of the informations against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of
commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this case before this
Court." The decision goes on to say that "the City Fiscal, who has no authority to issue warrants of
arrest (Hashim vs. Boncan and City Fiscal of Manila, 71 Phil., 261) was powerless to validate such
illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either express or implied."
With all modesty and with due respect to the opinion of the majority, I take a different view. The
bringing of the prisoners before the City Fiscal made a whole lot of difference and totally changed
the legal aspects of the detention. The Prosecuting Attorney of the City of Manila is a judicial officer
with powers to make investigations on the same level as municipal judge or justice of the peace,
(United States vs. Rubal, 37 Phil., 577; section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court.) Section 2, Rule
108 provides that "every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed within his
municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance." And with particular reference to the
Fiscal of the City of Manila, section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code ordains that he "shall
cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and
have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused."
I conclude from these provisions that when Montaniel's and Diaduco's cases were reported to the
City Fiscal, that action put an end to the illegality of their detention, assuming that the prolonged
detention had been unwarranted. In other words, if Montaniel's and Diaduco's detention had become
illegal upon the expiration of six hours from the time of their arrest, it reacquired its lawful character
the moment they were taken to the City Fiscal for appropriate action on their cases; in fact the
prisoners could not thereafter be released by the police except in the manner provided by law. What
the law is, I shall endeavor to explain.
There is legal and rational support for the proposition that after the case of an arrested person has
been placed in the hands of a fiscal or municipal judge, it is the right, let alone the duty, of the police
to keep him in custody until he is discharged according to law regardless of the illegality of his
previous detention, which, by the way, is not to be confused with the arrest. This practice is made
necessary, at least in the City of Manila, by the very nature of things as well as by express
enactments. The law, statutory and common, is that an officer or private individual who has made an
arrest of a person without a warrant has authority to detain him in custody until a preliminary hearing
against him can be had (4 Am. Jur., 49) and he may then be committed to jail or held to bail (William
F. Downs vs. Sherlock Swann, 23 L.R.A., N.S., 739, citing Brish vs. Carter, 98 Md., 445, and
Edger vs. Burke, 96 Md., 722). Supplementing and confirming this general rule the Manila Charter
specifically vests on the Chief of Police the power to keep the prisoner in custody or release him on
bail, although in cases of violation of any penal law, as distinguished from violations of municipal
ordinances, the bail is fixed by the City Fiscal and the release must be authorized or recommended
by the latter. Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code thus states that "the chief of police
may take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any person arrested for
violation of any city ordinances: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise this power in case of
violations of any penal law, except when the fiscal of the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to
be required of the person arrested."
In consonance with the foregoing rule and provision, the practice followed by the City Fiscal of
Manila, when a person arrested without a warrant is brought before him, has been either to fix the
bond and order the provisional release of the prisoner before filing a complaint or information or
making an investigation, or else to file a complaint or information and leave it to the appropriate court
to admit the detained person to bail. In either case it is necessary to, nor does the court, as a matter
of fact, issue an order of arrest. This is so simply because the accused is already under arrest; and
the court does not issue a commitment because there is no final judgment and because the arrest
has not been effected by its order. It is to be remembered that the City Fiscal himself has no
authority to order, but only to recommend to the police, the release of detained persons. Neither is
the City Fiscal empowered to order the continued detention of such persons for the reason already
stated, that it is upon the authority and responsibility of the Chief of Police that this functionary holds
the prisoners until the court commands his discharge.
The previous illegality of the detention of Montaniel and Deoduco has no relevancy to their petition
for habeas corpus and it is a mistake for this Court to allow itself to be influenced thereby. There can
be no serious doubt as to the intent of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act
No. 3940, which says that "The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours." This provision
refers solely to detention by a police officer prior to the retained person's delivery to the proper
judicial officer. It does not restrict the time within which the fiscal of the city, a justice of the peace or
a municipal judge should act on the case. It seeks to prevent abuses by the police to prevent
them from keeping for an unreasonable length of time arrested persons who are not properly
charged before a competent judicial officer, or whose detention has no justifiable cause. It does not
force the city fiscal, justice of the peace or municipal judge to release the prisoners at or before the
expiration of six hours from the time of their arrest. Nothing could have been farther from the thought
of the legislature than to tie so tightly the hands of the law, and coddle and pamper lawlessness to a
calamitous extreme. It requires no mental effort to see that it is beyond the ability of any person to
make an investigation of a criminal case, file a complaint or information, and secure an arrest
warrant or commitment in six hours, or worse still what remains, if any, of that period computed from
the time of the arrest. The theory sustained by the majority, if put into practice, would play havoc on
the efforts of law-enforcement agencies to produce disastrous consequences, not difficult to
imagine, in the maintenance of peace and order. The decision of this Court sets a precedent which
will open the door to evasions of criminal prosecution. The populous conditions of Manila and other
centers of population in the Philippines as they exist today, and the modern facilities of
transportation and rapid transit afford easy means for avoiding re-arrest or fleeing from justice. Such
evasions and such escapes would be the result of the holding that a person who has been arrested
without a warrant and detained beyond the six-hour limit by the police should be discharged
irrespective of the filing of a complaint after the lapse of the period, on the pendency of an
appropriate criminal action against him. The situation which I have pictured will follow from the ruling
that even if a crime has been committed by the person arrested and a complaint has been filed
against him, he nevertheless should be released, without prejudice to his re-arrest on a formal
information or complaint lodged against him.
I do not justify or condemn the arrest or the detention beyond the six-hour limit of the petitioners.
This question is not in issue and must be judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances of the
case which are not before us. But I do maintain that the illegal detention, if there was illegal
detention, and the subsequent lawful restraint are separable and must not be confounded with each
other. If a crime was committed as a result of the prolonged detention of the prisoners, there is the
penal law and the proper machinery of justice to take care of the erring officials. To prosecution and
punishment or correction of criminal offenders is a vital concern of the State, vital to its very
existence. The interests of the people should not be sacrified or jeopardized by the ignorance,
negligence or malicious conduct of the police.
The opinion of the majority stems from the erroneous assumption that the right to the writ must be
determined according to the facts as they appear at the time of the filing of the petition. Some early
cases did hold that valid process obtained after the time of service of the writ of habeas corpus was
not sufficient, and that a person detained unlawfully must be discharged from the imprisonment
under the unlawful proceedings, although he might thereafter be detained on lawful proceedings. But
the better, present-day and preponderant rule, which is more in keeping with modern conditions and
better safeguards against modern facilities for escape, is that a prisoner has no right to writ of
habeas corpus unless he is entitled to immediate release, and the writ will not issue unless he is
presently in restraint of his liberty without warrant of law; that the writ of habeas corpus is concerned
solely with the legality of the restraint at the time of the filing of the petition for its issue, or by the
conditions existing at the time of the hearing or final decision thereon, and does not depend on the
legality or illegality of the original caption; and that where the detention is lawful at the time of the
return, it is sufficient to defeat the writ. (39 C. J. S., 443, 444.) The United States Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, declares that "the validity of a detention questioned by a
petitioner for habeas corpus is to be determined by the conditions existing at the time of the final
decision thereon." (United States ex. rel. Mensevich vs. Tod, 68 Law. ed., 591.) Conversely, it has
been held, detention which was lawful in its inception may afterwards become unlawful and the
prisoner is then entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus, as, for example, where a prisoner has
been pardoned.
11. EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003]
ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, complainant, vs. DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of

Court II, 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), TalibonGetafe, Bohol, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe , Talibon, Bohol, is charged by Adriano
Albior, of usurpation of judicial function and negligence in the performance of
official duties. According to complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions
when he issued the order for the detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of
complainant. Further, complainant alleged that respondent committed
negligence when he failed to inform Acting Presiding Judge Avelino N.
[1]
Puracan of that court regarding the filing of cases that necessitated issuance
of the detention order.
The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows:
On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape were filed against Edilberto
Albior before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk
of court of the said court, respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints
which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following
day, respondent issued a detention order to the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP) in San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, for the commitment of the
accused Edilberto Albior. On January 27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a
receipt of detainee for the person of the accused.
[2]
[3]
[4]
According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior

preliminary investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there
any record in the Police Blotter of the accuseds apprehension, or of his
surrender. Nor was there proof that he signed a waiver for his detention.
Whats more, the respondent failed to inform Acting Municipal Judge Avelino
Puracan regarding the filing of the complaints for rape before his sala.
[5]
On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an urgent motion
to release the accused. Two days later, respondent issued a subpoena,
directing the accused to submit counter-affidavits for the preliminary
investigation of the charges of rape. But no further action was taken by the
court. Accused through counsel filed a second motion on March 1, 1999.
Again, the motion was not acted upon.
[6]
[7]
Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed a petition
for habeas corpus on March 15, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch 52. During the habeas corpus proceedings, the respondent testified
that this was not the first time he issued a detention order without a warrant of
arrest. He testified that he has done this action many times already in the
past, upon the request of the Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police
in Talibon. He reasoned out that it was in the best interest of the detainees to
be transferred from the PNP jail to the BJMP because the former did not have
meal provisions for detainees.
[8]
[9]
After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an order on
March 25, 1999, finding that the accused was being illegally restrained of his
liberty and ordering his immediate release from confinement. On the same
day, the MCTC conducted a preliminary examination of the prosecutions
witnesses and issued an Omnibus Order confirming the arrest of the
accused.
[10]
[11]
On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused filed a motion for
reinvestigation with the Department of Justice, assailing the validity of the
Omnibus Order. He maintained that no warrant of arrest was ever issued
against his client and as such, no confirmation of such arrest may be
undertaken.
[12]
On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant Adriano

Albior, filed a letter-complaint with the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Complainant charged respondent of usurpation of judicial functions and
negligence in the performance of duties, in connection with the detention of
his son, Edilberto Albior.
[13]
In a resolution dated June 3, 1999, the Deputy Ombudsman referred the

letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate
action. On May 8, 2000, the Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the
criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial function as defined under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code. However, he recommended the filing of an
information with the proper court for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to file a

comment
to
the
complaint.
Respondent
filed
his
counteraffidavit. Respondent claims that he issued the detention order only after the
PNP Chief and PNP Trial Officer of Talibon repeatedly requested him to do
so. The respondent asserts that it was out of honest conviction that he was
only helping the accused and his relatives. He was merely sparing them the
trouble of having to bring meals to the accused, as the municipal jail where
the latter was detained did not serve food to its prisoners.
[18]
Respondent also appended the affidavit of Police Senior Inspector

Lecarion P. Torrefiel, the PNP Chief of Police of Talibon. In it the Police Chief
stated that he personally requested the respondent to immediately issue a
detention order in order to transfer the accused to the BJMP jail, where he is
ensured of three square meals a day. The Chief explained that the
municipality did not have a budget for meals of detainees at the PNP jail,
hence, it is alleged that respondents action was intended purely for
humanitarian reasons. Nothing is said, however, why the local government
unit allows this inhumane practice. The Chief of Police himself appears
blissfully ignorant of the human rights aspects of the matter for which his
command could be held accountable.
[19]
On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report. It found respondents
defense unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said
detention order prior to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and
[20]
before a warrant of arrest was issued against the accused. It recommended

that the case be re-docketed as an administrative matter and that a fine in the
amount of P3,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the
case for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed. The respondent
subsequently manifested his conformity.
[21]
[22]
The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent should be
held administratively liable for the issuance of a detention order resulting in
the actual detention of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances.
The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered
to issue the questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the
absence of the judge are defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the absence
of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices
that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed so to
do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees,
and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith
transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with his findings
in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the
same in his report.
Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an
order of detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had
occasion to rule that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power
to order the commitment of a person charged with a penal offense.
[23]
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a
judge is not available, the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained
person, if the maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code had already expired. Failure to cause the release may
result in an offense under the Code, to wit:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or
their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the
accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware
that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human
right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order issued by
respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due
process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful detention on
January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by
the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation
committed by the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
mandates:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Underscoring ours)
Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree
of responsibility. Their conduct at all times must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum, but above all else must be in accordance with the
Constitution and the law. A clerk of court, such as herein respondent, is a
ranking and essential officer in the judicial system. His office is the hub of
activities. He performs delicate administrative functions essential to the
prompt and proper administration of justice.
[24]
[25]
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in the

dispensation of justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental
law of the land. His defense that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is
excusably ignorant of the legal implications of his detention order, deserves
scant consideration. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith, especially a clerk of court who ought to know better than an
ordinary layman.
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends
to undermine the faith and trust of the people in the judiciary. The Court
cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in
[26]
the administration of justice which would violate the norms of public

accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.
[27]
The respondents issuance of the detention order not only deprived the
accused of liberty, it also considerably diminished the peoples faith in the
judiciary. For the very officer of the court on whom they depended to
safeguard their human and constitutional rights was also the one who violated
these rights. Respondent should be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a
ranking officer in the judicial system, to ensure that basic rights are protected.
In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is
liable as charged administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation
that respondent be merely meted out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat
lightly the actions of the respondent for he has admitted doing them
repeatedly, in fact many times in the past. The implication of his action as an
official of the court is not only disturbing but shocking, for it involves no less
than a violation of the constitutional right to liberty. We hold that respondents
unauthorized issuance of the detention order and his failure to inform the
Presiding Judge about said order constitute not merely gross neglect of duty
but outright grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a violation of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be
serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must also have
direct relation to, and connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. Because of the order for the arrest of the
accused and resultant confinement in police custody, the respondent unduly
usurped the judicial prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation is
equivalent to grave misconduct.
[28]
[29]
In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for

issuing a Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding
Judge concerned. In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty
of grave misconduct warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a
warrant of arrest without any order coming from the court that caused the
accused to be illegally confined for three (3) days. In both cases we held that
though the respondents might have been moved by compassion and might
have acted in good faith, the respondents actuations could not be condoned,
for the committed acts constituted a serious infringement of, and
encroachment upon, judicial authority.
[30]
[31]
In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in
light of the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders
countless times in the past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, the appropriate
penalty to be imposed on respondent is dismissal from the service.
[32]
WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC,

Branch 4 at Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively
liable for issuing the assailed detention order without lawful authority, as well
as failing to inform the Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order,
thus committing GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official functions.
He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits
and privileges, except earned leave credits if any, and with prejudice to
reemployment in the government including government owned and controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
12. FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27331 : July 30, 1981.]
ELISEO ALIMPOOS, CIRIACA ALIMPOOS, SGT. MILLARDO M. PATES, PEDRO
BACLAY, CATALINO YAMILO, RAFAEL CAPANGPANGAN, DALMACIO YGOT and
EUFROCINA ESTORES, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HONORABLE JUDGE MONTANO A. ORTIZ, REYNALDO MOSQUITO and MATILDE
ABASTILLAS MOSQUITO, Respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner-spouses, Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos, shall hereinafter be called the
Offended Parties. Petitioners Pedro Baclay, Catalino Yamilo, Rafael Capangpangan, Dalmacio
Ygot, Eufrocina Estores and Sgt. Millardo M. Pates may hereinafter be referred to as the
Witnesses.
Respondent Reynaldo Mosquito will hereinafter be called the Accused. Respondent Matilde
A. Mosquito is the Accuseds wife. Respondent Court of Appeals will be termed the Appellate
Tribunal; respondent Judge Montano A. Ortiz, as respondent Trial Judge, and the Municipal
Judge, as such.
In this Petition for Certiorari, the Offended Parties and the Witnesses seek the reversal of
the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal, upholding the disallowance of the Offended Parties
appeal by the Court of First Instance of Agusan (the Trial Court, for short) in Civil Case No.
1088, entitled Reynaldo Mosquito, et al. vs. Eliseo Alimpoos, et al, wherein respondent
Trial Judge granted the Accuseds petition for Habeas Corpus and declared his detention
illegal. He also enjoined the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 458 of the Municipal Court of
Bayugan, Agusan (hereinafter called Criminal Case) where the Accused had been arrested.
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The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a Warrant
of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a prosecution for
Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. The place allegedly robbed belonged to the
Offended Parties. Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the
legal requirements for the issuance thereof, the Accused, then detained, and his wife
instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. Named as defendants in the
original complaint were the Offended parties and the Witnesses (as witnesses for the
prosecution) all of whom are residents of Agusan. In an amended complaint, the two
arresting policemen, the Chief of Police, and the Municipal Judge were added as codefendants.
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The Complaint of the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article
32 (4), (8), (15), (16), (17) and (19) of the Civil Code, and Article 269 of the Revised
Penal Code, by defendants therein who were said to have been instrumental in causing the
detention and arrest of the Accused. It prayed for the Accuseds release from detention, as
well as for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Offended Parties
and the Witnesses, and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives, from proceeding
with the Criminal Case. Actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs
were also prayed for.
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The Offended Parties and the Witnesses, except Sgt. Pates, were represented by the law
firm of Seno, Mendoza and Associates, with offices located in Cebu City. They contended
that they had nothing to do with the Accuseds detention and arrest. The Municipal Judge,
the Chief of Police, and Patrolmen Libres and Galimba, who were represented by the Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Butuan City, alleged that the Warrant of Arrest was validly issued. Sgt.
Pates was represented by Capt. Igualdad Cunanan, and reiterated substantially the same
defense.
After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued the appealed
Order (the ORDER, for short), dated March 26, 1966, declaring the detention of the
Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the Preliminary Injunction
prayed for upon the filing of the required bond. The dispositive portion of the ORDER reads:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring illegal the detention of plaintiff

Reynaldo Mosquito by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued without the observance of
the fundamental legal requirements prior to the issuance of said Writ. The petition
for habeas corpus is therefore granted and it is hereby ordered that said detention
prisoner be forthwith released from custody, and set at liberty and that upon the
filing of the bond in the amount of P1,000.00 a writ of preliminary injunction issue
restraining the Municipal Judge of Bayugan, Agusan, defendant Vicente Galicia and
the rest of the defendants, their attorneys, agents or representatives from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 458 entitled The People of the Philippines versus
Reynaldo Mosquito et als., for the crime of Robbery with Less Serious Physical
Injuries, with costs against the defendants in these habeas corpus and preliminary
injunction proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 1
The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on March 31, 1966, and
on April 1, 1966, moved for extension of time within which to appeal, but eventually
desisted from doing so.
On April 4, 1966, counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses mailed from Cebu City
a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals stating that:
Undersigned counsel received a copy of the order only today (April 4, 1966) which
copy was handed to him by defendant (petitioner) Eliseo Alimpoos.
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The appeal was opposed by the Accused on the ground that it was filed beyond the 48-hour
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in Habeas Corpus proceedings.
On April 23, 1966, over the Offended Parties objections, respondent Trial Judge dismissed
their appeal thus:
The notice of appeal of the Provincial Fiscal or of Atty. Seno for the defendants,
having been filed out of time the Order of March 26, 1966 granting the habeas
corpus is now final and executory. The urgent ex-parte motion to grant extension to
file notice of appeal does not interrupt the running of the period fixed by law for filing
an appeal which is forty-eight hours from receipt of the order. 2
No reconsideration was prayed for by the Provincial Fiscal.
The Offended Parties, however, resorted to a Mandamus proceeding before the Court of
Appeals seeking to compel respondent Trial Judge to give due course to said appeal.
On January 11, 1967, the Appellate Tribunal, 3 in CA-G.R. No. 37781-R, denied Mandamus
stating in part:
As the records show that copy of the questioned Order was received by counsel on
March 30, 1966, the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-hour limit.
Petitioners appeal was therefore filed out of time and the judgment has become
final.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby denied. Costs against petitioners.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, filed on March 13, 1967, praying that the Decision of the
Appellate Tribunal be set aside and the appeal interposed by the Offended Parties in the
Habeas Corpus case be allowed.
We gave due course to the Petition on March 31, 1967, and after the filing of the respective
Briefs, the case was considered submitted for decision on April 19, 1968.
The Offended Parties and the Witnesses pose the following Assignments of Error:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that counsel, however, has not
presented a shred of proof to bolster his claim of actual receipt of the order, Annex
B on April 4, 1966, save of his own self-serving assertions, which cannot prevail
over the court record, (Annex 1 of Answer) certified to by the Clerk of Court,
bearing the true actual date when the parties and counsel herein received their
corresponding copies. The same certified true copy of the order shows that the law
office of herein counsel received its copy on March 30, 1966 not on April 4, 1966;
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II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent Judge was fully
justified in relying on its own record to determine the date on which petitioners
counsel received copy of the order, without any proof thereof, because courts will
take judicial notice of its records and of the facts which the same records establish
and which are known to judges by reason of their judicial functions.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that as the records show that copy
of the questioned order was received by counsel on March 30, 1966, the notice of
appeal was not filed within the 48-hour limit.
IV
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioners appeal was,
therefore, filed out of time and the judgment has become final.
V
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration
without requiring the adverse party to answer the said Motion for Reconsideration.
VI
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to pass upon the issues raised in the
lower court and in the Court of Appeals.
The technical issue of timeliness of the appeal will first be considered. Counsel for the
Offended Parties alleges that he received a copy of the ORDER only on April 4, 1966 from
the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, who handed him the copy in Cebu City. The latter had
received it on March 31, 1966. Counsel contends that the reglementary period to appeal can
not be reckoned from the latter date because, under the Rules, when a party is represented
by counsel, notice should be sent, not to the party, but to his counsel of record. Counsel for
the Offended Parties and the Witnesses further maintains that the period from which to
reckon the period of appeal should actually be April 14, 1966 when he actually received,
through the mails, his copy of the ORDER, as shown by the rubber stamp of his office
appearing on the upper right hand corner of a duplicate copy of the ORDER. 4
Respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal alike found the foregoing assertion selfserving and relied instead on the last page of the ORDER, 5 purportedly showing that the
law office of counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses received its copy on March
30, 1966 and not on April 4, 1966, hence the disallowance of the appeal by respondent Trial
Judge, and its affirmance by the Appellate Court.
The crucial last page is reproduced hereunder exactly as it appears:
CIVIL CASE NO. 1088
ORDER
and preliminary injunction proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Done this 26th day of March, 1966 at the City of Butuan.
(SGD.) MONTANO A. ORTIZ

JUDGE
MAO-bb.
Recd.
31/3/66 (initial)
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Received:
(Sgd.) Illegible Mun. Judge (Sgd.) Illegible 3/30/66 7:00 evening
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3/31/66 (Sgd.) B. Galimba 3/30/00 7:00

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(Sgd.) Eliseo Alimpoos
Received copy March 31, 1966 8:00 A.M.

Ciriaco Alimpoos
Pedro Baklay
Catalino Yamilo
Rafael Capangpangan
Dalmacio Ygot
Eufrocina Estores
By: (Sgd.) Eliseo Alimpoos

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March 31, 1966

(Sgd.) Illegible
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(Sgd.) Illegible
For the Chief of Police 3-30-66

TO ATTYS. SENO, MENDOZA,
RUIZ & ASS. & CAPT. CUNANAN
BY REG. MAIL #11633 & #11634
A certified true copy:

(s) MACARIO C. CONDE
(t) MACARIO C. CONDE
Clerk of Court 6 (emphasis supplied)
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Obviously, copies of the ORDER intended for Attys. Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz & Ass. & Capt.
Cunanan were sent by registered mail with Receipts Nos. 11633 and 11634. Receipt No.
11633 is the registry number corresponding to the copy for the law office, and Receipt No.
11634 that for Capt. Cunanan. This is borne out by the envelope 7 from the Office of the
Clerk of Court Butuan City addressed to Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz and Associates, Cor.
Magallanes-D Jakosalem Sts., Aboitiz Bldg., Cebu City with the following markings:
On the face of the envelope lower left hand corner:
REGISTERED
CITY OF BUTUAN
PHILIPPINES
March 31, 1966
Superimposed on it in ink is No. 11633
On the back of the envelope appears a big diagonal stamp FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY and two post office stamp marks:
REGISTERED
CITY OF BUTUAN
PHILIPPINES
March 31, 1966
CEBU CITY
Received
April 11, 1966
Philippines
Since the registered mail was received in Cebu City only on April 11, 1966, it is not unlikely
that the law office and addressee, as alleged by it, received the mail only three days after,
or on April 14, 1966.
The notation
(Sgd.) Illegible
3-30-66
appearing above the following note:
To Attys. Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz & Ass. &
Capt. Cunanan by reg. mail #11633 & #11634
can not refer to personal receipt by the said law office for the obvious reason that its office
being at Cebu City, personal service would not have been possible in Agusan.
It is apparent then that both respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal committed
error in holding that the Offended Parties appeal was interposed beyond the reglementary
period. Service on the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, on March 31, 1966 cannot be
deemed as notice in law to his counsel. 8 Under the circumstances, therefore, reliance may
be placed on the assertion of counsel that the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, had given
him a copy of the ORDER only on April 4, 1966, which must be deemed as the date of notice
to said counsel of the ORDER. Counsel lost no time in mailing his Notice of Appeal on the
same day, April 4, 1966 from Cebu. 9 Procedurally, the appeal was seasonably filed.
Although the Appellate Tribunal had committed error in its appreciation of the date when
the lawyers of the Offended Parties were served notice of the ORDER, we believe it would
not be justifiable to reverse and to direct respondent Trial Judge to allow the Offended
Parties to appeal. Instead, we are opting to render a practical judgment.
1. The original and amended complaints filed by the Offended Parties with the Trial Court
contained three causes of action, principally for Habeas Corpus and for damages. However,
the proceedings were conducted purely as a Habeas Corpus case. The original complaint
was filed on February 22, 1966, and resolved on March 26, 1966, in keeping with the
speedy and effectual character of Habeas Corpus proceedings. 10
The ORDER treated the case as exclusively a Habeas Corpus proceeding, ignoring the
Accuseds prayer for damages. The lawyers of the Offended Parties attempted to appeal
from the ORDER in accordance with Section 19 of Rule 41, captioned who may appeal in
Habeas Corpus cases. The Appellate Tribunal resolved in the mandamus case as relating to
a Habeas Corpus case.
2. Because the proceedings before the trial Court was a Habeas Corpus case, the complaint
filed was obviously defective. A Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties.
Not a suit between the parties. While the issuance of the writ is to all intents and
purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the proceedings by
Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. It is an inquisition by the
government, at the suggestion and instance of an individual, most probably, but still in the
name and capacity of the sovereign. It may be analogized to a proceeding in rem and
instituted for the sole purpose of fixing the status of a person. The person restrained is the
central figure in the transaction. The proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. As it is
not designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment can be entered against
anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the
technical sense.
(Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Forrest G. Ferris & Forrest G. Ferris, Jr.,
p. 28)
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The Accused, therefore, should have limited his complaint against the Chief of Police of
Bayugan, the person having him in alleged illegal custody. That is the clear implication in
the following provisions of Section 3, Rule 102, which enumerates what should be set forth
in a petition for Habeas Corpus:
SEC. 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application for the writ shall be by
petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by
some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty;
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;
or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described
by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall
be deemed the person intended;
(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be
procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the
imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall
appear.
The Accuseds allegation as to, and prayer for, damages was out of place. In Habeas Corpus
cases, the judgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a provision for damages. It has
to be confined to what is provided for in Section 15, Rule 102, which reads:
SEC. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. When the court or Judge has
examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that
he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from
confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has
been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person
detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith
released.
It will be observed that there is no provision for serving copy of the discharge on any other
private party defendant, nor for an award of damages.
As it has been held:
The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily
it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. Thus it has been held that the writ
cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to determine whether a
person has committed a crime; in determine a disputed interstate boundary line; to
punish respondent or to afford the injured person redress, for the illegal detention;
to recover damages or other money award; . .
(emphasis supplied) (Vt In re
St. Onge, 108 A203, 93 Vt. 373; NY People vs. Prior, 182 NYS 577, 112 Misc. 208
[39 C.J.S. 430]).
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3. The Accused has challenged the personality of the Offended Parties to interpose the
appeal, premised on Section 19 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC 19. Who may appeal in habeas corpus cases. The appeal in habeas corpus
cases may be taken in the name of the person detained or of the officer or person
detaining him. But if the detention is by reason of civil proceedings the party in
interest or the person who caused the detention shall be entitled to control the
appeal; and if, by virtue of criminal proceedings, the provincial fiscal or the city fiscal
as the case may be, is entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the government,
subject to the right of the Solicitor General to intervene
(Rule 41).
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It is indisputable that the Habeas Corpus case arose by virtue of criminal proceedings in the
Criminal case. Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, it was the Provincial Fiscal
who was entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the Government. In this case, although
the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal on
April 1, 1966, he had nevertheless abandoned the same. Neither did he take steps for the
reconsideration of respondent Trial Judges Order of April 23, 1966 dismissing the appeal.
The inaction of the Fiscal may be deemed to have been an admission on his part of the
unmeritoriousness of an appeal. As in criminal proceedings, his sound discretion on the
matter should be deemed controlling, and it has to be held that the Offended Parties were
bereft of personality to prosecute the appeal.
Noteworthy is the fact that in the instant case, the Offended Parties had alleged in their
Answer 11 that they were not detaining the Accused and had nothing to do with the
Warrant of Arrest issued against him. With all the more reason then that they had no
personality to interpose an appeal from a judicial Order granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordering the release of a person detained.
4. It has been noted that the ORDER contains a provision enjoining the prosecution of the
Accused in the Criminal Case. That is error. If the Accused was illegally detained because he
was arrested without a preliminary examination, what should have been done was to set
aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of the Accused, but without enjoining
the Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards properly
issuing a warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal
responsibility. This principle was enunciated in Lee Ching v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil.
329 (1916) where it was said:
cranad
Proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from the main case from
which the proceedings spring. They rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the case and
require no pronouncement with respect thereto.
When a preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held, the procedure is not to
dismiss the case, or enjoin its prosecution, but to have the preliminary investigation
conducted. As stated in People v. Figueroa, 27 SCRA, 1239, 1247 (1969):
cranad
Assuming that the trial court felt that the accused should have been given more
ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation, then
what it could properly have done, since in its own Order it recognized that Fiscal
Abaca had conducted a preliminary investigation although hurriedly in its opinion,
was not to dismiss the information but to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its
own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. This Court, speaking
through now Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion in People vs. Casiano, had stressed this as
the proper procedure, pointing out that the absence of such investigation did not
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did
it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the present case.
5. As a matter of fact, Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy for the Accused. In a case
where a warrant of arrest was assailed for an alleged improper preliminary examination,
this Court, in Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA, 310, 323 (1968), said:
cranad
At any rate, we believe that, if at all, the remedy available to the petitioner herein,
under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation
of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is another
remedy available.
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be
had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy, such as
appeal or writ of error. But the existence of another remedy does not necessarily
preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from illegal detention,
especially where the other remedy is deemed not to be as effective as that of habeas
corpus. 12
Time and again, it has been explained that Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ of
error. 13
6. It has further been noted that respondent Trial Judge erred in adjudging costs against
defendants in the Habeas Corpus case. When a person confined under color of proceedings
in a criminal case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against the Republic 14
7. The Accused was charged with Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries in early 1966.
Through the error of the Municipal Judge in issuing the warrant of arrest without conducting
a preliminary examination, the Accused was able to institute the Habeas Corpus case which
has pended to this date, or for fifteen years. The error of the Municipal Judge has
considerably retarded the turning of the wheels of justice. It should be meet to reiterate the
following admonition made in the aforecited Luna-Plaza case:
We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this opinion is certainly
not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of
simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the
complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is
sought to be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act
cranad
296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a
warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by
examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath
and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. It is obvious
that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to,
their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the
criminal complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by municipal or
city judges of the provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended
by Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid malicious and/or unfounded criminal
prosecution of persons.
cranad
In view of the foregoing considerations, it should be practical to resolve this case in a

manner that will not further protract the matter brought to this instance. It will not do
merely to reverse and set aside the appealed decision of the Appellate Tribunal, for it will
leave the ORDER of respondent Trial Judge outstanding with its injunction against the
further prosecution of the Criminal Case.
WHEREFORE, in the distinct understanding that this Court has not acted in a proper Habeas
Corpus proceeding, the Warrant of Arrest issued against Reynaldo Mosquito in Criminal Case
No. 458 of the Municipal Court of Bayugan, Agusan, the Order of March 26, 1966 issued in
Civil Case No. 1088 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, as well as the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in its case CA-G.R. No. 37781-R, are hereby set aside; and the
proceedings in the last two cases mentioned are invalidated.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
13.

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1.

[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003]

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of

Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11,

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who,

That the offender is a public officer or employee.

In the case of People v. Cortez, we held that, in establishing the intent to

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the

felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are

Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an impartial

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993

FERNANDO CAYAO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JUSTINIANO A.

Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator

Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the

At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could

attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to

The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the

The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute

If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed

prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same time to condemn

The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of

The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose

Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted

While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as

physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270

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WITNESS (jail warden):

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A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.

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A He can move freely.

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A No, your Honor. Only inside the police station.

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A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be

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A I will still prevent him.

It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the

As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own

As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as

Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind

Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent

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Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his

WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the

[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the

of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years ofreclusion perpetua, as

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed

Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. On August 9,