Professional Documents
Culture Documents
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or
other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
It is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs, and
(3) Granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth.
Ruling:
The instant Petition is granted, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge is
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
LOCUS STANDI:
The said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if
not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The SC likewise declares
that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The SC finds no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
Nature means the created world in its entirety.Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology.
The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY:
The complaint focuses on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the Section 15 of
the same article.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not
be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
4
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Without
such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987
E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
there from for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment."
Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject
to law and higher authority.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said
policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of
its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation
to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
CAUSE OF ACTION:
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
The question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. Falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. It bears stressing, however, that insofar
as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party
defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS:
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the nonimpairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution.
The court declared that to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements amount to impairment of contracts abhorred
by the fundamental law.
The respondent Secretary did not even invoke in his motion to dismiss the nonimpairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes
in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Tan vs. Director of Forestry:. . .A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
Even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
2. Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or
processed log is covered by the forest products term in PD 705, as the law does not
distinguish between a raw and processed timber.
of the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed. However, this
cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools be the property of a third
person not liable for the offense. In this case, the truck, though used to transport the
illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence,
there was no justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec.
68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative
has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all
conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws. However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out,
this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
The court do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he
conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied himself that there was no reason
to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59.
The release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the
DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings under Adm. Order No. 59 is different
from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty
imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized
again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the truck
owner/driver as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before the
lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states
that the confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without
prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any
person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense.
Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR
field offices, deputized military personnel and officials of other agency apprehending
illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest
DENR field offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action
and disposition. A period of about two weeks lapsed from the time the seizure was
made before a complaint was filed. During this period, the apprehending policemen had
enough time to turn over the logs and the truck to the nearest DENR field office for
proper action and disposition since the duty to turn over the truck to the nearest DENR
field office rests on the officials apprehending the illegal logs. There being no mandatory
duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be visited with
disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in San
Juan, Southern Leyte.
The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police, the DENR, the
prosecutors, and the members of the bench to coordinate with each other for a
successful campaign against illegal logging. It behooves all the concerned agencies to
seriously strive for the attainment of the constitutionally-declared policy to protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature in order to preserve our natural resources for the benefit
of the generations still to come.
Thus, the complaint was dismissed.
11
12
Ruling:
Yes.Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted
under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive
is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which
is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs
Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases and, in fact, it
is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited
importations.
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct
recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of
Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. An order of a judge to
impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration
of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality
of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the
pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
13
the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the
commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint.
In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and
file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation and file the necessary informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case
do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705.
The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and
neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was
committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party
to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal
Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct
investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the
commission of the crime.
In short, Sec. 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only
special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom it is vested by
general law.
15
Ruling:
No.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD
705, to wit:
(1)
(2)
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by
CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut,
gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of
PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by
Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to
commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against
them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the
sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of
Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated
by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his
acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705
as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the
cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705.
17
the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should
appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and
authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a
passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such
closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forest Development.
The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with the respondent court,
alleged that the logs of petitioner Achanzar were cut down and removed outside of the
area granted to the latter under his Private Timber License No. 2 and therefore inside
the concession area of respondent companys Timber License Agreement. This,
apparently, was the reason why the respondent company denied to the petitioners the
use of the logging road. If we hold the respondents to their contention that the Bureau of
Forest Development has the power and authority not only to regulate the use or
blockade of logging roads but also to exclusively determine the legality of a closure of
such roads, why then did they take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed
logging road before taking up the matter with the Bureau and why did they close it again
notwithstanding the Bureaus order to open it after the petitioners had duly informed the
said Bureau of the closure? To use the Bureaus authority which the respondents
ignored to now defeat the courts jurisdiction would be totally unacceptable. The trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondent court
is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for trial on the
merits.
19
20
actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630. Following Article
310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one
day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630. The
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty
next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be
anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor
in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
23
Facts:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that illegally cut lumber were
delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia Bukidnon. DENR
officers in collaboration of PNP raided the companys warehouse and found a large stockpile of
lumber invarying sizes cut by a chainsaw.
As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts
issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The
DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt considering that R. L. Rivero
Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber
were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. On
February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations
manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and
Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
During the trial, the accused presented documents that the lumber are legally
obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the court found out that Pallada
was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of the accused were acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA and rendered a decision affirming
the decision of the lower court, thus this case was elevated.
Issue:
Whether or not a separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and timber.
Ruling:
Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court acted correctly in
not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the
lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For
indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber and to have uniformity in documenting
the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber.
Original CLO which form part of this circular is hereby adopted as
accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers
5. Lumber transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO)as herein required shall be considered
as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to
24
25
26
In a motion to quash the writ of replevin, the defendants DENR, CENRO, and
Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside. Thereafter, Judge
Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.
Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an
affidavit-complaint dated July 8, 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance
of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and
conduct unbecoming a judge.
Ruling:
The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for
conduct unbecoming a judge.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws.
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
countrys natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277, states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is
punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered,
removed, possessed, or abandoned.
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines,
Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner.
Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three
reasons:
First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot
take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies.In the instant case,
Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court
and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest
Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of
the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the
decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance
of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is
the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin
itself stated that members of DENRs Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest
products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had
27
custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been
commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the
subject of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR
seized the forest products in accordance with law.
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ
of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law.
28
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks
and lumber based on the writ of replevin.
Ruling:
29
No. The herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner
Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of
law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum. However, petitioners waived this ground for
failure to raise such in their motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, in order for replevin to
prosper, the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action
for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and
six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia
legis. When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of
his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be
interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to
the process under which the property was taken. Lastly, Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which
requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the
seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
30
Issues:
31
Ruling:
1.No, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones
cause of action. In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was
pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the
denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to
which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
2. Yes, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, SECTION 68-A.
Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To
Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then
they should not have necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is
unmeritorious. With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of
P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest
products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime
of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be
imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This
32
is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase
shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code .
ALVAREZ V. PICOP
508 SCRA 498
Facts:
PICOP (Paper Industries Corp of the Phil) filed with the DENR an application to
have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA (Integrated
forest management agreement). In the middle of the processing of PICOPs application,
however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2
September 2002, PICOP filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus 1
against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a
privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver
an IFMA to PICOP. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, CA affirmed, but upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed the judgment of the CA. Now PICOP files a
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
33
Whether or not PICOP is entitled to the IFMA by way of mandamus and due to
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution in relation to Document 1969.
Ruling:
NO, Document 1969 is not a contact, but a mere collateral undertaking pursuant
to the TLA.
An examination of the Presidential Warranty (Doc. 1969) at once reveals that it
simply reassures PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and
conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate
possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for
its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and
remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other
resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential
Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and FMA No. 35. It
is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber
license. The ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying.
Also, PICOP failed to secure NCIP Cerification based on R.A. 8371 and
Sanggunian consultation and approval for environmentally critical projects based on the
Local Government Code.
ALVAREZ V. PICOP
606 SCRA 444
Facts:
PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing TLA No. 43, such as the
non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan
as required by the DENR rules and regulations, as well as overdue and unpaid forest
charges. Upon submission of the memorandum to the DENR Secretary, negotiations
were held to assure PICOPs compliance with DAO 99-53, however PICOP later
claimed that the conversion had already been completed pursuant to Sec. Alvarez letter
of clearance.
PICOP then filed for a petition for mandamus against petitioner which was
granted by the trial court. Later on, Gozun was substituted in the case as the new
DENR Secretary. Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the lower courts ruling, to which
herein petitioners now appeal.
Issue:
Ruling:
35
3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and
conditions of the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations.
In the case at bar, PICOP failed to comply with DAO, as evidenced by the
memorandum submitted to the DENR Secretary by the Performance Evaluation Team.
Finally, the DENR, by withholding the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA,
has made a factual finding that PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for
such a conversion. Findings of facts of administrative agencies are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality, by the courts because of the special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Lastly, as to whether or not conversion already took place, the court ruled in the
negative. By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOPs TLA into an IFMA, the
DENR Secretary cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be claimed to have granted the
conversion itself. The letter is clear that the "conversion" could not be final since its
conditions and details still have to be discussed as stated in the second paragraph of
said letter; hence, the same letter could not have reduced to a mere formality the
approval of the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. Even assuming,
however, that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely academic because
of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not contracts
within the Non-Impairment Clause and thus, can be amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds
that the IFMA would be in violation of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly those
protecting the rights of the local governments and the indigenous peoples within the
IFMA area, then it behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such IFMA. These same
statutes, rules and regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above for the
conversion of the TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
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37
Facts:
On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01
creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of
and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest
products in that city. The team was composed of personnel of the Philippine Army,
PNP, DENR and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo
Lausa, who was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayors office, was a member
of the team. On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential
information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City
from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the team set up a checkpoint
along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City. Therafter upon catching up with the two cars in
the latters compound, the caretaker of the compound was not able to produce any
documents proving the legality of possession of the forest products. DENR officers then
seized the truck and lumber, and since there were no claimants after posting the notice
of confiscation, it was deemed forfeited in favor of the government.
2 months after the said forfeiture, petitioner herein filed a suit for replevin to
recover the trucks and lumber, to which respondent Lausa filed a motion for approval of
counterbond and dismissal of the replevin since the seizure was pursuant to the
38
Revised Forestry Code. Trial court for petitioner, but was reversed in the CA in favor of
Lausa. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the
replevin suit, considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited
by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised Forestry
Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Ruling:
No. The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he
can resort to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a
party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a courts
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a courts intervention is fatal
to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case
is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the
Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting
petitioners application for a replevin writ and denying private respondents motion to
dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber
properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover
possession thereof should be directed to that agency.
The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent
agent of the DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover custody of the lumber
should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of
petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done was to dismiss the case without
prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the DENR .
39
Facts:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for
brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and
Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the
40
Issue:
Whether or not the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities and
that the conversion of the agreement into MPSA will run counter to the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution.
Ruling:
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42
On March 24, 1975, respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. entered into a Contract for
Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore with Induplex wherein Induplex agreed to buy all the
perlite ore that may be found and mined in Tuasons mining claim located in Taysa,
Daraga, Albay. In exchange, Induplex will assist Tuason in securing and perfecting his
right over the mining claim . Thereafter, Tuason executed an Agreement to Operate
Mining Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction and Development Corporation.
Later, Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines, DENR a complaint against Asaphil and
Induplex for declaration of nullity of the said Contracts. Tuason alleged in his complaint
that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon Mineral Resources, an
entity whose purpose is to mine any and all kinds of minerals, that this is in violation of
the condition imposed by the Board of on Induplex in its Joint Venture Agreement with
Grefco, Inc, prohibiting Induplex from mining perlite ore, through an operating
agreement or any other method; that Induplex acquired the majority stocks of Asaphil
and that 95% of Ibalons shares were also transferred to Virgilio R. Romero, who is a
stockholder of Induplex, Asaphil and Ibalon. Tuason claimed that said acts adversely
affected, not only his interest as claimowner, but the governments interest as well.
Asaphil filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the DENR has no jurisdiction over the case. Induplex filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint, also on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Induplex contended that to fall within
the jurisdiction of the DENR, the controversy should involve a mining property and the
contending parties must be claimholders and/or mining operators; and that the dispute
in this case involves mineral product and not a mining property, and the protagonists
are claimholders (Tuason) and a buyer (Induplex). DENR affirmed, but the Mines
Adjucation Board reversed, stating that the complaint is for the cancellation and
revocation of the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims, which is within the jurisdiction of
the DENR under Section 7 of PD 1281. The MAB also found that the acquisition by
Induplex of the majority stocks of Asaphil, and Induplexs assumption of the mining
operation violated the BOI prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not the DENR has jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint for the
annulment of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore between Tuason and
Induplex, and the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims between Tuason and Asaphil;
and second, WON the MAB erred in invalidating the Agreement to Operate Mining
Claims.
Ruling:
43
Facts:
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is
taking involved but it is with just compensation. Sec. 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit:
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be
properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any
damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire
thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the
construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be
properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
46
existing law when it was granted. And under such law, it is clear that a license should
only cover 100 hectares without exceptions or consideration to the number of
applications. The intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a
license may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing
several applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited
by the law.
Validity of Proclamation No. 84
Rosemoors license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the
national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. This condition to the license
was acknowledged by Rosemoor in its permit. Moreover, granting that Rosemoor
license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.
The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with the
regalia doctrine which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources.
Proclamation 84 does not impair the non-impairment clause because the license
is not a contract. Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws
and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a
subject impressed with public welfare. PN 84 is also not a bill of attainder because the
declaration that the license was void is not a punishment. It is also not an ex post facto
law because the proclamation does not fall under any of the enumerated categories of
an ex post facto law. And an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters
criminal in nature.
48
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service
contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the
mining operation, RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention
of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
2. Yes. The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a device contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that WMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to
the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they
spring must be struck down.
51
governments expense. Section 7.9, meanwhile, deprives the Government of its share in
the net mining revenues in the event the foreign stockholders of a foreign mining
company sell 60% or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation.
Thus, with the exception of Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA, the FTAA,
RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are declared constitutional.
The Meaning of Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance
A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-owned corporation to
render financial or technical assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial
activity was clearly unnecessary; the provision meant to refer to more than mere
financial or technical assistance.
The framers of the Constitution, during its deliberation regarding foreign
investment in and management of an enterprise for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals spoke about service contracts as the concept
was understood in the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious from their discussions that they
did not intend to ban or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they were intent on crafting
provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate the abuses prevalent during
the martial law regime. They were going to permit service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors but with safety measures to prevent abuses as an
exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section2 of Article
XII, which reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations that are at least 60
percent owned by such citizens the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
or petroleum resources. This was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino
capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral resources.
The drafters, by specifying such agreements involving assistance, necessarily
gave implied assent to everything that these agreements entailed or that could
reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective including
management authority with respect to the day-to-day operations of the enterprise, and
measures for the protection of the interests of the foreign corporation, at least to the
extent that they are consistent with Philippine sovereignty over natural resources, the
constitutional requirement of State control, and beneficial ownership of natural
resources remains vested in the State.
It is clear that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance
referred to in paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but such new service contracts
are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand, and on the
other hand government as principal or owner )of the works), whereby the foreign
contractor provides the capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial
expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise,
and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full control and
supervision over the entire enterprise.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to mineral oils. The
grant of such service is subject to several safeguards, among them: (1) that the service
contract be crafted in accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements; (2) the President be the signatory for the government; and
(3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty days.
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54
with corresponding budget, for approval by the Bureau, before government may grant
an FTAA or MPSA or other mineral agreements. The government has the opportunity to
approve or reject the proposed work program and budgeted expenditures for
development works, which will become the pre-operating and development costs that
will have to be recovered.
Moreover, there is no concrete basis for the view that, in FTAAs with a foreign
contractor, the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax income from the
exploitation of its mineral resources, and that such share is the equivalent of the
constitutional requirement that at least 60 percent of the capital, and hence 60 percent
of the income, of mining companies should remain in Filipino hands. Even if the State is
entitled to a 60 percent share from other mineral agreements (CPA, JVA and MPSA),
that would not create a parallel or analogous situation for FTAAs. .
The Charter did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60 percent share, applicable
to all situations, regardless of circumstances. The terms and conditions of petroleum
FTAAs cannot serve as standards for mineral mining FTAAs, because the technical and
operational requirements, cost structures and investment needs of off-shore petroleum
exploration and drilling companies do not have the remotest resemblance to those of
on-shore mining companies. To avoid compromising the States full control and
supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources, there must be no attempt to
impose a minimum 60 percent rule. It is sufficient that the State has the power and
means, should it so decide, to get a 60 percent share (or greater); and it is not
necessary that the State does so in every case.
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57
58
59
settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which
a permit was already granted.
AMISTOSO VS. ONG AND NERI
130 SCRA 228
Facts:
Amistoso and Neri are owners of adjoining parcels of agricultural land. An
irrigation canal traverses the land of Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod
River passes and and flows to the land of the Amistoso for the latter's beneficial use.
Amistoso filed a complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against Neri and Ong(cultivator of Neris land) for refusal, despite repeated
demands, to recognize the rights and title of the former to the beneficial use of the water
passing through the irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's rights and/or claims
annotated on the Certificate of Title of Neri. Neri denied any right of Amistoso over the
use of the canal, nor was there any contract, deed or encumbrance on their property
and assert that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will
warrant the filing of the complaint against them.
Neri asserts that the complaint should be dismissed because Amistosos claim is
based on his right to use water coming from the Silmod River and prays that Amistosos
right to the utilization thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or obstructed by
Neri. The dispute is thus on the use, conservation and protection of the right to water
and the annotation is merely the relief prayed for on the basis of the claim to the use
and protection of water passing through the land of Neri. And since the controversy
hinges on the right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River that passes on
the land of Neri to Amistoso's property, the proper authority to determine such a
controversy is the National Water Resources Council, which is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction over such question. The trial court dismissed Amistosos complaint for lackof
jurisdiction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal. YES.
2. Whether or not National Water Resources Council has exclusive jurisdiction over
the matter. NO.
Ruling:
Based from the stipulation of facts between the parties, Neri admits that
Amistoso , has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications. Neri contends that the said grant does not
pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River. The records, however,
do not show any other irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing thru
60
respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod River, making Neris allegations
invalid.
The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of
Amistoso. The grant was made three (3) years before the promulgation of P.D. 1067
(Water Code of the Philippines). The water rights grant partakes the nature of a
document known as a water permit recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067. the
WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right to use water
existing on or before December 31, 1974" which under P.D. 1067 are required to be
registered with the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years from
promulgation of P.D. 1067, otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed
abandoned.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and
incontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That
right is now a. vested one and may no longer be litigated as to bring petitioner's case
within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. To resurrect that issue
will be violative of the rule on res judicata. Amistoso is not asking the court to grant him
the right to use but to compel Neri to recognize that right and have the same annotated
on the latters TCT. The interruption of the free flow of water caused by the refusal to reopen the closed irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court
below, which decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National
Water Resources Council.
61
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property should stand. NO.
2. Whether or not Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
Ruling:
No Duplicity of Charges
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the
accused in preparing his defense. In this case, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus,
Loney et al. erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
62
The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine that where two different laws (or articles of
the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. A
comparative analysis between the laws shows that each of these laws on which Loney
et al. were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others. Moreover,
the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished
by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.The charge for violation of RPC does
not absorb the charges for the other laws because mala in se felonies cannot absorb
mala prohibita crimes.
People v. Relova not in Point
In the case of People v. Relova, the court held that a person charged with theft of
electric power under the RPC after being acquitted of violating a City Ordinance
penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring violates the right against
double jeopardy because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an
ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
prosecutions for the same act. However, such is not the case here because Loney et
al.are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not
by an ordinance and a national statute. Although Loney et al. cannot be for multiple
prosecuted for the same offense, they can be charged for offenses arising from the
same incident.
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64
65
Facts:
Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty), which constructed and
developed The Alexandra Condominium Complex, transferred to The Alexandra
Condominium Corporation (TACC) such condominium complex by virtue of a Deed of
Conveyance. Subsequently (after 5 years), Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards, and
informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent
discharge to meet government standards. Since constructing an STP would be
expensive (P15M), TACC tried to experiment with other methods of cleaning its
wastewater. However, the wastewater still failed to meet government standards. For this
violation, LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC until the wastewater discharge
complies with the government standard.
TACC then entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the
construction of the STP for P7.5M. LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the
fine (~P1M) representing the penalty from until the STP was constructed. TACC
requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of P1,000 per day in
recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it undertook to comply with
government standards. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with government
standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty. This was denied by LLDA.
TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The CA denied TACCs petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the TACC complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. NO.
2. Whether or not TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. YES.
Ruling:
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
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