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JUL 17 1998
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 97-3314
(D. Kan.)
(D.Ct. No. 96-3042-DES)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Donald Davis was found guilty of five drug-related counts, including
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
two counts under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for use of a firearm in a drug trafficking
crime. He was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment, partly comprised of 120
months for the 924(c) convictions. He subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255
motion seeking to set aside his 924(c) convictions in light of the United States
Supreme Courts ruling in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995)
(clarifying the term use of a firearm for purposes of 924(c)). The
Government filed a response, claiming the 924(c) convictions should stand in
spite of Bailey. In its response, the Government did not expressly request the
court to resentence Mr. Davis if it granted his 2255 motion. The district court
granted Mr. Davis 2255 motion, vacating his 924(c) convictions. United
States v. Davis, 924 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Kan. 1996). The district courts order,
however, did not address the effect of its ruling on Mr. Davis sentence. Id. at
1084. Six days later, the Government filed a motion to resentence Mr. Davis to
reflect the firearms sentence enhancement under United States Sentencing
Guidelines 2D1.1(b)(1). The court denied the Governments motion,
concluding it did not have jurisdiction to modify a previously imposed sentenced.
The Government appeals, and we reverse.
Mr. Davis after it vacated his firearms convictions. We review the district courts
determination as to its jurisdiction to resentence de novo. United States v.
Mendoza, 118 F.3d 707, 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 393 (1997). A
district court may modify a defendants sentence only when Congress has
expressly granted the court jurisdiction to do so. United States v. Blackwell, 81
F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1996), revd on other grounds, 127 F.3d 947 (10th Cir.
1997).
sentence is necessary since once a court determines 2255 relief from a 924(c)
conviction is appropriate, it must then set aside the judgment, which
encompasse[s] both convictions and sentences. Mendoza, 118 F.3d at 709.
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