Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Party Politics
17(6) 849859
The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/1354068811416666
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Euroscepticism, that is: analysis of party positions mapped against electoral fortunes in a
specific time period. For example, party-based Euroscepticism in elections to the European Parliament (EP) or in referendums around European issues is largely excluded
from the case studies in volume 1, although Euroscepticism in EP elections is discussed
in the second volume. However, this narrow foundation is necessary in order to allow
systematic comparison; moreover, it does not preclude further studies which could either
extend the project into a longer time frame or provide complementary analysis.
The definition of party-based Euroscepticism has proved difficult. Building on
Szczerbiak and Taggarts earlier work, the chapters take as their definitional starting
point the distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism, the former being defined
as principled objection to European integration (opposition to membership or advocacy
of withdrawal), and the latter covering a more diffuse range of contingent positions
which accept the principle of EU membership but reject further integration and/or
contest specific EU policy directions. In the second volume, the editors review their distinction at some length, acknowledging the advantages of more nuanced classifications,
particularly that of Peter Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2002). They argue in favour of the
parsimony of the hard/soft distinction while acknowledging the need to clarify the
borders of soft Euroscepticism, leaving open the possibility that further research might
provide a definitive answer.
Broadening the analysis to cover 25 countries, the editors identify three broad patterns
of party-based contestation over European integration: limited, open and constrained. Of
these, the first is the largest, reflecting the low salience of European issues in domestic
voting. Constrained contestation is restricted to newer member states and may be a transitional category, since authors tend to concur that patterns of Euroscepticism are likely
to converge on those of established member states. In seeking to explain why some states
exhibit limited and others open contestation, Szczerbiak and Taggart posit (tentatively)
that party systems which are given to alternation and have a tendency to binary competition are more likely to provide incentives for open contestation. However, it proves
difficult to isolate explanatory factors across countries.
Elements of explanation are offered by several chapters in the first volume (particularly the empirically rich chapter on Spain and the conceptually sophisticated chapters on
Sweden and on central and eastern European countries) which seek to analyse party positions in relation to ideology (cleavages) on the one hand, and institutional factors on the
other (political opportunity structures). This relationship is teased out to good effect in
the chapters by Charles Lees and by Nick Sitter and Agnes Batory in the second volume.
After reviewing a series of institutional variables, Lees concludes that political opportunity structures shape patterns of party-based Euroscepticism but not in a satisfactorily
systematic way across countries. He argues that rich contextualization by country experts
could help to elucidate these relationships on a case-by-case basis. The chapter by Sitter
and Batory provides a particularly helpful way of conceptualizing these dynamics, which
could usefully be adopted by country specialists as a framework for analysis. They suggest that the expression of Euroscepticism depends on trade-offs between a partys identity and longer term policy preferences (ideology) on the one hand, and party strategy
(the pursuit of votes and office, shaped by electoral systems and coalition games) on the
other. Their chapter also indicates that comparing across countries by political family
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