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Ballot Propositions and Information Costs: Direct Democracy and the

Fatigued Voter
Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Trudi Happ
Political Research Quarterly 1992 45: 559
DOI: 10.1177/106591299204500216
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BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND INFORMATION

COSTS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE
FATIGUED VOTER
SHAUN BOWLER, TODD DONOVAN,

University of California,

AND

TRUDI HAPP

Riverside

any studies have considered the voters

~ / in terms of a cost benefit analysis:

(1)

decision

decision

to turn out

p(b)-c
having your .candidate win,

to vote

Here b denotes the benefit from

p the
the
of
vote
and
c
the
costs
of
votoutcome,
probability your
deciding
this
and
formulation
has
considered
b
and
ing (Downs 1957). By
large
c at the systemic level; ease of registration, competitiveness of the election, literacy requirements and many similar factors have all been
used to assess levels of turnout (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Powell
1980). In terms of this literature, then, c refers to a set of costs imposed

all voters within a given political jurisdiction. Once a voter has

arrived at the voting booth the costs of actually marking a ballot
would seem to be trivial relative to the costs of actually turning out to
vote. This last point, however, is not true for all types of ballot. Many
ballots require much more of voters than simply turning out and
marking a single preference for one office. Under preferential systems
or where a large number of elective offices and/or propositions are on
the ballot, the decisions facing voters are quite complex. Between
1974 and 1988, for example, in addition to a wide range of elective
offices, Californians faced an average of 13 propositions at each election. As can be seen from Figure 1, Californias voters express some
dissatisfaction with this process. Nearly one-third of voters gave responses
which suggested that propositions made too many demands upon them.
Responses which noted that there were too many propositions or that
they were too confusing (i.e., that too many demands were being
made) far outweighed responses which expressed a lack of faith in the
efficacy of the proposition process (e.g. that special interests dominate
the process). The question here is whether we can represent such
on

Received: August 23, 1990

Revision Received: February 19, 1991
Accepted for Publication: February 20, 1991

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560

responses

more

considering

formally.

the decision

Our
costs

is that we can, and we begin by

voters after they have turned out

answer

facing

to vote.

FIGURE 1
STATEWIDE BALLOT PROPOSITION ELECTIONS?
z

WHAT Is BAD

Ballot

propositions

We
in

can

and

recast

completing

(2)

ABOUT

information

costs

(1) in order to consider more clearly the costs involved

ballot:
Number of

preferences

marked

p(b)-c
expectation of ballot posilonger the ballot the more
=

This formulation readily lends itself to an

tion effects. Other things being equal, the
information required for a voter to make all the decisions necessary to
complete the ballot. Marginal increases in the length of the ballot
translate into additional decisions which increase costs. Voters, then,
face an increasing information cost curve as they look down the ballot
sorting out which candidate to vote for (or against) and then moving
on to examine a list of propositions.
There are a number of ways in which voters may try to minimize
these costs. They could simply not vote on some propositions, especially those further down the ballot. Alternatively voters wishing to
reduce information costs might decide to vote &dquo;no&dquo; on every proposition if they prefer the (known) status quo to an (unknown) future. One
possibility here is that the functional form of the cost curve may not

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561

be linear, but rise much more sharply as the number of propositions mounts (Bain and Hecock 1957: 72-75). In addition to nonlinearity, we may also expect a sign change. Research on voting under
Irelands preferential electoral system suggests that the lowest ballot
positions, as well as the highest, may be advantaged. Voters will begin
marking the ballot but tire easily, perhaps skipping several positions
in the middle of the order (Robson and Walsh 1974).
On preferential ballots party labels help reduce costs facing voters.
Where ballot propositions are concerned, such labels are not present
and so the decision problem facing voters is that much more difficult,
and hence, ballot position effects are more likely (Magleby 1989: 113;
Darcy and McAllister 1990: 15). Magleby suggests that the degree of
controversy surrounding a given proposition does help voters to sort
through a ballot and cast a vote for or against a selected list of propositions (Magleby 1989, 1984; Bone 1974; Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987).
While this search behavior may not contradict the hypotheses of ballot
position effects it can, at an extreme, be taken to suggest that there
should be little or no evidence of ballot position effects as voters scan
the ballot for the most controversial propositions. Unless such propositions occupy a similar place in each ballot, it seems unlikely to result
in any general pattern of ballot position effects.
Obviously this argument turns on how one defines &dquo;controversial.&dquo;
We will return to this issue below. For the moment, Maglebys argument highlights the important point that there will be factors associated with individual propositions which will raise or lower the costs
associated with voting.
One factor beyond the ballot itself which should affect voters reluctance to express a preference is that they simply know nothing about
the issues involved. Voters, then, could simply mark the ballot for or
against propositions that they have heard about (Magleby 1989). A
priori, we can, therefore, expect voters to know more about propositions which have been advertised more fully. While campaign advertising may not sway voters to vote for or against a particular proposition, the expenditures themselves may raise the general level of voter
awareness. Alternatively spending may reflect the especially controversial or divisive nature of an issue. Whatever the case, the end result
should be similar. Advertising will lower the cost of obtaining information and so lower the cost of finishing the ballot by exposing voters
to an issue prior to their entering the booth. Expenditure should,
therefore, increase the vote on a given proposition.

simply

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562

One of the disadvantages to studying these effects for elective offices

is that voters may simply not care who fills some offices. Drop-off for
elective ofhces, then, may relate more to the fact that it may be an
election for dog catcher rather than the fact that the dog catchers
ofBce appears low on the ballot. Separating out these two effects is, of
course, very difficult. While one may argue that propositions do not
carry with them the same sort of inherent inequality as elective offices
it is possible to argue that we should see voters pay more attention to
certain types of propositions (Bone 1974; Cronin 1989). There are
several possible kinds of effects we might see.
General levels of information may be raised by the manner in
which the proposition reached the ballot. Initiative propositions demand
great and sustained attention on the part of activists. For an initiative
measure to reach the California ballot it must be signed by a number
of registered voters equal to, or greater than, 5 percent of the vote cast
for Governor in the previous election. Clearly, a sizable number of
voters have come in contact with the initiative prior to seeing the proposition on the ballot. Perhaps the voter worked for a campaign, had
friends or co-workers involved in a campaign, or simply signed (or
refused to sign) the petition at the store. In any event, the voters general level of awareness should be raised, especially relative to those
issues placed on the ballot by the legislature.
While there are exceptions, it is generally the case in California
that bond propositions appear first followed by constitutional amendments and then initiative measures (Section 10218 of the Election
Code of California). Despite their position lower down the ballot we
expect initiative measures to experience less drop-off for the reasons
just outlined. Bond issues are also unlikely to see much drop-off. Not
only do they appear at the top of the ballot they also concern pocketbook issues. The large literature on popularity functions and economics readily lends itself to the idea that voters should be more sensitive
to issues of money than many other kinds of issues (e.g., Lanoue
1988; Alt and Chrystal 1985). In controlling for proposition type,
then, we also control for systematic differences in ballot position.
Constitutional issues offer two competing expectations. While many
controversial issues appear via initiatives some may appear as constitutional debates. By and large constitutional issues would seem to
involve fairly remote or obscure issues such as government reorganization and hence most likely to see drop-off. We can take Proposition
109 from the June 1990 ballot as an example:

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563

Governors Review of Legislation, Legislative Deadlines. Extends Governors

time to review bills in Governors possession after adjournment in
first year of legislative session, except reapportionment measures,
from 12 up to an additional 29 days. Statutes subject to referenda
petitions filed prior to January 1 take effect January 1 or 91 days from
enactment, whichever is later. Extends, to next working day, 12-day
period for Governor to consider bills if 12th day falls on Saturday,
Sunday or holiday. Changes in legislative deadline for consideration
of bills introduced in first year of legislative session to January 31 of
second year.

direct measure of the inherent difficulty of propositions

also consider the simple length of the proposition as it appears
on the ballot. In line with our discussion of the number of propositions,
longer, wordier propositions should - other things being equal - make
greater demands on individual voters than short ones (Magleby 1984).
Finally, we should also consider that the composition of the electorate differs according to election and general levels of turnout. While
presidential elections may lead more people to vote, they may as a
whole comprise a less well-informed electorate than is the case for
primary elections (Campbell et al. 1960). Less interested and less
well-informed voters may well be unwilling to bear the costs of making
a series of decisions. Drop-off may well be generally higher, then, in
presidential elections and/or when turnout is high.
As

a more

we can

DATA

AND

METHODS

We test the hypotheses above using voting results on all California

ballot propositions 1974-1988 (dates set by the availability of spending data). Our dependent variable is the difference between total number of votes cast on a given proposition and the turnout for that election (expressed as a percentage of turnout). This measure will increase
as drop-off increases to a maximum of 100 when no one who turned
out voted for a given proposition. We test our hypotheses by estimating the following regression equation with a specification that follows
equation (2) above (see Appendix A coding of the variables).

(3) Drop-off

-B*
-B*
-B*
-B*
+B *
+B*

Total campaign spending

Citizen initiative proposition
Bond issue
* Primary election
Prop alters the Constitution
Location on ballot

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564
&%~
dquo;

+B * Prolixity of proposition
+B* Large number of propositions on ballot
+B* Presidential election (long ballot)
+B* Turnout
+/-B* Time
In order to address the possibility of non-linearity in the relationship between ballot position and drop-off we squared the propositions
location on the ballot. One slight problem in estimating (3) was that
constitutional measures are more prolix than others. We therefore estimated the effects of prolixity on each proposition type by means of
interactive variables.
We also consider as a second dependent variable the proportion of
&dquo;no&dquo; votes on a given proposition. Above we suggested that simply
voting down propositions might be taken as one reaction to having to
make a decision. In a very loose sense this is an incumbency effect for
propositions. The incumbent here being the alternative &dquo;no change to
the status quo&dquo; or, in terms of actual voting, a &dquo;no&dquo; vote. We might
expect, then, to find a positive relationship between ballot position
and the percent of voters marking a &dquo;no&dquo; vote. While this leaves
unchanged most of our independent variables we do have to alter our
conception of spending to take account of the (hypothesized) direction
effects (see Appendix A).
Table 1 presents our results. In column 1 the dependent variable
is drop-off, in column 2 it is percent &dquo;no&dquo; vote. Both equations show
that there are ballot position effects in the predicted direction. While
voters may mark the very last propositions in greater numbers they
are also likely to mark these propositions &dquo;no&dquo; (column 2). Thus, even
after controlling for a series of proposition-and election-specific factors,
we see significant drop-off effects due to ballot position and, given the
quadratic form estimated, this drop-off is especially pronounced towards
the middle of the ballot. Ballot positions effects, then, are non-linear
as voters seem to skip over the middle portion of the ballot.
There are also significant proposition-specific effects. While constitutional measures generate higher levels of drop-off, initiative measures generally see significantly less drop-off. Similarly, we find that
campaign spending (for and against a proposition) also reduces dropoff. Campaign spending against a proposition also increases the &dquo;no&dquo;
vote. As expected from Campbell, we also find that as turnout increases
so does drop-off. In primary elections we should not expect this since,

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565

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566

following Campbell,
interested in politics.

the electorate should be

more

motivated and

The parameter for the time trend shows that general levels of
over time. Whether we should take this as a
testament to the value of direct democracy, or a reflection of generally
lower turnout rates, is uncertain.
We have somewhat mixed evidence on a number of our other
hypotheses. Bond issues do not significantly affect drop-off rates. Further, there does not seem to be any election specific (primary versus
presidential) effect over and above general turnout levels. More puzzling than these results is that the indicator for prolixity does not perform consistently. In the first equation, two of the relevant coefficients
are positive and one is significant. The longer initiative measures in
particular see greater drop-off. Curiously, longer constitutional propositions attract more voters than do shorter ones. This is a perverse
result, especially so in the light of the fact that our other hypotheses
have been substantiated.
In general the equation estimating the percent &dquo;no&dquo; vote does not
perform as well in terms of R2. Our measures of complexity are all in
the predicted direction but none is significant. Nevertheless, we do see
evidence here of both ballot position and spending effects...

drop-off are decreasing

DISCUSSION: DIRECT
In this paper

have

DEMOCRACY AND THE FATIGUED VOTER

..

to examine the process by which

ballots.
We
have presented a test of the
approach complex
of
ballot
from
within
an explicitly theoretical frameposition
importance
which
takes
account
of election-specific and
and
work
one, moreover,
proposition-specific factors in addition to ballot location. Here we used
as our example voting on propositions in California and our results
show that we can account for drop-off and, to a lesser extent, direction
of voter choice by using an approach which emphasizes the cost to
voters of making decisions. In voting on propositions, individual voter
rationality may not be in the interests of the process as a whole. In the
face of a complex ballot, voters will either not mark a preference or
vote &dquo;no&dquo; on propositions lower on the ballot. This behavior, while
individually rational, undermines the idea of giving voters a direct say
in policymaking through the use of ballot propositions. While these
patterns do not invalidate the idea of using propositions as a means to
exercise direct democracy, they do suggest that there are problems
with over use of this process.
we

attempted

voters

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567

APPENDIX A
The
ID

on

coding

of the variables and

= location of prop

ballot

on

note

ballot

on

estimation

( 1 = first,

2 = second

etc.)
ID

squared

On year

Primary
Bond
Initiative
Constitutional

LENGTH

= (0,1 )
= (0,1 )
;
= (0,1 )
= (0,1 )
(0,1) 1 =constitutional measure
length of the ballot proposition as it appears on
ballot in number of lines multiplied by each of the
,

..

,_

&dquo;

...

relevant variables
amount spent in favor of
against it (in $100,000s)

prop+amount spent

spent against a proposition minus amount

for
spent
expressed as a % of total spending.
-100 to 100
-100 all the spending was in favour of a prop
+ 100 all the spending was against a proposition

Spending against
by

ballot squared
1 = Presidential election
1 = primary election
1 = bond proposition
1 = initiative measure

on

Spending

Bounded

ID

amount

Turnout
time

turnout

year

Estimation
Here we address two questions of estimation. First the use of OLS
in this pooled data set and second the functional form of the relationship between ballot position and our dependent variables.
The data set is stacked (sorted) by time and proposition id number
(location on the ballot, first on the ballot 1, second on the ballot
2 and so on). Although this may bring into question the use of OLS
we did not find problems which required an alternative estimation
procedure (Stimson 1985). The OLS results, then, are the appropriate
=

ones to

report.

Whether or not the relationship between ballot position and &dquo;no&dquo;

vote is linear or non-linear is an empirical question. The form reported
here is the best fit. Only using ID (i.e., a linear relationship) produced
a significant relationship in terms of drop-off but not in terms of &dquo;no&dquo;
vote. Using ID squared (as a review suggested a &dquo;j&dquo; curve) produced a
significant relationship in neither case.

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568

REFERENCES

Alt, J., and A. Chrystal. 1985. Political Economics. Berkeley: University of

California Press.

Bain, H. M., Jr., and D. S. Hecock. 1957. Ballot Position and Voters Choice.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Bone, H. A. 1974. "The Initiative in Washington." Washington Public Policy
Notes 2

(October):

257-61.

Campbell, A., P. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. Stokes. 1960. The American

Voter. New York: Wiley.
T. 1989. Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and
Recall. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Darcy, R., and R. McAllister. 1990. "Ballot Position Effects." Electoral Studies
9 (April): 5-17.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Hahn, H., and S. Kamieniecki. 1987. Referendum Voting: Social Status and
Policy Preferences. New York: Greenwood Press.
Lanoue, D. J. 1988. From Camelot to the Teflon President: Economics and Presidential Popularity Since 1960. New York: Greenwood Press.
Magleby, D. B. 1984. Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United
States. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
1989. "Opinion Formation and Opinion Change in Ballot Proposition
Campaigns." In M. Margolis and G. Mauser, eds., Manipulating Public
Opinion. Belmont, CA: Brooks Cole.
Powell, G. B. 1980. "Voting Participation in Thirty Democracies: Effects of
Socioeconomic, Legal and Partisan Environments." In R. Rose, ed.,
Party and Electoral Systems. London: Sage.
Robson, C., and B. Walsh. 1974. "The Importance of Positional Voting Bias
in the Irish General Election of 1973." Political Studies.
Rosenstone, S., and R. Wolfinger. 1978. "The Effect of Registration Laws on
Voter Turnout." American Political Science Review 72: 22-45.
Stimson, J. A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay."
American Journal of Political Science 29 (4): 914-47.

Cronin,

—.