1. Cayetano vs.

Monsod
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall
be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
It is whether the respondent has the ten year practice of law requirement for
him to assume such office
HELD:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court. Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor

 verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has

been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years..

1. Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed as Chairman of the Commission of Elections.
His appointment was contested by Atty. Renato Cayetano citing that his years of
experience cannot be considered that which constitutes the practice of law.
Atty. Monsod was a member of good standing in the Bar for more than ten (10)
years. He worked:
-

As a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963);

As an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970);

As a Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986);

As a legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986);

As Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);

As a member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987);

As National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and,

As a member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the above mentioned activities may be considered to constitute
the practice of law.
HELD:
YES. By majority vote.
RATIO:
Definition of practice of law by:
Blacks Legal Dictionary: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent.
Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177): The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
Further, records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term practice of law.
2. PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA
G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On
May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who
are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and
that the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess
of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains
the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice
of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other
individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office.
Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first
time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice
before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training,
then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

3. People of the Philippines vs Simplicio Villanueva

14 SCRA 109 Legal Ethics Practice of Law Isolated Appearance

In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of

Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer
friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San
Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the
offended party as he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not
being compensated but rather hes doing it for free for his friend who happened to
be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fules appearance for his friend should be given credence.

4. JESUS MA. CUI

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L18727AUGUST 31, 1964

FACTS:
Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and DoaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of

indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate

existence by legislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said
spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2
of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and,
incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and
his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who
both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being
the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr.
Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered
into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no
prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him;
and the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in
this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office,
being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the
founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective qualifi cations to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of
the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among thel egitimate descendants
of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al
estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the
meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of
Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although
disbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator
of the Hospiciode Barili.

- C o u r t
a quo
- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in
the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator,
it should not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore
means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as
erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office
of administrator.
(YES)
RATIO:
Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in
the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A
Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This
term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class
of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to
the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion
of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are
instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons
who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to
take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet
certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo
de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from
some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili
must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of
donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the
Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution; shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the
Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which work,
it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset. Under this particular criterion we hold that
the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied

in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is

disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,
grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio
mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of
succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another
one of the said nephews. Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui,
Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal. The interven or contends that the intention of
the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the
descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named.
Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged
to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente
Cui, to whom the interven or belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified
by the terms of the deed of donation.

5. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Atty. Paguia is the counsel of Joseph Estrada in the case of Estrada vs.
Arroyo. Atty. Paguia asserts that the members of the Supreme Court should
inhibit themselves from hearing the petition because of Rule 5.10 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judges from participating in
partisan political activities. According the Atty. Paguia, the justices have

violated the rule by participating in the EDSA 2 rally and authorizing the
assumption of office by President Arroyo.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petition and motion for reconsideration
of Atty. Paguia to dismiss all the criminal cases against Estrada. Atty. Paguia
attacked the decision of the Court in the case of Estrada vs. Arroyo by saying:
similar in the decisions involving admin. agencies, if the act of the justices is
lawful, it is the act of the Supreme Court, and if the act of the judges is not
lawful, it is not the act of the Supreme Court. As such, Atty. Paguia asserts
that the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo being unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of
Code of Judicial Conduct, is not the act of the SC.
Atty. Paguia repeated his assault on the court in both broadcast and
print media. For that reason, the court asked him to show cause why he
should not be sanctioned.
Issue: W/N Atty. Paguia should be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming.
Held: Atty. Paguia is sanctioned. He is indefinitely suspended from
practice of law.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates the
lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning
the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.

6.

PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al. GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005,

En Banc (Puno, J.)

Matter is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles
of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation
and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the matter
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On July 17, 1987, pursuant

to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies of the
Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et
al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among
others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments
thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of
former President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present appearance as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking
Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.
ISSUES: Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: The petition is denied. The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the
meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the
intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar
Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not
merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Beyond doubt, the matter or the act
of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central
Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila. We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
matter and cannot disqualify. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in Civil Case No. 0096. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where
the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law. The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory
pleading; hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General.
For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with
the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter The Court has to
consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official

independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the position of
Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It
is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it
is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of
their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a
corrosive effect on the rule of law. Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among
others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply
retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact
that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by
the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made
after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable.

A.C. No. 516

June 27, 1967

7. TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ESTEBAN DEGAMO, respondent.
Teodoro O. Calo, Jr. for complainant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Pedro A,. Ramirez for investigators.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo 1 upon a verified letter-complaint of the petitioner,
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the former with "having committed false
statement under oath or perjury" in connection with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.
On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer (not a motion to dismiss.) After interposing
an unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court accordingly
referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General
referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. The fiscal conducted an investigation. The petitioner adduced
evidence, but not the respondent, because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several
postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for which reason the investigating fiscal
considered the respondent as having waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the
record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis thereof, the Solicitor General filed his report and a
complaint with this Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for gross misconduct.
No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts are either unrebutted or admitted:
On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police of Carmen,
Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose Malimit of the same
municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances, educational attainment, civil service
eligibility and so forth. One item required to be filled out reads:
Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not reach the Court. (State the details of case and
the final outcome.)"
to which respondent answered, "None."
Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor to the position applied for. However, on
the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there was pending against him, and two (2) other coaccused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No. 2646) for illegal possession of explosive
powder.2
Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was also charged in an information, dated
23 September 1960, for perjury, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2194, on
the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as a member of the Philippine bar.
In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the aforequoted questionnaire was made in good
faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted) that it referred to a final
judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal or police record.
1wph1.t

The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched in ordinary terms and devoid of legalism
hence, it needed no interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it asked for records "whichdid not reach

the Court" entirely disproves respondent's technical twist to the question as referring to final judgments or
convictions.
Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent complained of was committed
on 17 January 1959. Without explaining how and upon what authority, respondent invokes the defense of
prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance
that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal
proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434).
Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground for disbarment
in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but for gross misconduct. A
violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963 Ed., citing the case of In re Montagne and
Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario,
52 Phil. 399).
Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him because the information sheet is not
required by law but only by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the point. The issue is whether or
not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence against him of any criminal or police record,
including those that did not reach the court. In this, he did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to
secure an appointment in his own favor. He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27 April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm.
Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966 **), and he has violated his oath
as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical standards applicable to a member of the bar,
who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one higher than that of the market place.
The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent technical excuses disentitle him to
leniency from his Court.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered stricken from
the roll of attorneys. So ordered.

8. Director of Religious Affairs vs

Estanislao Bayot
74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he
does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that
legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious
Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for
the courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayots plea for
leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme
Court merely reprimanded him.

9.JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.
Facts:
On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case, finding respondent Atty.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross misconduct. The dispositive portion of the Court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct,
and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed
to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the
subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that
failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. seeks this reconsideration.
The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon whom the case was referred for investigation. We again
quote the said findings for emphasis:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as
to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill motive on the part
of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely
against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full
faith and credence.
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered
himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow
in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property
unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such
authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject
property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat,
Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider
himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose
Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant)
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat,

Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property.
Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself
when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was
affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr.
in affixing his wife's signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed
of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to
substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact
that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to
believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property
(which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable
character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims
that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never
appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the
amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of
the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted
that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it
appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or
ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of
worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense. 1
We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his duty to abide by his sworn oath as a member of the bar to
"do no falsehood nor consent to its commission" 2 and further violated the mandate of his profession to "uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession." 3
In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note that this is the first and only administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long career as a member of the bar. At one time, he was even the President
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Manila 1 Chapter, and as such he introduced various programs to
uphold the confidence of the public in the integrity of the legal profession and to uplift the welfare of his brethren.
Furthermore, it appears that as of July 8, 1997, respondent Atty. Villalon already returned to the complainant himself
the owner's duplicate of the subject TCT No. M-3023 and the complainant acknowledged receipt 4 thereof, thus there
is a need to delete the directive to deliver the said TCT from the Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce the
penalty imposed on respondent Atty. Villalon.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and MODIFIES the Decision dated
August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. The directive in the Decision to deliver TCT No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED, the
delivery thereof having been accomplished as of July 8, 1997.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of
the Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

10.In Re: CUNANAN

Resolution March 18, 1954
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue:
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

11.

Spouses Antonio and Lorencita

Algura vs City of Naga
506 SCRA 81 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Rule 141 Indigent Litigants

In 1999, the City of Naga demolished a portion of the house owned by spouses Antonio and Lorencita
Algura for allegedly being a nuisance as the said portion of the house was allegedly blocking the road
right of way.
In September, the spouses then sued Naga for damages arising from the said demolition (loss of income
from boarders), which to the spouses is an illegal demolition. Simultaneous to their complaint was an exparte motion for them to litigate as indigent litigants. The motion was granted and the spouses were
exempted from paying the required filing fees.
In February 2000, during pre-trial, the City of Naga asked for 5 days within which to file a Motion to
Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants. Under the Rules of Court (then Sec. 16, Rule 141), a party
may be qualified as a pauper litigant (for those residing outside Metro Manila) if he submits an affidavit
attesting that a.) his gross monthly income does not exceed P1,500.00 (now not more than double the
monthly minimum wage) and b.) he should not own property with an assessed value of not more than
P18,000.00 (now not more than P300k market value). The City asserted that the combined income of the
Alguras is at least P13,400 which is way beyond the threshold P1.5k. The City presented as proof
Antonios pay slip as a policeman (P10,400) and Lorencitas estimated income from her sari-sari store.
The claim of the spouses that they were property-less, as proven by the City Assessors Certification, was
not disputed by the City.
The spouses argued that since the boarding house was demolished by the city, they only relied on the
income of Antonio which was barely enough to cover their familys need like food, shelter, and other basic
necessities for them and their family (they have 6 children).
The judge, however, granted the motion of the City and so the spouses were disqualified as pauperlitigants. Subsequently, the case filed by the spouses against the City was dismissed for the spouses
failure to pay the required filing fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses should be disqualified as pauper-litigants.
HELD: No, there was no hearing on the matter hence the case was remanded back to the lower court. In
this case, the Supreme Court reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 (then
Sec. 16, Rule 141).
Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required to pay the
filing fees. On the other hand, Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a party must meet
before he can be

qualified as an indigent party and thus be exempt from paying the required fees.
If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses could not
qualify because their income exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if Sec. 21, Rule 3
is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a chance in a hearing to satisfy the court that
notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they have no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic necessities for their family, and are thus, qualified
as indigentlitigants under said Rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in order to let the
spouses satisfy the court that indeed the income theyre having, even though above the P1.5k limit, was
not sufficient to cover food, shelter, and their other basic needs.

12.BARTON V LEYTE ASPHALT

G.R. L-21237
STREET; March 22, 1924
(aida)
FACTS
- James Barton is a US citizen residing in Manila while Leyte Asphalt is a Philippine company which has its principal office in
Cebu.
- Barton sought to recover the sum of $318,563.30 in damages from Leyte Asphalt due to breach of contract along with a
judicial pronouncement that he was entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified in the contract
(Exhibit A).
- Leyte Asphalt appears to be the owner of the Lucio Mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other
asphalt products.
- William Anderson, the general manager of Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Baron authorizing the latter to sell the products
of the Lucio Mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter.
- Exhibit A, the authorization Baron relies on, contained the following stipulations (among others):
- Baron is given the sole and exclusive sales agency for the bituminous limestone and other asphalt products of the Leyte
Asphalt in Australia, Saigon, Java, New Zealand, India, China, Tasmania, Sumatra, Siam, the Strait Settlements, USA and
Hongkong until May 1, 1921.
- No orders for less than one thousand (1,000) tons will be accepted except under special agreement with Leyte Asphalt. It
also contained a breakdown of the prices per ton.
- If the sales in the above territory equal or exceed ten 10,000 tons in the year ending October 1, 1921 then in that event
the price of all shipments made during the above period shall be ten pesos (P10) per ton, and any sum charged to any of
your customers or buyers in the aforesaid territory in excess of ten pesos (P10) per ton shall be rebated to Baron.
- Baron also had full authority to sell the Lucio mine products for any sum he saw fit in excess of the prices quoted above
and such excess in price was to be his extra and additional profit and commission.
- All ships, steamers, boats or other carriers were to be loaded promptly with not less than 1,000 tons each 24 hours after
March 1, 1921, unless there was to be prior notice. It was also stipulated that Leyte Asphalt shall not be required to ship
orders of 5,000 tons except on 30 days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice.
- Baron entered into subagency agreements in San Francisco and Australia.
- In San Francisco, he entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy. Ludvigsen & McCurdy was instituted as a
subagent and given the sole selling rights for the bituminous limestone products of Leyte Asphalt for 1 year.
- Baron had also gone to Australia where he instituted Frank Smith as his sales agent.
- February 5, 1921 Ludvigsen & McCurdy advised Baron of an order of 6,000 tons of bituminous limestone which Baron
accepted.
- Anderson informed Baron that Leyte Asphalt was behind construction so it could not handle big contracts as of the
moment. The two met in Manila on March 12 and Baron told Anderson about the San Francisco order. Anderson said that,
owing to lack of capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large orders and suggested that
Baron had better hold up in the matter of taking orders.
- Despite Andersons response, Baron wrote a notification to Leyte Asphalt for the company to be prepared to ship five
thousand tons of bituminous limestone to San Francisco. He also made additional orders for Smith in Australia.
- Leyte Asphalt acknowledged the orders for Australia and San Francisco but stated that no orders would be entertained
without a cash deposit.
- The CFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from four of the six causes of action. The CFI allowed Barton to recover $202,500 from
the first cause of action and $405,000 from the fourth cause of action.
- Among the evidence presented was a carbon copy of a letter written by Baron to Atty. Ingersoll, his lawyer. In the said
letter, Baron wrote that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton.
- When the letter was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant, the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he
had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this
copy was secured.

- The attorney for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant
without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession.
- Barons lawyer then made an announcement that unless the defendants counsel explained how the letter came to the
defenses possession, he proposed to object the letters admission on the ground that it was a confidential communication
between client and lawyer.
- The trial judge excluded the letter.
ISSUE
WON the letter should be excluded
HELD
NO
Ratio When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally,
properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to try that question.
Reasoning
- Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this
privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party and it makes no difference how the defense
acquired possession.
- The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation,
but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
- According to Wigmore: Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's hands, and
since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to
extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the
communication, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule
ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy.
Disposition Judgment reversed

13.People v. Sleeper, 46 Phil. 625

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 3, 1924
G.R. No. 22783
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHARLES H. SLEEPER, defendant-appellant.
Thomas Cary Welch & James G. Lawrence for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real & Assistant Attorney-General Buenaventura for appellee.
STATEMENT
The following information was filed against the defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila:
That on, during and between the 17th day of October, 1922, and the 16th day of April, 1923, both dates
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused was then and there appointed, qualified
and acting secretary-treasurer of the Manila Building and Loan Association, a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands with principal office in said city; that during said
period the A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., deposited with said Manila Building and Loan Association
the sum of P30,000 with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum with the condition that said sum
could be withdrawn from said Association after 15 day's notice, and said accused, one in possession of said
sum which he received in said City of Manila and in his aforementioned capacity instead of applying the
said sum for the purposes intended therefore by the Manila Building and Loan Association and of rendering
proper accounting of the disbursements made thereof, as it was his duty so to do, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently fail to comply with his said obligation, but on the
contrary, misapply, misappropriate, and convert said sum to his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said Manila Building and Loan Association in said sum of P30,000, equivalent to
150,000 pesetas.
Contrary to law.
Upon which the defendant was tried, found guilty of estafa as provided in article 535, section 5, as it
relates to article 534, section 3, of the Penal Code, and sentenced to two years, eleven months and eleven
days of presidio correccional, from which the defendant appeals, contending that the court erred in the
admission of the evidence of the witnesses Fisher and Haussermann, in admitting Exhibit M, and in finding
the defendant guilty as charged.

At the inception of the trial, Fred, C. Fisher, of the Manila Bar, was called to identify a paper known in the
record as Exhibit M, to which the defense objected "on the ground that in the preparation of that paper the
witness had acted as attorney for the defendant who claimed the privilege arising from that relation." After
an examination of the exhibit, the court sustained the objection. Mr. Haussermann, whose name appears
on the exhibit as a witness, was then called, sworn and allowed to identify the exhibit over the defendant's
objection, and later Mr. Fisher was recalled, and the court then reversed its decision, and he was allowed to
testify, and Exhibit M was then introduced as evidence over the strenuous objection and exception of the
defendant.
JOHNS, J.:
Exhibit M is as follows:
Manila, P. I.
September 24, 1923.
In consideration of the assumption by a ground of American citizens, residents of Manila, of my obligation
to the Manila. Building & Loan Association, approximating P127,146.90, arising from the unauthorized
conversation of funds of that corporation for which I was responsible in a fiduciary capacity, I agree that I
will leave the Philippine Island permanently as soon as possible; that I will at once resign from the positions
held by me, including membership on boards of directors; that I will execute my demand note to F. C.
Fisher, trustee, for the benefit of said contributors, for the full amount which may be paid on my account to
the Manila Building & Loan Association; that I will, upon demand, transfer to F. C. Fisher, as trustee for the
contributors above mentioned, all property now owned by me, other than personal effect, and particularly
any and all interest in mining claims and mining companies, with authority of dispose of the same and
apply the proceeds to the payment of said note.
(Sgd.) C. H. SLEEPER
Witness:
(Sgd.) JOHN W. HAUSSERMANN
We agree with counsel for the defendant that, in the absence of Exhibit M, the conviction could not be
sustained. If appears that a short time before it was executed, Mr. Fisher was called to the office of the late
Mr. McCoy, who was then the president of the Manila Building and Loan Association, and who held that
position for a number of years along with the defendant as treasurer. At this conference it developed that
the defendant was short in his accounts for a very large amount, and it was suggested that, to protect the
honor and good name of the Americans in the community, an effort should be made to cover the shortage,

and steps were taken along that line in which Mr. Fisher took more or less of an active part. It is conceded
that he drafted Exhibit M in his own office in which the amount and the name of the association was left
blank, and that later the blanks were filled in his own handwriting.
With all due respect to counsel for the defendant, there is no evidence which shows or tends to show that
in the preparing of this document or the raising of the funds, Mr. Fisher was acting as attorney for the
defendant, or that he represented him in any manner. After the full amount of the shortage was obtained
and the money with which to make it good was raised, Exhibit M was submitted to the defendant for his
signature, and it was then signed by him in the presence of Fisher and of Haussermann, the latter of whom
subscribed his name as a witness. At the time this was done, no other persons were present. There is no
evidence with shows or tends to show that at or prior to his signing any question were asked by the
defendant, or that any statements or representation were made to him of any kind by anyone. Neither is
there any evidence that Fisher claimed or represented that he was the attorney for the defendant in the
transaction or that the defendant relied upon either of them as his attorney, or that the relation of attorney
and client existed between the defendant and Fisher or Haussermann or either or them. It is true that the
record shows that they had been lifelong personal friends, but there is no evidence that in preparing the
document or presenting it for signature, or that in any other manner, Mr. Fisher was acting for or
representing the defendant. It may be true that at the time the defendant signed the writing, and as a
result of the shortage having been made good, the defendant expected to leave the country and avoid
prosecution. Be that as it may, the record shows that when it was prepared, the defendant read the
instrument and signed it voluntarily without asking any questions from anyone, and there is no evidence
that any one promised him immunity from prosecution or that defendant relied on any such promise. The
question as to whether or not Fisher was acting as attorney for the defendant was a fact to be determined
by competent evidence like any other fact. Upon that point Mr. Fisher was the only witness, and he
testified positively that he was not attorney for the defendant and was not acting for him in the
transaction. Opposed to his positive testimony there is nothing but conjectures and inferences. Upon that
question the burden of proof was upon the defendant, and there was a failure of proof. It follows that the
relation of attorney and client did not exist between Mr. Fisher and the defendant and that Exhibit M was
not a privileged communication, and hence it was competent evidence.
It is conceded that the checks in question of the Ammen Transportation Company to the amount of
P30,000 were drawn in favor of the Manila Building and Loan Association and delivered to the defendant as
its treasurer, and that the identical checks were deposited in the bank to the credit of the association, and
that its overdraft in the bank was reduced in that amount. Relying upon such facts, defendant's counsel
vigorously and ably contend that he cannot be convicted of the crime charged in the information. That is
the real question in this case.

In a well-written opinion, the trial court overruled that contention and points out that during the trial,
through his counsel, the defendant admitted that P20,000 was received from the Transportation Company
between the 17th and 24th days of October, 1922, and the remaining P10,000 between the 9th and 16th
days of April, 1923, for which the three certificates of deposit Nos. 1198, 1199, and 1303, Exhibits G, H,
and L, were issued by the defendant. Also, that no entries were made in the books of the association of
such amounts until about September 24, 1923, which is the date of Exhibit M, at which time the whole
amount of the shortage was made good. In Exhibit M the defendant says that "in consideration of my
obligation to the Building and Loan Association approximating P127,146.90, arising from the unauthorized
conversion of funds of that corporation for which I was responsible in a fiduciary capacity, etc."
Notwithstanding the large overdraft of the association in the bank, it appears from the corporation books
that about P10,000 in cash was supposed to be kept in the company's safe, and that when previous
examinations were made by the auditor, the required amount of money was found to be in the safe in the
share of $500 bills. It also appears that at the time the discovery of the shortage was made, the
accountant appeared at the office of the company about 8 a.m. to investigate the corporate records. Mr.
Sleeper then stated that he did not have the key to the safe, went away and returned about 10 a. m., and
then opened the safe and the money was found to be intact. It was pointed out by the trial court that in
opening the same upon his return, the defendant had his back to the clerk and accountant, and that they
could not see what he did. It is also pointed out that at the time the money was deposited by the
Transaction Company, no corresponding slips or debits were made of the transaction, and for such reason,
it was not entered in the books, and hence could not be detected by the accountant whose duty it was to
examine the records of the company.
Upon that point, Manuel Pea, a bookkeeper for the Loan Association, testified:
Q. In what books of the Manila Building & Loan Association should the receipt of the P30,000 mentioned in
the complaint appear? A. In the cash book and in the ledger, and also in the book of interest payable.
Q. Should a credit slip be made for that amount? A. Yes, sir, so that it might be entered in the cash book
and in the ledger.
Q. Why was it not entered in those books? A. Because there was no cash slip.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What did the defendant tell you when you asked him for the cash credit slips for the three amount of
P10,000 each? A. He told me that he would see the auditor about it."
Among others counsel for the defendant at the trial made the following admission:

That the funds in question described in the complaint do not appear upon the books of the Manila Building
and Loan Association until on or after the 24th day of September, 1923, at which time the check, Exhibit O,
was deposited to the credit of that association, and that this amount covered by the complaint was paid by
Exhibit O, it being understood by this admission that the deposits mentioned in the complaint appear in
the stub account of `Bills Payable' dated October 24, 1922, numbered 1198 and 1199, respectively, and
dated April 16, 1923, numbered 1303, those being the only entries in the books of the corporation of the
three sums mentioned.
In an argument between counsel, when C. B. Moore was testifying as a witness for the defense, the force
and effect of this admission was pointed out, and the attorney for the defendant made the following
statement to the court:
I did not admit, I could not admit, because I did not know that it covered the specific amount charged in
the complaint. I do not know that, and I ask that that admission be corrected on the record accordingly.
Based upon which the court made an order striking out the following portion of the admission:
And that this amount covered by the complaint was paid by Exhibit O," on condition that the prosecution
would have the right to prove that fact by other evidence, and it later called Rafael Fernandez, who
testified that he had been a bank examiner since August 5, 1921, and that he had examined the books of
the Loan Association several times in 1921, 1922, and 1923, and the last time on May 4, 1923. His
attention was called to Exhibit G in which the association promised and agreed to pay the Ammen
Transportation Company P10,000 fifteen days after written demand, with interest at the rate of 7 per
centum, and Exhibit H which is also for another P10,000, both dated October 24, 1922, and asked whether
these two bills payable had been entered in the books of the association.
A. I would have seen them because I examined all the books of the Association.
Q. Did anything attract your attention while examining the cash of the Manila Building & Loan Association
at that time? A. There were two things that came to my attention; the first being the big amount of the
notes on hand they were all P500 bills and, second, that there was too much cash for such an
association as the Manila Building & Loan Association kept in the vaults of that Association.
Q. Up to what date were the transaction of the Manila Building & Loan Association entered in the books of
the Manila Building & Loan Association at the time you made your examination on May 4, 1923? A.
February 28, 1923.

He also testified to the same thing about Exhibit L, which is for another P10,000, executed on April 16,
1923.
Q. So that you did not consider this transaction when you made your report to the Insular Treasurer? A.
No, sir, I did not.
Q. Had you considered the P30,000, which is the amount of the transaction appearing in Exhibits G, H, and
L, what would have been the effect in the balance that you found? A. The balance would have been
increased by the P30,000.
Walter Brooks, as a witness for the prosecution, testified that he was a public accountant in the employ of
Fleming, Percy, Smith & Seth who were the auditors for the Building Association, and that he examined its
books in the year 1923 for the first time in June, "and other nine or ten occasions between then and
September." That it was his duty to examined the cash on hand, and that in June, 1923, he went to the
office of the association for that purpose, but found that Sleeper was absent, the safe was locked, and that
no one present has access to it. He then testified:
Q. Did you, on behalf of the firm of Fleming, Percy, Smith & Seth, examine the books of the Manila Building
and Loan Association in June, 1923? A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the course of that examination, did you find the account and books in order? A. No, sir.
Q. Please inform the court what you did not find in order in the books of the Manila Building & Loan
Association. A. I found three bills payable missing from the books.
Q. Showing you these three bills payable, marked as Exhibits G, H, and L, please inform the court whether
these three exhibits have any connection with the three bills payable referred to by you in your previous
answer, as missing. A. These are the three bills which were missing from the books of the Association.
Q. How did you happen to notice that these three bills payable, marked as Exhibits G, H, and L, were
missing and did not appear in the books of the Manila Building and Loan Association? A. I found that
they were missing by checking the consecutive numbers of bills payable issued. These three number did
not appear.
Q. What steps did you take on finding that these three bills payable were unrecorded in the books of the
Association? A. I asked the bookkeeper, the only person present, for an explanation. His answer was: "A"
(Cont.) And he answered that he would refer my request for information to Captain Sleeper.

Q. Did Captain Sleeper give you the desire explanation? A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ascertain the amount involved in those three bills payable, marked as Exhibits G, H, and L? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. How did you ascertain the amount involved? A. By reference to the stubs of the bills payable issued.
Q. Please explain to the court what should have been the correct procedure to properly record in the books
of the Manila Building & Loan Association these transactions. A. On receipt of the money or checks, a
receipts would be given as a bill payable. The entry into the books would have been to the debit of cash
and from there posted to the credit of bills payable.
Q. What would have been the effect of such entries? A. It would have charged cash with the amount
received and added a like amount to the indebtedness of the Association under the heading of the `Bills
Payable.'
Q. And how could that cash so charged be cleared? A. It could be cleared in two ways by deposits into
the bank or by cash disbursements.
Q. Considering that the defendant received the checks, Exhibits C, D, and J, from the A. L. Ammen
Transportation Company, Inc., and that the receipt of these checks was not entered in the books of the
association, and considering also that these checks were deposited at the International Banking
Corporation, had the accused any means of appropriating the amount as represented by these checks?
A. The effect of a payment into the bank account of a check which has not been charged to the cash is to
substitute actual cash on hand by this check deposited in the bank.
Q. Assuming that a large amount of about P100,000 appeared to have been carried as cash on hand, could
that substitution of the amount involved in these three checks be made? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing you this check marked as Exhibit O, drawn in the amount of P127,145.90, against the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, by Mr. Fisher, do you know whether the amount involved in
this check was paid to the Manila Building & Loan Association, and, if so, when? A. Yes, sir, it was in
September, 1923.
Q. Do you know whether the P30,000 represented by the checks, Exhibits C, D, and J, were included in this
check, Exhibit O? A. Yes, sir, they were included.

Q. How do you know it? A. I made a statement of receipts and disbursement by which the amount of the
check was determined, and I included the three bills payable not recorded in the books in that amount.
Q. Showing you this Exhibit Q, I ask you whether you recognize this document? A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Why do you recognize it? A. It contains my signature.
Q. To whom did you deliver this letter, Exhibit Q? A. To Mr. Fisher.
Q. Do you know whether this letter has any connection with the check, Exhibit O? A. The letter you have
just exhibited was given on the same date as the check, and I can only assume that there is a connection
between that and the check.
Q. What connection is that? A. The connection between the letter and the check is that the letter was
given to Judge Fisher at his request after ascertaining what the cash balance of the Manila Building and
Loan Association should be.
Q. Before or after including this P30,000? A. After including the P30.000.
Q. Do you know to how much did it amount, or it should amount, the cash on hand of the Manila Building
and Loan Association, in June, 1923, when you examined the books of that Association here for the first
time, according to the books of the corporation? A. The balance appearing in the books at the time was
short the amount of the three bills payable not entered.
The record shows that the witness Brooks is an experienced accountant, that he knows his business, and
his testimony is clear and convincing and not dispute. He testified as a fact that the P30,000 in question
was included in and is a part of the gross amount of P127,146.90, which the defendant over his own
signature admits was an "unauthorized conversation of funds of that corporation for which I was
responsible in a fiduciary capacity." He also testifies that "the balance appearing in the books at that time
was short the amount of the three bills payable not entered," the three bills payable about which he
testifies being for the P30,000 here in question.
Upon all of such matter, there is no dispute or conflict in the evidence. The defendant having admitted in
writing that he misappropriated the P127,146.90, and the testimony being undisputed that the P30,000 in
question was a part of the P127,146,90, the proof upon that point is conclusive.
Assuming that to be true, the defendant contends that there is a fatal variance between the proof and the
crime charged in the information. That point is not tenable.

The information alleged in substance that the defendant once in possession of the P30,000 "instead of
applying the said sum for the purpose intended therefor by the Manila Building and Loan Association and
of rending proper accounting of the disbursements made thereof, as it was his duty so to do, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently fail to comply with his said obligation, but on the
contrary, misapply, misappropriate and convert said sum to his own personal use and benefit, etc." The
defendant was not misled or deceived by the information. In legal effect it charged him with taking the
amount of the P30,000 evidence by those checks, which was the property of the association, and
wrongfully converting that amount of the funds of the association to his own use. In other words, that upon
the receipt of the checks he took that amount of the funds of the association and converted it to his own
use. Of course, he could not appropriate the checks, but the proof is conclusive that he did take the
amount evidence by the checks and converted it to his own use. He is not charged with estafa of the
checks, but with estafa of the amount of money evidenced by the checks.
It is fair to say that defendant's counsel have made a very vigorous, able, and adroit defense. But in the
final analysis, the stubborn fact remains that the defendant over his own signature admits the
appropriation of the P127,146.90 and the proof is conclusive that the P30,000 in question enters into and
is a part of that gross amount.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

14.ELESIO C. PORMENTO, SR. vs. ATTY. ALIAS A.

PONTEVEDRA
Facts: Herein respondent, ATTY. PONTEVEDRA is the counsel of herein petitioner, PORMENTO, Sr. and his
family. Pormento Sr. claims that the relationship of respondent with his family extends beyond mere lawyerclient relationship, to the point where financial support was also extended to respondent. Rift between petitioner
and respondent started when petitioners counterclaim in a civil case was dismissed. Petitioner claims that
respondent deliberately failed to inform him of such dismissal, thus, he was deprived of the right to appeal.
Further, petitioner alleges that he was constrained to hire a new lawyer in order to recover the (extrajudicially
foreclosed) subject property of the said civil case AND petitioner had to initiate a criminal case of qualified
theft against the relatives of the new owner of the subject property to protect his rights. Respondent is the
counsel of the accused in the criminal case of qualified theft. Petitioner claims that as part of his defense in said
criminal case, respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he obtained from complainant while the
latter is still his client.
n In another incident involving a parcel of land, wherein ownership over the same is still in dispute, petitioner
heeded respondents advice to build a house on said land and allow petitioners nephew and his family to
occupy the house in order to establish possession. Subsequently, nephew of petitioner refused to vacate the land
prompting petitioner to file an ejectment case. Respondent acted as counsel for complainants nephew.
n Respondents contention:
1.

i.

he was never a direct recipient of any monetary support coming from the

complainant.
2.

ii.
within two days upon his receipt of the trial court's order of dismissal, he delivered
to complainant a copy of the said order, apprising him of its contents.

3.

iii.
he honestly believes that there exists no conflict between his present and former
clients' interests as the cases he handled for these clients are separate and distinct from each other.

4.

iv.
he took up the cause of the accused in the criminal cases filed by complainant for
humanitarian considerations since said accused are poor and needy and because there is a dearth of
lawyers in their community.

5.

v.
With respect to the case for ejectment filed by complainant against petitioners
nephew, respondent admits that it was he who notarized the deed of sale of the parcel of land sold to
complainant. However, he contends that what is being contested in the said case is not the ownership of
the subject land but the ownership of the house built on the said land

Issue: WON respondent is guilty of representing interests which conflict with those of his former client, herein
petitioner; WON respondent is guilty of taking advantage of the information and knowledge that he obtained
from petitioner.
SC: GUILTY of representing conflicting interests; FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos
-

T/C: rule 15.03, canon 21, rule 21.02, canon 6

Test of (+) conflicting interests: whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double dealing in the performance thereof
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject
matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation
in which he appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client, with
full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous
employment, there being in that instance no conflict of interests.
Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer's new client and his former
client is in some way connected with that of the former client's action, the lawyer may have to contend for his
new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for the former client or to use against the latter
information confided to him as his counsel
conflict of interests when respondent represented herein complainant's nephew and other members of his
family in the ejectment case? NONE. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the
parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said land.
On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent obtained any information from herein
complainant that can be used to the detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed. Further, no substantial
evidence presented to support claim.
Conflict of interests in the criminal case of qualified theft and counsel of petitioner in the counterclaim
case? YES! The subject matter is the same parcel of land involved in the criminal case filed by herein
complainant against several persons, accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing coconut trees
within the premises of the said lot. Complainant contends that it is in this criminal case that respondent used
confidential information which the latter obtained from the former presented tsn. as evidence after reading,
no direct evidence to support contention was found.
Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of complainant
in Civil Case No. 1648, he became privy to the documents and information that complainant possessed with
respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against
complainant any information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing side.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent fully apprised complainant and his new clients
and secured or at least tried to secure their consent when he took the defense of the accused in the case of
qualified theft.
On defense of good faith, honest intention and motives, and termination of services as counsel: termination of
the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client; the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies
although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. Moreover, the fact that
the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative.

15.Clarita J. Samala vs. Atty. Luciano D.

Valencia
A.C. No. 5439; January 22, 2007Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a complaint against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds:
( a ) s e r v i n g o n t w o s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s a s c o u n s e l f o r c o n t e n d i n g parties;
(b)knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentaryevidence;
(c)initiating numerous cases in exchange for non-payment of rentalfees; and
(d)having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.After respondent
filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the IBPfor investigation, report, and
recommendation.After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective
memorandaand the case was deemed submitted for resolution. The Commissioner
found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penaltyof suspension for six months.
T h e I B P B o a r d o f G o v e r n o r s a d o p t e d a n d a p p r o v e d t h e r e p o r t a n d re
commendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspensio
n from six months to one year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated Canons 15 and 21 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
This Court adopts the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue
on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
(a) On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted
ascounsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga byfiling
an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. The Presiding Judge warned
respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both
parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not also undertake to
discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic

interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice. One of the tests of
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of the lawyer's duty
of u n d i v i d e d fi d e l i t y a n d l o y a l t y t o t h e c l i e n t o r i n v i t e s u s p i c i o n o f
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
( b ) O n k n o w i n g l y m i s l e a d i n g t h e c o u r t b y s u b m i t t i n g f a l s e doc
umentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 007137 fi led before MTC,B r a n c h 7 5 f o r e j e c t m e n t , re s p o n d e n t s u b m i t t e d TC
T N o. 2 7 3 0 2 0 a s e v i d e n c e o f Va l d e z ' s o w n e r s h i p d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t a
n e w TC T N o. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2,
1995.During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers thatw
hen the Answer was fi led in the said case, that was the time that he came to
know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that
whent h e c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e c o m p l a i n t , h e d i d n o t d o a n y t h i n g a n y m o re .
Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed
to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.Respondent failed to comply
with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the
trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the
name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing
thecomplaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's inten
t in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that
said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already
issued in the name of Alba.
(c) On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental
fees.
Complainant alleged that respondent filed the following cases:
(a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272;
(b) Civil Case No. 00-7137at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and
01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion,
respectively,
before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were fi led in retaliation for the cases she fi led against
Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318against
Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling. As culled from the records,
Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his
services, he was allowed to occupy
thep ro p e r t y f o r f re e a n d u t i l i z e t h e s a m e a s h i s o ffi c e p u r s u a n t t o t h e i r r

etainer
agreement. T h e C o u r t fi n d s t h e c h a rg e t o b e w i t h o u t s u ffi c i e n t b a s i s . T h e
a c t o f respondent of fi ling the a forecited cases to protect the interest of his
client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis
of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being
done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. The filing of an administrative
case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own
right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend
and prosecute the right of his client.
(d) On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
The Court finds respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita
Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also
admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20
years of age, and after his wife died in 1997,he married Lagmay in 1998. Respondent
further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one
of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not
consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter
as his second family. He reasoned
thath e w a s n o t s t a y i n g w i t h L a g m a y b e c a u s e h e h a s t w o h o u s e s , o n e i n
Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
al a w y e r s h a l l n o t e n g a g e i n u n l a w f u l , d i s h o n e s t , i m m o r a l o r d e c e i t f u l co
nduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an
act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer,i m m o r a l c o n d u c t h a s b e e n d e fi n e d a s t h a t " c o n d u c t w h i c h i s w i l l f
u l , fl a g r a n t , o r s h a m e l e s s , a n d w h i c h s h o w s a m o r a l i n d i ff e re n c e t o t h e o
pinion of respectable members of the
community.ACCORDINGLY, the Court fi nds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valenci
a
GUILTY
of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein
Resolution

16.RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO

Atty. Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat industries, Inc. until his
appointment as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. Employees of Taggat filed a
criminal complaint, they alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause. Complainant now
charges respondent with the violations Rule 15.03 of CPR and engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a govt prosecutor.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR. WON being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his
role as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
HELD: The Supreme Court finds no conflict of interests when respondent handled preliminary investigation of
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to nonpayment of wages that occurred from April 1 1996 to July 15, 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer
connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. In order to change respondent for
representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his
former client, any confidential information acquired thru his previous employment. It does not necessarily
follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or
Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
As the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as govt prosecutor
was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment
with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only
on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated. Thus, respondent is NOT guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
As to the second issue, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in Ra 6718 which constitutes a violation of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.. The respondent here performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of
their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term practice of law. Respondents admission

that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a govt prosecutor is unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

17.NAKPIL Vs VALDEZ
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio
City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent
would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent
obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in
respondents name.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil died. Respondent
acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of
Joses estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the complainant.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
RATIO:
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondents
accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of
the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate
proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of

conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of
interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.

18.VILLANUEVA vs. ATTY. GONZALES

FACTS: Vivian Villanueva engaged the services of Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales to transfer the title of property
of her mortgagee. She gave him P8K,the propertys TCT and other pertinent documents. However, after
receiving such, respondent lawyer avoided the complainant for 3 years and when visited at the IBP office, he
refused to meet her or her daughter (sleeping or doing something important). She informed him thru a letter of
her lost of trust and demanded that he return the money and documents. Respondent refused to do so. He only
returned the money when he was confronted by her daughter. However, he still failed to return the TCT and
other documents. Villanueva filed a complaint before the IBP1. Did not perform legal services, 2. Did not
inform client of the status of the case, 3. Returned acceptance fee w/o any explanation, 4. Respondent was
indifferent. Respondent was directed to answer, but he did not do so. Neither did he attend the mandatory
hearings.
HELD: YES, he violated Canons 16, 17, 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the CPR
1. Respondent refused to account for and return his clients money (16.01 &16.03)
2. Respondent refused to return his clients TCT and other documents (Canon 16 & Rule 16.03)
3. Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity , competence, and diligence (Canons 17, 18 & Rule
18.03)
4. Respondent did not keep his client informed of the status of her case and refused to respond to her
requests for information (Rule 18.04)
5. Respondent did not file an answer nor attend the mandatory hearing before the IBP (showed lack of
respect for IBP and its proceedings, stains the nobility of the profession)

19.FRANCISCO RAYOS, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Resolution dated 12 March 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
dismissing petitioner Francisco Rayoss complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.
Respondent was the counsel of petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 entitled, "Francisco Rayos v. NAPOCOR," filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) recklessly, imprudently and negligently opened the three floodgates of the
spillway of Angat Dam at midnight of 26 October 1978 until the early morning hours of 27 October 1978, during the
occurrence of typhoon "Kading" causing the release of a great volume of stored water, the resultant swelling and
flooding of Angat River, and the consequent loss of lives of some of petitioners relatives and destruction of his
familys properties, for which he sought damages. Of the 10 members of petitioners family who perished, only four
bodies were recovered and only petitioner and one of his sons, German Rayos, survived.
On 21 December 1979, the complaint was dismissed 2 on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its
consent as the operation and management of Angat Dam, Norzagaray, were governmental functions. Said dismissal
was questioned directly to this Court which set aside the RTC decision and ordered the reinstatement of the
complaint. 3
On 30 April 1990, however, the complaint was dismissed again by the RTC for lack of sufficient and credible
evidence. 4
The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision and awarded
damages in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and a new one is hereby rendered:

xxxx
2. In Civil Case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellant, with legal
interest from the date when this decision shall have become final and executory, the following:
A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);
B. Moral Damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and
C. Litigation Expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
xxxx
In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffsappellants, attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded. 5
The case was appealed to this Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. 6 The Decision of the Supreme
Court became final and executory on 4 August 1993.
Thus, a Writ of Execution 7 was issued by the RTC on 10 December 1993, upon motion filed by respondent. As a
consequence, NAPOCOR issued Check No. 014710 dated 5 January 1994, in the amount of P1,060,800.00
payable to petitioner. Thereafter, the check was turned over to respondent as counsel of petitioner. Petitioner
demanded the turn over of the check from respondent, but the latter refused.
On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion 8 to direct respondent to deliver to him the check issued
by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the
check in the amount of P1,060,800.00 from respondent, claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the
same as he was already dismissed by petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993. 9 Respondent, on the other
hand, justifies his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorneys fees.
On 7 April 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing respondent to deliver the check to the Sheriff of the court who
will subsequently deliver it to petitioner. A Writ of Execution was subsequently issued. Despite the Court Order,
respondent refused to surrender the check.
However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited the amount of P502,838.79 with Farmers Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of petitioner which was eventually received by the latter.
Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to return the rest of the award in
the amount of P557,961.21.
In his comment, 10 respondent alleged that he handled petitioners case, in Civil Case No. SM-951, for 15 years,
from the trial court up to the Supreme Court. On 21 November 1993, he received a letter from petitioner dismissing
him as counsel. Simultaneous thereto, respondent received a letter dated 15 November 1993 from Atty. Jose G.
Bruno asking him to comment on the therein attached letter dated 19 November 1993 of petitioner addressed to
NAPOCOR, requesting that the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme
Court be paid to him.
Respondent also averred that petitioner had a verbal contract for attorneys fees on a contingent basis and that the
said contract was only reduced in writing on 6 October 1991, duly signed by both of them. By virtue of the contract,
petitioner and respondent supposedly agreed on a 40%-60% sharing, respectively, of the court award. Respondent
was entitled to receive 60% of the award because petitioner agreed to pay him 40% of the award as attorneys fees
and 20% of the award as litigation expenses.
Respondent further asseverated that because petitioner dismissed the respondent and refused to settle his
obligation, he deposited the amount of P424,320.00 in a bank in petitioners name under Account No. 381
(representing petitioners share of 40% of the total award) on 10 May 1994 11 ; and the amount of P63,648.00 in
petitioners name under Account No. 389 (representing petitioners share of 40% of the P159,120.00 awarded as

attorneys fees by the Court of Appeals) on 19 May 1994.

accordance with the RTC Order dated 7 April 1994.

12

Petitioner already received the amount ofP502,838.79 in

Respondent contended that the petitioners complaint was without basis and was meant only to harass and put him
to shame before the residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.
In a Resolution dated 9 August 1995, 13 the Court referred the case to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation.
A series of hearings were conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, from March to September 2001.
On 1 February 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro B. Funa submitted her Report and
Recommendation, 14 recommending the dismissal of the case.
Thereafter, the IBP issued its Resolution dated 12 March 2005, approving and adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that the case lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. 15
We do not agree in the recommendation of the IBP.
The threshold issue in this petition is: whether respondent is justified in retaining the amount awarded to petitioner in
Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure payment of his attorneys fees.
Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute trust funds and must be
immediately paid over to the client. 16 Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as follows:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
In the case at bar, when respondent withheld and refused to deliver the NAPOCOR check representing the amount
awarded by the court in Civil Case No. SM-951, which he received on behalf of his client (petitioner herein), he
breached the trust reposed on him. It is only after an Order was issued by the RTC ordering the delivery of the
check to petitioner that the respondent partially delivered the amount of P502,838.79 to the former, but still retaining
for himself the amount of P557,961.21 as payment for his attorneys fees. The claim of the respondent that
petitioner failed to pay his attorneys fees is not an excuse for respondents failure to deliver the amount to the
petitioner. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere fact alone that
the client owes him attorneys fees. 17 The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general
morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. In short, a lawyers unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action. 18
It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has the following rights;
Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphases supplied.)
But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, as above-stated,
does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes

professional misconduct. 19 Thus, what respondent should have properly done in the case at bar was to provide the
petitioner with an accounting before deducting his attorneys fees and then to turn over the remaining balance of the
award collected to petitioner. The Court notes that respondent represented petitioner from the time of filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. SM-951 before what is now the RTC and of the appeal of the same case to the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court. But respondent was not justified to hold on the entire amount of award collected by
him until his fees had been paid and received by him.
The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust and confidence. An
attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship vis--vis his client. Respondent fell
far short of this standard when he failed to render an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf
of his client and when he refused to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his
attorneys fees had not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest above that
of his client.
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. 20 Law advocacy, it has
been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 21
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his clients cause and a trustee of his clients cause of action and assets; he
is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering
justice in society. 22 It follows that a lawyers compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the
supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and
commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to
which he belongs. Upon taking his attorneys oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority
of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees. 23
There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot just gloss over. Respondent claimed that he charged
petitioner, his client, a contingent fee comprising of forty percent (40%) as attorneys fees and twenty percent (20%)
as litigation expenses. The agreement provides:
UNAWAIN NG LAHAT SA PAMAMAGITAN NITO:
Ako, si Francisco Rayos, Sr., Pilipino, may sapat na gulang at ngayon ay naninirahan sa Pinagbarilan, Baliwag,
Bulacan, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, ay nagpapatunay sa mga sumusunod:
Na, kaugnay sa aking usapin laban sa NPC at Benjamin Chavez (Rayos vs. NPC, et al.) na ngayon ay nakabinbin
sa Court of Appeals, ako ay nakipagkasundo sa aking abogado, Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, gaya ng sumusunod:
1 Sakaling ipanalo ang aking usapin, ang ano mang aking makukuha ay hahatiin gaya ng sumusunod: 40% ang
para sa akin; 40% ang para kay Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez; 20% ay ilalabas bilang gastos sa kaso.
2. Kung matalo ako sa kaso ay wala akong sagutin sa aking abogado.
Sa katunayan ng lahat, ako ay lumagda sa kasunduang ito dito sa Norzagaray, Bulacan ngayong ika-6 ng Oktubre
1991.
(SGD)PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ (SGD)FRANCISCO RAYOS
Abogado May Usapin 24
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction 25 and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must
be laid down in an express contract. 26 The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the
stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit
fails. 27 Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
"especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal

services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds
of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can
seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated." 28
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be
protected from unjust charges. 29 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a
contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the
risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No
court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
(Underscoring supplied.)
The reduction of unreasonable attorneys fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts. 30 When the courts find
that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is unreasonable, or found to have been marred by fraud,
mistake, undue influence or suppression of facts on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract
be disregarded to protect the client from unreasonable exaction. 31
There is, therefore, now a corollary issue of whether the stipulated attorneys fees are unreasonable and
unconscionable under the circumstances of the case as to warrant a reduction thereof.
Stipulated attorneys fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the
value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. This means to say that the amount
of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had
been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him. 32
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract, will not,
however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyers
services.
Generally, the amount of attorneys fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to
the amount of the lawyers compensation. A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for
professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the
court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or unconscionable. 33 In the absence thereof, the amount of
attorneys fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys services. Courts
may ascertain also if the attorneys fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. 34 In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant
to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys
fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility
imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the
employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character
and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not; 35 and
(10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account in fixing the
reasonableness of the fee. 36
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following factors which should
guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
In the case at bar, respondent retained the amount of P557,961.21 out of the P1,060,800.00 award for damages
paid by NAPOCOR to petitioner. Under the said scheme, respondent actually collected fifty-three percent (53%) or
more than half of the total amount due the petitioner; indeed, he appropriated for himself more than the amount
which he had already turned over to and actually received by his client.
As adverted to above, we note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and hopeless with the tragic loss of his
loved ones caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan, on 26-27 October 1978 because of the
negligent release by NAPOCOR of the water through the spillways of the Angat Dam. Petitioner also had to face the
loss and destruction of his familys properties. Under such circumstances and given his understandable desire to
recover the damages for the loss of his loved ones and properties, petitioner would easily succumb and readily
agree to the demands of respondent lawyer regarding his attorneys fees.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly
excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this
case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon
him. Lawyers should not be permitted to get a lions share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless. Contracts
for legal services between the helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of
the benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to guard a client, 37 especially an aged and
necessitous client, 38 against such a contract.
A survey of existing jurisprudence regarding attorneys fees would reveal the following: in the case of Amalgamated
Laborers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 the rate of attorneys fees allowed was 25%; in Law Firm of
Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals, 40 the rate allowed was 20%; in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 41 25%;
in Santiago v. Dimayuga, 42 20%; in Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,43 15%; in Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 44 15%; and in Social Security Commission v. Almeda, 45 15%.
In the present case, respondent Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for his client,
the petitioner. At first, respondent failed to obtain a favorable judgment in the RTC as the case was dismissed. But
on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the RTC Decision was reversed and petitioner was awarded the amount
of P1,060,800.00 as damages and P159,120.00 as attorneys fees. Said award was sustained by the Supreme
Court. We also take note respondents efforts in litigating petitioners case for a long period of 15 years. Lastly, the
respondent took risk in representing petitioner on a contingent fee basis.
In consideration of the foregoing, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner would be a fair compensation for
respondents legal services.

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, renders him unworthy to the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension. 46
The court should also exercise a sound discretion in determining whether a lawyer should be disbarred or merely
suspended. It should bear in mind that admission to the Bar is obtained only after years of labor and study and the
office acquired often becomes the source of great honor and emolument to its possessor. To most members of the
legal profession, it is a means of support for themselves and their families. To deprive one of such an office is often
to decree poverty to the lawyer and destitution to his family. 47 Disbarment, therefore, should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 48
In the case of Schulz v. Atty. Flores, 49 a lawyer was suspended for six months for not returning his clients money
despite demands, for unjustifiably refusing to return his clients papers, and for collecting excessive and
unreasonable fees. Also in the case of Tanhueco v. Atty. De Dumo, 50 a lawyer was suspended for a period of six
months for failure to return the money received by him on behalf of his client and for collecting excessive and
unconscionable fees.
Guided by our rulings in the abovestated cases, suspension of respondent for six months is justified in the case at
bar.
1awphi1.net

WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely;
2. Respondent is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five percent (35%) of the total amount
awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951; and
3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred Nine Pesos and Twenty-One
Centavos (P290,109.21), 52 which he retained in excess of what we herein declared as fair and reasonable
attorneys fees, plus legal interest from date of finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of the Bar and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

20.METROBANK VS CA
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should pay the
certain amountbased on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed
case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorneys fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an
exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent, Arturo Alafriz
and Associates. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid
suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
ISSUES:
Whether or not: (1) respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorneys fees; (2) a
separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien, and (3) private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%)
percent of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
HELD:
(1) NO.
(2) YES.
(3) Ruling subject to separate trial.
RATIO:
[A] charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorneys fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of
his client
The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorneys fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their
propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
[I]n fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
determination of elements to be considered would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial.

21.NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY

LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR. vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO
Facts: Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly
thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage
contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against
her, complainant engaged the legal services of ATTY. JOSE C. GO, herein respondent.
Atty. Go advised her to give him her land titles so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors.
Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned lots located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the
mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving
those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to
complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he
paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real
properties worth millions.
n Respondents contention: He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers,
including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to
complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her "Lola" due to her frequent
visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
n IBP recommended 6 months suspension from practice of law. IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty
to 3 years.
Issue: WON respondent violated canon 16 and canon 17, CPR
SC: guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

His acts of acquiring for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment
The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein
respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her
lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her
trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay
her obligations; respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he sold
the latters lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers,
complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent.
Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too
light. J
It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters
properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession

22.SOLIDON vs. MACALADLAD

Facts: Atty. Macaladlad is the Chief of the legal div. of DENR and was given the authority to engage in the
practice of law. In his official visit to Samar he was introduced to Atty. SOlidon. Atty. Solidon asked Atty, M to
handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land and was for the pd.of 8mos. Paid 50k initial pyt. And bal.when
Atty. Solidon received the cert.of the title. Atty.M not filed any petition for registration. Atty. S tried to contact
and follow up on the case after 6mos. But however didnt recvd any communication.
Held: Yes, Canon 18.03 a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services
and failing to render the services is a clear violation of canon 18. a lawyer cant blame to his client for failing to
follow up because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client the status of the case. A lawyer so engaged to
represent a client bears the responsibility to protect his interest with utmost diligence. Records shoiw that attyM
failed to act as he committed when he failed to file the reqd petition. Atty.solidon even tried to reach him if he
truly wanted to file the petition he could have acquired the info from atty.S. Also a violation of 16.01 which reqs
a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client. Atty M did not immediately account for and
promptly return the money even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of
engagement. 6mos suspension. Sternly warned.