Gaanan vs.

Intermediate Appellate
Court
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
FACTS:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against
Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00
from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan
through a telephone extension as requested by
Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed
conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation
upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged
Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is
among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200
such that its use to overheard a private conversation
would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between two parties using a
telephone line.
HELD:
No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in
the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or
other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as
the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section
refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone
conversation. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened
to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal
statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case,
on whether or not an extension telephone is

included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the

penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension telephone.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record
shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups
from installing devices in order to gather evidence
for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone
users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in
order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other
similar nature.

OPLE VS TORRES
[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]
293 SCRA 141
FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople
assailed
the
constitutionality
of
the
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
Adoption of Computerized Identification
Reference System on the following grounds:
1.) The administrative order issued by the
executive is deemed to be a law and not a
mere administrative order thus it is a
usurpation of legislative power of the congress
to make laws, and
2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens
constitutional right of privacy.
ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308
violates the constitutional right to privacy?
HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates
the constitutional right to privacy because its
scope is too broad and vague that will put
peoples right to privacy in clear and present
danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also
lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the
information that will be gathered from people
through biometrics and other means. Thus,
A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individuals liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination;
it may pave the way for fishing expeditions
by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Rhonda Vivares vs
St. Theresas
College
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student
at St. Theresas College (STC), uploaded on
Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates
(Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only
their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said
photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and
downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the
students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies
scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO
(temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students
in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said
students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita,
and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the
school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook
accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus,
have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and,
thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were
intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as

well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data and have such data be declared
illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right
to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of
habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not
prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme
Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be
availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against
STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it
can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the
Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing,
and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online
Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online
networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools,
then he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy (right to informational privacy, that is).
Thus, such privacy must be respected and

protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the
students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on
Facebook were published as Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to
who can view a users posts on his wall (profile
page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook
user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook
friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can
view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to
particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only
by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants
to have some privacy, then he must choose any
setting other than Public. If it is true that the
students concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see them
(as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was
not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates
who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero,
of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan
et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook
hence, they have no reasonable expectation of
privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy.
The manner which the school gathered the pictures
cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was
the classmates of the students who showed the
picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to
the proper school authority and it was for a legal
purpose, that is, to discipline their students

according to the standards of the school (to which

the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there)

Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248

SCRA 590, September 28, 1995
Recording of conversation through a
tape recorder
The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is
clear and unambiguous.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for
ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL
PARTIES to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.
A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez
alleging that the private respondent, Garcia,
allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a
confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

To support her claim, petitioner produced a

verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages.

In response, private respondent filed a

criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE
TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the
confrontation.

Whether the act of recording through a

tape constitutes an offense?
YES.
The Court ruled that the language of the law
is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly
makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT
AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private
communication
to
secretly
record
such
communication by means of a tape recorder.

The law makes no distinction as to whether

the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier "any".

The nature of the conversations is

immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. The mere allegation that

an individual made a secret recording of a private

communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200.
Petitioner's contention that the phrase
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,
or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)."

These definitions are broad enough to

include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner
and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's
office.

In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate
R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused."

In this case, the use of tape recorder falls

under the devices enumerated in the law
(Dictaphone,
Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkietalkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of
recording through the tape constitutes an offense.

The instant case turns on a different note,

because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions
the
unauthorized
"recording"
of
private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.

ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner
Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the
trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good
Afternoon M'am.

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila

akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung
(sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga
noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano
ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa
Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung
paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan
doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka
pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko
naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr.
Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang

nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka
kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka

kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa

'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka
sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

conversation with said accused, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use
of a tape recorder secretly record the said
conversation and thereafter communicate in writing
the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga

taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi
ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob,
kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the
said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses
Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act
No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in
Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the abovenamed accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being
authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed
a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order
May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to
Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A.
4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
personother than
a
participant
to
the
4
communication.
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and

principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision
merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those
involved in the communication.8 In relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information,
otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues
that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not
illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally
from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a
literal
interpretation
would
be
either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an
injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to
Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The
aforestated
provision
clearly
and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication
to
secretly
record
such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The

law makes no distinction as to whether the party

sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in
the private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge
of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized
tape
recording
of
private
conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or
recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear
to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some
parties and involved not criminal cases that would
be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby
a recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the
parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the
contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would
you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it
within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of
this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used
not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to
be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete

ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable,
your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it
is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against
him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of
the parties. I believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of
recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say
that in meetings of the board of directors where a
tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this
if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people
whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take
statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed
that whatever you say here may be used against
you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a
recording of the observations and remarks of a
person without him knowing that it is being taped
or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it
is unfair.

penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is

public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626,
March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is
immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications
by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of
a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT
before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said
law) is it required that before one can be regarded
as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be
professed." 14

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584,
March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator,
that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase

"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,

communication connotes the act of sharing or

imparting signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols
(as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22,
1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about
the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to
rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing
to fear from their conversations being overheard.
But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that
most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects
of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Free conversationsare often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known
that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
ofcommunication between individuals free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a
case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate
R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or

arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following

the principle that "penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case
turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the
case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves
us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.