b2 Supreme Court Part 2

L.
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
MACEDA V VASQUEZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION
TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE
RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official
duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court
disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in
Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official
duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL
DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY
SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of
any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING

COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the
Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load,
as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a
criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court
for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this
matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for
the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us
is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide
cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not
yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve
the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme
Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court
of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the
Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court
filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90
days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and
in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10)
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that
petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May,
June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September
1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension
of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the
judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by
the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to
this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his
pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination.
The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of
time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this
question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said
question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed
to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the
same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1986.
2. L-50508-11, 139 SCRA 252 (1985).
3. The Order of September 18, 1991, in denying petitioner's ex-parte motion to refer the case
to the Supreme Court, cited Article XI, section 13 (1) and (2), which provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on compliant be any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at it own instance, any public official or employee of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
4. Rollo, p. 19.
IN RE DEMETRIA
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA. March 27, 2001]
In Re: Derogatory news Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate

Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a
Suspected Drug Queen:
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Men and Women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness,
prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They
should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their
influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost
prudence and discretion.For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence,
impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency."[1] The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course
of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public
confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared
on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The
Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported that Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of
suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of
prison to play in a Manila casino.[2]
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued
a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory
allegations in the news items.[3] On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted
his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuo, who
disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C.
Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their
respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.[4]
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated Mme.
Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000 and
continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuo, SP Formaran III,
Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the
Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand
presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
(ACSP) Severino Gana, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng Kok,
Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go
Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of
the Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite
clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai,
together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy,
before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18, [5] with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as
amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent and without authority of law x x x (to) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug."[6] Accused of nonbailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell
of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu
Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not
strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially Yu
Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday
Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention
of the Accused to the City Jail.[7] On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.,
granted the motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the
Manila City Jail.[8]
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing alone
and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the
crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.
[9]
Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial
court's actuations "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just and
impartial."[10] On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was
utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of mind
of the accused, inhibited himself.[11]
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu
Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the Accused in a
Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the
Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her
to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,
[12]
contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services
of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.[13]
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension of
Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to
be discharged from the said hospital." [14] On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk
Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit
Demurrer to Evidence.[15] Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge
Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there, On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC
Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary
of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge
Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even
if she (was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall,
that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file
the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos
and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in
the said branch."[16]
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying
that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling this case and/or from resolving
the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending
incidents therein."[17]
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed to
be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the
VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing
baccarat, She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge
Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP
Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by his secretary,
Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called
earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a
return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice
Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA
President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close
friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which SP
Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not
familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor
Formaran?"[18]
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP Formaran
III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the
resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro
would inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then
already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed
the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for resolution, one basis of
which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice Demetria opined
that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous
letter. The Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his
cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng
Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP
Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai. [19] SP Formaran III at first
politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation,"[20] he
told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria
replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
followed closely behind.[21]
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and informed the latter of what had
transpired. CSP Zuo replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who
gave the same reply.[22]
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo received a call from Justice
Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for
inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo
nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit
para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as
saying.[23] Politely, CSP Zuo said that he would see what he could do. Tingnan ko po kung
ano ang magagawa ko."[24]
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court
Justice x x x and an outspoken sports person and leader" [25] had been exerting "undue
pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That
same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to
the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected
by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers
named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a Copy of an Order dated 19 July 200 of
Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth
Monceda.[26]
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for
Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went
there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that
time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the
claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do
something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying the kind of
"help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of erroneous
impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to
withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and
requesting."[27] Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be
"within legal bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion
between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only
admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and
Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said,
demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could
not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP Zuo as
the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submited
that CSP Zuo based his identification from a newspaper account, from the statement of
his secretary that it was he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone
and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the
visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not Justice
Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the
withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok
that the matter would be taken up with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask
SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok
whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a
claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in
behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting
Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug
queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5
January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04,
Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate disciplinary
action be taken against him by this Honorable Court."[28]
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus,
even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that
"there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA Associate
Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai:
obstruction of justice punishable under PD No.1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."[29]
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his
denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III,
[30]
which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept the testimony of the
defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice
Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was
something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion
is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent with
the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State
Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."[31]
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that
he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely
telephone call to CSP Zuo was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made the
call except respondent Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP
Zuo would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's former superior
in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor
Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng
Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice
who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and
a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did
not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the
withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never
categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when respondent
Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something x x x
to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and
nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle
pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent
Justice called CSP Zuo to ask for just that - the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge
Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ,
first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty.
Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends," [32] and that the meeting
with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned in his
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in
going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead
decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied his
alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi." [33] SSP
Daosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his
room.[34] Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent
Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
decided to "stay a while."[35]
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the Investigating Justice,
Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to exchange pleasantries with
SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each other. Prior to
this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP
Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself.[36]
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's earlier Compliance to
the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a
friend, we decided to drop by his office x x x (and) I stayed a while."[37]
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join
forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to
the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP
Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but prearranged."[38] And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances
simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go
to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuo and SP Formaran
III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai and
Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and more unthinkable that he
would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close
friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent
Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for
him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he is a close friend of the
lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he wields influence
as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the
Court of Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and
trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only defy natural human
experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded and
overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His at all
times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. [39] His must be
free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his
judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this
expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of
his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere
mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug
queen and interfering with her prosecution, seriously undermined the integrity of the
entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts
a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary.
[40]
High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which
the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be
preserved.[41] There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the
exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.[42]
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice
Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and
with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or
instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon,
Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.
Puno, J., abroad on official business.
[1]
Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[2]
21 July 2000 issue of The Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. 20.
[3]
Exh. A.
[4]
Exhs. B and C.
[5]
Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguin, presiding.
[6]
Information dated 9 December 1998, filed by State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III.
[7]
Exh. F.
[8]
Exh. G.
[9]
Exh. H.
[10]
Exh. I.
[11]
Exh. K.
[12]
Exh. O.
[13]
Exh. N.
[14]
Exh. P.
[15]
Exh. S.
[16]
Exh. T.
[17]
Exh. U.
[18]
TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 35.
[19]
Id., p. 34.
[20]
Compliance of SP Pablo C. Formaran III, dated 1 August 2000.
[21]
TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 25-26.
[22]
Id., pp. 26-27.
[23]
TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 73-74.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Compliance of CSP Jovencito R. Zuo, dated 2 August 2000.
[26]
TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 53; Exh. V.
[27]
Id., p. 54.
[28]
5 January 2001 Report of Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, p. 12.
[29]
Committee Report No. 396 of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights submitted on 29 August
2000.
[30]
See Note 28, p. 11.
[31]
TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 74.
[32]
Counter Affidavit of respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria, pars. 1 and 2.
[33]
TSN, 8 September 2000, p. 8.
[34]
Id., p. 18.
[35]
Exh. 5, p. 1.
[36]
Memorandum of the Respondent, p. 20; TSN, 13 November 2000, p. 82.
[37]
Compliance of Justice Demetria, dated 24 July 2000, p. 1.
[38]
See Note 30.
[39]
Jereos, Jr. v. Reblando, Sr., AM No. P-141, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 126.
[40]
Dia-Aonuevo v. Beracio, AM No. 177-MJ, 27 November 1975, 68 SCRA 81.
[41]
Candia v. Tagabucba, AM No. 528, MJ, 12 September 1977, 79 SCRA 51.
[42]
Barja v. Judge Beracio, AM No. 561-MJ, 29 December 1976, 74 SCRA 355.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975
ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN
and ANGELINA ABLUYEN,respondents..
R E S O L U T I O N.
AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of double
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of
First Instance of Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in
connection with an ambuscade which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue,
Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and
his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case
have not been arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to transfer the
venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a
fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of
First Instance of that province is a protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former
Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for
fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be inferred
from previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of their witnesses
and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms
spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions.
(The accused, George Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing
resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but he invited
the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the case may be
transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness or truth of
the grounds relied upon for the change of venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed.
He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of
the Philippines. He said that the crime charged was not "committed personally against"
Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the governor is one of the victims
mentioned in the information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated August 30, 1975
wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who filed the instant petition for
transfer of venue). In view of that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as
having been filed only by Alipio Mondiguing. .
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522,
534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed by Crescencio Paredes
and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. In that case it was
alleged that Judge Abad was a political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended
to his present position by the Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A change of the
place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The
interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of
crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may
be, where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523,
562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It "possesses inherent
power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of
First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty
reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would
not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs.
Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that the accused
might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be
held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to support
his request for a change of the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion that his petition
is meritorious. .
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and
considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he
should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from the Philippine
Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should be submitted for the
consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue of Criminal
Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said case should be
transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District so that it may be
heard in Baguio City. .
SO ORDERED. .
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando J., is on leave.
PEOPLE V SOLA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT)
GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL,
CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD,
JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid
any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to
bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a
certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio
Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them
to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the
principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials
concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a change of venue
and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a
resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the
comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six
pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It
opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors
in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of
the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The
assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the
control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal
standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged
trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal
cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same
criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence
presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the
Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of
tile deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola
in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980
armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to
the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the
bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo
Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980,
the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for
murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven
Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the
Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the
accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted
them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco
Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been
released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases
informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be
jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan
and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of
the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of
venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court
Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1)
the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided
over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129,
4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor
Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal
cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal
cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City,
presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo
Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an
approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a
mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to
Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail,
without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure
the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has
become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo
Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent
Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds.
Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for
decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a
failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the
accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in
favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in
this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme
Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of
People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically
affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of
the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the
Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in
this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid
they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because
of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their
lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a
court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the
question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no
objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively
viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the
effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution
must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.
As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a
plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification
for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation
of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the
accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution That is to
disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by
Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of
the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come
to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with
crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the
thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the
pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of
justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the
municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not
cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private
respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive
Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the
cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is
directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution
being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur.
Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution: "The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers: (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial
to avoid a miscarriage of justice."
2 According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: All persons, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not
be required."
3 The name of the highly-experienced counsel Juan Hagad was included in
the list of private prosecutors, but he did not sign the petition.
4 The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and Ricardo (Cadoy)
Garcia.
5 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and

Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.
6 Comment, 1-2.
7 Ibid, 2.
8 Ibid, 2-4.
9 Resolution of the Court dated March 5, 1981.
10 Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.
11 L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172.
12 Ibid, 180.
13 Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9.
14 Comment of respondent Florendo Baliscao, erroneously entitled Rejoinder
to the Petition, 1.
15 Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously entitled Opposition of
respondent Mayor Pablo Sola, 1.
16 L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.
17 Ibid, 524.
18 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933).
19 Cf. Inocencio v. Alconcel, G. R. No. 55658, February 5, 1981.
BUSTOS V LUCERO
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2068
October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of
Pampanga, Respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent
TUASON, J.:
chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a

motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he
had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace
court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength
of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The
motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
chanroble s virtual law library
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's

attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion,
the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty
or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty.
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her
evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and
cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11
of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof,
the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his
right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after

renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial,
is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge
did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion
in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record
for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay
vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which
case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the
accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation
so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the

justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule
108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule
108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to
pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out
the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter

of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in
his presence what they had said at the preliminary
examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We
called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does
not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The

minority went farther than the majority and denied even any
discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge
holding the preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is

dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I am sorry to dissent from the decision.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary

investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol,
Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges
against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty,
pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved
that the complainant present her evidence so that her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking section 11,
Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof,
the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that
the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was
denied, and for that reason the present special civil action
of mandamus was instituted.
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to

present his evidence during the investigation in the justice of
the peace, was not a waiver of his alleged right to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation provided
for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he
claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the
case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for
the petitioner filed a motion with said court to remand the case
to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the latter to
make said preliminary investigation. His motion having been
denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11,
Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be
prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article
VIII, of the Constitution.
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L1336, we did not discuss and decide the question of validity or
constitutionality of said section 11 in connection with section 1
of Rule 108, because that question was not raised therein, and
we merely construed the provisions on preliminary
investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this
dissenting opinion said:
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of
this dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one
who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to
criminal procedure, and the provisions on preliminary
investigation in the draft were the same as those of the old
law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted with
and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But
the Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft,
except the part referring to preliminary investigation which it
modified, by suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead,
the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I
prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to
the majority decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes
the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to depend
entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or officer
conducting the preliminary investigation.
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule
108, is squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have
perforce to pass upon it.
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the

Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but
said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights." The constitution added the last part of the abovequoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the
Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact
or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that
rules which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are
substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning

pleading, practice and procedure.
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the

right granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in
preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a
substantive right. It is based on human experience, according
to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in
his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily
contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity
of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a crossexamination. It is substantive right because by exercising it,
an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his
favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a
crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and
therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not
committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public
accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a
public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering
which a criminal prosecution always entails.
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted

by law to an accused outside of the City of Manila because of
the usual delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in
provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person
charged with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in
the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or
presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed
of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right,
though not a constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged,
or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule
making power conferred upon this Court by the
Constitution.
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by

this Court in several cases, (in which the question of
constitutionality or validity of said section had not been
squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under

discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes the
substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this
Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore
is null and void.
The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above
cited case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the
inferior or justice of the peace courts have discretion to grant a
defendant's request to have the witnesses for the prosecution
recalled to testify again in the presence of the defendant and
be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate said
provision; because to make the exercise of an absolute right
discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the
court or officer making the preliminary investigation, is
evidently to diminish or modify it.
Petition is therefore granted.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito

and Saling Buhay vs.Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:
In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read,
interpreted, and applied in a way that will not contravene the
constitutional provision guaranteeing to all accused the right
"to meet the witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17], Article
III.)
Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said

reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of
fundamental right to her the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution and to cross-examine them.
Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot

finally be convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently
depicted in the decision, and the constitutional guarantee
protects defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being
finally convicted and punished, but also from the physical,
mental and moral sufferings that may unjustly be visited upon

him in any one of the stages of the criminal process instituted
against him. He must be afforded the opportunities to have the
charges against him quashed, not only at the final hearing, but
also at the preliminary investigation, if by confronting the
witnesses for the prosecution he can convince the court that
the charges are groundless. There is no justice in compelling
him to undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the
preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his favor.
Otherwise, the preliminary investigation or hearing will be an
empty gesture that should not have a place within the
framework of dignified and solemn judicial proceedings.
On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion
should be granted and so we vote.
Petition dismissed.
RESOLUTION
March 8, 1949
TUASON, J.:
This cause is now before us on a motion for

reconsideration.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said,

citing Dequito and Saling Buhay vs.Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336:
"The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings;
nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an
infringement of his right to confront witness. As a matter of
fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under
the due process clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be
ample enough to dispose the constitutional question pleaded in
the application for certiorari. Heeding the wishes of the
petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject.
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court 1 infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It
is said that the rule in question deals with substantive matters
and impairs substantive rights.
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that
section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective
law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive
law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a
term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60
C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part
of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which

declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment
for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.)
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial;
it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also

procedural. Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of
proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of the method
by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished.
Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice.
(State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) the entire rules
of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence

embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the
United States Supreme Court said:
Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the
effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by
alterations in the rules of evidence or
procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648,
650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356,
364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed.,
507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be procedural
changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense
available under the laws in force at the time of the commission
of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh
and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional
prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507,
2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42
L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is not well settled
that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and
which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to
his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after
indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be
witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of
persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law.
Hoptvs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the
rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render
admissible against the accused evidence previously held
inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed.,
204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial,
Gut. vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which
abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new
one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382,
38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570.
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment

of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to
cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his
arrest is of such importance as to offend against the
constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning,
preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process
of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder
can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right

to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his
right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him
both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the
latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the
full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the
fact that this formality is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is

incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467;
Beazellvs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any
particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy
and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive
rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that
boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P.,
1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in
making rules should step on substantive rights, and the
Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect
such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and
arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates
only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile,
revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of
the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,"

which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different
rules without regard to their source and discarding old
ones.
The motion is denied.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor,
JJ., concur.
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
The motion for reconsideration must be granted.
According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be

prosecution in a preliminary investigation granted by law or
provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as amended, in force
prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court, is not a
substantive right but a mere matter of procedure, and
therefore this Court can suppress it in section 11, Rule 108, of
the Rules of Court, for the following reasons:
First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and

essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution." . . . "As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule
108 is also procedural." . . . "The entire rules of evidence have
been incorporated into the Rules of Court." And therefore "we
can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
grounds without throwing out the whole Code of evidence
embodied in these rules."
Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an

essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed
entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the
privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall
within the constitutional prohibition."
Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and

'substantive right' is incapable of exact definition. The
difference is somewhat a question of degree" . . . It is difficult
to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching
upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. . . . "This
being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making
rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution
must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion
as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner
or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage."
Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law

from procedure, for the distinction is not always well
understood. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines, and regulates rights as opposed to objective
or procedural law which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights. What constitutes practice and procedure in the law is
the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced,
"that which regulates the formal steps in an action or judicial
proceedings; the course of procedure in courts; the form,
manner and order in which proceedings have been, and are
accustomed to be had; the form, manner and order of carrying
on and conducting suits or prosecutions in the courts through
their various sages according to the principles of law and the
rules laid down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc. Law and
Procedure, p. 1153; id., 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's
Law Dictionary; Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.
Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the

Constitution or in any branch of the law, civil, criminal,
administrative or procedural law. In our old Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there are provisions
which create, define and regulate substantive rights, and many
of those provisions such as those relating to guardianship,
adoption, evidence and many others are incorporated in the
Rules of Court for the sake of convenience and not because

this Court is empowered to promulgate them as rules of court.
And our old law of Criminal Procedure General Orders No. 58
grants the offended party the right to commence a criminal
action or file a complaint against the offender and to intervene
in the criminal prosecution against him, and grants the
defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in the City of
Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary investigation
including his rights during said investigation, and the rights at
the trial, which are now reproduced or incorporated in Rules
106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules of Court, except the rights
now in question. And all these, and others not necessary for us
to mention, are obviously substantive rights.
(1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary

investigation is eminently and essentially remedial is not
correct. Undoubtedly the majority means to say procedural, in
line with the conclusion in the resolution, because remedial law
is one thing, and procedural law is another. Obviously they are
different branches of the law. "Remedial statute" is "a statute
providing a remedy for an injury as distinguished from a penal
statute. A statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong
where he had none or a different one before. . . . Remedial
statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and
abridge such superfluities in the common law, as arise either
from the general imperfections of all human law, from change
of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised
determination of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from
any other cause whatsoever." (Black's Law Dictionary, third
edition, pp. 1525, 1526.)
It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108

relating to right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence
and therefore is also procedural." In the first place, the
provisions of said section to the effect that "the defendant,
after the arrest and his delivery to the court has the right to be
informed of the complaint or information filed against him, and
also to be informed of the testimony and evidence presented
against him, and may be allowed to testify and present
witnesses or evidence for him if he so desires," are not rules of

evidence; and in the second place, it is evident that most of
the rules of evidence, if not all, are substantive laws that
define, create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of
evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly
and growing out of reasoning, experience and common sense
of lawyers and courts." (State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P.,
1102.) "It is true that weighing of evidence and the rules of
practice with respect thereto form part of the law of procedure,
but the classification of proofs is sometime determined by the
substantive law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 Phil., 170, 176.) How
can the law on judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris
tantum presumption, hearsay and best evidence rule, parol
evidence rule, interpretation of documents, competency of a
person to testify as a witness be considered procedural?
Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear

down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without
throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these
Rules," is evidently wrong, not only for the reason just stated,
but because our contention that the defendant can not be
deprived of his right to be confronted with and cross-examine
the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary investigation
under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear down
said section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so
construed as to be valid and effective, that is, that if the
defendant asks the court to recall the witness or witnesses for
the prosecution to testify again in his presence, and to allow
the former to cross-examine the latter, the court or officer
making the preliminary investigation is under obligation to
grant the request. But if the defendant does not so ask the
court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witness against
him.
(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true

that the preliminary investigation as provided for in the
General Orders, No. 58, as amended, is not an essential part
of due process of law, because "due process of law" is not iron
clad in its meaning; its does not necessarily mean a particular

procedure. Due process of law simply requires a procedure
that fully protects the life, liberty and property. For that reason
the investigation to be made by the City Fiscal of the City of
Manila under Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the
Administrative Code, before filing an information, was
considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due process
of law constitutional requirement (U. S.vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil.,
1; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is also
true that we have already and correctly held that: "The law
having explicitly recognized and established that no person
charged with the commission of a crime shall be deprived of
his liberty or subjected to trial without prior preliminary
investigation (provided for in General orders, No. 58, as
amended) that shall show that there are reasonable grounds to
believe him guilty, there can be no doubt that the accused who
is deprived of his liberty, tried and sentenced without the
proper preliminary investigation having been made in his
regard, isconvicted without the process of law," (United
States vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564).
The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216,
quoted in the resolution, has no application to the present
case, for the question involved therein was the power of
Congress to alter the rules of evidence and procedure without
violating the constitutional precept that prohibits the passing
of ex post facto law, while the question herein involved is the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure, which diminish the substantive right of
a defendant, expressly prohibited by the same provision of the
Constitution that confers upon this Court the power to
promulgate said rules.
(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion

that "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is
incapable of exact definition;" indeed "the difference is
somewhat a question of degree," (Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F
487), is immaterial, because, as we have already said in
refuting the majority's first reason, remedy and procedure are

two completely different things.
As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from

procedural law and practice. But even assuming arguendo that
it is difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond
which the power of the court over procedure can not pass
without touching upon the substantial right of the parties, what
this Court should do in that case would be to abstain from
promulgating such rule of procedure which many increase,
diminish or modify substantive right in order to avoid violating
the constitutional prohibition above referred to. Because as
this Supreme Court is not empowered by the Constitution to
legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but only to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which
"shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this
Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the
Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such
incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused
in any manner.
Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and

cross-examine the witness against him in a preliminary
investigation would affect the accused not in a limited and
unsubstantial but in a harsh and arbitrary manner. The
testimony of a witness given in the absence of the defendant
and without an opportunity on the part of the latter to crossexamine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be
admitted against the defendant in a preliminary investigation
that is granted to the latter as a protection against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions (U. S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused who is innocent and
should not be arrested, or if arrested should be released
immediately a short time after his arrest after the preliminary
investigation, would have to be held for trial and wait for a
considerable period of time until the case is tried and acquitted
after trial by the Courts of First Instance in provinces on
account of the admission of such evidence in the preliminary
investigation, evidence not admissible at the trial.
Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after

the necessary proceedings the decision of the majority
reversed or modified in accordance with my dissenting opinion.
PERFECTO, J.:
We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The

motion for reconsideration should be granted.
Endnotes:
TUASON, J.:
Rights of defendant after arrest. - After the arrest of
the defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be
informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He
shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and
evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or
to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be
allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be
reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in
writing and subscribed by him.
1
The Supreme Court shall have the power to

promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The National Assembly shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines
2

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982
RUFINO V. NUEZ petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a
special Court, theSandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." 1 It came into
existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree. 2 Even under the 1935
Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft statute was passed, 3 to be supplemented
five years later by another act, 4 the validity of which was upheld inMorfe v. Mutuc, 5 a 1968
decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court: "Nothing can be clearer therefore than
that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A
public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be
pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of
such character. The times demanded such a remedial device." 6 It should occasion no
surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the
continuity need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited
provision.
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the
Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such
respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several
cases. 7 The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979.
Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. 8 A week later. respondent Court denied such
motion. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same
fate. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of
the due process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post facto 13 clauses of the Constitution. 14
The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more
effectively with dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether committed
by government officials or not, with the essential cooperation of the private citizens
with whom they deal, cannot of itself justify any departure from or disregard of
constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due recognition, however, of the
vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner 15 in his pleadings butressed by scholarly
and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues raised by the
exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, 16 is of the view that the invalidity of
Presidential Decree No, 1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been
demonstrated.
The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be
adjudged.
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this
proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that
such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made
clear that he as incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until martial law shall have been lifted. " 17 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of
this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided in 1975. In the language of
the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ... . 19 As the opinion
went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power
as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
" 20
2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking
to nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M.
Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: 21"The Ideal situation is for the law's
benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only
thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity which is of the very essence of the Idea of law." 22 There is
recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the Ideal.
Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of
the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that
disregards what is, what does in fact exist .To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty
and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or
at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. " 23 Classification is thus
not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in
the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest." 24
3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his
memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to
equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere
matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law,
excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to
appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two
chances; while all other estafaindictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right
covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court." 25 ,that is hardly convincing, considering
that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel
in People v. Vera 26 requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. 27 To repeat,
the Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be
denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter
be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the
present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of
the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and
equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one
reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities." 29 The scope
of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the
instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post
facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that
"petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." 30 A more
searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an
argument. The Kay Villegas Kami 31 decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner,
supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from
the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal
an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than the law required at the time of
the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty." 32 Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim
of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is
qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a
controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo 33 a
1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear
that seven of the nine Justices then composing this Court, excepting only
the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence,
does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes
committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.
5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition
of what is prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided
in 1903. Thus: "An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action
done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. " 35 There is relevance
to the next paragraph of the opinion of Justice Cooper: "The case clearly does not come
within this definition, nor can it be seen in what way the act in question alters the situation
of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit of
the appeal, and is intended
First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to
be the only foundation for the claim. A person can have no vested right in such a
possibility. 36
6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United States
Supreme Court. Even the very language as to what falls with the category of this provision
is well-nigh Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the
words and the intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. All these, and
similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive." 38 The opinion of Justice Chase who
spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The expressions 'ex post
facto laws,' are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had
acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and
judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law
precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr.
Wooddeson and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his
extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principle of government. " 39
7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. 40 As it was decided by the American Supreme
Court in April of 1898 - the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which,
American sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired - it is understandable why he did
so. Certainly, the exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an
author, has a cutting edge, but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to
declaring unconstitutional the challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable.
After a review of the previous pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this
subject, Justice Harlan made this realistic appraisal: "The difficulty is not so much as to
the soundness of the general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular modes
of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an
accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, as
vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him." 41 An 1894 decision of the American
Supreme Court, Duncan v. Missouri 42 was also cited by petitioner, The opinion of the then
Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically
stated that "the prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts
and the creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which
the existing laws surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the
constitutional inhibition." 43
8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be
successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under
Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review
coming from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is
disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-cited Thompson v.
Utah decision taking "from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The
crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a
criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal
deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be
in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the threejudge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is
required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from
among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of
five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for
rendering judgment. " 44 Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to
see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact
that there is no review of the facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this
Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be
convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence 45has been overcome. In that
sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether
the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as
to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People v.
Dramayo. 46 Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, as synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom
is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has
always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could
be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act
but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty." 47 This Court has
repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this fundamental and basic right to De
presumed innocent has been disregarded. 48 It does seem farfetched and highly unrealistic
to conclude that the omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in
the loss "vital protection" of liberty.
9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In
the exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages
were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is
made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American
Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 49 Again this citation cuts both ways.
With his usual felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion,
emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to
defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that
could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable,
however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to
the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept of fairness must not be strained till it
is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 50 What is required for
compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v.
Pecson, 51 this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with "a fair
and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense." 52 In criminal
proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is
proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest
on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the
sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the
court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction." 53 The above formulation
is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine
origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 54 decided during the period of American rule,
1910 to be precise. Thus: "This court has had frequent occasion to consider the
requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally
speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law." 55
10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606. The decision does not go as far as passing on any
question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the
Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The
view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar
that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be
construed in such a way as preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in
this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It
commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by
certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance
of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Ericta, JJ., took no part.
Fernandez, J., concurs and dissent
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:

I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned
colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has
unduly and improperly placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the Supreme
Court insofar as the matter of automatic releases of appropriations is concerned,
which definitely should not be the case. I must say emphatically that if such a
provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's independence, it is certainly
unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is unworthy of similar
protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the
provision in question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In
expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of protest in order that
hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme
Court its deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by
Justice Makasiar. I am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished
Chief Justice, whose learning in constitutional law is duly respected here and abroad,
that the arguments against the constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics
lack sufficient persuavity.
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the
Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary
courts. Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the
judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly
noted must be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution that the National
Assembly "shall create", it is not under the Article on the Judiciary (Article X) but
under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it
to be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed to the
Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it should be
treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial
power, and so under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme
Court. And in this respect, I agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power
granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional necessity be understood as signifying
that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved by the
Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section 5(5) of the Constitution
empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts, "special" as it
may be.
I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the
Sandiganbayan and the special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does
not infringe the constitutional injunction against ex-post facto laws. The creation of a
special court to take cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a
constitutional abnormality. Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of
offenses which in the public interest must be dealt with more expeditiously in order to
curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make
appeals therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of
judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan's primary and
primordial reason for being is to insure the people's faith and confidence in our public
officers more than it used to be. We have only to recall that the activism and
restlessness in the later '60's and the early '70's particularly of the youth who are
always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their conviction that
graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and
naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and more expeditious
remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary
counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.
It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the
Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure,
and the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not insulated by the Charter
against legislature's attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the
Supreme Court that cannot modify or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court
originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the
Sandiganbayan cannot be unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be
legitimately created to try offenses already committed, like the People's Court of
Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new procedure of appeal from such courts
can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a
pronouncement, the constitutional requirement is complied with. That the Supreme
Court may review the decisions of the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does
not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the conviction of the accused from the factual
point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long as the evidence relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over
decisions of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the
rules only to legal questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to
reweigh the evidence but only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and
legal, and no one has yet been heard to say the contrary, why should We wonder
about the method of review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606?
With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the accused
has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the
determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the
appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges,
except in cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them.
With more reason should this rule apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate
trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal
cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to
reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all
lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses
as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused
before such special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing
beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees
of due process as wen as equal protection of the law and against the enactment of ex
post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the power of supervision of
the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post
facto laws, have been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority
opinion; hence, there is no need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1606 on the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and
its power of supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of
P.D. No. 1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and
therefore can be given effect minus the challenged portions, which are separable from
the valid provisions.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very
beginning any attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to
appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the
Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as
graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7,
P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not
generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination Three
judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that
meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused
and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority
to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and
corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government
instrumentalities and government-owned and -controlled corporations. The
Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the
accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of
Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the constitutional directive.
It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due
process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17
and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended,
and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was
entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against him.
(Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555; People
vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil.
Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion
hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the
passage of ex post factolaws.
2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the
decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through
certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or
conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as
serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by
the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater
guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to
review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with
greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and
prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the
Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise
violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which
presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art.
IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial
court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan is supported by the substantial evidence, the presumption of
innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated
with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is
precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to
determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and
therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is
enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused
of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption.
4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8
associate Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606).
Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices
do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other
Justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a
division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall be
necessary for rendering judgment.
At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually
operating. Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members
may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to
constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members
now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only
three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a
special division of five in case a member of the division dissents. This situation
patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an
acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal
protection of the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more
members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.
P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to
other defendants indicted before other trial courts.
5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it
places expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As
heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate
court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers
and employees of the government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or
-controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising
appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions,
special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial courts or
quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is
being down-graded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the
Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly
provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically
released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan"
(emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the. annual
appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act,
the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the
Budget Ministry upon request therefor by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance
with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination
against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch
of our modified parliamentary-presidential government - the first Branch being
constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the Batasang Pambansa emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be
jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by
the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for
the operation of the courts.
II
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS 1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law
is one which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less
testimony than the law required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled.
The indictment against herein petitioner accused him of graft and corruption
committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including January 12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24,
rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No.
1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978.
As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978,
all persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa
were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of conviction by the Court of
Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on
both questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by
two appellate tribunals on both factual and legal issues, was already part of the
constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977. This vital right of
the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus
placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly
committed prior to 1978.
2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). P.D.
No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a
criminal conviction.
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which
was not so prior to its promulgation.
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying
cases against national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to the
Supreme Court (Sec. 13, CA 682); because at the time the People's Court Act or C.A.
No. 682 was enacted on September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer
existing then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued
by President Sergio Osmena soon after the Liberation. Consequently, the People's
Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals which was revived only
on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13 of the People's Court
Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari. The
Supreme Court can review all judgments of the People's Court both on questions of
fact and of law.
III
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING
AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules
of procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides
with the constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. to pro- promulgate
rules of court for all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER
INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own
internal affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the
allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its business," without
requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional
power of supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be

disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to
select and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of
court and to remove them for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the
authority to approve or disapprove such appointments and to review such removals,
aggravates the violation of the constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme
Court over inferior courts.
3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme
Court to supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires the
Sandiganbayan to submit an annual report directly to the President without coursing
the same to the Supreme Court for review' and approval.
That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General
Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that "all appropriations provided herein for
the Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1,
Sp. Provisions XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This
particular provision impairs likewise the constitutional power of administrative
supervision vested in the Supreme Court over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972
Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same General Appropriations Act of
1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of
Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian
Relations is expressly subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the
Sandiganbayan does not include the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the
constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.
All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12
and 13 are separable from the rest of its provisions without affecting the
completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared unconstitutional without
necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply determine
what is to be done, who is to do it, and now to do it - the test for a complete and
intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA
481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability although
under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily
binding on, the Supreme Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the
challenged portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Section1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written
therein the phrase "of the same level as the Court of Appeals.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more
members of the Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without
affecting the completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606;
because in the absence of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of
1984, as amended,can apply.
However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain
valid provided it is understood that the powers delegated thereunder to the
Sandiganbayan are deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned
colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has
unduly and improperly placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the Supreme
Court insofar as the matter of automatic releases of appropriations is concerned,
which definitely should not be the case. I must say emphatically that if such a
provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's independence, it is certainly
unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is unworthy of similar
protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the
provision in question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In
expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of protest in order that
hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme
Court its deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by
Justice Makasiar. I am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished
Chief Justice, whose learning in constitutional law is duly respected here and abroad,
that the arguments against the constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics
lack sufficient persuavity.
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the
Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary
courts. Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the
judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly
noted must be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution that the National
Assembly "shall create", it is not under the Article on the Judiciary (Article X) but
under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it
to be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed to the
Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it should be
treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial
power, and so under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme
Court. And in this respect, I agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power
granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional necessity be understood as signifying
that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved by the
Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section 5(5) of the Constitution
empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts, "special" as it
may be.
I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the
Sandiganbayan and the special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does
not infringe the constitutional injunction against ex-post facto laws. The creation of a
special court to take cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a
constitutional abnormality. Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of

offenses which in the public interest must be dealt with more expeditiously in order to
curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make
appeals therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of
judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan's primary and
primordial reason for being is to insure the people's faith and confidence in our public
officers more than it used to be. We have only to recall that the activism and
restlessness in the later '60's and the early '70's particularly of the youth who are
always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their conviction that
graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and
naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and more expeditious
remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary
counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.
It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the
Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure,
and the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not insulated by the Charter
against legislature's attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the
Supreme Court that cannot modify or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court
originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the
Sandiganbayan cannot be unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be
legitimately created to try offenses already committed, like the People's Court of
Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new procedure of appeal from such courts
can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a
pronouncement, the constitutional requirement is complied with. That the Supreme
Court may review the decisions of the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does
not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the conviction of the accused from the factual
point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long as the evidence relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over
decisions of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the
rules only to legal questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to
reweigh the evidence but only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and
legal, and no one has yet been heard to say the contrary, why should We wonder
about the method of review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606?
With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the accused
has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the
determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the
appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges,
except in cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them.
With more reason should this rule apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate
trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal
cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to
reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all
lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses
as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused
before such special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing
beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees
of due process as wen as equal protection of the law and against the enactment of ex
post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the power of supervision of
the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post
facto laws, have been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority
opinion; hence, there is no need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1606 on the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and
its power of supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of
P.D. No. 1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and
therefore can be given effect minus the challenged portions, which are separable from
the valid provisions.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very
beginning any attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to
appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the
Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as
graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7,
P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not
generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination Three
judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that
meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused
and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority
to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and
corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government

instrumentalities and government-owned and -controlled corporations. The
Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the
accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of
Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the constitutional directive.
It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due
process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17
and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended,
and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was
entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against him.
(Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555; People
vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil.
Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion
hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the
passage of ex post factolaws.
2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the
decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through
certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or
conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as
serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by
the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater
guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to
review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with
greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and
prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the
Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise
violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which
presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art.
IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial
court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan is supported by the substantial evidence, the presumption of
innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated
with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is
precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to
determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and
therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is
enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused
of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption.
4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8
associate Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606).
Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices
do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other
Justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a
division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall be
necessary for rendering judgment.
At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually
operating. Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members
may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to
constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members
now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only
three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a
special division of five in case a member of the division dissents. This situation
patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an
acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal
protection of the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more
members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.
P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to
other defendants indicted before other trial courts.
5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it
places expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As
heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate
court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers
and employees of the government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or
-controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising
appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions,
special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial courts or
quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is
being down-graded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the
Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly
provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically
released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan"
(emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the. annual
appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act,
the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the
Budget Ministry upon request therefor by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance
with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination
against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch
of our modified parliamentary-presidential government - the first Branch being
constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the Batasang Pambansa emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be
jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by
the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for
the operation of the courts.
II
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS 1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law
is one which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less
testimony than the law required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled.
The indictment against herein petitioner accused him of graft and corruption
committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including January 12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24,
rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No.
1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978.
As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978,
all persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa
were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of conviction by the Court of
Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on
both questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by
two appellate tribunals on both factual and legal issues, was already part of the
constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977. This vital right of
the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus
placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly
committed prior to 1978.
2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). P.D.
No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a
criminal conviction.
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which
was not so prior to its promulgation.
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying
cases against national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to the
Supreme Court (Sec. 13, CA 682); because at the time the People's Court Act or C.A.
No. 682 was enacted on September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer
existing then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued
by President Sergio Osmena soon after the Liberation. Consequently, the People's
Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals which was revived only
on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13 of the People's Court
Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari. The
Supreme Court can review all judgments of the People's Court both on questions of
fact and of law.
III
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING
AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT -
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules
of procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides
with the constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. to pro- promulgate
rules of court for all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER
INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own
internal affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the
allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its business," without
requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional
power of supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be
disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to
select and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of
court and to remove them for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the
authority to approve or disapprove such appointments and to review such removals,
aggravates the violation of the constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme
Court over inferior courts.
3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme
Court to supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires the
Sandiganbayan to submit an annual report directly to the President without coursing
the same to the Supreme Court for review' and approval.
That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General
Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that "all appropriations provided herein for
the Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1,
Sp. Provisions XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This
particular provision impairs likewise the constitutional power of administrative
supervision vested in the Supreme Court over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972
Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same General Appropriations Act of
1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of
Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian
Relations is expressly subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the
Sandiganbayan does not include the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the
constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.
All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12
and 13 are separable from the rest of its provisions without affecting the
completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared unconstitutional without
necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply determine
what is to be done, who is to do it, and now to do it - the test for a complete and
intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA
481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability although
under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily
binding on, the Supreme Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the
challenged portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Section- 1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written
therein the phrase "of the same level as the Court of Appeals.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more
members of the Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without
affecting the completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606;
because in the absence of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of
1984, as amended,can apply.
However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain
valid provided it is understood that the powers delegated thereunder to the
Sandiganbayan are deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Teehankee and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., concurs and dissent
Footnotes
1 Article XIII, Section 5 of the Constitution.
2 Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1606, both issued in 1978,
3 Republic Act No. 1379.
4 Republic Act No. 3019 (1960).
5 L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
6 Ibid, 435.
7 Petition, par. 2, enumerating such criminal cases as 027, 029, 054,
055, 059, 062, 067, 111, 119,120,124126,130,131,139,141,142,145,153,154,157,160,161,163,
165,167,168,171,175,179 and 186. Cf. Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
1605.
8 Ibid, par. 3.
9 Ibid, par. 4.
10 Ibid, par. 5.
11 Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: "No person shag be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shag any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. "
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, Sec. 12, Memorandum of Petitioner. 1.
15 Attorney Raymundo A. Armovit.
16 Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza was assisted by Assistant
Solicitor General Reynato Puno and Trial Attorney Patria Manalastas.
17 1976 Amendments, par. 5.
18 L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.
19 Ibid, 298.
20 Ibid, 298-299.
21 L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
22 Ibid, 434-435.
23 Ibid, 435.
24 Ibid.
25 Memorandum of Petitioner, 7-8.
26 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
27 Ibid, 126.
28 83 Phil. 242.
29 Ibid, 251.
30 Memorandum of Petitioner, 7-9, 36.
31 In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. L-32485, October 22,1970, 35 SCRA 429.
32 Ibid, 431.
33 82 Phil. 524. It is worthy of mention that the then Justice Paras was
the sole member of the Court relying on the 1908 decision, United
States v. Gomez, 12 Phil. 279, cited by petitioner.
34 2 Phil. 74.
35 Ibid, 77-78.
36 Ibid, 78.
37 3 Dallas 386.
38 Ibid 390-391.
39 Ibid, 391.
40 170 US 343 (1898).
41 Ibid, 352.
42 152 US 377.
43 Ibid, 382.
44 Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1606.
45 According to Article IV, Section 19 insofar as pertinent: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, * * *. "
46 L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.
47 Ibid, 64.
48 To speak of 1981 decisions alone, the judgment of acquittal was
handed down in the following cases: People v. Novales L-47400, Jan.
19, 1981, 102 SCRA 86: People v. Mendoza, L- 48275, Feb. 24, 1981, 103
SCRA 122: People v. Duero, L-52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379;
People v. Tabayoyong, L-31084, May 29,1981, 104 SCRA 724; Perez v.
People, L-43548, June 29, 1981: People v. Anggot, L-38l0l-02, June 29,
1981; People v. Utrela, L-38172, July 15, 1981; People v. Francisco, L43789, July 15, 1981; People v. Cuison, L-51363, July 25, 1981; People v.
Pisaivo, L-32886, Oct. 23, 1981; People v. Verges, L-36436, Oct. 23, 1981;
People v. Tapao, L-41704, Oct. 23, 1981; People v. Delmendo, L-32146,
Nov. 23, 1981; People v. Orpilla, L-30621, Dec. 14, 1981; People v.
Marquez, L-31403, Dec. 14, 1981; People v. Rosales, L-31694, Dec. 14,
1981; People v. Felipe, L-54335, Dec. 14, 1981. In People v. Corpus, L36234, Feb. 10, 1981, 102 SCRA 674, of the 10 accused, three were
acquitted.
49 291 US 97 (1934).
50 Ibid, 122.
51 87 Phil. 418 (1950).
52 Ibid, 422.
53 Cf. Vera v. People, L-31218, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711, 717.
54 218 US 272.
55 Ibid, 279-280.
[Syllabus]
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104392. February 20, 1996]
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

(First Division), HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used
in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc.
from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in
Loakan, Baguio City.
On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a
passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan
Road,Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was
filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, where it was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was
filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch IV of the same
court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the
trial court, in its order dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioners motion on the
ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of
the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused
in the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of

Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed independently of the
criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been
made in the criminal case.
On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the
authority of Garcia v. Florido,1 and Abellana v. Marave,2 which it held allowed a
civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even
though no reservation to file the same has been made. Therefore, it was held,
the trial court correctly denied petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in
the civil case.3
Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no dispute that private
respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to
bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the
driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer, herein petitioner Ruben
Maniago. The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation,
private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against
petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeing
faultornegligence,isobligedtopayforthedamagedone.Suchfaultor
negligence,ifthereisnopreexistingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties,
iscalledaquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthisChapter.
Art.2180.TheobligationimposedbyArticle2176isdemandablenotonlyfor
onesownactsoromissions,butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhomoneis
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the abovequoted provisions is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while
reiterating that a civil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be
brought separately from the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must
be reserved. This Rule reads:
Section1.Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions.Whenacriminalactionis
instituted,thecivilactionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedly
institutedwiththecriminalaction,unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivil
action,reserveshisrighttoinstituteitseparately,orinstitutesthecivilaction
priortothecriminalaction.
SuchcivilactionincludesrecoveryofindemnityundertheRevisedPenalCode,
anddamagesunderArticles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeof
thePhilippinesarisingfromthesameactoromissionoftheaccused.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereservationoftherighttoinstitutetheseparatecivilactionsshallbemade
beforetheprosecutionstartstopresentitsevidenceandundercircumstances
affordingtheoffendedpartyareasonableopportunitytomakesuchreservation.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.3.Whencivilactionmayproceedindependently.Inthecasesprovided
forinArticles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,the
independentcivilactionwhichhasbeenreservedmaybebroughtbythe
offendedparty,shallproceedindependentlyofthecriminalaction,andshall
requireonlyapreponderanceofevidence.
Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the civil action against him
was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his
employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this
action separately. (The records show that while this case was pending in the
Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of
the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that
the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be
petitioners argument that since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with
it the dismissal of the civil action.)
Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the
present civil action against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the
rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights
and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring
the action to enforce them separately. Private respondent cites in support of his
position statements made in Abellana v. Marave,4 Tayag v. Alcantara,5 Madeja v.
Caro,6 and Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals,7 to the effect that the requirement to
reserve the civil action is substantive in character and, therefore, is beyond the
rulemaking power of this Court under the Constitution. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the
conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code
must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
I.
A. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to

institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they
will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions
are not limited to those which arise from the offense charged, as originally
provided in Rule 111 before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the
civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed
instituted with the criminal action.9
Thus Rule 111, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides:
Section1.Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions.Whenacriminalactionis
instituted,thecivilactionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedly
institutedwiththecriminalaction,unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivil
action,reserveshisrighttoinstituteitseparately,orinstitutesthecivilaction
priortothecriminalaction.
SuchcivilactionincludesrecoveryofindemnityundertheRevisedPenalCode,
anddamagesunderArticles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeof
thePhilippinesarisingfromthesameactoromissionoftheaccused.
B. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, 1 and 3 are
beyond the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A
careful examination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of
separate civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to
institute such civil action had been reserved rests on considerations other than
that no reservation is needed.
In Garcia v. Florido10 the right of an injured person to bring an action for
damages even if he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal
prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the
ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had in effect
abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the criminal case. . ..
Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a
criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved
his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. 11 The
statement that Rule 111, 1 of the 1964 Rules is an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for
the reservation is not the ruling of the Court but only an aside, quoted from an
observation made in the footnote of a decision in another case. 12
Another case cited by private respondent in support of his contention that the
civil case need not be reserved in the criminal case is Abellana v. Marave13 in
which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate
action for damages was sustained despite the fact that the right to bring it
separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision in that case was the
fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was
made after the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been
appealed. Pursuant to Rule 123, 7 of the 1964 Rules, this had the effect of
vacating the decision in the criminal case so that technically, the injured parties
could still reserve their right to institute a civil action while the criminal case was
pending in the Court of First Instance. The statement the right of a party to sue
for damages independently of the criminal action is a substantive right which
cannot be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory without
raising a serious constitutional question 14 was thrown in only as additional support
for the ruling of the Court.
On the other hand, in Madeja v. Caro15 the Court held that a civil action for
damages could proceed even while the criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence was pending and did not have to await the termination of
the criminal case precisely because the widow of the deceased had reserved her
right to file a separate civil action for damages. We do not see how this case can
lend support to the view of private respondent.
In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals16 the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused
in the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the
ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages
even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of
Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that when an accused is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. This ruling obviously
cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case
against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a
result of its failure to make a formal offer of its evidence. Rule 132, 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides that The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
To the same effect are the holdings in Tayag, Sr. v. Alcantara,17 Bonite v.
Zosa18 and Diong Bi Chu v. Court of Appeals. 19 Since Art. 29 of the Civil Code
authorizes the bringing of a separate civil action in case of acquittal on
reasonable doubt and under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure such
action is not required to be reserved, it is plain that the statement in these cases
that to require a reservation to be made would be to sanction an unauthorized
amendment of the Civil Code provisions is a mere dictum. As already noted in
connection with the case of Garcia v. Florido, that statement was not the ruling of
the Court but only an observation borrowed from another case. 20
The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the
proposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission,
which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it
separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal
action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the
institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery
of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for
recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been
regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rulemaking power has been
conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court. Thus
the subject was provided for by G.O. No. 58, the first Rules of Criminal
Procedure under the American rule. Sec. 107 of these Orders provided:
Theprivilegesnowsecuredbylawtothepersonclaimingtobeinjuredbythe
commissionofanoffensetotakepartintheprosecutionoftheoffenseandto
recoverdamagesfortheinjurysustainedbyreasonofthesameshallnotbe
heldtobeabridgedbytheprovisionsofthisorder;butsuchpersonmayappear
andshallbeheardeitherindividuallyorbyattorneyatallstagesofthecase,
andthecourtuponconvictionoftheaccusedmayenterjudgmentagainsthim
forthedamagesoccasionedbyhiswrongfulact.Itshall,however,betheduty
ofthepromotorfiscaltodirecttheprosecution,subjecttotherightofthe
personinjuredtoappealfromanydecisionofthecourtdenyinghimalegal
right.
This was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule 106 of which
provided:
SEC.15.Interventionoftheoffendedpartyincriminalaction.Unlessthe
offendedpartyhaswaivedthecivilactionorexpresslyreservedtherightto
instituteitaftertheterminationofthecriminalcase,andsubjecttothe
provisionsofSection4hereof,hemayintervene,personallyorbyattorney,in
theprosecutionoftheoffense.
This Rule was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and lastly in 1988. Through
all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act
or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change
has been effected by this Court. Whatever contrary impression may have been
created byGarcia v. Florid21 and its progeny22 must therefore be deemed to have
been clarified and settled by the new rules which require reservation of the right
to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a
separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair,
diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the
general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in
nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to
bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such
action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.
Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code
separately must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character
of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actions
to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before
they may beinstituted at all, a reservation to bring them separately must be
made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its
institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed
independently of the outcome of the criminal case.
C. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an
independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to
avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the
same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his
subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary
liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the
accused.23
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus
driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would
have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate
civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there
would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a
case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In
such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the
Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or
omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the
prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. 24 As held
in Barredo v. Garcia,25 the injured party must choose which of the available
causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a
separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from
the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action
against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latters subsidiary
liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
II.
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his
vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the
criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or
institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not
reserved.26 The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with
regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but
follows that of his employee 27 is true not only with respect to the civil liability
arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code.
Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by
him from the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one
action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought
against the employee or against his employer. Thus inDulay v. Court of
Appeals28 this Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved
because, having instituted before the criminal case against the employee, the
filing of the civil action against the employer constituted an express reservation of
the right to institute its separately.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is RESERVED and the complaint
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
52 SCRA 420 (1973).
57 SCRA 106 (1974).
Per Justice Antonio M. Martinez concurred in by Justices Asaali S. Isnani and Regina G.
Ordoez-Benitez.
3
Supra at note 2.
98 SCRA 723 (1980).
126 SCRA 293 (1983).
171 SCRA 429 (1989).
Art. VIII, 5(5) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
8
Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220(1995); Yakult v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 347
(1990)
9
10
52 SCRA 420 (1973).
11
Id. at 428.
12
Corpus v. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, n. 2 at 1069(1969).
13
57 SCRA 106(1974).
14
Id. at 112.
15
126 SCRA 293 (1983).
16
171 SCRA 429 (1989).
17
98 SCRA 723 (1980).
18
162 SCRA 173(1988).
19
192 SCRA 554 (1990).
20
Supra, p. 8.
21
Supra at note 1.
Abellana v. Marave, 57 SCRA 106(1974); Tayag v. Alcantara, 98 SCRA 723 (1980);

Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 (1983); Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 429 (1989);
Bonite v. Zosa, 162 SCRA 173 (1988); Diong Bi Chu v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 554 (1990).
22
23
Civil Code, Art. 2181; Emerencia v. Gonzales, 104 Phil. 1059(1958).
24
Yakult v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 347 (1990).
25
73 Phil. 607 (1942). Accord, Joaquin v. Aniceto, 120 Phil. 1100 (1964).
26
Yasay v. Adil, 164 SCRA 494 (1988); Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275 (1978).
27
Miranda v. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670 (1956).
28
Supra at note 9

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be
sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP ByLaws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section
24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words
of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived
of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable
by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues
that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to
regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license
granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the
Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of
justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of
the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained,
the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to
"adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such
Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into
a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act
No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and
his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject
to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference
and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the
fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent.
It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly
where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect
the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that
the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the
power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession
is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution, promulgated on January 9,
1973, ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines.
2 114 A.L.R. 101.
3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited
in the Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of January
9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida
State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State Bar
Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P.
665; Commonwealth ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d 53;
Ayres vs. Hadaway 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for Integration of
Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota,
216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re
Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114
A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291; Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260,
82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95
P. 2d 113; State ex rel. Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484;
Campbell vs. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18
S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on September
17,1971.
6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N.
Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d
404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826;
Railways Employes' Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S.
Ct. 714.
7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration A Sword and a Shield for Justice"
(Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar Aloha!", Journal of the Am.
Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256. 9 Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10
Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L, ed.
2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of
California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of California,
211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re Scott,
53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson,
35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla,
282, 298 P. 623.
11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re Integration
of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota,
216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re
Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex.
550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148 Okla, 219, 298 P.
580; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623; Lathrop
vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The objection would
make every Governmental exaction the material of a 'free speech' issue.
Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to
lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in
furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral The right of private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government." (Concurring opinion of Harlan, J, joined by Frankfurter, J., in
Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367
U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J. with Branders and
Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293
U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)
13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37878
November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo
Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company,
requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the
terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig
bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila
Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of
Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act
granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric
railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system
from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province
of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted
to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines
and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other
person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that
the petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation
companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest
in the proceedings, and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility
operators. On the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made
ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is
attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed that
the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to effect the rights of
persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A
submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust
the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules
which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly
necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the Philippines, and in the United States
for that matter, it has been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in
dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to
public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims
& Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69;
Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897],
171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too
far. Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts
against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We
can also perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and
agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and
affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may
be said in extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made
final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract
authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the
question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs.
Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state
legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the
rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating
legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is
not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More
precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as
a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as
board of arbitrators, exercise administrative orquasi judicial functions. The first case would
appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it
does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any
other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity.
But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the
courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would
review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the
functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the
performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it
upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another
anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the
court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.
lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power
in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should
not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required
to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter
be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction"
by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction
between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of
arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the
jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or
authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being
defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress
cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of
every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the
legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be
inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon
the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and
pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial
power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the
whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And
while it executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully
abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and
which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United States
[1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section
11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the
members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial
and Butte, JJ., concur.
IN RE JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE

ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice
created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December
1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In
consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine
copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial
Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by
the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as
assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the
said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither
violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation
of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of
Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not
in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position
as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of
the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his
duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed
prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations
to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law
Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be
under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment
reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by
law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative
functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution,
the Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding
its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being
required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.
That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its
command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a
higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his

actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official,
however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity
of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance
of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and
performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help
promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions
are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of
government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of
supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long
as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and
experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against
one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and
impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a
quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be
monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible
solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the
people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the
Committees on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as
observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by
the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become
members, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The
line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into
matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other
departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not
shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper
performance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He
cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The
Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the
study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the
Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy
undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own
efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of
society. The familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by
the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example,
to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are
full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the
discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his
regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of
government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by
members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of
their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326
amending E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to
Committee work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions
are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of

government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of
supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long
as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and
experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against
one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and
impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a
quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be
monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible
solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the
people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the
Committees on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as
observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by
the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become
members, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The
line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into
matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other
departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not
shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper
performance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He
cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The
Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the
study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the
Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy
undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own
efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of
society. The familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by
the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to
become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example,
to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are
full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the
discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his
regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of
government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by
members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of
their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326
amending E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to
Committee work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
NITAFAN V COMMISSIONER
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78780
July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,

JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME
COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the
Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the
Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget
Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the
salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court
has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As
will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the
proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in
the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly
made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment
to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary
would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent
may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription
against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from
payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as
well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of
record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David,
infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the
income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges
are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that
the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional
protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution
provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court,
and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not
be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution
specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the
1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII,
negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income
tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall
receive an annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice
______________ pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners
presented their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices,
does this not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of
equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the
combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it is comingled
with the other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give
special privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase
or decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing
their salary and affecting the independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but
the special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of
uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner
Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the
Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense
against the executive and legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing,
some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might
say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of
privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines,
because a good number of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not
be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity,
which is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner
Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the
words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among
the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended
the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the
independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment
with the request for a modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying
that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax,"
because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the
decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo
vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would
propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN
support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice
and judges should not be subjected to income tax because they already gave up the
income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who have
accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are
still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced
by accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption,
Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent,
Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the
understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of
justices is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax
of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General
Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the
understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not
apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved
without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that
there will be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could
Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the
government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income tax?
The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as
follows: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED";
and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted. 9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 12
1avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is
again reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of
income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the
Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed inEndencia vs. David 14 must be declared
discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article
VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions
and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their
aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of
general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1
Section 9,Articie VIII.
Section 10, Article X.
Section 6, Article XV, General Provisions.
Section 10, Article VIII.
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.
Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 460.
Ibid., at page 467,
85 Phil. 552 (1950).
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 506.
10
Gold Creek Mining Co. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 413.
11
12
Tanada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21.
13
85 Phil. 552 (1950).
14
93 Phil. 696 (1953).
CORPUS
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40424 June 30, 1980
R. MARINO CORPUS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. DAVID, respondents
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on February 14, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 40583-R, affirming the decision of the court of Instance
of Manila, Branch V. dated september 4, 1967, in Civil Case no. 61802 entitled "Juan T.
David,plaintiff, versus R. Mariano Corpus, defendant', for the recovery of attorneys fees for
professional services rendered by the plaintiff, private respondent herein, to defendant,
petitioner herein.
A
Having been close friends, aside from being membres Civil Liberties Union, petitioner
Corpus intimately calls respondent David by his nickname "Juaning" and the latter addresses
the former simply as "Marino".
The factual setting of this case is stated in the decision of the lower court, thus:
It appears that in March, 1958, the defendant was charged administratively

by several employee of the Central Bank Export Department of which the
defendant is the director. The defendant was represented by Atty. Rosauro
Alvarez. Pending the investigation and effective March 18, 1958, he
defendant was suspended from office. After the investigating committee
found the administrative charges to be without merit, and subsequently
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the defendant, the then
Governor of Central Bank, Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., recommended that the
defendant be considered resigned as on the ground that he had lost
confidence in him. The Monetary Board, by a resolution of July 20, 1959,
declared the defendant as resigned as of the date of suspension.
On August 18, 1959, the defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez, filed the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto with
preliminary mandatory injuction and damages against Miguel Cuaderno, Sr.,
the Central Bank and Mario Marcos who was appointed to the position of the
defendant, said case having been docketed as Civil Case No. 41226 and
assigned to Branch VII presided over by Judge Gregorio T. Lantin. On
September 7, 1959, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
alleging among other grounds, the failure of the defendant to exhaust,
available administrative remedies (Exh. X). On September 25, 1959, the
defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez, filed his opposition to the said motion. On
March 17, 1960, during the course of the presentation of the evidence for the
petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, Atty. Alvarez
manifested that the defendant was abandoning his prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and asked for a ruling on the motion to
dismiss. On June 14, 1960, Judge Lantin dismissed Civil Case No. 41226 for
failure to exhaust she administrative remedies available to the herein
defendant.
On June 24, 1960, Atty. Alverez received a copy of the order of dismissal It
was at this state that the plaintiff entered into the case under circumstances
about which the parties herein have given divergent versions.
According to the plaintiff, six or seven days prior to the expiration of the
period for appeal from the order of dismissal, he chanced to meet the late
Rafael Corpus, father of the defendant, at the Taza de Oro coffee shop. After
they talked about the defendant's having lost his case before Judge Lantin,
and knowing that the plaintiff and the defendant were both members of the
Civil Liberties Union, Rafael Corpus requested the plaintiff to go over the
case and further said that he would send his son, the herein defendant, to the
plaintiff to find out what could be done about the case. The defendant called
up the plaintiff the following morning for an appointment, and the plaintiff
agreed to am him in the latter's office. At said conference, the defendant
requested the plaintiff to handle the case because Atty. Alvarez had already
been disenchanted and wanted to give up the case. Although at first reluctant
to handle the case, the plaintiff finally agreed on condition that he and Atty.
Alverez would collaborate in the case.
The defendant's version of how the plaintiff came into the case is as follows:
After the order of dismissal issued by Judge Lantin was published in the
newspapers, the plaintiff sought a conference with the defendant at Taza de
Oro, but the defendant told him that he would rather meet the plaintiff at the
Swiss Inn. Even before the case was dismissed the plaintiff had shown
interest in the same by being present during the hearings of said case in the
sala of Judge Lantin When the plaintiff and the defendant met at the Swiss
Inn, the plaintiff handed the defendant a memorandum prepared by him on
how he can secure the reversal of the order of dismissal by means of a
formula stated in said memorandum. During the said occasion the plaintiff
scribbled some notes on a paper napkin (Exhibit 19). On June 28, 1960, the
defendant wrote the plaintiff, sending with it a copy of the order of Judge
Lantin dated June 14, 1960 (Exhibit S Inasmuch as said letter, Exhibit S
already mentions the 'memorandum' of the plaintiff, the defendant contends
that it was not six or seven days prior to the expiration of the period of appeal
(which should be on or about July 2 or 3, 1960) but on a date even earlier
than June 28, 1960 that the plaintiff and the defendant met together to
discuss the latter's case.
Laying aside for the moment the true circumstances under which the plaintiff
started rendering professional services to the defendant, the undisputed
evidence shows that on July 7, 1960, the plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal under the joint signatures of the
plaintiff and Atty. Alverez (Exhibit B). The plaintiff argued the said motion
during the hearing thereof On August 8, 1960, he file a 13-page
'Memorandum of Authorities in support of said motion for reconsideration
(Exhibit C). A 3-page supplemental memorandum of authorities was filed by
the plaintiff on September 6, 1960 (Exhibit D)
On November 15, 1960, Judge Lantin denied the motion for reconsideration.
On November 19, 1960, the plaintiff perfected the appeal from the order of
dismissal dated June 14, 1960. For purposes of said appeal the plaintiff
prepared a 232-page brief and submitted the same before the Supreme
Court in Baguio City on April 20, 1961. The plaintiff was the one who orally
argued the case before the Supreme Court. In connection with the trip to
Baguio for the said oral argument, the plaintiff used his car hich broke down
and necessitated extensive repairs paid for by the plaintiff himself.
On March 30, 1962, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision reversing
the order of dismissal and remanding the case for further proceedings. On
April 18, 1962, after the promulgation of the decision of the Supreme Court
reversing the dismissal of the case the defendant wrote the plaintiff the
following letter, Exhibit 'Q'. .
xxxxxxxxx
Dear Juaning
Will you please accept the attached check in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND P2,000.00) PESOS for legal services in the handling of L-17860
recently decided by the Court? I wish I could give more but as yu know we
were banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimburse my backstage I
had been wanting to offer some token of my appreciation of your legal fight
for and in my behalf, and it was only last week that I received something on
account of a pending claim.
Looking forward to a continuation of the case in the lower court, I remain
Sincerely yours, Illegible
xxxxxxxxx
In a reply letter dated April 25, 1962, the plaintiff returned the check,
explaining said act as follows:
April 25, 1962
My dear Marino:
Yesterday, I received your letter of April 18th with its enclosure. I wished
thank you for your kind thoughts, however, please don't take offense if I have
to return the check. I will explain.
When I decided to render professional services in your case, I was motivated
by the value to me of the very intimate relations which you and I have
enjoyed during the past many years. It was nor primarily, for a professional
fee.
Although we were not fortunate to have obtained a decision in your case
which should have put an end to it. I feel that we have reason to be jubilant
over the outcome, because, the final favorable outcome of the case seems
certain irrespective of the length of time required to terminate the same.
Your appreciation of the efforts I have invested in your case is enough
compensation therefor, however, when you shall have obtained a decision
which would have finally resolved the case in your favor, remembering me
then will make me happy. In the meantime, you will make me happier by just
keeping the check.
Sincerely yours,
JUANING
xxxxxxxxx
When the case was remanded for further proceedings before Judge Lantin,
the evidence for the defendant was presented by Atty. 'Alvarez with the
plaintiff cooperating in the same-'On June 24, 1963, Judge Lantin rendered
his decision in favor of the defendant declaring illegal the resolution of the
Monetary Board of July 20, 1959, and ordering the defendant's reinstatement
and the payment of his back salaries and allowances - The respondents in
said Civil Case No. 41226 filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the herein plaintiff. The said decision was appealed by the
respondents, as well as by the herein defendant with respect to the award of
P5, 000. 00 attorney's feed The plaintiff prepared two briefs for submission to
the Court of Appeals one as appellee (Exhibit H) and the other as appellant
(Exhibit H-1). The Court of Appeal however, certified the case to the
Supreme Court in 1964.
On March 31, 1965, the Supreme Court rendered a decision affirming the
judgment of the Court of first Instance of Manila.
On April 19, 1965 the plaintiffs law office made a formal de command upon
the defendant for collection of 50% of the amount recovered by the
defendant as back salaries and other emoluments from the Central Bank
(Exhibit N). This letter was written after the defendant failed to appear at an
appointment with the plaintiff so that they could go together to the Central
Bank to claim the possession of the office to which the defendant was
reinstated and after a confrontation in the office of the plaintiff wherein the
plaintiff was remanding 50% of the back salaries and other emoluments
amounting to P203,000.00 recoverable by the defendant. The defendant
demurred to this demand inasmuch as he had plenty of outstanding
obligations and that his tax liability for said back salaries was around
P90,000.00, and that he expected to net only around P10,000.00 after
deducting all expenses and taxes.
On the same date, April 19,1965 the plaintiff wrote the Governor for of
Central Bank requesting that the amount representing the sack salaries of
the defendant be made out in two one in favor of the defendant and the other
representing the professional fees equivalent to 50% of the said back
salaries being claimed by the plaintiff (Exhibit 8). F to obtain the relief from
the Governor of Central Bank, the plaintiff instituted this action before this
Court on July 20, 1965 (Emphasis supplied).
As therein defendant, herein petitioner Marino Corpus filed in August 5, 1965 an answer with
counter-claim. On August 30, 1965, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David, plaintiff therein,
filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim of petitioner.
After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment on September 4, 1967, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00 in the concept of professional fees, and to pay
the costs (pp. 112-113, CA Record on Appeal p. 54, rec.)
After receipt on September 7, 1967 of a copy of the aforequoted judgment, petitioner Marino
Corpus, defendant therein, filed on October 7, 1967 a notice of appeal from said judgment to
the Court of Appeals. In his appeal, he alleged that the lower court erred:
1. In not holding that the plaintiff's professional services were offered and
rendered gratuitously;
2. Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to compensation in holding that he was
entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 when at most he
would be entitled to only P2,500.00;
3. In not dismissing plaintiff's complaint; and

4. In not awarding damages and attorney's fees to the defendant (p. 2, CA
Decision, p. 26, rec.)
Likewise, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David, plaintiff therein, appealed to the Court of
Appeals on October 9, 1967 assigning one error, to wit:
The lower court erred in ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff only the
sum of P30,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees (p. 1, CA Decision, p. 25,
rec.).
On February 14, 1975, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in
toto the decision of the lower court, with costs against petitioner Marino Corpus (Annex A,
Petition for Certiorari, p. 25, rec.)
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner contending that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner accepted private respondent's
services "with the understanding of both that he (private respondent) was to be
compensated" in money; and that the fee of private respondent was contingent (pp. 3 & 5,
Petition for Certiorari, pp. 17 & 19, rec.).
On October 1, 1975, the case was deemed submitted for decision (p. 177, rec.), after the
parties filed their respective memoranda.
B
On January 31, 1978, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed a petition to remand the
case to the court a quofor execution of the latter's decision in Civil Case No. 61802, dated
September 4, 1967, alleging that said decision is already deemed affirmed pursuant to
Section 11(2), Article X of the New Constitution by reason of the failure of this Tribunal to
decide the case within 18 months. Then on July 7, 1978, another petition to remand the case
to the lower court to execution was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed with The court a quo a motion
dated September 13, 1978 for the issuance of a writ of execution of the lower court's
decision in the aforesaid civil case, also invoking Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973
Constitution. In an order dated September 19, 1978, the lower court, through Judge Jose H.
Tecson, directed the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution was issued on
October 2, 1978 and a notice of garnishment was also issued n October 13, 1978 to garnish
the bank deposits of herein petitioner Marino Corpus in the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company, Makati Branch.
It appears that on October 13, 1978, herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
September 19, 1978 order. Private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on October 19, 1978
an opposition to said motion and herein petitioner filed a reply on October 30, 1978. The
lower court denied said motion for reconsideration in its over dated November 7, 1978.
It appears also that in a letter dated October 18, 1978, herein petitioner Marino Corpus
requested this Court to inquire into what appears to be an irregularity in the issuance of the
aforesaid garnishment notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, by virtue of which
his bank deposits were garnished and he was prevented from making withdrawals from his
bank account.
In OUR resolution of November 3, 1978, WE required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David
and the Commercial Bank and Trust Company to comment on petitioner's letter, and for the
bank to explain why it did not honor petitioner's withdrawals from his bank deposits when no
garnishment order has been issued by the Supreme Court. This Court further inquired from
the lower court whether it has issued any garnishment order during the pendency of the
present case.
On November 27, 1978, the Commercial Bank and Trust Company filed its comment which
was noted in the Court's resolution of December 4, 1978. In said resolution, the Court also
required Judge Jose H. Tecson to comply with the resolution of November 3, 1978, inquiring
as to whether he had issued any garnishment order, and to explain why a writ of execution
was issued despite the pendency of the present case before the Supreme Court.
Further, WE required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David Lo explain his failure to file his
comment, and to file the same as directed by the resolution of the Court dated November 3,
1978. Private respondent's compliance came on December 13, 1978, requesting to be
excused from the filing of his comment because herein petitioner's letter was unverified.
Judge Tecson's compliance was filed on December 15, 1978, to which herein petitioner
replied on January 11, 1979.
In OUR resolution dated January 3, 1979, WE set aside the order of Judge Jose H. Tecson
dated September 19, 1978, the writ of execution as well as the notice of garnishment, and
required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt for his failure to file his comment as directed by the resolution of the Court dated
December 4, 1978, and for filing a motion for execution knowing that the case is pending
appeal and review before this Court Likewise, the Court required Judge Jose H. Tecson to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for issuing an order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution and for issuing such writ despite the pendency of the present
case in the Supreme Court.
On January 12, 1979, Judge Jose H. Tecson filed his compliance explanation as directed by
the aforesaid resolution of January 3, 1979, while private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed
on January 30, 19 79 his compliance and motion for reconsideration after the Court has
granted him an extension of time to file his compliance.
Private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on February 28, 1979, a petition praying that the
merits of his compliance be resolved by the Court en banc. Subsequently, on March 26,
1979, another petition was filed by herein private respondent asking the Chief
Justice and the members of the First Division to inhibit themselves from participating in the
determination of the merits of his compliance and for its merits to be resolved by the
Court en banc.
C
The main thrust of this petition for review is whether or not private respondent Atty. Juan T.
David is entitled to attorney's fees.
Petitioner Marino Corpus contends that respondent David is not entitled to attorney's fees
because there was no contract to that effect. On the other hand, respondent David contends
that the absence of a formal contract for the payment of the attorney's fees will not negate
the payment thereof because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an
implied understanding between the petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay
the latter attorney's fees when a final decision shall have been rendered in favor of the
petitioner reinstating him to -his former position in the Central Bank and paying his back
salaries.
I
WE find respondent David's position meritorious. While there was express agreement
between petitioner Corpus and respondent David as regards attorney's fees, the facts of the
case support the position of respondent David that there was at least an implied agreement
for the payment of attorney's fees.
Petitioner's act of giving the check for P2,000.00 through his aforestated April 18, 1962 letter
to respondent David indicates petitioner's commitment to pay the former attorney's fees,
which is stressed by expressing that "I wish I could give more but as you know we were
banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimbursing my back salaries This last
sentiment constitutes a promise to pay more upon his reinstatement and payment of his
back salaries. Petitioner ended his letter that he was "looking forward to a continuation of the
case in the lower court, ... to which the certiorari-mandamus-quo warranto case was
remanded by the Supreme Court for further proceedings.
Moreover, respondent David's letter-reply of April 25, 1962 confirms the promise of petitioner
Corpus to pay attorney's fees upon his reinstatement and payment of back salaries. Said
reply states that respondent David decided to be his counsel in the case because of the
value to him of their intimate relationship over the years and "not, primarily, for a professional
fee." It is patent then, that respondent David agreed to render professional services to
petitioner Corpus secondarily for a professional fee. This is stressed by the last paragraph of
said reply which states that "however, when you shall have obtained a decision which would
have finally resolved the case in your favor, remembering me then will make me happy. In
the meantime, you will make me happier by just keeping the check." Thereafter, respondent
David continued to render legal services to petitioner Corpus, in collaboration with Atty.
Alverez until he and Atty. Alvarez secured the decision directing petitioner's reinstatement
with back salaries, which legal services were undisputedly accepted by, and benefited
petitioner.
Moreover, there is no reason to doubt respondent David's assertion that Don Rafael Corpus,
the late father of petitioner Corpus, requested respondent to help his son, whose suit for
reinstatement was dismissed by the lower court; that pursuant to such request, respondent
conferred in his office with petitioner, who requested respondent to handle the case as his
lawyer, Atty. Alvarez, was already disenchanted and wanted to give up the case; and that
respondent agreed on the case. It would have been unethical for respondent to even offer
his services when petitioner had a competent counsel in the person of Atty. Alvarez, who has
been teaching political, constitutional and administrative law for over twenty years.
Likewise, it appears that after the Supreme Court affirmed on March 31, 1965 the order of
the lower court reinstating petitioner Corpus with back salaries and awarding attorney's fees
of P5,000.00, respondent David made a written demand on April 19, 1965 upon petitioner
Corpus for the payment of his attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 50% of what was
paid as back salaries (Exh. N p. 75, Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No. 61802). Petitioner
Corpus, in his reply dated May 7, 1965 to the aforesaid written demand, while disagreeing as
to the amount of attorney's fees demanded, did not categorically deny the right of respondent
David to attorney's fees but on the contrary gave the latter the amount of P2,500.00, which is
one-half () of the court-awarded attorney's fees of P5,000.00, thus impliedly admitting the
right of respondent David to attorney's fees (Exh. K, p. 57, Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No.
61802).
It is further shown by the records that in the motion filed on March 5, 1975 by petitioner
Corpus before the Court of Appeals for the reconsideration of its decision the order of the
lower court granting P30,000.00 attorney's fee's to respondent David, he admitted that he
was the first to acknowledge that respondent David was entitled to tion for legal services
rendered when he sent the chock for P2,000.00 in his letter of April 18, 1962, and he is still
to compensate the respondent but only to the extent of P10,000.00 (p. 44, rec.). This
admission serves only to further emphasize the fact that petitioner Corpus was aware all the
time that he was liable to pay attorney's fees to respondent David which is therefore
inconsistent with his position that the services of respondent David were gratuitous, which
did not entitle said respondent to compensation.
It may be advanced that respondent David may be faulted for not reducing the agreement for
attorney's fees with petitioner Corpus in writing. However, this should be viewed from their
special relationship. It appears that both have been friends for several years and were comembers of the Civil Liberties Union. In addition, respondent David and petitioner's father,
the late Rafael Corpus, were also close friends. Thus, the absence of an express contract for
attorney's fees between respondent David and petitioner Corpus is no argument against the
payment of attorney's fees, considering their close relationship which signifies mutual trust
and confidence between them.
II
Moreover, the payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue
of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle
that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." innominate contracts
have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article
1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general
provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most
analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people. The rationale of this article
was stated in the 1903 case of Perez vs. Pomar (2 Phil. 982). In that case, the Court
sustained the claim of plaintiff Perez for payment of services rendered against defendant
Pomar despite the absence of an express contract to that effect, thus:
It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the
parties for the employment of the plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other
innominate contract was entered into but
whethertheplaintiffsservicesweresolicitedorwhethertheywereoffered to the
defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and
made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual
consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation
upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor,
since the bilateral obligation to render service as interpreter, on the one hand,
and on the other to pay for the service rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts.
1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code).
xxxxxxxxx
... Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact remains that Perez
rendered to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he did
this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, he having accepted
the benefit of the service, to pay a just compensation therefor, by virtue of the
innominate contract of facio ut des implicitly established.
xxxxxxxxx
... because it is a well-known principle of law that no one should permitted to
enrich himself to the damage of another" (emphasis supplied; see also
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 388, Vol. IV 119621, citing Estate
of Reguera vs. Tandra 81 Phil. 404 [1948]; Arroyo vs. Azur 76 Phil.
493119461; and Perez vs. Pomar. 2 Phil. 682 [1903]).
WE reiterated this rule in Pacific Merchandising Corp. vs. Consolacion Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc. (73 SCRA 564 [1976]) citing the case of Perez v. Pomar, supra thus:
Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are
accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that the service was rendered
gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a reasonable remuneration
therefor because 'it is a well-known principle of law, that no one should be
permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another (emphasis supplied).
Likewise, under American law, the same rule obtains (7 CJS 1079; FL Still & Co. v. Powell,
114 So 375).
III
There was no contract for contingent fee between Corpus and respondent David. Contingent
fees depend on an express contract therefor. Thus, "an attorney is not entitled to a
percentage of the amount recovered by his client in the absence of an express contract to
that effect" (7 C.J.S. 1063 citing Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 66, 128 Neb. 141).
Where services were rendered without any agreement whatever as to the
amount or terms of compensation, the attorney is not acting under a contract
for a contingent fee, and a letter by the attorney to the client stating that a
certain sum would be a reasonable amount to charge for his services and
adding that a rate of not less than five percent nor more than ten would be
reasonable and customary does not convert the original agreement into a
contract for a contingent fee (7 C.J.S. 1063 citing Fleming v. Phinizy 134 S.E.
814).
While there was no express contract between the parties for the payment of attorney's fees,
the fact remains that respondent David rendered legal services to petitioner Corpus and
therefore as aforestated, is entitled to compensation under the innominate contract of facio lit
des And such being the case, respondent David is entitled to a reasonable compensation.
IV
In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to respondent David as compensation for his

services, on a quantum meruit basis, it is proper to consider all the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case particularly the following:
The extent of the services rendered by respondent David should be considered together with
the extent of the services of Petitioner's other counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, It is undisputed
that Atty. Rosauro Alvarez had rendered legal services as principal counsel for more shall six
(6) years while respondent David has rendered legal services as collaborating counsel for
almost four (4) years. It appears that Atty. Alvarez started to render legal services after the
administrative case was filed on March 7, 1958 against petitioner Corpus. He represented
petitioner Corpus in the hearing of said case which was conducted from May 5, 1958 to
October 8, 1958, involving 56 sessions, and this resulted in the complete exoneration by the
Investigating Committee of all the charges against the petitioner. It appears further that after
the Monetary Board, in its resolution of July 20, 1959, declared petitioner Corpus as being
considered resigned from the service, Atty. Alvarez instituted on August 18, 1958 Civil Case
No. 41126 in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the setting aside of the aforestated
resolution and for the reinstatement of petitioner Corpus. Atty. Alvarez actively participated in
the proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent David entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner
Corpus sometime after the dismissal on June 14, 1960 of the aforesaid civil case. From the
time he entered his appearance, both he and Atty. Alvarez rendered legal services to
petitioner Corpus in connection with the appeals of the aforementioned civil case to the
Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court. The records disclose that in connection with the
appeal from the June 14, 1960 order of dismissal, respondent David prepared and signed
pleadings although the same were made for and on behalf of Atty. Alvarez and himself And it
is not far-fetched to conclude that all appearances were made by both counsels considering
that Atty. Alverez was the principal counsel and respondent David was the collaborating
counsel. Thus, when the case was called for oral argument on April 20, 1961 before the
Supreme Court, respondent David and Atty. Alverez appeared for petitioner Corpus although
it was David who orally argued the case.
When the Supreme Court, in its decision of March 30, 1962, remanded the case to the lower
court for further it was Atty. Alverez who conducted the presentation of evidence while
respondent David assisted him The records also review that respondent David prepared and
signed for Atty. Alverez and himself. certain pleadings, including a memorandum. Moreover,
after the lower court rendered judgment on June 2 4, 1963 ordering the reinstatement and
payment of back salaries to petitioner Corpus and awarding him P5,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees, both petitioner Corpus and the respondents in said case appealed the
judgment. At that stage, respondent David again prepared and signed for Atty. Alvarez and
himself, the necessary pleadings, including two appeal briefs. And in addition, he made oral
arguments in the hearings of motions filed in the lower court before the records of the case
were forwarded to the appellate court. Furthermore, while it appears that it was Atty. Alvarez
who laid down the basic theory and foundation of the case of petitioner Corpus in the
administrative case and later in the civil case, respondent David also advanced legal
propositions. Petitioner Corpus contends that said legal propositions were invariably rejected
by the courts. This is, however, of no moment because the fact remains that respondent
David faithfully rendered legal services for the success of petitioner's case.
The benefits secured for petitioner Corpus may also be considered in ascertaining what
should be the compensation of respondent David. It cannot be denied that both Atty. Alvarez
and respondent David were instrumental in obtaining substantial benefits for petitioner
Corpus which consisted primarily of his reinstatement, recovery of back salaries and the
vindication of his honor and reputation. But, note should also be taken of the fact that
respondent David came at the crucial stage when the case of petitioner Corpus was
dismissed by the lower court.
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez admittedly was paid by petitioner Corpus the sum of P20,000.00 or at
most P22,500.00 (T.s.n., Jan. 11, 1967, pp. 34-35; T.s.n., Feb. 10, 1967, pp. 48-49). On the
other hand, petitioner Corpus, after WE suggested on August 15, 1975 that they settle the
case amicably has, in his September 15, 1975 pleading filed before this Court (p. 166, rec.),
manifested his willingness to pay P10,000.00 for the services of respondent David. However,
respondent David has not manifested his intention to accept the offer.
In his complaint in the instant case, he asked for P75,000.00 as his attorney's fees. The
records reveal that petitioner Corpus actually received only P150,158.50 as back salaries
and emoluments after deducting taxes as well as retirement and life insurance premiums
due to the GSIS. The amount thus claimed by respondent David represents 50% of the
amount actually received by petitioner Corpus. The lower court, however, awarded only
P30,000.00 and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Considering the aforestated circumstances, WE are of the opinion that the reasonable
compensation of respondent David should be P20,000.00.
V
WE find private respondent Juan T. David and Judge Jose H. Tecson, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch V, guilty of contempt of court.
Respondent David filed on or about September 13, 1978 a motion with the court a quo for
the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its decision in Civil Case No 61802, subject of
the present petition, knowing fully well that it was then still pending appeal before this Court.
In addition, no certification that the aforesaid decision is already deemed affirmed had as yet
been issued by the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New
Constitution; because respondent David's petitions filed with the Supreme Court on January
31, 1978 and on July 7, 1978 to remand the case to the trial court for execution and for the
issuance of such certification had not yet been acted upon as the same were still pending
consideration by this Court. In fact, this Court has not as of this time made any
pronouncement on the aforesaid provision of the New Constitution.
This act of respondent David constitutes disrespect to, as well as disregard of, the authority
of this Court as the final arbiter of all cases duly appealed to it, especially constitutional
questions. It must be emphasized that as a member of the Philippine Bar he is required "to
observe and maintain the respect due to the court of justice and judicial officers" (Section 20
(b), 138 of the Revised Rules of Court). Likewise, Canon 1 of. the Canons of Professional
Ethic expressly provide that: "It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judgement office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance." And this Court had stressed that "the duty of
an attorney to the courts 'can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold'" (Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967] citing the case of Lualhati v. Albert, 67 Phil. 86, 92 [1932]).
Moreover, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that herein respondent David, in the
previous case of Integrated Construction Services, Inc. and Engineering Construction, Inc. v.
Relova (65 SCRA 638 [1975]), had sent letters addressed to the then Chief Justice Querube
C. Makalintal and later to the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, requesting for the issuance
of certification on the basis of the aforementioned provision of the New Constitution which
were not given due consideration. And knowing this, respondent David should have been
more prudent and cautious in g with the court a quo any motion for execution.
Furthermore, there was even a taint of arrogance and defiance on the part of respondent
David in not filing his comment to the letter- complaint dated October 18, 1978 of petitioner
Corpus, as required by this Court in its November 3, 1978 and December 4,1978 resolutions
which were duly received by him, and instead, he sent on December 13, 1978 a letter
requesting to be excused from the filing of his comment on the lame excuse that petitioner's
letter-complaint was not verified.
On the part of Judge Jose H. Tecson, his presumptuous and precipitate act of granting the
motion for execution of dent David likewise constitutes disrespect to, as well as of, the
authority of this Court because he know for a that the case was still pending apply as the had
not yet been remanded to it and that no certification has been issued by this Court. As a
judicial officer, Judge Tecson is charged with the knowledge of the fact that this Court has yet
to make a definite pronouncement on Section 11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New
Constitution. Judge Tecson should know that only the Supreme Court can authoritatively
interpret Section 11 (2) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. Yet, Judge Tecson assumed the
role of the Highest Court of the Land. He should be reminded of what Justice Laurel
speaking for the Court, has said in People v. Vera (65 Phil 56, 82 [1937]):
A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated
judged system of the nation.
It may also be added that the improvident act of respondent David in firing the motion for
execution and the precipitate act of Judge Tecson in issuing the writ of execution are
intriguing as they invite suspicion that there was connivance between the two. Respondent
David would seem to imply that his claim for attorney's fees should be given preference over
the other cams now pending in this Court. Certainly, such should not be the case because
there are cases which by their nature require immediate or preferential attention by this
Tribunal like habeas corpus cases, labor cases and c cases involving death sentence, let
alone cases involving properties and property rights of poor litigants pending decision or
resolution long before the New Constitution of 1973. Nobility and exempt forbearance were
expected of Atty. David, who is old and experienced in the practice of the legal profession,
from which he has derived a great measure. of economic well-being and independence
Consequently, the filing of the motion for immediate tion and the issuance of the writ of
execution constitute a defiance and usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As a
disciplinary measure for the preservation and vindication of the dignity of this Supreme
Tribunal respondent Atty. Juan T. David should be REPRIMANDED for his precipitate action
of filing a motion for execution as well as Judge Jose H. Tecson for his improvident issuance
of a writ of execution while the case is pending appeal before the Supreme Court, and a
repetition of said acts would be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER R. MARINO CORPUS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY
RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T. DAVID THE SUM OF TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T. DAVID AND JUDGE JOSE H. TECSON OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH V, ARE HEREBY DECLARED GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT AND ARE HEREBY REPRIMANDED, WITH A WARNING THAT REPETITION
TION OF THE SAME OR SIMILAR ACTS WILL BE DEALT WITH MORE SEVERELY.
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.
MALACORA V CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51042 September 30, 1982
DIONISIO MALACORA, and LUCIA, MARABULAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO LIBARNES and RODRIGO LIBARNES, respondents.
Rosarito Dabalor (CLAO) for petitioners.
Emmanuel R. Balanon for respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified the
judgment of the trial court, the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Butuan City. the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, questioned orders of June 27,1978 and August 1, 1978, as
wen as the writ of execution of October 7, 1974, the Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale and Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale are hereby annuled and set aside, with
costs against the private respondents." 1
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the following facts as set forth therein are
undisputed:
On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case
No. 6, entitled "Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes
and Consuelo Libarnes", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the herein defendants RODRIGO
LIBARNES and CONSUELO LIBARNES to pay the herein
plaintiffs DIONISIO MALACORA and LUCIA MARABULAS
the total amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND
NINETY FIVE (P2,595.00) PESOS for onehalf of all the
coconut trees and of TEN (P10.00) PESOS for one-half of the
banana plants said plaintiffs planted on the defendants' land
and after payment of said amounts their tenancy relation will
be considered as terminated and the said plaintiffs will be
allowed to surrender and leave their tenanted holding.
Both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty
the court fees, the plaintiffs to pay their one-half share upon
receipt of the payments for one-half of the improvements as
herein above ordered.
Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to this Court (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which
modified the judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with the modification that the petitioners are ordered
to pay P8.00 per coconut trees for one- half of all the coconut
trees which the private respondents had planted on the land
in question, without pronouncement as to costs.
After Our decision became final and the case had been returned to the
respondent court, plaintiffs, private respondents herein, filed a motion for
execution. Acting on the motion, the respondent court, on September 20,
1974, entered an order of execution; and on October 4, 1974, the Clerk of
Court issued a writ of execution which commanded petitioners 'to pay
plaintiffs Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas the total amount of
P2,184.00 for the 273 coconut trees planted by the plaintiffs.
On October 30, 1974, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte
enforced the writ of execution by levying upon the property of petitioners
herein, located in Bo. Mabini, Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Sur. In
the ensuing auction sale conducted on December 16, 1974, the property was
sold for the sum of P3,500.00 to private respondents, who were then issued
the corresponding certificate of sale.
As petitioners failed to exercise their right of redemption, the respondent
sheriff on February 21, 1976, executed a final deed of sale in favor of private
respondents.
On May 12, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
possession, which motion was opposed by petitioners on the ground 'that the
writ of execution did not conform to the judgment of the trial court as modified
by the decision of this Honorable Court of August 27, 1973,' The above
motion was resolved by the respondent court in the questioned order of May
12, 1977 in this wise:
This is a motion for the issuance of writ of possession on the
ground that defendants, the losing party, refuse to surrender
the possession of the property subject of execution of which
the Sheriff's final Deed of Sale has already been issued in
favor of plaintiffs. On record is also a motion in opposition to
the issuance of the writ.
In going over the case, we find that the decision of this Court
granted unto plaintiffs the sum of P2,595.00 corresponding to
one-half of P5,190.00 which is the total valuation of the 213
fruit bearing coconut trees at P20.00 per tree (P4,260.00) and
62 non-bearing coconut trees at P15.00 per tree (P930.00).
On appeal, the valuation was modified by the Court of
Appeals to P8.00 per coconut tree, be it fruit bearing or not.
The total number of trees is 275. Multiply this by P8.00 we get
a result of P2,200. One half of this is P1,100. There is then a
difference of P1,495.00 of what ought to have been executed
and of what was actually executed which was P2,595.00.
This Court feels that this variance in amount is not sufficient
to cancel and/or declare as null and void an otherwise regular
and lawful execution proceedings undertaken by the Sheriff. A
simple restitution would better serve the ends of justice than
have us follow the complexities of technical rules of
procedure and of law (Sec. 16, PD 946).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiffs are hereby
ordered to restore/return and/or reimburse unto defendants
the sum of P1,495.00 within 15 days from receipt of this
Order.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order, and after
due hearing, the respondent court modified the said order as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated May 12, 1977, is
hereby modified as follows:
1. Ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his
Deputy to place plaintiffs in effective possession of the abovedescribed property as owners thereof,
2. Ordering plaintiffs to reimburse the amount of ONE
THOUSAND FIFTY FIVE PESOS and 50/100 (P1,055.50)
unto defendants within a period of Thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Order.
Thereafter, petitioners filed the instant petition.
The issue raised for Our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the writ
of execution, the sheriff's certificate of sale and the sheriff's final deed of sale, and the orders
of June 27 and August 1, 1978 in CAR Case No. 6 Agrarian '68 as annulled and set aside.
The writ of execution is supposed to be to enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, is hereby affirmed, with the
modification that the petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut tree for
one-half of all the coconut trees which the private respondents had planted
on the land in question, without pronouncement as to cost. 3
The variance between the writ of execution and the final judgment of the court of Appeals
sought to be enforced is at once noticeable. On the basis of the judgment to be executed,
the amount to be paid by the private respondents to petitioners should be only P1,100.00,
the value of 1/2 of the 275 coconut trees planted, at the rate of P8.00 a tree already fruit
bearing or not. The writ of execution fixed the value at P2,184.00. Not being in accordance
with the judgment to be enforced, in a very substantial manner, the writ of execution was
correctly set aside as a nullity by the respondent Court of Appeals, properly acting on the
authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Gutierrez, et al. 4
The dispositive portion of decision controls in execution of judgment.
Consequently, the judgment appealed from must be sustained, being fully supported by
jurisprudential authority on the matter treated therein.
Furthermore, the records show that despite the Resolution of this Court of June 11, 1980
requiring the parties to submit their memorandum simultaneously within thirty (30) days from
notice, after the petition was given due course, the petitioner failed to file their memorandum,
while the private respondents filed their own. The petitioners, as the appellants, should feel
more under obligation to file his memorandum, just like the appellant in an ordinary appeal,
which would be dismissed for failure to file the appellant's brief.
Under the provision of Article X, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution which provides for a
period of eighteen (18) months within which an appealed case should be decided by this
Court, the appealed decision may also be deemed affirmed, this case having been submitted
for decision on October 8, 1980. I wish to go on record that I am personally for applying the
aforesaid provision with due respect to my colleagues, who may have a different view.
During my first days in January, 1979 in the Supreme Court, I had occasion to bring up, while
the Court was in session en banc, the question of why the aforementioned provision has not
been implemented despite the lapse of so long a period as more than six (6) years, at the
time, from the effectivity of the New Constitution. The answer given was that the
constitutional provision referred to is merely directory, not mandatory, and furthermore, the
court was not then in its full strength of fifteen (15) members.
We have since May 14, 1982, been brought to the full membership of (15) justices, including
the Chief Justice, as provided by the Constitution. We have heard that both the President
and the Batasan Pambansa have taken the view that the provision is mandatory. This is, too,
the view of the Court of Appeals which, while I was still there, had already started to draft
internal rules for the implementation of the cited constitutional provision and had, some years
ago, already approved said rules. Actual application of the said internal rules was, however,
held in abeyance in deferrence to the Supreme Court which has not seemed as eager to
avail of the benefits as envisioned by the provision.
I have always felt very strongly, and more so now, for the reasons above stated, that the
provision of Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and should have been
complied with immediately after the effectivity of the New Constitution. This has always been
my position, basically, on the legal principle that all provisions of the Constitution which direct
specific acts to be done, or prohibit certain acts to be done, should be construed as
mandatory. To construe them as merely directory would be to thwart the intention of the
Constitution which, its command being of the highest order should, under no circumstance,
be permitted if they are the 'great ordinances' as Justice Holmes had caned the provisions of
the Constitution (Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Island, 27 U.S. 189, 216 [1928].
The provision in question states:
Section 11. (1) Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period
within which a case or matter shall be decided or solved from the date of its
submission, shall be eighteen (18) months for the Supreme Court, and
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve (12) months for an inferior
collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all other inferior courts.
(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts,
when the applicable maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition
of the corresponding decision or resolution because the necessary vote
cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution appealed from shall be
deemed affirmed except in those cases where a qualified majority is required
and in appeals from judgment of conviction in criminal cases; and in original
special civil actions and proceedings for habeas corpus, the petition in such
cases shall be deemed dismissed; and a certification to this effect signed by
the chief magistrate of the court shall be issued and a copy thereof attached
to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the plain language of the provision, the Constitution could not have intended anything
but full and immediate compliance therewith. The manifest purpose of the provision is to
avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which always is a cause of injustice, under the
familiar aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied." It would, at the same time, ease up
the clogged dockets of the courts, which had long presented a problem that defies solution,
despite the striving of this Court in constant quest of one.
To begin with, it is, to me, not correct to say that it is impossible to comply with the provision
of Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. There is nothing hard to just follow its simple
mandate of considering an appealed decision affirmed if no decision is rendered before the
lapse of time limit set therefor. What may be impossible is for the Supreme Court, for
example, to decide a case on the merit within the eighteen (18) months given to it from its
submission for decision, because so many other appealed cases had already accumulated
and will increasingly do so, as long as We do not apply the clear mandate of the Constitution.
It is precisely with full cognizance of this fact-the impossibility of avoiding delays in disposing
of appealed cases on the merits-that prompted the adoption of this special remedy by no
less than the Constitution because similar time limitations as provided by mere statutes,
without an alternative prescription of what would be the effect of failure to meet the deadline,
had been held merely directory. To hold the Constitutional provision as also merely directory
would render it nugatory, because the unmistakable and clear intent of the framers would be
put to naught. The automatic affirmance of the appealed provision in case of failure to decide
or resolve within the time limit is precisely the alternative prescription, believed to' better
serve the cause of justice than waiting, no n-latter how long, for a decision on the merit.
This may be illustrated with a case in which a money award is made in favor of the plaintiff.
By applying the Constitution, the appealed decision is deemed affirmed if no decision is
rendered within the applicable maximum period allowed. Without the constitutional provision,
it may take many years more from the lapse of that period before decision is actually
rendered on the merits. If statistics showing that 95% more or less, of the appealed cases to
this Court are affirmed is accurate, the appealled decision would, in all probability, be
affirmed, if decision on the merits is rendered. The injustice caused by the delay becomes
instantly patent when it is considered that if the award is paid earlier, the money would have
a greater purchasing value than when it is paid years later. This is due to inflation which had
long since gripped the whole world so tightly and unrelentingly as the Constitutional
Convention was obviously aware of, for which it saw the need of inserting the unique and
novel provision in the new Constitution, as a much needed extraordinary remedy.
Under Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution, eight (8) votes are required for a decision of
the Court en banc, five (5) votes, for a decision of a Division. If the necessary vote is not
obtained, the petition is dismissed, and the appealed decision, order or resolution is then
deemed affirmed. This is what happens when this Court acts on the case within the period
fixed in Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution, but fails to obtain the necessary vote.
From this observation, it becomes apparent that to hold the provision of Section 11 of Article
X of the Constitution as only directory would make said provision serve no purpose at all,
because notwithstanding the lapse of the applicable maximum period without a decision or
resolution having been rendered, the case may nevertheless still be decided on the merit, as
if the provision did not exist.
It seems to me crystal clear that the Constitution intends that aside from the way an
appealed decision, order or resolution is deemed affirmed because of lack of necessary vote
under Section 2 of Article X, the same effect is contemplated by reason of the lapse of the
period fixed without the case being decided on the merits. If however, the maximum periods
fixed in Section 11, which is the real core of said provision, its heart and soul, as it were, may
be disregarded, because the provision is merely directory, We would be attributing to the
framers of the Constitution, with all their vision and wisdom, an act of colossal absurdity.
They have inserted a new provision which would have no different effect than what is already
covered by Section 2 of the same Article, thus rendering Section 11 a complete surplusage.
Only by holding that Section 11 is of mandatory character would such an absurdity be
avoided, as both Section 2 and Section 11 would each be given distinct Identity achieving a
common objective but through two different and separate ways: (1) the necessary vote could
not be had, under Section 2, and (2) the period fixed had lapsed, under Section 11.
It is elementary that all parts of a statute, and this should be more so of the Constitution,
should be given effect and made to serve its own distinct purpose, as no useless provision or
one without any purpose at all could have been intended to be made part of, or incorporated
in, the law. This is actually what had happened with Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution
on its being considered as merely directory, not mandatory. There has been, to my
knowledge, never any instance where Section 11 had been applied despite that it has been
in the Constitution for more than nine (9) years now. This is unheard of with reference to no
less than a constitutional mandate.
Examining how the provision works with the Court of First Instance, a one-man court, not a
collegiate court, may help in reaching the correct construction Of the provision in question. If
the Court of First Instance fails to decide the case within the 3-month period given it, what
happens? If the case is an ordinary civil action, there is no provision that after the lapse of
the 3-month period this case would be dismissed. What the provision of Section 11,
paragraph 2, makes specific mention of are only (1) appealed cases and (2) original special
civil actions. In a one-man court, the condition, "because the necessary vote could not be
had" has no application. If the period has lapsed without the decision or resolution being
rendered, that is all that is required for the appealed decision to be deemed affirmed, or the
original special civil action, dismissed, if the provision in question is to be given meaning and
purpose.
What the above observation proves is that all that paragraph 2 of Section 11 requires for the
appealed decision to be deemed affirmed and original special civil actions, dismissed, is that
the applicable maximum period has lapsed without the decision of the merits being rendered,
because of failure to act on the. case and put it to a vote, not that it was put to a vote, but
"the necessary vote could not be had." This phrase would thus appear to be either a mere
surplusage or as merely descriptive of how a decision is reached in the Supreme Court,
where alone that phrase has application. It cannot apply to the Court of Appeals, because
there the necessary votes can always be had for a decision to be reached, just like in the
oneman Court of First Instance, as long as the Court acts. What the Constitution has in and,
therefore, is "inaction" on the part of the court during the applicable period, as the reason or
cause for the failure to render a decision or resolution within the applicable period, not that
"the necessary vote cannot be had.
If the arguments thus far presented is not enough to support the view that the provision in
question is mandatory, not merely directory, We need not go outside of the text of the
provision to look for perhaps the argument that will end all arguments. The express mention
by Section 11 itself of exceptions to the automatic affirmance of appealed decisions, orders
or resolutions when not reversed or modified within the prescribed period, namely, (1) cases
where a qualified majority is required and (2) appeals from judgment of conviction in c cases,
which even after the lapse of the fixed period may still be decided on the merits, clearly,
means under the maxim "expressio inius est exclusio alterius," that aside from the
exceptions expressly mentioned, all other cases may no longer be decided on the merits
after the lapse of the applicable maximum period. The appealed decision, order and
resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall then be so certified by the chief magistrate of
the court, as provided in the last part of paragraph 2 of Section 11. Said provision would be
rendered also useless by holding Section 11 merely directory because the occasion for the
certification will never arise. It will thus be seen that the exceptions expressly mentioned in
the provision and the certification required thereby as just pointed out, argue most eloquently
and convincingly in favor of the mandatory character of Section 11 of Article X of the New
Constitution.
It may have to be stressed that in any case where, by operation of the constitutional
provision, the appealed decision, again for example, of the Court of Appeals, is deemed
affirmed by the Supreme Court, because the latter has not been able to decide the appeal on
the merits within the prescribed period, no member of the Court is meant to be singled out
for any culpability or dereliction of duty. Neither is any adverse reflection meant to be made
against the Court as a whole, because there is in the Constitution an implicit recognition of
the probability of many appealed cases not being decided or resolved within the period as
short as that prescribed, not because of culpable neglect, inefficiency or incompetence of
any member of the Court or of the Court itself as a body, but because of sheer physical
impossibility. A contrary view which to me is completely unfounded, seems to be what has
created a very strong influence towards holding the provision as merely directory, to avoid
incurring in some form of guilt or culpability for not deciding an appealed case within the time
limit set.
Another deterrent, as has been perceived during our deliberation, to holding the provision in
question as mandatory, is the fear that an our decisions already rendered reversing or
modifying the appealed decisions after the lapse of the period prescribed, would be
questioned even at this late hour. I do not share in this fear because to me, what the
provision does is to give a party the right to invoke its mandate and enjoy its beneficial
effects. As all rights go, the particular right to demand for the certification of the Chief
Magistrate that the appealed decision is deemed affirmed by the lapse of the specified period
without a decision on the merits having been rendered, is waivable, and is deemed waived if
not invoked within a reasonable time from notice of the questioned decision. At least, the
Supreme Court can come up with this ruling, should a case be brought up to raise the
question as above intimated, a ruling, I believe, would be impressed with absolute rationality
and soundness.
In any event, what should engage the Court's attention is to work out a procedure that would
avoid, as much as possible, having to apply the automatic affirmance as provided in the
Constitution. I am convinced of the possibility of the adoption of such a workable procedure.
The Constitution provides that the conclusion of the Court shall be reached in consultation
before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court (Section
8, Article X). Setting a case for that required consultation can reasonably be done within just
months from its submission for decision, long before the lapse of the applicable period. This
same case had already been discussed among the members, and dismissing it or giving due
course to it is not so difficult a matter to determine. Either of these actions is usually taken in
the session when the agenda in which the new petition is placed is discussed just one day or
so after the new cases are assigned to the members for report and recommendation as to
what action to take. There should perhaps be less difficulty in reaching the final conclusion
when, after a long period of study, and with the aid of briefs and/or memoranda, the Court
next sits in consultation to reach its decision. It is seldom that the taking of the vote of each
member on the issue to be resolved has not been held forthwith, following the consultation or
exchange of view. After the voting, the case is actually decided on the merits, or the
appealed decision, order or resolution is deemed affirmed by operation of the Constitution,
depending on the result of the voting.
If this procedure is adopted, no unnecessary delay need be incurred in. What really takes
some time is the writing of the decision by the ponente who is chosen after a final conclusion
is reached, because most often if not always, he has many other opinions to write. But if by
appropriate Resolution, which may be just a Minute Resolution, it would be made of record
that in that session when the voting was held after the required consultation, the Court had
reached its conclusion the case has, in fact, been already decided, at least for the purpose of
compliance with the Constitution. The decision complete with the opinion as written by the
ponente chosen for the purpose may be actually released later, as indeed, there have been
instances when decisions were promulgated without prejudice to the writing of the extended
opinion.
It is believed that under the procedure as roughly described above, but with the finer details
to be laid down, the disposition of any case in this Court can take place well within the period
fixed by the Constitution, specially if greater strictness is observed in giving due course to
every petition filed with this Court, which at times tends to be quite liberal in this regard.
As to the original special civil actions including habeas corpus, my recollection fails me as to
whether any such kind of action has not been disposed of on the merits within the applicable
period. In any event, all that the Constitution mandates with respect to original special civil
actions is that the petitions in such cases shall be deemed dismissed if the necessary vote
cannot be had within the period fixed, which as previously explained, is actually another way
of saying that no decision has been rendered. And to repeat, no culpability is intended to
attach to anyone of the Court for the happening of this eventuality.
I really see no impossibility in complying with what the Constitution intends to be an urgently
needed remedy to avoid injustice, as earlier stated, under the well-known dictum that 'justice
delayed is justice denied," at the same time helping solve the vexing problem of clogged
dockets. Why, indeed, can We not just consider the appealed decision as affirmed, as the
Constitution so unequivocally ordains, if, by reason of physical impossibility, which would free
the Court on any of its members from any fear of guilt or culpability, a decision of the appeal
on the merits within the period considered by the Constitution long enough for an appealed
case to remain unresolved may not be rendered? Is it because a decision is the correct
decision only when We, ourselves, render that decision on the merits when the case is
brought to Us on appeal? Who knows but that had there been a court higher than the
Supreme Court, the latter's decision may also be reversed or altered? Many a time a
judgment of a Court of First Instance was reversed by the Court of Appeals, but when an
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed
and that the lower court sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, and the instant petition, dismissed,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Guerrero, J., concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr. and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. I consider the dissertation on Art. X, Sec.11 of the Constitution
superfluous.
Barredo (Chairman), J., concurs.
AQUINO, J., concurring:

This case is about the implementation of an erroneous writ of execution. The Court of
Agrarian Relations at Butuan City in its decision dated April 14, 1971 ordered the spouses
Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo Libarnes (landowners) to pay the spouses Dionisio
Malacora and Lucia Marabulas (tenants) the sum of P2,595 for 1/2 of all the coconut trees
plus ten pesos for one-half of the banana plants on the tenanted land (Case No. 6).
In a 1974 decision, the Court of Appeals modified that decision by requiring the Libarnes
spouses to pay the Malacora spouses eight pesos a tree for one-half of an the coconut trees
which the Malacora spouses had planted (CA-G.R. No. 00658R).
To enforce that judgment, the trial court issued a writ of execution dated October 4, 1974,
requiring the Libarnes spouses to pay the Malacora spouses the sum of P2,184 for
the 273 coconut trees planted by the latter, instead of only one-half of that amount or P1,092
only.
The sheriff enforced the said writ of execution for P2,184 by levying on the land of the
Libarnes spouses located at Barrio Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Sur. The land was sold
at an auction sale to the Malacora spouses for P3,500. The corresponding certificate of sale
was issued to them. A final deed of sale was issued to them on February 21, 1976 in view of
the failure of the Libarnes spouses to redeem the land.
Later, the Malacora spouses filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. In
resolving that motion, the Agrarian Court recomputed the amount due from the Libarnes
spouses under the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It found that they were liable only
for P1,100 as one-half of the value of 275 coconut trees at eight pesos per tree. But the trial
court did not annul the execution. It simply ordered the Malacora spouses to pay the
Libarnes spouses the excess amount of P1,495.
In a subsequent order, that excess amount was recomputed and reduced to P1,055. The trial
court directed that a writ of possession be issued. Those two orders were assailed in the
Court of Appeals by means of certiorari.
The Appellate Court in its decision dated February 13, 1979, through Justice Escolin,
annulled the said orders and declared void the auction sale, the certificate of sale and the
final deed of sale issued to the Malacora spouses because the writ of execution did not
conform to its 1974 judgment (Libarnes vs. Judge Hidalgo, CA- G. R. No. 08321-SP). From
that decision, the Malacora spouses appealed to this Court.
I concur in the opinion of Justice De Castro that the judgment under appeal should be
affirmed because the writ of execution was void.
However, I disagree with his personal view that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
be affirmed on the additional ground that, as this case was submitted for decision on October
6, 1980, the period of eighteen months for deciding it, as fixed in section 11, Article X of the
Constitution, had already expired.
In my opinion, it is impossible for this Court to comply with the eighteen-month period
because of the thousand of judicial, administrative and disbarment cases pending decision.
Since the Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973, this Court has never complied with
the eighteen-month period.
Some Justices consider that provision directory. There is an opinion that the judgment or
order' under appeal is deemed affirmed after the expiration of the eighteen-month
period only when there is a showing that "the necessary note cannot be had". In the absence
of such a showing, the automatic affirmance of the judgment or order under appeal not take
place.
Separate Opinions
I concur in the result. I consider the dissertation on Art. X, Sec.11 of the Constitution
superfluous.
Barredo (Chairman), J., concurs.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
This case is about the implementation of an erroneous writ of execution. The Court of
Agrarian Relations at Butuan City in its decision dated April 14, 1971 ordered the spouses
Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo Libarnes (landowners) to pay the spouses Dionisio
Malacora and Lucia Marabulas (tenants) the sum of P2,595 for 1/2 of all the coconut trees
plus ten pesos for one-half of the banana plants on the tenanted land (Case No. 6).
In a 1974 decision, the Court of Appeals modified that decision by requiring the Libarnes
spouses to pay the Malacora spouses eight pesos a tree for one-half of an the coconut trees
which the Malacora spouses had planted (CA-G.R. No. 00658R).
To enforce that judgment, the trial court issued a writ of execution dated October 4, 1974,
requiring the Libarnes spouses to pay the Malacora spouses the sum of P2,184 for
the 273 coconut trees planted by the latter, instead of only one-half of that amount or P1,092
only.
The sheriff enforced the said writ of execution for P2,184 by levying on the land of the
Libarnes spouses located at Barrio Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Sur. The land was sold
at an auction sale to the Malacora spouses for P3,500. The corresponding certificate of sale
was issued to them. A final deed of sale was issued to them on February 21, 1976 in view of
the failure of the Libarnes spouses to redeem the land.
Later, the Malacora spouses filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. In
resolving that motion, the Agrarian Court recomputed the amount due from the Libarnes
spouses under the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It found that they were liable only
for P1,100 as one-half of the value of 275 coconut trees at eight pesos per tree. But the trial
court did not annul the execution. It simply ordered the Malacora spouses to pay the
Libarnes spouses the excess amount of P1,495.
In a subsequent order, that excess amount was recomputed and reduced to P1,055. The trial
court directed that a writ of possession be issued. Those two orders were assailed in the
Court of Appeals by means of certiorari.
The Appellate Court in its decision dated February 13, 1979, through Justice Escolin,
annulled the said orders and declared void the auction sale, the certificate of sale and the
final deed of sale issued to the Malacora spouses because the writ of execution did not
conform to its 1974 judgment (Libarnes vs. Judge Hidalgo, CA- G. R. No. 08321-SP). From
that decision, the Malacora spouses appealed to this Court.
I concur in the opinion of Justice De Castro that the judgment under appeal should be
affirmed because the writ of execution was void.
However, I disagree with his personal view that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
be affirmed on the additional ground that, as this case was submitted for decision on October
6, 1980, the period of eighteen months for deciding it, as fixed in section 11, Article X of the
Constitution, had already expired.
In my opinion, it is impossible for this Court to comply with the eighteen-month period
because of the thousand of judicial, administrative and disbarment cases pending decision.
Since the Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973, this Court has never complied with
the eighteen-month period.
Some Justices consider that provision directory. There is an opinion that the judgment or
order' under appeal is deemed affirmed after the expiration of the eighteen-month
period only when there is a showing that "the necessary note cannot be had". In the absence
of such a showing, the automatic affirmance of the judgment or order under appeal not take
place.
Footnotes
1 p. 17, Rollo.
2 pp: 13-16, Rollo.
3 p. 60, Rollo.
4 108 Phil. 215.
5 Presto vs. Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Castillo vs. Nagtalon, 4 SCRA 48;
Philippine American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Flores, 97 SCRA 811.
MARCELINO V CRUZ
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION.
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983

BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL
WARDEN OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL,respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando
Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled People of the
Philippines versus Bernardino Marcelino, and for release from detention of petitioner, the
accused in said case, on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the
case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90] days from submission
thereof.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his
case on August 4, 1975. On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved
for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial court granted the
motion as follows:
Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to submit their
respective memoranda, simultaneously, and thereafter the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision of the Court.
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was
filed by the People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in
said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975. 1
A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the
Grace Park Post Office 2to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and 011981, addressed
to Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango Road, Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining witness, and
Atty, Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg., Intramuros, Manila, counsel for the accused,
respectively, were posted in said office on December 4, 1975. These notices were received by the
respective addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975. 3
Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig and to the Provincial Warden of
Pasig, Rizal, who both received them on December 2,1975, 4
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for
postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Acceding to
counsel's request that he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to take, the
respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976 at 8:30 A. M.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the
promulgation of decision. Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the
promulgation to January 26, 1976.
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before Us the present
petition. On January 16, 1976, this Court issued an Order temporarily restraining respondent
judge from promulgating the decision in Criminal Case No, C-5910.
Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character
and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the
unresolved case.
We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty- five [851 days
from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent
judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus
veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the
Constitution.
In Comia v. Nicolas, 5 Ago v. Court of Appeals 6 and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance 7 this
Court ruled that the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed
decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by
petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this
date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the
case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as
the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at at a later date, considering that
notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is
beyond the control of the judge. As pointed out in People v. Court of Appeals 8, the promulgation
of a judgment in the trial court does not necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the
judge of the clerk of court.
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:
SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period
within which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its
submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate
courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered by
this Court. Thus, in approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what Mr. Cooley
characterizes as "very dangerous ground when they [referring to the courts] venture to apply
rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution." 9
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory,
unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest." 10 "The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined
on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law." 11
In Trapp v. McCormick, 12 a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation
of thirty [30] days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was
held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time
of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident
of the essential act. " Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to
be directory.
On this view, authorities are one in saying that:

Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the
trial or verdict have been held by some courts to be merely directory so that
non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it."
[American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742;
Heillen v. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39,
State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585, 5 Ann. Cas. 1000, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023, 92 S.W.
484; Wissman v. Meagher, 115 Mo. App. 82, 91 S.W. 448; Pohle v.
Dickmann, 67 Mo. App. 381; Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co., 61 Mo.
App. 454].
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration.
In Mikell v. School Dis. of Philadelphia, 13 it was ruled that "the legal distinction between
directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws."
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme
Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court
in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New Constitution to
"promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... " And there
can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency,
relates merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, 14 declares that
constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely
procedural.
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at
various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior
courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted
to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the
general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts
with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts,
through which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by
reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd
situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.
As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his Construction and Interpretation of the
Laws, 15 the constitutional provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus, where
the contrary construction) would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it
should not be followed. "
One last point, Notwithstanding Our conclusion that courts are not divested of their
jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the
rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their
salas must be decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact a
certificate to this certificate is required before judges are allowed Lo draw their salaries.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the Restraining Order dated January
16, 1976 issued by this Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. is already
deceased, his successor is hereby ordered to decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis
of the record thereof within ninety [90] days from the time the case is raffled to him.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions

I concur and I wish to add the following observations:
The petitioner sinks release from detention on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of the trial
court allegedly because its judge failed to decide his case within 90 days from the date of its
submission. Section 11(1), Art. X of the Constitution is invoked.
The main opinion states that the 90-day period was not exceeded in this case and I agree.
But exceeded or not, a decision rendered by an inferior court outside of the 90-day period is
not void for loss of jurisdiction. To hold otherwise is to make the administration of justice
depend heavily on the frailities of a human judge. A decision rendered beyond the 90-day
period, I submit, is valid and the only consequence is to subject the erring judge to
administrative action. "... failure to comply with the injunction for judges to decide their cases
within 90 days from submission merely deprives them of their right to collect their salaries or
to apply for leave (section 5, Judiciary Act of 1948; section 129, Revised Administrative
Code) but does not deprive them of jurisdiction to act in the causes pending before them."
(Dimson vs. Elepao, 99 Phil. 733, 737 ,1956].)
The judge who wrote the questioned decision has died. It cannot now be promulgated. "It is
well-settled that, to be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon." (People vs. So, July 30, 1957,
No. L-8732, citing Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Crescini, 37 Phil.
675; Barredo v. The Commission on Elections, 45 Off. Gaz. 4457; People v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-9111-9113.) For this reason, petitioner's case has to be declared by
another judge.
Separate Opinions
I concur and I wish to add the following observations:
The petitioner sinks release from detention on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of the trial
court allegedly because its judge failed to decide his case within 90 days from the date of its
submission. Section 11(1), Art. X of the Constitution is invoked.
The main opinion states that the 90-day period was not exceeded in this case and I agree.
But exceeded or not, a decision rendered by an inferior court outside of the 90-day period is
not void for loss of jurisdiction. To hold otherwise is to make the administration of justice
depend heavily on the frailities of a human judge. A decision rendered beyond the 90-day
period, I submit, is valid and the only consequence is to subject the erring judge to
administrative action. "... failure to comply with the injunction for judges to decide their cases
within 90 days from submission merely deprives them of their right to collect their salaries or
to apply for leave (section 5, Judiciary Act of 1948; section 129, Revised Administrative
Code) but does not deprive them of jurisdiction to act in the causes pending before them."
(Dimson vs. Elepao, 99 Phil. 733, 737 ,1956].)
The judge who wrote the questioned decision has died. It cannot now be promulgated. "It is
well-settled that, to be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon." (People vs. So, July 30, 1957,
No. L-8732, citing Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Crescini, 37 Phil.
675; Barredo v. The Commission on Elections, 45 Off. Gaz. 4457; People v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-9111-9113.) For this reason, petitioner's case has to be declared by
another judge.
Footnotes
1 Annex 5, Respondent's Comment.
2 Annex 4, Respondent's Comment.
3 Annexes 2, 2-B, Respondent's Comment.
4 Annexes 2-a and 3-a, Respondent's Comment.
5 29 SCRA 492.
6 6 SCRA 530.
7 83 SCRA 122.
8 99 Phil. 786.
9 I Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 159.
10 16 C.J.S. 174.
11 Huffines v. Gold, 154 Tenn. 583, at page 588, 288 S.W. 353, page 354;
Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn. 471, 527, 530; 125 S.W. 664; Covington's
Case, State ex rel Atty. Gen. V. Covington, 29 Ohio St., 102,117.
12 130 S.W. 2d 122, 125,175 Tenn.
13 58 A. 2d 359 Pa. 113,4 A.L.R. 2d 692.
14 121, S.E.60. 62.
15 Sec. 13. p, 28.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46903
July 23, 1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of
Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda.
Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was
opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree
upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously
argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing
Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such
collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the
inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the
decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited
collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted
daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free
portion of Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court ** holding
that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception
to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of
the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and
Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng
aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may
karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat
din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob
kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa
kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng
kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito
at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa
kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang
aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao
na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui
ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung
tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the
legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the
precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of
Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties
donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little
1awphil
consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed
donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to
collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of
that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the
decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period
prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v.
Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not
deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII,
Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed
with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been
clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by
the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner.
It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Record on Appeal, pp. 14-23.
Ibid., pp. 69-73.
Judge Manuel T. Reyes.
Rollo, pp. 16-25.
**
San Diego, J., ponente, and Busran and Jimenez, JJ.
Ibid., pp. 31-35.
Id., pp. 15-16.
Tagalog Forms for Notaries Public, Rosendo Ignacio, 1967, 2nd. Ed., pp. 21, 23, 26,
28, 31.
6
121 SCRA 51; New Frontier Mines vs. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502; Federation of free
farmers vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-41222, Nov. 13, 1985.
7

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L.

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING

[A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA. March 27, 2001]

In Re: Derogatory news Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct.

21 July 2000 issue of The Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. 20.

Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguin, presiding.

TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 35.

Compliance of SP Pablo C. Formaran III, dated 1 August 2000.

TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 25-26.

Id., pp. 26-27.

TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 73-74.

Compliance of CSP Jovencito R. Zuo, dated 2 August 2000.

TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 53; Exh. V.

5 January 2001 Report of Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, p. 12.

See Note 28, p. 11.

TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 74.

Counter Affidavit of respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria, pars. 1 and 2.

TSN, 8 September 2000, p. 8.

Memorandum of the Respondent, p. 20; TSN, 13 November 2000, p. 82.

Compliance of Justice Demetria, dated 24 July 2000, p. 1.

See Note 30.

Dia-Aonuevo v. Beracio, AM No. 177-MJ, 27 November 1975, 68 SCRA 81.

Candia v. Tagabucba, AM No. 528, MJ, 12 September 1977, 79 SCRA 51.

Barja v. Judge Beracio, AM No. 561-MJ, 29 December 1976, 74 SCRA 355.

Republic of the Philippines

5 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and

October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G.

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The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a

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According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's

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Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after

so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter

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The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The

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Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is

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The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary

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It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to

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Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the

substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning

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It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the

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This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted

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Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by

squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under

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Petition is therefore granted.