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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be
done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that
evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land
registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.

SECOND DIVISION
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily
for private respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute
that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not
material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case
amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate
of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on
Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:

G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998


LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
TEKSHENG, respondents.

HON.

ANTONIO

J.

FINEZA,

and

LEE

MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his father, herein private
respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. 2 In his answer with
counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered solely
in petitioner's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal
properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal
regime but was registered in petitioner's name only as a trustee considering that at
that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private
respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of
the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the
case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT
8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by
the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or
harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court
pending litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice
of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA),
but to no avail. 4
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an
incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to
thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be
passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack
of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as

Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. A certificate of title


shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. 6 (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title.
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to
ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently
confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the
best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 7 Besides, the certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 8 Mere issuance
of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or
that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but
is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not
be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership
although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioner's
fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private
respondent. 9 What the latter disputes is the former's claim of sole
ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may have become
incontrovertible one year after issuance, 10 yet contrary to his argument, it
does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership. 11
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the
motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of procedure 12 or
substance, 13 a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which
are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse
party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was

convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the
cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that such annotation
amounts to a collateral attack of petitioner's certificate of title or that ownership cannot
be adjudicated in a partition case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties are still locked in a legal battle to
settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation
pending litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public that parcel of
land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is forewarned of
such fact.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION,
FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY,respondents-appellees.

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice it
to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect partition of the property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that
the land belongs to him. 16 Besides, an action for partition is one case where the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.17

AQUlNO, J.:

Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the
parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the spouses
during their marriage. 18 In addition, private respondent in his answer with
counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue
of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must present their respective
evidence to substantiate their respective allegations. 19Considering that this is a
partition case, the court is required to inquire into the "nature and extent of title" of the
supposed claimant. 20 The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of
the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529,
although the latter may be considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979

the

Philippines
COURT

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.


Gonzalo D. David for respondents.

These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens
titles whose originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled
for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and
twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon
City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as shown in
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
both dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They
were not destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding cancelled titles
for those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the
name of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing
at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the
title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915. She alleged that she was the owner
of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she could not specify, was
"N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677). The petition was sworn to on
November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52, Consolidated
Record on Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on
June 14, 1968. The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies
thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished
the supposed adjoining owners (53-54, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The
registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the
petition and notice of hearing.

4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did
not oppose the petition. Laborada presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of
court. Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the
petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not
available and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The
transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The
plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner of Land
Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition (pp. 53-56,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the
title for Lot No. 915 in the name of Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not
appealed. It became final and executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August
14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot No. 915 was later subdivided
into seven lots, Lots Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land
Registration approved the subdivision plan. The register of deeds cancelled TCT No.
(N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada, namely, TCT
Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59, 61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisco
S. Bombast, single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the
lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of
another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N.A" or
not available. She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was
destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on
the same date, November 16, 1967, before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it
was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was not explained. (17-21,
Consolidated Record on Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in
Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the
Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and
copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners (22, Consolidated Record
on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing were served upon the
registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be interested in
the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original
of the title was really missing.

9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the
government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon, Judge Salvador in his
order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title
was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's
duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid
for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The technical description of the land the plan
were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who submitted a report
recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record on
Appeal).
10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of
Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register of deeds
issued to Bombast Transfer Certificate of Title No. N.A.4(R) dated August 27,
1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title,
Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of
1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was the same address used by
Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold
Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation
allegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the
corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and
annulment of the reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil
Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of
the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation were assigned, issued on June
5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and
Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction
regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate
answers containing mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro
forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of the preliminary
injunction sought by the State. After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents
corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the defense
that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.
14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself)
rendered a decision in the two cases holding that the State's evidence was insufficient
to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that

Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were purchasers in good faith
and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered
allegedly in conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the
reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the
originals before the reconstitution" (pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
The State appealed.
15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders
of reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no longer be set aside on
May 26, 1970, when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of the reconstituted
titles were filed, and that if there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as
between two innocent parties, the State, as the party that made possible the
reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section 101 of Act
496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the registration
of any other person as owner of such land".
The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate
Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of the reconstituted
titles which, although issued with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and
forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos.
C-677 and C-763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and
Bombast for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty
hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable value.
The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court
and the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B., Domondon and Ericta,
JJ.), is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast
on the false or perjurious assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the
war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of
justice. It was a stultification of the judicial process. One and the same judge (1)
allowed the reconstitution and then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the
cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso
facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the
said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be
given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in
bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the
source of legitimate rights and benefits.

Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It
is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and
available in the registry of deeds. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos.
C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and
beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in
the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow
Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480,
per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered
owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to
impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering
Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible
because the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was
reconstituted. That circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the
necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where
they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed
and set aside. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763
are declared void and are set aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R,
34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and subdivision plan connected
therewith are likewise declared void. The register of deeds is directed to cancel the
said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, is hereby declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918 of the Tala
Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry
of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.

From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally
and technically.
I. General description. It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected
thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90,
92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River;
bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the
Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for
66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez
for 62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the
attached plan.
II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present
month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the
topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and
two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located
in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96
Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on
the plan with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the
northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez
was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 40' W., 27.75 meters is
located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the topographical
operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net

G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914


MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.
Southworth and Faison for appellants.
D. R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner,
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system,
four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which
were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parcels to which attention
need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.

| Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |


|
stations.
|
degrees.
|
in
meters.
|
|

| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |


| B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |
|
D
to
E
|
S.
40
50'
E
|
13.20
|
|
| E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
|
F
to
G
|
N.
52
00'
E
|
10.94
|
|
|
G
to
H
|
N.
37
10'
W
|
24.90
|
|
|
H
to
I
|
N.
35
45'
W
|
6.56
|
|
| I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
|
J
to
K
|
N.
35
00'
W
|
7.60
|
|
|
K
to
A
|
N.
42
05'
W
|
25.50
|
|

The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points
specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and
its boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River;
on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the
heirs of Antonio Enriquez.

The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which
accompanied the petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."
{bmc 029035a.bmp}
By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it
will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44, 30' W., and that
the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S.
46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called to this difference between
the technical description and the plan at this time, but its importance to the questions
presented will be discussed below.
Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing
the chain of title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners
of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as follows:
The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the
parcels of land conterminous with this estate are, according to my
information:
The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys
Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P.
Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San Miguel.
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the
chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles of the
Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the title of the
petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of March, 1906, presented a very
carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said
Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the recommends the registration of said Parcel
A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario,
judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of section 31
of Act No. 496, issued the following notice:
UNITED
PHILIPPINE
[Registration
of
Case No. 1895.]

STATES
title.

OF
Court

of

Land

AMERICA,
ISLANDS.
Registration.

To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal


Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90;
Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90
interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; Rosendo
Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No.

28; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs.


Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No.
34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226,
and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng
Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros
No. 113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan,
Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle
Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros;
Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores
Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district
of San Miguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso
Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and Gervasio Rosario Ventura,
Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of Santa Cruz;
and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of
the city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:
Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio
Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to
register and confirm her title in the following described land: Four parcels of
land with the improvements of strong materials thereon, situated in the
district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as
follows:
Parcel A. Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked
"A" on plan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at
the S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W.,
31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m.
to pt. "C"; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt. "E"; N.
49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36 20' W.,
14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to
pt. "J"; N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N.
40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N. 44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the
NW. bank of the Pasig River.
Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the
Pasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by
the Escolta.
Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held
at the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day
of April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show
cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and place
aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken
as confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting said application
or any decree entered thereon.

Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March
in the year nineteen hundred and six.
Attest:
Clerk of said Court.

A.

K.

JONES,

In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land
Registration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of the
persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of said
persons received a copy of said notice, including the representative of the heirs of
Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the
certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was
posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been
published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La
Democracia.
On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration,
made the following certificate relating to the notice and to the publication of the
notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496.
UNITED
STATES
PHILIPPINE
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

OF

AMERICA,
ISLANDS.

Case No. 1895.

In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said
petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at
the place mentioned in said notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No
one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A
was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner and My.
Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr.
Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact that there existed certain
errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by the
petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said
errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in
the plan of said Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the
honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgment in
default against all persons:
UNITED
STATES
PHILIPPINE
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.


I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a
notice referring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio
Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian,
was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila
Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same
month and year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served
upon the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of
the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon
Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano
Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams &
Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim;
Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and
Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura;
and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to
each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of the
necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April,
1906.
A.
K.
Clerk of the Court.

On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the
city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court calling its
attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A,
and asked the court to correct the error. The said attorney also called the attention of
the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the original petition. Our
attention has not been called to any order made by the lower court, relating to said
request of the attorney of the city of Manila.

OF

AMERICA,
ISLANDS.

No. 1895.
Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for
registration of the real estate described herein,
vs.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board
of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M.
Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng
Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez;
Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico;
Lim Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores
Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario
Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern,
defendants.

JONES,
The present case having been duly tried, and

Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in
due from referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of
general circulation, one printed in the English language and another in the
Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia
of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice
was effected;
Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days
after the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish
language to each one of the persons named in the application or who
appeared to be concerned therein;

31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42
E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N.,
49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence
N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I;
thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to
point K; thence N., 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14
m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to point of beginning; having an
area of 1,817.03 square meters.
All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic;
date of survey, December 26, 1905.

Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the


parcels of land included in the application a certified copy of the notice in
Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building
of the city of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding that set for the
termination of the period fixed;

Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of
the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however
to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act that may be in
force and effect.

Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to


impugn the application, within the period fixed by the law;

Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land
Registration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and
six, at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian.

This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and
other persons who may be concerned in opposing the application, which is
granted.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land
Registration, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.
Attest:
Clerk of the Court.

A.

K.

Attest:
[SEAL.]
(Sgd.)
Clerk of the Court.

A.

K.

Jones,

A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September
25, 1906.

JONES,

Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that
said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows:
Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is
the absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located
in the city of Manila, the description whereof is hereinafter set forth:
A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo;
bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE.
by the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of Antonio
Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.
Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49
40' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of
Calle Escolta and Passage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W.,

On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No.
742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became
registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of
July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of Land Registration
until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after
said land had been registered, when we find that the assistant attorney of the city of
Manila filed the following petition:
UNITED
STATES
PHILIPPINE
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.
MOTION.

OF

AMERICA,
ISLANDS.

The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the
court and respectfully represents;

(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to
96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.

I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected
by an error of closure greater than 1/1500;

(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos.
28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.

II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has
to expropriate a portion of said land for use as a public street;

(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No.
149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.

Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said
property described in the plan filed in this case.

2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel
of land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle
Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire
that occurred on the 2d of November of the year just past, and it cannot
therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.

Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.


It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or
to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were
included in the petition of the petitioner.
On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the
Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the chief
surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported
to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered
the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Act No.
1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa
Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate issued to
her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands
included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:
UNITED
STATES
PHILIPPINE
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:

OF

AMERICA,
ISLANDS.

Case No. 1895.


Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.
Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and
represents:
1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and
representation of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four
estates, among them the following:

3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate
designated by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents
United States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States
currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b) was
assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the
buildings at 15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the
estate designated by the letter (c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites
States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States currency.
4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and
technical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are
annexed to the above-entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land
which form part of the estates under consideration there are erected
buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind the other,
in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in
that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in
that designated by the letter (c).
5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries
referring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of
land and the buildings stated.
6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the
tenants, and owners conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the
buildings erected on them are likewise mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the
estates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the
application; but in the certificate of the decree or resolution under
consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the parcel
of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building
on each was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title,
Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which accompany this application.

8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal
representative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund,
the rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed
valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts and vouchers
wherefore do not accompany this application because the applicant
destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but
averring that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the
accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the office of the
register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a person delegated therefor
by the applicant.

On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W.
Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the order of
the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of
correcting the errors in closure in the original plan presented by the petitioner on the
10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see page 48):

9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned


she observed the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the
building existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of title
corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed that said
omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly
affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the
request that you order the correction of said omission, especially as there at
present exist on the said parcels of land, without modification or alteration,
the same buildings that existed when legalization of title thereto was applied
for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-entitled
case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.

(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her
certificate of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in accordance with
her original petition; and

10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said
estates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building
erected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or propertytax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein are stated the two points
mentioned.
11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant
prays the honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings,
correction of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new
certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein record be made of the
building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third
paragraph of this application.
Manila, February 28, 1912.
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.
On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a
communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March,
1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her rights, title, and
interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple
Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the
judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a
new certificate to it.

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:


(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;

(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it
in accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria del Consuelo

{bmc 029048.bmp}

Felisa Roxas y Chuidian after notice had been given to all the interested
parties, were set down for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said
motion were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the
24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in addition to the appointment of
a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon the question of the
correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During
said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made
some objection to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement
in which their specific objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and
specific statement of their objections appears in the argument of their counsel at the
close of said several hearings, in which it appears that their objections to the
correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to
the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that
they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of
Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and the
Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the
24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of
Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple
Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a
motion for new trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lower court
were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a

new trial and after hearing the respective parties, the Court of Land Registration,
sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto
Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In this court
the respondents presented the following assignments of error:

accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk
that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall
be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such
service."

1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of
Land Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.

On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the
granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no
person appears and answer within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default
to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for confessed. By the
description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made parties
defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be
bound by the report of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."

2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.


3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of
said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but
little argument against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of August, 1912.
Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the
original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason
that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of the original action to confirm the
title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the pendency of the
original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez.
Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its
members represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record
shows, as we have pointed out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan,
Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez,
and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the record now in vain to
find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the representatives of said heirs,
even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the
present proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found
in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that
said attorneys were not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the
time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show any attempt on their
part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original action. The
appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was absolutely necessary in
order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by that
argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was
invalid, but that the original certificate (No. 742) was void, because they had not been
served with personal notice. This brings us to the question whether or not personal
notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property
under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said
registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the
pendency of the original petition had been given and that a publication of the same
had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No.
496. After the expiration of the period during which notice must be given, the original
cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land
Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and published in

The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the


appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice as an
absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No.
496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land
and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it
may concern.'"
There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not
absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section 32
(Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require
proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to all persons who appear to
have an interest in or claim to the land included in the application." It will be noted
also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give any notice
to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31
and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice
of the application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem
proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from
any obligation whatsoever to give motive to any person of the pendency of his
application to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true,
upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or delay or additional
expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice?
Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have
suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law.
(Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the
registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions of section
38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless he can show,
within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the granting of the
certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by
fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and
interest." In the present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for

the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not
intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightes degree.

so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly concerning either the character or the
extent of such claims.

While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many
States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The requirements
relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the
law has been attacked many times, because of the provision of said law relating to
notices. This is not the first time that the question has been presented to this court.
The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la
Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the
ground that fraud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The
existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In
passing upon that question, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said
(quoting from the syllabus):

The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of


registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the
reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great
difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants.
Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the
transfer of titles.

In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the
appellee herein was made a party- defendant by publication, but was not
personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land
Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the world.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in
rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res,
may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the
claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it.
Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a
proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to
make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were
known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding
is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant
(Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The record shows
that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registration of her
land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged even with negligence. The record
shows that she did all the law required her to do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is
the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land
of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land
registration is a system for the registration of title to land only, and not a system
established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may be acquired by
said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner has,
shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever
character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the
certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing
in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of his title.
The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims,
absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and to make there a record,

Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not
necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. (Grey
Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American
Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first established in admiralty
proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case. The owner of
a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant ports of
the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food.
The very nature of its business necessitated the making of contracts. The
continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get
credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be
able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to continue its
voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the
"ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner.
Consequently there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of
carrying into effect the broader purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been
universally considered that the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice
Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, and now a
member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges
(175 Mass., 71), in discussing this question, said:
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary
requirements of justice, a proceedingin rem, dealing with a tangible res, may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts
or the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this
not so, for it hardly would dot to make a distinction between the
constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff,
95 U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of
their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may occur. For
instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by
publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings,
as well as the rights of claimants against estates of deceased persons, personal
notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also unknown
claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for

the condemnation of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases
in which personal service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.

certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end and unknown claims
cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."

The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be
quited "by notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256,
274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18
Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs.Griggs,
134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal., 580.)

Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the
American Land Company vs.Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions
of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a
case may be conceived where rights in and to property would be adversely affected
without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the
power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."

Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to
provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had control
over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a
state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning
the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the models of
establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these question, it (the
state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters,
195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402;
Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70;
Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be
acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to establish the
method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47;
Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150
Cal., 208, 305; Perkinsvs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the
adjudication of title in a proceedingin rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in rem,
which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20
Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67;
McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National
Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep.,
175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppinvs. McLaughlin, 122
Iowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges,
175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24;
Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134
U.S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real
estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing
substituted services against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of
quieting title should not be limited to known persons. In order to make such a law
valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be made to operate on
all interest and persons known or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this
question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial
proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning
of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claims indeed

The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank
(18 N.Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases
for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are made with respect to
these remedies by it may possibly happen, notwithstanding all these precautions, that
a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the acts mentioned in the statutes,
may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the process by which it
has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this legislation,
that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute
a legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the legislature to determine
in the particular instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation,
and what manner of constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the
party proceeded against of the Legal steps which are taken against him. (American
Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs.Kerrigan,
150 Cal., 289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the
American Land Company vs.Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and the
decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand
how it is authority in support of the contention of the appellants here. The facts in that
case are as follows:
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the
country San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April,
1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of the county
recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was destroyed by fire; that on the
18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was the owner
and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that
his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of
owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or
demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss,
prayed that the be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said
parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from
all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever.
Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be the owner of
and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that
no one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part
thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.

Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of
the pendency of the action was published in certain newspaper, as was required by
law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute. No one
having appeared and opposed the granting of the petition of the complaint, or claimed
any interest in or lien upon the property described in the complaint, a default was
ordered against all persons, and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a decree was
entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute,
and entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other
person had any right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof,
either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss,
until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the entry of the
decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco. On that date
(the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United States Circuit Court for
the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed title to the parcels of
land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss.
The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county
of San Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained
without due process of law, and that said superior court, in said action and
proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such
proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain jurisdiction to divest the right,
title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right
whatever in said parcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation."
The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of
California, not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily
reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon
them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of the
action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property
herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until
more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District
certified the question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the
law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47), decided each of the
question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention of the
plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the
purpose of registrating his title to the same under an act of the legislature of the State
of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to
real property in case of loss or destruction of public records." Said law is known as
the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a method whereby owners
in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such an extent as
to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which
would furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law
was the fact that practically all of the public records of title in several counties in the
State of California had recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an
earthquake and fire. Said law provided that whenever the public records in the office
of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in

any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an estate of
inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons
holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said
county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior
court for the county in which said real property is situate, to establish his title, and to
determine all adverse claims thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified
complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming any
interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." He
was required to give in his complaint a particular description of the property. The law
provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or notice was required to be
issued, containing the names of the court and the country in which the action was
brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved,
which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was brought, at least
once a week for a period of two months.
The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming
an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons
and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed
to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the
plaintiff and said property and of the person and every one claiming any estate, right,
title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any part thereof, and shall be
deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for the purpose
of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein,
which is provided for in the law.
In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the
appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title granted to
Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and
because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of the application to Zeiss to have
his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the United States (219 U.S.,
47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and that a
compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to
be but little in the decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to
support the contention of the appellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the
procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure
adopted by said law; and

Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any
of the parties connected with said action, we are forced to the conclusion that the
appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration
and certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed
and which we deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Court
to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A
plan is prepared and is presented with the petition for the registration of a parcel of
land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the registration. All the
steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It is
then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of
the lines in the plan, said plan will not close that if a wall were built upon the lines
of the plan, one of the four corners of the wall would not meter. We believe that an
error of the character may be corrected by the court, provided that such correction
does not include land not included in the original petition. Upon the question whether
the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or different lands than were included
in the original petition, we find the following statements made by one of the judges
who ordered said plan amended. The statements is:
At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is
incumbent upon the court than to determine the property as it was
adjudicated in this case.
Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds
that such should be the holding on this particular point.
We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H.
Smith, relating to the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petition for a
writ of prohibition, presented by some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court.
That petition for a writ of prohibition involved practically the same question presented
by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or not additional lands had
been included in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering for himself
and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:
Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question
(premises of the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by
an order of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on
the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be that the dividing line
between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so
indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties
beginning on the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point
indicated in the original description and approved by the court; in other
words, the premises in question of the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas
y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have not
been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left
undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished,
except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by
the projection of some of the roots of the petitioners' building over the

aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly
by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her
property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying
said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a
distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the certificate issued to the petitioner (see
page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W., for a distance of 31.08
meters. The record contains no application why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page
35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That
error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of
the plan. Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely
justified in ordering the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not
discussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to
have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that
she was the owner of the buildings located upon the parcel of land in question. It will
be remembered that in her petition presented January 12, 1906, she alleged that she
was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with the buildings thereon.
No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the land
as described in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should
have been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an
errors. on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision
for the correction of such errors. Section 112 provides that the registered owner may,
at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made
in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate."
We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original
certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we
believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of
land, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the
buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not mentioned. Without
relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petition of the
plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so as to include
not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon
as well.
With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record
contains no sufficient reasons for not granting the same.
Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment
of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between
the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said
petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for
under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day
of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in
the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered
that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been
included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The
lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's
land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the
wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the
owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
G.R. No. L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,


vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson,
Ledesma
D.R. Williams for appellee.

and

Lim

for

appellants.

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment
or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other
words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that
part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the
defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the
defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he

had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name,
more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it
by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the
registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the
alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was
not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered
in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the
torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is
clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the
world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De
la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175
Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the
decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to
all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they
are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon
the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law.
The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title
than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered.
Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in
open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged,
or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in acollateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system
can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions,
where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by
express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his
excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The
general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield,
7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be
very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written
documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of
title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and
cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two
certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates
for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is
nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation,
or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall
not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of
Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties
to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after
the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened
for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such
decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the

land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law


contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of
the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name
of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when
one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the
person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land.
The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do
not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the
Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the
absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in
adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case
land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of
the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with
notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right,
and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their
failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission
as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens
titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to
quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then
the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely
upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the
expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his
registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title,
they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first
negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he
can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He
was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the
name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his
day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground

for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent


jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the
validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that
the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between
original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general
rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor;
that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of
the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the
later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon
the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and
112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights
in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights
against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser,"
as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their
land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of
their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the
appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would
such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used
in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of
the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be
protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate"
ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the
owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The
record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be
charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of
every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620,
629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of
its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases,
341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot
be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than
one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The
rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a
rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion
and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be
recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of
what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that
all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that
all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times,
shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of
ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all
of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such
purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied
to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of
the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of
the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The
rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason
of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior
original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In

order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe
the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to
cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the
torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of
the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part
of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for
example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system.
Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer
the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the
possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip
of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record
of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are
of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496
than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the
owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his
vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the
holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the
first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their
title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and
complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second
original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer
the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the
first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We
are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system,
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing
with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under
the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining
the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and
exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to
make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore
made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the
predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for
appellee UP.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in Quezon City
containing an area of about 430 hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City alleging that for many years prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the
present they and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive
and continuous possession as owners of the land in litigation; that they have been
cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time immemorial up to
the year 1955, they have been paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955 defendant
People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that
its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 embraces practically all of plaintiff's property,
while the other defendant University of the Philippines began also asserting title
thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the remaining
portion; that defendants are not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice
of plaintiff's actual possession and claim for ownership thereof; and that the inclusion
of plaintiff's property within the technical boundaries set out in defendants' titles was a
clear mistake and that at no time had defendants' predecessors in-interest exercised
dominical rights over plaintiff's property.
On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that it is barred by the statute of
limitations; that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; and that in the event the
motion is not granted, defendant is separated from the case and be impleaded in a
separate action. To this motion plaintiffs filed a reply alleging that the complaint on its
faces alleges a valid and sufficient cause of action upon which the court could render
a valid judgment. Defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the other
hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars to which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On
November 20, 1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose Pearanda filed a motion for
intervention which was likewise opposed by plaintiffs. On December 11, 1957, the trial
court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action and that it is already barred by the statute of limitations, leaving unresolved the
other points raised in the pleadings for being unnecessary. From this order plaintiffs
took the present appeal.

G.R. No. L-13479

October 31, 1959

MARCELINO
TIBURCIO,
ET
AL, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendantsappellees.

Appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground of lack of sufficient cause of action for the reason that on its face said
complaint alleges sufficient facts on which a valid judgment could be rendered against
defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint alleges the following facts: that
plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in 1910; that upon his
death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in
Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been actual, open, notorious and
exclusive possession of the land as owners pro indiviso; that sometime in 1955

defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is embraced and
covered by their respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their
respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership of
plaintiffs, and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of
the Torrens system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of
defendant's predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955
defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the original
owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff's property for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant
University of the Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of
the land which embraces the remainder of the property for which Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. It is therefore, clear that the land in question
has been registers in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-inters since 1914 under
the Torren's system and that notwithstanding what they now claim that the original title
lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they have never
taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the present action. In
other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what
they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the
land in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be
done for under our law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set
aside within one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496;
Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp.
1607; Rivera vs.Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period
within to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in
pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The purpose of
the law in limiting to one year the period within which the decree may be reviewed is
to put a limit to the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title
to property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set
aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the
indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil.,
520).
Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges that defendants acquired
their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership
of plaintiffs with respect to the land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for
such averment is sufficient to establish a cause of action against defendants. This
contention overlooks the fact that the land in question is covered by Torrens title.
Thus, it appears that defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation bought the
portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor. There is
nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property said defendant
knew of any defect in the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or

encumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to defendant University of the
Philippines. It likewise acquired the portion of the property on question sometime in
1955 from its predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462
was issued in its favor. There is also nothing in the complaint to show that when it
acquired the property it knew of any defect in the title appealing on its face in the form
of any lien or incumbrace. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be purchasers
for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing
with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the
property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require
him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens System."
(William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622;
Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as
contended, their right however to bring the instant action may be considered barred
by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after title to the property had
been issued under the Torrens system. It appears that the property in question was
originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11, 1957 that
appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the present action. In the
recent case of Domingo vs. Mayon Realty Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz.,
4954), September 30, 1957 this Court said: "Like Ciriaco Allingag in the previous
case, appellants herein could have raised the issue of the validity of the certificate of
title issued to Valle Cruz since 1928, when the foreclosure sale in her favor was
confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years afterwards, and their action (if any) now
should be held by their own laches and negligence."
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records in Land Registration
Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court cannot
take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other case even when such case
had been tried by the same court and notwithstanding the facts that both cases may
have been tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to
be the general rule, the same is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. Thus,
as noted by former Chief Justice Moran:
In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other
causes, because of their close connection with the matter in the controversy.
Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator of an estate arising
from an appeal against the report of the committee on claims appointed in
the administration proceedings of the said estate, to determine whether or
not the appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the record
of the administration proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one

or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under


consideration.
Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely
technical because they do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino Tiburcio, who
instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land
Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration of the same parcel of land which
application was denied by the court. It appears that in the registration case the
oppositors were the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and
the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor
in that case, in effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and
Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two case
there is not only identity of subject matter but identity of parties and causes of action.
Indeed, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res
judicata.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165427

March 21, 2011

BETTY
B.
vs.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.

LACBAYAN, Petitioner,

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan
against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had
affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties
involved in this suit and awarding to himP100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in
1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until
petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979.3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company.4 Five parcels of
land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and
respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described
as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."5

2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon


City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses
Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."6
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In
1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in
Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St.,
also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique
Heights.10
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways
sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. 11 Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
properties will go to respondent.12 However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. 13 Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition 14 of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together
as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as
business
partners,
acquiring
real
properties
amounting
toP15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied petitioners claim
of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal
funds without any contribution from petitioner.17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24
hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in
the wee hours of the morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said
real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent
established.19

Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his
personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions. 20 He countered
that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude
the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent
the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy
gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as
investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of
a new building.22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give
considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired
not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services
company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial
courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral
attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper
to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.25
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal,
explaining in the following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject
realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates
which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what
the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an
issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which
appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover,
that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to
subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in
litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even
more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in
the parties name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against
the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action
for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming
to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the
plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second assuming
that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be
divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially
settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of

co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would
be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial
court did when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of co-ownership.26
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission
against respondents interest as to the existence of co-ownership between
the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of
repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive
ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be
outweighed by respondents self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry.27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been
squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem
it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any
showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that
questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in petitions under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be
summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of
ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally
attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the
subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained
that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
resolution of an action for partition. Thus:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff
is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting
of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the
parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their
just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x 29 (Emphasis
supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of
co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie
if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over
the subject properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked,32 but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. 33 The certificate referred to is
that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the
title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by
that document.34 Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as
a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of
land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership

with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee,
or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest
ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as
an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the
existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts
alleged by him.38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the
complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed
properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file
against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is
DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a


relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to
the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that
the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,
basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners
argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but
that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over
the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may
be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters.
Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she
intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts
view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not
commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was
forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to
entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first
place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right
over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and
petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape
his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself

G.R. No. 147072

May 7, 2002

FRANCISCO
H.
vs.
Spouses ORLANDO and ROSITA MANIPON, respondents.

LU, petitioner,

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The registration of a sale of real estate will not protect a buyer in bad faith, for the law
cannot be used as a shield for fraud. On the other hand, the preferential right of a first
registrant in a double sale is always qualified by good faith.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the October 25, 2000
Decision and the February 9, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CAGR CV No. 55149. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that [petitioner] is directed to
convey Lot 5582-B-7-D covered by TCT No. 171497 to [respondent] Rosita
C. Manipon without being entitled to any payment from the latter."2
The assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration.3
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows:
"On May 9, 1981, Juan Peralta executed a [D]eed of [S]ale by installment in
favor of spouses Orlando and Rosita Manipon [herein respondents]. Therein,
Juan Peralta agreed to sell by installment to the said spouses 350 square
meters of the 2,078 square-meter lot he owned, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 137911 and located at Barrio Dilan, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. The said [D]eed was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
"On June 10, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot to Thrift
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). He however failed to pay the
loan he obtained for which the mortgage was constituted and so the same
was judicially foreclosed and sold to TSLAI for P62,789.18 which was the
highest bidder. The latter in turn sold the same on July 15, 1988 in the
amount of P80,000.00 to the [petitioner]. Thereafter, on August 30, 1989,
[petitioner] caused the subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots, one of
which is Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339 square meters covering the lot
which was earlier sold by installment to [respondents]. The said lot is now
covered by TCT No. 171497. In the interim, or on July 30, 1983, Juan
Peralta executed a [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of [respondents] after the couple
paid a total amount of P8,000.00 for the subject lot. The aforesaid [D]eed
was however also not registered.1wphi1.nt
"On January 22, 1990, [petitioner] through counsel wrote the [respondents]
regarding the presence of the latter's house, which was also being occupied
by them, on the lot in question. Efforts were apparently made by both parties
to settle the brewing dispute but to [no] avail. Hence, on February 26, 1990,
[petitioner] filed the present action alleging therein that he is the owner of the
lot in question including that which was being occupied by [respondents.
Petitioner] further claims that his ownership was confirmed by the Regional
Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. U-4399.
He also averred that for reasons unknown to him, [respondents] were

claiming ownership of Lot 5582-B-7-D and have constructed a house


thereon on January 22, 1990.
"In the Answer filed by [respondents], they claim that [petitioner] is a buyer in
bad faith because even before he bought the 2,078 square-meter lot, he
knew for a fact that they already bought Lot 5582-B-7-D from the original
owner of the said lot and have been residing therein since 1981.
[Respondents] also asserted that [petitioner] had knowledge of their claim
over the said property because when the whole lot was foreclosed they
shared the same problem as [petitioner] also bought a lot with the 2,078
square-meter lot of Juan Peralta.
"Trial ensued and thereafter, the trial court rendered the questioned
judgment. x x x."4 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith despite the fact that
he was able to register his ownership of the disputed lot. He admitted knowing that
respondents had constructed a house on the disputed lot in 1984, even before he
purchased the property from the loan association in 1990. Indeed, he waited more
than ten (10) years before contesting respondents' occupation and possession of the
land. The RTC disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders
judgment as follows:
"1). The [petitioner] is hereby ordered to convey to the herein [respondent]
Rosita Manipon, (defendant Orlando Manipon is already dead) the lot
consisting of 339 square meters denominated as Lot 5582-B-7-D and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 171497 after paying the sum of
P13,051.50 plus legal interest to the herein [petitioner] anytime after the
finality of this decision.
"2). The third-party defendant, Juan Peralta, is ordered to refund to the
defendants Manipons the amount of P18,000.00 paid by the latter to him;
"3). x x x no pronouncement as to damages in favor [of] or against either of
the parties."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court with the modification that respondents
would no longer be required to pay petitioner the value of the disputed portion in a
"forced sale." The appellate court said that petitioner knew that Lot 5582-B-7-D had

already been sold by Juan Peralta to respondents before the mother lot was
mortgaged, foreclosed and eventually purchased. He bought the entire property from
the foreclosing bank, because he feared that he might lose what he had earlier
bought in 1981 a 350 square meter lot which also formed part of the mother lot.
Hence, this Petition.6
The Issues
7

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:


"1. Who between petitioner and respondents have a better right of ownership
over the lot in question, Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339 square meters?
"2. Whether respondents' claim over the lot can rise [above that of] their
predecessor in interest Juan Peralta[.]
"3. Whether respondents are under estoppel to question petitioner's
ownership over the lot in question[.]
"4. Whether petitioner was in bad faith in the acquisition of the lot in
question[.]
"5. And even assuming without admitting that petitioner is under obligation to
convey the lot in question in favor of respondents, whether the consideration
of the lot be paid by respondent is P2,000.00 per square meter[.]"8
These issues can be summed up into three questions: (1) who has a better right to
the disputed property? (2) was petitioner a purchaser in bad faith? and (3) what
should be the purchase price of the disputed lot?
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Better Right to the Disputed Lot
Petitioner claims to have a better right to the disputed portion of the real
property. First, although respondents had bought it first, he was the first to register his
purchase of the mother lot. Second, respondents' ownership follows that of their
vendor who mortgaged to the bank his title to the mother lot and failed to redeem it.

Petitioner avers that, although respondents purchased the disputed lot by installment
on May 9, 1981 and fully paid for it on May 30, 1983, they failed to register their sale
with the Registry of Deeds. In the meantime, on June 18, 1981, Juan Peralta
mortgaged the mother lot including the disputed portion to the Thrift Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). The mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold
on July 10, 1988. Petitioner, on the other hand, bought the whole lot from the bank for
P80,000 on July 15, 1988 and registered it in his name on September 23, 1988.
Third, petitioner claims that from the time respondents fully paid for the lot until they
received a Notice to Vacate, they did not do anything to perfect their title thereto;
hence, they are now estopped from questioning his ownership of it.
We are not convinced. In estoppel, a person who by deed or conduct induces another
to act in a particular manner is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude
or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another.9 This equitable
principle will not apply to respondents, because they exercised dominion over the
property by occupying and building their house on it. On the other hand, it was
petitioner who, despite having knowledge of the existence of respondents' house on
the disputed portion, bought the whole lot. Before acquiring the mother lot from the
bank, he knew of respondents' claim of ownership and occupation. He cannot now
pretend to be an innocent buyer in good faith.
Registration is not the equivalent of title. 10 Under the Torrens system, registration only
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. 11 It was not established as
a means of acquiring title to private land because it merely confirms, but does not
confer, ownership.12 Moreover, the RTC and the CA have correctly ruled that the
preferential right of the first registrant of a real property in a case of double sale is
always qualified by good faith under Article 154413 of the Civil Code.14 A holder in bad
faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot
be used as a shield for fraud.15
"When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a party cannot
base his preference of title thereon, because the law will not protect anything
done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the registration futile. Thus, if a vendee
registers the sale in his favor after he has acquired knowledge that there
was a previous sale of the same property to a third party, or that another
person claims said property under a previous sale, or that the property is in
the possession of one who is not a vendor, or that there were flaws and
defects in the vendor's title, or that this was in dispute, the registration will
constitute x x x bad faith, and will not confer upon him any preferential right.
The situation will be the same as if there had been no registration, and the
vendee who first took possession of the real property in good faith shall be
preferred."16
Equally important, under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential
Decree No. 1529), every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance
of a decree of registration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking

such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances, except those noted on the certificate and enumerated therein.
Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent purchaser in good faith. Therefore, between
the parties, respondents have a better right to the property based on the concurring
factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts. We quote with approval the
following ruling of the CA:
"x x x We are persuaded that [petitioner] knew of the fact that Lot 5582-B-7D was sold by Juan Peralta to [respondents] before Lot 5582-B-7, the
mother lot of Lot 5582-B-7-D, was mortgaged, foreclosed, sold and [its
ownership] transferred x x x to him. In fact, [w]e are convinced that the main
reason why [petitioner] bought the entire lot from the TSLAI was hi fear of
losing the 350 square meter-lot he bought sometime in 1981 which also
forms part of Lot 5582-B-7. Having been aware of the 'defects' in the title of
TSLAI as far as Lot 5582-B-7-D is concerned, he cannot now claim to be a
purchaser in good faith and for value even if he traces his ownership [to]
TSLAI which [w]e believe was a purchaser in good faith the latter not being
aware of the sale that transpired between the [respondents] and Juan
Peralta before Lot 5582-B-7 was sold to it in a public auction.
"One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in
his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or an interest therein. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that [petitioner] was not aware of the sale between Juan
Peralta and the [respondents], still he cannot be considered as a purchaser
in good faith because he had personal knowledge of [respondents']
occupation of the lot in question. This fact alone should have put him on
guard before buying the land. But as he admitted during the trial, he was not
interested in the [respondents'] reason for occupying the said lot[;] all that he
was interested in was to buy the entire lot. This 'devil-may-care' attitude of
[petitioner] has placed him where he is now. Consequently, he cannot be
entitled to the relief he is seeking before this [c]ourt.
"True, the purchaser of a registered land is not required to go behind the title
to determine the condition of the property. However, a purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect
exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for
value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation."17
All told, the right of a buyer to rely upon the face of the title certificate and to dispense
with the need of inquiring further is upheld only when the party concerned had no

actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious
man to conduct further inquiry.18
Second Issue:
Bad Faith
Petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad faith. He alleges that the only reason he
spoke to the respondents before he bought the foreclosed land was to invite them to
share in the purchase price, but they turned him down. This, he argues, was not an
indication of bad faith.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. He might have had good intentions at heart, but it
is not the intention that makes one an innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith or an
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price
for it, at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person's claim on
or interest in it.19 One cannot close one's eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
person on guard and still claim to have acted in good faith. As aptly explained by
Vitug:
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first
buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33.) Conversely, knowledge
gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is
first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith
(see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December
1984). InCruz vs. Cabaa (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656),
it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering
his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA
99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).1wphi1.nt
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to
registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which
considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land
(see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil
694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such
rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any
prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only
exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in
the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is
equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R.
75336, 18 October 1988;Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs.
Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981)."20

By his own allegations, petitioner admits he was not a purchaser in good faith. A
buyer of real property which is in the possession of another must be wary and
investigate the rights of the latter. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer cannot
be said to be in good faith.21
Basic is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court are given great weight,
even finality, when they affirm those of the trial court, 22 unless they fall under the
exceptions enumerated in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals.23 Petitioner has not shown
that this case falls under any of those exceptions; hence, we find no cogent reason to
depart from this general rule.
Third Issue:
Proper Purchase Price
Petitioner protests respondents' exception from paying him P13,051.50 with legal
interest for the conveyance of the disputed portion. Instead, he pleads that this Court
modify the price to P2,000 per square meter.
We are not persuaded. While neither party appealed the issue of the purchase price,
petitioner did question the conveyance of Lot 5582-B-7-D to respondents upon
payment of the said price. Hence, the payment was also effectively put in issue. It is
well-settled that appellate courts have ample authority to rule on matters not
specifically assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary
to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.24
However, the CA modification exempting respondents from paying petitioner is
flawed, because the RTC had ordered Juan Peralta to refund the P18,000 paid to him
by petitioner as the purchase price of the disputed lot. Thus, the trial court correctly
ordered (1) respondents to pay petitioner 13,051.50 25 plus legal interest for Lot 5582B-7-D and (2) the third-party defendant Peralta to refund to respondents the P18,000
they had paid for the lot. The CA ruling would unjustly enrich respondents, who would
receive double compensation. In short, the RTC ruling should have been affirmed in
its entirety.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED without the MODIFICATION ordered by the CA. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on the
corresponding certificate of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295,
covering Lot 378.

G.R. No. L-16257

January 31, 1963

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant.
Eduardo P. Arboleda and Jesus S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of
Negros Occidental, the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey of Bacolod,
Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in addition to attorney's fees and
costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal taken by the defendant, this judgment was,
however, set aside by the Supreme Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31,
1956), which, likewise, ordered the case remanded to the lower court "for further
trial", after which another decision was rendered by said court of first instance
dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot
378 to the defendant. The case is, once again, before us, this time on appeal by the
plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000, exclusive of
interest and costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan,
consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the aforementioned
cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares, originally registered in
the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of 22,783
sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776
(Exhibit 4), issued on August 25, 1916, in the name of the Amenabars. On November
30, 1920, the latter sold the aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred
to in some documents as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000,
payable installments, as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8,
1924, said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares
obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name. Meanwhile,
or on March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose
Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2).
On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said
Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were duly recorded in

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a


decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated September 29,
1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151
which, owing to its subsequent loss, had to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-1371 in the name of the Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit
P). Soon, later, or on November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to
Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual
installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain
in the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this
contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the
installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949, the Bank
executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-1371), in
plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in
1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares
claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the
deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos P. Benares,
contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of
absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to
take possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied
by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on
October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the
status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the explanations given by said
officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378
in the year; 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that immediately after the
commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and began
the construction thereon of the provincial hospital, which was completed in 1926; that
since then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as
owner thereof; that, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond comprehension
of the defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of said defendant";
that said lot had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 16269 (dated December 31, 1937); and that plaintiff had acted in
bad faith in purchasing said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the
provincial hospital was where it is up to the present, and did not declare said lot in its

name for assessment purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo
Montelibano, the controlling stockholder, president and general manager of plaintiff
corporation, was the first City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to the support,
operation and maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November
8, 1950, defendant alleged, also, that the aforementioned expropriation case was
"amicably settled as between the parties herein, in the sense that the ... Province of
Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in fact pay to Jose Benares the assessed
value of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration pertaining to said lot in excess of its
assessed value which was paid by the Province would be donated and was in fact
donated by said ... Jose Benares in favor of the Province purposely for hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein
had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings. This decision
appealed from in effect decided this question in the affirmative and declared that
plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in view of which it ordered the former
to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is predicated, substantially, upon the
following premises, namely that case No. 3041 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental for the expropriation of the hospital site of said province, was
actually commenced on January 26, 1924; that, among the lands sought to be
expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the aforementioned cadastral survey,
belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to the defendant
(Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB2) was issued on July 12, 1926; that, according the testimony of Jose Benares, the
expropriation of Lot 378 was settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of
P12,000; and that defendant's failure to secure the corresponding transfer certificate
of title to Lot 378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of
Lot No. 405-B" in the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence,
because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the
plaintiff and its president, for the former believes that the latter had
"manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been
four (4) litigations between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been
finally decided against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he
testified to having been paid P12,000 by the Government, although, at the
rate of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to
sell Lot 378; he should have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq.
meters; (b) he claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year
1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days" after the Government had taken
possession of the land, and to have sent the money next day to Pilar
Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have received the said sum of
P12,000 on November 7, 1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose
Marco, former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose
Benares asserted that there was a written compromise agreement between

him and the Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was
merely oral; and (b) Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as
compensation for Lot 378, the assessed value thereof, which was P430, and
to donate to the Government the difference between this sum and the true
value of the property, but Benares affirmed that he was first offered P300 per
hectare, which he rejected, and that he later demanded P1,000 a hectare,
which the Government agreed to pay, although, subsequently, he said that
Rafael Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept P1,000
per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso
Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the
expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case
"was not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the
acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in
1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise
agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached and
that the expropriation had not been consummated. For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its
filing and the publication in the newspaper of the corresponding notices
(Exhibit 1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the
Government, followed by the cancellation of the certificate of title in her
name and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the
Province, when contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment
and of a transfer certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378,
strongly suggest that no such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot
378 had been made or reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since
March 12, 1921, and this mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia,
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was
not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have
been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter
was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in
favor of the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378
not belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been
expropriated subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and
participation. What is more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November
8, 1935 (Exhibit R), promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos
Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410,
forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B
and 410-A, had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros

Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not
been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the
expropriation case and the chances are that the case was dismissed. The
Court had to examine carefully and minutely every single piece of evidence
adduced by both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the
mystery. The Court believes that the failure of the government to secure the
corresponding transfer of title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief
that said lot forms a part of Lot 405-B. This conclusion was arrived at after
examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the
subdivided lots were properly identified by lot numbers, that particular
portion at the lower corner of the plan encircled with red pencil, marked
Exhibit X-1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot number and that
portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where the hospital building
was constructed. This plan was prepared for the government on May 12,
1927 by public land surveyor, Mr. Formento, embracing lots covering over 22
hectares for the Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular
portion was not labelled with the corresponding lot number might have
misled the authorities to believe that it formed a part of lot 405-B, which
adjoins it, although separated by the creek. This lack of reasonable
explanation why the government failed to secure the corresponding
certificate of title to lot 378, when there is sufficient proof that Jose Benares
was paid and he executed the deed of sale in favor of the government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness
and moral courage that account for the well earned reputation and prestige of the
Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to concur in the foregoing view. To begin
with, there is no evidence, and defendant has not even tried to prove, that the
expropriation case had ever been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned. Hence,
the lower court merely speculated about the "chances that the (expropriation) case
was dismissed." By the way, the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness,
Ildefonso Coscolluela, for he testified that the expropriation case was still pending in
1934, when he ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and the record before us
suggests that since the Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925 and
completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there were no further proceedings
in said case..
With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that the
authorities had been "misled ... to believe" that the portion at the lower corner of said
plan which was enclosed, during the trial, within a circle in red pencil, and marked
as Exhibit X-1 formed part of Lot 405-B, which had been expropriated by the
Province of Negros Occidental. In fact, said portion, Exhibit X-1, is not part of the land
covered by the plan Exhibit X. A close examination of the latter shows that the
boundaries of said portion are not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the
right hand side of Exhibit X, the following appears in bold letters: "Subdivision &
Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403,405, 406, 407 and 410 Bacolod
Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial Government of Bacolod, Negros Occidental

(Capitol site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said enumeration and the explicit
statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to the "Capitol Site", negates the
possibility of its being mistaken by any body, much less by government engineers, as
including the hospital site, and, hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the very evidence for the
defendant herein, specially the assessor's field sheets and declarations of real
property for tax purposes (Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the Government
had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In
any event, said possibility of mistake, if any, which would be remote, cannot suffice to
warrant in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary the conclusion that
Lot 378 has already been acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and applied
by him to the payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount could not possibly
be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly agreed therefor,
its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00. In this connection, it should be noted
that, aside from the expropriation proceedings for the hospital site, another
expropriation case for the Capitol site, affecting another property of Jose Benares,
appears to have been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Jose Benares may have mistaken the payment for his land included in the Capitol
site, as one intended for Lot 378, which was affected by the hospital site. And this
possibility may amount to a probability when we consider that he erroneously
believed that there had been only one expropriation case, instead of two cases,
against him, and that Lot 378, was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in
favor of the Philippine National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an accurate
recollection of the events or transactions affecting his properties, and, hence, his
testimony may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition
by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be the exclusive
property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of plaintiff's
president to the effect that he did not know until 1949 that the land on which the
Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held that plaintiff was "not a
purchaser in good faith for having constructive knowledge of defendant's possession
of the property at the time it was bought by the plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benares
whose right to buy the Hacienda Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by
plaintiff "is a part owner of the Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position
therein"; because the hospital was already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the
lot was declared in the name of the Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in
1935 the purchaser should have inquired as to its location and improvement";
because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over the supposed rights to take
possession of lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that lot No. 378
was erroneously or inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q & R)
executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiff subdivision and that
same lot was occupied by the defendant government for the provincial hospital for the
last 34 years, as owner thereof".
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did not
know until 1949 that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the provincial hospital.

Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known to Carlos P.
Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced from the
circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the latter
appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose Benares
did not apparently know that there were two (2) expropriation proceedings effecting
said properties: that the P12,000 received by him from the Government was not
meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties mortgaged by him to the
Bank.
"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible
conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla
vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March 30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No.
L-13791, February 27, 1961). In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual
knowledge, it being an established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land
on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921,
or before the expropriation case for the hospital site had begun, said lot was
mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly registered, as
well as annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, was not cancelled until
September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was
subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru
foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to
sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his rights
to plaintiff herein, as well as when the bank executed the deed of absolute sale in
plaintiff's favor on September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the
Bank. Considering that sugar centrals as well as banks are known to have an array of
experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified in
assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were
satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were
constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In short, we find
that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are
of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not
contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due by
reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time when possession
thereof was actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential damages
including attorney's fees from which consequential damages the consequential
benefits, if any, should be deducted, with interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate
sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking. The case should
be remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the date of
said actual taking and the amount of compensation collectible from the defendant,
and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs
against the defendant. It is so ordered..

4. Ordering the execution by the defendant-appellant Genato of the


Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject two lots covered by TCT
No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T-76.197 (M) in favor of intervenorsappellants Spouses Da Jose;
5. The return by defendant-appellant Genato of the P50,000.00
paid to him by the plaintiff-appellee Cheng, and

G.R. No. 129760 December 29, 1998


RICARDO CHENG, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON B. GENATO and ERNESTO R. DA JOSE & SOCORRO DA
JOSE, respondents.

6. Payment by plaintiff-appellee Cheng of moral damages to herein


intervenors-appellants Da Jose of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages of P50,000.00, attorney's fees of P50,000.00, and costs
of suit; and to defendant-appellant, of P100,000.00 in exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 in attorney's fees. The amounts payable to
the defendant-appellant may be compensated by plaintiff appellee
with the amount ordered under the immediately foregoing
paragraph which defendant-appellant has to pay the plaintiffappellee.
SO ORDERED. 2

MARTINEZ, J.:

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) 1 dated July 7, 1997 in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 44706 entitled
"Ricardo Cheng, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon B. Genato, defendant-appellant,
Ernesto R. Da Jose & Socorro B. Da Jose, Intervenors-Appellants" which reversed
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 of Quezon City dated January 18,
1994. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

Respondent Ramon B. Genato (Genato) is the owner of two parcels of land located at
Paradise Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-76.196
(M) 3 and TCT No. T-76.197 (M) 4 with an aggregate area of 35,821square meters,
more or less.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, appealed decision is


hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered
ordering;

On September 6, 1989, respondent Genato entered into an agreement with


respondent-spouses Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose (Da Jose spouses)
over the above-mentioned two parcels of land. The agreement culminated in the
execution of a contract to sell for which the purchase price was P80.00 per square
meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was duly annotated at the back of
the two certificates of title on the same day. Clauses 1and 3 thereof provide:

1. The dismissal of the complaint;


2. The cancellation of the annotations of the defendant-appellant's
Affidavit to Annul Contract to Sell and plaintiff-appellee's Notice of
Adverse Claim in the subject TCT's, namely, TCT No. T-76.196 (M)
and TCT No. T-76.197 (M);
3. Payment by the intervenors-appellants of the remaining balance
of the purchase price pursuant to their agreement with the
defendant-appellant to suspend encashment of the three postdated checks issued since 1989.

1. That the purchase price shall be EIGHTY (P80.00) PESOS,


Philippine Currency per square meter, of which the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS shall be paid by the
VENDEE to the VENDOR as partial down payment at the time of
execution of this Contract to Sell.
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the VENDEE, Thirty (30) DAYS after the execution of this
contract, and only after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed
the truth and authenticity of documents, and that no restrictions,
limitations, and developments imposed on and/or affecting the

property subject of this contract shall be detrimental to his interest,


the VENDEE shall pay to the VENDOR, NINE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND
(P950,00.00)
PESOS.
Philippine
Currency,
representing the full payment of the agreed Down Payment, after
which complete possession of the property shall be given to the
VENDEE to enable him to prepare the premises and any
development therein.
On October 4, 1989, the Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles
mentioned in clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by respondent
Genato an extension of another 30 days or until November 5, 1989. However,
according to Genato, the extension was granted on condition that a new set of
documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989. 6 This was denied by the
Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the
Da Jose spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell, 7 on
October 13, 1989. Moreover, no annotation of the said affidavit at the back of his titles
was made right away. The affidavit contained, inter alia, the following paragraphs;
xxx xxx xxx
That it was agreed between the parties that the agreed
downpayment of P950,000.00 shall be paid thirty (30) days after
the execution of the Contract, that is on or before October 6, 1989;
The supposed VENDEES failed to pay the said full downpayment
even up to this writing, a breach of contract;
That this affidavit is being executed to Annul the aforesaid Contract
to Sell for the vendee having committed a breach of contract for not
having complied with the obligation as provided in the Contract to
Sell; 8
On October 24, 1989, herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genato's
residence and expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion,
Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the
annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses.
Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell
which has not been annotated at the back of the titles.
Despite these, Cheng went ahead and issued a check for P50,000.00 upon the
assurance by Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses will be
annulled for which Genato issued a handwritten receipt (Exh. "D"), written in this wise:
10/24/89

Received from Ricardo Cheng


the Sum of Fifty Thousand Only (P50.000-)
as partial for T-76196 (M)
T-76197 (M) area 35.821 Sq.m.
Paradise Farm, Gaya-Gaya, San Jose Del Monte
P70/m2 Bulacan
plus C. G. T. etc.
Check # 470393 (SGD.) Ramon B. Genato
10/24/89 9
On October 25, 1989, Genato deposited Cheng's check. On the same day, Cheng
called up Genato reminding him to register the affidavit to annul the contract to sell. 10
The following day, or on October 26, 1989, acting on Cheng's request, Genato
caused the registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in the Registry of
Deeds, Meycauayan, Bulacan as primary entry No. 262702. 11
While the Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan on October 27, 1989, they met Genato by coincidence. It was
only then that the Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their
contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against the
rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he (Genato) had given them (Da
Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their verification of his titles, that
the period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to pay the balance of
the agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the
Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was
formalized in a conforme letter dated October 27, 1989.
Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his
contract with the Da Jose spouses and the return of Cheng's P50,000.00 check.
Consequently, on October 30, 1989, Cheng's lawyer sent a letter 12 to Genato
demanding compliance with their agreement to sell the property to him stating that the
contract to sell between him and Genato was already perfected and threatening legal
action.
On November 2, 1989, Genato sent a letter 13 to Cheng (Exh. "6") enclosing a BPI
Cashier's Check for P50,000.00 and expressed regret for his inability to "consummate

his transaction" with him. After having received the letter of Genato on November 4,
1989, Cheng, however, returned the said check to the former via RCPI
telegram 14 dated November 6, 1989, reiterating that "our contract to sell your
property had already been perfected."
Meanwhile, also on November 2, 1989, Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse
claim 15 and had it annotated on the subject TCT's.
On the same day, consistent with the decision of Genato and the Da Jose spouses to
continue with their Contract to Sell of September 6, 1989, the Da Jose spouses paid
Genato the complete down payment of P950,000.00 and delivered to him three (3)
postdated checks (all dated May 6, 1990, the stipulated due date) in the total amount
of P1,865,680.00 to cover full payment of the balance of the agreed purchase price.
However, due to the filing of the pendency of this case, the three (3) postdated
checks have not been encashed.

made to the substance of the agreement between Genato and the Da Jose spouses,
the lower court also concluded that Cheng should be preferred over the intervenorsDa Jose spouses in the purchase of the subject properties. Thus, on January 18,
1994 the trial court rendered its decision the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 executed
between defendant Ramon Genato, as vendor, and intervenors
Spouses Ernesto and Socorro Da Jose, as vendees, resolved and
rescinded in accordance with Art. 1191, Civil Code, by virtue of
defendant's affidavit to annul contract to sell dated October 13,
1989 and as the consequence of intervenors' failure to execute
within seven (7) days from October 4, 1989 another contract to sell
pursuant to their mutual agreement with defendant;

On December 8, 1989, Cheng instituted a complaint 16 for specific performance to


compel Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus
damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that
the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to the total agreed purchase
price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which Genato
acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected.

2. Ordering defendant to return to the intervenors the sum of


P1,000,000.00, plus interest at the legal rate from November 2,
1989 until full payment;

In Answer 17 thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of
an option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial payment, nor is it an
earnest money and that it was subject to condition that the prior contract with the Da
Jose spouses be first cancelled.

4. Commanding defendant to execute with and in favor of the


plaintiff Ricardo Cheng, as vendee, a deed of conveyance and sale
of the real properties described and covered in Transfer Certificates
of Title No. T-76-196 (M) and T-76.197 (M) of the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, at the rate of P70.000/square
meter, less the amount of P50,000.00 alreaddy paid to defendant,
which is considered as part of the purchase price, with the plaintiff
being liable for payment of the capital gains taxes and other
expenses of the transfer pursuant to the agreement to sell dated
October 24, 1989; and

The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention, 18 asserted that they have a
superior right to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral
cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without effect and void. They also cited
Cheng's bad faith as a buyer being duly informed by Genato of the existing annotated
Contract to Sell on the titles.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to
Cheng unerringly meant a sale and not just a priority or an option to buy. It cannot be
true that the transaction was subjected to some condition or reservation, like the
priority in favor of the Da Jose spouses as first buyer because, if it were otherwise,
the receipt would have provided such material condition or reservation, especially as
it was Genato himself who had made the receipt in his own hand. It also opined that
there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell by virtue of the Affidavit to Annul
the Contract to Sell. Time was of the essence in the execution of the agreement
between Genato and Cheng, under this circumstance demand, extrajudicial or
judicial, is not necessary. It falls under the exception to the rule provided in Article
1169 19 of the Civil Code. The right of Genato to unilaterally rescind the contract is
said to be under Article 1191 20 of the Civil Code. Additionally, after reference was

3. Directing defendant to return to the intervenors the three (3)


postdated checks immediately upon finality of this judgment;

5 Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff and the intervenors as


follows:
a/ P50,000.00, as
damages, to plaintiff;

nominal

b/ P50,000.00, as nominal
damages, to intervenors;
c/ P20,000.00, as and for
attorney's fees, to plaintiff;

d/ P20,000.00, as and for


attorney's fees, to intervenors;
and
e/ Cost of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, herein respondents Ramon Genato and Da
Jose spouses appealed to the court a quo which reversed such judgment and ruled
that the prior contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly
rescinded; that the subsequent contract to sell between Genato and Cheng,
embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without force and effect due to the failure to
rescind the prior contract; and that Cheng should pay damages to the respondents
herein being found to be in bad faith.
Hence this petition. 21
This petition for review, assails the Court of Appeals' Decision on the following
grounds: (1) that the Da Jose spouses' Contract to Sell has been validly rescinded or
resolved; (2) that Ricardo Cheng's own contract with Genato was not just a contract
to sell but one of conditional contract of sale which gave him better rights, thus
precluding the application of the rule on double sales under Article 1544, Civil Code;
and (3) that, in any case, it was error to hold him liable for damages.
The petition must be denied for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error which would warrant a contrary ruling.
No reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there
was no valid and effective rescission or resolution of the Da Jose spouses Contract to
Sell, contrary to petitioner's contentions and the trial court's erroneous ruling.
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory
force. 22 It is one where the happening of the event gives rise to an obligation. Thus,
for its non-fulfillment there will be no contract to speak of, the obligor having failed to
perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. In fact with this
circumstance, there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent, the
suspensive condition not having occurred as yet. 23 Emphasis should be made that
the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor's failure
to comply with an obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to render
binding that obligation. 24
Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the
instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the

30-day extension period has not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses' contention that
no further condition was agreed when they were granted the 30-days extension
period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell dated
September 6, 1989 should be upheld for the following reason, to wit; firstly, If this
were not true, Genato could not have been persuaded to continue his contract with
them and later on agree to accept the full settlement of the purchase price knowing
fully well that he himself imposed such sine qua non condition in order for the
extension to be valid; secondly, Genato could have immediately annotated his
affidavit to annul the contract to sell on his title when it was executed on October 13,
1989 and not only on October 26, 1989 after Cheng reminded him of the
annotation; thirdly, Genato could have sent at least a notice of such fact, there being
no stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the
encumbrance on his titles and make it available to other would be buyers. It likewise
settles the holding of the trial court that Genato "needed money urgently."
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that the Da Jose spouses defaulted, as claimed
by Genato, in their Contract to Sell, the execution by Genato of the affidavit to annul
the contract is not even called for. For with or without the aforesaid affidavit their nonpayment to complete the full downpayment of the purchase price ipso facto avoids
their contract to sell, it being subjected to a suspensive condition. When a contract is
subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and
when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. 25 If the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation
had
never
existed. 26
Nevertheless, this being so Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal
or written, to the Da Jose spouses for his decision to rescind their contract. In many
cases, 27 even though we upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract to sell
authorizing automatic rescission for a violation of its terms and conditions, at least a
written notice must be sent to the defaulter informing him of the same. The act of a
party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made known to the other. 28 For
such act is always provisional. It is always subject to scrutiny and review by the courts
in case the alleged defaulter brings the matter to the proper courts. In University of
the Philippines vs. De Los Angeles, 29 this Court stressed and we quote:
In other words, the party who deems the contract violated may
consider it resolved or rescinded, and act accordingly, without
previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk. For it is only
the final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively
and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in
law. But the law definitely does not require that the contracting party
who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment
before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise,
the party injured by the other's breach will have to passively sit and
watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until
the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself

requires that he should exercise due diligence to minimize its own


damages (Civil Code, Article 2203).

govern their Petition. We do not agree. Apparently, the factual milieu in Coronel is not
on all fours with those in the case at bar.

This rule validates, both in equity and justice, contracts such as the one at bat, in
order to avoid and prevent the defaulting party from assuming the offer as still in
effect due to the obligee's tolerance for such non-fulfillment. Resultantly, litigations of
this sort shall be prevented and the relations among would-be parties may be
preserved. Thus, Ricardo Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between
Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's
unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.

In Coronel, this Court found that the petitioners therein clearly intended to transfer title
to the buyer which petitioner themselves admitted in their pleading. The agreement of
the parties therein was definitively outlined in the "Receipt of Down Payment" both as
to property, the purchase price, the delivery of the seller of the property and the
manner of the transfer of title subject to the specific condition that upon the transfer in
their names of the subject property the Coronels will execute the deed of absolute
sale.

Anent the issue on the nature of the agreement between Cheng and Genato, the
records of this case are replete with admissions 30 that Cheng believed it to be one of
a Contract to Sell and not one of Conditional Contract of Sale which he, in a
transparent turn-around, now pleads in this Petition. This ambivalent stance of Cheng
is even noted by the appellate court, thus:

Whereas, in the instant case, even by a careful perusal of the receipt, Exh. "D," alone
such kind of circumstances cannot be ascertained without however resorting to the
exceptions of the Rule on Parol Evidence.

At the outset, this Court notes that plaintiff-appellee was


inconsistent in characterizing the contract he allegedly entered into.
In his complaint. 31 Cheng alleged that the P50,000.00 down
payment was earnest money. And next, his testimony 32 was offered
to prove that the transaction between him and Genato on October
24, 1989 was actually a perfected contract to sell. 33
Settled is the rule that an issue which was not raised during the trial in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 34 Issues of fact and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be and ordinarily will not
be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. 35 In fact, both courts below correctly held that the receipt which was the result
of their agreement, is a contract to sell. This was, in fact Cheng's contention in his
pleadings before said courts. This patent twist only operates against Cheng's posture
which is indicative of the weakness of his claim.
But even if we are to assume that the receipt, Exh. "D," is to be treated as a
conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject
to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da
Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded a condition never met, as
Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed himself by respecting and
maintaining his earlier contract with the Da Jose spouses. In fact, a careful reading of
the receipt, Exh. "D," alone would not even show that a conditional contract of sale
has been entered by Genato and Cheng. When the requisites of a valid contract of
sale are lacking in said receipt, therefore the "sale" is neither valid or enfoceable. 36
To support his now new theory that the transaction was a conditional contract of sale,
petitioner invokes the case of Coronel vs. Court of Appeals 37 as the law that should

To our mind, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the agreement
between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell, which was, in fact, petitioner
connection in his pleadings before the said courts. Consequently, both to mind, which
read:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry
of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents he oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
However, a meticulous reading of the aforequoted provision shows that said law is not
apropos to the instant case. This provision connotes that the following circumstances
must concur:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter, and must be valid sales
transactions.
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of
the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and

(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of
the subject matter must each have bought from the very same
seller.
These situations obviously are lacking in a contract to sell for neither a transfer of
ownership nor a sales transaction has been consummated. The contract to be binding
upon the obligee or the vendor depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of an
event.
Notwithstanding this contrary finding with the appellate court, we are of the view that
the governing principle of Article 1544, Civil Code, should apply in this situation.
Jurisprudence 38 teaches us that the governing principle is PRIMUS TEMPORE,
PORTIOR JURE (first in time, stronger in right). For not only was the contract
between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long before
petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer. This principle only applies when the special
rules provided in the aforcited article of the Civil Code do not apply or fit the specific
circumstances mandated under said law or by jurisprudence interpreting the article.
The rule exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer to be able to
displace the first buyer are:
(1) that the second buyer must show that he acted in good faith (i.e. in ignorance of
the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until title is
transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession; 39
(2) the second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of
knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior
registration as provided by law. 40
Thus, in the case at bar, the knowledge gained by the Da Jose spouses, as first
buyers, of the new agreement between Cheng and Genato will not defeat their rights
as first buyers except where Cheng, as second buyer, registers or annotates his
transaction or agreement on the title of the subject properties in good faith ahead of
the Da Jose spouses. Moreover, although the Da Jose spouses, as first buyers, knew
of the second transaction it will not bar them from availing of their rights granted by
law, among them, to register first their agreement as against the second buyer.
In contrast, knowledge gained by Cheng of the first transaction between the Da Jose
spouses and Genato defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second
transaction, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
"Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the books
of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and
cancellation, annotation, and even marginal notes. 41 In its strict acceptation, it is the
entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of
ownership and other real rights. 42 We have ruled 43 before that when a Deed of Sale is

inscribed in the registry of property on the original document itself, what was done
with respect to said entries or annotations and marginal notes amounted to a
registration of the sale. In this light, we see no reason why we should not give priority
in right the annotation made by the Da Jose spouses with respect to their Contract to
Sell dated September 6, 1989.
Moreover, registration alone in such cases without good faith is not sufficient. Good
faith must concur with registration for such prior right to be enforceable. In the instant
case, the annotation made by the Da Jose spouses on the titles of Genato of their
"Contract To Sell" more than satisfies this requirement. Whereas in the case of
Genato's agreement with Cheng such is unavailing. For even before the receipt, Exh.
"D," was issued to Cheng information of such pre-existing agreement has been
brought to his knowledge which did not deter him from pursuing his agreement with
Genato. We give credence to the factual finding of the appellate court that "Cheng
himself admitted that it was he who sought Genato in order to inquire about the
property and offered to buy the same. 44 And since Cheng was fully aware, or could
have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the
Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now
becomes unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad
faith in entering into such agreement. As we have held in Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong
Machinery Co.: 45
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect . . . of
title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in
good faith as against . . . . an interest therein; and the same rule
must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his
willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser
for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective,
and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have
led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution
which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like
situation. Good faith, or lack of it, is in its last analysis a question of
intention; but in ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated
on a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence
as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward
motive may with safety, be determined. So it is that "the honesty of
intention," "the honest lawful intent," which constitutes good faith
implies a "freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought
to put a person on inquiry," and so it is that proof of such knowledge
overcomes the presumption of good faith in which the courts

always indulge in the absence of the proof to the contrary. "Good


faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen
or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can only
be judge of by actual or fancied tokens or signs." (Wilder vs.
Gilman, 55 Vt. 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas vs. Miller, 108 Cal., 250;
Breaux-Renoudet, Cypress Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La. Ann.,
2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs. Bromely, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.)
(Emphasis ours)
Damages were awarded by the appellate court on the basis of its finding that
petitioner "was in bad faith when he filed the suit for specific performance knowing
fully well that his agreement with Genato did not push through. 46Such bad faith,
coupled with his wrongful interference with the contractual relations between Genato
and the Da Jose spouses, which culminated in his filing of the present suit and
thereby creating what the counsel for the respondents describes as "a prolonged and
economically unhealthy gridlock 47 on both the land itself and the respondents' rights
provides ample basis for the damages awarded. Based on these overwhelming
evidence of bad faith on the part of herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng, we find that the
award of damages made by the appellate court is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED and
the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED EN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133168

March 28, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1


vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the decision 2dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled "Petition for Amendment of
Plan and Technical Description of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the name of
Benjamin Guerrero, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City."
The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:
Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of
Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V83191 covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of
256 square meters. Upon favorable report and recommendation of the District Land
Officer, Guerreros application was approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with
the boundaries of the land awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801;
S-Culiat Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is
contained at the back of the Order of Award.
Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was
issued in favor of respondent. Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.
On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands
claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of
facts and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to
respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has been
residing since 1961.
A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director
of Lands issued an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. The
dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the then Minister of Natural Resources and
by the Office of the President in a Decision dated July 22, 1985.

Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22, 1985.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration, the President, , ordered that the case be
remanded to the DENR [Department of Environment and Natural Resources] for the
latters office to conduct an ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed area.
The said directive is contained in the Order dated October 30, 1987(Exhibit "J").
Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and
relocation survey was conducted by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K") was thereafter
submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of the titled property of Guerrero
consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of
Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante) with only 91 square meters
under the physical possession of Guerrero. It was also found out that OCT No. 0-28 is
supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the Order of Award in
favor of Guerrero, shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz:
bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public
Land.
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR] Ocular
Investigation and Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") , issued an order directing
the DENR to implement the Report for the proper correction of the technical
description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to respondent.
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for
Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of
Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the
petition , alleging among other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the Director of Lands petition and that the said petition was defective
in form and substance, inasmuch as it failed to name [Guerrero] who holds a
certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) over the properties subject of the petition, as
respondent in the action, and that the title sought to be amended was irrevocable and
can no longer be questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. Trial of the petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand,
and [Guerrero], on the other, presenting their respective evidence and
witnesses.3 [Words in bracket added.]
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its
allegation that respondent obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through
fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court
likewise ruled that the original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of
respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1)
year from the entry of the decree of registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated
February 12, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:

It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent
involving public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title
issued upon private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The effect
of registration of a homestead or any other similar patent and the issuance of a
certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in
the same manner as if ownership had been determined by final decree of the court,
and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or
reopened within one year after the entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud, a
patent awarded in accordance with the Public Land Law may be reviewed within one
year from the date of the order for the issuance of the patent also on the ground of
actual fraud.
xxx

xxx

xxx
xxx there is no showing that at the time the [respondent] applied for his
miscellaneous sales patent, there were third persons who had been in occupation of
the land applied for. While subsequent survey documents, prepared as a
consequence of the protest filed by the Bustamentes, report the possession of the
Bustamantes of a portion of the land, and the erection of their house thereon, these
reports do not indicate if such structures were existing at the time the application of
the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of
actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent, and subsequently,
OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied by the appellate court in its resolution of March 23, 1998.5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in
holding I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving
public lands is conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondents
title was procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of
actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent despite the
final ruling of the Office of the President from which ruling respondent did not
appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third
person of the land, or a portion thereof, after the award and issuance of the
patent to the applicant despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed
within one year from the issuance of patent.6

Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of
title through fraud and misrepresentation. To support its basic posture, petitioner
points to the verification survey conducted by Engr. Ernesto Erive of the DENR,
which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that respondents entitlement to a
public land award should have been limited to a 91-square meter area instead of the
174 square meters eventually granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured
pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of
registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition
the presence of fraud is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review
factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has consistently held, factual findings
of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on
this Court,7 save when the judgment of the appellate court is based on a
misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that court
overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.8Obviously, petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having
the Court review the factual determinations of the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by clear
and convincing evidence that respondent procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent
(MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 through fraud and misrepresentation.
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the
public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now
covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the
operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903.
Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an
official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted
or what the law warrants or reserves. 9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate
possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further;
on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that
he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of
any right over the covered land.10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands belonging to the Government of the [Republic of
the Philippines] are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument
of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such
instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for
the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and
conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered

land, and an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or
instrument of conveyance from the Government shall not take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and
the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the
land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the
register of deeds for the province where the land lies. xxx. (Words in bracket added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes
registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of
an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land
to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual
fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says so:
SEC. 38. xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the [Republic of the Philippines]
and all the branches thereof, . Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the decree of registration within one
year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired
an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of
title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis
and words in bracket supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of
a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental
effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is
not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic
if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from
asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had
been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a
decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land
where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not
contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other
claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him
not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the

true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these
examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case.
The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where
the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and
has been controverted and decided. Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief
where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed
forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a
fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of
the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case.15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review
of the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate
evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in
procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably
failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question
and from properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud. In fact, other than its
peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial court that "the patentee,
Benjamin Guerrero, obtained the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false
statement of facts and/or omission of material facts," 16 petitioner did not specifically
allege how fraud was perpetrated by respondent in procuring the sales patent and the
certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation.
Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own
cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears
the burden of proof.17 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the
people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it
may be committed in as many different ways. 18 Thus, the law requires that fraud be
established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing
evidence.19
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report20 which stated that
respondent Guerrero was entitled to only 91 square meters of the subject lot instead
of 174 square meters which was awarded to him. There is, however, no proof that the
area eventually awarded to respondent was intentionally and fraudulently increased.
It was never proven that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award of
a bigger area of 174 square meters instead of 91 square meters. Petitioner even
failed to give sufficient proof of any error which may have been committed by its
agents who had surveyed the subject property nor had petitioner offered a sensible
explanation as to the reason for such discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject
lot was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. 21 Under Section 91
thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the
veracity of the material facts set out in the application. 22 The law also requires

sufficient notice to the municipality and barrio where the land is located in order to
give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent
filed his miscellaneous sales application, an actual investigation and site verification
of the parcel of land was conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who
reported that the land was free from claims and conflicts. 24 Likewise, the notice of sale
of the lot in question was posted at the District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at
the Quezon City Hall, and at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from
February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965 which was the date scheduled for the sale of
the lot. The said notice was worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of
Lands, Manila on or before the date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be
barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of
Patent"27 dated June 28, 1982 were both duly signed by the Director of Lands. The
"Order of Award" even declared that Guerrero has in good faith established his
residence on the land in question. On the other hand, the "Issuance of Patent" stated
that the land consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim and that
Guerrero has fully paid the purchase price of the lot. Having complied with all the
requirements of the law preliminary to the issuance of the patent, respondent was
thus issued MSP No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding
OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly
performed their official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land registration that led to
the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in respondents name are
presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this legal presumption will not only
endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens
system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens
titles to meaningless verbiage.28 Besides, this presumption of regularity has not been
overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain
petitioners contention that fraud tainted the sales patent granted to respondent
Guerrero, as well as the certificate of title issued in consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail
itself of the remedy within the prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration must be filed within one
year from the date of entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the
issuance of the patent by the government.29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982,
while petitioner instituted an action to amend respondents certificate of title on
November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years from the issuance

of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the remedy to contest
Guerreros title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired
property is not barred by prescription. Thus, it can still recover the land granted to
respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still
bring an action, even after the lapse of one year, for the reversion to the public
domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in cases of
fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title. In the
present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke this defense for, as discussed
earlier, it was never proven that respondents patent and title were obtained through
actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the
corresponding certificate of title ceases to be part of the public domain. As such, it is
considered a private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction.31
Petitioner likewise insists that respondents title had yet to attain the status of
indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file a protest on
July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-year prescriptive period.
We do not agree.
While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of
respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with
the regional trial court as mandated by the aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act
No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition for review of a decree of
registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial
Court). The law did not say that such petition may be filed with an administrative
agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law contemplates in allowing a
review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court where
each party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and where each of
them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence and not by mere
substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in administrative
proceedings. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth.32On the other hand, substantial evidence refers
to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of
land titles and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the merits before a regular
court is necessary for the purpose of achieving a more in-depth and thorough
determination of all issues involved.

Hence, contrary to petitioners assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the
Bureau of Lands cannot be considered in the context of a petition to review the
decree of registration issued to respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that
such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with the RTC and obviously, it was
way beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it
was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers
title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition
was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if
this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be
that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept
the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are
satisfied.34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment
of OCT No. 0-28, derogates the very integrity of the system as it gives the impression
to Torrens title holders, like herein respondent, that their titles can be questioned by
the same authority who had approved their titles. In that case, no Torrens title holder
shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for land registration
officers can question his title any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title
holder. This is all the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he
had bought the subject lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now
impugning his title.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a
system of registration of titles to lands,35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder
should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
States agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest
damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims
that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.37
Respondents certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system,
was thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988


EDUARDO
S.
BARANDA
and
ALFONSO
HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO
SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:


Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and
the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases
and the instant case is the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of
the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing
of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated
December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title
filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana
Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in
the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court
issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera
and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also
have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT
No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of
possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having

been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982.


Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on
certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme
Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution dated
January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the
denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with
the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The
petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the
writs of possession and demolition issued in the respondent court
should now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before the
Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the
implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should
be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile
effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and
demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of
prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in
the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for
indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil
Case No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been
passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended
not to render the petition moot and academic pending the Court's
consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of
issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the
petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the
writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January
7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which
covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our
Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in
G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided
by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:

Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S.


Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28,
1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions
dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by
Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated
December 29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court
(First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under
Act 496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment,
resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition
thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098
is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the
ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register
the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration
and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P.
Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for
Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court
and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court.
They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII,
under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds
Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of
the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;

Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p.
473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another
motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution
dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and
January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the
movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of
Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated
October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso,
Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5,
1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full
implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution
dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby
GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to


surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court
within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after which period,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled
and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new
Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall
contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation
asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of
TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals
(as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it
already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution
dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only
the implementation of the writ of possession but also the
cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p.
536, Rollo 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is


hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September
5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners
Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2,
1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated November
25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by
Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which
was granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15,
1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30)
days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the
same is hereby GRANTED.

Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7,


1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains
is the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED
to refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply
disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the
implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions
in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso
annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.

However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil
Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated
in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial
court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the
cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing
the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates
of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another
order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge
to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds
to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in
the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of
is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion
and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said
order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant or other disposition of the action such
as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in
and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any
case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
Pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall
be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a
certificate of the clerk of court in which the action
or proceeding was pending stating the manner of
disposal thereof."

That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case
docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo
Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus
Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the
cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or
deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the
Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending,
stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis
Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this
Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court
resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and
granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis
pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid
and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue
is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No.
64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido,
Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is
pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated
October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why
respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting
Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of
titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.

Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that
Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners
in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871,
among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues
raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042
was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings,
respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as
null and void the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3,
Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No.
62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the
reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and
declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre
in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long
before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents
herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of
the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court
ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the
reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the
party causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly
recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property
or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property
is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same,
unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the
litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et
al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing
cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)

The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this
case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v.
Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which
has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the
action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as
for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff
does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where
the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible,
are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the
Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly
the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be
cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section
77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof
which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party
who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused
the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled
by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the
same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the
private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of
Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the
order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties
subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein)
touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos
over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of
Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference
to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title
is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means "ought to,
must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of
doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrumentpresented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner
of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case
No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot
No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders
issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22486

March 20, 1968

TEODORO
ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino
O.
Calo,
Jr.
for
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

petitioner-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds
of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the
following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is
considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the
New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made,
the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without
violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of
extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or
heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale
executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on
a petition for mandamus(sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to
register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of
title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the
respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent
reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner
has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision
of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed
for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that
"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over
real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30,
1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid
objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their nonexistence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on
registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered.

How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before
they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their
provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then
questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be
decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92
Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.
For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is
supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to
be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration.
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage,
or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the
party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the
matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands,
after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the
step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided,
further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution
of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision
may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after
receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition
for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest
does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to
by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is
affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1wph1.t

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 dated May 14, 2010 and
the Resolution2dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
70235, which affirmed with modification the assailed Decision 3 dated February 14,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 273, in Civil Case No.
96-274-MK.
The following facts are found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court:
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on
September 1, 1990.4 Sometime in 1988 when the parties were still engaged, Shirley
was working as a domestic helper in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent
him money5 for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had planned
to eventually build their home. Rogelio was then also working abroad as a seaman.
The following year, or on September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house
and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00)6 from Rodeanna Realty
Corporation. The subject property has an aggregate area of one hundred eleven
square meters (111 sq. m.) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N133844.7 Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she
settled the balance for the equity over the subject property with the developer through
SSS8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations. On
October 19, 1989, TCT No. 171963 9 over the subject property was issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal solely under the name of Rogelio.

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject
property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she
received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica
Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, and was able to confirm upon her
return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as
his
wife.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before
the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and
Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. Shirley later withdrew the
complaint for legal separation and liquidation of property, but re-filed 10 the same on
January 29, 1993. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio
had the intention of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested
buyers - one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza
(petitioner) - of the existence of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and
cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and
terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale 11 dated December 29, 1992,
Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's consent in the amount
of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner's
undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on the property with the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.
Meanwhile, in a Decision12 dated May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70,
granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the dissolution and liquidation of
the regime of absolute community of property between Shirley and
Rogelio, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the instant petition
for legal separation between the subject spouses with all its legal effects as provided
for in Art. 63 of the Family Code. Their community property is consequently dissolved
and must be liquidated in accordance with Art. 102 of the New Family Code. The
respondent is thus hereby enjoined from selling, encumbering or in any way disposing
or alienating any of their community property including the subject house and lot
before the required liquidation. Moreover, he, being the guilty spouse, must forfeit the
net profits of the community property in favor of the petitioner who is the innocent
spouse pursuant to Art. 43 of the aforesaid law. Finally, in the light of the claim of
ownership by the present occupants who have not been impleaded in the instant
case, a separate action must be instituted by the petitioner against the alleged buyer
or
buyers
thereof
to
determine
their
respective
rights
thereon.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila and the National Statistics Office (NSO),
sta.
Mesa,
Manila.
SO ORDERED.13cralawlawlibrary
Rogelio appealed the above-quoted ruling before the CA which denied due course
and dismissed the petition. It became final and executory and a writ of execution was
issued
in
August
1995.14
On August 27, 1996, Shirley instituted a Complaint 15 for Rescission of Sale and
Recoveiy of Property against petitioner and Rogelio before the RTC of Marikina City,

Branch 273. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on February
14, 2001, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff Shirley Nuega and against defendant Josefina Nobleza, as follows:
1)

the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 insofar as the 55.05 square
meters representing the one half (1/2) portion of plaintiff Shirley Nuega is
concerned, is hereby ordered rescinded, the same being null and void;

2)

defendant Josefina Nobleza is ordered to reconvey said 55.05 square meters to


plaintiff Shirley Nuega, or in the alternative to pay plaintiff Shirley Nuega the
present market value of said 55.05 square meters; and

3)

to pay plaintiff Shirley Nuega attorney's fees in the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00).

For

lack

of

merit,

defendant's

counterclaim

is

hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, while Rogelio did not appeal the ruling of the
trial court. In its assailed Decision promulgated on May 14, 2010, the appellate court
affirmed with modification the trial court's ruling, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, subject to the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated 14 February 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch
273 in Civil Case No. 96-274-MK is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 29 December 1992 is hereby declared null and void in its
entirety, and defendant-appellant Josefina V. Nobleza is ordered to reconvey the
entire subject property to plaintiff-appellee Shirley B. Nuega and defendant Rogelio
Nuega, without prejudice to said defendant-appellant's right to recover from
defendant Rogelio whatever amount she paid for the subject property. Costs against
defendant-appellant
Nobleza.
SO ORDERED.17cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated July 21, 2010, the
appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition raising the
following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I.] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY SUSTAINING THE FINDING
THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH.
[II.] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MODIFIED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY DECLARING AS NULL AND
VOID THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 29 DECEMBER 1992 IN ITS
ENTIRETY.18
We
deny
the
petition.
Petitioner

is

not

buyer

in

good

faith.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full
and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any

notice of claims or interest of some other person in the property.19 It is the party who
claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such
assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. 20 To
successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is
that first and foremost, the "buyer in good faith" must have shown prudence and due
diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did everything
that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her rights and
interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation.
The prudence required of a buyer in good faith is "not that of a person with training in
law, but rather that of an average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
nil.'"21 A buyer in good faith does his homework and verifies that the particulars are in
order such as the title, the parties, the mode of transfer and the provisions in the
deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence can be
shown by making an ocular inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership
with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or
inquiring into the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type of ownership,
and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily
includes an inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital
consent is secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property in the
possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise due diligence, conduct an
investigation, and weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances like what any
prudent
man
in
a
similar
situation
would
do. 22
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good faith of the subject
property which is titled under the name of the seller Rogelio A. Nuega alone as
evidenced by TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-01204724.23 Petitioner argues, among others, that since she has examined the TCT over
the subject property and found the property to have been registered under the name
of seller Rogelio alone, she is an innocent purchaser for value and "she is not
required to go beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of the subject
property at the time of the consummation of the sale and at the date of the sale." 24
We

disagree

with

petitioner.

A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the
TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to
the
sale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong,25 petitioners therein - as
does petitioner herein - were also harping that due to the indefeasibility of a Torrens
title, there was nothing in the TCT of the property in litigation that should have
aroused the buyer's suspicion as to put her on guard that there was a defect in the
title of therein seller. The Court held in the Spouses Raymundo case that the buyer
therein could not hide behind the cloak of being an innocent purchaser for value by
merely relying on the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the land
purchased is the seller. The Court ruled in this case that the buyer was not an
innocent
purchaser
for
value
due
to
the
following
attendant
circumstances, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, we are not convinced by the petitioners' incessant assertion that
Jocelyn is an innocent purchaser for value. To begin with, she is a grandniece of
Eulalia and resides in the same locality where the latter lives and conducts her

principal business. It is therefore impossible for her not to acquire knowledge of her
grand aunt's business practice of requiring her biyaheros to surrender the titles to
their properties and to sign the corresponding deeds of sale over said properties in
her favor, as security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on guard for any possible
abuses that Eulalia may commit with the titles and the deeds of sale in her
possession.26cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in the case of Arrofo v. Quio,27 the Court held that while "the law does not
require a person dealing with registered land to inquire further than what the Torrens
Title on its face indicates," the rule is not absolute. 28 Thus, finding that the buyer
therein failed to take the necessary precaution required of a prudent man, the Court
held
that
Arrofo
was
not
an
innocent
purchaser
for
value, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to act as a prudent buyer.
True, she asked her daughter to verify from the Register of Deeds if the title to the
Property is free from encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that the Property is
within the neighborhood and that she conducted an ocular inspection of the Property.
She saw the house constructed on the Property. Yet, Arrofo did not even bother to
inquire about the occupants of the house. Arrofo also admitted that at the time of the
sale, Myrna was occupying a room in her house as her lessee. The fact that Myrna
was renting a room from Arrofo yet selling a land with a house should have put Arrofo
on her guard. She knew that Myrna was not occupying the house. Hence, someone
else
must
have
been
occupying
the
house.
Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the house, and if a lessee, who
received the rentals from such lessee. Such inquiry would have led Arrofo to discover
that the lessee was paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and Myrna, who claimed to
own the Property.29cralawlawlibrary
An

analogous

situation

obtains

in

the

case

at

bar.

The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the seller Rogelio himself
who was therein also described as "single". However, as in the cases of Spouses
Raymundo and Arrofo, there are circumstances critical to the case at bar which
convince us to affirm the ruling of both the appellate and lower courts that herein
petitioner
is
not
a
buyer
in
good
faith.
First, petitioner's sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was residing near
Rogelio and Shirley's house - the subject property - in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina
City. Had petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if
Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of the subject property. Had petitioner been more
vigilant, she could have inquired with such facility - considering that her sister lived in
the same Ladislao Diwa Village where the property is located - if there was any
person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the subject property.
To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao
Diwa Village - including petitioner's sister - not to engage in any deal with Rogelio
relative to the purchase of the subject property because of the cases she had filed
against Rogelio. Petitioner denies that respondent had given such warning to her
neighbors, which includes her sister, therefore arguing that such warning could not be
construed as "notice" on her part that there is a person other than the seller himself
who has any right or interest in the subject property. Nonetheless, despite petitioner's
adamant denial, both courts a quo gave probative value to the testimony of

respondent, and the instant petition failed to present any convincing evidence for this
Court to reverse such factual finding. To be sure, it is not within our province to
second-guess the courts a quo, and the re-determination of this factual issue is
beyond the reach of a petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law
may
be
reviewed.30
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale also pose
question on the claim of petitioner that she is a buyer in good faith. As correctly
observed by both courts a quo, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated
on December 29, 1992. However, the Community Tax Certificates of the witnesses
therein were dated January 2 and 20, 1993. 31 While this irregularity is not a direct
proof of the intent of the parties to the sale to make it appear that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed on December 29, 1992 - or before Shirley filed the
petition for legal separation on January 29, 1993 - it is circumstantial and relevant to
the claim of herein petitioner as an innocent purchaser for value.
That

is

not

all.

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the civil status of Rogelio as
seller was not stated, while petitioner as buyer was indicated as
"single," viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with postal address at 2-A-2
Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the
VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and with postal address
at No. L-2-A-3 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter
referred to as the VENDEE.32cralawlawlibrary
It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly claimed that Rogelio is
"single" under TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-01204724, his civil status as seller was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale - further
creating a cloud on the claim of petitioner that she is an innocent purchaser for value.
As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did not err when it modified
the decision of the trial court and declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December
29,
1992
is
void
in
its
entirety.
The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the subject property is
Rogelio alone, respondent was able to prove at the trial court that she contributed in
the payment of the purchase price of the subject property. This fact was also settled
with finality by the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case
for legal separation and liquidation of property docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510.
The pertinent portion of the decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the parties prior to their marriage
forms
part
of
their
community
property
regime,
xxx
From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial contribution for the
purchase of the house and lot covered by TCT 171963. Thus, the present lot which
forms part of their community property should be divided equally between them upon

the grant of the instant petition for legal separation. Having established by
preponderance of evidence the fact of her husband's guilt in contracting a subsequent
marriage xxx, Shirley alone should be entitled to the net profits earned by the
absolute community property.33cralawlawlibrary
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of
respondent's financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual
contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community
property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the
community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by theFamily Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code,
which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall
form
part
of
the
community
property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of
such property.
As held in Quiao v. Quiao:34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the
couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in
the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article
92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio.
Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and
despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is
owned
jointly
by
the
spouses
Shirley
and
Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own
and without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property
via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 - or during the subsistence of
a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise

known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal
property is void, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed


Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2010 and July 21,
2010,
respectively,
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
70235
areAFFIRMED.
Costs

against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.35cralawlawlibrary
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell
the subject property without the written consent of respondent or the authority of the
court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void. As correctly explained
by the appellate court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject property to defendantappellant Josefina on 29 December 1992 or during the existence of Rogelio's
marriage to plaintiff-appellee Shirley, without the consent of the latter. The subject
property forms part of Rogelio and Shirley's absolute community of property. Thus,
the trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale null and void only insofar as the
55.05 square meters representing the one-half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-appellee
Shirley. In absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and
consent of the wife, sells (their) property, such sale is void. The consent of both the
husband Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void including the portion of the subject property
pertaining to defendant Rogelio who contracted the sale with defendant-appellant
Josefina. Since the Deed of Absolute Sale x x x entered into by and between
defendant-appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29 December 1992,
during the subsisting marriage between plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was
without the written consent of Shirley, the said Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its
entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in declaring the said Deed of Absolute Sale as
void only insofar as the 1/2 portion pertaining to the share of Shirley is
concerned.36cralawlawlibrary
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale
with petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the contract
under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner
for the reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under
Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall only be "liable
for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x." As correctly
stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that the amount
received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent cannot be
made
to
reimburse
any
amount
to
petitioner.37

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61565 August 20, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO SAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch I,
and RAMON TAN BIANA JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Rogelio P. Corpus for private respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on 9 January 1952 in
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, as the fifth legitimate child of the spouses Ramon Tan
Biana and Tiu Muy. His birth was registered on the same day in the Office of the

Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, by the nurse who attended the
parturition of Ramon's mother. Private respondent claims that, in the process,
the attending nurse erroneously reported to the Local Civil Registrar that
Ramon's citizenship, and the citizenship of his parents, as "Chinese" instead of
"Filipino". Private respondent claims that his "true and real citizenship", and
that of his parents, is Philippine citizenship.
On 2 February 1982, private respondent filed a petition before the then Court of
First Instance of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 1, entitled "In the Matter
of the Correction of the Birth Certificate of Ramon Tan Biana, Jr., Ramon Tan
Biana, Jr., Petitioner v. The Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
Respondent", docketed as Special Proceedings No. 847. In this petition, private
respondent sought the correction of entries in the Civil Registry of Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya, relating to his citizenship and the citizenship of his legitimate
parents, as appearing in his Certificate of Birth.
Copies of the petition were furnished to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati,
Metropolitan Manila and the Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. On
2 February 1982, notice of hearing was issued by the trial court, setting the
petition for heating on 15 April 1982. A copy of the notice of hearing served
upon the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Nueva Vizcaya and the Local Civil Registrar, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. A copy of
the notice of hearing was also posted by the Sheriff in the bulletin board of the
townhall of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya on 26 February 1982. The notice of hearing
was also published in the "Vizcaya Advocate", a newspaper of general
circulation published in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks. 1
At the initial hearing of the petition on 15 April 1982, no appearance was
entered by the Office of the Solicitor General, notwithstanding its receipt of a
copy of the petition and of the notice of hearing. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Leo
G. Rosario, however, appeared on behalf of the Government. In view of the
failure of a representative of the Office of the Solicitor General to appear, the
trial court reset the hearing of the petition to 14 May 1982 and in an Order of the
court, requested the Solicitor General to file either an opposition, comment or
any other responsive pleading to the petition since "the court believe[d] that
the petition [was] significant, involving, as it does, a change of citizenship of
petitioner. 2Notwithstanding this order of the court of 15 April 1982, no pleading
was received by the trial court from the Solicitor General's Office. Accordingly,
the trial court proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner on 14 May 1982,
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal representing the Government.
The evidence submitted at the hearing by private respondent in respect of his
claim of Filipino citizenship was summarized by the trial court in the following
manner:

To support the claim of petitioner that his parents are filipinos


and that his citizenship is, likewise, filipino, petitioner
presented to the Court a decision of the Bureau of immigration
in I.C. No. 2480 dated June 18, 1947, (Exh. 'F') the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW THEREOF, this Board is of the
opinion. and so holds that the herein
applicant, RAMON TAN BIANA being a natural
son of Marciana Goco a Filipino woman, is
entitled to re-admission into this country as a
Filipino citizen.
The Petitioner also submitted to the Court as Exh. 'H' another
decision of the Bureau of Immigration in I.C. No. 12890-C dated
April 4, 1956, a portion of which is quoted as follows:
However, with respect to Tiu Muy, who claims to be the wife of
Ramon Tan Biana by virtue of an alleged legal union in
February, 1928, in Amoy, China, the doubt may be resolved
favorably in view of their marriage in Arayat, Pampanga, on
September 14, 1953, as evidenced by their corresponding
marriage certificate. As a consequence of this marriage, which
is in full force and effect, it cannot be denied that TIU MUY is
the legal wife of Ramon Tan Biana, and therefore, imbued with
the latter's Philippine nationality. (Paragraph 1 of Sec. 15, C.A.
473) 3
By a decision dated 13 July 1982, the trial court ordered the Local Civil
Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, to make in the entries and records of this
office "with particular reference to Register No. 41, Book No. 111, of the
Register of Births of that municipality", the corrections sought by private
respondent so as to reflect a change in the citizenship of Ramon Tan Biana, Jr.
as well as his parents Ramon Tan Biana and Tiu Muy from "Chinese" to
"Filipino" and to furnish copies of the corrected Certificate of Birth to "all other
offices concerned."
On 4 August 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General finally appeared and filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, arguing that the
entries ordered corrected by the court were "not merely clerical of a harmless
or innocuous nature but [were] substantial in as much as they involved the
citizenship of petitioner and his parents". The Office of the Solicitor General
prayed that the trial court reconsider its decision and render a new one
dismissing the petition. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner alleges that the trial court should
not have ordered the correction of the relevant entries in the Local Civil
Registry since they involved substantial matters which should not have been
decided in "a merely summary proceeding" but rather in "an appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented."
Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that he does not seek a judicial
declaration of his citizenship but rather merely a correction of an entry in the
Local Civil Registrar's Office as to his citizenship and that of his parents,
considering that the citizenship of his parents had already been passed upon
by the Bureau of Immigration. Private respondent further contends that the
proceedings taken before the trial court were not summary in nature, and that
the decision was rendered only after the required notices had been given and
after a hearing.
The basic issue presented in this case was passed upon and settled by this
Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Leonor Valencia. 4 There the Court held:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is
not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship,
which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative
relief
cannot
be
granted
in
a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a
right in law may be enforced and a, wrong may be remedied as
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the
opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970
while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that
'the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in
an appropriate proceeding.
What is meant by 'appropriate adversary proceeding?' Blacks
Law Dictionary defines 'adversary proceeding' as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an exparte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. (Platt v.
Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39).

xxx xxx xxx 5


Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.
Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court
to issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of
the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition the civil
registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a
petition for correction and /or cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
'summary'. There can be no doubt that when an opposition to
the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings. 6
Tested by the standards projected in Valencia, the proceedings taken in the
instant case appear to us to be appropriate adversary proceedings. As
indicated earlier, a copy of the petition was sent both to the Office of the Nueva
Vizcaya Provincial Fiscal and the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition
was set for hearing on 15 April 1982, and a notice of hearing dated 2 February
1982 was served upon the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya, the
Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya and the Office of the Solicitor
General, Makati, Metro Manila; posted by the Sheriff in the bulletin board of the
municipal townhall of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, and published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. 7 Upon failure of the Solicitor General's Office to appear at the
first hearing set by the trial court, the latter reset the hearing for the succeeding
month and expressly requested the Solicitor General to appear and to file a
responsive pleading considering that the changes in the Local Civil Registry
requested by petitioner were "significant" involving the citizenship of the
petitioner. Notwithstanding the resetting of the hearing, and despite having
received notice of the rescheduled hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General
entered no appearance and filed no pleading before the trial court. The
Assistant Provincial Fiscal appeared on behalf of the Government and was
present when the court proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner on the
rescheduled hearing. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal did not file any opposition

to the petition. It must be assumed that the Assistant Provincial Fiscal did not
do so because he saw no need to file such an opposition. We do not believe
that his failure to file an opposition changed the adversarial character of the
proceedings. It certainly was not private respondent's fault that neither the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal nor anyone else saw fit to oppose the petition for
correction.
Both in the motion for reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General of the
decision of the trial court and in the Petition for Review filed before tills Court,
the Solicitor General did not question the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy
or sufficiency of the evidence submitted before the trial court relating to
petitioner's citizenship and that of his parents. The Office of the Solicitor
General, both before the trial court and before us, has limited itself to
contending that substantial changes of entries in the Local Civil Registry are
not to be made pursuant to "a summary proceeding."
The Court considers that the procedure followed in the case at bar satisfied the
requirements of "appropriate adversary pro-proceedings."
It remains only to note that the evidence submitted by private respondent
before the trial court consisted of the following:
1. The Voter's Identification Card (Exhibit "E") of his father,
Ramon Tan Biana, Sr. y Goco showing his father to be a
registered voter;
2. A decision of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of
Immigration in I.C. No. 2480, dated 18 June 1947 (Exhibit 'F")
stating that private respondent's father being a natural son of
Marciana Goco a Filipino citizen, was entitled to re-admission
into the country as a Philippine citizen;
3. A certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Exhibit
"G") stating that Ramon Tan Biana, Sr. is a Philippine citizen;
4. The decision of the Bureau of Immigration in I.C. No. 12890C
dated 4 April 1956 (Exhibit "H") stating that private
respondent's mother, Tiu Muy, being the legal wife of Ramon
Tan Biana, was also a Philippine citizen;
5. The Birth Certificate of Alfred Tan (Exhibit "I"), a brother of
private respondent, stating that he is the sixth child of Ramon
Tan Biana, Sr. and Tiu Muy, who are both Philippine citizens;
and

6. The Voter's Identification Card (Exhibit 'J") of private


respondent showing him to be a registered voter in the
Philippines. 8
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for lack of merit. The
Decision of the trial court dated 13 June 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON
PASAHOL, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:


This petition for review by way of certiorari questions the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Bataan granting the private respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral
registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its registration in the names
of the respondents.
The facts are undisputed. As found by the appellate court, they are as follows:
On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza
and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First Instance of Bataan,
Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by
purchase from its original owners (Annex "A") and thereafter,
actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by them tacked
on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30
years.

Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the


cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an ongoing
cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was declared
public land. Notwithstanding, admittedly it has not been alienated,
reserved, leased or otherwise disposed of by the government.
Basic petition reopens cadastral proceedings insofar as this lot is
concerned and prays for issuance of a decree/title in petitioners'
name.
Traversing the foregoing, Solicitor General opposed denying
adequate basis for grant of prayer; that neither documentary
evidence nor nature of possession would warrant; that lot 444 is of
public domain.
Evidence of ownership and possession show petitioner Esteban
Mendoza and his co-petitioner, his brother-in-law Leon Pasahol,
bought Lot 444 from the heirs of Maria Nunez and Feliciano Ignacio
on December 1, 1957 as shown by a deed of sale (Exhibit "A"); that
after acquiring the land, they planted it to various fruit-bearing trees;
that from December 1, 1957, petitioners had possessed the land
peacefully, openly and continuously under claim of ownership, as
had their predecessors-in-interest before them; that before the
purchase of the land, it had been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Maria Nunez since 1932 (Exhibit "E"); that in 1962, he
and Leon Pasahol had agreed that the property was to be declared
for taxation in Pasahol's name only (Exhibit "F"); that petitioners
were informed before the sale by their vendors that the latter did
not claim the land in the cadastral proceedings Rec. No. 1097, Cad.
Case No. 19 because they were "totally ignorant" of said
proceedings, not having been notified of the same; and that the
land subject of the petition was not covered by any government or
forest reservation.
Mendoza's testimony was corroborated by witnesses Arsenio
Amante, Eliseo Reyes (one of the vendors), and Cresencio
Abuzman.
Petitioners likewise presented other documentary evidence namely:
Exhibit "B" Certification of the Land
Registration Commission dated December 23,
1968 that the lot in question had been declared
public land.
Exhibit "C" Plan of Lot 444 of the Mariveles
Cadastre prepared by Geodetic Engineer Victor

Clamor, Jr. and certified by Carlos G. Reyes,


Chief of the Surveys Division of the Bureau of
Lands.
Exhibit "D" Technical description of Lot 444
certified as correct by the Surveys Division Chief
acting for the Director of Lands.
Exhibit "G" Certification dated December 10,
1968 by the Municipal Treasurer of Mariveles,
Bataan that payment of land taxes for Lot 444
was up to date.
Exhibit "H" Certification by the Acting District
Land Officer dated April 15, 1969 that the land
had been cadastrally surveyed for the heirs of
Feliciano Iglesia, predecessors- in-interest of the
petitioners.
Exhibit "J" Report of the District Forester,
Bureau
of
Forestry,
Balanga,
Bataan
recommending
approval
of
the
petition
considering that the land being applied for was
not needed for forestry purposes.
On the part of the State, the Solicitor General did not present
evidence of any kind but relied only on the petitioners' own
evidence.
Initially, the court a quo denied registration observing, that Exhibit
"C", the plan of the property sought to be registered, "does not
appear to have been approved by the Director of Lands."
Furthermore, although Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol were
the petitioners in the case, the latter had not appeared "to
corroborate the oral testimony of Mendoza that Pasahol has agreed
with him to have the land declared for taxation purposes only in the
latter's name."
On motion for reconsideration, the court a quo reconsidered and
ordered a new hearing on the petition.
In the new trial, the previous deficiencies were rectified by the
petitioners. Leon Pasahol took the witness stand to corroborate
Esteban Mendoza's testimony; Exhibit "C" was presented anew in
evidence, this time with the required approval of the Director of
Lands. As a consequence, the courta quo granted the petition for

registration of Lot 444. (pp. 1-3, Decision-Intermediate Appellate


Court)
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision and
held:
In this appeal, the Solicitor General contests, alleging Exhibit "A"
shows that petitioners' possession began only in 1957, they could
not tack their possession to their predecessors-in-interest because
of the failure of the latter to lay claim to the property in question
either during the cadastral survey of the area in 1927 or in the
original cadastral proceedings held thereafter.
We do not agree.
Record shows Feliciano Iglesia, original owner of the property, died
before herein cadastral proceedings were instituted. His heirs who
succeeded to his rights over the land lived in a remote part thereof
and only infrequently visited the provincial capital where the courts
were located. Under these circumstances, it is quite credible
petitioners'predecessors-in-interest did not receive any notice of the
cadastral proceedings, Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
show that either the petitioners' possession or that of their
predecessors was ever disrupted or interrupted by third-parties,
much less by the government. Petitioners after the sale had
zealously cultivated the property and religiously paid the taxes
thereon for a good number of years. We find possession of the land
by both parties was in good faith and that petitioners herein should
not, as a consequence, be held strictly accountable for the lapse of
their predecessors to file a cadastral yo to the property. Petitioners
may tack their period of possession with that of their vendors
totalling to more than thirty years.
The Solicitor General points out, however, that under Section 1 of
Republic Act 391, as amended by Republic Act 2061, reopening
cadastral proceedings is allowable "only with respect to such of
said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by
the Government." Applying said provision to the lot in question, it is
claimed that registration is not possible as said land is actually
already forest land and/or part of a military reservation. In support
of this contention, the Solicitor General cites the Report of Forest
Guard Crescensio Abuzman to the District Forester (Exhibit "J")
which states that "the area involved is a portion of former Military
Reservation (US) turned over to Philippine government." Hence,
not disposable under any circumstances.

We disagree.
The land may have been a military reservation in the past, but no
longer. The same report Exhibit "J" relied upon by the Solicitor
General goes on to state that this "former Military Reservation" had
already been "delimited and classified by our bureau (Forestry) as
alienable and disposable block under the Proposed Land
Classification Project No. 4-C of Mariveles, Bataan." Additionally,
the Report in fact recommended the titling of the property in the
petitioners' name as the same was no longer needed for forestry
purposes and the government would not be adversely affected.
Contributing to the view as to the disposable character of the land
is the approval by the Director of Lands himself of Exhibit "C", the
plan of the land to be registered. Such approval would hardly be
forthcoming were the property really non-disposable as claimed by
the State.
Finally, We note from the record as well that all the other adjoining
lots (Nos. 443, 447, 446, 438, etc.) were already registered and
titled in the names of private individuals, a circumstance hard to
reconcile with the position of the Solicitor General that registration
of the area was simply not possible. (pp. 4-6, Decision-Intermediate
Appellate Court).
In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the decision of the appellate court as
being contrary to law on the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural and
alienable land of the public domain and that the same can be subject to acquisitive
prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and uninterrupted possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership by the private respondents as to entitle them to
registration and title over the land.
The petitioner maintains that Exhibit "J" which is the report of the District Forester
recommending approval of the private respondents' petition is a mere proposal
contained in the Proposed Land Classification Project No. 4 of Mariveles, Bataan,
which has not yet been approved by the President of the Philippines; and that unless
the President upon the recommendation of the Minister (Secretary) of Natural
Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable, its
status as military reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of
physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change it to agricultural land and bring
it within the provisions of the Public Land Act. Therefore, it was error on the part of the
appellate court to rule that the land in dispute has been in the open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the private respondents for more than thirty years as to
entitle them to register the same and procure a title thereto because possession of an
inalienable land, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

On the other hand, the private respondents argue that even though Exhibit "J" was a
mere proposal, such proposal had been honored and implemented when the land in
dispute had been recommended for titling in their favor. Furthermore, the
recommendation for such titling was made by the same office or branch of the
government authorized and empowered to classify and dispose of the property.
Moreover, the subject property has no more use for any government purpose and for
which reason, the Bureau did not object but instead recommended that it be titled in
favor of the private respondents. In fact, the Director of Lands himself approved the
plan Exhibit "C" covering the land sought to be registered.
We find merit in the instant petition.
While it may be true that as ruled by the appellate court, the private respondents
could tack their possession of the land to that of their predecessors-in-interest as a
result of which they now have more than thirty (30) years' possession of the same,
the fact remains that the subject land has not yet been released from its classification
as part of the military reservation zone and still has to be reclassified as alienable
public land with the approval of the President of the Philippines as required by the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275. As we
have ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (148 SCRA 480, 489):
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all
possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under
Sec- 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private
respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20
days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from
July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio
Cabraban Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267,
which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been
segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of
Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above
mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the
requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.
(Emphasis supplied).
We, therefore, cannot sustain the appellate court's ruling that the land in dispute is no
longer part of the military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify the
same as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A proposal cannot take
the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as public
agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling would be to pre-empt the executive
branch of the government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the
public domain. We ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, (129
SCRA 689, 692-693) that:

In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release the subject
property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended: Yngson v. Secretary of
Agriculture
and
Natural
Resources,
123
SCRA 441
[1983]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]. This
should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is
also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973
Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979])
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject
property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the
matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927
showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was
not presented in evidence will not operate against the State
considering the stipulation between the parties and under the wellsettled rule that the State Cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]) if omission there was, in fact.
While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been
cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all lands
comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey
made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of
the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be
beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under
the Torrens System.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession
Applicant may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
We are not unmindful, however of the plight of the private respondents who have in
good faith possessed and occupied the disputed land for more than (30) years. If
what is needed is only the formal release of the property from its classification as a
military reservation and its reclassification to disposable agricultural land, the
petitioner should, for equitable reasons, take the necessary steps towards the

declassification of the same. As we have held in the same case of Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals (supra):
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or
the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically
render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants'
remedy lies in the release of the property from its present
classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there
are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials
should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of
the land in question.
The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for
generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding
attitude but should, as a matter of policy be encouraged. (Director of Lands v. Funtillar
142 SCRA 57, 69). Apart from strongly opposing an obviously improper method of
securing title to public land, the Solicitor General should also take positive steps to
help the private respondents remedy the situation in which they find themselves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
appellate court is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The application for cadastral
registration of title of the private respondents is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice
to their recourse to the proper administrative remedy.
SO ORDERED.

1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh,
and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of
Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115
meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running
982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo
and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that
the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the
former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the
whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was
never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresionfrom the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land
Registration rendered its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not
possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to
the date on which Cario constructed the house now there that is to say,
for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some years
afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions
are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land.
(Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court
below are the following:

EN BANC
G.R. No. 2869

March 25, 1907

MATEO
CARIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert
Brothers
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

for

appellant.

ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in
the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of
land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of
Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed
of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running

From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the
witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884
Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to
the north of that property now in question, property which, according to the
plan attached toexpediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to
Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one
Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to
and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to
be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the
grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and
located on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No.
561, having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which
house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan;
and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the
property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the
superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan
filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch
as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against
the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under
date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year;
and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains
an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a
road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in
half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of
land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not
have been included in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made
in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually
occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession
in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called
public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the
legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title
ofegresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any
possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The
possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being
the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present
subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein
is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by
article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted
state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a
state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years
immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed
openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the
land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the
two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second,
because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal
disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual
proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and
required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was
limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A
period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory
informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this
period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous
title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or,

as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or
their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in
the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the
cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time
the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common
law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it
be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of
average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period
of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had
been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of
the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in
the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to
show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the
expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity
with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe
by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law
remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it
could only be of force when pertaining to royaltransferable or alienable lands, which
condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which
classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing
them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time
pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal
decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing
with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and
acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth
merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government,
in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 1 and in
conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No.
648,2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627, 3 which
appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions
contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The
petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that
act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial."
(Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title
and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6
of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the
possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows

that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in
accordance with the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of
same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent
of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not
been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the
event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario.
And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in
granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have
already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is
shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or
gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof
with the assistance of these new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had
not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time
immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that,
on the contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this
decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let
the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So
ordered.
Torres,
Mapa,
Willard,
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972

and

Tracey,

JJ., concur.

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK
and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their
complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and
void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for
their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by
respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on
a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore
far from persuasive. A grant by the government through the appropriate public
officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at
naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into
private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war
with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes
clear that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano
David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent
officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of
award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June
18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a
portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on
August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No.
510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano
David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of
the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection
with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is
fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and

duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning
the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year
from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based
thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a private
property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been
formed by reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an
action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud
committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the
land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered
in the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033,
because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of
the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not
clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The
application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said
deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is
likely to be attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion
having taken place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals,
would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the
disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for any
further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as
to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government
to dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a
public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at
the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal
proposition set forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of
the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal
defect of parties to this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of
Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to
cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian,
102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July
31, 1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs,
who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since
they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in
the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands
or public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but notwithstanding such
fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants." 5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable
to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v.
Consolacion, 6a 1908 decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the

grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until
it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government." 7 The
above citation was repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals. 8 Bereft
as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the
Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the
[title] legally issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the
well-known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by
the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its
capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further.
The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use
of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and
other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval
era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a
corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a
recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, 12 a case of Philippine
origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the concept of jura
regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being
vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes
served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case
of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having
acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to
us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in
those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the
natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what
they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the
unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of
legislation is vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that character until
severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court
of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly
categorized as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun
v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that

the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either
by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title
or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to
be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." 24 It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of the doctrine,
found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having failed to
establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the
present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by
any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property
is and remains part of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of
error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice
Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales
application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is
fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning
the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year
from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based
thereon becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the
view that respondent David's title is impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In
thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling
precedents.
As
far
back
as
1919,
in Aquino
v.
Director
of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the
Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law
are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final." 30 Such a view has been followed since then. 31 The latest case in point
is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is
said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more
favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free
patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it
is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five
years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN,
HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE
AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST
EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN
AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or
in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect
title
do
not
apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. This
Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that
the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part
of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other
purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS
ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,

Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain
but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he
has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court
of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in
favor
of
private
persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect
title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of
land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar,
Capiz,
and
has
an
area
of
645,703
square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in
G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades
Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar
Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the
names
of
said
Heirs
of
Jose
Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot
No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to
said
portion
be
confirmed
and
registered
in
his
name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights
and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an
opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to
Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was
adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades
Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective
appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.

In

its

decision,

the

Court

of

Appeals

held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have
been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a
little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of
527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question
that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private
litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition
and
evidence
of
the
Director
of
Forestry;
.
.
.
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed
which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that
period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area; and this can
only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it
was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively
indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but
only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could
not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind
and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957,
two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for
applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least
thirty
(30)
years,
preceding
the
filing
of
the
application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or
oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed
by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire
period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands
of
the
public
domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that
period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had
made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this
Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the
conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had
demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation
will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as
complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the
application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of
Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw
virtua1aw
library

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for
over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act.
On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre
and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885
executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed
on the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public
domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final
decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest
land.chanrobles
law
library
:
red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin
in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is,
whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the
names
of
the
private
applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and
third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings
because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public
interests
to
be
kept
under
forest
classification.
The

petition

is

without

bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land


which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural
or
other
purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant
petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in
1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry
was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask
for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the
District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public
forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land
he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as
those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding
the
filing
of
his
application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never
ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.

merit.
In

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules
on
confirmation
of
imperfect
title
do
not
apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184)
that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the
ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it
being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It

Republic

v.

Gonong

(118

SCRA

729)

we

ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the

occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of
Lands
v.
Reyes,
68
SCRA
177,
195)."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the
public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon
the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such
issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
merit.
Costs
against
the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI
CRUZ
and
CESAR
EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON
INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMOBEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAWCRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE
G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTESVIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT,
ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.
AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO
O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL
S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG
MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA,
FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,

represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,


represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented
by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother
LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA
BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S
EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,intervenors.
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment
to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one
of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join
the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of
the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion
to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and
the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et
al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree
with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray
that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors
filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in
their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found
within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization
of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are

found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,


wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

Petitioners pray for the following:


"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;

These provisions are:


"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget


and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban
filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8,
and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must
await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban
and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130174

July 14, 2000

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND TABANGAO REALTY, INC., represented by Rodolfo
Perez, respondents.

"Lot 10171 Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situated
in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas.
"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the abovementioned lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the
corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been
in actual possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous
owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation as owners including
that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to
the whole world and in the concept of an owner.
"The applicant further alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Company is partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it
(applicant). It also claims that the subject lots are not subject of any lien or
encumbrance; that no adverse interests exist with respect to the subject lots; and that
there are no military or forest reservation or any pending litigation affecting said
subject lots.
"Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant in the
alternative applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus alleged
that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years. It also
declared that the lots are not tenanted nor subject of an agricultural leasehold
relationship.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal1 via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 07, Batangas City decreeing the registration
under the Property Registration Decree, P. D. No. 1529, of three (3) parcels of land
situated in Tabangao, Batangas City in favor of respondent corporation.3
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original
Registration of Title over three parcels of land, more particularly described as follows:
"Lot 9895 Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situated
in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas;
"Lot 10155 Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters,
situated in the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas;

"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of


Incorporation, the tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, technical
descriptions of the lots, Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax Declarations for
the three lots and Tax Clearances.
"On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial
Court for the applicants failure to comply with the requirements called for in the
Report dated February 22, 1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority. On
June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to set the case
for initial hearing. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Court on June 7,
1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994.
"At the hearing, only the Assistant City Prosecutor appeared to oppose the application
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Counsel for the applicant thereupon
presented all the necessary evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.
Thereafter, upon motion of the application, the Regional Trial Court issued an order of
special default against the whole world with the exception of the government. The
court also issued an order designating and authorizing Mr. Rodolfo G. Serrano, Legal
Researcher of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, to receive evidence.

"At the reception of evidence, the applicant presented Romeo Geron, the Consultant
and Project Controller of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. Geron testified that he is a
resident of Tabangao and was a member of the Task Force responsible for
negotiating with the numerous landowners and the subsequent acquisition by sale of
the properties of Tabangao Realty, Inc. in Tabangao and Libjo, Batangas. He testified
that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by purchase and
develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or
otherwise, real estate of all kinds.
"He also testified that Lot 9895 was acquired by the applicant-corporation on March
31, 1980 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor by the previous
owners; the spouses Santiago and Cristina Dimaano (Exh. "L"); that Lot 10155 was
acquired by applicant-corporation by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on April 25,
1980 in its favor by the former owner Mr. Perpetuo Almario married to Felisa
Magpantay who owned the lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-1"); and that Lot 10171 was
purchased by applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 from Anita Clear de Jesus
who had been the owner of said lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-2").
"The witness presented the tax declarations for the three parcels of land and tax
receipts showing full payment of all taxes due. (Exh. "P, P-1, P-2" and "Q") He
testified that there is no pending litigation involving the subject properties or any
adverse claims filed against the applicants; that they are free from any liens or
encumbrances; that there are no tenants or agricultural leasehold contracts involving
the subject properties; and that there are no mineral deposits in said lots.
"Geron also testified that the properties are presently under Lease Contract with Shell
Gas Philippines for 25 years from 1981 up to 2006 as evidenced by a Lease Contract
executed on May 18, 1991 (Exh. "M").
"The applicants also presented Crecencio Marasigan. He is an employee at the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Batangas since June 1971. He testified that he has been
a resident of Barangay Malitan, Batangas City even before 1937 up to the present
and that he knew the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and the areas surrounding the
lots subject of the application. He mentioned that he was the Chairman of the Task
Force that was responsible for the negotiations that were done with the previous
owners of the subject lots, and was therefore personally aware of the specific dealing
regarding the lots subject of the application. He said that he knew the previous
owners since he started residing in Batangas; and that their possessions had been
open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners.
"Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the
ownership, possession and the status of the lots subject of the application.

"In opposition, the City Prosecutor of Batangas offered the testimonies of Rodolfo
Fernandez of the Bureau of Lands and Loida Maglinao of the Bureau of Forest
Development.
"Rodolfo Fernandez testified that the three parcels of land subject of the application
are not covered by any kind of public land application or patent; that they are not
within the reservation area nor within the forest zone; that they are not reserved for
any government purposes; and that the entire areas are within the Alienable and
Disposable Zone as Classified under Project No. 13, Map No. 718 and certified on
March 26, 1928. Fernandez presented the Investigation Report made by the Bureau
of Lands dated April 24, 1991 (Exh. "1" to "1-b").
"Loida Maglinao testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and
disposable area of the public domain and no forestry interest is adversely interposed
by the Bureau of Forest Development.
"On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision on March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. It held:
"From the credible testimony and documentary evidence adduced establishing
applicant-corporation that the latter and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, public, continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possessions of the
parcels of land applied for up to the present, for the requisite period of time,
under bona fide claim of ownership, and considering, that no evidence has been
presented by the government in support of its Opposition, and even presented the
favorable testimonies of Mr. Rodolfo Fernandez, of the Bureau of Lands and Miss
Loida Y. Maglinao, of the Bureau of Forest Development, both CENRO, Batangas
City Branch, Batangas City, supported by their respective official Reports, the Court is
convinced that the applicant-corporation Tabangao Realty Incorporated had
sufficiently established its rights to the grant of title over the three (3) parcels of land
subject of this case."
In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.4
On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the
appealed decision.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title
over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to
registration of title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The ruling is
erroneous.

An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he
is the owner thereof in fee simple, 7 for the standing presumption is that all lands
belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either
by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his
predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been private property even before the Spanish conquest.8
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all.1wphi1 Its
claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of
land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. 9 Such
being the case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 10 is
barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected
to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no
longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential
Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata.11 As previously
held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land,
he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."12
Nonetheless, applicant anchors its application for registration of title on the provisions
of P. D. No. 1529 or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation and registration of title.13
However, the evidence is inconclusive that applicant and its predecessors in interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in
question, en concepto de dueo, or a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application, 14or since
June 12, 1945,15 or earlier,16 or since time immemorial.17
Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact
of possession by itself and its predecessors in interest for at least thirty (30) years
before the filing of the application.
Witness Romeo Geron, a consultant of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. testified that
in the year 1945, he knew that the land designated as Lot 9895, with an area of 4,596
square meters was owned by Santiago Dimaano, who sold the lot to applicant
corporation on March 31, 1980 and that the parcel of land designated as Lot 10155
with an area of 4,031 square meters was owned by Perpetuo Almario way back in
1945, and that he possessed the lot up to the time he sold the same to applicant
corporation on April 25, 1980 because he was in charge of negotiation with the
numerous landowners for acquisition of their property by Tabangao Realty,
Inc.18 However, in 1945, witness Geron was only seven (7) years old, and obviously
could not competently testify on the ownership and possession of the subject land.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of
its predecessors in interest.19 "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession."20 "Actual possession of land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property."21
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open,
adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly
"the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.22 In other
words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence.
Consequently, the lower court gravely erred in granting the application.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES
the application for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and
declares the subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171631

November 15, 2010

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February
15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting
respondents application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land
located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose
R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed
with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land 3 under Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters,
situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of attorney
showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2)
Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C.
Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of
Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-

01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag
sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8)
Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public land
appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural
land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their
parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier
acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro)
by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng
Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they
are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner
since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of
possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since
the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the
subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents
presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds,
among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments
of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of
land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to
private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the
application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default 6 against the whole
world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their
evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application
for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is
hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ,

Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and
residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084
(consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping,
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square
Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of
all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of
registration shall be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in its Decision
dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous,
open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property through themselves
and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the
subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE
CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE
WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse
possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June
12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive

possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an owner.
Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained to be
owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of
specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove
their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented
several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and
2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents
presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to
show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents
maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves
as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are
questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under
Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this
Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court
to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as
to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the
subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and


notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-00008416 (Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following
annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03,
1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic
engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does
not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the
said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a

legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at
bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever
with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit
a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for
registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court held that the
applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the
Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area
per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof
required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable
zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency
to establish that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the
subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider
the same as still inalienable public domain.20
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of
the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier.1avvphil
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation
over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo
(Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish
respondents predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that
since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case
belonged to them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the
subject property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he knew that the
respondents were occupying the subject land.24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific
details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of
the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously

owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their
parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of
acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before
June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general
statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just
harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto
the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the
land.26
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can
only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-ininterest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-ininterest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule
that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the
disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily
prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2)
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the
subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of
title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz,
and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land,
with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square
meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p


The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of
controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third
persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000
hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de
Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San
Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal,
Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City,
Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending
from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between
Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. 2
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and
land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial
courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, 3in connection therewith.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN,
represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN
PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D.
BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE
PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN
PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN

We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et


al. v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968];Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357
[1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360
[1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of lands v. Tesalona,
236 SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered
by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal
of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point,
litigation must end, Hence, after the procedures and processes for
lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law
have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the
same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the
part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict,
and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment,
indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's,
which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at
some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's

dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 5 [Cited cases


omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render
judgment herein writing finisto these controversies by laying to rest the issue of
validity of the basis of the estate's claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real
property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of
possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104,
Quezon City in its decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion 8 of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the
complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador
Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of
the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance
with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15,
1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the "Intestate Estate of
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo,
MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R Soliven,
Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D.
Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic
Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F.
Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro
discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412,
353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and
264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid
defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain
portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been
cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in

relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest


Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central
Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10,
1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been
resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the
defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and
Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against
Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and
Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and
Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based
on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the
registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be
defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the
subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled
"In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban"
specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been
legally and validly titled under the Torrens System by private persons shall be
excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was
dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower court's decision was affirmed with
costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy
thereof was presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not
registered under the Torrens system hence, it cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor
expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private individuals;

(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo,


Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles
of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already
cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the
same
as
null
and
void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March
16, 1992, filed the present petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a
petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978
declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal
force and effect.
The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators


submit in Court within twenty days their final accounting and
inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which had
come into their possession or knowledge under oath.
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to
continue with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their
case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator's final
accounting and inventory of the presentation of movantsintervenors' evidence as well as the consideration of all other
incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a.m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the
defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag,
Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and coadministrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the
petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition. 21

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.

On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing
Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate. 22

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no


legal force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived
therefrom.

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San
Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any


other transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force
and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of
the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined
from representing or exercising any acts of possession or
ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately
vacate the same.

On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish


copies of the letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain
dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a)
The
Philippine
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b)
Manila

Commanding

The

(c)
The
Government
A. Mabini St., Manila

Solicitor

Corporate

(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan

General
Constabulary

General

Counsel

(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan

8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the


land subject matter of the petition considering that, except such
portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid
adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong
in State ownership. 25

(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan


(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which
properties of the estate are located; and

On February
Proceedings. 26

1977,

the

Republic

filed

Motion

to

Suspend

On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge
Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues
raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated
August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General;
likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
is DENIED.

(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion
brought about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as
having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by
virtue thereof.

The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator


Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor
General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten
(10) days from notice hereof. 27

On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was
filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16,
1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and
ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except
where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496,
which is not true in the proceedings at bar;

15,

On March
Republic. 28

9,

1977,

motion

for

reconsideration

was

filed

by

the

On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao,
rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE


PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban


and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership
they might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of
inaction, laches and/or prescription;

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo


de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,
issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately
214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of
Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;

7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be


administered for purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in
accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted,
insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed
ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and

(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago


Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon,
Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and
Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate
estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned

tract of private land covered and described by said abovementioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already
been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private
persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the
government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all
lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof
which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the
Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court,
except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due
consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set
aside the said Court order which approved the said sales, quitclaims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is
hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion
in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of
administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro,
whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said coadministrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final
accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby
ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all
the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban,
as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate
and/or to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the
proper Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate
forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the
Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to
submit a project of partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as
herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much
land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban land
reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land
reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of
the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated
or purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be used in
its human settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED. 29

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition
for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On
July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge
Fernandez denied the said petition. 31
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge
Fernandez issued the aforestated Order 32 dated November 17, 1978 which, in
essence, set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus,
excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court
of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it
granted the Republic's motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma,
thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitionersheirs. 34 In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court
focused its discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in
declaring Titulo de Priopriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that
the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the
subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) nonregistration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as
required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage
System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by
invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been
allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 35
Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September
18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this
Court
resolved
to
consolidate
both
cases
on
September
15,
1994. 37

While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for
intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as
follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447,
RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross
negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take
cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial
and in affirming the lower court's null and void judgment. 38
In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order
which resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower
court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous
and repeated objections of the petitioners. 39
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order
of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge
Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an
appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the
order and decision of Judges of equal rank. 40
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold
the order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the
order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of
which were already final. 41
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that
Judge Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse
Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that
petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. 42

Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the


evidence presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao
and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never
received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906
Guide title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the
boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme
Court upholding the Guido title. 43
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of
the petitioners' Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's
resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special
proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not
petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and
effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a
probate court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the
San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court,
then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court" 44 to resolve
the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of
the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. 45
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens
patriae, argues that petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the
Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the
lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de
Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court
in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are
proven to be part of the State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the
estate of the deceased. 46
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are
and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is
it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Manigat
v. Castillo, 47 that "the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the
estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of
administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes theexamination of the
properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the
inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net
assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:

. . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to


estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court,
with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons
...
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of
whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and
accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe
resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case
of Garcia v. Garcia 49 that:
. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a
deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties,
and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the
inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all
the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this
duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in
or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested
in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention
to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out
in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the
observations, with power to determine if such observations should
be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein
belong prima facieto the intestate, but no such determination is
final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said
properties. 50 [Emphasis Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit
any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set
aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by
the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the
assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of
granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since,
Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed
him as a "reviewing judge." By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his
predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and
Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing
judge," proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction. 51

There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision
arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide
the same as long as the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the
same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge"
argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that
the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a
compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record
was available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at bar, it is evident that the 41page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a
knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting
aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge
Fernandez' disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the
assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or
not the lower court in G.R No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from
the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is
null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of
whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496,
erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove
ownership by the Late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on
February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was
abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered
thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months from
the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, noncompliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles
can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law
is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are
not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered
lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of
their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of
land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under


the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its
passage, to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of
conveyances of large tracts of public and private lands to
unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated
by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles
or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in
conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title
holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the
one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the
said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion
and instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and
order renditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show
that recording in the system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become
obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to
prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless
accompanied by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the
Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took
cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in
the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous
fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent
to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de
Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation
that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we have held that a mere
allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving

it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the
land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge
Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have
declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the
effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's
decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is
inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special
proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of
recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership
underscored the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart
speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into
buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running
into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned
donations to charitable and religious organizations, including
veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud
they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and
unsuspecting victims. 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the
then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for
recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R No. 103727 on
August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of
the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had
already been set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of November 17, 1978. We are in
accord with the appellate courts' holding in G.R No. 103727 insofar as it concludes
that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private
respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under
the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to
comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the
Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due
execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to
present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In
the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite
a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the Republic
from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and
Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim
of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as

"hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However,
the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence.
Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with
damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence.
Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court
is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can
be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of
inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:
Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed
When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses.
Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's
custody. If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and
after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its
loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing
is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or
withheld by the adverse party.

lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and
being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 61
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the
existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original
copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents
thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject
intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case
of Ong Ching Po v.Court of Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents
were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. 63
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136,
Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr.
Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as
"Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the original of
the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipotecaRegistered in the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's
April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited
to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez
Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by
the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the
Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to
call the distinguished counsel for the government
whether he admits that there is actually a titulo
propiedad 4136.
COURT:

Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary
in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be
had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost
or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in

Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?

ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think
the question of counsel is already answered by
witness. The parties have not yet established the
due existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to
be candid about the question. The witness is a
witness for the government, so with the testimony
of this witness for the government to the effect
that there is actually in existence titulo propiedad
4136; we are asking the question candidly to the
government counsel whether he is prepared to
state that there is really in existence such titulo
propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this court that there
was such a document examined by the NBI
insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and
Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they
are found to be authentic. 64
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our
pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated
September 2, 1977 (Exhibit "O-RP") concluded that the document
contained material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word
"Pinagcamaligan" was written after "Pulo;"
b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"
c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in
"tres mil;"
d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after
"setentay tres;"

e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;"


and
f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of
the titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still
"pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions which are
indications of burnings". The burnings were made on the very
portions where there were previous erasures, alterations and
intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase
traces of the criminal act. 65
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1. 66 Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's judgment therein,
sustained the finding that:
. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish
title in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations
and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and
change the location of the land described in the original title . . .
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain
the lower court's analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was
never presented in Court. Upon request of the Government,
a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to the two
administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as
to other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the titulo. What the
parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original
could not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any
secondary evidence.
It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into
the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later
disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious
efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve
this document of vital importance despite the Court order to
produce it in order to determine its authenticity.

It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts


are unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The
only logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse
if
produced. 67

"Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the


land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which?
This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's land,
Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness,
fatal at least in these proceedings.

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject
intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by
law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a
document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires
no probative value. 68

Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the


original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the
property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree
of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that
authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for
adjustment showing the location, boundaries and area of land
applied for were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administration Civil, which then ordered theclassification and
survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his
legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).

At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et
al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private respondent,
Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed to be
the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat,
Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of
doubtful validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of
two undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land "located in the
Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second.
The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and
inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation,
indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that
private ownership of land must be proved not only through the
genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land
claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v.
Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and
Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil. 51, 54-56;
Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case
involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be
concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass
(cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The
fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as
a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied
for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In
Piadeco's "Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in
Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de
Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its

The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing
applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication
of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880,
extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881
(Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time
prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered
here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October
26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arids lands,
500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands
(See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of
Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January
26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to
2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op cit., p.
19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that
Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares
of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17,
1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a
second petition for adjustment within six months from publication,
for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the
publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial
boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of
December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31,
1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the
provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization
issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they
may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at
p. 124).

Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to


consider that title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve
or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.

Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends
before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, 72 the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:

Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how


Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original
owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
From Piadeco's explanation not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796,
pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don
Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable
within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This
transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on
December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria
Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At
about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of
registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don
Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the
land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B.
Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares.
Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then
came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir
of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also
executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land,
and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was
paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under
Act 496.

. . . conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question


which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed
upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and
cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held
that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or
their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular
point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment
will depend on the determination of that particular point or question,
a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question
was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required by merely identity of issues.

The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the
consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration
of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the
validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein
pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most
conspicuously over Piadeco's title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 71 we categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land
ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6,
1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No.
69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No.
69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court
relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from
adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity.
In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both cases, the

The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now
be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or
their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of
administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted
solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate" to
speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private
respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2",
Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2"
Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private
respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final
decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity. 75 As a last
hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title,
the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part
of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own
counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the
Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614 from
which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal
principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client. 76 The records show that the
petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to

prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the lands
being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et
al., 77 we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his
responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a
judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake
binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is
bound by the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals,
101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the application of the general rule
would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be
called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue
prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily
demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the
petitioner bad been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel,
without an explanation to that effect.

matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a
party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution
dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial.
And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the
subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino
Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and
106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and,
therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the


petitioners-heirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of
their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.

(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban;

It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y


Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove,
grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands
under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6)
months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if
utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any
land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special


Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and
terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf
of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby
disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to
otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the
estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are
hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of
them are in possession thereof.

All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be
more vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving
portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor
General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such
portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San
Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.


SO ORDERED.

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