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Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.

171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)


I.

THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate
cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of
the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of
government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the
absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials
for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the
warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
II.

THE ISSUE

1.
2.

Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING


[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1.

NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers
could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand
their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor
ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not

wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was
NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates
that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the
daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may
be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)


Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the
prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open
for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also
invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the
ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail
in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being
laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to

discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase
"the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"
decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement.
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process:

refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in
open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no
violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court
reversed and injunction lifted.
JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and
other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council
which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record
Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of
the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts

and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower
court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the
burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance
the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly
the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the
deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further
underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at
least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1.

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

3.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7.

The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

8.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1.

Power of Judicial Review

2.

Actual Case or Controversy

3.

Facial Challenge

4.

Locus Standi

5.

Declaratory Relief

6.

One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1.

Right to life

2.

Right to health

3.

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4.

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5.

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6.

Due process clause

7.

Equal protection clause

8.

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1.

Actual Case or Controversy

2.

Facial Challenge

3.

Locus Standi

4.

Declaratory Relief

5.

One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It
must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes
which ones thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses
the principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it
had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality
does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute

prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the
law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1.

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view
that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should
be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature
from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this
intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers
womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be
struck down.
2.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.
3.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or
the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)
(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies
the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are
not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
6.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information
and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect
and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the
State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH
Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8.

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers
to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike
its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned
a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to
life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case
or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
3.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they
may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative

need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible parenthood are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in defining abortifacients
and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

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