G.R. No.

L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for
participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms
are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will
be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called
"Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of
liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next
closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner
kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second;
and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third.
The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional
Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in
each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize
and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will
be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied
by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The
regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and
P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final firstprize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for
winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and
P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982
and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read
as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to
any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not,
shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited
in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee
by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any
manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole
or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any
person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is
conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct
any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the
person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly
written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of
whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the
representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic
transfer service.The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to
him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift
enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining
money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or
payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic
transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or
company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for

the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or

telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the antilottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General
opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and
declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960,
Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being
involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under
controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion
rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before
(Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the
contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December
10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but
as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be
issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment
be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the
Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring
the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the
respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner
under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the
Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of
said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic
issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the
Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was
the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief
is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration

of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In
amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid
down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination
(Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28,
1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the
appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing
crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a
number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a
business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to
exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and
stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the
authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power
and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of
fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the
appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To
forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails,
amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance
clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and
construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation
thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of
difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus
reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories
were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position
was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this
impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the
proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and
all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The
appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed
contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the
privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on
one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To
the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the
appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a

law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's
bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and
inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April
30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when
it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in
the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:
Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question
of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the
law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no
room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds
from the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the
legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's
contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or
not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the
matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing
down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the
Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,
presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the
battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of
setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.
Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr.,
800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the
appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose
between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its
proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and
uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually

threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma
which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the
contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect
a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh
these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules
of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1,
Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law we can see
in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in
our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we
hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying
function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the
appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this
jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the
legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those
in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings
that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117
A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by
the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of
a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be
subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17
App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs.
Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as
absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders
against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any
information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".
Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the
power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal
Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative
one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in
analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and
third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing
House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915],
30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs.
Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs.
Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance
are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently
as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the
existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is
considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid
down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn
the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is
derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does
condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some
kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the
language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You
don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the
Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense
from to , and win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise
be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit
the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out,

the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a
lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to
the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which
the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find
none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy
Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a
consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the
purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite
to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to
buy anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales
promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by
those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to
draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does
not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid
down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of
the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that
matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,
should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact
does receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result
of the drawing; does not supply the element of consideration.Griffith
Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p.
849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind",
which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have
concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided
if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both
curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated,
amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice,
which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration,
may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the

determination of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as

we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub
silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in
explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard
authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which
goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is
given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary,
4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail
Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb.
13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507,
509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the
scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all
qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be
encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of
being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As
stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise
involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration
necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192,
178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex
rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114
Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare
that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it
exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs.
People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151
Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs.
Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54
C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words
and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained
by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some
cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are
used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element
of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S.,
351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls
Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent
jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular
phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in
association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant
to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion
217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is

concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded
no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must
the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law,
resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the
mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy
are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar
schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to
inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d.,
839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be
hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no
consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can
hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute
"lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the
chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of
Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases,
perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we
have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be
denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or
a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private
respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of
the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of
the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National
Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and
members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this
certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the
officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a
writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile
such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their
behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further
obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or
egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City
and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the
determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES
UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO,
COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and
ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.

The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982,
filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga
City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such
employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the
Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4Then came, on May
3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging
illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor
practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union
submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of
which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6The strike began on May 23,
1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with
respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for
"damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded
the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and
suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a
motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was
contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then
on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction
belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of
first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
Hence this petition for certiorari.

Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required
respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on
Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was
issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and
his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to
restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise
case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of
the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor
Code, which now reads: '(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12
On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original
jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not
in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand, instead of filing an answer,
submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of whether or not
respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that
"the instant petition has merit and should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the
decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original
wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied
by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978,
however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and
provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not
entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were
thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal
dismissal of employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
end of the story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further
amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus
enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based on
non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and
other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other
claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by tills
Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of
first instance then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending
Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2,
paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former
phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be
noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and

exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or

claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition.
certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on
the matter.
1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of
a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court
of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the
scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within
the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has
been the constant ruling of this Court even prior toLizarraga Hermanos v. Yap
Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still
call for obedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is
to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so
even after the lapse of sixty years. 24
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has
spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of
the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive
jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In PepsiCola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in
the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has
exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for
recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general
jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission
[NLRC]?" 26 It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case."27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over
the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed;
it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction
of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the
issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We
find that law in presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3
of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those
based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation
pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases
involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee

relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28 That same month, two other
cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30

matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as
a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.

3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of
1982, was not followed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages
on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On this point, reference may be made
to our decision in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of
Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In that case, the
question involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work
after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations
Commission the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of
the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in
that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would
not comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration
came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved
to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket line and start
returning to work on August 20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion
for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We
find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended,
specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the
Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification,
"all striking employees shall immediately return to work and the employees shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between
the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the
express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the
Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the
matter.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued
by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial
Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any further action on Civil
Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary
restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.

4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for
damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if
they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what
was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v.
Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management &
Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the
dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged in an administrative body and
a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly,
this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the
present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and
equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a
court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova

and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
De Castro, J., is on leave.

(CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an
action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter
of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional

Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his
capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of
private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose,
Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in
the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1] Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action
of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private
respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989
order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent
order of July 12, 1989.[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated
June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this
letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. [3] Pending resolution
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by
the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, [5] which issued a writ

ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. [6] Petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an
order dated December 28, 1989. [7] Their motion for reconsideration having been
likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent
Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question.[8] Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September
9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,[10] the prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.Hence, it is

disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, [13] (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, [14] (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, [15] (4) when there is estoppel on the
part of the administrative agency concerned, [16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,
[17]
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, [18] (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, [19] (8) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim, [20] (9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings,[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.[22]

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver

that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705,
as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to
avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated
because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and
forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in
transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners
was not used in the commission of the crime.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before
the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the
petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order
of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, [23] private
respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they
seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence
on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause
of action.[11] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. [12] This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice
for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose
of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and

xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should
be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.[24]
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the
Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they
acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open
to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a
free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit
filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain
of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.[25] In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, [26] which

was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, [27] this
Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering
the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of
private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of
due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of
petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
[28]
One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. [29] In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration,[31] as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly
given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of
Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,[32] we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon
is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have
no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is
authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx

xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and toolsillegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found. (Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private
respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not
mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts,
but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents interpretation of the
subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces
the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below:
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized representative,
may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed
or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or airin the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies
on the matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit
any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of
forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should
be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In
the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the
purpose projected in the statute. [33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be
given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure
the benefits intended.[34] In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is
significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations
and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that
the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative
remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is
intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for
the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the
vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to
certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more
responsive to present situations and realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation
of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If
as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only
through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply
put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO
277, supra.[35]
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the
crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private
respondents, reads in part , viz. :
xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the
crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case
could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. xxx[36]
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated
order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated
by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of
the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no
case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that
the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of
Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989,
petitioners pointed out:
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive
Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport

of forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been
involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted
the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx[37]
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and
punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners
admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for
theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then
necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime
under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705
before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277
amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.
- Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands,
without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall bepunished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours;
Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products
without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed
is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear
from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is
clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.[38]

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the
proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of
the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by
the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby
SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27,
1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the
controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the
claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It
lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. [39] To
detain is defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody, [40] and it has been held that
there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or
an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this,
without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. [41] Under the Rules of Court, it is
indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit
that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully
detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not
been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.
[42]
Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the
truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with
out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.
705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably
warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his
duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of
forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question
the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that
actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of
DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :
SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive

G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.
Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is
whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the
provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is
exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were
admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1wph1.t

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated
August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as
further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and
control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6)
rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the
accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.
The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the
Government."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the
outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused
was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit
or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law
whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by
the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a
question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question
to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he
could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the
accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the
City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from
the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered
categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The
accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his
appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of
Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste
also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon
City on a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret
agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret
agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation
of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision
must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for
any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is
not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The
conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section
879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside
the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this
decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks
with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO
DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY
and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the
Civil Code. 4

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered
by the respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos;
Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which
reads, as follows:

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was
presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its
decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth

Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and
purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero
Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from
legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents,
Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and
Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and
their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with
"Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting
parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New
Civil Code.

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent
spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records
of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its
legal effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of
the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of
the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda RamosAgonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to
be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the
ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos
Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father
and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that
"to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to
(sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is
not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of
Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of
their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable
disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent
reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction. 7
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines,
obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the
Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its
Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from
adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have
been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners
herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through
legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood
relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion
of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and
happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the
law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as
to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay
of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in
1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall
election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election,
petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for
injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted
the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.[2]
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, rescheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf
of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the
latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed
a reply.[3]
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists
that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May
1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner citesAssociated
Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK
election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a
regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office.Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of
office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of
the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then
no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed
to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. [5] An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.[6]
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. [7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of
the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in
conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to
enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill
its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the
letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the
office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a
successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping
with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as

one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to
be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same
having been scheduled on May 1997.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996,
enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.