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By A.J. D'Asaro
they'll keep buying gold in New York and selling it in London until the prices
converge. That happens so fast that individual investors certainly can't take
advantage of it, a few very quick institutional investors can.
But if I told you as a value investor that you could buy gold in New York today and
sometime in the next two or three years, it's likely you'll be able to sell it for a profit,
but you may lose 40% while you are waiting around for that to happen, it's much
harder to find someone to arbitrage that away. Time horizons are actually shrinking
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over the last 20-30 years even. So, things are actually getting better for value
investors, not worse. The world is becoming more institutionalized, there is more
access to performance information, it's much easier to trade. So, patience is in
short supply, and it really makes it much nicer for patient value investors.
If value investing worked every day and every month and every year, of course, it
would get arbitraged away, but it doesn't. It works over time, and it's quite
irregular. But it does still work like clockwork; your clock has to be really slow.
Dasaro: Recently in the investment community, we've seen the rise of
fundamentally weighted indexes such as the RAFI Indexes. Is this value investing,
and can investors benefit from investing alongside these indexes?
Greenblatt: Sure. The answer is, it is not value investing, yet investors can benefit
from the fundamentally weighted indexes. They were developed really because there
are some natural problems with market-cap weighting.
In market-cap weighting you are putting more weight into companies with the
largest market cap, like the S&P 500 or the Russell 1000. So, when companies are
overvalued, and their prices are too high, you are automatically putting too much
money into those overpriced companies. If companies are bargain-priced, because
you are market cap weighting the prices are too low, you are putting too little in.
So you actually don't have to know for a market-cap weighted index whether a
company is overvalued or undervalued; you just know if it is overvalued, you are
going to own too much of it, and if it's undervalued, you are going to own too little
of it.
So, over the last 40 years, if you did the studies, instead of making systematic
errors, which is what you do in a market-cap weighted index, if you equally
weighted the index, you would still make plenty of errors. So, in other words, for the
S&P 500, you buy an equal amount of number one, the biggest stock, and number
500. So, you put 0.2% in each. You will still make plenty of errors, you own too
much of some and too little of others, but you also own too much of cheap stocks
and too little of others. You will randomize your errors. Actually it turns out that
over the last 40 years, an equally weighted index would have earned about 2% more
per year than a market-cap-weighted index, before your trading cost, and that's an
indication of how much the market cap weighted index is costing you.
The problem with equally weighted indexes, however, is that if you have to put the
same amount of money in stock number one as number 500, not that many people
can do it, because stock number 500 is not that big in market cap. And if a lot of
people did indexing, like they do for the S&P 500, it would be very hard to keep
them equally weighted. Also, prices change daily, so to keep them equally weighted
it depends how much trading you'd have to do to go do that.
So, the RAFI Index, for instance, is a fundamentally weighted index, which resizes
companies' portion in the index by their size, not by their market cap, but by how
much sales they have, how much book value, how much earnings or cash flow they
have on average.
So, there is no price component in what they are doing. It's merely a company size
issue. And so that kind of index tends to put more money in higher-market-cap
companies, but what they are doing is randomizing the errors that a market-capweighted index does.
So, they also make random errors. They also get back the 2%. But because
companies with a lot of sales tend to have higher market caps, you can actually
invest more money in these kind of indexes than an equally weighted index, so the
people at RAFI have figured out a way to do it.
But there's no price component in what they are doing, so they are not actually
investing, they are randomizing errors.
Dasaro: Joel, your funds follow a systematic fundamental value weighting strategy.
What do investors get when they pay for active management in your funds?
Greenblatt: Well, we do fundamental research bottom-up in our long/short funds of
roughly the 2,000, large and mid-cap range, or maybe the 2,000 largest companies,
somewhere in that area. And we go through every balance sheet, income
statement, and cash flow statement, making our adjustments as to what we think
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the difference between what their reporting and what economic reality is.
Then, we're ranking companies based on our measures of absolute relative value of
companies. I have a partner, Rob Goldstein, who's been with me since 1989, and
that's the only way we know how to value companies--measures of absolute and
relative value--and we rank them from 1 to 2,000, based on their discount to our
assessment of value.
What I promise my students at Columbia the first day of class is that, if they do
good valuation work, I guarantee them the market will agree with them. I just don't
tell them when. It could be a couple of weeks, could be two or three years. But I
tell them, if they do good valuation work, the market will agree with them.
So, we put together portfolios, and we're very patient with them. Out of the 2,000
largest companies, we're generally buying about 300 stocks on the long side and 300
stocks on the short side. We don't equally weight. The cheaper a company is, the
more weight we give it in our portfolio. The more expensive it is, the more weight we
give it in our short portfolio. But what we're trying to do is buy the cheapest stocks
we can find and short the most expensive.
So, we've actually created three long/short mutual funds. One is called Gotham
Absolute Return Fund, which runs roughly 120 long, 60 short. We created a fund
that's a 100% long, which is roughly 170 long by 70% short. And then we also
created Gotham Neutral Fund. But really, we're doing the same thing in all those
funds.
We're buying the cheapest stocks we can find; we're shorting the most expensive
we can find. We have a lot of diversity. We don't have too much concentration. We
balance our risk. So, we're trying to make a smooth ride for investors, so they
actually take advantage of the patience of being a value investor, and we're trying
to make it that as easy as possible.
Dasaro: With that many holdings, do you find it difficult to value each individual
holding, and how do you avoid investing in a value trap or going short a stock that
looks overvalued that actually has really good future prospects?
Greenblatt: Well, that's a great question. It took us the last six or seven years to
actually research all of these companies and be in a position to update our research
on a quarterly basis as new information comes out, or between quarters when that
comes out. So, that's been a very, very big project to be able to do that. And like I
said, the cheaper something is the more weight we put into it, so we're really taking
advantage of the benefit of that research.
Repeat the last part of your question.
Dasaro: How do you avoid investing in stocks where the numbers may disagree with
the story behind the stock?
Greenblatt: Oh, value traps, right. Well, we're very tough on cash flows, is what I
would say. Ben Graham said, buy cheap. Figure out what something's worth and pay
a lot less. And Warren Buffett, Graham's most famous student, made one little twist
that made him one of the richest people in the world. And he said, if I can buy a
good business cheap, even better.
So, the stocks that we tend to like earn very high returns on tangible capital, and
the stocks that we tend to short are high-priced, but they also don't invest their
money very well in their own business.
I wrote, The Little Book, as you mentioned, and the example I give in that book of
cheap, we know a company that's trading cheaply relative to its cash flows, but
then the question is Buffett's part--a good business. If I could buy a good business
cheap, even better. And the example I gave was companies that earned high
returns on tangible capital.
So, in simplest form, in the book, I talked about when you build a store, you have to
buy the land, build the store, set up the display, stock it with inventory, and all that
cost you $400,000. If that store earns $200,000 year, that's a 50% return on
tangible capital; that's really nice. If you can open new stores and earn 50% a year,
there are not many places in the world you can reinvest your money that way.
Then, in the book, I used an example, and I called that Just Broccoli. That's another
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store. It just sells broccoli--not a very good idea. Unfortunately, you still have to
buy the land, build the store, set up the display, stock it with inventory, and all that
still costs you $400,000, it's just that selling broccoli in your store is not a very
good idea. So, maybe it somehow earns $10,000 a year, that's a 2.5% return on
tangible capital.
So, we tend to like those companies that are not only cheap on various metrics of
absolute relative value that we use to value them, but they also earn very high
returns on capital. In our mutual funds, that we run like hedge funds, are long/short
funds. Our longs tend to have right now the returns on tangible capital on average
of over 50%, even though the stocks are very cheap. And our shorts earned almost
40% lower returns on tangible capital, and they're very expensive. So, certainly we
own cheap and good, and with short, expensive and not nearly as good.
Dasaro: Joel, we appreciate the insights. Thank you for being here.
Greenblatt: Thanks so much, A.J.
Dasaro: For Morningstar, this is A.J. Dasaro, and with me, Joel Greenblatt, manager
of the Gotham Funds. Thanks for watching.
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