Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ANNE WINsLoW
Editor-in-Chief
Contents
TOPOGRAPHY AND TRADITION ................
14
26
34
42
51
CONCLUSIONS .................................
58
MAPS
Regional Groupings ..........................
27
32
No. 541
International Conciliation
January 1963
* Although titles are given in English throughout this study, French acronyms
are employed, following common usage.
January daily mean is about 60 degrees; the daily mean for July
is a respectable 95. The hot dry air also increases evaporation, a
major threat to irrigation canals and natural watercourses alike.
Both seek refuge underground, the canals being replaced by
foggaras, or horizontal wells, and the surface water becoming
underground streams and a low lying water table fed by rains
outside the desert area. Whole rivers, such as the Algerian
Saoura and Igharghar, and lakes, such as the former inland sea
of the Upper Niger, have disappeared from the surface.
This hot, dry, high pressure area, a permanent characteristic
of the Saharan atmosphere, is kept in place by surrounding geographic and atmospheric conditions. To the north, the Atlas
Mountains catch humid winter winds from the Atlantic and
wring out their moisture before they reach the desert; in the
summer, hot shergis or siroccos carry the dry dust of the Sahara
across North Africa and sometimes out into the Mediterranean.
To the south, the humid Tropical Maritime Air meets the Tropical Continental Air in an Intertropical Convergence Zone that
swings seasonally back and forth across West Africa. In July and
August, when this Zone lies at its northernmost point along the
southern edge of the Sahara (about 17 degrees north latitude),
the rainfall along the Guinea coast is heavy (over twenty inches
between Bathurst and Monrovia) and Timbuctu receives as
much as four inches. In December and January, the Saharan air
sweeps across West Africa as the hot dry harmattan and pushes
the Zone out to sea (about 4 degrees north latitude). North or
south, no humidity succeeds in crossing the mountains or the
rain forest to fall as rain on the Sahara. To the west along the
Mauritanian coast, some little moisture does fall, captured
mainly in the latter half of the year as rain or dew by the
Zemmour massif that rises some 200 miles inland parallel to thd
coast. This bit of moisture makes the coastal plains of Mauritania and Spanish Sahara a grazing area for pastoral nomads.
During the first six months of the year, a sandy wind blows
across the coastal plain from the Sahara out to sea. Although
surrounded by humid air as well as by bodies of water, the desert
is, above all, a product of the atmosphere that hangs over it.
Nothing in this atmosphere dictates the topography of the
5
and 1962, the pro-Moroccan feeling among some Mauritanians (see p. 45)
may well be a modern example of this phenomenon.
from im-
16
but it has been highly controversial politically. After the agreement for its construction was signed on 30 July 1958, Tunisia
was strongly criticized by the Algerian provisional government
for lack of solidarity with the Algerian nationalists; in the summer of 1961, when the Bizerte crisis embittered its relations
with France, Tunisia closed the pipeline at La Skhira for about
two months."
In Libya a 100-mile 30" pipeline, opened in October 1961,
links Zelten with the newly created oil port of Marsa al-Brega.
In mid 1962 a 30" spur joined the Raguba fields to this line,
and another line of the same diameter 86 miles long joined the
wells of Dhara and al-Mabruk with the port of as-Sidra. Longer
pipelines in Algeria make the port-price of its oil two to three
times higher than that of Libya or of the Middle East. As in
the Middle East, however, the possibility of rapid amortization
makes this only a short-term disadvantage.
The results of these pipelines have been twofold. New work
is given to a small but highly trained group of Algerians and
Libyans, new products and new ways of life are brought into
the interior of the desert, and new revenues are added to government and private income. At the same time the two countries
turn their economic faces toward the Mediterranean, to the
benefit of their common neighbor, Tunisia, but away from other
Saharan countries that do not have the same natural resources.
Transportation problems can also be observed in connection
with other important mineral deposits. Coal is found at Colomb
Bechar but the cost of transportation makes exploitation uneconomic unless the coal is used on the spot; the mines, begun in
1947, were closed by decision of the French government in
December 1961.
The additional discovery of 1,000,000 tons of 45 per cent
manganese ore at Jebel Gettara in the same region brings up
the often-discussed possibility of an industrial zone shared by
Morocco and Algeria in the Bechar region. Morocco's under4Libya was first approached for the construction of a pipeline some 50
miles shorter to the Libyan port of Zaoura, but refused to permit construction as a gesture of solidarity with the Algerian rebels. See, on the larger
pipelines, Industries et Travaux d'Outre-Mer, No. 84 (Paris: Nov. 1960),
exploited lead, zinc, and manganese deposits and its large unworked iron fields are located within 100 miles of the Bechar
complex. Less than 150 miles to the north, but connected with
Colomb Bechar by rail, the anthracite mines of Jerrada have
reserves estimated at 100,000,000 tons; production from these
mines is now shipped north or west to the coast. More than
2 billion tons of over 50 per cent iron ore lie near the surface at
Gara Jebilet near Tindouf, but Moroccan refusal in 1958 to
allow shipment through Tarfaya has prevented exploitation and
there is no basis for local industry. Elsewhere in the Algerian
Sahara, tungsten deposits in the Hoggar at Launi are being
surveyed for possible exploitation and there are unevaluated
deposits of tin, copper, and diamonds; distance factors, again,
are of discouraging magnitude. Large phosphate deposits are
being worked near the Shott al-Jerid in the Tunisian Sahara;
the larger Moroccan phosphate deposits are located north of
the Atlas.
On the western side of the desert, Mauritania by 1967 will
benefit from an estimated $9,000,000 annual royalties paid for
its iron deposits, as well as from the indirect value of additional
employment and trade. The 145,000,000 tons of 63 per cent
iron ore at Fort Gouraud are being exploited by the Mauritanian
Iron Mine Company (MIFERMA). Half of the profits are to
go to Mauritania. Too frequently overlooked, however, is the
fact that at the projected rate of extraction the iron at Fort
Gouraud will last only twenty-five years; and there is little hope
of building up an industry that would use the minerals on the
spot. Additional iron and more important deposits of copper
at Akjoujt are mined by the Mauritanian Copper Mine Company (MICUMA). 5
The three southern Saharan countries have the barren share
of the desert. Tin and tungsten are mined in small quantities in
the Air (Niger), and the Tibesti (Chad), and sodium salts
also continue to be mined and exported, largely through Nigeria.
5 The French government owns 25% and French private capital 35% of
MIFERMA, with the remainder divided among British, German, and
Italian interests. Half of MICUMA is owned by private French capital,
with France and Mauritania sharing the remainder.
18
but was quickly abandoned. The Mediterranean-Niger or "MerNiger" line appears to pose no serious technological difficulties
over its 2,000-mile length, except for the passage of the Wadi
Guir south of Bechar. But its raison d'Stre would have to be a
flow of goods that does not yet exist.
Less famous but just as controversial are the plans first laid
in 1920 for a 100-mile extension of the Tuggurt railroad to
Wargla. After the discovery of oil the project was revived and,
in 1958 and 1959, plans were drawn up for a railway to Wargla
and to Hassi Messaud, or to Hassi Messaud alone, following
close by the bed of the pipeline from Haud al-Hamra. But
indecision between the "and" and the "or," and the uncertainties of the Algerian war kept the railroad on the planning board.
Unlike the case of the gigantic Mer-Niger project, commercial
flow between Tuggurt and Wargla and Hassi Messaud is already
in existence being carried by pipe and truck lines. Both means are
adequate for present and foreseeable traffic.
The paramount factor operating against the modem centrifugal forces in the Sahara is transportation over tracks and trails
that follow old caravan routes. Although no paved road crosses
the Sahara, some Algerian trails have been partially paved. The
development of trucks and automobiles made specially for the
desert has increased traffic over these trails and has tended to
revive commerce between littoral states across the desert.
Finally, technological advances, still largely confined to the
research stage, have permitted wild dreams and moderate hopes
of bringing back some of the prehistoric greenery of the Saharan
region. The Albian Water Table (Nappe du Continent Intercalaire), an aquifer lying between 1,600 and 3,000 feet under
the surface of the Moroccan and Tunisian Sahara and the
northern part of the Mauritanian, Algerian, and Libyan Sahara,
is fed from the Atlas Mountains. Already it has been tapped by
twelve deep wells in the northern Sahara, the most famous of
which are the artesian wells near Tuggurt and Wargla; these
and traditional wells now draw off about a quarter of the
annual replenishment by rain from surrounding mountains. It
has been found that palm trees in traditional oases frequently
take their nourishment from water alone, and experiments in
22
that oil companies had enjoyed under the more liberal 1955
law, and put new concessions up for open bidding on the basis
of these new conditions. Thus Libya joined the list of Middle
Eastern countries seeking greater control over, and profits from,
their oil resources. The Evian Agreements also seem to envision
bidding for Algerian concessions, although the Saharan Oil Code
is guaranteed by the new Algerian state.
Pan-Africanism
The third new element-Pan-Africanism-tends to mitigate
the disruptiveness of independence and attendant nationalism.
But the exact dimensions of Pan-Africanism must be made clear.
At best, it is a "working disposition," a state of mind that suggests that African criteria are paramount and that cooperation
with other Africans is preferable to external ties. As such it is a
powerful slogan through which actions can be justified and
communication between mass and leaders facilitated.
At the same time, Pan-Africanism has never been implemented
politically; it is a myth, not a reality. The crucial element, both
in understanding the myth and in separating it from current
reality, is its relation to nationalism. Although Pan-Africanism
and nationalism have the same root-both respond to the need
of newly politically conscious and politically independent Africans to establish their identity-their branches are often far apart.
The oldest and common element to both is ethnic. Racial nationalism (in this case called negritude) is, like any other nationalism, exaggerated pride in the self, here identified with color and
culture. As a political feeling, however, Pan-Africanism is synonymous with individual states' nationalism only in its negative
facet, anti-colonialism, and is conceived of as solidarity against
external political, economic, and cultural forces. Anti-colonalism
is only a reaction and in the long run not very satisfying as an
answer either to the countries' need for identification or to real
problems; in fact, after independence, colonialism has to be redefined as neo-colonialism to take into account its less ostentatious economic nature. The African is therefore obliged sooner
or later to find the real nature of his problems and to find a
satisfying definition of his self. He may choose to identify with
The OCRS
of the Saharan Regions was created by French law on 10 January 1957 for the purpose of the
exploitation, economic development, and human advancement
of the Saharan zones. It was born out of sudden interest in
the desert and its populations because of the discovery of oil.
Through the use of oil revenues it became possible to pay long
overdue attention to the development of the Saharan region and
to the social conditions of its inhabitants. It was not until three
years after its founding that OCRS finally achieved its proper
administrative shape, and it was less than two years later that
it passed out of existence with the advent of Algerian independence. Yet even during this time- as official publicity does not
hesitate to point out- "France was the only country in the
world to consecrate all of its income from oil discovery and exploitation to the advancement of the population of this underdeveloped part of the world."7
OCRS territory originally included Mauritania and the Saharan regions of Algeria, Soudan (Mall), Niger, and Chad. The
mission of the Organization was to raise the local standard of
living while taking into account existing traditions, and to foster
research and development, transportation and communications,
industrial promotion, and industrial and agricultural urbanization within a broad framework of state planning. Its DelegateGeneral, who was French Minister for the Sahara as well, was
given political, administrative, and military powers formerly held
by the Delegate-General of Algeria and the High Commissioners
of French West and Equatorial Africa. This political centralization just at the moment when the territories involved were moving toward autonomy aroused opposition among Algerian repTHE COMMON ORGANIZATION
m
C
1962.
28
INTENTIONAL
BLANK
34
36
occupations. On the other hand, independence allowed diplomatic freedom both to aid the FLN and to pursue the objectives
of an Arab Maghreb, as the state leaders might wish. Often both
goals could be covered at the same time.
The first official move came soon after independence in the
form of a meeting in Paris between Moroccan Foreign Minister
Balafrej and Tunisian Vice-Premier Bahi Ladgham, leaders of
the Istiqlal and the Neo-Destour parties, respectively, to discuss
a "unified North African policy." At the end of October 1956
a meeting with Mohammed V and the FLN leaders, including
Ahmed Ben Bella, was organized by Bourguiba in Tunis. The
conference turned into an indignant protest meeting after the
French kidnapped and imprisoned the Algerian delegates on
their way to Tunis. The following June, Bourguiba reiterated a
proposal he had made earlier for a "Franco-North African community" in which France would recognize the independence of
all the Maghreb in exchange for cooperation. Meanwhile, in
October 1956 and November 1957, Morocco and Tunisia proposed their good offices in the Algerian revolution. Later, in
October 1959, Morocco tried alone, and the following year
Tunisia was instrumental in starting the talks that finally led to
Algerian independence.
The year 1958 saw both the birth and the near-death of the
Arab Maghreb movement. During the first week of March,
Mohammed V and Bourguiba formally espoused the idea of a
Maghreb federation. At the same time, the executive committee
of the Istiqlal party met and decided to study means of enforcing
North African solidarity and building a "true union." The implementation of these ideas took place at the flood tide of PanAfricanism; as President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was preparing the first Conference of Independent African States,
North Africa and Egypt both attempted to capture the initiative.
When the Accra Conference was definitely scheduled for the
week of 15 April, the North Africans had no choice but to attend
and to re-schedule their own meeting for the following week.
On 27 April, a four-day conference opened in Tangier, bringing
together the representatives of the Istiqlal and Neo-Destour
parties and the FLN. Resolutions recognized the FLN as the
38
and Algeria teetered between strain and amity over the attitude
to take toward negotiations with the French, the Ejeleh pipeline, and the activities of Algerian troops in Tunisia. After Bourguiba had backed away from the stand adopted in Tangier,
Tunisia and Morocco withdrew ambassadors from each other's
capitals in early 1961 over the Mauritanian question. Most important, the politicians of all three countries used the cry of
North African unity primarily to promote victory in Algeria,
and their silent rivalries heightened as an Algerian settlement
came into view.
Like Tunisian and Moroccan independence, the impending
independence of Algeria created an entirely new situation. If
the FLN was interested in Pan-Maghrebism in order to gain
support for its revolutionary war, its two neighbors used the
same movement to gain the support of a potentially strong and
independent Algeria. In October 1960, Bourguiba, who had
never ceased speaking of an Arab Maghreb, again referred to
the work of the permanent secretariat, and made his stillborn
suggestion of an "organic political union" between Algeria and
Tunisia in order to internationalize the conflict. At Mohammed
V's funeral, on 2 March 1961, newly enthroned Hassan II met
with Bourguiba and Algerian Provisional President Ferhat Abbas
to condone negotiations with France; and a summit conference
of the Maghreb states was called under the pressure of the
Bizerte crisis in July. But the meeting that took place on 23
January 1962 brought together only Hassan II and Abbas' successor, Benyoussef Ben Khedda. The conference created an
interministerial commission of the Arab Maghreb, with three
Algerian members and four Moroccans; it looked to the creation of a United Arab Maghreb; and it reserved all outstanding problems between the countries for diplomatic settlement
after Algerian independence. However, the interministerial commission has never met. Instead, in the summer of 1962, Moroccan troops and officials clashed with Algerian troops over the
ownership of a wide band of frontier territory from Tindouf to
Bechar. On the Algerian side all three members of the commission are out of power, and Premier Ben Bella has refused to
subscribe to any commitments or guarantees.
This last flurry of activity indicates some of the major problems in the construction of the Arab Maghreb. With Algerian
independence, the initiative has shifted to that nation, with its
predominance in size, resources, and dynamism. But it is unlikely
that Algeria "feels" Pan-Maghrebism as deeply as do some
Tunisians or Moroccans. By waiting for Algerian independence
to create the Maghreb, North African leaders gave Algerian
nationalism time to grow strong and, at the same time, removed
the unifying anti-French impetus of Pan-Maghrebism. None of
the present Algerian leaders has ever spoken of the Arab
Maghreb with the fervor of an Allal al-Fassi or the insistence of
a Bourguiba or the logic of an Abdurrahim Bouabid.
Bouabid, former Moroccan Economics Minister and VicePremier and a leader of the activist opposition, National Union
of Popular Forces (UNFP), and his supporters are now the
most articulate spokesmen for the Arab Maghreb. In their view
the basic idea is neither cultural, as it is for al-Fassi, nor political,
as it is for Bourguiba, but economic. To them, North Africa,
confronted with the European Economic Community (Common
Market) will be forced to "specialize in underdevelopment" by
the growing agricultural self-sufficiency of Europe. Alone, none
of the countries can overcome this danger. Together, they can
take rational and self-supporting measures of economic defense.
Bouabid suggests reconversion of agricultural production to reduce imports, reorientation of trade away from dominance by
Europe, nationalization of foreign commerce, and creation of a
common tariff for the whole of the Maghreb. He also proposes
an exchange of resources between an agricultural Morocco and
an Algeria endowed with sources of energy; this proposition has
evoked a favorable echo in some Algerian circles. The resulting
economic union would then gradually become tighter through
the successive steps of confederation and federation until a single
nation would be created. Bouabid and the UNFP have the
advantage of coherence. They have the disadvantage of impotence, for although they are the second largest party in Morocco
their influence as the opposition party under the monarchy is
relatively small.
There are other problems to be met before an Arab Maghreb
can be created. Is it in fact true that a state of 30 million inhabitants has a better chance and greater means of pulling itself
more rapidly out of underdevelopment than a country of four
(or eleven or twelve) million locked up in its political and
economic frontiers? What forces would create an Arab Maghreb?
The UNFP is close in temperament to some forces in Algeria,
but the two are frequently at serious odds with both Hassan II
and Bourguiba. How would the Arab Maghreb be created?
Bourguiba continues to speak of a union of governments and
the UNFP of action by the masses, but Bourguiba's proposal has
met with a deaf ear from the other governments. In November
1962 Ahmed Til of the General Union of Tunisian Workers
announced the imminent revival of plans for a Maghreb Labor
Confederation, but the existing Maghreb labor union secretariat
does not function. Could the Arab Maghreb be formed as long
as Morocco has a king? How would the monarchy fit into a
republican Maghreb? None of these problems is insurmountable,
and all are of a newer nature than those faced by the architects
of the Common Market. But the fact is that an Arab Maghreb
must be created. It will not spring into being from the heritage
of history, or the logic of economics, or the pressure of the
masses. To date, the strongest feeling in the Maghreb is the
feeling of Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan nationalism.
Morocco Irredenta
SINCE THE INDEPENDENCE of Morocco, the irredentist thesis
proclaimed by the president of the Istiqlal party, Allal al-Fassi,
has been a keystone of Moroccan foreign policy. The late King
Mohammed V was gradually won over to this policy, which
would equate the old Islamic notions of community (umma) and
the Imamate with the modem ideas of a sovereign state. The
new King Hassan II has adopted the same slogans with characteristic impetuous vigor.
The territory that has been claimed is four times larger than
present-day Morocco, although it would add less than a million
people to Morocco's 11,600,000 population. Claims against
Spain have involved the Atlantic enclave of Ifni and the
Spanish Sahara (Rio de Oro and Saqiet al-Hamra), as well as
the Mediterranean fortress cities of Ceuta and Melilla, all now
governed as integral parts of Spain. Claims against African
states have included parts of the Algerian Sahara; Mali, north
and west of Timbuctu; and all of Mauritania." In Moroccan
eyes, the Western distinction between de facto and de jure is,
strictly speaking, irrelevant. There is a single united Morocco,
part of which is independent and part of which is not. The superimposition of Spanish government on these territories, or of
independent governments operating within their frontiers, is
regarded as an illegal intrusion which does not alter the legal
position. The Moroccan case is based on two closely interrelated
concepts of law and history.
In a nomadic society such as that from which Muslim legal
ideas spring, the notion of territory is subordinate to the concept
of people. It is the umma that determines the geographic scope
of nations, not the territorial limit of the state or its effective
"The original map appeared in al-Alam (Rabat), 5 July 1956; see also
as-Sahra al-Maghrebi (Rabat), 30 October 1957.
46
position defined by the King, in that the demand for a referendum was dropped under the pretext that "a referendum would
be inadmissible in the province of Casablanca, and Mauritania
is as much a Moroccan province as Casablanca."
After its partial failure in the United Nations, Moroccan
policy found itself both limited and directed by its proclaimed
stand. The first meeting of the Brazzaville powers in Abidjan in
October 1960 supported Mauritania. King Mohammed V then
called the Casablanca Conference of January 1961 to discuss
the Congo and, at the request of Morocco, the Mauritanian
question. In February, "with a heavy heart," Morocco walked
out of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
meeting in Addis Ababa in protest against the presence of
Mauritania. The Moroccan ambassador was recalled from Tunis
in protest against Tunisia's support for Mauritania.
The death of Mohammed V and the ascension of Hassan II
brought a moment of reflection to Moroccan policy-makers. The
new King realized the prison into which Moroccan policy had
been locking itself, although he himself had been instrumental
in dropping the request for a referendum. In mid-1961 the
Moroccan ambassador to Dakar presented Mauritanian President Mokhtar Ould Daddah with an offer of a heads-of-state
meeting and the text of a joint declaration of amity, opening
frontiers and establishing a "fraternal union" that would not
interfere in the sovereignty of the two states. Ould Daddah,
however, insisted on a preliminary public recognition of Mauritanian independence by Hassan II and the possibility of a
diplomatic solution vanished. In 1961, despite Moroccan protests, Mauritania was given United Nations membership. This
formal recognition by a majority of states has put Moroccan
policy in an embarrassing position; the King was committed to
his domestic audience to press the issue. Morocco now unofficially
hopes for a third party to suggest a referendum but does not
believe the right moment has come. Official embarrassment is
heightened by the stand of the opposition, which openly supports
a referendum and castigates the government for continuing to
fight a battle it has lost when other problems are more pressing.
48
49
51
52
p. 16.
and turned
down an invitation to meet with the Brazzaville
20
powers.
54
Conclusions
BEFORE
AN ENUMERATION
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
CHAPTER I
Studies on the Sahara: Robert Capot-Rey, Le Sahara Frangais (Paris:
Presses Univ. de France, 1953); R. J. Harrison Church, West Africa: A
study of the environment and man's use of it, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, 1960); R. Furon, Le Sahara (Paris: Payot, 1959); E. F. Gautier,
Le Sahara (Paris: Payot, 1950); Georg Gerster, Sahara, Desert of Destiny
(New York: Coward-McCann, 1960); Paul Mousset, Ce Sahara qui
voit le jour (Paris: Cit6, 1959); Bruno Verlet, Le Sahara (Paris: PUFQue Sais-je?, 1959); Frangois Vergnaud, Le Sahara (Paris: Seuil-Petite
Planate, 1959).
Historical and anthropological studies: E. W. Bovill, The Golden
Trade of the Moors (London: Oxford, 1958); L. C. Briggs, Tribes of the
Sahara (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960); Robert CapotRey, "Etat actuel du nomadisme au Sahara," Les Probl~mes de la Zone
Aride (Paris: UNESCO, 1962); T. Clauzel, "Evolution de la vie
6conomique et structure sociale du pays nomade du Mali," Tiers-Monde,
Vol. III, Nos. 9-10; J. C. de Graft-Johnson, African Glory (London:
Watts, 1954); Jean Despois, L'Afrique du Nord (Paris: PUF, 1958);
J. D. Fage, An Introduction to the History of West Africa (Cambridge,
Eng.: University Press, 1961); Henri Lhote, The Search for the Tassili
Frescoes (New York: Dutton, 1959); C. B. M. McBumey, The Stone
Age of Northern Africa (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960); Henri Terrasse,
Histoire du Maroc, 2 vols. (Casablanca: Atlantides, 1949-1950); Benjamin
E. Thomas, Trade Routes of Algeria and the Sahara (Berkeley: Univ. of
California, 1957).
CHAPTER II
Oil, gas, and coal: Daniel Durand, La Politque PitrolikreInternationale
(Paris: PUF-Que Sais-je?, 1962); France and Petroleum (New York:
French Embassy Info. Service, Nov. 1961); Industries et Travaux d'OutreMer (Paris), No. 84 (Nov. 1960); Frangois Perroux, ed., Algbie de
demain (Paris: Tiers-Monde, 1962); "La Situation des Houil~res du SudOuest Oranie," OCRS Bulletin (Paris), No. 2 (Feb. 1962), pp. 17-20;
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, The Lamp, periodic reports.
Problems of Arid Lands: Pierre Chouard, La Culture sans sol (Paris:
Maison Rustique, 1959); R. J. Harrison Church, "Problems and Development of the Dry Zone of West Africa," Geographic journal (London),
Vol. 127, No. 2 (June 1961), pp. 187-205; Christine Gamier, Disert
Fertile; Un nouvel dtat, la Mauritanie (Paris: Hachette, 1960); "La
R~publique Islamique de Mauritanie, "L'Information Giographique
(Paris), Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1962), pp. 47-57; Gilbert White,
61
CHAPTER V
Allal al-Fassi, Livre Rouge (Tangier: Perette, n.d.); J. M. Picquin,
"Les Iddes nationalistes marocaines," unpublished thesis, Rabat Law
School, 1960; White Paper on Mauritania (Rabat: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 1960). See also, various issues of al-Istiqlal.