[_CONTENTS

_ _ _ _J

EDITORIAL

FEATURES
5 It's a Systems World - After All
by E.e. Aldridge and N.R. Augustine

20 Decision-Making in a Brigade Command Team:

Integrating Theory and Practice
by COL Ong Yu Lin and LTC Lim Beng Chong

39 The Challenge of Systematic Leadership Development

in the Singapore Armed Forces
by LTC Chan Kim Yin and CPT Psalm Lew

51 The SAF's Experiences In Peace Support Operations

by LTC(Ret) Deep Singh

56 Armed Humanitarian Intervention: An Emerging Issue And Controversy

In Need Of A Consensus
by LTC Soh Star
 CONTENTS.. C OTIt'd

TECHEDGE @
66 Low Cost Virtual Cockpits for Combat Experimentation
by MAl Chia Chien We i

VIEWPOINT
73 Re-Thinking The Political Relevance Of Airpower Transformation
by MAl Christopher Chan

76 Political vs Military Deterrence

by MAl H o Peng Yung

BOOK REVIEW
78 Remembering and Debating The Malayan Campaign
and the Fall of Singapore
by Mr Toh Boon Kioan

FEATURED AUTHOR
83 Henry Frei

PERSONALITY PROFILES
86 World War II North Afric an Theatre: Romm el vs Montgomery

( 2 )
 Decision-Making
in a Brigade Command Team:
Integrating Theory and Practice
by COL Ong Yu Lin and LTC Lim Beng Chong
Humans make decisions, but,
exactly, how do we make decisions?
One school of thought is that humans
adopt an analytical, rational decision-
making process. That is, we first
diagnose the problem, seek relevant
information, identify a number of
options or alternatives, and finally,
make a rational choice among the many
options.
In the military context, where
decisions made by military com-
manders, often have dire consequences
if failed, it is not surprising that military
organizations have invested time and
resources to develop doctrine and
procedures to guide military decision-
making, and train military commanders
to be cognizant with these re-
quirements. These procedures are
logical and prescriptive in nature.
Indeed, the SAF has adopted this
anal ytical perspective for its ba ttle
procedure.
Increasingly, there is awareness
tha t the current set of doctrine and
procedures may not be appropriate
under certain conditions. This growing
uneasiness among many military
20 )
commanders can be attributed to two
reasons. Firstly, military commanders
realize that this is not how they make
decisions in operations. Often they have
to adapt the prescribed procedures to
suit the way they operate. Secondly,
and also more importantly, military
commanders find it hard to follow the
prescribed procedures even if they
want to because of both time pressure
caused by high operational tempo
and high level of uncertainty.
So how do humans make decisions
under time pressure and uncertainty?
In 1985, Gary Klein examined how
firefighters made life and death
decisions under extreme time pressure.
Simply put, they found that experts
use their experience to make rapid
and effective decisions under time
pressure and uncertainty. The field
has come to be known as Naturalistic
Decision-Making (NOM).
We believe insights from NOM can
complement the analytical approach
to decision-making, and ad vance
our understanding of decision-making
in the SAF. Hence, in developing
a preliminary model of decision-
making, we have incorporated many
of the insights gleaned from NDM
research. In addition, as teams are
the basic building blocks of any
military, we see the need to advance
our understanding of decision-making
in a team context. Specifically, for
this article, we discuss decision-making
in the context of a brigade command
team. Integrating insights from both
the NOM and team effectiveness
literature to build a framework for
decision-making in the military, we
believe, is critical. Currently, there is
little integration of the two literature.
Apart from theoretical perspectives,
we see the need to incorporate
experiences of military commanders
into the model building process as
well. This approach is consistent
with the insights from NOM, i.e .,
experts use their experience to make
decisions. Hence, in building a model
of decision-making, we should also
incorporate the experiences of experts;
and the experts are none other than
military commanders!
The objectives of this article are
threefold. First, we articulate a
preliminary model of decision-making
in a team context for the SAP.
This preliminary model can form the
basis for discussions among interested
parties to further improve the utility
of the framework . Second, after
explicating a theoretical framework
of decision-making in a team context,
we use 3rd Singapore Infantry Brigade
(3 SIB) command team as a case study
to illustrate how the framework can
be applied to a brigade command
team. Finally, the implications of the
framework for the SAF in terms of
command team training, leader
development, battle p roce . re - -
human resource (HR) po licies earr.
selection will be discussed.
A Preliminary Model of
Decision-Making in a Team
Context
lnsights from NDM
Klein, in his book Sources of Power:
How People Make Decisions, argued that
in natural settings, the conventional
sources of power (e.g., deductive logical
thinking, analysis of probabilities, and
statistical methods) are not as useful as
"the power of intuition, mental
stimulation,
metaphor, and
story telling."!
He asserts that
intuition allows
individuals to
size up a situa-
tion rapidly,
while mental
stimulation
enables decision
makers to ima-
gine how a course of action might be
carried out. Furthermore, metaphor
enables people to draw on their
experiences to compare the current
situation to a situation that they have
come across. Finally, story telling allows
individuals to consolidate their
experiences for future use. These
experiences are captured as mental
models. The development of mental
models of a specific domain dif-
ferentiates an expert from a novice.
Often, experienced decision makers
are able to carry out their tasks even
when faced with uncertainty due to
inadequate information (i.e., missing,
21 )
ambiguous or unreliable - either due
to errors in transmission or deception
by the adversary). Essentially, their
acquired mental models can fill
the information gaps and enable
them to extract a storyline or pattern
from the inadequate information. In
addition, their mental models also
allow them to focus their attention on
the right set of cues and provide the
right weightage to the selected cues.
Essentially, this is what differentiates
an expert from a novice for a specific
domain.
Experienced decision makers
generate an initial feasible course of
action, mentally simulate the process
and consequences of that action, and if
the simulation suggests that the course
of action will work as desired, they act.
Interestingly, there does not appear to
be a process of comparing different
courses of action, as would be expected
from the traditional decision-making
view. They are able to do this because
of their extensive mental models built
over time. Their experience lets them
see a situation, even a novel one, as an
example of a prototype, so they know
the appropriate course of action im­
mediately. And this first option is often
good enough so they are not bothered
with exploring other options.
Even in cases where the decision
maker actually looks at several options,
he never compares any two of them. He
evaluates each in turn, rejects it, and
moves to the next option. He stops once
he finds one that works. This is called
satisficing - selecting the first option that
works. Satisficing is different from
optimising, which is trying to come up
with the best strategy.
22
lnsights from Team
Effectiveness Literature
When a task is beyond the capability
of an individual, organizations often
rely on teams of individuals who can
work together to accomplish the goals.
Military command teams are one good
example. The combined cognitive and
behavioural capability of a team allows
a team to achieve goals that are
potentially unachievable by an in­
dividual. However, simply putting a
group of people together does not
ensure they will operate as a team.
Teams must be systematically de­
veloped over time.
There are a number of critical team
processes that have been posited by
researchers to affect team effectiveness.
These team processes can be categorised
into affective, behavioural, cognitive
and leader components.
Affective components Individuals
working together often develop a
sense of togetherness and bonding.
This sense of togetherness is important
for the development of some critical
team affective processes such as
team orientation and team trust.
Members of a team that is high on
team orientation tend to have a strong
team identity, believe in a team
approach to achieving goals, believe
in the team's ability in the face of
difficulty, and is highly committed to
their team goals. The trust developed
among team members further bonds
them together.
Behavioural components With the
appropriate team affective processes
as foundation, other more behavioural,
but not le ss critical team processes
can be developed. Two such team
processes are team communication
pa tterns and team self correction
behaviour s. Optimal team com-
munication patterns facilitate an open
flow of constructive information
wi thin the team . In other words,
there is no bottleneck in the information
flow. Dysfunctional team dynamics,
such as those teams without high
levels of te am ori entation or team trust
often inhibit the development of an
open, constructive and responsive
communication patterns. Team self-
correction behaviours include mem-
ber s engaging in mutual and team
performance moni tor ing', demon-
strating back up behaviours (i.e., offer
to help others), willingness and
inclination to both offer and accept help
from others, readiness to provide
feedback and are receptive to feedback,
and engage in effective corrective
actions if necessary.
Cognitive components Researchers
have found that a team mind evolves
over time when a group of individuals
work together. Not only that
members agree on the team task and
work procedures, they are also
cognizant about each other's personal
characteristics (e .g. , strengths and
weaknesses, habits) and the interaction
processes in the team. Defined as" team
members ' shared, organized under-
standing and mental representation of
knowledge about key elements of the
team's relevant environment'", team
mental models have been proposed to
enhance team performance especially
when time is of essence and oppor-
tunities for overt communication and
debate are Iirn ited ." Team mental
models allow team members to
anticipate one another's actions and to
coordinate their behaviours. Another
important team cognitive process is
team situation awareness - a process
by which team members develop
compatible models of teams' internal
and task environment at a given point
in time.
Leader components Finally, as
command teams in the military are
hierarchical, there is no doubt that team
leaders exert a powerful influence on
the cognitive, affective (motivational),
and behavioural aspects of team
processes.! In order to facilitate the
development of all these critical team
processes, the appropriate leadership
being exhibited in the team is
paramount. Without belabouring the
point, we believe that team leaders
exhibi ting more transformational
leadership behaviours will be critical
for the development of such team
processes. Transformational leadership
is often contrasted to transactional
leadership. Transactional leadership is
often depicted as contingent reinforce-
ment; leader-subordinate relationships
based on a series of exchanges or
bargains between them. Transjormaiional
leaders, on the other hand, rise above the
exchange relationships typical of
transactional leadership by developing
intellectually stimulating, and inspiring
subordinates to transcend their own
self-interests for a higher collective
purpose, mission, or vision." Notice
that one consequence of this perspective
is a focus on unit-level interests, beyond
those of the individual person.
Traditionally, especially in the
military, leadership is often conceived
23
as resid ing in one individual. Som eone w ill impact the decision-making process

is "in charge" w hile th e res t are sim ply o f a te am . Hence, it is p aramount

foll ow ers. H ow e ver, recen t views of th at a lead er 's mental model is w ell­

leadersh ip h ave broaden ed to include d eveloped .

the idea that team le ad ers and team

members can share leadership. Th at is,

Proposed Framework
leadersh ip is ro ta ted to the p erson w ith
the key knowledge, skill s, and abilities Deci sion -making is de fined here as
for the p articular issue facing th e team th e manner in which an individual or a
at any giv en m oment.' Indeed, team te am ac ts o n the in fo r ma tio n a n d
research has show n th at less effective elements as perceived in th eir situa tion
teams tend to be dominated by the tea m awareness, an d h ow this in formation
leader, w h ile effective teams di splay interacts wi th th eir more stable mental
more dispersed leadersh ip patterns i.e. models of reality, to make an d arrive at
team le adership. Moreover, rese arch decisions. At the individual level, th e
indicates that teams that h ave tasks that in d iv id ua l bia se s a n d ex per ie nces
are hi ghl y interdependent, requir e a emplo y ed b e com e imp ortant an d
great deal of crea tivity an d are h ighly crucial in the qua lity and sp ee d o f
comple x will d o w ell w i th te am d ecision-m aking . A t the te am le vel,
leadership. human interacti on p atterns an d group
d ynamics will also play an im p or tan t
Another w ay a leader can influence role. As su ch, decision-making processes
the team effe ctiveness is th rough hi s can be seen as transcending four d o­
mental mode ls. What h e know s or does mains - Cognitive, Social, Information and
not know, his biases and inclinations Phy sical (see Table 1).

What is it? How is it related to What is the desired

• Ph ys ical Domain:
Whe re Strike, Protec t an d
Ma noe uvre take pla ce
• Information Domain:
Where information is
created, man ipulated
an d shared
• Social Domain:
Where ind ividu als
in tera ct
• Cognitive Domain:
Where m ental m ode ls,
pe rcep tions, situa tion
awa reness, beliefs and
va lues res ide
decision-making?
Where decision s
are execu ted as actions
Where infor ma tion is put
int o con tex t to facilita te
id entificati on of pa tte rns
Where relationsh ips and
team dynam ics affec t
the process and qua lity
of decision-mak ing
Where dec isions are mad e
endstate?
Th e righ t ac tions at the
right places at the rig h t
tim e
The right inform at ion in
the rig ht forma t at the
right time
The right dissem ina tion
of in tent /vision, and the
rig ht rul es, roles and
rela tionships at the rig ht
time
The right un d erst an d ing
at the right time

Table 1: Domains of Decision-Making.

24 J
 When time permits elaborate
deliberations, the analytical approach to
decision-making is still useful ; however,
under difficult circumstances (e.g., time
pressure, high stakes, inadequate
information, ill defined goals, d ynamic
and uncertain conditions), naturalistic
decision-making process will become
more relevant.
Figure 1 (please refer overleaf)
depicts a preliminary model of decision­
making in a team context. As mentioned
earlier, many of the insights were
gleaned from NDM and team effective­
ne ss literature. In this article, we value­
add by integrating both literature with
military commanders' experiences.
There are perhaps 10 key components
critical to d ecision-making in a team
context: two affective components
(i.e., positive team orientation, high
level of mutual trust), two behavioural
components (i.e., open and constructive
communication patterns, high level of
team self correction), four cognitive
components (i.e., high level of team
situation awareness, accurate/shared
mental models, collective sense making,
collective understanding of command
intent), and leader components (i.e.,
team leadership, leader 's expert m ental
model or experience).
Thi s framework depicts how a team
goes about making deci sions under time
pressure and high level of uncertainty.
The s t a r t state of thi s framework
assumes that the team leader and team
members are experts in their specific
domains, and these experiences are
captured in their individual m ental
models. Their mental model s guide
their information search by focusing
their attention on relevant cues via
situation awareness. At th e same time .
their mental models also facilitate th e
recognition of patterns in the arrays ot
cues and information. Both of these
processes help the expert to size up the
situation quickly. The interplay among
the three processes - sense making,
command intent and mental stimulation
- enables the expert to first determine a
course of action, ev aluate it against the
command intent by mentally simulating
the consequences when that course of
action is executed. If the consequences
cannot fulfil the command intent, the
expert will then seek another course of
action. The judgement process repeats
itself until the expert determines the first
course of action that works (satisficing).
Individually, the team leader and team
members are capable of conducting this
cognitive process at any point in time
during the operation (i.e., individual
cognition). As these experts do not
operat e in isolation, they need to
function as a team. There is another
level of cognition that will be operating
as well - team cognition. At the team
level, the extent to which the team
leader and team members have similar
mental model s (i.e., team mental
models), have a similar perception of the
situ ation (i.e., team situation aware­
ness), have a sh ared understanding of
the situation (i.e., collective sense
making), and have a common under­
standing of command intent, the team
will be able to make swift and quality
decisions.
Like individuals who hav e to
accumulate experience to become
experts, team co gnition takes time
and effort to develop . Moreover,
team cognition can only be developed
when the team develops the fiv e
25
 Collective
Sense
Member n...
Making
Member 3
Member 2
E Member 1
Judgement
Pattern Collective
Recognition Unde rstanding
Men tal
of command
Stimulation
intent

Providing Sense Command

Cues Mak ing Intent

Cognitive
Domain

Depend s o n flow,
representation Social
& management
Domain

Information
Domain

Physical
Domain

Figure 1: A Model of Decision-Makingin a Team Context .

critical team p rocesses in th e socia l
domain of d eci sion-m aking - team
leader ship , te am communic ation,
team se lf correction, mutu al trust,
an d te am orientation. Th e existence of
these key team proce sses w ill facilitate
the d ev elopment an d maintenance
o f the team cognition ov er time .
In other words, we fi rs t de v el op
individual experts, th en de velop th e
n eces sar y team proce sses to tr ans-
fo r m " tea ms of ex perts in to exp ert
teams'" .
Once th e pl anning p rocess is
completed, directives are disseminated
followe d by sy nch roniza tion acti vities
that are then tr an sl at ed in to actions.
These ac ti on s inevitably will effect
environmental ch anges. Changes in
the si tua t io ns are repre sented as
data an d information fo r the con-
s u m p tio n of th e co m m a n d team .
However, the exten t to which a pie ce
of dat a or in fo r ma ti o n a ffect s
team situa tion aware n ess or in div i-
dual si tu a tio n a w a re ne ss d epend s
ve r y mu ch on the r epresent ation s
and flow of th e info rma tion.
The w h o le cy cle then rep e a ts
itse lf. Note th at, individuals ' mental
models may be updated or ma y under-
go refinements after ge ttin g fee d back
fro m the e nviro n m e n ta l cha nges
(i.e., reality check). Hence, the whole
process is very dynamic.
In the next se ction, theor y is put
into p ractice. Usin g 3 SIB as an exa mple,
the first au thor (the n Commander 3 SIB)
shares his first h and exp erience in build-
ing up his command team , in accord-
ance w ith th e depicted framew ork.
Developing Decision-Making
Process in a Brigade Command
Team
IQi@Mi' Vision, Role, Rule, and
Relationship Developing a command
team is a d e liber ate pro ce ss. Th is
section briefly documents the efforts in
build in g up a bri g ade command
team . The build-up comprised tw o
phases. In Ph ase 1, efforts were targeted
at d e vel oping a sha re d v isio n a n d
buil ding te am s tr u ctu res and
relation ships. Th e Vision, Role, Rule
an d Relationship (V3R) team build-
ing program ad voc ated b y Fiel d
Psychologists was ad opted. Within the
bri gad e, a shared vision was developed.
The roles to be played by ea ch member
of the team w ere agreed on . Finally, a
set of rules wa s set to gu ide the work
and intera cti ons o f the t e am. Fo r
ex a mp le, so me of th e rul e s w er e
"Quest ion an d underst and the reas ons
why", "Make it happen", "Don't complain
ab ou t the probl ems - so lve them!" , "If
there are no rul es, invent them", "Who
else ne eds to kn ow an d why". Th ese
effor ts were cons istent w ith building up
the so cial d omain in the framework.
I QiHOfiJ Understand and develop
the thinking process, mental
models, analytical skills of team
members, and the information
management process In thi s phase,
the effor t w as to focu s on building th e
cog nitive d omain of team functioning .
Th e focus was on understanding one
anoth er's thinkin g pro cess, m enta l
mod els and ana lytical skills. The p rocess
started off by analysing the streng th s
and weaknesses of each team m ember
in terms of h is thinking and analytical
r---~
27
skills. This shared understanding of
collective strengths and weaknesses
allowed team members to complement
one another. For this process to work,
mutual trust was critical. From the
onset, members were assured that
these discussions would not be used
for annual ranking purposes. Under-
standing the background of each team
member, their past postings, ex-
periences enabled other team members
to have a better understanding of how
their mental models were shaped and
developed. All these efforts built shared
understanding in the team (i.e., team
mental models). In addition, team
members also agreed on a common
theory of success.
Shared Theory of Success
--- l Quality of
~ RelatiO"Sh'PS~
Quality of 0 ~, Quality of
\}
Actions ~
~
Qualityof P
yCommunication
Understanding
To improve the team communica-
tion process and team situation
awareness, especially under time con-
straint, technology was leveraged on to
enhance information dissemination and
management. The Brigade Command
post used webpages to present/organise
most frequently used information. This
information was just one click away.
These were some of the considera-
tions when designing the brigade
information management process:
28
• Post before Processing
Populate the network with informa-
tion in a timely way to facilitate
parallel processing to achieve speed.
Experience showed tha t 80 % of
informa tion in a product remains
relevant/unchanged/unaffected. Where
possible, new information were posted
and merged with existing knowledge to
produce richer products. Users were
informed/updated of changes by
highlighting what has changed and if
possible why.
• Pull and Push
Pull/push the right information in the
right format to the right persons at the
right time and right place by asking who
else needs to know. Team members were
constantly reminded that information
has no hierarchy even though the
military organisation has.
• Define what information is and
what it is supposed to facilitate
Table 2 was instrumental in helping the
Brigade make sense of the data,
information and knowledge as part of
the information management process.
The brigade 's human intelligence
sensors were trained to report data
accurately and to highlight if
they were reporting da ta or their
interpretations/assessments, in order
not to confuse receivers due to
different experience levels and mental
models. Likewise, as a standard opera-
ting procedure, planners in the HQ
would highlight if they were stating
data or information. To facilitate
processing time, data and analysis were
presented on webpages early so that
team members had access to them
ahead of time. When team members
 Data Information Knowledge
Data organized to Information
DEFINITION Raw Facts show patterns structured for action

CONTENT Events Trends Expertise

FORM Transactions Patterns Learning

INFO TASK Representation Manipulation Codification

HUMAN Observation Jud gement Experience

ELEMENT

ORG INTENT Automation Decision-Making Action

VALUE TEST Building Blocks Uncertainty New Understanding

Reduct ion

Table 2: Making sense of data, information and knowledge

Source: Sensemaking Symposium 23-25 Oct 2001

subsequently came together, dis- Situation Awareness wa s defined as

cussions were focused on what the
event meant, and what the implications
were.
Every effort was also made to
create an open HQ structure to increase
situation awareness and facilitate
information flow. For example,
webpages were used to facilitate
information flow in the command post.
The Fire Support Cell was also moved
from the fringe to the centre of the
command post to enhance awareness
and coordination.
the following:
• Not what is on display but what is
in the head
• Not static but a rich, dynamic com-
prehension of a situation and what
drives it
• Looking beyond data to notice
trends, build expectancies, spot
anomalies and see windows of
opportunities for exploitation
• Good situation awareness also
envisions more than one potential
future and recognises uncertainty as
a key element of the situation

To further develop the team Sensemaking was defined as:

mental models and collective sense-
making ability, there was a common
understanding of what constituted
team situation awareness and sense-
making.
• More than just sharing information
and identifying patterns
• Going beyond what is happening
and what may happen to what can
be done about it

We educated our human intelligence sensors to report data

accurately and to highlight if they were reporting data or their
interpretations/assessments, in order not to confuse receivers
due to different experience level and mental models.

( 29
• Involve generating options, pre-
dicting adversary's actions and
reactions and understanding the
effects of particular courses of actions
This shared understanding of what
constituted team situation awareness
and sensemaking engendered the
development of many team-orientated
behaviours. For example, there were
more backup behaviours; members
were more proactive in pushing
information to the relevant people;
members began to ask new questions;
members began to see how the various
moving parts fit together rather than
piecemeal understanding.
Mission Analysis
CAOS
Develop Analyse and
Operationalise COAs
Issue detailed CPG outlining a vision
of how the battle is shaped and the
possible concepts of operations to
achieve this
- Intent
• Concepts
• Options
Figure 2: Deliberate Planning Process.
The planning process was seen as a
learning process. The purpose was to
create shared mental models or
framework to facilitate discussions and
deliberations. Senge noted that "shared
mental models are important
mechanisms for development of
effective communication strategies and
also increase team performance".
30 )
Before the start of any exercise, there
would be a deliberate planning process,
adapted from Klein's work, as depicted
in Figure 2 below.
As mentioned earlier, the leader
component is critical to the team
effectiveness. Hence, the Commander
was made an integrated planner to
share his experiences and knowledge
instead of functioning as an approver
of plans. Detailed commander planning
guidance (CrG) was meant to provide
possible frameworks for own course of
actions (COAs) and enemy COAs so
that staff can quickly fill in the gaps and
details.
Mental Simulation
Action & Reaction Compile Orders
Wargaming
Develops multiple COAs NOT for
comparision but to understand the
alternatives and the relationships
between them
- Line of Options
- SWOT Analysis of each COA
As the intent of the deliberate
planning phase was to generate op-
tions, the end state was not to develop
multiple COAs for comparison, but to
understand the strengths and weak-
nesses of each option using a strength-
weakness-opportunity-threat (SWOT)
analysis, and to understand the
relationships between the options. These
relationship s were then mapped as
Line s of Options wi th critical battlefield
events as nodes in the lines of options.
This line of options provided shared
ment al models of the v ariou s
poss ibilities of how the b attle can
unfold. This process greatly enhanced
not onl y the team mental models, but
also the collective sense makin g
capability of the team.
Mapping of the relationships also
facilit ated the su p p o r t planners in
working out their su p port plans with
sufficien t flexibilit y and robustness to
support the alternatives. The variety of
alterna tive paths to mission accomplish-
ment was also an indicator of degree of
flexibility. The line of options frame-
work - a creative process stimulated by
collaboration among multiple partici-
pants with differ ent perspective s -
all ow ed the te am to develop it s
cognitiv e domain of team functioning,
as d epicted in the framework.
The experience in the brigade also
showed th at the team did not have to
go th rough a d eliberate sel ection of
eOA process to determine which eOA
to be selected as the plan, but intuitively
each knew which option was the best
Perceived
State
, 1
--... '
"-
"-
"-
"-
Time
"-
Figure 4: Operational Process of Klein's Data-Frame Theory.
' Personal communication between Klein & authors
to be adopted as the plan. Toensure that
all members were informed, the
command er would confirm th at a
certain eOA w as selected, often with
unanimous agr eement.
An example for offensive operations
is shown in Figure 3 overleaf.
The line of options framework wa s
subsequently used in the cond u ct of
operations ph ase. As it captu red
the sh a red understanding o f te am
members, it provided possible frames
to interpret battlefield ev ents as the y
unfold in a seemingly random fashion.
Team members then m ade use of these
frames to in terp ret the event in context
as well as use the event to explain
possible emerging frames or to discard
frames (i.e., collective sensemaking). In
the operations phase, team members
used the line of options to elabo ra te,
qu estion, pre serv e, seek a frame,
reframe or compare frames*, with each
line of options as a possible frame. In
essence, this is an ope rationalisa tion
of Klein 's Data-Fr ame theory. The
process is shown in Figure 4 below.
Thi s pro ces s also en h an ced shared
situation aw areness and sh a red
understanding of th e situ ation.
Transition to
other COAs
.~:-=:~
_
"-
'" '"
( 31 )
 Line of Options
lOa. CAPTURE
STANLEY,
B ZAMBIA AND
WILFRED

1. INSERTION OF 4. HIGHERHQ
HUMINT ELEMENTS TGT
~~~N~~:~tJ
5. CROSS C(COtVlE
MERCURY
(SA BATTLE) 9c. TF100 AND
TF200 ESTB BLKS
6. TGT ALONG
3. INSERTION OF
FORCES AT CAMPHORfDOORS
DISRUPTION FORCE . OR BRUTUS LINE
MDA
7. COMMENCE 9d . TF200TO
INSERTION OF CANDY TO CUT
DEPTH OFF SA FORCES
FORCES

KERS

I LAUNCH OPS I LAUNCH

TF100 & TF 200

PRE-OPS ADVANCE ATTACK

Figure 3: An examplefor offensive operations.

 The line of options facilitated control
of operations in several exercises
participated by 3 SIB as it provides:
• A frame for more rapid recognition
of changes in the battlespace
• Seamless transition to foreclose or
marginalise some options and
maintenance of momentum with-
out need to develop detailed con-
tingency plans
• Foreseeable multiple futures -
building blocks for actions
• Less likelihood of surprise and
dislocation
To further facilitate the diagnosis of
the evolving battle situation, all team
members were asked to constantly
review these four questions:
• Is the situa tion clear or uncertain?
What are the key indicators/
patterns emerging? What are the
implications?
• Is the opera tions proceeding
according to plan? If not, what are
the anomalies? What are the
implications?
• Is the Commander Intent for this
phase and entire operations achiev-
able? If not, what are the alternatives
or adjustments needed? What are the
implications?
• Is the plan still relevant? If not, what
are the alternatives or adjustments
needed? What are the implications?
The team's discussions focused on
interpreting the situation, and the
implications for both enemy and own
forces, and inevitably, a discussion of the
options available using the line of
options.If an event occurred and has not
been considered as a possible line of
options, the team would deliberate on
the possibility of a new frame and
the components of this new line of
options. Experience from past exercises
showed that the team was able to
develop a good shared understanding
of the situation and of the possible
future states.
Active Information Search
The process was supported by
an active search of information during
the planning phase and conduct of
operations phase. It is important to note
that as the team saw the planning
process as a learning process and
accepted that it was an iterative process,
it was inevitable that the team
periodically referenced a previous
product to make improvements as well
as removed parts of the plan, as they
crystallized the problem.
The team also acknowledged that
information was unbounded and
needed to be bounded by our own
operational concepts as well as the
most probable enemy CGA. The
information needed was then derived
and crafted as Essential Elements of
Intelligence (EEl) for the enemy as
well as Blue Critical Information
Required (BCIR) for subordinates to
report the a ttainmen t of critical
battlefield events. These information
requirements were crafted to:
• Facilitate recognition of changes and
emerging patterns which in turn
facilitate the determination of the
current perceived state
• Facilitate interpretation of possible
33 )
 enemy intent with a supporting list
of descriptions of indicators and cues
(which become Specific Information
Requirment - SIRs) to allow us to
foreclose or marginalise options
and thus reducing enemy flexibility
and prevent surprises
• The descriptions of indicators/cues
allowed us to determine possible
options (using the line of options) to
counter emerging threats or exploit
opportunities by disrupting enemy
intent and decision cycles
In cases where the intelligence
agencies were not able to provide a
positive response on the EEl (i.e., no
sightings), it was not to be taken as
a non-event but rather it triggered
further thinking and questions such as
"so what can he be possibly doing?".
Other intelligence agencies were then
redirected to confirm the most likely
alternatives.
lmplications for SAF
There are a number of implications
for SAP.
• Team Training/Field Psychologist
Services
To enhance decision-making in
command teams, it is important that
team training for command teams
should be systematically developed and
conducted. Based on the proposed
framework, efforts should focus on
developing the cognitive and social
domains of a team . Specifically, we
should develop measurement tools to
assess and outline interventions for
developing team mental models, team
situation awareness, team orientation,
34
mutual trust, team self correction, and
team communication. Team building
programs advocated by both field
psychologists from Applied Behav-
ioural Science Department (ABSD), G6
and TRADOC have focused primarily
on enhancing the social domain of team
effectiveness (e.g., V3R framework of
team building). To this end, field
psychologists from ABSD can work
with TRADOC to improve the current
version of the team building program
by augmenting it with measurement
tools and interventions for enhancing
the cognitive domain of team
effecti veness.
Looking ahead, a revised command
team development program may
include three phases: phase 1 - build
the basics through team building,
phase 2 - enable component develop-
ment through PC based simulation,
phase 3 - make further refinements of
the command team operations through
field exercises.
In Phase 1, build team orientation
through building team mental models
(i.e., shared understanding of one
another), and establishing mutual trust.
This effort is similar to the current
team building intervention (i.e., V3R
model) advocated by ABSD field
psychologists. One addition may be to
provide feedback on team leader's team
leadership style so that the leader can
begin to enhance his leadership
effectiveness in a team context.
In Phase 2, team development
should continue to build up the team
mental models, communication patterns,
and team self correction strategies
systematically through scenario based
training. While this team develop-
ment can be done using traditional
field exercises, the use of PC based
simulations for team development is
also advanced in this phase. This is
because PC based simulations (e.g.,
command and conquer) can be easily
customized to simulate various military
scenarios so as to develop certain
aspects of their mental models (i.e.,
experience with different military
scenarios), and critical team processes
(e.g., team mental models, communica-
tion patterns, team leadership,
mechanisms to promote team situation
awareness, collective sensemaking and
collective understanding of command
intent, and team self correction
strategies). All these learning can be
acquired within a shorter time period
and possibly with lesser resources.
Moreover, PC based simulations once
developed, can be used for other
command teams. Not all training
needs to be done in the field . Team
development training can be more
effectively carried out at a simulation
centre, as long as the learning takes
place in the cognitive and social
domains of decision-making . Once
the critical mental models and
team processes have been developed,
then the command team is ready for
phase 3.
In Phase 3, the command team
will be ready for field exercises.
Further refinements would be made to
ensure the decision-making process in
the command team is optimised.
Expertise takes time and effort
to develop . However, in order to
maintain our professional edge,
knowledge management is critical. It
is essential to capture expertise from the
senior commanders and package them
in a useful and meaningful manner for
learning by the junior commanders.
One way is to first identify critical
mili tary scenarios faced by military
commanders in operations . Know-
ledge databases can then be built by
eliciting expertise from experts (i.e.,
senior commanders) on how they go
abou t making decisions in these
scenarios using Cognitive Task Analysis
(CTA) methodology. This newly
acquired knowledge can then be used
to design military scenarios for
command team training.
• Leader Development
Similarly, incorporating scenario
based training into leader development
is critical to build expertise (i.e., expert
mental models). Leaders have a dis-
proportionate influence on decision-
making in the team. As men tioned,
leaders can affect the team process not
only with his leadership style but also
with his mental models (i.e., what he
knows and does not know, and his
biases and inclinations). Klein contends
that "if we can present many situations
an hour, several hours a day, for days
or weeks, we should be able to improve
the trainee's ability to detect familiar
patterns."? If the hypothesis is correct,
leveraging on technology (e.g., PC
based simulation) to deliver scenario
based training may be effective.
• Battle Procedure
There is a need to align the current
IS-step battle procedure to the decision-
35 )
making framework. The objective of
procedures should be to facilitate
human decision-making rather than to
inhibit it . Given that there is now
greater insight into how humans go
about making decisions, battle
procedures should be aligned to
facilitate the naturalistic decision-
making cycle of human decision
makers. Here, the experience of the
brigade command team is again used
as a case study to illustrate the useful-
ness of the proposed framework.
• Human Resource Policies/Team
Selection
Human Resource policy makers
must break away from the traditional
mindset of viewing job postings as
independent decisions for individuals.
They must begin to be more team-
focused and take into consideration
how personnel movement can affect
command team effectiveness. The
objective of personnel movement
should be to retain or build the ideal
command team configuration. Con-
siderations should be given to the make
up of a command team. Personnel
movement should not be piecemeal.
Collective attributes of a command
team must be considered. This would
however require some radical change in
the mindset of the Human Resource
Departments/Personnel Management
Centres.
• Disrupt the Adversary's Decision
Cycles
In order to enhance one's probability
of success, one can enhance one's
decision-making process. On the other
hand, one can also attempt to disrupt
36 )
the adversary's decision cycles.
The framework mentioned here is
equally applicable to the adversary.
Given what we know about the human
decision-making process, military
commanders can attempt to disrupt
the adversary 's decision cycle by
overwhelming him in the physical
domain like what the Americans did in
Operation Iraqi Freedom with superior
firepower. Unlike the Americans, this
option may not be applicable to the
SAF given that we may not have
significant technological advantage
over our adversary. Disrupting the
adversary in the information, social
and cognitive domains of decision-
making may be the strategy to explore.
These are some suggestions.
Cognitive domain We can profile
adversary commanders by under-
standing the adversary's mental
models, values, beliefs, doctrine, and
cultural values and beliefs. Armed with
this information, our military com-
manders can better read the actions of
these adversaries, and subsequently
exploit their cognitive vulnerabilities
(e.g. , biases and heuristics) of these
adversary commanders.
Social domain The effectiveness
of exploiting the vulnerabilities of
the adversary commanders' cognition
can be further enhanced by disrupting
the social domain of the adversary's
decision-making cycle. To do this
effectively profiling the other team
members in the adversary command
team is critical. Based on this profiling,
a team can be postulated in terms of
their communication patterns, level of
trust among members, level of team
orientati on, team mental models, team
situa tion aw areness, existence of team
self corre ction strate gy or adaptability.
Once the adversary team profile can be
identified, vulner abilities and wea k-
n es s es i n th e ir soc ia l dom a in of
decision-making cycle can be targeted
and exploited . The objective is to disrupt
their team dynamics.
Information domain If the streng ths
and limitations o f the ad v er sa ry 's
Comm and and Control Inform ation
Systems (CCIS) an d decision su p p or t
tool s are well underst ood , it will en able
us to attac k the info rmation domain of
the ir d ecision-m aking cy cle. The
adver sary's information domain can be
targeted to disrupt their cognitive an d
social domain. Esse n tially, th e aim is to
sh ape the adversary' s decision-making
by letting him see wh at we wa n t him
to see .
• Leverage on Technology
People first. Technology must be
built to facilitate human funct ioning
and n ot the rever se. Hopefully, th is
fram ewo rk can provide some insigh ts
for decision support tools development
and CCIS.
Conclusion
Re se arch in d ecisi on-m aking
ha s s pa n n e d th re e decad es. Much
more work is n eeded to furth er our
und e rstanding of d e cision-m aking,
especi all y in a tea m context. In thi s
article, a preliminary fram ework of
decisi on-making in a team context has
been put forth, u sing 3 SIB as a case
study to illustrate its utility. We have
also drawn up the imp lications for team
tr ainin g, leader d evelopment, human
reso urce policy, and use of technology
to facilitate human decision-making.
It is our h ope th at thi s article can
engender so me lively discussions and
di alogue on this important top ic. ~
Endnotes
Gary Klein, Source s of Power: How People
Make Decisions (Cam bridge, Massach use tts:
MIT Press , 1998), p3.
McIn tyre, RM., and Salas, E., " Measur ing
an d M an ag ing for Team Pe r for m ance:
Emerging P ri n cipl es fr om Complex En -
viron men ts", in RA . Guzzo, and E.5a las
(eds .), Team Eff ectiveness and Decision
making in Organ izations (Sa n Fr ancisco :
Jossey-Bass, 1995).
Mohamme d, S. and DumviIIe, B.C., "Team
Me n ta l Mo de ls ina Te a m Kno w le dge
F ra m e w ork : Expa n d ing Th e o r y a nd
Meas u re men t a cr oss Di scipli n a r y
Boundarie s ", Journ al Of Organiza tional
Behavior, Vol.22 (2001), p90.
Ma thie u, [.E, H effner, T.S., Goodwin, G.F.,
Sa la s, E.,' & Ca n no n- Bowe rs, J.A ., "The
Influence of Shared Mental Models on Team s
Process and Performance", [ournal Of Applied
PsychologJj, Vol. 85, pp273-283.
Stephen Z ac ca ro, And rea Rittma n, and
Mic heIIe Marks, "Team lea d ersh ip ", The
Leadership Quarterly, Vol.12 (2001), pp45 1-483.
Bern ard Bass, Transformational Leadership:
Industrial, Military and Educational Impact
(New Jersey, Law rence Erlbau m Associates,
1998).
Pearce CL., "Th e Future of Lead er sh ip :
Combining Vertical and Shared Leadership
to Tran sform Kn ow ledge Work", The
Academy Of M anagement Executive VoI.18
No. 1 (2004), p p47-60.
Carol R Paris, Edua rdo Salas, an d Jan is A.
Ca n no n -Bowers, "Teamwork in M u lti-
Person Systems: A Rev iew and Ana lysis ",
Ergonomics Vol.43 No.8, p1052.
Gary Klein, op cit, p30.
37 )
 COL Ong Yu Lin is cu rren tly the Commander of Officer Cadet
School in SAFTI Milit ary In stitute. He is a Gu ards Officer by
training, and has attended the Ro yal Militar y Academ y at
Sandhurst, UK, the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, and
the Au stralian Co mma nd & Staff Co llege . He ha s pr eviousl y held
command app oin tmen ts at the battalion and brigade level s. He
holds a BSc in Physics from the National University of Singa pore,
a Master of Mana geme nt in Defenc e Stud ies from the Univers ity
of Canbe rr a, Au stralia , an d an MBA from the N anya ng Fellow s
Pro gramme at N anyang Busin ess School.

LTC Lim Beng Ch on g, PhD , a Guards Officer, is currently Head

Trai ni ng Psychol ogy Branch, Applied Behavioural Scien ces
Department. He hold s a BSc (Hono ur s) in Psychol ogy from
Uni versity of Nottingha m, MSc in training and develop ment from
Leicest er Uni versity, MA and phD in Industri al an d Occu pation al
Psycholog y from Uni ve rsity of Mar yland .

38